The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II by Mark P. ParilloReview by: Ronald SpectorThe American Historical Review, Vol. 99, No. 2 (Apr., 1994), p. 622Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2167427 .

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622 Reviews of Books

used by the U.S. for all intelligence produced by the solving of foreign codes and ciphers) remained clas- sified.

Osihma had been in Germany since 1934, first as military attache and then as ambassador. His govern- ment recalled him in 1939 but posted him to Berlin again the following year, where he remained until the final days of the war. Boyd emphasizes two themes and their connection: the close relationship and com- mon interests Osihma had with Hitler and his foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop; and the remark- able achievements of American cryptanalysts in breaking the Japanese code and deciphering Osih- ma's messages.

The messages filled a crucial gap in Allied intelli- gence in Europe left by Ultra, the intelligence Britain obtained from breaking the German code enciphered on the Enigma machine. The British were unable to read the secret communications of the top Nazi leaders, something provided by the Magic intercepts of Osihma's messages because Hitler and von Ribben- trop confided significantly in the ambassador. As a result, Boyd concludes, "the labor of American crypt- analysts turned Osihma into an inadvertent informer of incalculable importance in leading the Allies to victory" (p. 16).

Boyd makes a powerful case that the information in Osihma's communications served Washington more than Tokyo. The ambassador's lack of objectivity in seeing the war too much from German and Japanese perspectives, in overestimating German strength, and in failing to think on a world-wide scale limited his usefulness to his own government. As for Osihma's value to the enemy, during 1941 Magic intelligence obtained from him information about Nazi plans to attack the Soviet Union, the progress of the war there, and what turned out to be Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.

During 1942 the Osihma intercepts yielded impor- tant information to Washington on conditions in Nazi-occupied Russia, the planned German buildup in North Africa, Japan's decision not to attack the Soviet Union, and the elaborate Axis strategy to advance on the Middle East. At the end of the year his messages to Tokyo showed that he believed the tide had turned against the Germans on the eastern front. In 1943 the Americans learned from Osihma valu- able material on the rumored German-Soviet sepa- rate peace and in 1944 on German fortifications in northern France.

Finally, Boyd demonstrates how, despite elaborate preparations, President Franklin Roosevelt had only limited access to Magic intelligence when he was away from Washington, as he so often was after 1942. Until 1944, Boyd observes, the failure to distribute such information speedily and completely "was the Achil- les heel of the system" (p. 101) and hurt its effective- ness in helping to end the war sooner.

DONALD M. McKALE Clemson University

MARK P. PARILLO. The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. 1993. Pp. xx, 308. $28.95.

Naval history usually discusses sea battles and admi- rals, and studies of the war against Japan have been no exception to this rule. The standard accounts almost always devote most of their attention to the battles of the Coral Sea, Midway, Savo Island, Leyte Gulf, and the rest. Yet, as Mark P. Parillo shows, the Japanese defeat in the Pacific cannot be explained solely by reference to strategy, operations, and tactics.

At the end of 1944 the United States and Japan fought the largest naval battle in history at Leyte. Yet by that time the Japanese had effectively lost the war. Coal imports to Japan had declined from 2,300,000 tons at the end of 1941 to about 600,000 tons at the end of 1944; imports of pig iron and bauxite had declined by more than 85 percent and rubber imports were zero. Only 67 percent of the supplies and munitions dispatched by Japan to her far-flung gar- risons in the Pacific and Asia ever reached their destination. The cause of all this was the destruction of Japan's merchant marine by American forces in a period of less than two years, between 1943 and late 1944. Having begun the war with one of the largest and most modern merchant fleets in the world, Japan suffered the near annihilation of all its shipping, including replacements built during the conflict, a catastrophe that insured its ultimate defeat.

This critical development, when not omitted en- tirely in favor of more dramatic sea fights and island battles, is usually explained by reference to the United States' outstandingly successful submarine campaign and Japan's appalling failure to devise effective measures for trade protection and antisub- marine warfare. Parillo does this aspect of the story full justice, drawing on little-known Japanese-lan- guage publications as well as U.S. intelligence reports and material collected by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

Parillo's work also demonstrates, however, that the Japanese failure was not simply one of practice but also one of policy. As a matter of policy, the Japanese allocated too many resources to building giant war- ships like the Yamato class battleships and too few to merchant shipping and antisubmarine vessels. It was not simply Japan's antisubmarine efforts that were flawed, but their entire logistical system. Even during the campaign for Guadalcanal, when American sub- marine efforts were still negligible and Japan's navy roughly equal to the U.S. fleet in the Pacific, the Japanese still managed to supply their forces on the island with only one-tenth of the material reaching the Americans. By highlighting the logistical dimen- sion of the conflict, Parillo's book provides an impor- tant and needed new perspective on the war with Japan.

RONALD SPECTOR

George Washington University

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 1994

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