the logical structure of stoic ethics

The Logical Structure of Stoic Ethics

JAREK GRYZ

York University4700 Keele StreetToronto M3J 1P3

Canada

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to reject the classical interpretation of Stoic ethics as virtueethics. The typical assumptions of this interpretation, that virtue is the supreme goodand happiness can be reduced to virtue, are questioned. We first lay out the concep-tual framework of Stoic philosophy and present an outline of their reduction ofhappiness to virtue. The main part of the paper provides an argument for reinterpre-tation of virtue as rationality. In the last part of the paper, which is more speculative,we argue against the possibility of the reduction of happiness to virtue. The mainpoint of the argument is the conceptual incompatibility of the two notions.

I Introduction

This paper is not a historical exegesis of Stoic ethics. We do not attemptto look at all (or even most) of the historical sources and consider allarguments for and against the interpretation proposed here. Indeed, this isunavoidable for anyone who wishes to address ‘Stoicism’ as a single unit.However, we go even further. We place quotations from Chrysippus, Ci-cero, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius on equal footing, without consider-ing the fact that these authors are separated by nearly 500 years as well asdifferences in philosophical allegiances or genres. Our aim is to identify aconsistent thread within otherwise largely inconsistent philosophical theo-ry. We readily admit that the logical structure revealed by this exercise isnot the only interpretation, or even the most plausible, of Stoic ethics.We hope to show, though, that the proposed interpretation is clearly pre-sent throughout the life of Stoicism however sweeping and controversialour claims may be.

apeiron, vol. 45, pp. 221–237©Walter de Gruyter 2012 DOI 10.1515/apeiron-2012-0002

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II Virtue and Happiness

Nature

Stoic metaphysics is a form of pantheism. The universe is permeated byGod (Nature, Zeus, pneuma, logos, order, destiny, creative fire, etc. – allthese notions are used almost equivalently). There is no difference betweenGod and the universe; it is an entity to which both thought and extensioncan be attributed. All things owe their identity to pneuma which, in caseof a human being, is said to constitute the soul. At the same time, how-ever, because it is the same pneuma that pervades all parts of the universe,everything is related to everything, and all things are interdependent. Thelaw of universal causation that naturally follows from this assumption cre-ates typical problems in asserting human freedom and moral responsibility.

For our discussion, the most interesting property of Nature is its nor-mative power. This power is very different from that of the ChristianGod. It Nature does not consist in a one-time establishment of all valuesbut rather in a constant and dynamic display of these within the universe.Its acts are necessarily good and since all events1 are also caused by Nature,then all are good; thus, it is said to be the best of all possible worlds. Insuch metaphysical context, any reference to Nature is meant to draw at-tention to rationality, purposefulness, and the way things should be. More-over, all statements of facts would necessarily involve some evaluative com-ponent, and as such, there is really no difference between ‘is’ and ‘oughtto be’, that is, ethics can be derived from physics.

However, this derivation is not straightforward. The Stoics faced thesame dilemma that, a few centuries later, troubled Christian philosophersas well: the existence of evil.2 The problem has two dimensions. The firstone refers to the presence of pain and suffering in the world: How are weto reconcile God’s benevolence with undeserved sufferings for which we,the humans, are not responsible? The answer given by the Stoics is similarto that offered by Leibniz: evil is not in God’s plan but an unavoidableconsequence of the good things which are; thus, in the long run, it wouldprove to have been useful to the whole.

The evil which occurs in terrible disasters has a principle (logos) peculiar to itself;for in a sense it too occurs in accordance with universal reason and, so to speak, isnot without usefulness in relation to the whole. For without it there could be nogood (Chrysippus, On Nature, quoted by Plutarch, Comm. Not. 1065b, in: Long1968, p. 331).

1 With the exception of those brought about by bad men.2 This problem is discussed in Long (1968).

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We perceive something as evil because our mind lacks the ability to relateit to the whole and realize its necessity in the grand plan. The second kindof evil, the moral evil, has its source within us. Again, two questions arisehere: How can humans be independent agents in the world of completedeterminism? What is the nature of evil? As to the first question, which isonly remotely related to our discussion, it should be sufficient to mentionone solution suggested by the Stoics: man shares the logos with God-Nat-ure, and as such, he can play an active role in the causal network.3 Thesecond problem brings us to our main subject.

