the journal of environment development 2007 newell 183 206

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Author’s Note: Dr. Peter Newell, Principal Research Fellow, Centre for the Study of Gobalisation andRegionalisation, University of Warwick, Coventyr, UK. E-mail: [email protected]

The Journal of Environment& Development

Volume 16 Number 2June 2007 183–206

© 2007 Sage Publications10.1177/1070496507300920

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Biotech Firms, Biotech PoliticsNegotiating GMOs in India1

Peter NewellUniversity of Warwick

This article identifies and explains the ways in which firms involved in the debate aboutthe role of biotechnology in Indian agriculture have sought to advance their interests.It argues that the public positions of larger biotech and agro-chemical companies, seedenterprises, and newer start-up firms and the associations to which they belong relateto the differences in their underlying corporate strategies. The extent to which thesefirms are involved in primary research, export their products, or require protection fortheir products helps to determine their political affiliations to the leading industry bod-ies that are active on biotechnology issues. In turn, each of these associations has beenshown to have distinct patterns of interaction with particular government agenciesinvolved in the regulation of biotechnology products, as well as differing degrees ofcontact with global industry coalitions. Through a combination of material influences,in most cases high levels of institutional access, and in a context in which claims aboutthe benefits of biotechnology are echoed and repeated in influential media, industry hasplayed an important role in the evolving regulatory regime. These forms of leverageapply to some firms more than others and smaller actors in the vast seed sector in Indiaare barely involved directly in the current debate about India’s “gene revolution.”Currently, the policy agenda in Delhi appears to be far more influenced by a fairlyclose-knit policy network of biotech entrepreneurs from larger multinationals andsuccessful start-up firms with good national and global connections.

Keywords: Agricultural biotechnology; business; GMOs; India; political influence; seeds

Introduction

Although there have been a number of attempts to explain the emergence andevolution of national and regional systems of agricultural biotechnology regulation(Levidow, Carr, & Wield, 2000; Gottweiss, 1995), there have been few attempts toexplore the detailed interactions of the primary actors in the unfolding gene revolu-tion, the biotech companies themselves, with particular systems of biosafety regula-tion. Besides studies of business influence within international negotiations aroundspecific aspects of the technology (Clapp, 2003; Glover & Newell 2004), there has

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been a notable neglect of the role of business actors in the governance of biotech-nology at the national level in the developing world. This constitutes a critical gap inour understanding of biotechnology policy processes. Work on biotechnology inIndia has focused on the interface between science and policy (Scoones, 2005),generic issues of biosafety and regulation (Gupta, 2000; Seshia, 2002; Indira,Bhagavan, & Virgin, 2005; Ramanna, 2006), or upon the controversies surroundingparticular technologies, most notably Bt cotton2 (Visvanathan & Parma, 2002; Shah,2005). This has been at the expense of a detailed understanding of the political econ-omy of the firm in India’s biotechnology politics.

Bodies of literature on business lobbying and corporate strategy, developed inother contexts (Coen, 2005; Grant & Marsh, 1977; Vogel, 1989; Wilson, 2003), canbe nuanced by an understanding of the role of firms as actors in environmental pol-itics in the unique context of India around this critical issue. There is evidence of theimport of lobbying styles common to other political cultures, notably the UnitedStates (Giridharadas, 2006), alongside the persistence of older patterns of politick-ing unique to India. Such insights usefully complement the literature on corporationsin India that has tended to neglect their political practices and patterns of influence(Kumar, 1990; Jansson, Saqib, & Deo Sharma, 1995). Exploring in detail the formsof material, institutional, and discursive forms of power that firms employ is helpfulboth to a fuller theoretical understanding of the “political economy of the firm”(Amoore, 2000) in general, and to the development of theoretical approaches thatseek to explain the reciprocal relationship between corporate strategy and forms ofenvironmental governance by looking at the interplay between each of these sourcesand manifestations of power (Levy & Newell, 2002).

This article explores the corporate strategies of firms in the biotech and seedsectors, and how these firms have organized themselves to influence the policy pro-cess. It also provides an account of the different degrees of influence they have beenable to exercise. It draws on over 100 interviews conducted over a 4-year period(2000–2004) of field work in India. The approach is to look at the reciprocal rela-tionship between corporate strategy, the public positions adopted by firms, and thedevelopment of biotechnology policy in India. It is argued that this allows us toexplore the extent to which the policy preferences of leading firms and associationsinfluence the design and implementation of environmental regulations and, in turn,how those regulations shape the corporate strategies of firms in the biotechnology andseed sectors. The reciprocal links between corporate strategy and policy processes inpractice suggest the need for theoretical innovation. Rather than viewing businessinterests as homogeneous and monolithic, the importance of looking at divisionswithin capital and the political alliances that firms form as a basis for understandingthe ways in which policy choices are framed and decisions taken, becomes clear.

Exploring the role of biotechnology and seed firms in the policy process is key tounderstanding the regulatory approach taken by a government. Because of the exper-tise, economic power, and influential policy networks in which biotechnology firms

184 The Journal of Environment & Development



are nested, they have come to play a central role in shaping regulatory developmentsat the national and international levels (Glover & Newell, 2004). In implementingthese regulations, firms are expected to act as “street-level bureaucrats” (Lipskey,1980) overseeing compliance concerning biosafety in particular. This is especiallytrue for many developing countries, where state capacity for monitoring and enforc-ing environmental regulations at the field level, for example, is particularly lacking.

India presents an interesting prism through which to understand the role of indus-try groups in biotech policy processes. In global terms, given the size of the countryand the symbolic weight its actions carry, what happens in India sends out a power-ful message to the rest of the developing world. India is currently the world’s seventhlargest producer of genetically modified (GM) crops, cultivating 1.3 million hectaresin 2005 (James, 2005). This is one of the reasons that it has become a key site forbiotechnology companies and anti-GM activists alike in the global contest over thefuture of biotechnology in agriculture. The policy debate about the development andregulation of biotechnology in India is, therefore, strongly affected by global constel-lations of interests within the scientific, business, and non-governmental organization(NGO) communities. They play out in policy arenas in India in ways that create chal-lenges and threats to the biotechnology industry that it seeks to confront, accommo-date, and manage in accordance with the pursuit of its underlying corporate strategies.A potent combination of a diverse and multifaceted set of industrial concerns, a vocaland mobilized civil society, and an interesting set of intragovernmental dynamicsinteract to produce a quite unique politics of biotechnology in India.

The article first provides some background on the regulation of the environmentalrisks associated with biotechnology before discussing the corporate strategies of theleading business players in the biotechnology and seed sectors. It then looks at howthose strategies determine the policy positions of firms and the ways in which they or-ganize themselves into industry associations to represent their interests. Finally, thearticle assesses the different strategies of influence that have been adopted by thesegroupings, looking in particular at the material, institutional, and discursive forms ofpower that they have sought to exercise in debates about the role of biotechnology inIndian agriculture.

