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C L A Y T O N K . S . C H U N

RAID

THE LAST BOARDING PART Y

The USMC and the SS Mayaguez 1975

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

THE LAST BOARDING PART Y

The USMC and the SS Mayaguez 1975

C L A Y T O N K . S . C H U N


CONTENTSINTRODUCTION 4Southeast Asia in turmoil 4

America charts a new path 7

A powder keg in the Gulf of Thailand 8

ORIGINS 9“Mayday” 10

INITIAL STRATEGY 11“What are our options?” 14

“This is not an easy operation” 19

Intelligence: The key to planning 21

America: Limited forces, limited options 23

THE PLAN 24Operational concept 25

Conflicting priorities 28

Taking Koh Tang 30

Attacking the mainland 33

Command, control, and communications 35

THE RAID 38The Khmer Rouge take action 38

America responds 41

Recovering the Mayaguez: “Marines over the side” 42

Green Lizards, Fighting Redcocks, and Mighty Shrikes go to war 46

Koh Tang: A costly initial assault 48

The second wave 61

The rescuers need rescue 64

ANALYSIS 71The Mayaguez’s legacy 71

National leaders and the future 74

CONCLUSION 76

BIBLIOGRAPHY 78

INDEX 80


INTRODUCTION The Vietnam War was one of the most divisive conflicts in American history.After more than a decade of involvement in South Vietnam, Washingtonnegotiated a peace with Hanoi in 1973. US combat operations officiallyended on January 28, 1973, when a ceasefire took effect. The United States’military disengagement in other Southeast Asian nations, however, wouldtake longer. Washington officially stopped bombing in Laos on February 21,but continued authorizing sorties until April 17. On August 15, the lastmilitary combat sorties over Cambodian skies concluded the US war. Yetdespite massive aid and some political support by Washington, Saigon stillfell in 1975. Laos and Cambodia turned into communist states.

These actions seemed to confirm fears of a regional communist takeover,apparently proving the “domino theory” first advanced in the 1950s. Oneof the few Southeast Asian nations that seemed to escape revolution wasThailand, but its government was nevertheless changing. Although a shadowof its former self, the only sizeable American military presence in the regionwas in Thailand and the Philippines. Despite a calm exterior, elements withinBangkok wanted to expel the US Air Force (USAF) units stationedthroughout the country.

Southeast Asia in turmoil During the Vietnam War, North Vietnam had largely moved from aninsurgency to a conventional war to overthrow the Saigon government by1975, and now had designs on other neighboring states. The Laotian andCambodian governments, meanwhile, faced counter-revolutionarymovements. Both governments had been, at times, willing to acceptAmerican aid in exchange for their support in fighting a secret war againstthe North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC). With Washingtonpulling out of South Vietnam, however, the administrations started tocrumble. The Laotian leadership, without massive American aid andbombing support, suffered continuing setbacks against communist PathetLao and NVA units bent on the government’s overthrow. Laos was valuable

4© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

to the North Vietnamese as an indirect route to South Vietnam. A ceasefireon February 22, 1973, allowed the communists to control wide areas of thecountryside, and although a coalition government was formed under PrinceSouvanna Phouma, the Pathet Lao continued to consolidate its power.Eventually Laos fell to the communists in December 1975.

In Cambodia, Defense Minister General Lon Nol, sympathetic toAmerican foreign and military aims, had clashed with head of state PrinceNorodom Sihanouk over national policies, including the prince’s complaintsabout American and South Vietnamese border incursions, bombings, and aid. US and South Vietnamese forces had briefly invaded Cambodia in late April1970 to oust Vietnamese troops and destroy supplies in the border area withSouth Vietnam. These differences strained relations between Washington andPhnom Penh, and in 1970 Lon Nol launched a coup, forcing Sihanouk toabdicate. His assumption of power sparked a war with the Khmer Rouge,Cambodian communists supported by the North Vietnamese and Chinese.He would eventually leave office, but later return to power in 1972, when hesuspended the constitution. Lon Nol announced a ceasefire on January 29,1973, but it never took hold. Khmer Rouge, NVA, and VC forces controlledrural Cambodia, and they had bottled up Lon Nol’s forces in the cities.

Phnom Penh relied heavily on American airpower and support to survive.Khmer Rouge forces, with support from Sihanouk, continued to fight on.They started to surround Phnom Penh, shutting down the Mekong Riveraccess and shelling and rocketing Pochentong Airport, the major airfield nearPhnom Penh. Despite American air-delivered aid, it was not enough to stemthe tide. Lon Nol abdicated and left for Hawaii, and the Khmer Rouge tookover the country in April 1975.

The leader of the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot, did not allow Sihanouk to returnto power. Instead, he began a process aimed at rebuilding Cambodia into aself-reliant, agrarian state. He also carried out mass executions among thenation’s business owners, political opposition, government employees,Buddhist monks, and various ethnic groups, including Vietnamese andChinese. Pol Pot also continued the border disputes with Vietnam andThailand to demonstrate his resolve for maintaining Cambodian sovereignty.Cambodian military forces began to occupy disputed islands in the Gulf ofThailand. The Khmer Rouge also wanted to extend their territory to offshorewaters. Foreign embassies and citizens were not immune to this onslaught.Pol Pot’s regime told foreigners to leave and, in some cases, forcibly removedthem from Cambodia. These actions not only demonstrated Pol Pot’sxenophobic nature, but a vicious character.

American National Security Agency (NSA) signal intercepts became themost reliable information source available on Khmer Rouge activities.President Gerald Ford’s administration started receiving NSA signalsintelligence, that indicated that the Khmer Rouge had initiated massexecutions, re-education efforts, forced relocations, retribution actions, andfamily separations “on an unbelievable scale.” Within the White House,speculation ran rampant on why the new Cambodian government had takenthese paths.

Introduction

5

end of US combatops in Vietnam

JANUARY 281973


6

The Last Boarding Party – The USMC and the SS Mayaguez 1975

Future relations between Phnom Penh, Washington and other nationsseemed bleak. Cambodia’s aggressive border behavior and willingness toexecute its own people had the potential to cause more conflict withinSoutheast Asia. Fortunately, for Washington, the United States had largelywithdrawn from the region. The only major American military presence inmainland Southeast Asia was in Thailand.

The Thai government had allowed American airpower to conduct bomber,fighter, reconnaissance, and tanker operations throughout the region virtuallyunconstrained. Bangkok stood by for years as F-105s and later B-52s and F-111s hammered Hanoi. This situation was changing, however. Communistrevolutionary forces had tumbled Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, so Thailandcould be next. Bangkok did not want to upset her neighbors unduly and bringa communist insurgency within Thailand. The United States had several air

The United States had removed all of its combat unitsfrom the Republic of Vietnam well before 1975.Although Washington had supported Saigon withequipment and money, the US Congress had reduced aidto South Vietnam as the nation focused on other issues.Hanoi still looked south as it saw the American public’sinterest in Southeast Asia rapidly waning. NorthVietnamese and VC forces had already failed to conquerSouth Vietnam during the 1968 Tet Offensive, andSaigon turned back Hanoi’s conventional invasion in the1972 Easter Offensive. By 1975, however, Saigon couldnot rely on massive American airpower or militaryresupply to stem another northern invasion. NorthVietnamese divisions streamed south and pushed asideSouth Vietnamese units. Ford tried to get a $300 millionaid package to Saigon, but the Congress refused to passit. The Republic of Vietnam’s days were numbered.

Phouc Binh, a provincial capital, fell on January 6,1975. North Vietnam took Ban Me Thuot, a key city in the central highlands, in March. South VietnameseArmy units fled to the coast. South Vietnam’s PresidentNguyen Van Thieu decided to abandon much of thehighlands and concentrate on defending major cities,but Hue fell on March 26. Two days later, NVA forcestook South Vietnam’s second largest city, Da Nang.Saigon was next.

Events escalated. On April 1, Cambodian President LonNol exited the country, and American forces executedOperation Eagle Pull to extract all American personnelfrom Phnom Penh on April 16. Some South Vietnameseforces started to switch sides; two South Vietnamese Air

Force F-5Es dropped bombs on the Presidential Palaceon April 8. South Vietnamese Army units deserted andthrew away their uniforms as the North Vietnamesesurrounded Saigon. Thieu resigned on April 21. A weeklater, the American embassy prepared landing zones for the coming helicopter evacuation.

South Vietnamese citizens had already started leavingthe country by boat and plane well before April. The US government had helped 160,000 refugees fleethe country. Many of these refugees fled by boat andentered camps throughout Asia. Tens of thousands ofthem eventually entered the United States. In earlyApril, USAF C-5As had started Operation Baby Lift totransport infants, some of them orphans, out of thecountry. One C-5A crashed, killing 206 people, 172 of whom were children. Some alleged that a NorthVietnamese SA-7 shot down the plane.

American Navy, Marine Corps, and USAF helicoptersstarted the evacuation from the American embassy onApril 28 under Operation Frequent Wind. USAF C-141 andC-130 aircraft also took people out of the country fromTan Son Nhut Air Base. Three South Vietnamese Air ForceA-37s attacked the airfield and flew north. UH-1, CH-53,HH-53, and CH-46 helicopters, some participants of theCambodian evacuation, pulled out 1,373 Americans,6,422 foreign nationals, and the 989-strong marinesecurity detachment. Two marines died and lossesincluded three aircraft during the operation. On April29, the end came. The last Americans destroyedequipment and documents at Tan Son Nhut andAmbassador Graham Martin left the embassy that day.

THE FALL OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND OPERATION FREQUENT WIND


7

President Gerald Ford

assumed the presidency

after Richard Nixon’s

resignation. The Mayaguez

incident was his first foreign

policy crisis. Ford was

anxious to avoid a long

negotiated settlement if

Phnom Penh decided to

hold the crew hostage.

He wanted a swift

resolution that included

possible military action.

(US Air Force)

Introduction

bases that maintained strategic bombers, tactical fighters, and specialoperations aircraft and helicopters. Although Washington did not have majorground forces in Thailand, its air and naval forces had the capability toconduct limited attacks on Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.

Thailand was also concerned about border incursions. Disputes aboutborder locations, the ownership of islands, or land areas had plaguedSoutheast Asia for decades. Criminal activities took advantage of thesedisputes to operate drug smuggling or piracy operations. The VC and NVAhad used the borders between Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to operate theHo Chi Minh trail, transporting supplies, arms, and troops into SouthVietnam. By 1975, opposing sides moves across borders to support regionalrevolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements. Counter-revolutionaryforces, for example, operated in southern and northeastern Thailand againstthe Khmer Rouge. Their activities spawned small cross-border attacks byCambodia, supported by Vietnam and China. Another issue heighteningtensions was the flood of refugees streaming across the Thai border.

America charts a new path In the second half of the 1970s, the United States was trying to forget aboutVietnam and move on. Washington had started advising the SouthVietnamese in 1961, but left after years of combat that resulted in 58,193American deaths. By early 1975, observers witnessed South Vietnamesedefenses crumble as the North Vietnamese pushed south. Without Americanmilitary firepower and aid, Saigon was ready to fall. America had “lost” itsfirst war, which ended with a massive helicopter and ship evacuation that puta stain on national honor.

The American public would not support any move to stem furthercommunist expansion in Southeast Asia. To limit further Americaninvolvement in the region, the Congress started to restrain the power of thepresidency. The Cooper-Church Amendment, passed in the Senate on June19, 1973, restricted the nation from providing any funds to finance Americanmilitary operations in Southeast Asia, unlessauthorized by Congress. This amendmentundermined any perception that the United Stateswould aid South Vietnam or other nation if itcame under attack by a communist movement.

The Vietnam War had taken place in thecontext of a wider conflict, the Cold War. Sincethe end of World War II, the United States andthe free world were in a state of continualconflict with the Soviet Union and the WarsawPact. The Nixon administration had tried todefuse tensions with its communist rivals, yetthe United States still faced a huge arsenal ofnuclear weapons aimed at it. The North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) faced the Sovietmilitary on the German border. Armed proxies


8

waged a war representing East and West, and Soviet-backed Arab statesfought American-armed Israel. Marxist-led revolutionary movementssprouted throughout Latin America, Asia, and Africa. One of the hottestspots in the world was the border between North and South Korea, twocountries technically still at war. Fortunately, the People’s Republic of China(PRC) and America were trying to normalize relations after years of silence.Yet Washington was still unsure of its future path. American military forcesaround the world stood on alert to respond to any conflict, from aninsurgency to global nuclear war. Demonstrating American military powerwas deemed as crucial to deter any future enemies.

The US government faced another challenge. Years of civil strife andprotests over the Vietnam War had changed America’s outlook on the world.Within a few years, the optimism of the Kennedy administration’sinternationalism disintegrated into insularity. Congress and the public wereskeptical of any foreign adventure. Gerald Ford had inherited a country thatwas cynical about the government, especially after revelations about theTonkin Gulf incident, the release of the Pentagon Papers, Watergate, andother issues. Given the mood of the nation, other powers wondered ifWashington could act decisively.

A powder keg in the Gulf of Thailand The Gulf of Thailand did not seem to be an area of potential conflict to mostAmericans. After all, the reason for the war in Southeast Asia – saving theRepublic of Vietnam – no longer existed. Trade ships plied the tranquil waters,but a new government, old rivalries, and plenty of weapons did not mix well.Under Lon Nol, the United States provided not only bombing sorties againstthe Khmer Rouge, but massive military and economic aid. After Cambodia’sfall, the communist insurgents now had access to American military suppliesin the form of aircraft, small arms, and naval craft. Pol Pot had the ability toexpand his power across Cambodia’s borders. The Khmer Rouge had the willand ability to launch a wide range of outrages. The Americans had left theregion and it appeared they would not return for any reason; American militaryforces had returned to a training status throughout the Pacific.

Ship seizures, however, began to occur throughout the Gulf of Thailand, asCambodian communists started to exert their new power in the region. TheWhite House and other government agencies did not receive reports of anyAmerican ships attacked, however, so the government agencies did not issueimmediate mariners’ warnings to the public or interested parties. Yet theattacks were growing in frequency, and included international commercialships.

The seeming end of the Vietnam War in May 1975 was an illusion. A return to conflict in Southeast Asia began on a sunny afternoon south ofthe Cambodian mainland. Soon, world newspapers announced the captureand detainment of an American container ship. Inevitably, American militaryactions swiftly followed.


Cambodianpresident Lon Nol

flees country

APRIL 11975


ORIGINS Long-simmering territorial disputes, control of potential oil deposits, andconcerns about American-supported insurgents had pushed the newcommunist government in Phnom Penh to defend its oceanic sovereigntyaround Cambodia. Nations in the region had a history of geographicaldisputes that made relations contentious for decades. Some of these issuesarose after France withdrew from her colonies in Indochina, resulting in theindependence of Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam. For several years,Phnom Penh sparred over borders shared with South Vietnam, Thailand,and Laos. In the Gulf of Thailand, ongoing questions regarding undefinedmaritime boundaries and ownership of several islands led to problems,including armed confrontations between South Vietnam and Thailand.

Pol Pot’s rise to power did not alter Cambodia’s border problems. KhmerRouge forces, despite recently taking control of Cambodia, were still tryingto assert sovereignty over several islands, including Poulo Wai, Hon Panjang,and Dao Phu Quoc. Cambodian soldiers had raided Dao Phu Quoc, forexample, on May 1, 1975, to demonstrate the government’s seriousness overthis issue. The boundary problems were not only about national honor, butalso control over a more substantive resource – petroleum. These islandscontained potential oil reserves that might bring wealth to a war-ravagednation. Whatever country controlled this area would have a great advantageto get access to oil and natural gas reserves.

Revolution in Cambodia cemented apparent communist control over thecountry. Although the Khmer Rouge had secured the nation, the fight hadbeen long and bloody. The former Lon Nol government had received vastquantities of arms and funds from the United States, while the vehementxenophobia of Pol Pot’s government contributed to a heightened fear ofpotential foreign activities to overthrow the new communist regime. KhmerRouge military units were on alert to intercept Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) funded insurgents crossing the border with Thailand, or landing fromships transiting the Gulf of Thailand. Pol Pot was still fearful that merchantships, in the guise of commercial trade, were secretly funneling CIA weapons

9

US personnelevacuated from

Phnom Penh

APRIL 161975


10

to insurgents trying to ignite a counter-revolution. Additionally, theCambodian government was also concerned about potential Americanespionage efforts to aid its enemies. The new government had started to expelall foreigners from Cambodian soil, and foreign governments could notcontact the Pol Pot government directly. Compounding this problem was thenew regime’s struggles to organize the government and get control over itsmilitary forces and foreign relations, activities that needed time to consolidate.

Boundary squabbles and perceived security questions were immediateproblems that required solutions. One method to illustrate Cambodianresolve was to maintain a naval presence and demonstrate aggressively itsability to enforce its maritime boundaries. Khmer Rouge Swift boats, formerUS Navy patrol craft captured from the Lon Nol government, provided thecapability to enforce Cambodian boundary claims. In early May 1975,Khmer Rouge naval units started to seize vessels in the Gulf of Thailand. On May 2, Cambodian military forces took control of seven Thai fishingboats. Two days later, the South Korean freighter Masan Ho avoided seizure,but Khmer Rouge gunboats chased and fired upon the ship. Khmer Rougenaval units also took refugee boats fleeing South Vietnam. The most seriousmaritime incident occurred on May 7, when Cambodians held a Panamanianfreighter for 35 hours. Phnom Penh officials had ordered the detention andinterrogation of the ship and crew. The communist government’s actionswere not new; under Lon Nol, Cambodian naval forces had also taken Thaifishing boats caught in its waters.

Cambodians were not the only military forces in the region. KhmerRouge naval forces had witnessed American military and commercialshipping throughout the Gulf of Thailand area. Washington maintainedseveral USAF tactical and strategic wings on bases in Thailand, remnants ofthe massive American Southeast Asian military presence to fight the VietnamWar. USAF aircraft flew training missions throughout the region, and the USNavy had evacuated American citizens and others when Phnom Penh fell tothe communists. US Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) ships patrolled the Gulf ofThailand to aid refugees fleeing both Cambodia and Vietnam. AdditionallyP-3 Orion antisubmarine aircraft conducted surveillance missions thatincluded flying near Cambodia.

The end of the Vietnam War did not stop the Cold War. Washington stillhad to contend with Soviet Pacific naval activities along with securing traderoutes for American and allied nations. PACFLT assets also conductedtraining exercises and transited international waters. However, disagreements


This Mayaguez photograph

shows the container ship

after its recovery. The ship

was en route from Hong

Kong to Singapore with a

stop in Thailand when it was

captured. After the incident,

it continued to serve as a

freighter until its owners

scrapped it in 1979.

(US Navy)


arose about what constituted international waters. Washington insisted onrecognizing only a 3 nautical mile territorial boundary while Phnom Penh,among other Southeast Asian states, claimed a 12 nautical mile limit.Cambodia had argued for such a boundary since 1969. Despite theseincidents, commercial shipping continued to travel to routine destinationsthrough the region.

“Mayday” One of the hundreds of commercial vessels plying the Pacific trading routeswas the SS Mayaguez. The Mayaguez was a 10,485-ton containerizedAmerican-flagged cargo ship. Built in 1944 as the SS White Falcon, the shiphad a crew of 40 and carried 107 commercial, 77 military, and 90 emptycontainers on May 12. Charles T. Miller was Mayaguez’s captain and thevoyage initially seemed uneventful. He was guiding the ship from Hong Kongvia Sattahip, Thailand, to its final destination of Singapore. Miller woulddrop off the military cargo at Sattahip. This cargo did not include weapons;instead, it contained machine parts, supplies, mail, replacement equipment,commissary goods, and food. The remaining military containers, about halfof the cargo, was destined for base exchanges at the USAF’s Thaiinstallations. The Mayaguez’s path would pass close to Poulo Wai. KhmerRouge units had already taken the island from the Vietnamese. Despite therecent ship seizures, Miller had not received any warnings about problemswith Khmer Rouge gunboats. The vessel steamed at 12.5 knots on a headingtowards Thailand.

At 1418hrs on May 12, two Cambodian Swift boats approached theMayaguez and fired across the bow and down her sides with rockets and .50-caliber rounds. Fortunately, the Mayaguez’s radio operator transmitted aMayday message that reported they were under attack. Miller was about 7 nautical miles southwest of Poulo Wai when seven Khmer Rouge naval

The National Security

Council met several times

during the Mayaguez

incident. Ford’s

administration had several

Nixon appointees who gave

him an experienced national

security team. Here acting

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, General David C.

Jones, briefs Ford as William

Colby, Director of Central

Intelligence, looks on.

(Ford Presidential Library)

Origins


12

personnel boarded his ship. Poluo Wai is located approximately 60 nauticalmiles south of the Cambodian mainland. Armed with a combination of AK-47 and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) weapons, the Khmer Rougeboarding party indicated, on navigational maps, for Miller to proceed toKompong Som. Kompong Som, is a port complex on the Cambodian coast.However, the Mayaguez had a damaged radar system that could endangerthe vessel, since there were many shallow reefs in the region, which would beespecially difficult to negotiate if Miller proceeded to Kompong Som at night.

John Neal of the Delta Exploration Company, in Jakarta, Indonesia,received the following emergency message: “Have been fired upon andboarded by Cambodian armed forces at 9 degrees 48 minutes North/102degrees 53 minutes East. Ship being towed to unknown Cambodian port.”Neal tried to raise the Mayaguez, but failed to do so. He then contacted theAmerican embassy in Jakarta to report the incident. Another shipping agencyin Singapore also transmitted the message to the local American embassy.Washington would soon hear about the boarding. The US defense attaché inSingapore notified PACFLT’s Commander, Seventh Fleet. The Americanambassador in Jakarta sent immediate messages to the White House, NSA,CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Military Command Center(NMCC) at the Pentagon, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), andother appropriate commands. CINCPAC was the regional combatantcommand responsible for military actions in the Pacific area, including theGulf of Thailand. Located in Honolulu, Hawaii, CINCPAC only hadcommand of assigned air, naval, ground, and marine forces. Other forces in-theater, such as strategic reconnaissance aircraft, belonged to othercommands. NMCC officials started to discuss the Mayaguez situation withthe CINCPAC staff and suggested that they prepare to send Navy and USAFreconnaissance aircraft to search for and locate the Mayaguez.

Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General David C.Jones, received the news about the Mayaguez at 0646hrs. In Cambodia thelocal time was 1746hrs, and time zone differences would affect somecoordination and decision-making. About 45 minutes later, Jones orderedCINCPAC to launch reconnaissance aircraft to locate the Mayaguez.Fortunately, search aircraft would have to go no further than Poulo Wai;due to approaching darkness and the broken radar, Miller convinced hisCambodian captors to anchor off the island.

President Gerald R. Ford had been in office less than a year. Ford hadreplaced Richard M. Nixon, who had resigned in lieu of facing impeachmentdue to the Watergate scandal. At his 0740hrs daily intelligence briefing, CIAbriefers told Ford about the Mayaguez. Washington would soon react.


Pol Pot takesPhnom Penh

APRIL 171975

Khmer Rougenaval units startseizing vessels in

the Gulf ofThailand

MAY1975


13

INITIAL STRATEGY Pol Pot’s government had no qualms about severing contacts with foreignpowers, especially the United States. As we have seen, Lon Nol had receivedextensive American military aid, to include air support, for use against theKhmer Rouge. By April 1975, Washington had evacuated all military andgovernment personnel from South Vietnam, withdrew from Cambodia, andhad been humiliated worldwide with the rise of communist movementsthroughout Southeast Asia. Although the United States suffered greatly fromthe fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975, it still had air and naval theater forcescapable of attacking Cambodia. Why would Phnom Penh tempt an attack bya superpower by seizing an American ship?

