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Höpfl’s exhaustive study of Jesuit politi-cal thought. Robert Bireley’s thoroughlyresearched and well-written history ofJesuit political behavior in early seven-teenth-century Europe confirms much ofHöpfl’s own conclusions. Both authorsdeny the existence of a uniform Jesuitdoctrine on all political questions. How-ever, there does exist a predispositiontoward hierarchy and monarchy and abelief, widely held at the time, that tolera-tion was disastrous for spiritual welfareand good political order. In early modernEurope, virtually no one—certainly notthe Jesuits—granted authority to privatejudgment. There is no “freedom of belief”that would allow one to ignore Churchauthority.

The Society embraced the monarchi-cal principle as an essential feature of thevisible institutional Church with the pa-pacy as its head, in contrast to the “invis-ible” church of the reformers who soughtto counter the pretensions of the papacyby emphasizing the community of believ-ers and its common headship in Christ.“[A]n enduring legacy of the evangelicalrevolt was a tendency to regard the orga-nization and administration...of ‘visible’churches...as being peripheral,” writesHöpfl, “since what was ultimately deci-sive was membership of the ‘invisible’church.” The result was that responsibil-ity for “externals” frequently became sub-

JOHN M. VELLA is Managing Editor of ModernAge: A Quarterly Review.

Jesuit Political Thought: The Society ofJesus and the State, c. 1540-1630, byHarro Höpfl, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2004. xii + 406 pp.

The Jesuits and the Thirty Years War:Kings, Courts, and Confessors,by Robert Bireley, Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 2003. xii + 300pp.

IGNATIUS LOYOLA (1491-1556) could not haveimagined the Society of Jesus that heestablished in 1540 would play such aninfluential role in the political develop-ments of early modern Europe. The formerBasque military officer lived to see onlythe early stages of its dramatic transfor-mation from a modest Roman Catholicmissionary order of preachers into a vastsociety of teachers and founders ofschools and universities, as well as coun-cillors and confessors to heads of state. Indue course, its members would partici-pate in some of the most momentouspolitical events of their day.

These institutional developments ledmembers to produce an extensive bodyof political writing that has largely beenignored by the English-speaking worlduntil the recent publication of Harro

BOOK REVIEWS

The Jesuits and Political PowerJohn M. Vella

Modern Age 159

ject to control of the secular magistrate.The transfer of church administration tothe state “proved a millstone even for theReformers,” writes Höpfl. By weakeningChurch sovereignty, these Reformers en-couraged greater state interference inreligious affairs. They refused—at least intheory—to characterize the Church as avisible institution responsible for defin-ing doctrine and resolving theologicaldisputes, punishing, rewarding, teaching,excommunicating, binding, loosing, ad-ministering sacraments and all other du-ties required of the Church in Scrip-ture.

Jesuit theologians andpublicists sought to con-vince wavering princes thatheresy undermined publicpeace. They said hereticswere motivated by pride, andpride undermines obedi-ence. Heretical doctrines likesola fide, sola scriptura, privatejudgment, and the priesthoodof all believers, were products ofpride. They exalt equality andwar against hierarchy, which isessential for good political order. TheGerman Peasant Wars and the civil warsin France were given as examples. Höpfltells us that Pedro de Ribadeneira’s Chris-tian Prince (1595) devoted a chapter tothe argument that heresies cause civilunrest and social disintegration. The Re-formers’ commitment to liberty was ques-tioned by some Jesuit polemicists whoargued that once they got the upper handpolitically, they were just as intolerant asthe true Church and orthodox princesbut could not justify their policies. As inthe case of the Peace of Augsburg (1555),heresy is to be tolerated under extremeconditions and only in order to avoidsomething worse.

The Jesuits also opposed the DivineRight of Kings. Only the Church couldclaim authority from God. Princely au-thority comes from “the people” or the

commonwealth. While Jesuits readilyadmitted that their view exalted ecclesi-astical authority vis-à-vis civil authority,it did not mean, as critics charged, thatsecular authority was subordinate topapal authority since the prince obtainedhis power from an entirely differentsource. Roman Law located imperial au-thority in the people. Well-establishedwithin the scholastic tradition, this viewwas bolstered by the fact that all com-monwealths have a “people” yet not alllegitimate polities have monarchs. Juan

de Mariana argued that it was theexperience of civil society, and

not the pre-civil “state of na-ture” of the contract theo-rists, that established theneed to place limitations onpolitical leaders. As Höpflpoints out, the tenure of pub-lic officials in any legitimateregime depends on their will-

ingness to abide by the legalrestraints of the original consti-tution. While this distinction didnot subordinate secular author-ity to papal potestas, it did ac-

knowledge—at least in principle—thatlegitimate political authority is limitedauthority.