Regulating Biotechnology in India

Firms engaged in agricultural biotechnology in India are potentially affected by aplethora of environmental regulations concerning research into their products, howtheir biosafety is assessed and monitored, and how their products are then marketed anddistributed. For each stage of the production process, there are rules and regulationsgoverning business practice, which firms have sought to shape and accommodate.Although latest-generation gene transfer technologies raise particular environmentalchallenges in terms of the potential for gene flow and contamination of non-GM

Newell / Biotech Firms, Biotech Politics 185



crops, regulations regarding the selling and distribution of seeds have a much longerhistory in India, as elsewhere. Likewise, whereas biotechnology brings with itthe desire to patent biological processes, firms for a long time have sought legalprotection for the end products of their innovation. Indeed, even biosafety regula-tions in India derive from an Environmental Protection Act (1986) that is now 20 yearsold. There have been several incarnations of India’s biosafety rules since the Ministryof Environment and Forests (MoEF) first issued them in 1989. The Department ofBiotechnology (DBT) has revised policy in 1990, 1994, and 1998 covering all activ-ities associated with the development and diffusion of genetically modified organ-isms. An elaborate regulatory infrastructure exists from the national level down tostate and even district levels, with varying degrees of capacity to enforce policy ema-nating from Delhi. The principal institutional bodies with the mandate to approveapplications to commercialize products are the GEAC (Genetic EngineeringApproval Committee) and the RCGM (Review Committee on Genetic Modification),the former under the authority of MoEF and the latter that of the DBT. It is thesebodies that firms have sought to lobby and seek access to in order to ensure the com-mercialization of their products. In order to understand why some firms are moreconcerned about some aspects of the regulations than others, why they enjoy closerrelations with some ministries than others, it is important to understand their keycorporate strategies in the area of crop biotechnology.

Corporate Strategy

In looking at the biotech sector in India the first point to note is that there aremany important differences between these firms with regard their role in the “generevolution” and the public positions they adopt regarding the regulation of biotech-nology products. This is a function of their corporate strategies, which engender dif-ferences of opinion over intellectual property rights and the protection of plantvarieties, as well as issues such as commercial confidentiality and the nature ofbiosafety regulation. Many smaller seed companies even openly question the role ofbiotechnology in India’s agricultural development, critical of the hype about biotechas a magic bullet to address India’s food security, describing it as a “fashion.”3 Thereare broadly three categories of firm that are considered here: multinational biotechcompanies, national seed companies, and local start-up companies.

First, we look at the multinational corporations (MNCs) that operate in India. Ofthe ten private-sector companies working on GM crop development in 2004, threewere foreign multinationals. These include Monsanto and subsidiaries of Syngentaand Bayer/ProAgro-PGS (now including Aventis CropScience). These firms are char-acterized by large biotech portfolios, and access to élite science and sophisticatedpublic relations strategies. Monsanto is the most high profile of these and has thelargest presence in India. Monsanto maintains a research center in Bangalore at the




Indian Institute of Science (IISc) that has become a magnet for protests against GMdevelopment. As early as 1990, Monsanto sought approval for the commercial release ofits Bt cotton variety. This was rejected in 1993 on the basis that the technology transferfees were too high. In 1995 Mayhco (Maharastra Hybrid Seed Company), a long-established Indian seed company, was granted permission to import 100 g of transgeniccotton seed as part of an agreement with Monsanto. To consolidate its position in themarket, in 1998 Monsanto bought a 26% stake in Mayhco, creating Mayhco-MonsantoBiotech India Ltd. (MMB). This was seen by many as an astute strategic move, giventhat Mayhco’s director, Dr. Barwale, is a well-respected member of the Indian agri-cultural industry, honored by the Indian government for his contributions to the agricul-tural sector (Gupta, 2000). His connections within government extend beyond theDBT to many of the key agencies involved in biosafety regulation. In March 2002MMB’s Bt cotton was approved for commercial release for a 3-year trial period in sixstates, subject to a series of conditions (Dhar, 2002).

Monsanto maintains a regulatory affairs office in Delhi to engage in routine inter-actions with government officials over policy development. The company has alsoadopted a range of public relations strategies to promote the benefits of biotechnol-ogy. Newspaper advertisements, open days, videos, and workshops have all beenused to woo a sceptical public. Public surveys demonstrating support for the tech-nology have been funded and platforms created for those farmers’ leaders, such asChengal Reddy of the Andhra Pradesh Farmers’ Association, in favor of GM cropdevelopment in India. Monsanto has also led attempts to get media publicity for theviews of biotech-advocate NRIs (non-resident Indians), such as C. S Prakash fromTuskegee University in the United States, who made several high-profile visits toIndia. The epicenter of this national push is the company’s government and publicaffairs department based in Mumbai.

Monsanto has had to engage in public-political strategies to a greater degree thanother companies because of the particular fire that its activities have drawn fromactivists. The farmers’ group KRRS (Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangha) in Karnataka,for example, led a campaign in November 1998 to “Cremate Monsanto,” burning thecompany’s field trial sites in the state. The company has also faced allegations ofengaging in “biopiracy” from prominent activist Vandana Shiva of the ResearchFoundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, as well as legal actions from thegroup Gene Campaign, headed by Suman Sahai. It is clearly the case that in India,as elsewhere, because of its level of commitment to biotechnology development, aswell as its high-profile public relations work, Monsanto has found its activitiessubject to greater critical public scrutiny than many other companies that are pre-pared to let the company front the public defence of biotechnology on their behalf.Such firms have even been critical of Monsanto’s clumsy approach to aggressivelypushing approval of its products, resulting in damaging repercussions for the sectoras a whole. Rumors of illegal trials being undertaken with the company’s full knowl-edge and of the use of the controversial terminator technology compounded activist




accusations that “Monsanto treated India like a banana republic.”4 In the latter caseconfusion was generated by the fact that the trials of Bt cotton coincided with thetiming of the terminator controversy on the global stage. For Monsanto this episodecritically “damaged their relations with cotton-growing farmers,” according to theirdirector of Regulatory Affairs in India.5 Monsanto’s experience has not served todeter companies such as Du Pont from expanding their biotech portfolio in India,however, through proposed tie-ins with the Reliance group, as part of a broader con-centration on joint research on biotech crops and crop protection products.6 Majorfood companies such as Nestlé India are also looking to develop biotech projects,supported by the company’s own Life Ventures capital fund, which has 150 millionEuros to invest in “health enhancing food and agricultural biotechnology.”7

The second category of firms active is the large Indian seed companies with someinterest in biotechnology. These include companies such as Rallis and Indo-American Hybrid Seeds. These remain seed companies in a traditional sense, with astrong history of plant breeding and important experience in tissue culture and other“lower” tech biotechnology innovations. Though as yet they have developed little inthe way of transgenics, they are courting biotech tie-ins with companies such asAvesthagen8 and have registered interest in the production, sale, and marketing ofhybrid seeds. Companies such as Rallis remain attractive to larger biotechnologycompanies because of their extensive distribution network. Rallis, for example, hasjoint venture arrangements with Cargill on sunflower, sorghum, and maize.9 It hasthe reputation, access, and effective delivery systems that global firms are seeking.10

These firms, in turn, work with small traders such as Green Seeds Pvt, forexample, which distributes seeds for Indo-American, ProAgro-PGS, and Rallis.11