Good and Bad

The Stoics list three main criteria, according to which the value of allthings can be given. First, we divide all things into those in our power andthose that are not (Epictetus, Enchiridion 1; Cicero, Tusculan disputationsV. 81–82). Desire, aversion, and creations of our imagination belong tothe first category; whereas our body, other people’s opinions, and our per-sonal possessions are examples of the second. Ours is what no one gave usand no one can take away. Moreover, we cannot make ourselves dependon other people or fortune; we must be able to achieve the good wheneverwe want to. Likewise, evil cannot be imposed on us against our will.

Second, good things have to be stable and lasting (Cicero, Tusculandisputations V. 40–41), which means that what is good cannot cease toexist or even abate. The argument for this condition seems to be the fol-lowing: one who possesses the good is, as we shall see later, happy. It wouldnot be possible if what he had was unstable, because if that was the case,then he would either be in constant fear of losing it or crave for more.With this argument at hand it is easy to reject pleasure and, in fact, mostof the worldly things, as good things. These two conditions constitute ne-cessary criteria, by which to classify something as a good thing. They alsoallow us to separate the subdomain of ethics, which is concerned withgood and bad things, from the rest of it which talks about indifferentthings. The latter category contains life, health, pleasure, beauty, wealth,reputation and so on (Diogenes Laertius 7.101–3 in: Long & Sedley1987), in other words, things that we conventionally regard as good.

The third condition of goodness, which appears to have a form of adefinition, is as follows: good is what accords with Nature; Nature is theultimate source of everything which has value.

3 The problem of freedom, moral responsibility, and determinism in Stoic philosophyis discussed in Long (1968, 1986, 1970/1).

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There is no possible or more appropriate way of approaching the theory of goodand bad things or the virtues or happiness than from universal nature and the ad-ministration of the world (Plutarch, On Stoic Self-contradictions 1035C–D, in: Long& Sedley 1987).

There are two possible ways to understand this statement. The first inter-pretation, already mentioned in the description of Nature, is a form oftheodicy particularly advocated by Marcus Aurelius.

The Whole contains nothing not beneficial to itself … the nature of the universehas this further attribute, that it cannot be compelled by any outside cause to pro-duce something injurious to itself (Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations 10.6).

However, we can also understand the notion of ‘in accordance with Nat-ure’ as ‘representing our natural needs and desires’ (Cicero, On Ends 3, 4;Diogenes Laertius 7, Epictetus, Discourses 1.6.12–22, Clement, Miscellanies2.21.129.4–5 in: Long & Sedley 1987, 63J). Nature sanctions what is goodfor a particular thing (a plant, an animal, or a man) by reference to whatis advantageous to its own end. In order to decide what is good or bad,we only need to look at our own experiences and see what we naturallydesire and despise. If everything that we desired were natural, then wewould have a practical criterion of ‘good’. Unfortunately, it is not the case– most people look for pleasure and none of the Stoics would think of itas natural. The criterion would still be plausible, however, if we had adifferent definition of ‘naturalness’. The nature of man is his rationality,so we can take as natural only the desires that are rational (i.e., directed byreason). However, we have to come to grips with yet another undefinednotion, that of reason and rationality. The Stoics are not very helpful withthis task, because they claim that reason selects what is good and rejectswhat is bad.

… it is its [soul’s] nature to be moved appetitively towards the good (Epictetus,Discourses 3.3.2–4); “What then will be good in them [things to be chosen]?” Justthis being well selected (Seneca, Letters 92.11–13); … the end is reasoning well inselections of things which have value in relation to reasoning well (Plutarch, OnCommon Conceptions, 1072E–F, in: Long & Sedley 1987).

To determine what is good, we need to know what is in accordance withnature, and to determine what is in accordance with nature, we need toknow what is good.4 Let us assume for the sake of argument that we knowwhat ‘good’ means for the Stoics. We now have to provide a link betweenthis notion and the notion of ‘virtue’ on one side and the notion of ‘hap-piness’ on the other. We begin with the former.

4 To break this vicious cycle, one can – as we will – appeal to the notion of oikeiosisand the Stoic idea of moral development.