Great speculation surrounds why Cambodians seized the Mayaguez.Cambodians had previously detained foreign shipping in their territorialwaters. The Mayaguez boarding may have been an extension of previousCambodian government activities, but those policies focused on small fishingboats, not major international shipping. Phnom Penh’s attempt to maintainits sovereignty while interdicting potential counter-revolutionaries and armsmight have given more motivation for shipseizures. Conversely, the Cambodians mayhave sought a way to blackmail orembarrass Washington by capturing theship and negotiating for the crew’srelease, much akin to North Korea’sactions when Pyongyang took the USSPueblo, an American intelligence ship, in1968. Phnom Penh could demand moneyor a guarantee from Washington not toattack the country or provide aid toinsurgents. Pol Pot could alsodemonstrate that his government wouldnot suffer any intimidation by any foreignpower, including the United States.

Three of the main National

Security Council members

were National Security

Adviser and Secretary of

State Dr Henry Kissinger

(right), White House Chief

of Staff Donald Rumsfeld

(middle), and Secretary

of Defense Dr James

Schlesinger (left). All helped

shape final policy and

decisions on the Mayaguez.

(Ford Presidential Library)


The Navy commissioned

the USS Harold E. Holt, a

Knox-class frigate, in 1971.

The ship was one of the first

naval vessels that entered

the Gulf of Thailand during

the Mayaguez incident. The

Holt’s small helicopter pad

would prove a challenge to

Air Force helicopter pilots

landing marines on the ship.

(US Navy)

14

Another rationale for the seizure was that a local naval commander tookthe initiative to board the Mayaguez without Phnom Penh’s knowledge. TheKhmer Rouge Swift boat commanders who seized the Mayaguez could havefollowed standard procedure to detain any ship within the territorial watersaround Poulo Wai. Some months after the Mayaguez incident, Cambodiandeputy premier Ieng Sary claimed the capture was a “horrible mistake”undertaken by a local commander. NSA records indicate that the firstcommunication intercepted involving the Mayaguez was one from PhnomPenh to a local commander to release the crew on May 15. Sary insisted thatPhnom Penh had no prior knowledge about the seizure.

“What are our options?” Ford’s May 12 morning intelligence briefing by the CIA drove the Presidentto arrange for a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) later that day.The NSC is the top American interagency body that discusses and decides thepath of American national security policy actions. Ford met with his NSCprincipals: Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, Secretary of State and NationalSecurity Adviser Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger,David Jones (the JCS chairman General George Brown was in Europe),Director Central Intelligence (DCI) William Colby, Kissinger’s deputy at theNSC Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, White House Chief of Staff DonaldRumsfeld, and others. At the 1205hrs meeting, Ford wanted options.

NSC attendees had concerns. Kissinger’s initial reaction was about gettingthe ship back and “how the US appears at the time.” Discussion centered onways to get Phnom Penh to release the ship through a public media demand.Most talk, however, revolved around military actions. Ford and the NSCprincipals debated mining Cambodian ports, using B-52s to bombCambodian targets, and taking a Cambodian-held island. Several attendees



15

Initial Strategy

recalled the Pueblo and all wanted to avoid another repeat of this incident.Kissinger seemed to downplay diplomatic action and looked for militaryoptions. The Secretary of State declared, “I am more in favor of seizingsomething, be it the island, the ship, or Kompong Som.” The NSC meetingattendees considered some constraints. There were no aircraft carriers in the immediate area. Conducting Thai-based military operations wasproblematic. Bangkok was demanding that Washington remove USAFaircraft from Thailand.

Congress had also put legal restrictions on the President’s ability to getAmerica involved in war. The 1973 War Powers Resolution forced thePresident, within 48 hours, to report the start of military action to getcongressional approval unless the United States was under imminent attack.Time was critical and Washington had little information about the KhmerRouge’s motives and strength. Ford agreed to demand publicly that PhnomPenh release both the crew and ship since he considered the Cambodianaction one of piracy. At the end of the meeting, Ford looked forward toseeing detailed military options. Schlesinger would soon deliver.

Schlesinger and the JCS had already taken some actions. Aerialreconnaissance aircraft were searching for the Mayaguez and Thai-basedUSAF fighters patrolled the area. The aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea(CVA-43), steamed into the area, planning to arrive on May 15. This vesselcould provide tactical air operations against Cambodia, its offshore positionhelping to avoid some of the political difficulties of US aircraft flying fromThailand. CINCPAC also directed the USS Harold E. Holt (DE-1074), a destroyer escort, to steam at “best speed” from its location southwest ofSubic Bay, the Philippines, to the Gulf of Thailand. The USS Hancock(CVA-19) and accompanying ships, with a Marine Amphibious ReadyGroup, was assembling at Subic Bay. Unfortunately, a faulty steam valve thataffected a propeller shaft limited its top speed and its role in any option wasquestionable. Marine units at Okinawa and Cubi Point, in the Philippines,mobilized for action. Forces were prepared while awaiting a plan. Alongwith USAF units in Thailand, Guam, and the Philippines, Schlesingerprovided Ford with six military options.

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger’s options depended on certain conditions.The primary objective was the safe return of the crew and the Mayaguez’srecovery. If the Khmer Rouge kept both crew and ship away from ports at

The USS Coral Sea’s air wing

gave Ford the ability to strike

the Cambodian mainland

without using Thai-based

assets. Ford and Kissinger’s

major concerns were how

fast the carrier could reach

striking distance to hit the

Khmer Rouge. A secondary

mission was to conduct

close air support missions.

(US Navy)


16


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17

P-3 Orion aircraft, like this

one, provided surveillance

and tracking of targets

during the incident. P-3

crews found the Mayaguez

at Poulo Wai and followed

it to Koh Tang. The P-3 could

carry mines, torpedoes, and

conventional bombs. Navy

units flew from U-Tapao and

the Philippines. (US Navy)

Kompong Som or Ream (a naval base near Kompong Som), then the USNavy could board the ship, destroy any Cambodian gunboats, and rescue thecrew. Additionally, the Cambodians could also move the ship and crew to another part of the mainland or disperse the crew among several of theislands. Spreading the crew would complicate the ability to rescue them.These options were also time sensitive. Events were proceeding quickly andthe President needed to make a decision.

The first option involved a direct capture of the crew and Mayaguez atsea. The Holt would confront the Cambodians and take the containerizedfreighter by force, if necessary. The Holt was within 24 hours of the area, butcould receive air support from the Coral Sea. This course of action woulddisplay Washington’s ability to protect American interests worldwide. Theonly force used involved the Holt and perhaps some carrier aviation assets.Additionally, if the action occurred offshore of Cambodia, then the legalconcerns about invading sovereign territory could be minimized. This optioncould also result in casualties. A major fear was that Khmer Rouge forcesmight harm the crew if they saw the Holt ready to take the Mayaguez.

A second more ambitious option proposed involved a situation in whichthe Khmer Rouge sent the Mayaguez and crew to Kompong Som, Ream, orsome other location. American military forces would include an aircraftcarrier task force to impose air superiority and conduct close air support. A Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) consisting of 5,000 troops would seizethe port. These marines from Subic Bay and Okinawa might face 1,500 to2,000 Khmer Rouge soldiers in the area. For such a complicated assault,Defense Department officials estimated they could execute this option in fiveand a half days, although naval tactical air forces could begin operationswithin a day. Like the first option, this plan would show the nation’swillingness and ability to protect American shipping and lives. The plannersbelieved that the Khmer Rouge would probably not be able to stop thisinvasion. Yet this option would bring immediate public and congressionalprotest because of the reappearance of Americans in a conflict in SoutheastAsia. Despite Department of Defense (DoD) confidence that they wouldprevail, American forces would suffer casualties, including the potential death

1418hrsMayaguez seized

by Khmer Rouge forces

MAY 121975


18


of the crew and destruction of the Mayaguez. Attacking mainland Cambodiawould also be much different than taking back an American flagged ship atsea. Ford would definitely need congressional approval for this action.

The third option was a blockade of the Cambodian coast. Air power andsurface vessels could isolate Kompong Som and Ream. A naval surface taskgroup could turn back any ships trying to enter the ports. PACFLT couldimplement this option immediately with the Holt and the USS Vega, a fleetreplenishment ship that had also steamed into the Gulf of Thailand inresponse to the seizure. The Navy also had P-3 aircraft to supplement theblockade. This option was available within 24 hours. Ford could minimizepotential military confrontation. Yet the option might not result in immediaterelease of the Mayaguez’s crew. In addition, the Navy might require a largeforce for a long time. Depending on the location of the blockading force andthe extent of the blockade, some critics might consider this an act of war.

The fourth course of action advanced was the mining of Cambodianharbors. The United States had conducted aerial mining operations againstNorth Vietnam’s Haiphong harbor in December 1973 under OperationLinebacker II. Schlesinger noted that the Coral Sea and Guam based B-52Dscould drop mines or “destructors” around Kompong Som and Ream thatwould prevent the entry or exit by ships into both ports. Mines were storedat Subic Bay, and the Coral Sea would have to return to base to secure them.The USAF did have Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-52Ds at U-Tapao AirBase, in Thailand. Fear of Bangkok’s opposition to using Thai-based B-52sagainst its neighbor limited the JCS to using Guam units, which were morethan 2,000 miles away and would require additional tanker support.Ordnance crews could adjust the mines to operate for 10–180 days beforethey self-destructed. Pentagon planners estimated that they could startoperations within 36 hours. Aircrews could emplace mines with a lowprobability of casualties. Mining did have some drawbacks, which rangedfrom the accidental sinking of neutral ships to keeping the Mayaguez and hercrew in Kompong Som or Ream. Ford could also use a combination ofblockade and mining to seal off and isolate Cambodian harbors.

Ford had a fifth option – attacking and seizing Cambodian naval andmerchant ships. This “tit-for-tat” option concentrated on Khmer Rougenaval and small merchant ships operating in the Gulf of Thailand region.The Holt, Vega, and P-3 aircraft could start operations within 24 hours.Later, this force would receive more ships from the Navy’s Seventh Fleet.Benefits of this option rested on its proportionality and low risk of Americanmilitary casualties. However, these small ships were not the same in size orvalue to the Mayaguez, nor did the plan deter the Khmer Rouge from sinkingthe Mayaguez in revenge. Additionally, the Navy might have to tow or escortthe captured ships back to American territory at Guam.

The final proposal was to seize Poulo Wai and blockade the CambodianHon Panjang islands. Schlesinger disclosed that a May 8 Khmer Rougecommunication had indicated a desire to take Hon Panjang, and PhnomPenh also showed great interest in Poulo Wai, because of its oil. TheCambodians wanted to control the islands before the Vietnamese took them.


Assistant Secretary of Defense William Clements, in the NSC meeting, notedthat Shell and Mobil oil companies had made “a significant discovery” of oilin two wells that approached 600 million to 1.5 million barrels in volume.Schlesinger offered an opinion: “The proximity of the Mayaguez to PouloWai could well have been the reason for its seizure.” This option involvedsurrounding the islands with PACFLT assets and then securing Poulo Waiwith marines. CINCPAC could use the Holt and Vega until reinforced.Marines from Subic Bay or Okinawa would then board surface ships andthen make an amphibious landing or use a helicopter assault. Blockadingthe islands might take a day to position the Holt. Transit of marines mighttake longer, and the landing force needed additional reconnaissance. Thiscourse of action provided several advantages. Since the islands had oil, theCambodians would be sensitive to their capture. In addition, by restrictingCambodian access to Hon Panjang, the Vietnamese had a new opportunityto make a claim to the island, which would pressure Phnom Penh to releasethe Mayaguez. Unfortunately, this option would benefit communist Vietnam.

Ford could accept a single option or could combine several options. If hedid go for a military action, he would need to consult congressional leadersunder the War Powers Resolution. Unfortunately, as Schlesinger would note,if the President failed to get approval by Congress or if he faced publicopposition, then this situation would tarnish the ability and image of theUnited States worldwide. Unfortunately, the longer Ford waited, the morelikely the Khmer Rouge might send the Mayaguez and crew to the mainland,and Washington would face protracted negotiations, as with the Pueblo.Without a direct communications link with the Cambodians, diplomacymight take time. Schlesinger’s options did not call for Thai-based USAFcapabilities. The situation, however, would all change quickly.

“This is not an easy operation” Ford met with his NSC on May 13, twice. The Khmer Rouge had orderedMiller to move the Mayaguez towards Kompong Som; instead the ship endedup anchored off another island, Koh Tang. The NMCC received reports thatthe crew had transferred from the Mayaguez and it appeared theCambodians had indeed taken them to Koh Tang. With these new reports,some of the options proposed by Schlesinger were not feasible. Other expertsargued that some options would not pass Congress. Rockefeller stated, “We do not want a land war on Cambodia.”

B-52Ds, based at Andersen

Air Force Base in Guam,

stood ready to conduct

aerial mining or to drop

500lb bombs on Kompong

Som or other targets in

Cambodia. Some critics

of the B-52D said its use

was out of proportion to

the incident and might

raise Congressional ire.

(US Air Force)

Initial Strategy


20

There was concern about taking too long to act. Rockefeller commented,“The longer we take, the worse it gets.” There was no definite proof that theMayaguez crew was still on the ship, imprisoned on Koh Tang, headed toKompong Som, or that the Cambodians had split up the crew. Ford decidedon several immediate actions. First, aircraft would stop any vessels fromleaving Koh Tang. This would require using Thai-based USAF units, since theCoral Sea’s aircraft were not in range. Second, the President ordered themilitary to stop all ship traffic moving to and around Koh Tang. Third, Fordtold the NSC to prepare to land on the Mayaguez the next morning. Fourth,he ordered the JCS to get ready to take Koh Tang. Some marines had alreadylanded via C-141 aircraft at U-Tapao; others would follow. The only meansto land on the ship was by USAF helicopters from rescue and specialoperations units. Kissinger told Ford that the Thai government wasdemanding an explanation about the marines on U-Tapao. Ford wanted toland the marines at night to take back the ship. Jones’ reaction to all of theseactions was that “This is not an easy operation.”

By May 13, diplomatic efforts seemed to have failed. A day earlier,Kissinger had sent a demand for the release of the crew and ship throughthe PRC’s liaison office in Washington to Phnom Penh. The Chinese chief ofthe liaison office refused to accept the letter. George H. W. Bush, chief of the


13 AFClark AFB, PI

14th TRS24 RF-4C

432nd TFWUdorn RTAFB

347th TFWKorat RTAFB

388th TFWKorat RTAFB

56th SOWNakhon Phanom

RTAFB

25th TFS18 F-4E

428th TFS9 F-111A

429th TFS9 F-111A

3rd TFS24 A-7D

34th TFS18 F-4E

16th SOS9 AC-130A8 AC-130H

421st TFS18 F-4E

4th TFS18 F-4D

13th TFS18 F-4D

23rd TASS40 OV-10A

21st SOS10 CH-53C

Military AirliftCommand

56th ARRS5 HC-130P

41st ARRWKorat RTAFB

41st ARRWNakhon Phanom

RTAFB

40th ARRS9 HH-53C

Strategic AirCommand

901st AR(P)KC-135

307th SWU-Tapao RTAFB

364th BS(P)B-52D

365th BS(P)B-52D

Major USAF Units Assigned in Thailand

AR(P): Aerial Refueling Squadron (Provisional)ARRW: Aerospace Rescue and Recovery WingARRS: Aerospace Rescue and Recovery SquadronBS(P): Bombardment Squadron (Provisional)PI: Philippine IslandsRTAFB: Royal Thai Air Force BaseSOW: Strategic Operations WingSOS: Strategic Operations SquadronSW: Strategic WingTASS: Tactical Air Support SquadronTFW: Tactical Fighter WingTFS: Tactical Fighter SquadronTRS: Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron


21

Initial Strategy

US liaison office in China, tried to deliver the same message to the Chinesegovernment and the Cambodian embassy in Beijing. Both attempts failed.The United States also tried to get United Nations Secretary General KurtWaldheim to intervene, but that would take time. Waldheim cautioned theUnited States not to take immediate action. The Cambodians did notrespond. Diplomacy appeared dead.

Later that evening, Ford met again with the NSC. The situation hadchanged yet again. USAF aircraft tried to stop a fishing boat with 30–40passengers, which appeared to have “Caucasians” on board, headed forKompong Som. The aircraft sank escorting gunboats, but they failed to stopthe fishing vessel – rather than attempt to disable it and possibly killAmericans, the pilots allowed it to pass. Ford was upset that the ship hadescaped Koh Tang, despite his previous order. Kissinger recommended allships around Koh Tang sunk. Despite a question by White House aide JohnMarsh that Americans may be on board some of those ships, Kissingerresponded, “I think the pilot should sink them. He should destroy the boatsand not send situation reports.”

The Secretary of State pushed for invading Koh Tang and Kompong Som.Jones had already started planning the details on the options given to Ford.The situation was complicated because the Hancock was having mechanicalproblems and could not reach Koh Tang in time. Schlesinger thought thatusing B-52s would raise “red flags” in Congress and collateral damage mightbe too severe. Discussion also centered on bombing Kompong Som andReam airfields both to ensure that no support was available to Khmer Rougeon Koh Tang and to punish the Cambodians. Ford would soon approve thisoption; the question was whether to use Coral Sea naval aviators or B-52sfrom Guam. Ford authorized the military mission to proceed the next day.

Intelligence: The key to planning Uncertainty clouded the decision-making abilities of Ford and his advisersregarding military actions. American intelligence about the Cambodianintentions, military strength and disposition, and Mayaguez crew locationwas partial. USAF and Navy reconnaissance and patrol aircraft had locatedthe ship, but they could not determine where the Khmer Rouge had taken thecrew. Patrolling AC-130s used infrared imaging devices which indicated thatthere was no heat coming from the Mayaguez’s smokestacks. As the shiphad no power, the crew was therefore probably not on board. The NSCcould not dismiss the possibility of crew members on Koh Tang, despitereports of the fishing boat approaching Kompong Som.

Koh Tang is a small island

that had few distinguishing

landmarks. The island had

limited natural landing

zones and a thick jungle

canopy hindered close air

support efforts. This view of

the island is from the Holt.

Gunfire support is visible

on the West Beach area.

(US Navy)

1640–1700hrsCrew removed

from the Mayaguez

MAY 131975


22

Landing, occupying, and searching Koh Tang required a rapid assault.The number of marines needed for the assault depended on the size,disposition, and armament of any Khmer Rouge defenders. Initial reportsconcerning the strength of the defenders varied. One report, actually used bythe marines who eventually landed on Koh Tang, indicated only 18–30irregular forces. This information, based on an account from a former LonNol naval officer, was out of date. The Commander, Intelligence Pacific(IPAC) indicated that there might be 90–100 Khmer Rouge with unknownnumbers of 82mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles, rocket-propelled grenades(RPGs), and machine guns. The DIA estimated a higher number of enemyforces, at 150–200, with similar heavy armaments to those mentioned inIPAC’s report. Additionally, an orbiting AC-130 gunship, using its sensors,reported a sizeable ground force on Koh Tang during the early evening on


Washington had to overcome significant distances to conduct the Mayaguez operation, and hence reliedheavily on American airpower. Helicopters, for example,provided the means to transport marines to Koh Tangand the Holt. Another asset was the USAF and Navyattack, bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance aircraft thatallowed Washington to find and hit targets throughoutthe region. The USAF’s 7AF controlled scores of aircraftin Southeast Asia throughout its command area duringthe Vietnam War. By 1975, however, it was a shadow ofits former self, and relocated to Thailand, althoughduring the Mayaguez incident it was augmented bytaking operational control of 13AF aircraft.

Two of the major USAF workhorses were the A-7D and F-4. The A-7D could deliver 15,000lb of externalordnance at a range of 1,430 miles. Its 1,000-round20mm M61A1 Vulcan cannon and payload offered a superb ability to conduct close air support andinterdiction. Like the A-7D, the F-4 Phantom II multiroleaircraft had a naval background, and could carry up to16,000lb of external stores, including four supersonicair-to-air missiles. The F-4E mounted its 20mm cannoninternally, while its older brother, the F-4D, used anexternal gun pod. The RF-4C reconnaissance versionused medium- to long-range oblique angle cameras.CINCPAC called on F-4D, F-4E, and RF-4Cs to conduct air superiority, close air support, interdiction, andphotographic reconnaissance missions. Due to theirintensive use, the F-4 and RF-4 had the highest lossrates in Vietnam, accounting for more than 20 percentof fixed-wing losses.

Two other USAF aircraft that gave 7AF an advantage werethe F-111A and AC-130. The F-111A had a troubledhistory. Conceived as a multirole, multiservice aircraft, it had severe developmental problems, and the Navyeventually cancelled its participation. The F-111A’s initial1968 Vietnam deployment, under Operation CombatLancer, resulted in three aircraft losses. One of theaircraft was lost on its first combat mission. Onceengineers solved its technical issues, the F-111A becamean outstanding all weather, low-level strike aircraftcapable of carrying 30,000lb of weapons. The F-111AAardvark returned to conduct very effective missionsagainst Hanoi during the 1972 Linebacker bombingcampaign.

Calls for better night-time close air support led toconversion of C-119 and C-47 transports to gunshipsduring the Vietnam War. The AC-130 Spectre was anextension of this development. The AC-130A had two20mm and two 40mm cannon, as wel as a pair ofminiguns with tracking and radar systems. The AC-130Halso had an M102 105mm howitzer with 100 rounds. The aircraft could loiter over a target for about twohours with a 45-minute fuel reserve. Thai-based AC-130s attacked the Ho Chi Minh trail at night.

The Navy also flew variants of the F-4 and A-7, andoperated the Grumman A-6A Intruder that replaced the venerable A-1 Skyraider. The A-6A bomber used its Digital Integrated Attack Navigation Equipment todeliver its 17,000lb payload at night and under badweather. Intruders flew low-level against targetsthroughout North Vietnam.

AMERICAN STRIKING POWER IN THE GULF OF THAILAND


23

Initial Strategy

May 13. The Air Force crew estimated that the Cambodianshad three gun emplacements positioned in a 100yd curve.

Cambodian forces also had gunboats and some aircraft.An end-of-tour report by Brigadier General William Palmer,dated April 30, 1975, indicated that the Cambodians had 22T-28 propeller-driven aircraft and six AC-47 gunships.These aircraft could potentially attack marines on KohTang, but their operational status was questionable due toa lack of pilots and poor maintenance. The NSC wasnevertheless concerned about these aircraft, and used themas a justification to attack Kompong Som and Ream.

America: Limited forces, limited options CINCPAC would plan, coordinate, and control the major elements of anyoperation. PACFLT had few ships in the area. Major combatants includedthe Holt and the guided-missile destroyer Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7), orderedto head to the area on May 13, and the Coral Sea and her escorts whichwere steaming to the Gulf of Thailand. Coral Sea aircraft included 10 A-6Abombers in VA-95, 24 A-7Es in VA-22 and VA-94, and F-4Ns in VF-51 andVF-111. The Hancock and the amphibious assault ship Okinawa (LPH-3)were not available due to mechanical problems. PACFLT also controlled VP-4’s P-3 aircraft, which operated in the area.

USMC forces were available to support the military options. From CubiPoint in the Philippines, a reinforced company of five officers and 115 enlistedmarines from the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines (1/4 Marines) had departed toThailand. The 2/9 Marines would later arrive at U-Tapao from Okinawa. Thisforce was sufficient to take the Mayaguez and land troops on Koh Tang.