Referring to his company’s tie-in with ProAgro-PGS on the distribution side of thesupply chain, one seed trader said, “We can be in their chain, but we can’t com-pete.”12 Multinationals are interested in joint ventures with local firms to boost theircredibility as legitimate players in local markets and to tap both the trust that localseed firms have built up with farmers and their understanding of the regulatory envi-ronment. A. R. Modi from Oriental Biotech in Bangalore noted, “our strategicadvantage is that we know the agricultural system and have the political contacts . . .[as well as] 1,500 growers loyal to us that will accept any crops we give them.”Foreign corporations can buy firms for their germplasm then use it to develop trans-genics like Bt cotton, taking adapted hybrids and inserting a gene to add value.Alternatively, rather than establish formal tie-ins, some firms prefer to set up licens-ing arrangements with seed companies for the use of their transgenic technologies.Although Rasi Seeds is developing GM cotton under license from Mayho-Monsanto, in the case of Navbharat Seeds, a hybrid variety of Bt cotton was mar-keted illegally in 2001 in Gujarat, without the consent of Mayco-Monsanto or theapproval of the government GEAC committee. Despite the role of these smaller seedfirms in crop development, they are not, as yet, key organized political actors in theway the large biotech and seed firms are.




Third, there is a smaller, but significant, group of start-up firms, such as Avesthagenand BioCon, as well as outfits with close links to universities, such as StrandGenomics, which is run by scientists at Bangalore’s IISc. Strand Genomics developedwith funds from local venture and angel investors and is rated as one of the top fivecompanies in the bioinformatics sector.13 Avesthagen was founded by Villoo Patelwith the backing of major banks such as ICICI and a loan from the Global Trust Bank.These are newer firms, often dependent on venture capital and technology supportfrom groups such as Biotech Consortium India and with little independent capacityfor production, instead often being involved in contract research, which is out-sourcedfrom larger biotechnology concerns such as AstraZeneca in the case of Avesthagen.14

They are involved, for example, in trait identification and screening work for compa-nies, using tools for the prediction of gene sequences or marker-assisted selection andbioinformatics. BioCon, founded by Muzumdar-Shaw in 1978, with a longer historythan many such firms, continues to focus on conventional work such as the provisionof enzymes to the brewing and bread industry. The start-ups are assisted in terms ofresources and profile by an influential community of NRIs. For example, theK-GANGA (Karnataka Global Advisory Network Group on Agriculture) umbrellagroup convened by C. S. Prakash and backed by the state government of Karnataka,was formed to bring together biotechnologists from Bangalore working overseassharing common views about the benefits of biotech for India.

The sort of work these companies engage in is capital intensive, with high costs,especially for service-oriented firms working on bio-informatics for example.Venture capital firms, upon which these smaller entrepreneurial outfits depend, seeka short-term return on their investments. This explains the importance that “start-up”firms attach to forms of intellectual property protection. By 2003 BioCon heldnearly 100 patents on its work, for example (Scoones, 2005). The company, togetherwith Strand Genomics, has courted the idea of a partnership to develop intellectualproperty rights protection for their bio-marker research.15 The need to secure intel-lectual property rights protection has drawn a company like Avesthagen into the pol-icy process, where legal experts represent the company on government committees.

The financial vulnerability of the start-ups means they are more directly andimmediately affected by the politics that surrounds the technology’s perceived popu-larity than some of their larger counterparts. Concerns about “burdensome” govern-ment regulations and about public opposition to GMOs serve to temper the enthusiasmof venture capitalists about the potential of the technology to deliver high commercialreturns. Equally, positive signals from government help to create an environmentconducive to new investment in the sector. This is why biotech entrepreneur KiranMuzumdar-Shaw, head of BioCon, reacted to the approval of MMB’s Bt cottonvariety in March 2002 by suggesting that “with the right policy signals such . . . thecommercialisation of Bt cotton, global venture capitalists will now be more inclinedto invest in the Indian biotech industry.”16 Unlike the major biotech MNCs that canafford to take a longer-term perspective on innovations, markets, and regulatory




developments, “bio-entrepreneurs,” such as Villoo Patel and Dinesh Joshi, havecontinually to “woo” venture capital firms.17 Assessments are made of companiesregarding their commitment, track record, and potential. Because banks and otherinvestors got their “fingers burned” when the information technology bubble burst,they are more cautious with the hype around biotech and less bullish in their out-look.18 Some larger seed companies in India have been well placed to seek out ven-ture capital, however, such as Indo-American Hybrids whose director Dr. ManmohanAttavar sits on the board of the venture capital fund, UTI (Unit Trust India).19 Giventhe importance of this type of funding, the DBT has sought to develop a NationalBiotechnology Venture Capital Fund for biotech entrepreneurs working on smaller-scale projects and the government of Karnataka, in association with the Vision group,has plans to set up its own Biotech Venture Fund.20

Though small in global financial terms and subject to the whims of investors, thesestart-ups are used symbolically to highlight the commercial success that biotechnol-ogy can bring to India. In this sense, their profile in policy debates currently outstripstheir material contribution to the Indian economy (Scoones, 2005). The projected suc-cess of these companies has also been used to lever political influence, with VillooPatel being part of the Vision group on biotechnology created by Karnataka’s ChiefMinister in February 2001 and a member of the Karnataka State Board for theDevelopment of Technology. The profile that such bio-entrepreneurs enjoy also helpsto attract international investment from groups such as American International andGary Wendt Capital that have sought to buy out ICICI’s 10% venture stake in BioConIndia.21 The exponential growth in the share value of the company following an ini-tial public offer in April 2004 looks set to consolidate that success.22

Getting Organized

This section looks at how the firms described in the section above have orga-nized to represent their interests in India’s policy debate on biotechnology andbiosafety. Although there are some areas of common concern, there are many dif-ferences in position among the key national associations active in the debate. Theserelate quite strongly to the distinct corporate strategies that firms have adopted, sur-veyed above.

The Seed Industry

There are several industry groupings that support the seed industry in India. Thetwo most prominent are the Association of the Seed Industry (ASI) and the SeedAssociation of India (SAI). Protecting traditional plant breeding and securing accessto seed technologies at affordable prices are the issues that preoccupy their mem-bership. The ASI has, for example, called on the government to provide a financial




package to support traditional plant breeding and biotechnology research, as well asdevelop a global strategy for sourcing seed technologies at affordable prices forfarmers.23 ASI was set up in 1992 as a proactive forum “for the Indian seed industryto face the challenges of the globalisation of Indian agriculture” (ASI, 2001).Represented on the association’s board are key players in the seed industry, includ-ing Dr. Manmohan Attavar of Indo-American Hybrid Seeds, R. B. Barwale ofMayhco, and senior figures from Rallis and Nath Seeds. Both ASI and SAI are activemembers of the International Seed Federation, which represents a forum for the dis-cussion of issues of interest to the global seed industry (ISF, 2003). On the nationalstage in India, however, it is SAI that has been more prominent in debates aboutbiotechnology development and to which I now turn my attention.