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Virtue

Virtue is defined as a perfection of human nature, and as such, it is alsodescribed as a perfect reason (Seneca, Letters 76.9–10), a soul which hasbeen fashioned to achieve consistency in the whole of life (Diogenes Laer-tius 7.89 in: Long & Sedley 1987), and the natural perfection of a rationalbeing as a rational being (Diogenes Laertius 7.85–6 in: Long & Sedley1987). All statements describing virtue are clearly designed to account forone crucial property: that it is a necessary and sufficient condition for liv-ing in accordance with Nature. Defined this way, virtue trivially satisfiesthe third criterion of goodness (in accordance with Nature). Let us nowconsider the other two.

There seems to be disagreement among the Stoics (Diogenes Laertius7.127, in: Long & Sedley 1987) as to the stability of virtue. For instance,Cleanthes thought virtue is so secure that it can never be lost, whereasChrysippus claimed that such factors as depression and intoxication mayaffect it. Long suggests that Chrysippus’s position ‘was perhaps no morethan an ad hominem response to the objection that even a wise mancould be the victim of circumstances outside his control’ (Long & Sedley1987, p. 385). In Stoic writings one can also find another more indirectargument for the stability of virtue: when a man is faced with the situa-tion in which his virtue is threatened, suicide becomes the right optionwhen he is lacking necessary conditions to exercise his virtue (Cicero, OnEnds 3.60–1, in: Long & Sedley 1987).

How likely is it for an ordinary man to become a sage, a Stoic ideal ofa perfectly virtuous human being? Is it possible at all for us to reach virtue,and does it bring about happiness? Problems posed by these questionsstem from the claim that there are no intermediate stages between viceand virtue (Diogenes Laertius 7.127 in: Long & Sedley 1987; Plutarch,On moral progress 75C in: Long & Sedley 1987): one is either a saint or avillain, perfectly virtuous or totally wicked. On the other hand the Stoicsheld that all men have natural tendencies to virtue, which can be taughtto anyone (Diogenes Laertius 7.91 in: Long & Sedley 1987). Seneca pre-sents in detail the way such learning proceeds (Seneca, Letters 120.3–5, 8–11 in: Long & Sedley 1987). If this is the case, then we can conclude thatno matter how difficult it is to reach virtue, we are capable of achieving it.Thus, virtue satisfies the first condition of goodness. This concludes theargument that virtue is indeed a good thing.

Nevertheless, we need to establish a stronger thesis stating that virtueis the only good. The Stoics did not bother to prove it; they either simplyasserted that virtue is the only good (Seneca, Letters 76), or presented in-valid arguments to that effect (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations V 21). Theargument is straightforward, though, such that if something is good thenit accords with Nature and so has to be some virtue. As all virtues are the




same (Stobaeus 2.63, 6–24 in: Long & Sedley 1987; Plutarch, On Stoicself-contradictions l046E–F in: Long & Sedley 1987), it is the Virtue. Ofcourse, this argument does not have much force for someone who is notconvinced that the Stoic definition of goodness is very intuitive.

Having set up the link between virtue and goodness, we can now turnto the second link, that between goodness and happiness. We would liketo show that being in possession of all goods is a necessary and sufficientcondition for happiness. First of all, following the tradition of Greek phi-losophy, the Stoics explicitly identify good with benefit (Sextus Empiricus,Against the Professors 11.22–6 in: Long & Sedley 1987). On one hand,they take as indisputable the fact that everyone desires what benefits himand wants what is most advantageous to him. On the other hand, also inaccordance with the Greek tradition, the Stoics understand happinessfunctionally as ‘eudaimonia’, ‘living well’, or ‘the fulfilment of all desires’.It follows immediately that possessing all goods (i.e., having satisfied alldesires) guarantees happiness.5

This counterintuitive conclusion has been discussed at length through-out the history of philosophy. The outright impossibility of this result hasbeen stated by Kant.

The second [i.e., that virtue is the efficient cause of happiness] is, however, alsoimpossible, since every practical connection of causes and effects in the world, as aresult of the determination of the will, is dependent not on the moral intentions ofthe will but on knowledge of natural laws and the physical capacity of using themto its purposes; consequently, no necessary connection, sufficient to the highestgood, between happiness and virtue in the world can be expected from the mostmeticulous observance of the moral law (Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 118).

The problem is, of course, with the Stoic interpretation of almost all ofthe moral concepts: good, happiness, virtue, benefit, and so on. They allcan be, and have been, contested as non-intuitive. To make the Stoicethics more plausible, we propose a reinterpretation of the notion of vir-tue.