The largest contingent available for operations was from the USAF. The13th Air Force (13AF) at Clark Air Base in the Philippines controlled tacticaland special operations units in Thailand. Thai-based units included the432nd Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Udorn; the 347th TFW, 388th TFW,and 56th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS) at Korat; andthe 56th Special Operations Wing (SOW) and the 40th ARRS at NakhonPhanom. SAC maintained the 307th Strategic Wing (SW) with KC-135tankers and B-52Ds at U-Tapao. They were not under CINCPAC’s control.Similarly, SAC’s 43rd SW at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam was availableto conduct B-52D bombing missions and KC-135 tanker support. Clark alsosupplied EC-130 airborne command and control aircraft to manage allcombat operations. Likewise, the USAF’s Military Airlift Command providedtransportation by C-141 to the marines to move them from Okinawa and thePhilippines to U-Tapao. National assets also included U-2 reconnaissanceaircraft.

Thai-based AC-130s used

their low-light level

television sensors to observe

the Mayaguez. These sensors

helped target ships or

soldiers at night, and

enabled the AC-130 to

attack with great accuracy

with weapons ranging from

howitzers to miniguns.

The AC-130 would prove

invaluable throughout the

operation. (US Air Force)


THE PLAN Ford, the NSC, CINCPAC staffers, and commanders in Thailand and at seabegan to develop detailed operational concepts, which evolved into plans tosend America into combat in Southeast Asia once again. Despite evolvingconditions around the Sea of Thailand, the CINCPAC staff developed a planto meet Ford’s objectives. Coordination between Washington, CINCPAC,Thailand, and forces afloat demanded precise timing. Retaking theMayaguez, assaulting Koh Tang, searching for and rescuing the crew, and

24

Air Force Security Police,

from Nakhon Phanom,

volunteered to retake the

Mayaguez. While trying to

move forces to U-Tapao, a

CH-53C transporting these

volunteers crashed when

the main rotor separated. All

onboard died. The marines

would have to board the

ship and try to rescue the

crew. (US Air Force)


25

bombing targets on Kompong Som and Ream would require precisioncommand and control.

While the staffs exchanged ideas, external events shaped the finaloperational concept. The need to attempt a rescue without the Okinawa orthe Hancock limited CINCPAC options – Thai-based USAF aircraft had toreplace these Navy assets. Air Force rescue and special operations helicopterswould instead move marines from U-Tapao to Koh Tang, where they wouldtake the Mayaguez. Tactical aircraft from Thailand were designated toprovide close air support and interdiction. JCS directives had already pushedCINCPAC to conduct reconnaissance missions, and USAF A-7D, F-4D/E, and F-111A aircraft had strafed and bombed Cambodian ships toisolate Koh Tang. Special operations AC-130A/Hs and F-111As watchedCambodian movements at night – Washington had already moved beyondconsidering Thai sensitivities.

The 7AF under Lieutenant General John Burns would control all Thai-based USAF units. Burns was also head of the United States SupportActivities Group (USSAG). USAAG had inherited the role of the MilitaryAssistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Gayler designated Burns as theoverall mission commander in charge of the assault on Koh Tang andboarding the Mayaguez. Burns had begun planning a rescue attempt evenbefore Ford examined the options. USAF helicopters at Nakhon Phanommoved to U-Tapao to support the operation. Airmen from the 656th SecurityPolice Squadron at Nakhon Phanom had volunteered to board the Mayaguezas an alternative plan. Tragically, on May 13 at 2130hrs, a CH-53C crashed36 miles east of the base, killing all aboard including 18 of the volunteer AirForce security policemen for the mission and five helicopter crew members.The loss of life and a valuable helicopter would obviously affect the finalplan, limiting the means to carry marines and reinforce them.

The distance from U-Tapao to Koh Tang is 190 nautical miles. A HH-53Cor CH-53C would require about one hour and forty minutes to cross thedistance. This meant a round trip of about four hours to resupply orreinforce any marine units on the island. Any further helicopter lossesthrough combat or mechanical issues would severely disrupt operations.

Operational concept The JCS-defined mission to CINCPAC was simply to retake the Mayaguez.Jones also directed CINCPAC to conduct militaryoperations “to influence the outcome of US initiativesto secure the release of the ship’s crew.” Given thismission statement, CINCPAC had wide latitude to planand change operations. The JCS provided Ford withan initial operational concept, but more detailedplanning was needed.

Jones had notified CINCPAC to start all militaryoperations on May 15 at sunrise. The marines werefront and center in recapturing the Mayaguez andinvading Koh Tang. The original plan to retake the ship

This topside view of the

Mayaguez shows the

difficulty of trying to land

helicopters directly on her.

The aluminum containers

could not support a

helicopter’s weight. The

bow and aft were too small.

Having marines use ropes to

land was too risky. Boarding

by the Holt was the only

viable option. (US Navy)

The Plan


26

envisioned using six USAF helicopters, but the Nakhon Phanom loss andsome maintenance problems reduced the force to three. One option was toplace the helicopters directly on the Mayaguez. The only area for a helicopterto land was on the containers, but unfortunately the helicopter’s weight onan aluminum cargo container might cause it to collapse. An alternative wasto have the marines use ropes to deploy onto the freighter while thehelicopters hovered. If Khmer Rouge forces were on the ship, however, thenthey could easily shoot at the helicopters and anyone leaving them.

Helicopter deployment was rejected. Instead, the marine force from thePhilippines, Company D of the 1/4 Marines, under Captain Walter J.Wood, would therefore arrive on and board the Mayaguez from the Holt.This plan involved using 48 marines, 12 Navy and Military SealiftCommand (MSC) personnel, a USAF explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)


The Khmer Rouge (meaning “Red Khmer,” the Khmerbeing a major ethnic group in Cambodia) started as a fringe communist group in rural areas in Cambodia.Their rise to power came about due to the actions ofCambodian generals under Lon Nol, who overthrewPrince Norodom Sihanouk. Sihanouk supported theKhmer Rouge in his quest to return to power. The KhmerRouge, formed by Pol Pot, would eventually kill betweenone and two million people – no one truly knows howmany Cambodians and foreigners lost their lives underthe Khmer Rouge. Their goal was to return Cambodia,later renamed the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea,to the more simple life of an agrarian state. Pol Pot alsowanted to eliminate all Western influences.

The Khmer Rouge, aided by the North Vietnamese andVC, started a communist insurgency against the Lon Nolgovernment in 1970. This insurgency successfullycontrolled about one third of the country. For five years,Lon Nol, supported by Washington, battled the KhmerRouge and Vietnamese. American secret bombings in1973, the ceasefire with the United States, the growingnumber and success of Khmer Rouge insurgents, and thedesire to capture South Vietnam caused Hanoi to moveaway from Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge took up theslack and they continued their war against Lon Nol. Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge eventually forced Lon Nol frompower and Phnom Penh fell in April 1975. Many of theKhmer Rouge followers were teenagers and children.The implementation of Pol Pot’s deadly policies took on an even more sinister face when these youngcommunists administered them.

Under the Khmer Rouge, any Cambodian governmentworkers, business owners, educators, or those whodisagreed with the regime were marked for arrest,torture, and death. The Khmer Rouge also wanted to killany intellectuals. Suspicion fell on any Cambodian whospoke a foreign language, since that ability indicated aneducation. Religion was banned, especially Buddhism.No one could own personal property. Cambodianswearing glasses, using a watch, or possessing any other technology also met with instant death.

After taking control of the country, the communistseventually abandoned cities and closed any facilitiesthat used modern technology. The country was rebornfrom “Year Zero.” Schools, monasteries, temples, andbusinesses closed. The Khmer Rouge rebuilt society bysending citizens to rural agricultural camps and farms.Mass evacuations moved the population to theseideologically run collective farms and a brutal lifewithout money and material goods. Phnom Penh’s aimwas to triple food production to become self-reliant.One of the only countries that maintained a verylimited, distant relationship with Phnom Penh wasChina. In reality, the collective farms became deathcamps. Any sign of disobedience would end a worker’slife. Many died due to overwork, starvation, anddisease. The reign of terror ended in 1979. Continuedborder skirmishes with the Vietnamese and crimesagainst humanity forced the Vietnamese to intervene.Pol Pot faced arrest and trial, but he only served housearrest, and died in April 1998.

THE KHMER ROUGE


27

team, and an Army Cambodian linguist. The Navy and MSC crew wouldoperate the recaptured ship and help move it out of the area. Plannersfeared that the Khmer Rouge might have placed explosives on board thevessel, and they would detonate these if the Americans attempted to takeit. The EOD team, therefore, would search the vessel and make it safe ifneed be. Photographs from reconnaissance aircraft helped identify 30Cambodians on board. The Holt and her crew could support the marinesif they were in a fight. Once the Mayaguez was under American control,the Holt would then escort it to safety.

The main effort of the operation was a marine assault on Koh Tang.Helicopter availability reduced the assault force to eight CH-53C and HH-53C aircraft. Along with the accident loss and maintenance problems,the USAF had to keep some helicopters in reserve for rescue and recoveryoperations. The first assault wave would set 175 marines on the island. Otherwaves would deliver additional marines, ultimately deploying a total forceof 625 marines and 25 other personnel. The initial wave would secureopposite sides of the island and search an area that included a fishing villagewhere the Khmer Rouge might hold the Mayaguez crew.

These operations required support from the USAF and the Navy. 7AFassets could provide day and night aircraft coverage over Koh Tang and theMayaguez. Their main mission was to give close air support to the marineground support force on the island. USAF aircraft would prevent movementby any small Cambodian watercraft in the Koh Tang and Poulo Wai area.Planners also assigned Thai-based HC-130P and at least two HH-53Caircraft for search-and-rescue operations. Naval vessels would provideoffshore gunfire support.

SAC units in Thailand and Guam also had support missions. Theapproved JCS concept included four B-52D cells of three aircraft to attackKompong Som harbor, Phumi Phsar Ream naval base, and Ream airfield.Later plans specified one cell each against Ream airfield and naval base. SACplanners readied the other six aircraft for Kompong Som. Twelve KC-135tankers supported the attack force. The initial B-52 attack would occur threehours after the first assault on Koh Tang. SAC tankers from Thailand wouldalso refuel any 7AF jets. The plan called for continuous coverage by at leastone EC-130 to serve as an on-scene mission coordinator. The finaloperational concept also included authorization to use the BLU-82, a15,000lb conventional bomb designed to clear a landing zone for helicoptersfrom dense jungle terrain. Philippines-based C-130 aircraft would deploythe weapon from a parachute.

US Navy carrier aviation also played a major role in the operation. Likethe 7AF aircraft, carrier A-6A and A-7E aircraft from the Coral Sea hadauthorization to restrict Cambodian shipping movements around the KohTang and Poulo Wai islands. Naval aviation, when in range, would alsoconduct daytime armed reconnaissance missions in the area. Ford might havethe option to use Coral Sea aircraft strikes on Kompong Som and the Reamcomplexes. He had to choose between B-52D and Coral Sea aircraft to attackthe Cambodian coast.

The Plan


The final and crucial determination centered on the command and controlstructure. Ford gave CINCPAC overall control of the operation, and the JCSalso designated Commander USSAG (COMUSSAG)/7AF as the on-scenecoordinating authority for all supporting forces. CINCPAC staff on Hawaiihad to control activities regarding CINCPAC, COMUSSAG/7AF, and themarine forces operating in Thailand and on Koh Tang. The only majorcommand and control element outside of CINCPAC was the SAC B-52Dforce at Guam.

Conflicting priorities The mission concept was not without controversy. Local commanders usingthe concept to make detailed plans would need more information andrequired extensive coordination. Some of their concerns led to options thatdelayed decisions or forced commanders to adapt rapidly to changingrequirements or events. Still, the priority of the mission rested on safelyrescuing all of the crew.

Another priority included avoiding casualties, friendly and civilian. Oneof the lingering psychological remnants of the Vietnam War was theAmerican public’s aversion to casualties. Ford and Kissinger, however, were

A-7Ds, like these, gave

CINCPAC a variety of

capabilities to strike the

Khmer Rouge. The A-7Ds

from the 388th TFW

provided close air support

and interdicted boats in

the area. A month after

the incident, the Thai

government forced America

to start pulling aircraft out of

the country. (US Air Force)


VF-51“Screaming

Eagles”F-4N

VF-111“Sundowners”

F-4N

VA-22“Fighting

Redcocks”A-7E

VA-94“MightyShrikes”

A-7E

VA-95“Green

Lizards”A-6A / KA-6D

VFP-63Detachment 5

“Eyes ofthe Fleet”

RF-8G

HC1Detachment 3“Pacific Fleet

Angels”SH-3G

RVAM-110Detachment 2

“Firebirds”E-1B

Carrier Air Wing 15

USS Coral Sea Carrier Air Wing 15(Deployed December 5, 1974 to July 2, 1975)


When the F-111A first

deployed to Southeast Asia,

it was plagued by problems

with its terrain-following

radar, causing several

aircraft to crash. By 1975,

the Air Force fixed the

problem and they served

admirably. The F-111s

would provide close air

support and interdict boats.

(US Air Force)

29

also advocating the bombing of the Cambodian mainland, partly to restrictKhmer Rouge reinforcement or thwart any air or naval threat, despiteoverwhelming American air superiority and growing naval strength in thearea. The final priority was American/Thai relations. Bangkok had allowedAmerican military forces to maintain a foothold in Southeast Asia, despiteWashington’s retreat from Cambodia and Vietnam. Maintaining goodrelations with any country, especially ones bordering communist states,would potentially be difficult after the Mayaguez rescue.

Washington had several operational objectives and priorities that cameinto direct conflict with one another. Accidental bombing of a ship or aninadvertent firefight on Koh Tang might kill members of the Mayaguez’screw; bombing Kompong Som and Ream could achieve the same result.Similarly, Khmer Rouge defenders could exact revenge on the crew membersor the ship once military operations began. A direct assault on Koh Tangand the ship might result in an unacceptable number of Americans killed orwounded – the CH-53C helicopter crash had already cost 23 Americans liveseven before any rescue attempt. The initial wave of marines landing on KohTang faced an indeterminate number of Cambodian defenders. In addition,using B-52Ds to bomb an urban area could inflict heavy civilian casualties,harden Cambodian resistance, and turn world and domestic opinion againstWashington. Keeping the Bangkok government placated was also at oddswith the need to use USAF-based assets at U-Tapao and staging marines fromThailand to take the ship and lead the assault on the island.

Time and uncertainty weighed heavily on Washington. Dynamic eventsdictated changes to the priorities. For such a complex set of interrelated

c.1645hrsPresident Ford

orders operation to commence

MAY 141975


30

activities, there was no written operational plan provided to or discussed bythe CINCPAC and other forces that would ultimately conduct the rescue of the Mayaguez and her crew. The JCS, CINCPAC, COMUSSAG/7AF,PACFLT, and the marines needed more than concept, they required a detailedplans and actions.

Taking Koh Tang Koh Tang is about 3.5 miles long and 2 miles wide. It sits approximately 27nautical miles from the Cambodian coast. Jungle-covered terrain dominatedthe island, with a small rise in the center, designated Hill 440. Before theKhmer Rouge had taken control of Cambodia, the island had a smallcommunications site and was home to limited fishing activity. The northernarea also contained two relatively shallow beaches on the east and westcoasts. The East Beach had a longer, coral sand beach that could serve as amain landing zone. The West Beach was much smaller, but if the marinescould land simultaneously on both beaches, then they could drive towardsthe center, take the fishing village, and possibly rescue any Mayaguez crewmembers. The East Beach cove area had also been the location where theKhmer Rouge had removed the Mayaguez crew by fishing boat. The marinesnoticed that the East and West Beaches were the best approaches to takeKoh Tang; so did the Khmer Rouge.

Men from 2/9 Marines in Okinawa began to get ready for deployment onthe afternoon of May 13. At U-Tapao, Colonel John M. Johnson, thedesignated USMC ground force commander, had ordered Lieutenant ColonelRandall W. Austin, the 2nd Battalion commander, to get his force to Thailand.Ten C-141s moved Austin’s battalion and other elements from Kadena AirBase to U-Tapao throughout May 14. Six other C-141s also transported 118.3short tons of equipment, supplies, and ammunition from Okinawa to Thailand

One can here see the

narrow gap between the East

and West Beaches. The

distance from one beach to

the other was about 1,200ft.

The planned marine assault

called for an initial hook-up

between the two forces. This

assumed few Cambodian

defenders, a false

assumption. (US Air Force)



31

to support the operation. Austin’s force totaled 1,095 personnel. The forcewas designated Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/9. BLT 2/9 included troopsthat had just completed field-training exercises in Okinawa. The marine forceincluded E and G Companies, headquarters elements, a heavy weapons sectionto include 4.2in and 81mm mortars, and other support teams.

Austin’s mission was to take Koh Tang and hold it for at least 48 hours.His marines would then search the island for any captives. They would alsoensure that Khmer Rouge forces did not interfere with the Mayaguezboarding action by firing upon the ship from the island – the attack on KohTang would occur simultaneously with the boarding of the Mayaguez. The40th ARRS and 21st Special Operations Squadron (SOS) only had 11operating helicopters. With three helicopters assigned to 1/4’s transport to theHolt, Austin therefore had only eight helicopters to conduct the first of threeplanned assault waves. The first wave would send Company G onto the Eastand West Beaches; the planned attack force included 163 marines, 11 Navycorpsmen, and three Army translators. Captain James H. Davis, theCompany G commander, and a reinforced platoon would land with twohelicopters on the West Beach. The rest of Company G would land on theeast end with the rest of the helicopters. A second wave would bring inCompany E. The third wave would end the assault, which in total wouldput about 625 marines and 25 other personnel on the island.

Completing a helicopter assault against an unknown enemy force, one that may have had time to entrench itself, was an uncertain challenge.To avoid accidently killing captive Mayaguez crew members and to achievesurprise, the first assault wave would dispense with any naval gunfire supportor pre-invasion air attacks to soften up Cambodian defenses. Once on theisland, a Marine forward air controller (FAC) could direct USAF close airsupport and any naval gunfire support from the Holt and the Wilson. Later,the Coral Sea attack squadrons could provide additional firepower. Theonsite FAC would have good situational awareness and local information todirect accurate fire. In an attempt to enhance mission intelligence, Austinhad conducted an afternoon aerial reconnaissance over Koh Tang on May14. Using a handheld 35mm camera, he flew over the densely forested areaat 6,000ft in an Army U-21 airplane. This minimum altitude was aboveeffective enemy antiaircraft fire, but it was also too high to photograph anydetails on the island. The island had no discernable landmarks; the junglefoliage had created an effective defensive cover for the Khmer Rouge.

If the initial intelligence estimate of about 18–30 Khmer Rouge defenderson Koh Tang were true, then the marines’ attack would have no problemoverwhelming them. There is some question about whether anyone providedthe IPAC or DIA estimates to Johnson and Austin. A 307th SW intelligenceofficer had briefed the Air Force helicopter crews and allegedly, a marine officerwas present. Unfortunately, the island landing planners did not have this vitalpiece of information about Cambodian ground strength, details that may havechanged Austin’s plan. The marines did not envision landing on a defendedbeach area emplaced with heavy weapons. Reinforcements, if required, mighttake more than two hours to arrive due to the helicopter transit time.

The Plan


HH-53Cs had a

distinct advantage over

the CH-53Cs; they were air-

refuelable. This HC-130P

allowed HH-53Cs to remain

on station to conduct

extraction or rescue

operations. In addition,

damaged helicopters could

refuel and avoid crashing

due to fuel problems. The

Coral Sea’s appearance

would help to alleviate this

problem for the CH-53Cs by

providing an offshore base.

(US Air Force)

32

Khmer Rouge forces had actually built several defensive positions on KohTang; Cambodian military units had to defend the territory against potentialVietnamese incursions. On the island, the Khmer Rouge battalioncommander, Em Son, nominally had 450 soldiers. The battalion was part ofthe Khmer Rouge’s 3rd Division, assigned to the Cambodian coastal areas.During the Mayaguez incident, however, he had no more than 100 defenders.Em Son’s men had a variety of weapons, which included captured Americanmilitary stocks. The garrison had created a trench system along the East and West Beaches, dotted with three-man fighting positions and bunkers.The defensive lines also included overlapping fields of fire from entrenchedmachine-gun positions and mortars. Ammunition storage areas supportedthe trench defenses. The Khmer Rouge headquarters was near Hill 440 alongwith a radio site.

The planned execution time for the rescue mission, calculated by the JCS,was 0542hrs on May 15. This time was the four minutes before Koh Tangofficial sunrise. Unfortunately, the dawn breaks about 20–30 minutes beforethis time, so there was the danger that the Khmer Rouge defenders might beable to see the first wave’s helicopters arriving and take immediate action.The first wave of helicopters would leave U-Tapao at 0414hrs that day. Planscalled for the last wave of the initial marine assault force to depart at 0423hrs.The marines would deploy in three helicopter flights. The first three HH-53Cswould go to the Holt and carry out the Mayaguez recapture team. Five HH-53C and CH-53Cs would land the initial marine force on Koh Tang. Thesimultaneous boarding of the Mayaguez would require additional time. Someof the USAF helicopter crews had experience landing their aircraft on theaircraft carrier Midway during Operation Frequent Wind, the evacuationfrom South Vietnam. The Midway’s landing deck, however, was much largerthan the small helicopter pad on the Holt. Transferring Company D might bedifficult, especially in the early daylight. The Holt also had to close on theMayaguez and allow Wood’s men to gain access to the ship.

Once BLT 2/9’s mission was complete, the JCS would extract the marines.The NSC was still apprehensive about alienating Bangkok by using U-Tapao


33

The Plan

as a base of military operations against Cambodia. There was no hiding fromBangkok the use of 7AF and SAC resources from Thailand in the operation,since Thai forces also used the airfields. The Thai government had alreadyasked questions about Company D’s arrival at U-Tapao. Austin’s battalioncreated more angst among the Thais. JCS planners advanced two options:marine recovery on the Coral Sea or return to Thailand. Sending the marinesto the Coral Sea would avoid angering the Thais again. As the aircraft carriermoved closer to Koh Tang, the extraction might not require as much time asthe return to Thailand and the carrier could provide more support. Inaddition, Navy maintenance crews could help repair and refuel anyhelicopters. Medical support was also available to any wounded personnel.The return to Thailand therefore became a last resort.

Attacking the mainland The other major elements of the operation were to be a series of attacks onseveral locations on the Cambodian coast, including Kompong Som and theReam area complexes. CIA analysts had discounted Kompong Som as anactive port. Its main activity was a resupply point for the VC and KhmerRouge naval ships. The original reason to attack the harbor and airfields wasto restrict any possible Cambodian reinforcement or interference withAmerican military actions around Koh Tang. American bombing could alsoconvince Phnom Penh to release the crew, or else the Cambodian capital mightbe the next target. A more strategic reason was a demonstration of Americanresolve – bombing Cambodia was a message to Phnom Penh and others thatWashington had the political will and military means to retaliate globally.Kissinger and other NSC members had discussed the impact of the Mayaguezincident in relation to North Korea. With America’s seeming defeat inSoutheast Asia, Washington wanted to demonstrate to Pyongyang not toconfuse the Vietnam withdrawal with an unwillingness to defend South Korea.