The Seed Association of India has been active on biotech issues, broadly con-ceived, for a lot longer than the other business associations discussed below, theConfederation of Indian Industry (CII), which only became active on these issuesonce the larger biotech firms became interested in modern biotechnology, and the AllIndia Biotech Association (AIBA) which was formed to capitalize on the commer-cial potential of new innovations in biotech in the agricultural and pharmaceuticalsectors.24 SAI was formed in 1982 in order to provide inputs into the developmentof the new seed regulations. It has participated in national debates about the seedsector ever since, including active engagement with debates about the New SeedLaw of 2001 and the Seeds Bill of 2004 through the Seed Policy Review Group. Theassociation represents a combination of older seed companies, such as Indo-AmericanHybrid Seed, and companies with links to multinationals, such as Mahyco. Despitethis history, SAI shares with associations representing the larger players in the mar-ket a concern with the speed of approvals and certification for new hybrids, whichare described as “out of date by the time you get certification from governmentinspectors.”25 There is also a shared frustration from a sector that claims to be subjectto 16 separate laws of the Government of India.26 The comment of Dr. Barwale,President of the Association of Seed Industries, that “we will bear the process, butplease don’t let it break us,” seems to capture the fears of many companies thatexcessive regulation could cripple the performance of their business.27

On issues directly impinging on the seed industry, the SAI enjoys close relationswith the Ministry of Agriculture, and has access to most of the committees hosted bythat ministry dealing with issues such as import clearances, export and quarantinefees. Despite ongoing complaints about the lack of coordination across governmentregarding regulation and the slow pace of implementation, reflected in the commentsabove, the association claims to have their suggestions adopted “at least 90% of thetime,” according to a senior SAI spokesperson. These channels of access are used toraise broader concerns their members have about the lifting of quantitative restric-tions on imports and the dumping of agricultural produce on the Indian marketthrough price cutting.28 The national outcry over farmer suicides in many states inIndia lent credence to the urgency of calls to support farmers struggling to compete




in the new liberalized environment.29 The suicides, in which farmers have killedthemselves by swallowing pesticides, driven to despair by competition from foreignproducers, low yields, and the high price of pesticides, have become a key referencepoint in the debate about India’s agricultural future.

Divergences between seed companies about the priority that should be attachedto crop protection and to market liberalization and relaxation of controls on foreignownership reflect their market position within India and globally and the extent towhich they engage in primary research. The eclectic nature of SAI’s membershipmeans that it is a broad organization and has to accommodate the divergent interestsof MNCs such as Monsanto and Syngenta and small seed traders simultaneously.

The Biotech Industry

Unlike the SAI, the AIBA (All India Biotech Association) has a much shorterhistory. Established in 1994, the association represents a smaller number of multi-national and Indian agri-biotech and pharmaceutical companies in a more promo-tional capacity. AIBA’s long-term aim is to establish itself as a “strong and vibrantorganisation” in India comparable to similar bodies already existing in variousEuropean countries, Japan, and the United States (AIBA, 2000b). Members of AIBAinclude Novartis, Monsanto, and ProAgro, but the association has no links with theseed industry per se.30 Some claim the association to be relatively weak and thatmany of the multinationals that it represents do not really need the body.31 Nevertheless,representing larger firms and those with clearly defined interests in biotech meansthat the association suffers from fewer internal competing and potentially contradic-tory agendas among its membership than the SAI for example.

Its membership composition also explains the position of the association onissues such as international property rights, which they see as key to attracting for-eign investors to India.32 The other primary areas of concern for AIBA are biosafetyregulation and import and excise duty. The head of the association, Vivek Singhal,claims to enjoy “excellent” relations with all the government departments activeon the biotech issue, especially the Ministry of Commerce.33 As DBT Secretary,P. K. Ghosh attended the meetings of the executive committee of the association andthe relationship is reciprocated by Vivek Singhal’s presence on the DevelopmentTask Force of DBT.34 A report produced by the association under the authorship ofC. Prakash in 2000 (AIBA, 2000a), which was sharply critical of the Indian govern-ment’s handling of biotech applications, served to sour relations with DBT tem-porarily. In general, however, close relations with key government departments havebeen used to make the associations’ views known on what they describe as a “cum-bersome” regulatory process in need of simplification and rationalization in thenumber of authorities required to give approval for new products. Although all theassociations described here interact on issues of mutual concern, ties appear to becloser between CII and AIBA, where the latter is indeed a member of the former and




CII has people on leave from AIBA.35 The overlap between the two outfits is perhapsless surprising when we recall who they represent and the preferences these firmshave concerning the nature of the regulatory system. CII, for example, endorsedAIBA’s controversial report on biotechnology noted above.

CII has a membership of over 4,000 companies, including 170 sectoral andregional associations and affiliates. Eighty percent of investment in India is accountedfor by CII members. The body has 26 offices in India and 10 overseas, intended tohelp create a political climate of support for Indian industry. Although 40% of itsmembers are made up of smaller firms, these are less vocal and by its own admis-sion it is viewed as a “big boys’ club.”36 CII is seen by many government officialsand CII’s counterparts in other industry associations as by far the most significantand powerful industry grouping in this debate. By all accounts, it is the mostrespected of the industry groupings and enjoys the highest levels of access to gov-ernment departments such as DBT and the MoEF with whom CII has a “strong part-nership.”37 Senior figures within CII claim that “in 99% of cases, no new policy isevolved without consulting us,” and that “we write the legislation, lets face it!” Aswith the SAI, such bold claims often refer to involvement in the drafting of environ-mental regulations and influence over commercial approvals either through directrepresentation or through close ties to key individuals on the RCGM and GEACcommittees, rather than enforcement, where their frustrations center on the pace anduneven nature of implementation of biosafety regulations.

Indeed, the CII is represented on all 25 committees within MoEF that addressissues of concern to its members, including those dealing with the BiosafetyProtocol and biodiversity issues, as well as being a member of the RCGM. The CIIis also able to make key inputs into the policy process through the publication, forexample, of its white paper on biotechnology regulation in India, which laid out astrong case for a single-window, time-bound regulatory approval process (maximum3 months), in contrast to the multiple clearances currently required.38 This stanceclearly reflects the needs and corporate strategies of the majority of its multinationalmembers. Impact for initiatives such as the white paper was secured through activegovernment involvement and buy-in early on in the development of the paper.Following in the wake of reactions to the AIBA report, mentioned above, the CII isanxious not to alienate government officials, but rather to bring them into their dis-cussions about changes to the regulatory system.

As DBT Secretary, Manju Sharma publicly acknowledged the concerns expressedin the white paper over the speed and complexity of the approval process and in aprivate meeting with seed industry representatives claimed that “we [the govern-ment] have tried to streamline the process.” To demonstrate the government’s com-mitment to biotech she took the extraordinary step of assuring those in attendanceat the meeting, some time before the crop was authorized for commercialization,“let us assume that cotton will be in the hands of the farmers very soon.”39 Despitethis high level of support, the CII acknowledges the need to boost the profile of




industry on committees such as RCGM dealing with these issues. K. P. Nyati, headof the Environmental Management Division at CII, feels that “industry is not worriedenough” and that CII needs “to broaden the base of interest to raise the level of dia-logue with government.”40

Among the CII and its close associates, there are clear policy entrepreneurswhose own political contacts and commercial success make them attractive sponsorsof the CII’s overall message. Kiran Muzumdar-Shaw, head of BioCon in Bangaloreand dubbed the “Queen of biotechnology” by The Economist (Scoones, 2002), andher colleagues, have played a key agenda-setting role in setting the tone for thedebate on reforms to the system of biotechnology regulation in India. She also chairsthe CII National Committee on Biotechnology and is president of the ABLE(Association of Biotechnology-Led Enterprises) group set up by the CII in February2003 to tackle common issues faced by the biotech industry.