5 The Stoics consider this conclusion so trivial that they do not seem to prove it inany orderly way. On the contrary, they exploit this fact extensively to prove, for ex-ample, that something we think is good is not really good. ‘As for the other so-called‘good’ things, it is erroneous to describe or regard them as good, since [it] is perfectlypossible to possess them in abundance and still to be miserable all the same’, (Cicero,Tusculan Disputations V 43). We take note that the sufficiency of goodness for hap-piness is assumed here.

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III Virtue and Rationality

Virtue as Rationality

The possibility of construing virtue as rationality is supported by numer-ous statements in Stoic texts. Thus, virtue is considered to be:

• disposition and power produced by reason and a consistent andsteadfast reason itself (Clem. Alex. Prot. 6.72 (SVF I 202), in: Rist1977, p. 163);

• natural perfection of a rational being as such (Diogenes Laertius7.94, in: Long & Sedley 1987 p. 383);

• expertise concerned with the whole of life (Stobaeus 2.66, 14–67,4 in: Long & Sedley 1987);

• character which is itself consistent, firm, and unchangeable reason(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 440E–441D, in: Long & Sedley1987); and

• disposition of the commanding-faculty (Sextus Empiricus, Againstthe Professors 11.22–6, in: Long & Sedley 1987).

One could combine these statements into a single definition stating thatvirtue is a reason (i.e., steady reasoning or intellectual faculty or disposi-tion), which is consistent with Nature and itself. Before we get into theanalysis of this definition, two additional remarks about the Stoic notionof virtue are necessary. Virtues are usually understood as some admirabletraits of character, and so one can possess many of them. As we have al-ready indicated, this is not the case in Stoic ethics. There is only one vir-tue, an all-compassing disposition by which one chooses what is good andrejects what is evil.6 Second, the concepts of virtue and admirability aretypically meant to be strongly interconnected, even interdefinable. Again,this is not a point of primary concern for the Stoics who would ratherfocus our attention either on the advantages that virtue delivers or oncertain obligations or duties imposed by God-Nature that a virtuous manis following.

There are two points requiring further clarification in the descriptionof virtue as rationality: reason (R) and consistency (C). First and foremostthe Stoics viewed rationality as (R1) a cognitive capacity ‘to see the rela-tionships between things and express them in articulate thoughts’ (Long1986, p. 175); second, (R2) they view it as something that characterizesthe governing principle in mature men. In the Stoic view of human devel-

6 The Stoic notion of virtue is very similar to that described by Aristotle (e.g., in: (Aris-totle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1107a).




opment, innate impulses are, at a certain point, transformed and even-tually taken over by reason. Emerging rationality creates new needs anddesires (whether or not it also removes the old ones is still an open ques-tion). Unfortunately, this reading of rationality (reason as a creator) is notcompatible with the one we are looking for (reason as a good administra-tor).

The notion of consistency – as a property of reason – seems to bemuch more promising for our purposes. It allows two different readings:one (C1), when the Stoics talk about the reason consistent with itself,another (C2) when consistency (accordance) with Nature is considered.Each of these can in turn be understood in two different ways. Reasonconsistent with itself can simply mean (C1.1), i.e., a reason capable of andefficient in correct logical reasoning (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations V 24).The lack of this skill may lead to wrong judgments and, hence, to morallydeplorable acts. According to Epictetus (for example, in the passage dis-cussed later in the paper), this is indeed the main source of moral evil.

Inner consistency of the reason is also a consistency in behaviour(C1.2). Once we recognize our genuine preferences, an act that is guaran-teed by reason’s consistency with Nature, we should pursue firmly thegoals that follow from them and do so constantly and soberly (Cicero,Tusculan Disputations V 81). All kinds of passion and excitement shouldbe avoided, because they distort our vision and can easily divert us fromthe chosen path. Weakness of will is another danger, because even thoughwe know what is good for us, we may lack the inner strength to strive forit.