This was not a sufficient explanationfor enemies of the Society. The recogni-tion that, under extreme conditions,tyrannicide could be legitimate, and thatpublic assemblies were a suitable meansof disciplining kings, as proposed byMariana and Francisco Suarez, were seenby detractors as evidence of a more sinis-ter plot. The Society’s theoretical defenseof the papal deposing power offered moreevidence for conspiracy theorists. Jesu-its believed, as did Calvin, that legitimatepolitical authority should be limited andthat well-placed members of the com-monwealth did, in extreme cases, havethe authority to enforce such limits. Höpflobserves that most did not go as far asSuarez, the only prominent Jesuit to use

Robert Bellarmine, S.J.(1542-1621)

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princes were central to this revival. Thegrowth of state power meant royal con-trol over local church administration andit was very difficult for the Jesuits them-selves to reverse this trend. State policywas not always compatible with papalwishes and, as Bireley makes clear, it wasimpossible to unite Catholic princes be-hind a program to reconvert Europe. In1624 and 1625, for example, Adam Contzenwrote scathing pamphlets against Cardi-nal Richelieu complaining that GermanCatholic princes could not even count onCatholic France’s neutrality, let alone itsactive support, against German Protes-tant princes and the Swedish armies ofGustavus Adolphus.

Written anonymously, Contzen’s pam-phlets were published at the behest ofMaximilian of Bavaria who supported theHabsburg Emperor’s efforts to reevangel-ize the German empire. Contzen, who wasMaximilian’s confessor, would have beenreprimanded by the Jesuit superior gen-eral Muzio Vitelleschi if his authorshipwas known because his imprudent attackon a Catholic political leader put in jeop-ardy the Jesuits of France, who dependedon Richelieu’s generosity and protection.Jesuit political involvement was accept-able to Vitelleschi only if it involved “aquestion of preserving the faith or ad-vancing the neighbors’ spiritual good,”writes Bireley. Thus, fighting heresy waslegitimate—as long as it did not causeharm to the Society or the Church at large.

As in the case of Contzen, rulers oftenrequested political favors from Jesuitswho were often not in a position to refuse.Vitelleschi frequently complained aboutJesuit-authored publications that glori-fied their patrons, not because he dis-agreed with what they wrote, says Bireley,but because their praise could alienaterival princes. To reduce public hostilitytoward the Society, Jesuits were not per-mitted to write political pamphlets oncurrent affairs or to publish politicallycontroversial theological works. Official

contract language to describe the rela-tionship between people and prince andwho emphasized more than any otherpossible remedies for imperial derelic-tion of duty. Talk of tyrannicide and papaltemporal authority became very unpalat-able to the Jesuits in the wake of the 1610assassination of Henri IV of France, whowas their benefactor and spiritual son.

Jesuits discussed tyrannicide up tothat point, writes Höpfl, because it was astandard textbook subject in theologyand law. When Suarez examined the mat-ter, he referenced nineteen scholasticsources, only three of which were Jesuit.The subject is discussed in classical lit-erature and by Protestant leaders who, itwas said by Jesuit apologists, favored thepractice. (Whether the charge was true,Höpfl does not say.) It is unlikely thatThomas More himself “celebrated” un-derhanded methods of “vanquishing ty-rants” in his Utopia as Höpfl interprets it.1

Despite its widespread acceptance un-der extreme conditions, tyrannicidenever became an essential part of Jesuitpolitical teaching; however, enemies ofthe Society and of the papacy made ituniquely Jesuit property. The teachingcould not be disavowed since it was per-fectly orthodox and entirely compatiblewith the Jesuit understanding of the lim-its of secular political power. Despite theSociety’s 1610 moratorium on discussingthe topic, writes Höpfl, the legend of theJesuit as assassin, conspirator, and friendof regicide was already well established.

Leading Jesuit spokesmen dutifullyavoided discussing tyrannicide after aself-imposed ban. Nonetheless, they con-tinued to recognize the need for somelimitation on civil abuse of power andpapal temporal authority seemed to be asuitable method. Here, too, a ban wasnecessary because the timing was notpropitious. As Höpfl points out, “[t]hefirst decades of the seventeenth centuryin Europe were a period of Catholic resur-gence and self-confidence.” And Catholic

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attempts to censor these publicationswere not entirely successful.

Jesuit organizing principles weregrounded on the irreducible belief in thecentrality of order, hierarchy, monarchy,and obedience. Höpfl argues that thisabsolutist monarchical interpretation ofhierarchy was becoming the norm in earlymodern Europe. Despite their reputationas defenders of papal claims, Jesuits alsorecognized the independent authority ofprinces. Jesuits saw order as a fun-damental moral good, andconsidered obedience tosecular leaders just as vir-tuous as it was toward reli-gious superiors. However,as Bireley amply demon-strates, Jesuits were alsolargely dependent on thepatronage of princes. Indeed,Vitelleschi admitted in 1625that “Without their [theprinces’] support our labor canaccomplish very little or even nothing inmany places.”