To a greater degree than either SAI or AIBA, the CII is very active in internationalpolicy debates on biotech issues, working with groups such as BIO (BiotechnologyIndustry Organisation) and the Global Industry Coalition that have led the industrypresence at the international biosafety negotiations, as well as with counterparts inSouth Africa and Europe.41 The CII and the U.S.-India Business Council launched theIndo-U.S. Biotech Alliance in November 2002, of which BIO was a member. Thealliance is part of the U.S.-India Economic Dialogue launched by former prime min-ister Atal Bihari Vajpayee during his visit to the United States in 2001 aimed atimproving investment opportunities and business cooperation in biotechnology.42 Forthe companies, these ties serve both commercial and political purposes where repre-sentatives from the CII have been invited along to promote the benefits of investingin India to foreign firms on overseas trade promotion tours.43 The CII sees these vis-its as key to offsetting the image of India as a hostile investment environment forbiotech firms. In playing this promotional role, the CII has been at the forefront ofpersuading the Government of India to provide tax breaks for investors in researchand development and for patented products,44 lowering duties and creating attractiveinfrastructures, following the model set by the information technology industry.

Gauging Influence

This section looks at the different dimensions of business influence through thelens of material, institutional, and discursive power. Such an approach is helpful inunderstanding links between the structural power of firms, which derives from theresources they provide the state, the nature of access to key decision-making institu-tions that they are able to secure as a result of this, and how such access and influ-ence is supported by, and in turn generates, understandings about the strategicimportance of biotechnology to the Indian economy. Intricate social and funding tiesbetween policy makers, industry personnel and media representatives serve to ensure




that, despite concerted opposition within some quarters of civil society and withincertain parts of the Government of India, the prevailing orthodoxy continues to bethat the further development of biotechnology is in India’s national interest. Takentogether, these forms of influence help to account for the forms and degree of powerthat industry groups have been able to exercise in the politics of biotechnology inIndia. This approach contributes to theoretical accounts of the role of business inenvironmental governance (Jansen & Vellema, 2004; Levy & Newell, 2002),showing how public regulation and decision making within the firm are intimatelyrelated. This is helpful in moving beyond the emphasis in the literature oncorporatism and those that are pluralist studies in orientation, which tend to assumefirst, the bounded nature of the state and business as political actors, without lookingwithin these entities and exploring the multiple sources of power that they exercise(Wilson, 2003), and second, the openness of the political system to competition,without taking into account the “mobilisation of bias” towards powerful economicactors (Schattschneider, 1960).

Material

The first thing to note here is the way in which some of the larger firms within thebiotech sector have been able to present the interests of their particular fraction ofcapital as consistent with those of capital in general (Holloway & Picciotto, 1978).Hence, although all sectors and firms within the economy compete to demonstratetheir strategic importance to the economy of the country in which they are operating,some are better placed than others to make the case that their activities coincide withthe government’s own national interests. For biotech companies operating in India,the simultaneous potential for high profitability and global market penetration, and theprospect of addressing some of India’s food security needs, places them well to arguethat their commercial interests coincide with those of the national interest.

Hence, although the potential for growth and employment that agriculturalbiotechnology can deliver is hotly contested in public arenas in India, the prevailingperception among policy élites within government is that biotechnology has greatgrowth potential. Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated at the ScienceCongress in Delhi in 2001 that India’s vision included “shaping biotechnology intoa premier precision tool of the future for creation of wealth and ensuring social jus-tice especially for the welfare of the poor” (quoted in Herring, 2005). This vision isalso shared by the department that is in many ways at the center of biotechnologyregulation in India, the DBT. P. K.Ghosh, former DBT advisor, said that “we have topush this technology . . . it is good for the country,”45 and Manju Sharma, DBT sec-retary until 2004, used her position to publicize the benefits of biotechnology forIndian agriculture.

Structural analysis of the relationship between state and business would also sug-gest that larger businesses tend to enjoy a privileged position with government




because governments depend on them for taxation, employment, and legitimacythrough their endorsement of government handling of the economy. The capitalmobility that larger firms enjoy heightens their structural power over governments.Although access to skilled labour and adequate infrastructure place constraints onwhere firms can locate, large biotech firms consider themselves to be highly mobilein where they base themselves. This provides them with a degree of leverage overgovernments anxious to attract investors where they can exercise a powerful threatto move operations elsewhere. Comparisons with China are invoked by bodies suchas the CII, as well as individual firms, to underline the fact that if the Indian gov-ernment does not send out positive signals about biotech development in the coun-try, there are many other attractive investment locations to which firms can move.Quotes below from former government officials such as P. K. Ghosh testify to theextent to which these fears have registered in the discourse of policy élites.

The perception of the growth potential of biotech in India is endorsed and encour-aged by many of the media and business-based narratives discussed below and linksto national ambitions reinforced by association with political slogans such as “Indiashining.”46 But its acceptance is also a function of the social networks that bring com-mercial and policy élites together which help to nurture this consensus. This occursformally through the organization of seminars between industry and policy makers.These occasions are used by government officials to repeat to industry their ownmantras about grasping the nettle of biotechnology, a technology India cannot affordto be without, given declining yields, growing populations, and millions withoutaccess to adequate levels of nutrition. As DBT secretary Manju Sharma endorsed thehighly disputed industry claim that the Indian biotech market was expected to reach$2.5 billion by 2001 (Scoones, 2005). Informally, the message reinforcement occursthrough social networks that meet at élite social clubs that business and governmentpersonnel frequent in cities such as Bangalore and Hyderabad where opinions canbe expressed more freely and gossip shared more easily than in formal meetingswith government officials. These channels are often especially important for firmswhose economic might alone is not sufficient to guarantee the ear of government.Representatives of GMCI (Greater Mysore Chambers of Commerce and Industry)and their affiliates, for example, are clear about the strategic value of their attendanceat the Bowring Institute and other clubs in Bangalore in order to network and seek toinfluence officials from the Karnataka state government that frequent the club.

Institutional

The institutional influence that firms are able to enjoy manifests itself mostdirectly in the form of access to committees and key government departmentsinvolved in policy making on biotechnology. Although some argue that industry has“tentacles everywhere” within government,47 in reality the patterns of influence arerather more complicated. It is important then to disaggregate the question of




influence and address it in terms of links between particular associations and even atthe level of relations between particular firms and specific government departments.