The attack on the Ream airfield was of questionable value. The onlyCambodian aircraft that might attack were T-28s, AC-47s, and somepossible helicopter gunships. These aircraft had limited armament,serviceability, and operational capability, and the 7AF and Coral Sea F-4combat air patrols over the Gulf of Thailand would make short work ofthem. Furthermore, both the Holt and Wilson had surface-to-air missilesthat covered the area around Koh Tang and the Mayaguez. Jones and DCIColby both argued that the Cambodian aircraft at Ream did not seem to bea major threat and opposed an attack on the airfield. White House Chief ofStaff Donald Rumsfeld, however, pressed the point that if the Cambodianshad the capability to launch military aircraft from the airport, thenWashington had a “stronger argument” to bomb it. The Ream airfieldremained a target.

The only unanswered question was the use of B-52s or the Coral Seaaircraft. The long distance from Guam, potential collateral damage andconflict escalation, and the prospect of congressional opposition convincedFord to drop the B-52 option. B-52s carried more bombs than naval aircraft,but their value was in hitting area targets. A B-52 cell of three planes typically


34

carried about 108 500lb bombs apiece. Jones had mentioned at an NSCmeeting that the only targets of value seemed to be at the harbor of KompongSom. RF-4C photo-reconnaissance jets had overflown the area, and spottedtwo freighters in port. Although the B-52 might not target the ships, therewas a chance of them being hit by errant bombs. This unintended damagemight affect the public perception of America’s military action, especially ifthe ships were vessels for neutral countries. Ford still wanted to use the B-52s, but settled on the naval carrier aircraft to conduct the mission.CINCSAC keep the Guam-based B-52s on a one-hour alert.

The Coral Sea had a stock of precision guided munitions (PGMs), suchas the AGM-62 Walleye television-guided bomb and Paveway laser-guidedbombs. PGMs offered Ford the ability to destroy specific buildings,warehouses, and other storage facilities. Chief of Naval Operations AdmiralJames L. Holloway had reported to Ford that the Coral Sea had 81 PGMsonboard, plenty to sustain several missions. The Navy pilots would reduceany collateral damage in the mission by deploying these weapons. Usingcarrier aircraft also allowed CINCPAC to cycle the Coral Sea A-6A and A-7Es to step up bombing missions.

Jones’ plan would send Coral Sea aircraft into the Kompong Som areaand Ream around the time of the Mayaguez boarding. The NSC directedthe JCS to have the Coral Sea aircraft’s time on target as 0745hrs for thefirst mission. Jones designated the first mission as “armed reconnaissance”and subsequent missions to include strikes against multiple targets. Thetargets included enemy aircraft at the Ream airfield, port areas, railwayfacilities, warehouses, and other buildings. Since no one could positivelyidentify the two ships at Kompong Som harbor, they were left alone.Subsequent witnesses identified the ships as Chinese.

A RF-4C photographed the

area where the Khmer

Rouge might hold the

Mayaguez’s crew, in an

abandoned fishing village.

This would be the marines’

center of attention for the

helicopter assault. The

Khmer Rouge did not

hold any captives on Koh

Tang. Notice the RF-4C

shadow in the right bottom.

(US Air Force)



35

At a May 14 NSC meeting, the CIA estimated that approximately 2,000Khmer Rouge forces defended the Kompong Som area with a potential foradding another 14,000 soldiers from southwest Cambodia. Air defensesaround Kompong Som and Ream were minimal. The Cambodians possessed23mm and 37mm antiaircraft guns, and CIA analysts identified a single37mm gun south of Kompong Som and two 37mm gun sites at Reamairfield. The effective range for these weapons was 3 nautical miles, capableof hitting targets under 14,000ft. Navy aircrew would not face any surface-to-air missiles. A-6A and A-7E crews could launch PGMs at enough distancefrom the targets to avoid any antiaircraft artillery rounds. The Khmer Rougealso had no interceptors capable of shooting down jets, so the air threatseemed negligible. Cambodian naval forces in port at Kompong Som andReam, on the eve of the attack, were limited to 13 coastal patrol boats, tenriverine patrol boats, and one submarine chaser. These vessels did not appearto offer much opposition to any American attack. However, the KhmerRouge could call on several landing craft, which could move about 2,400soldiers and reach Koh Tang in four hours.

Discussion among NSC members on May 14 had included using theCoral Sea aircraft to attack Phnom Penh. The President quickly dismissedthis option, since he wanted to focus on protecting the operation from anyCambodian reinforcements deploying from Kompong Som. In addition, ifthe Navy pilots struck only military targets, then there was little chance ofkilling any Mayaguez crew members, based on the strong assumption thatthey were not held in military facilities. Kissinger had, before the May 14NSC meeting, a conversation with Ford in which he pressed the President toconduct the air strikes on Kompong Som. Ultimately, Ford would agree withKissinger. At an 1145hrs meeting in the Oval Office, Kissinger thought theJCS would not pursue the attacks. He thought they suffered from the“McNamara syndrome,” and that they would “not be so ferocious.” Dr Kissinger also called Gayler “disastrous,” showing little confidence in theCINCPAC leadership to conduct the operation – the secretary wanted action.

Command, control, and communications By 1975, technical advances in communications had allowed Washington totalk to a regional commander or individual platoon commander in the field.The Mayaguez incident had national security implications that caught Ford’sattention. The operation’s command and control systems were complicated,as the operation was one of the first in which the highest levels of governmentcould oversee tactical decisions. The implications were enormous. Seniorofficers could direct or countermand orders from subordinate commandersto their units. Demands for information might swamp communicationssystems. Similarly, decision-makers had access to both unfiltered andproperly analyzed information.

The command and control system relied on a number of secure voice,teletype, and satellite communications systems. The White House hadgovernance over all forces through the NMCC – the Pentagon control centerissued orders from the President to CINCPAC. Coincidentally, Gayler was in

The Plan


36

Washington throughout the Mayaguez incident. The NMCC communicatedthrough a JCS voice alert network, secure voice, and a secure teletypewritermessage system. CINCPAC disseminated directives to Commander-in-Chief,PACFLT (CINCPACFLT) and 7AF’s immediate headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF). Although not in the directoperational chain of command, CINCPACAF had control of several supportactivities in the Philippines and he was still 7AF’s commander. CINCPAChad its own secure voice and teletypewriter capabilities. Gayler’s staff inHonolulu had a teletypewriter system to transmit written directives, but theyalso had access to a Defense Satellite Communications System capability toget instant contact with Burns.

COMUSSAG/7AF could direct all naval, air, and ground operations from his Nakhon Phanom headquarters. During the operation, Burns turned on-site command over to an EC-130 Airborne Battlefield, Communications,Command, and Control (ABCCC) aircraft circling in the vicinity. The

The HH-53C played a major

role during the assault and

extraction of marines on Koh

Tang. The aircraft were from

the 40th ARRS from Nakhon

Phanom. Its three 7.62mm

miniguns provided

suppressing fire that

frequently stopped the

Cambodians from shooting

down the helicopters around

Koh Tang. (US Air Force)


JCS

White House/National Security

Council

NMCC

CINCPAC

CINCPACAF

CINCPACFLT

COMUSSAG/7AF

13AF

ABCCCEC-130

U-2 Relay

Aircraft

Ships

USMC 2/9Koh Tang

US Lines of Communication

Formal lines of communication

CINCPAC receive/monitor operationalcommunications over region via 13AF

U-2 data relay


37

EC-130 ABCCC was codenamed “Cricket,” and its capabilities were criticalto harmonizing the many simultaneous actions planned for May 15. ACricket aircraft transmitted orders to all forces in theater, and its battle staffcoordinated aircraft flights, deployments of forces, integrated requests forsupport, and other activities. Cricket talked to the marines through very highfrequency (VHF), frequency modulation, and ultra high frequency (UHF)radio communications, while the EC-130 battle staff directed aircraft andships mainly through a UHF radio link. A secondary system to support theABCCC was a SAC U-2 aircraft, which served as a manual UHF relay andallowed Burns to communicate with any aircraft or ships in the area.COMUSSAG/7AF also could send and receive messages to CINCPACFLTships via a high frequency secure teletypewriter. Unfortunately, staff rangingfrom CINCPAC to the White House could also listen to traffic and responddirectly to any messages from deployed units in action.

The Plan

Fears that B-52D bombing

might produce heavy

civilian and collateral

damage forced Washington

to reconsider their use in

Cambodia. Instead, Coral

Sea tactical aircraft armed

with precision guided

munitions, like this Walleye

bomb, had to make the

attacks. These weapons gave

CINCPAC more capability

to hit specific targets.

(US Navy)

A-6As, from the Coral Sea’s

CAW-15, participated in the

attacks on the Cambodian

coast. The A-6s pictured

here are similar to the ones

that hit Kompong Som and

Ream. The aircraft had two

crew members and could

deliver ordnance with

precision at night or under

poor weather conditions.

(US Navy)


AC-130s used their sensors

to illuminate targets. Here,

an AC-130 has just engaged

a Cambodian gunboat with

20mm and 40mm guns.

USAF aircraft tried to isolate

the Cambodians on

Koh Tang to ensure that

Mayaguez crew members

were not transferred to the

mainland nor Cambodian

reinforcements could deploy

to the island. (US Air Force)

38

THE RAID The Khmer Rouge take action While Ford and the NSC debated American military and diplomatic actions,the Khmer Rouge naval contingent that had taken the Mayaguez crewcaptive was also busy. From 1640hrs (all times are local Cambodian) to1700hrs on May 13, they forced Miller and his crew onto two fishing boatsand anchored near an East Beach cove. The Mayaguez remained inCambodian hands, but the ship had no power. The fishing boats anchoredabout 76yd from shore, but no American left the boats. Some Khmer Rougemembers did depart for Koh Tang.

A Cambodian interrogated Miller’s crew. He wanted to know theirmission and cargo. Miller explained that the ship carried neither guns normunitions. He even proposed that his captors search the ship as proof. Atabout 2000hrs, Miller and another crew member accompanied severalCambodians back to the Mayaguez to search it. Miller never reached hisship, as an RF-4C appeared and dropped flares to illuminate thenphotograph the ship. The Cambodians, frightened by the aircraft, returnedto the cove. Aircraft buzzed the island all night, and the defenders directedantiaircraft fire at these planes without success.

The shipping movements near Koh Tang had heightened US worriesabout the American crew being moved. That evening, the JCS ordered

CINCPAC to authorize his aircraft to use riot control agent(RCA) tear gas munitions, bombs, and gunfire to stop theMayaguez from reaching the mainland. Aircrews did not haveto deploy any munitions, as the Khmer Rouge did not attemptto move the ship. A few hours later, CINCPAC received aNMCC message ordering Air Force and Navy assets to isolateKoh Tang; 7AF and PACFLT forces were to intercept anyships trying to enter or exit the area. Air Force pilots reportedfive boats in the area about 300yd offshore from Koh Tang.

The next day, a Khmer Rouge naval officer decided to takeMiller and his shipmates to Kompong Som. Debate had raged


39

between the Cambodian naval contingent, who wanted tokeep the Americans on Koh Tang, and the Khmer Rougeisland forces who wanted nothing to do with them. The KohTang garrison argued that it had no facilities to keep thesailors, not enough food, and controlling 40 prisoners wouldbe a drain on the undermanned facility. The American crewhad to go. An AC-130 crew spotted several boats leaving theKoh Tang area headed to the mainland at 0530hrs. The JCS’fear that the Mayaguez’s crew might head to the mainlandcame true. Ford had just approved the sinking of Cambodianships trying to leave Koh Tang and the JCS issued the order.A-7D and other aircraft went into action.

Eight minutes after Ford’s decision, at 0720hrs, two A-7Ds dropped RCAsub-munitions on a Swift boat northeast of Koh Tang, trying to stop it.Failing to divert its course, the pilots fired 20mm rounds near the ship aswarning shots, but struck it; the vessel caught fire and sank. A HH-53Chelicopter tried to rescue the ten crew members, but it was not successful.After the A-7Ds destroyed the boat, a P-3 sighted a fishing boat with about30–40 people huddled in the bow, described as “Caucasians,” headed duenorth to Kompong Som. The boat was moving at about 5 knots. SeveralAmerican aircraft subsequently saw the fishing boat, including four A-7Ds,two F-4s, a C-130, and a KC-135 tanker. The rationale for the marinestaking Koh Tang had departed on the Thai fishing boat. Unfortunately,Washington was not sure that all of the crew had moved – NSA signalsintelligence analysts intercepted a message that indicated some of the crewwas still on Koh Tang – but the intelligence was inaccurate, and the wholecrew had indeed departed.

The 7AF pilots tried several times to stop the boat. Fears of wounding orkilling some of the people aboard forced the pilots to avoid direct fire on theship. An F-4 fighter unleashed a 20mm burst across the boat’s bow, and alsoused 2.75in rockets. These actions failed to turn the craft. F-111As thendropped bombs in an attempt to intimidate the Khmer Rouge crew, and A-7Ds also released RCA through CBU-30 (cluster bomb unit) sub-munitionsat about 70ft above the fishing boat’s stern. The pilots made several passes;the A-7Ds ejected CBU-30 sub-munitions many times. Captives and captorsvomited due to the tear gas, but the fishing trawler chugged forward – armedKhmer Rouge guards forced the Thai crew, at gunpoint, to move towards themainland despite the tear gas. The A-7Ds returned 30 minutes later anddropped RCA munitions again, but they failed to deter the vessel. A pilotoffered to disable the ship by shooting out the rudder, but Washingtondeclined. Ford was incensed that the military had allowed any Khmer Rougeships to leave Koh Tang. While Jones and Schlesinger tried to get guidancefrom Ford, the President wanted to find out why the pilots did not follow hisorder. He later issued a directive to sink all boats in the area. Jones and othersreminded the President that there could still be Americans on the boats, butJones authorized tactical aircraft and naval gunfire attacks against allCambodian small naval vessels within 25 nautical miles of Koh Tang,

An AC-13 took this night

shot of the Mayaguez before

Miller and another crew

member arrived with their

Khmer Rouge captors.

The Cambodians wanted to

search the ship for arms and

munitions, but an RF-4C,

dropping flares, frightened

them off. (US Air Force)

The Raid


40

This Cambodian Swift boat

lies damaged near the East

Beach. Although the craft

could not move, Khmer

Rouge sailors used its

.50-caliber machine guns

to thwart American efforts

to reinforce marines on Koh

Tang. The Holt eventually

destroyed the boat with its

0.5in guns. (US Air Force)


Kompong Som, Poulo Wai, and Ream. These forces werenot to attack into Vietnamese territory.

A-7D and RF-4C crews watched the fishing boat enterwaters off Kompong Som. The boats anchored about a milesouth of the harbor. The failure to stop the boat forced thePresident to move faster. He wanted to avoid any lengthynegotiation for their release, and a military action mightconvince the Cambodian leadership to release the crew.

Throughout May 14, the 7AF pilots observed patrolboats operating throughout the Koh Tang area. Aircraft

attacked several patrol vessels, and F-4s sank two small craft between theMayaguez and Koh Tang. An AC-130 aircraft also destroyed a patrol craftabout 2 nautical miles east northeast of the island. Air Force crews damagedfour other ships. During the night, AC-130s continued to attack patrol craft.

In the morning, Phnom Penh had received word about the Mayaguez’scapture, as the world press reported the incident. George H. W. Bush hadtried to deliver the diplomatic demands to the Cambodian embassy inBeijing, but failed. The United Nations had attempted and failed to getCambodia to acknowledge America’s request to release the ship and its crew.Washington’s “Voice of America” radio station broadcast demands to releasethe crew and the ship at 1800hrs Cambodian time. There was no response.The American military presence had also visibly intensified in the Gulf ofThailand. The local Cambodian naval commander who had seized theMayaguez wanted the Kompong Som garrison to take control of theAmerican ship’s crew. The garrison commander refused to take anyone.

The naval officer had no other alternative but to leave. He took the crewto Koh Rong Sam Lem, a Cambodian naval compound about 10 nauticalmiles southwest of Kompong Som. An English-speaking Khmer Rouge navalofficer questioned Miller again. The interrogator wanted to know if any crewmembers had CIA or Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) affiliation. Healso inquired once again about the ship’s cargo and mission. After consultingwith his superiors, he then asked how Miller had contacted the aircraft thathad sunk the Khmer Rouge patrol boats. The officer pressed Miller abouthow many men he needed to get his ship underway, and if he could contactthe appropriate authorities to call off the air attacks. Miller convinced theCambodian that if he and his crew returned to the Mayaguez, then he couldcontact the American military and stop the bombing. After discussions withPhnom Penh, the officer notified Miller that he and nine crew memberswould return to the ship and use the radio to call for a ceasefire. Thenotification came at 1300hrs; they would depart at dusk by a gunboat.However, the gunboat crew feared that they would be targets for Americanaircraft. Miller and the crew would remain overnight. During this time,Phnom Penh decided to release all of the crew and that they would all leaveon a fishing boat at daybreak, at about the same time as the start of the KohTang assault and the Mayaguez seizure.

Unfortunately, Ford and the NSC did not know about this decision. Otherevents also shaped the final call to launch the American rescue. The

0542hrsPlanned

operational starttime for

Koh Tang assault

MAY 151975


41

The Holt’s commander was

concerned about enemy

gunboats or craft attacking

amidships – the 5in main

gun and other weapons did

not have to ability to protect

the ship in those areas. Navy

crews armed with M-60s,

M-16s, and other small arms

guarded the ship from

gunboats while marines

boarded the Mayaguez.

(US Navy)

The Raid

Cambodians had detained a Thai freighter for two hours just 30 miles eastof where they had taken the Mayaguez, and Khmer Rouge gunboats hadalso fired upon the Hirado, a Swedish refrigerator cargo ship. The Americanembassy in Tehran, Iran, had reported that a senior Chinese diplomatmentioned that his government was trying to influence the Cambodians torelease the crew. The diplomat believed that the Mayaguez crew would soonbe free. Kissinger received this report, but did not report the news to Ford.The American assault force now had only a few hours before the attack.

Under the War Powers Resolution, Ford gave notification tocongressional members about his proposed actions. On the afternoon of May14, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee drafted and passed unanimouslya resolution that condemned Cambodia for taking the Mayaguez and notedthe President’s attempts to use diplomatic means to solve the situation. Thecommittee also voted to support Ford to exercise his constitutional powersto release the crew.

With no apparent success with the United Nations, the American demandsfor the crew and ship’s release, Ford started to issue operational orders. Around1645hrs on May 14 (Washington time), Ford told Jones to relay the order totake the Mayaguez, assault Koh Tang, and begin the air raids. In Thailand,USAF helicopter crews were getting ready to transport the marines; it was0345hrs on May 15. Jones transmitted the orders by voice to CINCPAC. He also confirmed Ford’s directives to seize and secure the Mayaguez and toconduct the helicopter assault on Koh Tang. PACFLT would launch Coral Seaaircraft against Kompong Som at 0745hrs. Jones specifically mentioned not toattack any merchant ships in the harbor unless they could be identified. Theaircraft pilots had to make maximum use of PGMs.

The JCS and CINCPAC staffs were moving towards military actions. TheCoral Sea was now within seven hours of its destination, although it wasalready in aircraft range and could conduct flight operations. The Holt alsoreported that it was ready to receive the marines to board the Mayaguez.

America responds The US forces were ready to initiate offensive actions to take back theMayaguez and its crew. The USAF had already sunk Khmer Rougeships, now 7AF was preparing to support the assault. Moreimportantly, helicopter crews started preflight activities for themissions to Koh Tang and the Holt. Likewise, the BLT 1/4 and 2/9Marines received final briefings and loaded ammunition, supplies,and weapons onto the helicopters. The Wilson and the Holt weregetting prepared to receive the boarding party and to shield the areafrom any possible Khmer Rouge gunboat interference. Washingtonwas ready to act.

The HH-53C and CH-53C aircraft scheduled to fly out over theGulf of Thailand had few veteran crews. Most of the pilots and co-pilotshad not served in the Vietnam War, but had participated in OperationsFrequent Wind and Eagle Pull. Fortunately, some of the pararescue and flight engineers were experienced, combat noncommissioned

0600hrsMarines commence

landings on Koh Tang

MAY 151975


42

officers (NCOs). The helicopter crews did not havemuch training with other services. Rescue and specialoperations activities did not typically involve theparticular tactical maneuvers and approaches neededfor a helicopter assault on an island or ship, especiallyif operations occurred under fire. These helicoptersalso did not normally fly in formation, unless theywere trying to refuel in flight.

The helicopters flown by the USAF and theassault helicopters used by the marines were similar.Different missions forced some distinct changes inconfiguration. The HH-53C had more armorplating to protect the crew during rescue missions

than a typical CH-53C. Normal missions of CH-53s in 21st SOS serviceincluded delivery and extraction of personnel in enemy-held territory. TheCH-53C had to carry personnel and equipment over longer distances, andcrews could trade this payload for the removal of some of the armor plating.The HH-53C also had an aerial refueling boom that could extend the rangeof the helicopter or allow it to stay over an area for an extended time tosearch for downed aircrews. Armament was also different: the 40th ARRSHH-53 aircrews operated three 7.62mm miniguns compared to only two inthe CH-53C. Both helicopter types carried two external fuel tanks. The HH-53C’s tanks contained 450 gallons of fuel, but they also featured afire-retardant polyurethane foam system that would limit damage to theaircraft if hit by enemy gunfire. The CH-53C carried two 650-gallon tanksto compensate for its lack of aerial refueling capability, but did not have thefire-retardant system. Several 21st SOS personnel had requested the samefire-retardant system for the CH-53C fuel tanks, but CINCPACAF did notgive approval. The 40th ARRS used the call sign “Jolly Green” for their HH-53Cs, while the CH-53Cs responded to “Knife.”

With marines loaded aboard, 11 helicopters left U-Tapao for the Holtand Koh Tang. The pilots took off from 0414hrs to 0425hrs and flew inloose formation on a southwesterly course into the Gulf of Thailand.

Recovering the Mayaguez: “Marines over the side” Major Ray E. Porter, 1/4 Marines’ executive officer, and Captain WaltWood’s force were in three HH-53Cs: Jolly Green (JG) 11, 12, and 13. By0600hrs, the first helicopter had reached the Holt. The destroyer escort’ssmall antisubmarine helicopter pad, used by its antisubmarine SH-2 Seaprite,did not provide room to land a HH-53C. The helicopter pilot also had toensure the main rotor would not hit any part of the ship. The only option tooffload the marines was to set down the front landing gear on the pad andhave the passengers depart from the one of the front crew doors. Theoperation went smoothly with all personnel on the Holt within 15–20minutes. The three helicopters had brought the 48-man contingent fromCompany D, the MSC personnel, and the Navy volunteers to power up theMayaguez, two Air Force EOD technicians, and an Army linguist. The MSC


Commander Peterson

successfully positioned his

ship near the Mayaguez

with one attempt. He did

not know if the difference in

deck height would affect

the seizure. This photograph

indicates that the concern

was unfounded. Note the

relative size of the Holt to

the Mayaguez. (US Navy)


43

civilian personnel had come from the USNS Greenville Victory, a World WarII-era cargo ship. The Navy personnel from the USS Duluth, an Austin-classamphibious transport ship, had just finished recovering refugees fromOperation Frequent Wind. JG11 and 12 returned to Thailand to prepare forthe second wave assault on Koh Tang. JG13 remained near the action tohelp in any search-and-rescue effort. Commander Robert Peterson, the Holt’scaptain, got the ship moving at 25 knots towards the Mayaguez at 0630hrs.