Consistency with Nature, i.e., self-sufficiency and indifference to theoutside world, is one of the most popular perceptions held by Stoicism(Aurelius, The Meditations VI 16). Both of these features are so importantfor achieving harmony and serenity (hence happiness) in human life thatthe Stoics are not very far from proposing self-deception as the method bywhich to reach them (Aurelius, The Meditations VI 8; Epictetus, Enchiri-dion 4 and 8). The scope of the indifference is not of much concerneither; if needed, it might even include other people (Epictetus, Enchiri-dion 16; Aurelius, The Meditations III 5, V 20, V 36). The Stoics do notadvocate passivism, believing that one remains indifferent to the world ifand only if one cannot change it. The ability to discern the events we caninfluence from those which are independent of our will is deemed an im-portant part of virtuous life; Zeno even insisted that it is necessary for asage to know something of logic and physics as well as of ethics (Rist1969, pp. 71–76).

The Stoic notion of consistency and our modern intuitive notion ofrationality are clearly related. Shall we call rational someone who lacks theability of logical reasoning (C1.1)? Certainly not, because such a personwould never be able to figure out what is best for him. What about passions

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and the weak will (C1.2)? Well, these are outright opposites of rationality.Even the consistency with Nature (C2) can be accommodated into rational-ity, that is, defiance of nature is clearly a sign of irrationality.

We believe that the Stoics would not hesitate to include the modernnotion of rationality in their concept of virtue and treat it as an importantpart of it. However, the identification of the two concepts is not possible.Rationality, as described above, works in the same way as a function inmathematics: it produces an output only when fed with some input (pre-ferences). In comparison, the Stoic notion of virtue, is certainly richerthan that. The main trait of a sage (i.e., a virtuous man) is his constantability to choose rightly, to choose things which are good, reject bad, andnot to strive for indifferent. Such a disposition would not be possiblewithout the knowledge of what is morally good or bad, or, to go one stepfurther, without adopting the right set of preferences. Now, by supple-menting the formal notion of rationality with at least some principle un-derlying those preferences, we can claim that this combination describessatisfactorily the Stoic concept of virtue. The second meaning of consis-tency with Nature (C2), which comes from the Stoic theory of moral de-velopment, may provide exactly such a principle.

Self-interest

The key concept in the development of virtue, and rationality in general, isoikeiosis, which is translated as ‘endearment’, ‘orientation’, or ‘affective rela-tionship’. All creatures are so constituted by Nature that they exhibit thisdisposition from the first day they are born (Diogenes Laertius 7.85–6 inLong & Sedley 1987). The primary object of this disposition is oneself (ananimal or a child). At this stage oikeiosis takes a form of self-concern or, asDiogenes Laertius puts it, self-preservation (i.e., self-protection). An animal(or a child) rejects everything that is harmful and selects everything that isgood for it. As reason develops, the scope of oikeiosis widens, eventually em-bracing all of mankind. A human being is able to recognize now, that virtueand moral conduct is what suits his nature and is, therefore, good for him.

Moral development and the concept of oikeiosis were the topic of thedetailed research conducted by Pembroke (Long 1971, pp. 114–149), In-wood (Inwood 1985, in particular pp. 182–215), and Rist (1977). Theanalyses they provide, although different at some points, are in agreementon one issue: according to the Stoics, the impulse of self-concern remainscentral throughout our life. The developing reason eventually supervenesover that impulse, not as an opponent though, but ‘as the craftsman ofimpulse’ (Diogenes Laertius 7.85–6 in: Long & Sedley 1987). A feeling ofendearment to oneself at different stages of life is sufficient to provide onewith a wider frame of reference, to account for affection that he feels to-




wards other human beings. Even though some of the Stoic statements, forexample, the famous argument by Cicero (Cicero, On Ends 3.62–8 in:Long & Sedley 1987), seem to contrast reason with primary impulse, theyare considered non-representative in the Stoic orthodoxy. Indeed, theStoics admitted explicitly several times that it is something else, ratherthan virtue itself, that is the supreme good and the main principle of mor-al conduct. We present only one of their arguments to that effect andleave the rest of the citations for the Appendix.