There are multiple formal institutional channels that firms can use to express theirconcerns and seek to advance their interests. Larger agrochemical firms such as Rallisclaim to interact on a regular basis on biosafety issues with key individuals within thenational policy process, such as P. K. Ghosh and Manju Sharma. Given the nature oftheir portfolio, however, their advice is sought more frequently from committees reg-ulating pesticide use where they claim to be heavily involved in “framing the rules.”48

Sometimes it is the case that an association will be invited to comment on proposals.In other cases individual firms will be approached. What is interesting about firmssuch as Rallis, with interests in biotech and in pesticide and fertilizer production, isthat the association through which they channel their concerns differs according to theissue. For example, for inputs on global chemical regulations, Rallis tends to gothrough the CII, whereas for their seed sector interests they use SAI.

Despite protestations on the part of some firms of lack of consultation over thedesign of regulations, a more plausible explanation is that, although they enjoy closerelations with some parts of government, this is not the case with all governmentdepartments. For example, although relations with departments such as Commerceare good, biotech firms have been less successful at getting a sympathetic hearingfor their concerns with the Ministry of Environment and Forests. Firms that belongto CII and AIBA have been strongly supportive of common approaches to risk assess-ment and the use of principles such as “substantial equivalence” and “familiarity,”reflecting their ties to global industry groupings such as BIO (Newell, 2003). Theyhave been unable to persuade environment bureaucrats of the merits of approachesto regulation that are minimally disruptive of global trade, however. On this andother issues, firms express frustration because MoEF officials tend not to be techni-cal specialists but general IAS (Indian Administrative Service) officers. Because per-sonnel there change every couple of years, firms feel officials there need to be(educated) each time on the technical aspects of the biotech issue.

Although the CII and AIBA appear to enjoy more influence with DBT and theMinistry of Commerce than with the Ministry of Agriculture, SAI has closer linkswith the latter.49 As the most significant seed association in India, an importantaspect of SAI’s mandate has been to cultivate close links with the Ministry ofAgriculture. Seshia notes, “To this end it has established itself as an industry repre-sentative within policy networks by, for example, securing seats on a number of gov-ernment committees,” which provides “a base from which to influence policy” (2002,p. 2744). DBT, on the other hand, is accused by opponents of biotech to operate,essentially, as the mouthpiece of multinational biotech firms. DBT’s former scien-tific adviser, P. K. Ghosh, in particular, was lambasted by the Delhi press in 1998over allegations of collusion with Monsanto-Mayhco and by activists for his over-zealous approach to endorsing the company’s application without due regard forthe procedures set up to approve GMOs. Those involved in decision making on




the RCGM and GEAC approval committees comment on the way in which “Ghoshspeeds the process up” by bundling together a series of requests for approval.50 Thishaste, however, has resulted in Vandana Shiva’s organization, Research Foundationfor Science, Technology and Ecology, bringing a case before the Supreme Court ofIndia over the authority of the body that approved trials of the controversial Bt cot-ton crop (RFSTE, 2002). Critics also allege a pro-industry bias in the selection ofscientists who sit on the RCGM and GEAC committees to the exclusion of critics.51

Privileged access has not always yielded immediate gains for the biotech busi-ness, however. On the Plant Varieties Protection and Farmers’ Rights bill of 2002,Monsanto was invited by the Joint Parliamentary Committee to make an oral sub-mission during consultations on the bill in 2000, the only individual company to doso (Seshia, 2002). Seen as a victory for activists, the PVP and Farmers’ Rights Actthat resulted excludes plant varieties and seeds from patentability and allows farm-ers to save, exchange, and share seed, going against the wishes of multinational com-panies that wanted to restrict the selling of protected varieties. India’s accession tothe UPOV (International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants)Act of 1978, however, may well reverse the “farmers’ privilege” clause protected inthis legislation. Acceptance of the agreement was rushed through in spite of theseconcerns, “in response to international pressure and pressure from the powerfulcommercial plant breeders” (Ramakrishna, 2003, p. 20). There is concern that acces-sion to UPOV demands that India have a pro-breeder and pro-patent plant varietiesprotection scheme will be incompatible with the existing pro-farmer PVP andFarmers’ Rights Act. “By its very nature UPOV is intended to preserve and enlargethe interest of multinational seed corporations and the scientists/plant breeders whowork for them,” according to B. J. Krishan of the International Union for Conservationof Nature (Krishan, 2002).

There is some evidence also of a strong degree of overlap between the DBT and theindustry whose activities it is meant to regulate, raising concerns that have been raisedelsewhere about the ability of the same agency to simultaneously be a “promoter” of atechnology and a “protector” against the risks associated with it. To take one example,Dr. S. R. Rao of the DBT was formerly involved in developing a strand ofbiotechnology-related work with Rallis Corporation in Bangalore.52 Suspicions aboutthe unhealthy degree of interaction between DBT and the biotech companies it regu-lates are compounded by incidental evidence of the ties between the two, such as theMahyco calendar that hung on P. K. Ghosh’s wall until he stood down in 2002, or theMonsanto diary-filofax that sits on S. R. Rao’s desk in the DBT.

Despite the closeness of the relationship between some biotech firms and theDBT, there is a suspicion on the part of some biotech firms that businesses whosecore investments are in pesticides and chemicals and with whom the government tra-ditionally has enjoyed a close relationship, are using fears about biotechnologyapplications to slow the growth of the industry, as it competes directly with theirpotential share of the market. In reality, the fact that cotton is the first crop to go




through the system may explain the protracted nature of the process on this occasionand should not necessarily be taken as evidence of industry claims that the decision-making process is faulty by design. The recommendations of the Task Force onApplication of Biotechnology in Agriculture, set up in 2004, indicate that policyremains in fact highly receptive to industry concerns. Calls to reduce the number ofevaluations, consolidate regulatory steps required for approval, and strengthen therole of the DBT over that of MoEF in decision making were adopted in the nationalstrategy of 2005 (Indira et al., 2005).

Discursive

Besides the material power wielded by some biotech firms and the level of accessand influence that they are able to secure through institutional means, an importantpart of the story is the social construction of the commercial potential of biotech-nology. Media framings help to boost perceptions of the material potential of thesector, as well as ensure high levels of government interest in the industry’s activi-ties, key to sustaining institutional access. There appears to be an intimate relation-ship between each of these dimensions, therefore, where material power helps tosecure institutional access and both interactions with policy communities and theeconomic potential of the sector create an environment conducive to the constructionof discourses supportive of biotech development.

The case for biotechnology development in India is premised on a set of assump-tions that leading firms have played a key part in constructing and embedding inpolicy debate. Government officials repeat the central narrative of declining produc-tivity, lack of fertile lands, and rising costs of inputs that are said to make biotech-nology the “only way” forward.53 Through these means, projections and assumptionsare internalized and carried forward in policy discourse by influential players withinkey government departments. Though it remains removed from the reality of lack ofprogress and poor incentive structures for industry to perform the role set for it, theseclaims serve to reassure investors and suspicious publics about the technology.