Despite their theoretical belief in lim-ited government, Jesuits did not find ab-solute monarchy objectionable sincemany Catholic princes were both abso-lute in the exercise of their political powerand religiously devout sons of the Church.Unlike in centuries past these modernCatholic monarchs had the means to re-sist papal demands. “Neither Phillip II norhis son, nor Henri IV nor his, nor FerdinandII nor Maximilian of Bavaria would submitto papal dictation on any point of theirgovernment,” writes Höpfl, “althoughtheir doctrine was utterly orthodox, theirpiety was fervent, and (in the case of thelast four) their confessors were Jesuits.”Senior Jesuits in the Holy Roman Empire,for instance, acknowledged the principleof indirect papal political authority, yetsaw no great role for the papacy in thedaily life of the polity and were willing tooffer broad support to godly princes, evenover Church administration. While not

entirely lacking of influence, some papalpronouncements on temporal matters,like the condemnation of the Peace ofWestphalia (1648), were largely ignored.

The growth of state power resulted ina corresponding decline of papal influ-ence. At best, says Höpfl, the papacy wasviewed by Catholic monarchs as a friendlyforeign power whose authority on tempo-ral matters did not extend beyond its ownborders: “Administratively, it was not only

Gallican France, but every Catho-lic commonwealth that was

coming to resemble theChristian polities of the ref-ormation.” Papal coercionwas only to be consideredunder desperate circum-stances as a last resort. De-fending papal authority as

an exceptional corrective topolitical tyranny earned theSociety hostility from propo-nents of unrestricted state

power, not from advocates of civic libertyand limited government. Enemies pro-tested that Jesuits did not insist enoughon the rights of princes and on the dutiesof subjects. “It was rather the Society’sunflinching advocacy of a particular un-compromising view of papal authoritythat earned it undying enmity and oblo-quy,” Höpfl contends.

The Society’s 1610 ban on talk of papaltemporal power that coincided with itsprohibition on the discussion of tyran-nicide did little to satisfy critics. Nor werethey satisfied when some Jesuits wereexpelled from the order when their pri-vate criticisms of princes became public.Bireley acknowledges the traditional Je-suit defense of papal temporal authority,yet argues that by the seventeenth cen-tury, the Society’s support of absolutemonarchs actually strengthened theirhand vis-à-vis the papacy. In 1626, for ex-ample, a group of French Jesuits was pres-sured by Richelieu to condemn publiclythe writings of Robert Bellarmine and

King Henry IV of France(1553-1610)

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Suarez on papal temporal authority. Yetfar from giving evidence of widespreaddisobedience to Rome, these few Jesuitsdid so under duress, after “intense soul-searching,” and to the dismay of theirprovincial, the superior general and PopeUrban VIII. It is one thing to remain silenton a perfectly orthodox teaching thatmight give offence to some well-placedand powerful figures. It is something elseto repudiate it publicly. The public re-nunciation was not official Jesuit policyand was not widely repeated.

While Habsburg emperor Ferdinand IIwas consistently supported by the Jesu-its and resistant to some papal policies,he was not the “founder of Josephism” asBireley suggests. This eighteenth-centuryAustrian version of French Gallicanismwas a radical program of ecclesiasticaland social reform grounded on Enlight-enment presuppositions and named af-ter Joseph II who, along with his motherMaria Theresa, first implemented it in anincreasingly despotic manner.2 Josephismis not merely the imperial desire to resistpapal temporal demands, a policy widelypracticed by royal courts well beforeFerdinand II. To be sure, his Jesuit confes-sor Lamormaini did condemn privatelythe “little dogs” in Rome who opposed theemperor’s wish that the Society adminis-ter the University of Prague. Yet the deci-sion came not from an Enlightened des-pot but from a pius Catholic monarchwhose objectives were entirely orthodoxeven though his policy choices some-times differed with Rome’s. Jesuits oftenavoided taking sides in disputes betweenRome and Catholic monarchs for pruden-tial reasons, not because they favored theradical reform measures of tyrannicalprinces. Ferdinand may have been abso-lute, but he did not exercise his powerdespotically to advance a program of radi-cal religious change.