While Wood conducted preparations to board the container ship, theKhmer Rouge on Koh Rong Sam Lem freed the Mayaguez crew. Miller andhis men received final approval from Phnom Penh to return to their ship atabout 0620hrs. Six Khmer Rouge sailors accompanied Miller onto a Thaifishing boat. Twenty minutes after leaving Koh Rong Sam Lem, anotherfishing boat intercepted the Thai vessel. The Cambodian captors left theThai boat and told the American crew that they could return to the

The Raid

OPPOSITE, BOTTOM: Arms

at the ready. This marine

prepares to go aboard the

Mayaguez from the Holt.

With gas mask on, he

prepares for the worst.

A-7Ds delivered riot control

agents onto the container

ship to incapacitate any

Khmer Rouge defenders.

Fortunately, no one was

killed or wounded during

the boarding. (US Navy)

The Vietnam War’s end in 1975 meant a return to normaltraining duty for the USMC. Marine units throughout thePacific prepared for an unpredictable future, with dutiesranging from embassy security details, Fleet MarinePacific deployments, guarding naval installations andships, and acting as a ready force. The marine units alsohad to respond at a moment’s notice to any nationalemergency, like the Mayaguez incident.

Within hours of the Mayaguez alert, marine officers had to send men and material from the Philippines andOkinawa to get ready to board a ship and potentiallyassault an unknown location. Sketchy conditions forcedofficers to plan with broad concepts. With no time totrain or coordinate with Navy, USAF, and otherparticipants, the officers from 1/4 and 2/9 Marines had to make do with their limited resources to execute a unique raid under constantly changing conditions.

Layers of decision makers, some in theater and others in Washington, debated tactical decisions that affectedthe final concepts. Officers in the field had to improviseand overcome problems, a trademark of the MarineCorps. One example stands out. During the finalplanning phase for the Mayaguez boarding and Koh Tangassault, COMUSSAG/7AF and the Mayaguez groundsecurity force commander, Colonel Johnson, had agreedto a direct helicopter assault on the container ship.CINCPACFLT had disagreed and pushed the concept ofhelicopters transporting the marines to the Holt, whichwould then transfer them to the Mayaguez. SinceCOMMUSSAG/7AF did not control PACFLT assets in the

area, the decision had to go to CINCPAC. The plan thatAdmiral Gayler reviewed had inadvertently specified adirect helicopter insertion on the Mayaguez. Gaylerfound the CINCPACFLT concept less risky and approvedthe plan with that modification. Johnson had only a fewhours to design and coordinate a new plan. Fortunately,the ship seizure occurred without any problems.

Marines in Subic Bay, Philippines, also reacted swiftlywhen CINCPAC activated the 9th Marine AmphibiousBrigade (9 MAB) to support the Mayaguez operations.The 9 MAB’s commander put together a staff at 0800hrson May 13. The 2/4 Marines served as the groundelement with 662 men. CH-53s from Heavy MarineHelicopter Squadron 462 (HMH-462) would providedirect support. The marines could also count on CH-46sto land forces and conduct resupply missions. The 9 MABpersonnel and equipment started to load onto theHancock and the Mobile within hours. Their potentialmissions included taking Poulo Wai, occupyingKompong Som, landing on Koh Tang, and seizing theMayaguez. The task force left Subic Bay at 0700hrs thenext day. While 9 MAB staff monitored the Air ForceCommand Net for information, the marines heard aboutthe 7AF helicopter rescue of the Koh Tang assault force.The planning for combat operations turned to a rescuemission. The 2/4 and HMH-462 marines stood ready incase the USAF helicopters failed. Fortunately, theextraction took place within hours. Still, 9 MAB wasready to execute an attack on Kompong Som. CINCPACdeactivated the task force on May 18.

AMERICA’S SPEAR POINT: THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS


44

Mayaguez. Earlier, the Cambodian guards had given Miller’s crew longbamboo poles, to which they tied some white undershirts to ward offattacks by any American combat aircraft or naval ships. At 0607hrs, HuNim, Cambodian Minister of Information and Propaganda, made adomestic 19-minute radio broadcast. He stated Phnom Penh’s willingness torelease the Mayaguez and allow it to leave Cambodian waters. Thebroadcast made no specific mention of the crew. Kissinger did not informFord about the message until 0715hrs.

Peterson and Wood were ready to take the Mayaguez. Peterson was nowonly 10–15 minutes from his target and called for the RCA drop. Three A-7Ds delivered the RCA with 16 CBU-30s over the freighter at 0719hrs.Peterson then carefully maneuvered the Holt for the boarding. The destroyerescort had only one propeller screw, but moved the vessel so that he wouldallow the marines to enter the ship from his portside. At about 200yd fromthe Mayaguez, Peterson called in the strafing run, but later waved it off sincethey were closing too fast. Marines and sailors watched for any KhmerRouge defenders, but none showed.

One of Peterson’s major concerns was how to board the ship. The Holtwould come alongside the container ship, but differences in deck heightsmight make a boarding difficult. Fortunately, the main decks were about thesame height. With the Holt next to the Mayaguez, Lieutenant CommanderJohn Todd, Peterson’s executive officer, ordered “Marines over the side.”With gas masks on, Wood and Corporal C. R. Coker jumped onto theMayaguez at 0725hrs, to begin securing the vessel. Coker moved towards thebridge. A squad was supposed to follow the two men onto the freighter, butthe ships drifted apart by about 25ft and the remaining boarding party couldnot come cross the gap. The captain and the corporal quickly secured theships together once they retrieved mooring lines from the Holt.

Now, with the ships tied together, two marine squads startedto search the freighter. A squad took control of the bridge.Another moved below decks towards its objective, the engineroom. Other personnel started to look for any Khmer Rougesoldiers and booby traps. The EOD team found no bombs ormines. The marines on the Mayaguez’s bridge did find evidenceof the Cambodians, in the form of prepared food, but theKhmer Rouge detail had apparently abandoned ship. At0822hrs, the Holt signaled to CINPAC that the ship was secure.Porter and Wood raised the American flag on the Mayaguez at0825hrs. While the MSC and naval personnel started to get theMayaguez under steam, the Holt prepared to tow the freighter.Leaving a small marine contingent onboard, Wood and theremaining marines returned to the Holt. They were preparedto support the Koh Tang assault as a contingency. Two oceanictugs had also headed towards the Mayaguez to get it intointernational waters if the crew failed to get the freighter understeam, but were not needed. Once underway, the Holt couldturn to other combat operations near Koh Tang.


Marines swarm throughout

the Mayaguez. It took a little

more than an hour to secure

the ship. Company D was

involved in the first naval

hostile ship-to-ship boarding

since 1826. The marines

accomplished the recovery

without a hitch, unlike the

Koh Tang assault. (US Navy)

0725–0822hrsMarines board and clear theMayaguez

MAY 151975


45

While the marines were taking the Mayaguez, Millerand his crew churned towards Koh Tang. The Wilsonwas on station by 0710hrs. The air raids on KompongSom and Ream also began. More importantly, thehelicopter assault on Koh Tang had started. Fordreleased an announcement to the Cambodians, at0815hrs, that if they would release the crewunconditionally and immediately, then he would orderall military operations to cease. The White House alsomentioned that Americans had retaken the Mayaguez.

A controller on the EC-130 Cricket aircraft receiveda report that a small craft had appeared, headed from the Kompong Som areato Koh Tang. A P-3 investigated. The pilot reported at 0935hrs that the boat,some 13 nautical miles from Koh Tang, had about 30 Caucasians on boardwaving white flags. The Wilson got underway and intercepted the ship. Initial

The Raid

East BeachWest Beach

SS Mayaguez

Hill 440

USS Holt

K31, K23

JG31, K32

JG43, JG42

K21, K22

JG11, JG12, JG13

K O H T A N G

N

KHMER ROUGE POSITIONS

Heavy machine-gun

Light machine-gun

Mortar

Defensive positions

Ammunition storage

Headquarters

Radio

0

0

500

500

1,000 1,500 yards

1,500 metres1,000

Planned Koh Tang and Mayaguez actions

0600hrs, May 15, 1975

Marines retook the

Mayaguez with little

opposition. Still, fear of

mines or sabotage by the

Khmer Rouge forced

American military and

civilian personnel to

search the containers,

superstructure, and engine

room carefully. They found

no booby traps or explosive

devices. The ship was ready

to get underway in hours.

(US Navy)

1040hrsMayaguez crew

released

MAY 151975


reports from the Wilson indicated thatonly 30 of the 40 crew were on the boat,but staff quickly corrected the report – all40 of the Mayaguez crew and five Thaisailors were recovered. Burns’headquarters sent a message, copying inthe White House, confirming the releaseof the crew at 1040hrs. The Thais receivedfood and fuel, and told the Americans thatthe Cambodians had held them for fivemonths. They then left for home. Americahad now recovered the ship and crew. TheWilson headed to the Mayaguez to returnthe crew. At 1045hrs, the Wilson’s captain

told the JCS that Miller had convinced the Cambodians that if they werereleased, the Americans would stop any airstrikes. Ford made a publicannouncement that the Cambodians had released the crew and ship at1127hrs, but air operations continued.

Miller and his crew returned to the Mayaguez at 1205hrs. The Holt hadtaken the freighter under tow and it headed north of Koh Tang towardsThailand. When the Mayaguez came under steam, Peterson ordered the towline cut. The Holt had escorted the container ship until it was 12 nauticalmiles from any Cambodian territory, in what Phnom Penh classified asinternational waters. Unfortunately, Peterson could not retrieve any of theMSC, Navy, Marine, or other personnel, since CINCPAC ordered them tosupport the marines at Koh Tang immediately.

Green Lizards, Fighting Redcocks, and Mighty Shrikesgo to war The Coral Sea was ready for action by the morning of May 15. Rear Admiral

R. P. Coogan, commanding Task Force 77 (TF 77), had his carrierair wing prepared for the first mission, an armed reconnaissanceflight over the targeted area. The carrier air wing on the Coral Seaconsisted of five tactical air squadrons plus several detachments.VF-51 (Screaming Eagles) and VF-111 (Sundowners) flew F-4NPhantom II fighters that provided combat air patrols over thetargeted areas. The F-4N pilots could also strafe and bomb groundtargets. The primary attack capability came from VA-95 (GreenLizards), VA-22 (Fighting Redcocks), and VA-94 (Mighty Shrikes).The Green Lizards had a mix of A-6A Intruder bombers and KA-6D tankers. The Fighting Redcocks and Mighty Shrikesoperated the single seated A-7E Corsair II. TF-77 also had its ownE-1B airborne early warning aircraft, RF-8G photo-reconnaissancejets, and SH-3G rescue helicopters. The wing had come aboardthe aircraft carrier in December 1974. This day would provide thepilots with their first and only combat mission of their seven-month western Pacific cruise.


46

The Holt’s bridge was busy

during the boarding of the

freighter. Commander

Peterson, the Holt’s captain,

is at the center of the

photograph. The frigate

was ready to take action

if Cambodian defenders

decided to contest the

boarding. Fortunately, the

Mayaguez was abandoned

and the mission uneventful.

(US Navy)


Coogan had launched his aircraft at0705hrs to ensure he met the planned time overtarget (TOT) at 0745hrs. The Navy pilots’mission was to locate and identify any boats oraircraft in the area. If identified as Cambodian,they could attack. Coogan estimated that hecould launch an aircraft strike every one hourand 15 minutes to achieve his objectives.

Before the air strikes, Ford and the NSCwere in a quandary. The President had receivedreports that the Cambodians had released theMayaguez, but had no news of the crew. At0728hrs, Ford ordered TF 77 pilots not to dropany ordnance over Kompong Som. Discussionsbetween CINCPAC and the NMCC revolvedaround the impact of the Cambodian announcement on the mission.Confusion set in. Orders from the White House at 0729hrs then directedCINCPAC not to launch the Coral Sea’s aircraft against Kompong Som. Fiveminutes later, the JCS staff sent a verbal message to CINCPAC to use allcommunications means to divert and cancel the first mission. By 0744hrs, theJCS cancelled all of the cyclic air strike missions on the mainland, one minutebefore TOT for the Coral Sea aircraft. Four minutes later, another orderfrom the NMCC restored the first attack mission to hit the Cambodianmainland and conduct battle damage assessment (BDA). They provided norationale. Scowcroft approved all of the scheduled cyclic missions again. TheNMCC transmitted his message to continue the bombing as planned. A0757hrs PACFLT message confirmed the directive to resume attacks on theCambodian mainland. Flying crews, planners, maintenance teams, and flightdeck personnel had to adjust and prepare for the upcoming missions. TheCoral Sea’s aircraft barely reached the Cambodian coast. The armedreconnaissance mission returned to the Coral Sea at 0830hrs. Although thepilots did not use their weapons, they did identify an oil refinery in theKompong Som area as a potential target.

TF 77 aircraft prepared for the planned second wave. At 0845hrs, theCoral Sea launched two A-6A and five A-7E attack jets along with supportplanes to attack the Ream airfield. This wave stuck at 0957hrs. RF-4Caircraft had photographed the airfield and analysts found aircraft werepresent. The A-6A and A-7E jets destroyed two C-47s and a C-46. The Navypilots left two aircraft damaged. Initial pilot BDA reports indicated as manyas 17 aircraft destroyed, but the pilots had overestimated the damage. Afterthe attack, photo-reconnaissance analysts counted only 12 aircraft at theReam airfield. The speed of the aircraft and the minimum 6,000ft altitudemay have affected the reporting. The Navy pilots did, however, crater theReam runway. The aircrews also bombed and strafed a petroleum, oil, andlubricant (POL) storage facility, warehouses, a 37mm antiaircraft artillerysite, and hangers. The aircrews reported a large POL fire and they haddamaged the 37mm gun position.

The Raid

47

The Thai-based fishing boat

used to carry Miller to the

Wilson was also the same

vessel that took him and his

crew to Koh Rong Sam Lem

from Koh Tang via Kompong

Som. The Cambodians

captured and held the Thai

crew for five months. One

can see the Mayaguez

towed by the Holt in the

top right. (US Navy)

OPPOSITE, BOTTOM:

The marines found evidence

of previous Cambodian

presence on the Mayaguez.

Prepared food, cold and

uneaten, was on the bridge.

Khmer Rouge sailors had left

the ship unmanned. The

American military party that

took control of the ship did

not find any weapons;

allegedly, $5,000 in cash

went missing from the

captain’s cabin. (US Navy)


The marines who took the

Mayaguez were well armed

with M-16s, shotguns, M-79

grenade launchers, M-60

machine guns, and other

weapons. These marines

could only watch as

activities heated up

on Koh Tang island, in

the background. There was

consideration of landing the

marines via Holt’s gig, but

no one requested it.

(US Navy)

At 1020hrs, Coogan launched the thirdwave. While the aircraft were in flight to thetargets, CINCPAC was made aware that acondition of the Mayaguez crew’s release was acessation of aircraft attacks. Gayler asked Jonesif the third planned attack should continue.Schlesinger authorized the third wave, and Jonesnotified CINCPAC to proceed. The strike forcehad several targets: Kompong Som’s harbor, thePhumi Phsar Ream naval base, and the POLrefinery north of Kompong Som identified bythe first mission. Before each mission, TF 77 senta list of targets to the JCS. IPAC did not proposethe POL refinery target to Coogan, sinceintelligence center personnel knew that the

refinery had been non-operational for years. At 1050hrs, the bombing began.Two A-6A and two A-7E planes hit the Ream naval facility, destroying abarrack and causing fires at a POL storage area. Four A-7Es set twowarehouses on fire, causing moderate structural damage, and scored a directhit on a railroad marshalling yard building, probably a warehouse, nearKompong Som. The aircraft also hit the POL refinery target identified fromthe first mission. Pilots damaged and holed some storage tanks, but nothingwas set aflame.

The final bombing mission prepared for action. The strike force of twoA-6As, four A-7Es, and escorting F-4N aircraft left the Coral Sea at 1145hrs.TF 77 moved south of Koh Tang, the ships now about 85–90 nautical milesfrom the island. While the Coral Sea aircraft sped towards their targets,Schlesinger had decided, with the JCS’ recommendation, to cancel themission. The strike aircraft did not hit any targets, but an A-7E did sink apatrol boat 5 nautical miles south of the island. The last Coral Sea pilotreturned to the aircraft carrier at 1335hrs.

The Green Lizards, Fighting Redcocks, and Mighty Shrikes completed theirmissions, a total of 15 sorties. Green Lizard tankers also made six sorties. TF 77 pilots conducted two E-1B sorties and another two RF-8G missions onMay 15 to support the attacks. Coogan could now focus on Koh Tang.

Koh Tang: A costly initial assault Before events clarified the situation, Ford, the NSC, CINCPAC, and othershad evidence that the main focus of the rescue, the Mayaguez crew, might notbe on Koh Tang. The fishing boat carrying a number of people, who lookedlike American crew members, to Kompong Som caused Washington to thinktwice. Was the assault on Koh Tang a reasonable mission? Did the Cambodianssend the entire crew to the mainland? There was no conclusive proof toindicate that the Khmer Rouge had moved all 40 Mayaguez sailors toKompong Som. After Captain Wood and his marines had secured the freighter,the CINCPAC staff had received a Cambodian radio transmission from anunknown location. The transmission mentioned, “Let the Americans go.



49

The marines who landed on

the Mayaguez had moved

from the Philippines,

Thailand, and onto the Holt

within a short time. Still,

they performed very well

under the circumstances and

retook the ship without any

practice and against a

potentially hostile Khmer

Rouge force with AK-47s,

RPGs, and machine guns.

(US Navy)

The Raid

We do not want to become prisoners ourselves.” Intelligenceanalysts could only speculate if the message was from PhnomPenh to Koh Tang or Kompong Som. Washington and Honolulucould not discount the idea that the Khmer Rouge was holdingAmerican prisoners on the island early on May 15.

CINCPAC had put into play a number of actions thatrequired precise timing and simultaneous activities. TheMayaguez seizure, TF 77 and the Coral Sea aircraft strikes onCambodia, and BLT 2/9’s helicopter assault and search of KohTang were scheduled to occur about the same time. Jones,Gayler, and Burns had already set actions into motion. Stoppingthe helicopter attack on Koh Tang might be possible, but theywere almost ready to hit the beaches.

Elements of BLT 2/9 had departed with 1/4’s Company Dfrom U-Tapao at 0415hrs. Unfortunately, Phnom Penh’s0607hrs radio broadcast about the Khmer Rouge willingness to release the container ship occurred after the HH-53C and CH-53C had left Thailand. While the marines approached KohTang, American intelligence analysts had just translated the message. Evenif the message reached Ford, the marines would have already touched downon the East and West Beaches.

The marine assault force nearing Koh Tang would land in pairs ofhelicopters. One pair, Knife (K)21 and 22, with parts of Company G includingits commander Captain James H. Davis, approached the West Beach. K21 andK22’s landing had to hit at first light to achieve surprise. At the same time, K23and K31, carrying further elements of Company G, would strike the EastBeach. Austin, with further units of BLT 2/9 in four other helicopters, was inthe initial wave that would land on the East Beach too.

As the assault force flew close to Koh Tang, the sun’s light appeared on thehorizon, making the helicopters visible. Some of the helicopters had seengunfire, probably from patrolling gunboats, but none from the shoreline. Afterthe landings, the marines could call on five flights of A-7Ds for close airsupport, but it looked unnecessary now. The first wave would have nopreparatory fires, naval or aerial, to hit any possible beach defenses. Besides,the Holt was busy with the Mayaguez and the Wilson would approach KohTang at about 0700hrs. Austin’s mission was to search for and recover Millerand his crew. Any air bombardment or naval gunfire could accidently kill someof the Mayaguez crew. The marines only expected little resistance anyway.

The next pair, JG41 and K32 was only a mile back from K23 and K31.The last pair, JG42 and JG43, brought up the rear. The men on the EastBeach were the main strike force to drive west towards the fishing villageand link up with Davis’ contingent.

At about 0600hrs, the helicopters approached the beaches. To offload themarines, the helicopter crews had to use their rear cargo ramp. A pilot had toturn the helicopter around to drop the rear ramp, putting the aircraft in avulnerable position. Any enemy fire from the beaches would endanger thelandings. Supporting American gunfire would have to come from the


50

helicopters themselves – as one helicopter deliveredits men, the other could provide fire support withits miniguns in an emergency. The CH-53Chelicopters only had miniguns in the forward areaof the aircraft; unlike the HH-53Cs, there was nominigun in the rear cargo ramp.

K21 started to unload the 20 marines onto thebeach. Second Lieutenant James McDaniel hadhalf of the 1st Platoon of Company G with him.The Cambodians, from their entrenched defensivepositions, delivered immediate fire from AK-47s,RPGs, mortars, and machine guns. K22 tried to

provide fire support; it reported a “Hot LZ” (landing zone) to Cricket atabout 0605hrs. Air Force Captain Terry Ohlemeier, in K22, noted the shore“looked like a string of Christmas tree lights.” Enemy gunfire damaged oneof K21’s engines and it had to leave the West Beach immediately. With thehelicopter leaking fuel and emitting smoke, its pilot Lieutenant Colonel JohnDenham tried to control the CH-53C, but failed. Denham was the 21st SOScommander and had led the eight helicopters from U-Tapao to Koh Tang. Asthe crippled CH-53C struggled to stay airborne, the crew lightened thehelicopter by ditching equipment and other items. The helicopter slid into theocean, about three-quarters of a mile off the beach. Crew members startedto evacuate the sinking CH-53C. All but one member escaped, Staff SergeantElwood Rumbaugh, the flight mechanic. Rumbaugh had helped the co-pilotget out the helicopter, but the crew never saw him again. He presumablydrowned. Another USAF helicopter later rescued Denham and the rest ofthe crew.

Like K21, K22 was struck by many rounds, which produced fuel leaksand ripped up the airframe, and wounded marines in the cargo bay. Davis,in K22, could not join his men on the beach. Ohlemeier had problemscontrolling the helicopter. He had to abort the mission and try to fly back toThailand. Losing altitude, power, and fuel, the K22 crew wondered if theycould make landfall. Fortunately, the helicopter found a landing spot, about83 nautical miles from U-Tapao. With the damaged instruments, the pilotwas unsure of where they had set down – fear that they had landed inCambodia was on the minds of the Air Force crew and the marines.Fortunately, JG11 and 12, returning from the Holt, linked up with K22 inflight. The damaged helicopter had landed in Thailand and JG12 returnedthe marines and their equipment to U-Tapao.

The West Beach assault had landed in a hornet’s nest. The assault forcesuffered one helicopter destroyed and another damaged. McDaniel and hismen had to contend with an enemy force much larger and more heavilyarmed than expected, and in good defensive positions. He did manage tomove past the tree line and overrun a 60mm mortar position. The loss ofhelicopters also called into question the ability to send in more marines in thesubsequent planned waves, and to resupply the force with criticalammunition and water.

Marines, onboard the

recaptured Mayaguez,

watch the Wilson sail by

with Koh Tang in the

background. The Wilson

would get a radio call from

a passing P-3 that reported

a boat headed south to Koh

Tang. It was a Thai fishing

boat containing the released

Mayaguez crew returning to

their ship. (US Navy)



51

If the marine assault in the western approach faced difficulties, the EastBeach landing would prove even worse. K23 approached the beach. Thegunfire on the West Beach had already erupted, so the Khmer Rougedefenders were ready. K23 took immediate fire as the marines fromCompany G’s 3rd Platoon left the cargo bay. The helicopter’s engine wasdying and Cambodian RPG gunners shot off the rear tail section. K23’s pilothad to set down his chopper a few hundred yards from shore, damagedbeyond control. The pilot put the CH-53C into the water and the helicopterquickly flooded. With the rear cargo ramp down, the marines started to exitthe downed chopper while firing into the tree line with M-16s. SecondLieutenant Michael Cicere, 3rd Platoon’s commander, led his men towardsthe beach. The K23 crew and some Air Force personnel also disembarked,but the pilot and two others stayed behind to shut down the CH-53C andtry to contact Cricket. When the three attempted to reach Cicere and theothers, they came under fire. A flight mechanic was wounded, but allmanaged to reunite with the group.

