the international chernobyl project - iaea · the technical report of the international chernobyl...

THE INTERNATIONALCHERNOBYL PROJECT

PROCEEDINGS OFAN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

ASSESSMENT OF RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCESAND EVALUATION OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES

THE INTERNATIONAL CHERNOBYL PROJECT

PROCEEDINGSOF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

held in Vienna, 21-24 May 1991for presentation and discussion of the Technical Report

Assessment of Radiological Consequencesand Evaluation of Protective Measures

ISBN 92-0-129391-?

Printed by the IAEA in Vienna

© IAEA, 1991


PROCEEDINGSOF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

held in Vienna, 21-24 May 1991for presentation and discussion of the Technical Report

Assessment of Radiological Consequencesand Evaluation of Protective Measures

Preface

The Technical Report of the International Chernobyl Project was presented to the scientific community and themedia at an International Conference in Vienna on 21-24 May 1991 for examination and discussion. The Report, whichhas now been published, assesses the radiological and health situation in the affected areas and evaluates the protectivemeasures taken. An unedited draft of the Technical Report was made available to participants, together with an Overviewsummarizing the Project and setting out the International Advisory Committee's Conclusions and Recommendations.

The Conference was designed in such a way that each major task of the Project, corresponding to a section ofthe Technical Report, was described in presentations by each Task Group Leader and by members of the Group, settingout the methodology, findings, conclusions and recommendations, which were then open for questions and comments.Each session was summarized by a Rapporteur, who also made some concluding remarks. The presentations them-selves are not included in these Proceedings since they summarize parts of the Technical Report to which this is acompanion volume. Only those scientists who had taken part in the Project made presentations. During the discussionperiods some statements were made by representatives of the USSR, BSSR, RSFSR and UkrSSR. The Conferenceclosed with a Panel Discussion on the lessons learned from the results of the International Chernobyl Project.

The discussions were not originally intended for publication. Since, however, they were obviously of considerableinterest, it was considered that many important issues could be aired and fine technical points clarified if the completediscussions and statements were to be made available to readers of the Technical Report. These Proceedings cannottherefore stand alone: they are intended to be read in conjunction with the Report.

A daily Press Briefing was held after the formal sessions, during which members of the Task Groups andrepresentatives of the affected Republics answered questions. These meetings are not recorded in the Proceedings.

Editorial Note

This record of the discussions that took place during the Conference to present the results of the International

Chernobyl Project was recorded on tape and later transcribed and, where necessary, translated into English. In somecases, the identity of a particular speaker was uncertain and no name could then be ascribed to that contribution. Greatcare has been taken to avoid misrepresenting any speaker, but individuals have not been asked for approval of the finalform of their contributions except when it was necessary to confirm unclear numerical data.

The late decision to publish these very valuable discussions meant that the text had to be salvaged from the tape

some time after the Conference, with the inevitable disadvantages of this way of working. A completely unedited transcriptwould, of course, be unreadable, but the discussions have not been edited as strictly as is normally done for such material.

CONTENTS

Programme of the Conference 1

Director General's Opening Address 5

Chairman's Opening Address 7

Introductory Address by the Head of the USSR Delegation 9

The International Chernobyl Project 13M. Rosen

WHO'S International Programme on the Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident (IPHECA) 17P. Waight

Session 2: Environmental ContaminationDiscussion 19

Session 3: Radiation Exposure of the PopulationDiscussion 27

Sessions 4 and 5: Health ImpactDiscussion 33

Session 6: Protective MeasuresDiscussion 51

Session 7: Management of Contaminated Agricultural AreasDiscussion 57

Panel Discussion: The Lessons Learned 61

Director General's Closing Remarks 77

Chairman's Closing Remarks 79

List of Participants 81


INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

ASSESSMENT OF RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCESAND EVALUATION OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Vienna, 21-24 May 1991

Chairman: I. ShigematsuVice-Chairman: M. Rosen

Scientific Secretary: E. AsculaiProgramme Manager: M. Dreicer

PROGRAMME OF THE CONFERENCE

21 May

Director General's opening address

Chairman's opening address

SESSION 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT

Introductory address by the Head of the USSR Delegation (V.A. Gubanov)

The International Chernobyl Project (M. Rosen)

Video presentation

The International Programme on the Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident(IPHECA) of the World Health Organization (P. Waight)

Historical portrayal: chronology of major events (A. Carnino)

SESSION 2: ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION

Objectives and presentation of the methodological approach used (F. Steinhausler)

Results of the intercomparison exercise and data management (V. Valkovic)

THE INDEPENDENT SURVEY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION

Radiological survey of selected settlements in the BSSR, UkrSSR and RSFSR(P. Zombori)