In Discourses I 11, Epictetus presents an argument to demonstrate thatall moral judgments are equivalent to logical ones. Epictetus admits thatthere are indeed differences in opinions among different people and cul-tures but they all cannot be right. We obviously need some criterion todecide which of them are right (or according to Nature); this criterionturns out to be logical consistency. However, there also arises the need todetermine how such contradictions can be fixed upon their discovery.Here comes the crucial point in Epictetus’ reasoning: we are naturallyformed to look after our own interest (Epictetus, Discourses I 22), and it isthe nature of every man to seek the good and avoid the bad (Epictetus,Discourses III 3). If we take ‘good’ as simply ‘beneficial’ or ‘advantageous’then this principle is possibly a true statement about human psychology,thus asserting our rationality. Needless to say, Epictetus wants to statemore than that: whatever serves my interest is morally right or good, espe-cially since whatever is natural is positively value-loaded. This is not aprinciple of indiscriminate egoism though: ‘He [god] has made the natureof rational animal such that it cannot obtain anyone of its proper inter-ests, if it does not contribute something to the common interest’ (Epicte-tus, Discourses I 19). This connection between individual and commoninterest is stressed – through various arguments – by all Stoics.

Here is yet another example from Discourses showing that deplorabledeeds are, in fact, mistakes of rationality: ‘For what does the thief wish todo? That, which is for his own interest. If then, theft is not for his inter-est, he does not do that which he wishes. But every rational soul is bynature offended at contradiction. (…) For if anyone shall show this [thatis, a contradiction consisting in not doing what one wishes], a man willhimself withdraw from that which he does’ (Epictetus, Discourses II 26). Itis obvious that Epictetus clearly understands contradiction here, i.e., doingsomething which is not in one’s best interest, as a mistake of rationality.

Rationality Elevated

There is certainly some discrepancy between claims: ‘We are naturallyequipped to look after our own interest’ and ‘It is natural to pursue virtuefor its own sake’. This tension in Stoic writings did not pass unnoticed.

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On one hand, Long calls Stoic ethics a hybrid of Bentham and Kant(Long 1970/71 p.95), but claims that its consistency can still be saved.Rist (Rist 1977, p. 165), on the other hand, seems to abandon altogetherthe standard interpretation of Stoic ethics with the following comment:‘It is only when a man recognizes where his genuine self-interest lies thathe is capable of being “moral” and of recognizing “moral” facts’.

The last statement suggests an interpretation of the Stoic ethics thatwe would like to propose here. Instead of saying that what we have here isan example of virtue ethics, we can maintain that, rather, it is rationalitythat plays the central role in this theory. The schema of reduction that weare suggesting has a shape of a triangle,with happiness and virtue as thebottom vertices and rationality as the top one. Both happiness and virtueare reduced to rationality, which is the basic notion of the theory (henceits supreme position). The first of these reductions (or rather elevation, asrationality is ‘higher’ than happiness) seems to be quite plausible and cer-tainly more so than the elevation of happiness to virtue. The second one,that of virtue to rationality is – at least in a general sense – more proble-matic. The logical possibility of deriving morality from rationality has beenexplored in a previous work,7 and we hope to have shown that such deri-vation can be traced in Stoic texts. We also believe that retaining most ofthe intuitive meaning of virtue is the best way of saving the consistency ofthe Stoic theory.

According to this interpretation of Stoic ethics, happiness cannot bereduced, or elevated to virtue; specifically, the relation of conceptual reduc-tion maybe transitive, but it certainly is not symmetric. We do not thinkthis is much of a problem. Given that both happiness and virtue can beexplained in terms of rationality, then the most important of the Stoicclaims (i.e., that about the sufficiency of virtue for happiness) can be re-tained. By mediating these two notions with rationality, the previouslyvery unintuitive thesis gains in plausibility.

The last word of this argument is an appeal to intuitions. If the Stoicsage were an embodiment of virtue, we would have admired him. In rea-lity, however, we do not. We might just envy him.

7 See, e.g., Gauthier (1967) or Railton (1986). Strictly speaking, it was morality andmoral norms that were defined there in terms of rationality. However, if we takevirtue, as the Stoics did, to be a disposition to follow those norms, then we simplyneed an extra step to reduce virtue to rationality.




IV The Moral Life and the Good Life

The Stoic notions of virtue and happiness and the relationship betweenthem seem counterintuitive to many people. Let us look briefly again atthe Stoic reasoning. We do so not to provide a logical reconstruction thistime, but rather to reveal the philosophical motivation behind it.