K31 was trying to suppress the Cambodians from attacking K23, usingone of its 7.62mm miniguns, but it also came under accurate gunfire. As K23settled into the water, the Cambodians increasingly concentrated on takingdown K31. The helicopter was on its final approach when it received a blastof heavy automatic gunfire and RPG volleys. One RPG struck the helicopteron the left side, wounding several men and igniting leaking fuel. One of the650-gallon external fuel tanks exploded. The pilot, Major Howard Corson,tried to turn the helicopter around, but it was a fireball. K31’s co-pilot,Second Lieutenant Richard Vandegeer, tried to use an M-16 to return firefrom the cockpit while the helicopter moved away from the shore.Unfortunately, another RPG round stuck the cockpit, ripping out theinstrument panel and wounding Vandegeer. Corson was in trouble – he wasin danger of the Khmer Rouge shooting the CH-53C out of the skies. He had to set the helicopter down into the surf south of K23.

The USS Coral Sea’s Carrier

Air Wing-15 conducted

several air raids on the

Kompong Som area to

punish the Cambodian

government and stop any

reinforcements moving to

Koh Tang. An attack on the

Ream airfield netted the

destruction of three aircraft,

including this C-47,

although the raid failed to

destroy any combat aircraft.

(US Air Force)

The Mayaguez boarding

team tried to get the

freighter quickly up to

steam, but it took a few

hours. The Holt towed the

ship out to international

waters; the Cambodian

government recognized

such waters 12 miles from

its coastline. After reaching

this limit, the Holt returned

to Koh Tang. (US Navy)

The Raid



THE ORIGINAL PLANOperations against SS Mayaguez, Koh Tang, and Cambodian mainland

1

1

1 23

KOH TANG ASSAULTAND MAYAGUEZBOARDING1 First Wave: BLT 2/9 Company G, with177 personnel, hits West Beach and EastBeach. Helicopters will deliver 1/4Company D marines to the Holt to form theboarding party.

2 Second Wave: BLT 2/9 Company E landson East Beach.

3 Third wave: After Third Wave, CINCPAChas 650 personnel on Koh Tang.

1 3

PLANNED B-52DSTRIKES

1 Cell 1: Three B-52Ds hit Phumi PhsarReam naval base

2 Cell 2: Three B-52Ds hit Ream airfield

3 Cells 3 and 4: Six B-52Ds hit KompongSom harbor

1 3

KOH RONG

KOH RONG SAM LEM

ILE DES PALÉTUVIERS

KOH PAS

KOH TANG

USS HOLT

SSMAYAGUEZ

KOH PRINS


The Raid

G u l f o f T h a i l a n d

3

1

1

2

CARRIER STRIKE BYUSS CORAL SEA

1 Tactical aviation using precision-guidedmunitions (PGMs) can strike the same targetsas the B-52Ds. NSC debates which force willhit Kompong Som and Ream. Withdrawalroute after the attack

1

KEYProposed B-52D operations

Approved US movements

ILE NORA-OUESTILE DE LA BAIE

ILE DU CHENAL

ILE DU MILIEU

CAMBODIA


54

K31’s crew and the marines floated off KohTang. Although they were only in 4ft of water,they were vulnerable targets to theCambodians. Air Force crews and marinesperformed heroically by helping rescue thewounded and assisting others escape theburning helicopter. Khmer Rouge gunfire hadcaused several casualties. Three marines whoescaped the burning helicopter tried to stormthe beach, but Cambodian soldiers easily cutthem down. Ten marines, two Navy corpsmen,and Vandegeer died in the helicopter. Facing

enemy fire, the survivors, some badly wounded or burned, started to headtowards the Gulf of Thailand.

The survivors included Corson, two Air Force crew members, and tenmarines. One of the marines, Lieutenant Terry Tonkin, was a critical assetto the BLT 2/9 force. He was the marine FAC officer who could direct airand naval gunfire support to the ground forces on Koh Tang.Unfortunately, all of his radio equipment was in K31. Despite theproblems, Tonkin would provide help to his fellow marines on the beach.He used Corson’s Air Force survival radio to contact Cricket. Tonkindirected A-7D close air support strafing missions against the Cambodianpositions. Other A-7Ds tried to help McDaniel on the West Beach. Yetwithout marking smoke or any discernable landmarks, trying to establishpositions to bomb or strafe was difficult.

Fortunately, for the K31 survivors, the Wilson was transiting the area.From about 1,000yd from the northeast tip of Koh Tang, spotters on theWilson located K31 survivors, who were in three groups. The survivors hadbeen in the water for a few hours by this time. The only way to rescue themen was by the Wilson’s gig, Black Velvet-1. Armed with two M-60 machineguns to return fire from any Cambodian attackers, the gig rescued two of thegroups, while the Wilson picked up the third group. With the marines andAir Force crew secured and treated for their wounds, the Wilson proceedednorth, where it would eventually rescue Miller in the Thai fishing boat.

Cricket started to receive requests from the downed helicopters. Outof the initial assault, only one helicoptermanaged to return to Thailand. 7AF lost threechoppers. K32 and JG41 made their run to theEast Beach. They could see the smoke fromthe two helicopters on fire. K32, piloted byFirst Lieutenant Michael Lackey, approachedthe beach and received heavy machine-gunfire. An RPG struck the side of his helicopter;Lackey had to abort the mission. He flewacross the neck of the island to the westernside of Koh Tang. Fortunately, Lackey sawK21 in the water. He had to release fuel to

The only way to drop off or

embark marines and other

personnel on Koh Tang was

through the rear cargo ramp.

This HH-53C had the added

advantage of a rear-mounted

minigun. The gunner could

therefore give some covering

fire against Cambodians

trying to shoot at the

helicopter or passengers.

(US Air Force)

A 7.62mm minigun view

of Koh Tang offers a good

perspective of the terrain.

Cambodian defensive works

stymied efforts to land,

reinforce, and evacuate

the marines on Koh Tang.

CH-53C and HH-53C

miniguns proved invaluable

in providing fire support all

day and into the night.

(US Air Force)



OVERLEAF:

One of the most frustrating

tasks that faced American

forces during the Koh Tang

operation was the rescue

of K23’s five crewmembers,

Second Lieutenant Michael

Cierce and 19 other

marines, as the Khmer

Rouge foiled several

USAF extraction attempts.

The men were under

constant fire and the fears

of the Khmer Rouge

overrunning his position at

night forced CINCPAC to

attempt another extraction.

At 1820hrs Cierce’s men

used an orange smoke

marker to identify their

position, while AC-130

gunships, F-4s, A-7Ds,

OV-10As, and USAF

helicopters provided

suppressing fire. Fortunately,

the extraction succeeded as

JG11, a USAF HH-53C

helicopter, rescued all from

the East Beach by 1823hrs.

lighten the CH-53C, but he did manage to pick up Denham and the rest ofthe crew.

There were still four helicopters in the area. Lackey, in K32, still had hismarines and was ready to try an insertion on the East Beach again. JG41 hadjust refueled from an HC-130P. Two other helicopters, JG42 and JG43, wereminutes from their scheduled landing times. Cricket’s controllers were gettingoverwhelmed with information and requests for support and instructions.McDaniel wanted Cricket to send in reinforcements, but the planned landingswere in confusion. K32 started towards the East Beach, but Lackey saw thetwo helicopters on fire. He asked Cricket for instructions; the EC-130controllers decided to move the force onto the West Beach area. The remaininghelicopters followed K32 to the western beaches.

JG41 started to hover. Enemy fire scored direct hits on the right fuel tankand rear ramp area. First Lieutenant Thomas Cooper, the aircraftcommander, decided to abort. JG42 and JG43 also tried to set down at about0620hrs. First Lieutenant Phillip Pacini, JG42’s pilot, identified two potentiallanding zones. These sites were north and south of the neck connecting theEast and West Beaches. JG42 went to the southern site and found nomarines. Captain Wayne Purser, in JG43, took the northern site. Purser’shelicopter received small-arms fire. The Cambodian opposition proved toomuch. JG42 and JG43’s pilots decided to try each other’s location on theWest Beach; they merely switched landing zones.

Lackey started his approach as he tried to reach McDaniel’s position, but hishelicopter was not immune to the intense ground fire. While trying to offloadthe marines, one of the helicopter’s minigun operators was wounded. Denhamand the rescued K21 crew had to endure another attack while the marinesdisgorged from K32. As soon as 13 marines offloaded about 0623hrs, Lackeyrushed back to U-Tapao. One wounded marine and the Army linguist stayedaboard. Departing marines tried to get the linguist to move to the landing zone,but he refused to leave the helicopter. Under intense Khmer Rouge attack, themarines managed to leave K32. An A-7D flew overhead, but without a FACmarking enemy positions it couldn’t attack, as the potential of hitting friendlyforces was great. Furthermore, the Cambodians had advanced as close as 25ydto American positions. Despite the US aircrafts’ ability to drop bombs and strafeaccurately, the distance between the East and West Beaches was less than a mile,so a pilot aiming for one beach could hit the other with a misplaced bomb. A-7D pilots tried to fly low to get the Cambodians to fire on them and allow theairborne FAC to identify locations. The Khmer Rouge defenders, however, didnot take the bait. Unfortunately, marines on the ground could not talk to the A-7Ds directly. Instead, they radioed Cricket, and the EC-130 passed requests forclose air support to an orbiting A-7D FAC.

Lackey’s CH-53C had suffered massive damage to the fuselage, manyfuel leaks, and hydraulic problems from gunfire and a RPG round thatactually went through the helicopter. He took the helicopter back toThailand, but it was incapable of flying again.

Purser tried again. This time he selected a landing site south of the WestBeach. Among a rocky patch, JG43 set down Austin, his command group,

The Raid


OPPOSITE RIGHT: This

series of AC-130 video stills

shows JG13’s attempt to

rescue the K23 survivors on

the East Beach. From top,

JG13 approaches the

landing zone; maneuvers to

land with its rear cargo ramp

toward the beach; then is hit

by Cambodian defensive

fire, igniting an external fuel

tank and flare box. Finally,

JG13 aborts the mission after

a crew member dumps the

flare box overboard. (US Air

Force)

58

and a section of 81mm mortars. Thelocation was isolated from McDaniel’sposition. Austin and the other 28marines were assigned to supportCompany G’s heavily armed infantry;his men did not have many M-16s.Austin’s command group includedradio operators, support staff, and themortar men armed mostly with .45-caliber pistols and only four M-16s. Ifthe Khmer Rouge attacked, they mightnot hold them back. Austin’s groupwas about three-quarters of a milesouth of the original landing zone.

Pacini, on his second try, placed his marines near McDaniel’s position.Onboard JG42 was Company G’s executive officer, First Lieutenant DickKeith. Keith took command of the perimeter when he met McDaniel. Keithand McDaniel did not know if their company commander, Davis, was onthe island. One of Keith’s first directives was to knock out a Cambodianmachine gun north of the landing site. Two marines did succeed ineliminating the gun position. Keith then planned a link-up with Austin.

Pacini’s helicopter limped back to U-Tapao. The enemy fire had damagedthe helicopter’s flight control system and fuselage. JG42 had to refuel on itsreturn to the base, since it had taken several hits on an external fuel tank.Pacini’s helicopter would not fly again that day.

The Cambodian fire against Cicere’s East Beach position intensified. At least the western side of the island had more marines; Cicere only had 25men and some were wounded. Cricket controllers decided to pull out themarines and Air Force personnel. Fortunately, JG13, from the Mayaguezrecovery effort, was orbiting the area and could try to extract everyone fromthe beach. A-7D strikes took out some Cambodian bunkers – FirstLieutenant John Lucas, K23’s co-pilot, had started to use his survival radioto identify enemy positions. As the situation unfolded, A-7D, AC-130, andF-4 pilots started to observe and attack the Cambodian locations. Lucashelped direct an AC-130 to fire ten 40mm rounds against the Khmer Rouge.

JG13 reached Cicere’s position. As the helicopter positioned itself to takeon the 25 survivors, the HH-53C was in the gun sights of machine guns,AK-47s, and other weapons. The rear ramp minigun swept the tree line, butthe helicopter suffered multiple heavy automatic hits. Cicere was 75yd northof JG13 and could not move due to intense Cambodian opposition. JG13had to break off the rescue attempt. Khmer Rouge soldiers had punctured anexternal fuel tank with machine-gun fire that ignited the tank. Fortunately,the flame-retardant system in the tank worked and the fuel did not explode.Inside JG13, the crew also had to jettison an ignited flare box. The flightcontrol system, rotor hits, cockpit damage, and numerous leaks in the oil,fuel, and hydraulic lines forced the helicopter to creep back to U-Tapao. TheHH-53C had to request aerial refueling because of the damaged external


The 21st Special Operations

Squadron AC-130Hs gave

CINCPAC a unique ability

to observe and fight the

Cambodians. These Korat-

based aircraft had a variety

of weapons. Their 20mm

guns allowed Air Force

crews to destroy enemy

positions or boats

throughout the incident,

day or night. (US Air Force)


ABOVE LEFT: Air Force

AC-130H crew members

operate a 105mm howitzer.

Crews used the 105mm

howitzer to knock out

several enemy fortified

positions, including a log

bunker that kept the western

area marines from uniting.

This aircraft type was so

successful that it continues

in use today. (US Air Force)

59

fuel tank; it made it back to Thailand, but had to land about 25 milesfrom U-Tapao. Another helicopter was inoperative for a secondassault or rescue attempt.

JG41 was the last helicopter from the initial assault group. Cooperwas still trying to land near Keith and McDaniel’s position as the A-7DFAC tried to determine where the Khmer Rouge defenders had builttheir defending positions on the western beaches. JG41 had refueledand was ready to make another run. While waiting to launch theirsecond landing, Cooper and First Lieutenant Dave Keith, his co-pilot,contacted the A-7D FAC to direct support for the marines. The FACcalled on an AC-130H, Spectre 61, which could now help Cooper andKeith. Spectre 61 conducted fire-suppression attacks againstCambodian positions between the two marine positions on the westernbeaches. With A-7D and Spectre 61 help, Cooper tried to push on tothe landing zone at 0835hrs, but enemy fire again repulsed JG41.

Cooper and Keith needed another refueling by an HC-130P.Despite extensive damage to their chopper, JG41 tried again at0915hrs. In this attempt, Cooper flew towards the beach with its leftminigun facing the beach to provide covering fire. The choppersuffered hits to its rotor blades and engine cowling. The third attemptat dropping off the marines was unsuccessful.

After receiving reports and observing fire from the Cambodians, Spectre61 located enemy fortifications. The marines on the West Beach raisedSpectre 61 and they fed reports of Cambodian locations at 0938hrs. TheAC-130H aircraft used 14 105mm howitzer rounds to destroy some KhmerRouge log bunkers north of the marine positions on the West Beach. TheAC-130H crew also used 20mm and 40mm guns to sweep the targets. Withthis additional support and the destruction of the log fortifications, Coopermade another effort to drop off the marines.

At 1000hrs, JG41 made the run. This time, Cooper was able to drop off20 marines under fire, but the Khmer Rouge started to ring the landing zonewith mortar fire. As rounds moved closer to Cooper’s helicopter – the Khmer

The Raid



60

Rouge mortar team landed one mortar round about 10ft from the tail rotor– he realized that he might have to leave immediately. Five marines remainedon JG41. Cooper and Keith decided to make a fifth try at the landing zone.While JG41 hovered over the landing zone, mortar fire passed through therotor and exploded 20ft from the helicopter. The chopper received moredamage from mortar shrapnel. JG41 had to leave the area with the fivemarines to refuel. Despite their willingness to continue, Cooper receivedorders to abort and return to U-Tapao. If the Cambodians had shot downJG41, no helicopters were in the area to rescue them.

Austin tried to move north and meet up with Keith and McDaniel. Somemarines from the West Beach enclave did advance south, but theyencountered heavy opposition. Intense machine-gun fire and Claymore mineshalted the attempt. One marine died and several others received wounds.Entrenched Cambodian defenders blocked the path. AC-130 20mm and40mm gun operators sprayed the area. They tried to limit their gunfire to atleast 150ft from friendly forces. Austin would try again later.

After Cooper left, 131 marines and five Air Force crew personnel held threepositions on Koh Tang. The West Beach contained 82 marines. Austin’s group,

East Beach

West Beach

SS Mayaguez

Hill 440

USS Holt

K O H T A N G

N

K21

K23K31 Black Velvet-1

AB

C

Circere

Keith & McDaniel

Austin, command section & mortars

A

B

C

APPROXIMATE MARINE POSITIONS

Sunken Khmer Rouge Swift Boat

Downed CH-53

0

0

500

500

1,000 1,500 yards

1,500 metres1,000

Marine forces on Koh Tang after first wave


One of the major difficulties

facing American military

forces was the thick jungle

terrain on Koh Tang. Finding

and destroying the heavily

defended areas or spotting

moving Khmer Rouge was

difficult due to the lush

vegetation. This shot from a

HH-53C demonstrates the

problem for minigun

operators. (US Air Force)

The Raid

61

south of that position, had 29. Twenty-five other personnel hung on at theEast Beach. CH-53C and HH-53C crew had planned on delivering 180marines. The marines at U-Tapao waited for the second assault wave, butcombat losses had decimated the helicopter force. Out of 11 helicopters usedon the first wave, eight were either destroyed or suffered extensive damagesbeyond repair. Reinforcing the first wave of the marines would be difficult.

The second wave Ford and the NSC knew that Miller and the Mayaguez crew were in Americanhands. Miller, his crew, and the team from the Holt rescue force had started toget the container ship underway. All seemed going as planned, except for the KohTang operation. With fewer forces on the ground, split up into three groups,facing more opposition than thought, and the possibility of enemyreinforcements, the marines were in a perilous situation. CINCPAC hadscheduled the second wave to kick off at 1000hrs. Delays inserting the first waveand helicopter losses forced 7AF and Marine Corps officials to reassess the plan.The marines only had three helicopters left from the first assault. Thesehelicopters were not the only ones in Thailand. Air Force maintenance crews hadmade two additional CH-53Cs operational and available for the second wave.K51 and K52 would now enter the fray. Five helicopters could now insertmarines to protect the original wave from Khmer Rouge forces overruning them.

CINCPAC’s original plan had scheduled upwards of 12 helicopters toemplace 250 marines and others to reinforce the initial assault. 7AF couldnot provide half of the choppers. The air support for Koh Tang also neededreplacement. A-7D FACs had tried to operate through the confusion of thefirst wave – these aircraft pilots had trained with the 40th ARRS for rescueattempts, not providing ground support for marines. Fortunately, 7AF couldcall on the 23rd Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS) at Nakhon Phanom.The 23rd TASS had first deployed to Thailand in 1966 and had remained in-theater. The squadron operated 40 OV-10As, and it had many combatFAC veterans using the call sign “Nail.” The OV-10As were powered bytwin propellers, which allowed them to maneuver at low speeds. Nail aircrafthad extensive training in providing provide close air support missions.Compared to the A-7D, the two-man OV-10A crew had wider visibility andanother set of eyes to direct ground-attack sorties. FourNails moved from Nakhon Phanom to U-Tapao to supportthe second assault.

The Navy was also getting ready to support the KohTang operation. After the Wilson transferred Miller back tohis ship, the missile destroyer could now use its twin 5inguns to attack island defenses. In addition, the Coral Seamoved closer to Koh Tang, which would allow Navy A-6As,A-7Es, and F-4Ns to conduct bombing and strafing missionsagainst the Cambodians. Yet they never had the chance,since it would take too much time to coordinate strikes withthe 7AF and solve communications problems. Air Forcehelicopters, however, could drop off wounded men and


62

refuel faster by landing on the carrierdeck rather than flying back toThailand. Also, in the case of a possibleevacuation, the CH-53C and HH-53Caircraft might have to drop off themarines on the Coral Sea. The carriercould make available two unarmedSH-3G rescue helicopters that mighthelp with such an evacuation.

The Thai government was alreadycomplaining about the use of U-Tapao

to attack Cambodia, and pressure mounted to stop operations from Thailand.Despite Thai protests, Burns had to launch a second wave of marines againstKoh Tang. Five helicopters prepared to leave. The first pair, K52 and JG43, leftU-Tapao about 0930hrs. Once refueled, JG11 and JG12 made their firstattempt to hit Koh Tang when they departed at 1000hrs. K51 was last and itleft at 1010hrs. The force contained 127 marines.

At about 1110hrs, Schlesinger ordered the marines on Koh Tangextracted with minimum casualties. The NMCC used a satellitecommunications system to beam a host of directives, orders, questions, andrequests to CINCPAC, COMUSSAG/7AF, and Johnson, the marine groundforce commander, at U-Tapao. Since the American military controlled theMayaguez and her crew, further actions on Koh Tang seemed pointless.Instead of taking more casualties, JCS planners believed it was best to pullout of Koh Tang. However, the marines on Koh Tang needed help since theKhmer Rouge continued to attack their positions.

A JCS directive ordered CINCPAC to develop an extraction plan andexplained that there was no reason to keep marines on the island or captureit. Later, the JCS amplified on the directive by telling CINCPAC not to sendadditional marines onto Koh Tang, but the second wave was already in theair and ready to hit the landing zones. Johnson was livid with the JCSdirective. He asked how the helicopters could extract the marines if they hadnot even secured the landing zones. If CINCPAC followed the Ford andSchlesinger directives to the letter, then the Koh Tang marines would have tosecure their defensive perimeters on their own. A second wave of marinescould help secure the positions and allow for a safer extraction. Burns andthe Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, agreed and pressedthe JCS to reconsider the order. Jones rescinded the order and allowed thesecond wave to continue. The NMCC and the JCS appeared not to have afull picture of the problems on Koh Tang.

While the second wave of helicopters headed to Koh Tang, Austin’s groupattempted to link up with Keith. Austin had an air liaison officer whomanaged to coordinate A-7D strikes, and he also used his 81mm mortarsection to suppress the enemy. Spectre 61 had left to refuel in Thailand. The only remaining aircraft were A-7Ds and F-4s. Without proper markingsmoke and landmarks, the marines used a radio to vector in the A-7Ds,which strafed the Khmer Rouge with their 20mm guns and dropped 500lb

K22 received severe damage

that forced the crew to

return to Thailand. They tried

to make it to U-Tapao, but

failed. The marines and Air

Force crew left the CH-53C

and later disabled the

helicopter. Initially, the crew

thought they had landed in

Cambodia, as the

helicopter’s instrumentation

had sustained damage.

(US Air Force)



63

bombs. These attacks broke up the Cambodian defenders. Shortly beforenoon, just as the second wave approached the island, Austin reached hisobjectives on Keith’s perimeter. On his route north, Austin’s men saw adestroyed Khmer Rouge 106mm recoilless rifle.