The early history of the Society of Jesusincludes the story of the growth of statepower, the decline of papal influence as a

check on that power, and the consequentdependence of the Christian Church onthe whims and the dictates of secularmagistrates. Even though Catholic princesduring this period were largely respectfulof religious faith, this would change overtime. To support absolute monarchs be-cause of their personal devotion becameimpossible when Enlightened state offi-cials hostile to traditional religion tooktheir place. Secular rulers came to see theSociety as an obstacle to their worldlyambition. Jesuit missions in SouthAmerica interfered with the colonial aspi-rations of Portugal and Spain. The vastnetwork of Jesuit colleges and seminaries(nearly 1,000 in total across Europe)posed a barrier to State-sponsored edu-cation “reform.” Furthermore, theSociety’s refusal to renounce its specialrelationship to the papacy was seen byministers of state as a case of dividedloyalty. As a result, the papacy was pres-sured by Catholic monarchs into dissolv-ing the Jesuit order in 1773 only to restoreit in 1814 after the demise of Napoleon.

It would be easy to criticize the Jesuitsfor becoming too deferential to secularpower. Certainly there were times whenmembers were reluctant to defend papaltemporal policies where those interestsran counter to those of their secular pa-tron. But there was a limit to their defer-ence. Jesuit critics, whether they wereJansenists, deists, or skeptics, saw theorder as a reliable defender of Catholicrights against the abuses of overzealousmagistrates. Furthermore, EnlightenedCatholic reformers among the clergy andlaity saw Jesuits as reactionaries whoundermined their efforts to reconcile theChurch with the modern world. Its publi-cations, like the Journal de Trévoux pub-lished by the French Jesuits, were leadingorgans of the Counter-Enlightenment inEurope during the eighteenth century. Itshould not come as a surprise that Jesuitideals were “socially conservative.”3 Whilethere were times when prudence recom-

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mended Jesuit acquiescence toward royalauthority over matters of church admin-istration, their reputation for orthodoxydid not diminish as state power grew.

While Bireley could argue that Jesuitdeference to secular authority weakenedpapal influence, could it also be said thatpapal power would have been greater ifthe order never existed? The Societyalone could not have reversed the long-standing and persistent trend toward in-creasing government power. Yet, on theo-logical matters, the Jesuits never surren-dering their loyalty to the papacy to sat-isfy their increasingly belligerent foes.Indeed, their resistance to the modernstate over questions of principle was pre-cisely what caused their ultimate demisein 1773.

Nigel Aston has reported that the dis-solution of the Society of Jesus wasgreeted with joy by Protestants whoseefforts to secure their reformation waseffectively hampered by Jesuit missionar-ies for over two centuries.4 Yet an equallyjoyful song of praise could be heard frommany parliaments and palaces acrossEurope, where politicians and princesrejoiced in their successful effort towrestle away from the Church even greatertreasure and influence. The rise of themodern state could not have taken placewithout a corresponding diminution ofChurch temporal authority. And for twohundred years, the Society of Jesus was atthe center of that rivalry.

1. Indeed, the passage on political assassinationreferred to war-fighting strategies used by theUtopians against their enemies, methods that thecharacter “More” found “really absurd.” Cf. Uto-pia by Thomas More, ed. by George M. Logan andRobert M. Adams (Cambridge, Eng. [1989], 2002),87, 106. 2. See Derek Beales, “Joseph II andJosephism,” in Enlightenment and Reform in Eigh-teenth-Century Europe (New York, 2005), 287-308.3. John W. O’Malley, The First Jesuits (Cambridge,Mass., 1993), 211. 4. Christianity and RevolutionaryEurope, 1750-1830 (Cambridge, Eng., 2002), 131. TIMOTHY FULLER is Professor of Government at

Colorado College and editor (with Corey Abel) ofThe Intellectual Legacy of Michael Oakeshott(Imprint Academic, 2005).

“Who Are We?”Timothy Fuller

My Correct Views on Everything, byLeszek Kolakowski; edited byZbigniew Janowski, South Bend, Ind.:St. Augustine’s Press, 2005. viii + 284pp.

LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI is among the most promi-nent political and religious thinkers ofour time. This volume brings togetheressays and addresses, spanning the pe-riod from 1956 to 2003, illustrating theconnection of the political and philo-sophico-theological strands of histhought. The first of the three parts of thevolume, “Amid Moving Ruins,” presentssome of the most incisive criticisms ofMarxism and Soviet Communism one willever find. Kolakowski is both witty andblunt. He knows the Marxist-Leninistworld from the inside—and by laboriousself-extrication from its sway.

This is exemplified in his satirical “re-joinder” to the left-wing British historianE. P. Thompson, which exposes the intel-lectual dishonesty that has too oftenovertaken intellectuals who, in their alien-ation from the West, were willing to ratio-nalize the flaws and cruelties of Commu-nist regimes. In this and the other piecesof part one, Professor Kolakowski showshis appreciation for the complexities ofpolitical and social life, and his judgmentof the abstract fantasy of ideological at-tempts to manage and harmonize these