The core question of ancient ethics can be briefly stated as follows:‘What constitutes good life, what is happiness?’ Any attempt to answerthis question involves immediately an additional problem – that of a rela-tion between happiness and virtue. Even for ancient Greeks, these twonotions were not coextensive, so the Stoic decision to reduce one to an-other required a comprehensive argument. The main idea of the argumentwas to redefine virtue and happiness in such a way that the former wouldbe part of the latter. Thus, happiness was taken to be inner equilibrium,peace of mind, or indifference to the outside world. Virtue, probably notonly for the Stoics but for most of the ancient philosophers, was supposedto provide this psychological harmony. This last assumption is the one wewant to dispute. Particularly, we argue that virtue does not and, in fact,should not be a source of harmony or peace of mind in moral behaviour.

The accordance with Nature that the Stoics so fondly discussed isnothing else than a perfect obedience to a set of moral rules which a sageis somehow able to discover as ‘the right ones’. Once properly recognized,the rules are set – after all they are Nature’s, not our creation and as suchcould not be questioned or doubted.8 The Stoic sage is infallible; he knowswhat should be done in every situation of life and takes the right steps atthe right time. His attitude towards others is very restrained, and he actsas required by Nature but without reaching the point beyond which hisinternal peace could be destroyed.9 Life is a game (Epictetus, Discourses XI5) and all that is required from us is to follow its rules. The precision andcertainty of these rules, the ease with which one could make moral deci-sions (logic proved sufficient there), and, perhaps, the awareness of one’sown perfection guaranteed peace of mind and, in effect, happiness.

There is something unappealing about the Stoic ideal of moral lifeand the concept of virtue that is based on it. It is hard to accept the claimthat moral life is a game where there is always a rule telling us what moveto make and that its goal is to achieve one’s own perfection. Indeed, onecannot, and perhaps should not, expect virtue to give us satisfaction and

8 ‘… the Stoics distrust ‘pathological’ virtue, virtue based on feeling. They ask for virtuethat is based on principle’ (Edelstein 1968, p. 2).

9 ‘When you see a person weeping in sorrow … do not be unwilling to show him sym-pathy … but take care that you do not lament internally also’ (Epictetus, Enchiridion16).

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contentment. We want to defend the last claim since its acceptance de-prives the Stoics of the crucial link for their intended elevation.

The weaker claim, namely, that the ‘correct’ moral behaviour does notprovide us with contentment (this is just a statement of the fact, not anorm which we propose) can be proven very easily; choices between con-flicting values provide an obvious example. The Stoics, however, wouldprobably reject this argument, saying that anyone who has doubts abouthis or her moral choices has not yet reached the level of wisdom reservedfor the ‘real’ virtue; if she did, she would have known that her choice isright and this certitude would guarantee her peace of mind. It is necessary,therefore, to propose a stronger, normative thesis: all our moral choices(right or wrong) ought to involve a certain level of anxiety, discomfort,and even guilty conscience.

The key assumption that the Stoics must make in order to defendtheir derivation of happiness from virtue is the existence of the completeset of hierarchically ordered norms that are applicable to any moral situa-tion and, therefore, capable of providing a definite answer to any moralquestion. Only then can the sage be certain that his moral choices areuniversally correct, providing him with contentment and, ultimately, hap-piness. For the Stoics, the existence of such norms follows trivially fromtheir concept of Nature endowed with normative power. However, with-out the underlying metaphysics, these norms have no grounding. Manyphilosophical arguments have been proposed in the past against the claimthat such strict, hierarchical, unconditional, and universal norms do exist.Rather than reiterating this philosophical discussion here, we point out afew obvious difficulties.

If a moral code is to be useful in solving moral dilemmas, it has totreat values as comparable and strictly hierarchic. Yet, we all often noticethat moral values cannot be compared against each other and placed in ahierarchy to determine which is higher or lower. The homogeneity of va-lues can be defended on philosophical grounds only by appealing to ahigher source (Nature, God) and is as compelling as the underlying meta-physics.

Values and norms are not symmetric, and even though every value is asource of some norm, the opposite is not true, that is, we can say thatsome action should be undertaken even without considering it to be agood thing. If a burglar threatens your life and there is no other way tostop him except to kill him, then one may do so even though killing ismorally not a good thing.10

10 Ross (1968) discusses a related case, wherein someone can fulfill his duty and stillend up doing something bad.




The specificity of moral norms, as opposed to other norms, is some-times taken to consist in their inseparability from personal pronoun ‘I’.From the fact that I should do something, it does not follow that you, he,or they ought to do the same in the same situation. From my belief that Ishould risk my life to save someone else, no general norm to that effectcan be derived. Even though the Stoics often mentioned the possibility ofsacrifice as part of the virtuous life, this idea simply does not fit into theirsystem. The Stoic sage does not follow his feelings, but the voice of logoswhich is shared by every sage. Thus, the unique personal character of anact of sacrifice, along with the very fact that someone does what we donot expect him to do, are lost.