First Lieutenant Robert E. Rakitis, K52’s aircraft commander, made thefirst attempt to land on the East Beach. Despite many attempts from otherhelicopters and the loss of two craft, Cricket sent K23 in too. K51 and JG43would follow. Rakitis immediately took heavy fire. Machine-gun rounds rippedopen his fuel tanks. The pilot tried to cross the island to the West Beach, butfuel loss became critical. The CH-53C did not have a refueling boom, and thepilot had to abort rather than risk running out of fuel. His attempt to landmarines failed. K51 and JG43 watched K52 abort. They moved across theisland to land on the West Beach

K51 and JG43 tried to provide mutual minigun fire support to one anotherwhile they dropped off the marines. Khmer Rouge soldiers started to pepperthe helicopters as they attempted to hover and discharge members of CompanyE. First Lieutenant Richard C. Brims, piloting K51, swept in first. Thehelicopter went to touch down on the beach several times. Eventually, Brimsset down the CH-53C on the surf. The marines left, but Brims waited to receivefive critically wounded. Remarkably, the CH-53C suffered only minor damage.Cambodian soldiers had let loose with small arms, grenades, and otherweapons from positions about 150ft from the landing zone, but Brims returnedto Thailand. JG43 also positioned itself for insertion. The HH-53C quicklydischarged its marines without any serious problems. After leaving the beach,Purser, still piloting JG43, refueled from an HC-130P.

JG11 and JG12 arrived on the West Beach landing zone at about1150hrs. The landing zone only had enough room for one helicopter, so thesecond helicopter provided minigun fire support to keep the Khmer Rougefrom shooting down the other. The West Beach perimeter had continued toreceive attention from Cambodian attacks. Fortunately, JG11 and JG12offloaded their marines without serious incident. The arrival of additionalmarines was welcome. After JG12’s marines left the helicopter, the chopperdeparted to Thailand with four wounded marines. JG11 also sought theHC-130P to get fuel.

The marines on Koh Tang still facedintense opposition. At least Austin hadconsolidated his position with CompaniesE and G. Davis, the Company Gcommander, had finally arrived on one ofthe helicopters in the second assault wave.There were now 226 Americans on KohTang. Austin had a force of 201 personnelon the West Beach and Cicere still held onwith his group of 25. All of the groups wereunder intense fire, but the marinescontinued to hold back any opposition. Themarines tried to expand their perimeters to

Marines leave K22 with

their equipment. They did

not land on Koh Tang, but

had to return to Thailand.

Unfortunately, the CH-53C

was unable to land at

U-Tapao since it had

suffered extensive damage

attempting to land on the

West Beach. The marines

returned to U-Tapao via

JG12. (US Air Force)

The Raid


secure the western landing zone, but made little headway against theentrenched defenders and the jungle. The blistering firefights had forced themarines to expend their ammunition. Heat and humidity also took their toll,and the Americans started to run out of water. Austin could do little to rescueCicere.

Two helicopters flew towards Thailand with wounded personnel. JG11and JG43 had taken on JP-4 fuel and were ready to conduct rescue operations.K52 had suffered too much damage to return to Koh Tang. Extracting themarines out of Koh Tang would be a slow business, since there were only fourhelicopters left. Fortunately, the Coral Sea was now about 70 nautical milesfrom the island and closing. It could serve as a helicopter base. The Wilsonwas also offshore to provide naval gunfire support and could possibly pick upany survivors with Black Velvet-1 and a whaleboat.

The rescuers need rescue Through the afternoon, the West Beach marines consolidated their positionsand the defensive perimeter seemed secure, but the Cambodians could attackat any time. The marines and Navy corpsmen meanwhile kept watch forsnipers and defended against probing Cambodian attacks. One group thatneeded rescue was the East Beach survivors. They had endured a helicoptercrash, had seen unsuccessful attempts at reinforcement, and had witnessed

JG13’s failed rescue mission. Air Force CH-53C and HH-53Caircraft would lead the extraction effort. However, the Navywas also available to provide vital aid to the Americans onKoh Tang. The Coral Sea and the Wilson gave CINCPACmore flexible options to pull the Americans off the island.

After the Wilson had returned Miller to the Mayaguez,Commander J. Michael Rodgers, the guided-missiledestroyer’s captain, turned the ship towards Koh Tang.Wilson had saved one group of survivors earlier, extractingthem from the West Beach. They would now act in anothercapacity. While Rodgers maneuvered past the northern tip ofKoh Tang, a Khmer Rouge machine gun opened up on the


64

This HH-53C, probably

JG12, landed to take K22’s

crew and marines back to

U-Tapao. JG12 had just

delivered marines to the

Holt to retake the

Mayaguez. The helicopter

was unscathed from enemy

fire, unlike the initial wave

of helicopters hitting Koh

Tang. JG12 would later

participate in combat

actions at Koh Tang.

(US Air Force)

K23 lies on the East

Beach, tail rotor shot off.

Miraculously, no one died

in the crash. The CH-53Cs

were more vulnerable to

enemy fire than the

HH-53Cs, since they

reduced armor and minigun

protection for additional

cargo capacity. The USAF

lost five CH-53Cs in the

mission. (US Air Force)

1110hrsExtraction order

given

MAY 151975


Wilson. The crew of the 5in gun returned fire and silenced the Cambodianposition. Unfortunately, Rodgers had no detailed navigational charts to guidethe ship. He managed to establish a cruising pattern offshore of the East Beachand cove. Staying within a six-fathom depth, Rodgers could provide gunfiresupport for the marines pinned down on the beach. The ship followed apattern that allowed it to stay 1,000–3,000yds offshore at a speed of 3 knots,far enough away from shore to avoid RPG or heavy automatic fire. TheWilson did have problems, however, identifying targets. Without propermarking smoke or charts, plotting an accurate position for the two 5in gunsproved difficult. Despite this problem, the Wilson’s crew and A-7D pilotsworked together to locate positions, identify landmarks, and adjust fire toallow the gunners onboard to deliver deadly rounds. Wilson crew membersidentified hits on a chart and recorded their position for later references whenfiring their main gun batteries.

The Wilson added another dimension to the rescue. Its physical presencecould intimidate the Cambodians, especially with her twin 5in guns. Inaddition, the ship’s gig and whaleboat could help evacuate Cicere’s marinesand give another source of gunfire support by using Black Velvet-1. The shipalso offered a stable platform to observe and spot enemy activity.

At 1430hrs, JG11 and JG43 began a run towards the East Beach. In thissituation, Cricket directed A-7Ds to drop RCA munitions in the area. JG43crew, wearing gas masks, would go in first while JG11 stood by with herminiguns. Unfortunately, the tear gas drifted offshore and was useless to JG43.One of the miniguns had also jammed. Purser, JG43’s commander, decided togo into the area anyway. Enemy gunfire caused heavy damage to the fuel linesin the helicopter. Fuel sprayed throughout the cargo compartment and bulletscut a fuel line to an engine, crippling the helicopter. JG43 could not continuethe rescue, but instead flew towards the Coral Sea. Purser managed to land hisfuel-starved helicopter. Naval aircraft maintenance personnel and the Air Forceflight mechanic on board replaced the damaged fuel line with rubber tubing andradiator clamps. JG11 had to abort too and it also landed on the Coral Sea.

Air Force maintenance crews in Thailand worked fast on damagedhelicopters or those undergoing routine maintenance. By 1100hrs, they hadmade another HH-53C operational. JG44 would add a valuable resource tothe limited helicopter pool.

The OV-10As had departed fromNakhon Phanom for U-Tapao and flewto the Koh Tang area to relieve the A-7DFACs. Nail-68, flown by Major RobertW. Undorf, and another OV-10A, Nail-47, arrived on station at about1620hrs. Undorf took stock of thesituation. He contacted the marines, theWilson, Cricket, and Lucas, the co-pilotof K23 on the West Beach. Nail-68 wasable to mark enemy positions with smokerockets to help direct support fire from

The Raid

65

The BLU-82 was,

at the time, the largest

conventional bomb in the

Air Force’s inventory. It

weighed 15,000lb, and

engineers designed the

aluminum powder bomb

to clear helicopter landing

zones during the Vietnam

War. Delivered by a C-130,

the bomb would create a

250ft diameter cleared area.

(US Air Force)

2015hrsExtractioncompleted

MAY 151975


66

aircraft and the Wilson. He also helped assess the situationto aid the marine evacuation from the West Beach.Discussion among all parties dismissed an option of usingthe Wilson’s armed gig and whaleboat to land near Cicere,since the boats could only carry 15 survivors at a time,and the Cambodians might overrun the diminishingnumber of defenders. However, Black Velvet-1 couldstand offshore and the crew use its M-60s for suppressingfire against the Cambodians. The gig could also stand byto rescue any Americans shot down in helicopters.

Throughout the afternoon, the marines watched 7AFaircraft deliver ordnance against the Cambodian

fortifications, but time was running out. Although the West Beach had receivedadditional men and support, the East Beach marines might suffer defeat at anytime. Soon, daylight would end. Someone had to make a decision. CINCPACcould withdraw the marines before dark with the four helicopters available,with maybe JG43 on the Coral Sea, or wait until the next day. The decision tostay or go fell on Undorf and Austin, since no guidance came forward fromCricket. Austin requested extraction before nightfall.

Extracting the marines under darkness and against heavy enemyopposition required careful coordination. The Air Force aircraft and theWilson could provide fire support. After seeing the Mayaguez off, the Holtsped towards Koh Tang. The destroyer escort’s 5in gun gave the marinesadditional fire support on the West Beach side. On-station AC-130s – Spectre11, 21, and 22 – could use their infrared sensors and low-light level televisionsystem to track and attack any Khmer Rouge forces. The major problemwas helicopter availability. The only 7AF choppers available included JG11,JG12, JG43, JG44, and K51. The Coral Sea also had two SH-3Gs that couldhelp, but they were unarmored and unarmed. M-16-armed marines couldstay onboard to give the SH-3Gs some defensive power, albeit limited.

The extraction phase would again start with an attempt to get K23’s survivorsout first. A partially submerged Cambodian Swift boat, in the East Beach area,had repeatedly interfered with efforts to rescue Cicere. A-7D pilots attacked theboat, but failed to stop its crew from emerging to fire its machine guns. The Swiftboat had opened up with its .50-caliber machine guns against JG11 and JG43on their mission to extract Cicere. The Wilson’s 5in guns now focused on thistarget at 1633hrs. After several shots, about six Cambodians left the boat.Wilson’s gunners destroyed the boat with 22 rounds. Rodgers’ 5in guns also letloose 157 shells against the Khmer Rouge in support of the marines.

After coordinating the mission, extraction began with JG11. It had leftthe Coral Sea with the two SH-3Gs, and they were ready to start the rescueat 1635hrs. Nail-68 and -47 directed accurate fire on enemy positions aroundCicere. First on scene were F-4s, which delivered strafing fire and Mk 82laser-guided bombs under Undorf and his wingman’s direction. Next, A-7Dsroared in and attacked the Cambodians. JG11 flew in to pick up thesurvivors on the East Beach. JG12 and K51 had the mission of providingminigun support. JG43 also launched from the aircraft carrier, ready to lend


This view from JG11 shows

the short distance between

the East and West Beach

areas. The rear cargo ramp

minigun allowed the Air

Force crew to give covering

fire to marines entering or

exiting the helicopter. The

six-barreled 7.62mm

minigun was a potent

weapon. (US Air Force)


67

help. Black Velvet-1 stood offshore firing its M-60s tokeep Cambodians from shooting down JG11. Spectre11’s crew had its weapons ready to fire.

Undorf directed JG11 in after the AC-130 hit theKhmer Rouge positions. The marines on the beachpopped a smoke grenade, and JG11 landed at1820hrs. Undorf, the Wilson’s gig, and the otherhelicopters used their machine guns to suppressKhmer Rouge fire. The marines conducted an orderlywithdrawal, firing with their M-16s as they retreated.Three minutes later, with all survivors aboard, JG11headed towards the Coral Sea.

After JG11 departed, a C-130 dropped a BLU-82 in the middle of theisland. The order came from CINCPAC. Unfortunately, no one told themarines on the island, Undorf, or others. Marines saw the BLU-82 deploy ona pallet dropped with a parachute. Some of the marines thought it wassupplies. The 15,000lb bomb fell about 1,000yd south of the marines’ WestBeach perimeter. Witnesses reported seeing a huge mushroom cloud over thearea. CINCPAC’s desire to drop the BLU-82 drop shocked the marines. If theintention of the bomb drop was to intimidate the Cambodians, then it didnot stop the attacks on the marines. No further BLU-82s fell on Koh Tang.

Cricket directed JG12 to examine the K23 crash site. Reports of asurvivor in the area had surfaced. Unfortunately, they were false.Cambodians zeroed in on the HH-53C when it approached the site. A crewmember lowered a hoist to K23, but suffered wounds from gunfire. Sinceone of the miniguns ran out of ammunition, JG12 had to maneuver the craftto allow one of her other weapons to shoot. Crew members also used small arms to fire from the windows. Undorf guided fire from K51 thatstopped six Cambodian soldiers. JG12 then left, and the helicopter had tomake a landing on the Coral Sea with damaged main and tail rotors,hydraulic lines, and fuel tanks. JG11 and JG12’s ability to support furtheroperations seemed questionable.

One of major problems facing Austin was communications difficulties.Undorf lost contact with Cricket. He did advise Austin about the helicopterextractions, but was not sure of the timing. The Holt could provide generalassistance and Black Velvet-1 had moved from the eastern to the westernside of the island.

Darkness was rapidly descending on the island. Cricket tapped K51 tolead the first run to Austin’s position and try to pull out as many marines aspossible. K51, along with JG43 and JG44, had orbited the West Beach.Smoke, haze, and the darkness made landing difficult. K51 would have tofind the beach and hopefully discover the marines ready to withdraw quickly.At 1840hrs, K51 went in. The Khmer Rouge immediately opened fire andexchanged grenades with the marines, and the Cambodians used flares toilluminate the area. Fortuitously, the marines were ready to depart despiteK51’s surprise arrival. Navy corpsmen loaded the wounded into the chopper.K51 left, with 41 marines, for the Coral Sea.

CINCPAC ordered a C-130

to drop a BLU-82 on Koh

Tang. This image shows

the result of the 15,000lb

bomb exploding. Deployed

without warning, the

resulting explosion

surprised American as well

as Cambodians. Marines on

the Holt witnessed a shock

wave passing over the island

as a result. (US Air Force)

The Raid



OPERATIONS AGAINST SS MAYAGUEZ AND KOH TANG

KEYMayaguez movements

Mayaguez crew movements

Movements of US forces

MAYAGUEZLOCATIONS 12–15 May

1 11

CARRIER STRIKE BY USS CORAL SEA May 15

1 0705hrs: Armed reconnaissancemission. The mission is cancelled and theaircraft are recovered at 0830hrs. A refinerynorth of Kompong Som is identified.

2 0845hrs: Strike mission against Reamairfield. Three Cambodian aircraftdestroyed and several structures damaged.

3 1020hrs: Mission against KompongSom area and Phumi Phsar naval base.

4 1155hrs: Launch of fourth missioncancelled.

1 4

1

2

1 Mayaguez captured at 1420hrs on May 12.

2 Mayaguez anchors overnight at PouloWai due to a damaged radar.

3 Mayaguez seen heading north towardsKompong Som.

4 Mayaguez diverts to Koh Tang at1325hrs on May 13 and remains overnight.

5 Mayaguez crew placed on Thai fishingboat on the morning of May 14. US aircraftfail to stop the boat and her escorts.

6 Mayaguez crew arrives at KompongSom harbor at 0948hrs on May 14, but arerefused entry.

7 Mayaguez crew moved to Koh RongSam Lem naval compound. Phnom Penhdecides to release the crew, but they staythe night and depart at 0729hrs on May 15.

8 Thai fishing boat with Mayaguez crewseen heading to Koh Tang at 0935hrs.

9 USS Wilson intercepts the Thai fishingboat at 1008hrs.

10 Crew returns to Mayaguez at 1205hrs.

KOH RONG

KOH PRINS

POULO WAI


The Raid

KOH TANG ISLANDASSAULT May 15

1 JG11 and JG43 fail to extract K23survivors at 1430hrs.

2 JG11, with support from JG12, K41,JG44, Spectre 11, A-7Ds, F-4s, USS Wilson,and other forces rescues K23 survivors at1820hrs.

3 C-130 drops a BLU-82 on Koh Tangshortly after the JG11 rescue.

4 Starting at 1840hrs, K51 rescues 41marines on West Beach. JG43, JG44, andK51 (after returning from USS Coral Sea)recover the remaining marines. K51 is thelast to leave at 2000hrs.

KOH TANG EXTRACTION May 15

1 4

1 0415hrs: 11 CH-53C and HH-53Csdepart U-Tapao for Koh Tang and USS Holt.

2 0603hrs: K21 and K22 approach WestBeach. K21 deploys marines, but takes fireand crashes in the sea. K22 aborts and is forced to land in Thailand.

3 K23 and K31 try to land on East Beach.K23 deploys marines and is shot down. K31is destroyed by gunfire. K32 aborts andrescues the K21 crew, deploying marines in

the west of the island. JG41 aborts, buttries repeatedly to land marines on WestBeach. JG42 and JG43 land on West Beach.

4 JG11, JG12, and JG13 deliver marinesto Holt.

5 Mayaguez is boarded and secured by0822hrs.

1 5

G u l f o f T h a i l a n d

3

5

8

7

4

6

9

10

1

1

1

23

1 2

3

4

1

2

3

4

4

5

CAMBODIA

KOH RONG SAM LEM

ILE DES PALÉTUVIERS

KOH PAS

KOH TANGKOH TANG

ILE NORA-OUESTILE DE LA BAIE

ILE DU CHENAL

ILE DU MILIEU


70


Next in line was JG43. Khmer Rouge small-arms and mortar fire eruptedalong the perimeter. Unfortunately, Undorf could not provide tactical jet or AC-130 suppressing fire in time. The OV-10s did mark enemy positions with smokerockets, but in the darkness the A-7Ds would have a problem seeing the smoke.Purser had to provide whatever support from his miniguns and crew memberswith small arms. He landed seven minutes after K51’s departure. JG43 hadproblems with its lighting system – the marines could only hear the helicopter– but they did manage to find the helicopter and start boarding. JG44 almosthit the blacked-out helicopter, when it tried to land in the same area. Fortunately,Purser had determined through radio transmissions that JG44 was inbound.He turned on his helicopter’s searchlight to avoid a collision. Some 54 marinesloaded on the HH-53C and Purser headed for the Coral Sea at 1850hrs. Hischopper had suffered damage to his main rotor spar.

JG44 attempted another landing, but he had to abort again due to intenseground fire from the Cambodians. Its third try worked, and marinesscrambled aboard at 1854hrs. The marines reported that they had moved theperimeter to about 50yd from the landing zone. JG44’s crew was concernedthat any return fire from their miniguns could hit the marines. With 40marines onboard, the helicopter left for the Holt instead of the Coral Sea.JG44’s lights were also not working, so a crew member vectored in thehelicopter to the ship’s landing pad by hanging outside of the chopper. Afterunloading the marines, JG44 went back to get more.

There were 73 marines left on the island. The biggest challenge was toensure the Cambodians would not overrun the last US troops. Undorf andhis wingman also returned to U-Tapao and another OV-10A pair replacedthem. Spectre 21 had taken over from Spectre 11 and knocked out a mortarposition. At 1915hrs, JG44 landed again with the aid of a strobe light thrownon the beach by Davis. The helicopter picked up 34 more men and had toland on the Coral Sea due to an engine problem.

Spectre 11 and the OV-10As kept the enemy at bay, since they were nowthe only aircraft available. K51 would have to take the last marines out alone,with the only minigun support coming from its two onboard weapons. Facingheavy opposition, K51 landed after four attempts. Under fire, poor lighting,and some confusion, the remaining marines executed their withdrawal andhurried aboard. The helicopter was ready to leave, but Technical SergeantWayne Fisk, a K51 crew member, left to search the area and make sure no onewas left behind. Fisk looked around the tree line frantically while under fire.He found two marines still providing covering fire against the Khmer Rouge.All three returned to K51 with the helicopter leaving for the Coral Sea at2015hrs, ending the 14-hour mission on Koh Tang.

With the evacuation complete, the rescue of the Mayaguez concluded.The mission cost 11 marines, two Navy corpsmen, and two Air Force crewmembers, with another 50 US troops wounded. There were also the 23 USAFpersonnel killed in the helicopter crash in Thailand. Cambodian casualtiesare unknown. Despite the efforts to withdraw carefully, three marines wereleft behind. The Cambodians later found and executed them, two of them atKompong Som.


71

In the photograph taken

from JG11, the survivors

from K23 scramble onboard

the HH-53C. After several

attempts to extricate Cicere’s

marines, the Air Force finally

got the men off the East

Beach. Fears of the marines’

position being overrun by

the Khmer Rouge made their

rescue a priority over other

rescues. (US Air Force)

ANALYSIS The Mayaguez incident had profound military implications. Ford and the NSCavoided another USS Pueblo incident, with its lengthy negotiations, andAmerica certainly acted to defend its interests. Yet although successful inmeeting the national objective of quickly securing the safe return of ship andcrew, the mission provided sobering lessons that affect military activities today.

The Mayaguez’s legacy Many aspects of the operation provided an early demonstration of moderncommunications advances. Despite the global distances, local commanderswere now under the constant watch of their chain of command, from thePresident to their immediate headquarters. Commanders could now listenin, comment on, and override decisions by their field subordinates. ThePresident could literally micro-manage a tactical situation instead of focusingon a strategic or long-term view. Alocal commander’s initiative andability to make decisions was thereforeat risk of disappearing. Potentially, anorganization in combat might suffer aloss of unity of command, as decisionsfrom outside the immediate unit createconfusion in direction, especially ifleaders make those decisions withincomplete information or a lack ofsituational awareness. In addition,local commanders might have to waitfor a decision, the loss of tempodestroying initiative and innovation.Communications and informationtechnology improved dramaticallyafter 1975. One might argue that theability of high-level commanders to


72

affect tactical operations reached a critical juncture five years later duringOperation Eagle Claw, which ended in a humiliating failure for forces tryingto rescue American embassy hostages in Iran.

Presidential decision-making was also crucial to the incident. Ford hadinherited the remains of the Vietnam conflict with Operation Eagle Pull andFrequent Wind. Finding some way to salvage America’s honor bydemonstrating that it was not a “paper tiger” would go a long way to sooththe pain of Vietnam. Some of NSC staff also wanted to avoid another USSPueblo incident, which forced the nation into a bitter negotiation with theNorth Koreans. Under crisis, Ford and the NSC had to make decisions from11 time zones away, and in some cases without benefit of current information.The ability to issue directives instantly to the field compounded this problem.

In some situations, rapid communications to direct subordinates is adefinite advantage, assuming higher headquarters have all the availableinformation. In the case of the Mayaguez, Ford’s decision to cease all militaryoperations and disengage with the Cambodians almost created a situation inwhich the extraction of the marines might have been bloodier. The choice tosink all boats in the Koh Tang area could also have resulted in the death ofMiller and his crew on the Thai fishing boat, if not for the P-3 and the Wilson’scaptain identifying Miller before firing. Without proper situational awarenessby higher command, policies might be contradictory at best or deadly at worst.

Like many military operations, current and accurate information waslacking. CINCPAC forces did not have maps with the proper scale oraccuracy to conduct targeting. More serious was the problem concerningenemy force estimates on Koh Tang. The three sources concerning enemystrength varied widely in their data. Intelligence reporting to the marines and7AF units also seemed fragmented. Some received DIA/IPAC reports; themarines thought they would face limited opposition. Most military leaderswould have planned for the worst, by using the DIA estimate of 150 to 200Khmer Rouge soldiers. Similarly, if CINCPAC had an accurate location forthe Mayaguez crew, then the Koh Tang assault might not have happened.CINCPAC did make corrections to intelligence dissemination and feedbackbased on its experience of the operation.