Radionuclides in grass-cow-milk ecosystems (P. Stegnar)

Presentation of the independent verification of the contamination maps(F. Steinhausler)

Conclusions (F. Steinhausler)

Plenary discussion

Summary of Rapporteur (B.W. Wachholz)

Programme

22 May

SESSION 3: RADIATION EXPOSURE OF THE POPULATION

Objectives and approach (L. Anspaugh)

Presentation of the USSR dose assessment methodologies(L. Anspaugh, A. Bouville)

IAEA independent dose measurements (A. Bouville)

Independent dose assessment and comparisons with reported values(B.G. Bennett)

Conclusions (B.G. Bennett)

Plenary discussion

Summary of Rapporteur (B.W. Wachholz)

SESSION 4: HEALTH IMPACT

Objectives and approach (F.A. Mettler)

INDEPENDENT CLINICAL HEALTH STUDIES

General health situation (H. Royal)

Cardiovascular disorders (H. Royal)

Haematology (A. Kuramoto)

Thyroid (M. Sheppard)

Cancer (K. Mabuchi)

23 May

SESSION 5: HEALTH IMPACT (cont.)

INDEPENDENT CLINICAL HEALTH STUDIES (cont.)

Foetal and genetic anomalies (F.A. Mettler)

Nutrition (R. Parr)

Psychology (T.R. Lee)

Future risks (F.A. Mettler)

Conclusions (F.A. Mettler)

Plenary discussion

Summary of Rapporteur (K. Duncan)

Programme

SESSION 6: PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Objectives and approach (P. Hedemann Jensen)

Evaluation of protective measures (P. Hedemann Jensen)

Comparison with international guidance (N. Kelly)

Cost-benefit analysis (J. Lochard)

Decision conferences (S. French)

Summary (N. Kelly)

Conclusions (P. Hedemann Jensen)

Plenary discussion

Summary of Rapporteur (K. Duncan)

24 May

SESSION 7: MANAGEMENT OF CONTAMINATED AGRICULTURAL AREAS

Current situation (A.W. Randell)

Agricultural protective measures (M.J. Crick)

PANEL DISCUSSION: THE LESSONS LEARNED

Director General's closing remarks

Chairman's closing remarks

Director General's Opening Address

I should like to welcome you to this Conference, towhich you have been invited in order to examine theReport of the International Chernobyl Project. ThisReport contains an assessment of the radiological conse-quences of the accident and an evaluation of the protec-tive measures undertaken.

You have before you an Overview of the Project,which is a concentrate of a much larger report1 that isalso available in final but unedited draft. Both are sub-mitted for your examination.

The International Advisory Committee has adoptedthe Conclusions and Recommendations of the Project.All the members of this Committee are scientists andexperts speaking on their own authority, and they arehere to take part in the discussion. I should like to thankthem for the tremendous work they have performed andthe vast amount of time they have given with no rewardexcept the knowledge that they are participating in alarge and honest effort to "sort facts from misconcep-tions and radiation effects from effects not related toradiation exposure", to quote Professor Shigematsu,who has chaired the Committee and whom I thankparticularly.

The Committee's assessment and evaluation whichare before you now represent the response to a requestdirected to the IAEA by the Government of the USSRin October 1989. We expected the task to be difficult andextensive but did not realize how much work it wouldentail and how long a time it would take. The basis onwhich we accepted the request were the following:

(1) We considered it to be the duty of the Agency toassist a Member State if possible. Intergovernmentalorganizations are set up to be of service to theirMember States, and the Agency had already per-formed a useful service to the world and to theSoviet Union in 1986 by organizing an internationalinquiry into the technological causes of the Cher-nobyl accident. The need was now perceived for aninternational inquiry into the radiological conse-quences of the accident and an outside assessmentof the protective measures undertaken. This wouldbe a natural follow-up.

(2) Such an international inquiry called for expertisefrom disciplines other than those fully covered bythe Agency's programme — above all medicine, butincluding agriculture. It was concluded that whilethe Agency should provide organization, logisticsand secretarial junctions, the inquiry should bemultidisciplinary, should be undertaken jointly with

1 International Chernobyl Project: Technical Report, IAEA,Vienna (1991).

some other organizations, and should Junctionunder a scientific direction separate from theAgency.

Hence the International Advisory Committee wasformed — comprising scientific experts from the USSRand the Republics most affected by the accident. TheCommittee approved the work plan for the inquiry,monitored the work itself, and carries responsibility forthe Report.

(3) The principles and methods of modern science mustgovern the inquiry at every stage.

It is according to these principles that both the Over-view and the Technical Report are laid before thisassembly of experts.