If a complete, homogeneous system of moral rules does not exist, thenself-contentment and peace of mind cannot be a part of a virtuous life.Every moral situation, no matter how similar to the one encountered inthe past, has to be evaluated all over again. There are no exact replicas ofmoral choices, because there are no rules independent of the circumstancesin which they are applied. One should be constantly aware that all hisdecisions are good only to some extent, that is, by choosing what is ‘better’one must often choose evil. A certain level of anxiety helps us rememberother options available in similar situations, and this does not let our mor-al intuitions ossify and remain blind to changing circumstances. Last butnot least, keeping conscience in constant uncertainty fosters tolerance forthe choices made by other people in similar circumstances. If we do notbelieve in our own moral infallibility, then we are reluctant to condemnothers. The history of mankind is populated by ‘saints’ perfectly satisfiedwith their own moral standing, breathing fanaticism, hypocrisy, and intol-erance.

V Conclusions

Stoic moral theory was probably the first and only attempt in the historyof philosophy to found the notion of good life on virtue alone. In thispaper, we hope to have shown that the Stoics not only failed to provetheir point, but that such reduction is, in principle, impossible. The no-tions of good life (happiness) and moral life (virtue) seem to belong totwo different and incompatible orders, and the gap between them cannotbe bridged without a substantial distortion of their intuitive meanings. In-deed, happiness that lacks worldly pleasures is good for gods, not humans;virtue as gratifying game cannot be taught to responsible moral agents inan imperfect world.

The Stoics faced, as everyone else would in their position, an insolva-ble dilemma. They wanted virtue to be pursued for its own sake and, atthe same time, exalted its benefits. By showing the sufficiency of virtue for

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happiness they tried (intentionally or not) to motivate its pursuit. How-ever, if one provides reasons for doing something and claims at the sametime that it should be sought for its own sake (i.e., not for any otherreason), then he is saying something inconsistent. Long’s solution (Long1970/71, pp. 95–6), which dismisses these motivational concerns, seems tobe a way out of this dilemma; however, it is an artificial one. One canmaintain that virtue ought to be followed and that it is advantageouswithout committing oneself to the motivational entailment only if onedenies the rationality of an agent. If something is advantageous, then –everything else being equal – it is rational to pursue it, and it is thenpursued because it is advantageous.

It took a few more centuries before Kant delivered an argument forthe separation of virtue and happiness. Even if we do not accept his diag-nosis, we tend to agree that there is something incompatible about thesenotions – something that also restrains us from accepting naturalistic ac-counts of virtue and morality. Let the conclusion of this paper be a callfor a qualified return to Kant.

Appendix

Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations

III 6: If you mean to your advantage as a reasonable being, give heed to it,but if you mean to your advantage as an animal, say so, and keep to yourdecision without vanity.

V 1: You do not love yourself. If you did, you would certainly love yourown nature and its purpose.

V 9: But consider whether there is not more delight to be found in high-mindedness, freedom, simplicity, and piety. What gives more delight thanwisdom itself (…)

XI 4: Have I done something for the common good? Then it has been tomy advantage. This thought you must always keep before you, and nevergive up.

Cicero, On Moral Obligation

III 4.17: Therefore, true goodness should never come into conflict withexpediency.

III 5.22: It is quite in accordance with nature for each man to be moreeager to acquire the necessities of life for himself than to provide for an-other.




III 8.35: It is impossible to be unaffected whenever any apparent advan-tage presents itself; but if on taking a closer look you find that the appar-ent advantage contains moral wrong, then your duty is not so much toreject what is expedient, but to realize that where there is wrong, therecannot be expediency.

III 10.42 [quotation from Chrysippus]: … so in life it is right that eachman should promote his own interests, provided that he does not defraudanyone else.

III 28.101: Indeed we all pursue what is to our advantage…

Epictetus, Enchiridion

XXXI: For where the useful (your interest) is, there also piety is.

Bibliography

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