The various military forces used in the operation worked well togethergiven the circumstances. Still, a lack of joint training affected their abilityto operate together. Coordinating close air support between Air Force andUSMC air units was difficult given their different communications systems.The capacity for Air Force helicopters to conduct a beach assault was alsoa challenge. Three downed and many damaged helicopters seriouslyimpaired commanders’ options for conducting a second-wave attack andextraction. However, the disparate forces were able to adapt and adjust tothe difficult situation. Commanders also demonstrated flexibility in creatingplans and conducting operations with the limited resources deployed inSoutheast Asia. Washington pulled together and massed forces within hoursof the Mayaguez’s capture. CINCPAC planners had to coordinateoperations over wide geographic distances, and at great speed. Suchmissions, and problems encountered in Vietnam, Iran, and Grenada, led to



73

OV-10As, like this aircraft,

from the 23rd Tactical Air

Support Squadron took over

forward air control duties

from the 3rd Tactical Fighter

Squadron A-7Ds. The OV-

10As gave the marines and

the aircrew crews a different

perspective to control and

direct operations against the

Khmer Rouge. They worked

in pairs: one briefed

incoming aircraft, the other

directed air strikes and

kept watch over the area.

(US Air Force)

Analysis

more emphasis on inter-service cooperation, planning,training, and equipment. The Goldwater–Nichols Act of1986 tried to address many of the issues about operatingin a joint service environment and made significantprogress in improving military capability.

Diplomatic moves at the time were particularlydifficult to make given the recent Cambodian revolution.Washington attempted, through several avenues, to sendmessages to Phnom Penh to release the Mayaguez. Tryingto establish who decided to seize and keep the crew hasnever been determined. State Department officials didnot know whom to contact. They tried to get the Chinese government tointercede, initially unsuccessfully, but word eventually arrived from Tehranthat a PRC diplomat indicated a release was possible. Time urgency andother motivations may have scuttled the White House’s attempts to securethe release of the crew without having to initiate the Koh Tang operations.Diplomatic efforts take time, Ford and the NSC wanted to resolve the issueimmediately.

During the Mayaguez incident, objectives and priorities seemed to be inconflict in some instances. The overall safety of the Mayaguez crew waspotentially jeopardized by several actions, such as the sinking of patrol boatsthat might have held the captives, conducting air strikes near Kompong Somand Ream, and landing on Koh Tang without knowledge of the prisoners’location. Although CINCPAC and JCS planners designed the air raids onthe Kompong Som area to avoid Cambodian reinforcements deploying to Koh Tang, the attacks they could have also worked against Washington.The original plan to use B-52s could have inflicted massive civilian casualties,turning world and domestic sympathy into condemnation. National leadersdebated the use of the air raids: a demonstrative action or tactical supportfor the Koh Tang assault? Expanded American military actions throughoutthe region might have hardened Phnom Penh’s stance on releasing the crew.Still, American air operations, including sinking Cambodian patrol boats,caught Phnom Penh’s attention and played a significant part in the release ofthe Mayaguez’s crew.

A significant issue raised by the crisis was the question of when to usemilitary force. Ford and the NSC first attempted diplomatic means ofresolution, but unfortunately time demands and the desire to demonstrateAmerica’s military muscle may have short-circuited diplomacy. Trying tocontact the Cambodian government directly was difficult, if not impossible.Without the ability to transmit American demands, Washington had to usethird parties or the world press. This situation contributed to uncertainty aboutpossible settlement of the crisis. Today, governments have similar problemscontacting insurgents or other non-state actors, decreasing the likelihood ofnegotiated settlements and increasing the possibility of armed conflict.

Domestic political concerns also clouded the NSC’s decision-makingprocesses by creating an artificial time constraint. The War PowersResolution and the Cooper–Church Amendment forced Ford to get the


74

mission planned and completed before anyserious congressional opposition developed.If the operation dragged on and incurredheavy casualties, the American public andCongress might have demanded a halt.CINCPAC had to plan and execute basedon assumptions that Ford could convinceCongress that the operation was necessary.

Some critics of the Mayaguez operationwould argue that the loss of 41 Americanmilitary personnel was too high to rescuethe 40-member container ship crew. A simple cost analysis appears toosimplistic. Indeed, larger national interestsand objectives were at play above and

beyond the release of crew and ship. The USMC, USAF, and US Navypersonnel involved in the military operations in the Gulf of Thailand largelyachieved all American mission objectives, but the toll was heavy.

The United States’ image and credibility had suffered amongst her NATOallies and Cold War foes after Vietnam. The Mayaguez incident was a test ofWashington’s will and capability to use military force. The United Statesdemonstrated that it would protect American interests globally. North Korea,the Soviet Union, China, and others watched as the nation reacted quicklyand adapted to a dynamic situation. American military actions appeared tosalvage the nation’s honor and reputation abroad, but also domestically. By1975, the United States had endured the loss of Vietnam, impeachmentefforts and the resignation of a President, rising unemployment, and otherproblems. Despite the rescue of the Mayaguez and its crew, critics arguedthat the operation had several deadly flaws. Difficultes with joint planning,command and control, incompatibility of equipment, the War PowersResolution, and operational mistakes resulted in congressional investigationsand internal reviews within the Pentagon. Many of these difficulties, alongwith problems during the failed Iranian hostage rescue and Grenadaoperations, resulted in a movement to reform how Washington wouldconduct future joint operations, training, and acquisition of commonequipment that would result in the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986, a majormilestone in changing the face of the American military.

National leaders and the future The national and military leaders involved in the Mayaguez incident went onto take very different paths. Gerald Ford survived the incident with a boostin his domestic popularity. He later reorganized his cabinet in a majorshakeup in November 1975, known as the “Halloween Massacre.” Thecabinet became more conservative, and Ford replaced Kissinger forScowcroft as his national security advisor. Still smarting from perceivedproblems in military planning, capability, and operations, Ford firedSchlesinger and replaced him with Donald Rumsfeld, the youngest Secretary

Khmer Rouge defenders

fought to stop all the Air

Force rescue efforts. An

A-7D aircraft dropped riot

control agent cluster bombs

on the East Beach in an

attempt to suppress the

Cambodians, but the wind

blew the gas offshore into

the helicopters instead.

(US Air Force)



75

of Defense. Rumsfeld’s deputy, Richard Cheney, became Ford’s White HouseChief of Staff. George H. W. Bush became DCI when Ford forced Colby out.Bush would become the 41st President and Cheney served him as hisSecretary of Defense. Coincidentally, Bush’s son, George W. Bush, wouldbecome the 43rd President. He selected Cheney as his Vice President andRumsfeld as Secretary of Defense. Several of these selections would have asignificant impact on future American foreign policy. Unfortunately, GeraldFord’s later tenure suffered from declining presidential power, a very weakeconomy, and public resentment of his pardon of Richard Nixon. Althoughsurviving two assassination attempts, Ford was not re-elected President. He died on December 26, 2006.

Henry Kissinger remained Secretary of State in the Ford administration.He retained great influence in foreign policy after he left office. As a scholarand consultant, Kissinger advised George W. Bush on a range of foreignpolicy issues, especially on Israel and the Middle East.

David C. Jones, then acting Chairman of the JCS, completed his tour as AirForce Chief of Staff. Jones rose to Chairman of the JCS in 1978. Jones hadheavily criticized the planning and conduct of the Mayaguez incident. Hissolution was more intensively centralized command, control, and planning ofsimilar military operations. Jones remained in office until 1982, when heretired. During his tenure, he oversaw the failed attempt to rescue Americanmilitary and embassy personnel in Iran through Operation Eagle Claw, anaction that suffered from constant micro-management from senior leadership.

This photograph illustrates

damage to JG13 after its

failed attempt to land on the

East Beach. A round entered

the pilot’s instrument panel

via the lower windshield.

JG13 was still able to fly, but

was out of commission after

the operation. (US Air Force)

Analysis


76

These F-4Ds from the 432nd

Tactical Fighter Wing strafed

and bombed Cambodian

forces on Koh Tang and the

Gulf of Thailand. Despite the

protests and warnings from

Bangkok, Washington used

Thai-based aircraft and

marines deployed from

U-Tapao. (US Air Force)

CONCLUSION Despite America’s success in recovering the Mayaguez, Cambodia remainedgoverned by one of the most murderous regimes in mankind’s history. Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge leader, consolidated his power after taking PhnomPenh on April 17, 1975. His agrarian revolution, which forced hundreds ofthousands of urban dwellers into the fields, is infamous. Under his regime,20–25 percent of the population perished due to starvation, overwork, ormass execution. Opposition to the Khmer Rouge grew, until Vietnaminvaded in 1978 and replaced the government. Pol Pot himself died in 1998while under house arrest.

American military actions did not sway Pol Pot into transforming hiscountry into the “killing fields,” nor did Cambodia slow its desire to extendterritorial sovereignty over border regions and several islands in the Gulf ofThailand. American military operations did, however, weaken the Khmer


77

Rouge in the region in May 1975, allowing theVietnamese to increase their influence in the area.By June 1975, the Vietnamese had occupied PouloWai. The issue over borders created problemsbetween Cambodia and her neighbors. One mightargue that the mass exterminations and the borderissues caused the Vietnamese to embark on a slowpath to war with Cambodia, a journey that wouldeventually overthrow the Khmer Rouge.

The Mayaguez incident forced many to pauseand think about Washington’s response. Questionsabout the proportionality of response, executivebranch decision-making, diplomatic versus militaryoptions, intelligence gathering, command andcontrol, and concerns about military capabilityarose after the crisis. Modern technology had alsoaltered the face of military operations forWashington.

Still, American military forces demonstrated theirability to conduct a rapid-response mission.Adaptive, creative leadership, along with valor,turned a potential disaster at Koh Tang into asuccessful evacuation. All services involved showedan ability to work out problems in spite ofconflicting directives caused by higher officialsunaware of the full situation. Hasty decisions and the ability to oversee andoverturn a subordinate commander’s decisions immediately could haveseriously impaired the mission. Fortunately, Washington did allow localforces to operate with some flexibility. Future command and control,however, may have tighter reins and may influence events at even lower“tactical” levels than occurred in the Mayaguez incident. Communicationstechnology has improved significantly and the sensitivity regarding collateraldamage has only increased since 1975. The media is global and the damagedone to a nation’s image can, in some cases, be hurt more by a picture thanactual combat operations.

The mission ultimately proved a success, but the loss of personnel andequipment was costly. Yet how does a nation balance the bill to implementnational policy? Piracy, terrorism, hostage-taking, and other activitiesthreaten a nation’s ability to protect its citizenry and property aboard.Although missions like the Mayaguez seemed costly, what would Washingtonhave had to pay for future events in the Gulf of Thailand and beyond if Forddid not stand up to Cambodia? The speed and use of force, which includedattacks on Cambodia, underscored Washington’s ability to respond to a crisissituation. Unfortunately for Washington, national leaders would have toprove this point on more than one occasion in the future.

Conclusion

Men of 2/9 Marines,

Companies E and G, depart

from the USS Coral Sea,

after they left Koh Tang via

Air Force helicopters. These

marines were landed on the

Coral Sea by crews of the

40th Aerospace Rescue

and Recovery Squadron

and 21st Special Operations

Squadron. They returned to

Subic Bay, the Philippines.

(US Navy)


78

BIBLIOGRAPHY Command History Branch, Commander in Chief Pacific Command

History 1975 Appendix VI – The SS Mayaguez Incident (Top Secret),Camp Smith, HI, Office of the Joint Secretary (1976) (Declassified)

General Accounting Office, The Seizure of the Mayaguez – A Case Studyof Crisis Management, Washington, DC, Comptroller General of theUnited States (1976)

Guilmartin, John F., Jr., A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battleof Koh Tang, College Station, TX, Texas A&M University Press (1995)

Head, Richard G., et al., Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision Makingin the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations, Boulder, CO, WestviewPress (1978)

Johnson, Thomas R., (U) American Cryptology during the Cold War,1945–1989 (U) Book III: Retrenchment and Reform, 1972–1980 (TopSecret), CCH-S54-98-01, Fort Meade, MD, Center for CryptologicHistory, National Security Agency (1998) (Declassified)

Joint Chiefs of Staff, After Action Report US Military Operations SSMayaguez/Kaoh Tang Island 12–15 May 1975 (Secret), Washington, DC,Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff (undated) (Declassified)

Joint Secretariat, Note to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on The Rescue of the“SS Mayaguez” and its Crew (U) (Secret), Washington, DC, Office of theJoint Chiefs of Staff (May 19, 1975) (Declassified)

Lamb, Christopher Jon, Belief Systems and Decision Making in theMayaguez Crisis, Gainsville, FL, University of Florida Press (1989)

Messengee, J.A. et al, “‘Mayday’ for the Mayaguez,” Naval InstituteProceedings (November 1976)

Lavelle, A.C.J. (ed.), The Vietnamese Air Force, 1951–1975: An Analysisof its Role in Combat and Fourteen Hours at Koh Tang, Washington,DC, Office of Air Force History (1985)

Office of the Historian, History of the Pacific Air Forces 1 Jul 74–31 Dec75 (Secret), Hickam AFB, HI, CINCPACAF/HO (1976) (Declassified)


79

Major R.E. Porter (left) and

Captain Walt Wood (right)

raise the colors on the

Mayaguez after its boarding.

Wood’s Company D,

support personnel, explosive

ordnance disposal team,

and others searched the

ship. They later helped get

the ship ready to steam on

her own, once the Wilson

returned Miller to his ship.

(US Navy)

Bibliography

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum For the PresidentSubject: Seizure of U.S. Ship Mayaguez (Top Secret), Washington, DC,Office of the Secretary of Defense (undated) (Declassified)

Rowan, Roy, The Four Days of Mayaguez, New York, W. W. Norton(1975)

Wetterhahn, Ralph, The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the Endof the Vietnam War, New York, Carroll & Graf (2001)

White House, Memorandum of Conversation Subject: Mayaguez (Secret),Washington, DC, Office of the President (May 14, 1975) (Declassified)

White House, Minutes National Security Council Meeting Subject: Seizureof American Ship by Cambodian Authorities (Top Secret/Sensitive),Washington, DC, Office of the President (May 13–15, 1975)(Declassified)


80

INDEXFigures in bold refer to illustrations

aircraftA-6A 37A-7D 22, 28A-7E Corsair II 46AC-130 22, 23, 38, 55, 58B-52 33–34EC-130 ABCCC “Cricket” 36–37F-4 22, 76F-111A 22, 29OV-10A 61, 73P-3 Orion 17P-52D 18, 19

Austin, Lieutenant Colonel Randall W. 30–31, 49, 58, 60, 62, 63–64, 66, 67

bombs 65, 67, 67Brims, First Lieutenant Richard C. 63Burns, Lieutenant General John 25, 36, 62Bush, George H. W. 20–21, 40, 75

Cambodiaborder problems 9–10, 76–77Khmer Rouge’s rise to power and regime

5, 26, 76–77ship seizures in Gulf of Thailand 8, 10USA pulls out 6

Cheney, Richard 75Cicere, Second Lieutenant Michael 51,

58–59, 63–64, 66–67CINCPAC

description 12Kissinger’s lack of confidence in 35

Colby, William 11, 33, 75Cold War 7–8command, control, and communications

35–37, 71–72, 77Coogan, Rear Admiral R. P. 46, 47, 48Cooper, First Lieutenant Thomas 55,

59–60Coral Sea, USS 15

aircraft on 28, 46attacks on mainland 41, 46–48, 68–69and Koh Tang attack 61, 64, 65, 66–67,

70, 77PGMs on 34plans for 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 27, 31,

33–34Corson, Major Howard 51, 54

Davis, Captain James H. 31, 49, 50, 58, 63,70

Denham, Lieutenant Colonel John 50, 55diplomacy 20–21, 73

Fisk, Technical Sergeant Wayne 70Ford, Gerald 7, 11

ignorance of Cambodian freeing ofMayaguez 41, 44later life 74–75orders given 39–40, 41, 45performance assessed 72, 73–74plans 12, 14–15, 18–21, 24, 27–29, 33–

34, 35and Vietnam 6

Gayler, Admiral Noel 25, 35–36, 43, 48

Hancock, USS 15, 21Harold E. Holt, USS 14, 41, 48

and Koh Tang attack 66, 67, 70missiles on 33plans for 15, 17, 18, 19, 23, 26–27, 31recapture of Mayaguez 41, 42–44, 42, 46tows Mayaguez to safety 46, 47, 51

helicopters 32, 36, 54, 56–57, 59, 62, 64crew experience 41–42description 42instrument panels 75role in Koh Tang attack 49–50

Henry B. Wilson, USSand Koh Tang attack 49, 54, 61, 64–65,

66, 67picks up Mayaguez crew 45–46plans for 23, 31, 33ready for action 41, 45

Holloway, Admiral James L. 34Hon Panjang islands 9, 18–19

intelligence 22–23, 31, 72

Johnson, Colonel John M. 30, 43, 62Jones, General David C. 11

during the action 39–40, 41, 62later life 75and plans 20, 25, 33, 34receives news of Mayaguez capture 12

Keith, First Lieutenant Dave 59Keith, First Lieutenant Dick 58, 60, 62Khmer Rouge

overview 26rise to power and regime 5, 26, 76–77

Kissinger, Dr Henry 13hawk-like behaviour 41, 44later life 74, 75and plans 14–15, 20, 21, 28–29, 33, 35

Koh Tang 21, 30, 34bomb dropped on 65, 67, 67defenses 22–23, 31, 32, 72geography and terrain 30, 54, 61US attack on 45, 48–70, 52–53, 56–57,

60, 66, 68–69, 71, 74US attack plans 19–21, 21–23, 27,

30–33, 45US isolation 25, 38–40

Kompong Som 33, 34–35, 38–40, 47, 48Korea 8, 33

Lackey, First Lieutenant Michael 54–55, 58Laos 4–5Lucas, First Lieutenant John 58, 65

Mayaguez, SS 10, 23, 25, 39background 11capture 11–14, 19–20crew’s location 38–40crew’s release goes unnoticed by USA

40–41, 43–44crew’s return to ship 45–46, 47difficulties of boarding 25, 26–27towed to safety 46, 47, 51, 61USA recaptures 42–44, 42, 44, 45,

52–53, 68–69McDaniel, Second Lieutenant James 50, 54,

55, 58, 60

Miller, Captain Charles T. 11–12, 38–39,40, 43–44, 45–46, 61

National Security Council (NSC) 11, 13,14–21, 73–74

Ohlemeier, Captain Terry 50oil 9, 18–19

Pacini, First Lieutenant Phillip 55, 58Peterson, Commander Robert 43, 44,

46, 46Pol Pot 5, 9–10, 13, 26, 76Porter, Major Ray E. 42Poulo Wai 9, 11–12, 18–19, 77precision guided munitions (PGMs) 34, 37Purser, Captain Wayne 55, 58, 63, 65, 70

Rakitis, First Lieutenant Robert E. 63Ream airfield and naval base 33, 34–35, 47,

48, 51Rockefeller, Nelson 19–20Rodgers, Commander J. Michael 64–65Rumbaugh, Staff Sergeant Elwood 50Rumsfeld, Donald 13, 33, 74–75

Schlesinger, Dr James 13fired 74orders given during raid 39, 48, 62and plans 15–17, 18, 21

Swift boats 40

Thailandrelations with neighbours 6–7role in US raid plans 32–33, 62US relations with 4, 6–7, 15, 29

Thailand, Gulf oflater problems 76–77start of ship seizures 8, 10US presence 10–11US striking power 22

Todd, Lieutenant Commander John 44Tonkin, Lieutenant Terry 54

Undorf, Major Robert W. 65, 66, 67, 70United Nations 21US forces

Air Force Security Police 24, 25air squadrons on Coral Sea 46command relationships 16, 28in Gulf of Thailand 23major USAF units in Thailand 20overview of those used in raid 26–28performance assessed 72–73, 74

USMC 48, 49, 50, 63, 77role in raid 43

USSAG 25

Vandegeer, Second Lieutenant Richard 51, 54Vega, USS 18, 19Vietnam 4–5, 18–19, 26, 77Vietnam War (1961–75) 4, 6, 7

weaponshowitzers 58marines 48, 49miniguns 66

Wood, Captain Walter J. 26, 42, 43, 44


``First published in Great Britain in 2011 by Osprey Publishing,Midland House,WestWay, Botley, Oxford, OX2 0PH, UK44–02 23rd St, Suite 219, Long Island City, NY 11101, USA

E-mail: [email protected]

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All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of privatestudy, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright,Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may bereproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or byany means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical,photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permissionof the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers.

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Print ISBN: 978 1 84908 425 3PDF e-book ISBN: 978 1 84908 426 0EPUB e-book ISBN: 978 1 84908 877 0

Page layout by Bounford.com, Cambridge, UKIndex by DavidWorthingtonTypeset in SabonMaps by Bounford.comBEVs by Alan GillilandOriginated by United Graphics Pte, SingaporePrinted in China throughWorldprint

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©Osprey Publishing. Access to this book is not digitally restricted. In return, weask you that you use it for personal, non-commercial purposes only. Pleasedon’t upload this pdf to a peer-to-peer site, email it to everyone you know, orresell it. Osprey Publishing reserves all rights to its digital content and no part ofthese productsmay be copied, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in anyform by anymeans, electronic, mechanical, recording or otherwise (except aspermitted here), without the written permission of the publisher. Please supportour continuing book publishing programme by using this pdf responsibly.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTSI would like to thank Colonel (ret.) WaltWood, USMC, from the US ArmyWarCollege, for the use of his photographs. Additionally, Dr GeorgeWatson, AirForce History Office, provided me with some additional perspectives on themission and helped me secure some of the USAF photographs. Mr MikeSemrau, US ArmyWar College, was kind enough to get me a copy of videofrom theMayaguez incident. Lastly, I appreciate the encouragement fromPhilip Smith from Osprey Publishing in completing this project.

GLOSSARY7AF 7th Air Force13AF 13th Air ForceABCCC airborne battlefield communications, command, and

controlARRS Aerospace Rescue and Recovery SquadronARRW Aerospace Rescue and RecoveryWingBDA bomb damage assessmentBLT battalion landing teamCBU cluster bomb unitCIA Central Intelligence AgencyCINCPAC Commander-in-Chief, PacificCINCPACAF Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air ForcesCINCPACFLT Commander-in-Chief, Pacific FleetCOMUSSAG Commander, US Support Activities GroupDCI Director of Central IntelligenceDIA Defense Intelligence AgencyDoD Department of DefenseEOD explosive ordnance disposalFAC forward air controllerIPAC Intelligence PacificJCS Joint Chiefs of StaffJG Jolly GreenK KnifeMSC Military Sealift CommandNMCC National Military Command CenterNSA National Security AgencyNSC National Security CouncilNVA North Vietnamese ArmyPACFLT Pacific FleetPGM precision guided munitionPOL petroleum, oil, and lubricantRCA riot control agentRPG rocket-propelled grenadeSAC Strategic Air CommandSOS Special Operations SquadronSOW Special OperationsWingSW StrategicWingTASS Tactical Air Support SquadronTFS Tactical Fighter SquadronTFW Tactical FighterWingTOT time over targetUSAF US Air ForceUSSAG US Support Activities GroupUHF ultra high frequency


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