Many media commentators and industry representatives discuss the potential ofbiotechnology in light of the success achieved by the information technology (IT)industry in India. The slogan “from IT to BT” is heard frequently from advocates ofthe technology, assuming IT provides a replicable model for the successful develop-ment of biotechnology in India. Such suppositions acquire the status of “givens” inpolicy debates through constant repetition and uncritical acceptance. Biotech com-panies gain materially from such an association with the IT success story. TheMinister of Finance has granted biotech companies the same entitlements as theother “sunrise” industries such as IT, including tax holidays and exemptions fromcustoms duty, for example.54 Contestable assumptions behind media-led social con-structions of the seamless continuity from the IT to BT revolutions, around the levelof skills required to sustain the shift, and about the types of government intervention




that are necessary to support these new market players, are overlooked in the rush tosell India as a prime biotech location for investors.55

Despite more critical coverage in papers such as The Hindu or the Indian Express,key daily national papers such as the Economic Times play an important role in thisprocess. Activist Devinder Sharma describes the Economic Times as “the mouth-piece of industry.”56 Both Time magazine India and the Economic Times adopt abroadly pro-biotech line, but it is the latter that is taken most seriously by govern-ment.57 Business World and Business Line also play an important role within thebiotech sector in promoting the attractiveness of investing in the sector and lendingsupport to claims regarding its growth potential. The Economic Times reported thatthe bioinformatics sector in India is registering per annum growth of 90%.58

Similarly, Kiran Muzumdar-Shaw is quoted as suggesting that the biotech businessin India will reach $1.5 billion by 200759 and the Financial Express cites the samefigure, gleaned directly from a CII report on the subject.60

These magazines and newspapers play a key role in terms of selling the potentialof Indian firms to global audiences, faithfully and regularly reporting statementsfrom leading pro-biotech NRIs such as C. S. Prakash, endorsing the government’sapproval of Bt cotton for example.61 The views of bodies such as the Foundationfor Biotechnology Awareness and Education, which aims to generate beneficialpublicity about the benefits of biotechnology for Indian agriculture, are frequentlyreported, as are ambitious growth forecasts produced by industry groups such asABLE.62 The opinions of leading industry bodies are taken as an adequate statementof truth in the debate in much of the mainstream media. In a story on the problemsassociated with India’s patent legislation, the Business Standard concludes: “Indiarequires a strong patent regime to encourage research and development. Intellectualproperty rights must be used to build an asset base.”63 The same publication alsoattributes the success of Bangalore in attracting biotech investors to the “single clear-ance for investors,” endorsing the calls of industry associations for such clearance atthe national level.

One recurrent feature of this general narrative about the enormous potential ofagricultural biotechnology and the urgency with which it has to be tapped is the“myth of the biotech superpower,” China. The analysis underpinning this narrative isweak on detail, importantly regarding the extent to which there is scope to apply inIndia the Chinese model of agribiotech development. Key differences that are glossedover in the rush to present China as a viable model for India to follow include the dif-ferent capacities for public sector research and the contrasting role of civil society incontesting the benefits of the technology. Nevertheless, the success of biotech devel-opments to date in China is a common point of reference for government officials,who readily cite the savings in pesticide use, the absence of detrimental environmen-tal effects, and the positive benefits accruing to smaller farmers reported in studiesfrom China.64 Slow downs in the process are regarded as missed opportunities tocatch up with China. P. K. Ghosh, former advisor to the DBT and member secretary




of the RCGM committee, regrets that when Monsanto and Mahyco proposed cottonback in 1993, a decision was stalled which meant that India lost the bus that wouldhave allowed them to surpass China’s technological supremacy in this area.65 Industrygroups such as the CII perpetuate this sense of a zero-sum competition between Indiaand China, where potential investors are waiting and watching to see which signalsthe government sends out about its likely stance on approvals for GMOs, in order tocreate pressure on government officials to hasten the approval process.

A final component of the social construction of biotechnology relates to the poten-tial environmental risks associated with the technology. In India, as elsewhere, propo-nents of GM crops have sought to emphasize the ways in which GM is a “precisiontechnology,” able to target specific pests and resistant to nature’s defects in the form ofpests and viruses (Levidow & Tait, 1995). Through recourse to metaphors of controland engineering, technologies developed under carefully controlled laboratory condi-tions are claimed to be “self-regulating,” thus avoiding the need for overbearing publicregulation. Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTs) or “terminator” technolo-gies, as activists successfully dubbed them, seeds that are engineered to become ster-ile after one season’s use, provide the epitome of such a technology. Unfortunately forMonsanto, the scandal, which erupted internationally with reverberations felt in India,where rumours were rife that the company had trialled the technology there, meansthat the technology has not yet been introduced, legally at least, into India.

Conclusion

This article has identified and explained the ways in which different firms affectedby and involved in the debate about the role of biotechnology in Indian agriculturehave sought to advance their interests. It has been argued that the public positions oflarger biotech and agro-chemical companies, seed enterprises, and newer start-up firmsand the associations to which they belong relate to the differences in their underlyingcorporate strategies. The extent to which these firms are involved in primary research,export their products, or require protection for their products helps to determine theirpolitical affiliations to the leading industry bodies that are active on biotechnologyissues. In turn, each of these associations has been shown to have distinct patterns ofinteraction with particular government agencies involved in the regulation of biotech-nology products, as well as differing degrees of contact with global industry coalitions.Alongside this, individual firms, especially larger companies such as Monsanto, haveadopted their own unique and changing approach to policy engagement.

It is clear that through a combination of material influence, in most cases highlevels of institutional access, and in a context in which claims about the benefits ofbiotechnology are echoed and repeated in influential media, industry, has played animportant role in the evolving regulatory regime. Reasons for this include theexpertise and economic weight of these actors and the fact that they are providing a




technology that ostensibly has the potential to directly address pressing problems thatIndia faces. These forms of leverage apply to some firms more than others. Smalleractors in the vast seed sector in India are barely involved directly in the current debateabout India’s “gene revolution.” Although they are happy for a body like the SAI topresent their concerns to government regarding laws governing seed markets andmore generic concerns about competition from foreign seed producers, they are notat the frontline of debates about the role of biotechnology in Indian agriculture.Instead, the policy agenda in Delhi appears to be far more influenced by a fairly close-knit policy network of biotech entrepreneurs from larger multinationals and success-ful start-up firms such as BioCon with good national and global connections. Whoseinfluence runs furthest will depend on the perceived role of biotechnology in India’sdevelopment trajectory, decisions about which forms of biotechnology developmentare considered to be most consistent with the national interest, and choices about theappropriate role in this development of foreign investors as opposed to domesticenterprises. Given the enormity and economic and global significance of thesechoices, we can expect to see continued intense engagement with the policy processby all sectors with a stake in the issue.

Understanding the role of the firm in the governance of this key technology bylooking at power as it is exercised in material, institutional, and discursive formslends weight to accounts of environmental governance that explore the coalitions thatbring into alliance elements of capital with particular parts of the state, often alsoseeking legitimacy for their positions through association with civil society groupsand access to influential media (Andrée, 2005; Levy & Newell, 2002). It helps us toexplain why some environmental regulations prevail over others, why some under-standings of biotechnology’s relationship to sustainability are never considered, andwhy, despite the furor that has surrounded the technology’s development in India, thegovernment is able to continue developing and commercializing it.

List of Abbreviations

ABLE Association of Biotechnology-Led EnterprisesAIBA All India Biotechnology AssociationASI Association of the Seed IndustryBIO Biotechnology Industry OrganisationCII Confederation of Indian IndustryDBT Department of BiotechnologyGEAC Genetic Engineering Approval CommitteeGMCI Greater Mysore Chambers of Commerce and IndustryIAS Indian Administrative ServiceIBSC Institutional Biosafety Committee




ISF International Seed FederationIT Information TechnologyIUCN International Union for Conservation of NatureK-GANGA Karnataka Global Advisory Network Group on AgricultureKRRS Karnataka Rajya Ryota SanghaMahyco Maharastra Hybrid Seed CompanyMoEF Ministry of Environment and ForestsNRIs Non-Resident IndiansRCGM Review Committee on Genetic ModificationSAI Seed Association of India

Notes

1. I am grateful to Dominic Glover, James Keeley, Ian Scoones, the three anonymous referees of thepaper, and the editors for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

2. Bacillus thuringiensis.3. Interviews with seed company representatives, April 5, 2001.4. Interview with leading activist, New Delhi, May 5, 2001.5. Interview with R. D. Kapoor, head of Regulatory Affairs, Monsanto India, April 4, 2001.6. Du Pont plans biotech foray in India. (2003, February 10). Economic Times, p. 9; Du Pont eyeing

biotech, agri and fuel cell biz in India. (2003, February 8). Financial Express, p. 1.7. Nestle scouts for biotechnology projects. (2002, March 18). Business Line, p. 7.8. Rallis in talks with Avesthagen for biotech foray. (2002, April 9). Chemical Weekly, p. 117.9. Interviews with Dr. V. R. Patil, head of Biotechnology at Rallis and Dr. M. S. Mithyantha, vice-

president of Research and Development at Rallis, Bangalore, May 8, 2001.10. Interview with Dr. Manmohan Attavar, Bangalore, May 10, 2001.11. Interview with Jagal Kishor, director, Green Seeds Pvt Ltd., April 6, 2001.12. Interview with Iswar Bahuja, Puhaja Seeds Ltd., April 5, 2001.13. The right genetics. (2002, October 21). Business World, p. 46.14. Interview with Dinesh Joshi, Avestha Gengraine Techs Pvt Ltd., Bangalore, May 10, 2001.15. Strand, Biocon may jointly develop IP. (2002, February 14). Financial Express, p. 4.16. The Hindu (2002, March 28).17. Interview with Dinesh Joshi, Avestha Gengraine Techs Pvt Ltd., Bangalore, May 10, 2001.18. Interview with Ghanshyam Dass, NASDAQ Bangalore, May 8, 2001.19. Interview with Dr. Manmohan Attavar, Bangalore, May 10, 2001.20. DBT’s venture capital fund fails to take off. (2003, March 27). Economic Times, p. 12.21. AIG, GW may buy out ICICI venture in BioCon. (2002, December 14). Economic Times, p. 1.22. BioCon on expansion spree. (2005, July 21). Economic Times, p. 2.23. Seed growers want technology mission for sector. (2002, December 21). Business Standard, p. 5.24. Interview with Dr. Kataria, Seed Association of India, March 27, 2001.25. Interview with seed company representative, April 6, 2001.26. Presentation by Arvind Kapur, ProAgro-PGS India Ltd., at seminar on “Agricultural biotechnology:

The need of the new millennium, April 9, 2001, New Delhi.27. Intervention at the seminar “Agricultural biotechnology: The need of the new millennium,” April

9, 2001, New Delhi.28. Interview with Iswar Bahuja, Puhaja Seeds Ltd., April 5, 2001.




29. A farm crisis and suicides. (2001, April 14–27). Frontline; 650 suicide deaths among farmers inKarnataka state alone were reported for the 2003–2004 season (Scoones, 2005, p. 1).

30. AIBA has 115 members made up of three categories, including (a) companies, (b) research anddevelopment organizations, and (c) individuals and associates.

31. Interview with K. P. Nyati, head, Environmental Management Division, CII, Habitat Centre,Delhi, May 1, 2001.

32. Interview with Dr. Arvind Kapoor, Nunhems-ProAgro, Delhi, March 27, 2001.33. Interview with Vivek Singhal, AIBA, Delhi, March 27, 2001.34. Interview with Malik, AIBA, Delhi, March 27, 2001.35. Interview with K. P. Nyati, head, Environmental Management Division, CII, Habitat Centre,

Delhi, May 1, 2001.36. Interview with K. P. Nyati, head, Environmental Management Division, CII, Habitat Centre,


Delhi, May 1, 2001.38. Interview with Sandhya Tiwari, head of Biotechnology, CII, March 30, 2001.39. Keynote speech at seminar on “Agricultural biotechnology: The need of the new millennium,”

April 9, 2001, New Delhi.40. Interview with K. P. Nyati, head, Environmental Management Division, CII, Habitat Centre,


Delhi, May 1, 2001.42. Indo-U.S. biotech alliance launched to boost fund flow. (2002, November 9). Business Line, p. 4.43. Interview with Sandhya Tiwari, head of Biotechnology, CII, March 30, 2001.44. Biotech sector seeks tax sops. (2003, February 19). Business Standard, p. 3.45. Interview with Dr. P. K. Ghosh, scientific advisor, DBT, Delhi, March 28, 2001.46. India shining in GM crop fields. (2005, June 8). Economic Times, p. 6.47. Interview with NGO representative, New Delhi, April 4, 2001.48. Interview with M. S. Smithyantha, vice-president, Research and Development, Rallis, Bangalore

May 11, 2001.49. Dr. Babu, MoEF, March 30, 2001.50. Interview with RCGM and GEAC member, April 3, 2001.51. Interview with NGO representative, New Delhi, April 4, 2001.52. Interview with Dr. S. R. Rao, DBT, April 4, 2001.53. Interview with Dr. P. K. Ghosh, scientific advisor, DBT, Delhi, March 28, 2001.54. Sunrise sector gets its due from FM. (2003, March 1). Financial Express, p. 10.55. Interview with Mr. Pani, Economic Times, May 8, 2001, Bangalore.56. Interview with Devinder Sharma, April 4, 2001.57. Interview with Saritha Rai, technology correspondent, South Asia, Time magazine, Bangalore,

May 16, 2001.58. Biotech sector to lead in Bio-IT adoption. (2002, December 26). Economic Times, p. 4.59. Indian biotechnology will grow exponentially: Kiran Shaw. (2002, July 4). Express Pharma

Pulse, p. 20.60. Biotech sector poised for better growth. (2002, June 28). Financial Express, p. 3.61. Expert endorses Bt cotton decision. (2002, April 12). Business Standard, p. 16.62. Biotechnology: The next big wave. (2005, July 26). Times of India, p. 12.63. MNCs fear patent abuse. (2002, May 15). Business Standard, p. 4.64. Interview with Dr. S. R. Rao, DBT, April 4, 2001.65. Interview with Dr. P. K. Ghosh, scientific advisor, DBT, Delhi, March 28, 2001.




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Peter Newell is Principal Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation,University of Warwick. He is author of Climate for Change: Non-State Actors and the Global Politics of theGreenhouse (Cambridge University Press, 2000), coauthor of The Effectiveness of EU Environmental Policy(MacMillan, 2000), and coeditor of The Business of Global Environmental Governance (MIT Press, 2005).




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