(4) The main purpose of the inquiry would be to assistthe people and countries affected by the Chernobylaccident by providing independent internationalexpert analysis and assessment and at the same timeenabling the world to learn from this radiologicaldisaster.

International solidarity demands that we all try toalleviate suffering wherever it exists in our shrinkingworld. Much obviously needed help can be renderedwithout prior scientific inquiry. It is to be welcomed thatmany private initiatives have been taken to assist peopleliving in regions affected by the Chernobyl accident andthat the United Nations is proceeding with an interna-tional assistance project focusing on the economic andsocial consequences of the disaster. The IAEA warmlysupports and endorses this project. However, an effec-tive remedy requires correct diagnosis.

In unpredictable radiological situations such as thepost-Chernobyl contamination, advice on appropriateprotective measures may vary, even when the facts ofthe situation have been clarified. This contributes in nosmall measure to the confusion and anxiety felt by somany people and explains their distrust of experts. Ihave no other suggestion to make than that you, thescientific experts, must continue your discussion in aworldwide context in order to offer the best advice thatcan be given on the basis of available data. While thesedeliberations cannot be the ultimate truth, we know thatthey will not be influenced by obscurantism or sensation-alism, nor governed by any political motives.

Let me conclude by renewing my thanks to eachmember of the International Advisory Committee, to thehundreds of individuals who participated in one way oranother in the Project, to the many governments, insti-tutes and organizations who donated their staffs time, tothe government authorities and private companies whodonated equipment and supplies, and to the Secretariat

Opening Addresses

of the Project for all the hard work they did in bringingthis Project to its conclusion.

We are grateful, indeed, for the great contributionand assistance of the many government authorities in theUSSR and the affected Republics and settlements, and tothe many scientists, experts, technical and administra-tive staff and members of the public who opened theirhearts to the visiting experts and described theirexperiences and their anxieties.

This Project is by no means the end of the road, nordoes it answer all the questions raised: for example,about the health of the emergency workers and those

involved in the cleanup operations, about the situation ofthose who have moved out, or about the unprecedentedsocial and economic consequences of the accident.

However, if the Project contributes to the creation ofa true picture of the situation and to bringing about effec-tive remedies, it will have served its purpose.

Hans BlixDirector General

International Atomic Energy AgencyVienna

Chairman's Opening Address

The International Chernobyl Project initiated itsPhase I in March 1990 and is now entering its finalphase. Our International Advisory Committee wasorganized for Phase II of the Project in April 1990. TheCommittee was given the responsibility of formulatingthe work plan for the Project and monitoring itsimplementation. The aims of the Project are to examinethe assessments that have been made of the radiologicaland health situation in areas of the USSR affected by theChernobyl accident and to evaluate measures to protectthe population.

Five task groups were organized to conduct thisProject, each group consisting of international experts invarious fields of radiological sciences. My colleaguesfrom Japan and I, like those from other countries andinternational organizations, willingly participated forhumanitarian reasons in this opportunity to serve theChernobyl victims, although we had hoped that the les-sons learned from the experiences in Hiroshima andNagasaki would never need to be used in an event suchas the Chernobyl accident.

The outline of all data so far obtained by the five taskgroups will be presented during this meeting and will beopen for discussion. We welcome your comments. It istrue that there were many difficulties and constraints onthe time, manpower and funds available for the assign-ment, but I can assure you that each team made thegreatest possible effort to conduct an independent andscientifically authoritative study.

I am aware that our Report does not mean the end ofthe International Chernobyl Project but should rather beconsidered the starting point for further international co-operation. I particularly hope that the Recommendationsmade in the Report will be implemented with interna-tional support. I also wish to emphasize the importanceof estimating the radiation dose received by eachindividual; otherwise, of course, any attempt at a follow-up study of the health effects of radiation would bemeaningless. In fact, it may be no exaggeration to saythat more than half of all the efforts made in Hiroshimaand Nagasaki during the past 45 years to follow up thelate health effects of the atomic bomb survivors has beendevoted to the dosimetry problem.

Finally, on behalf of the Advisory Committee, Ishould like to express deep gratitude to all the people inthe surveyed areas of the three Soviet Republics whohave co-operated in the studies and investigations under-taken by the international task groups. My thanks arealso extended to all the Soviet scientists and others whoworked so hard together with the Project task groups.

I hope this meeting will be fruitful.

Itsuzo ShigematsuDirector

Radiation Effects Research FoundationHiroshima, Japan

Introductory Address by the Head of the USSR Delegation

Today we are witness to an important event — thepresentation of the results of a project carried out by abroad spectrum of participants to evaluate the conse-quences of the Chernobyl disaster for the inhabitants ofthe affected regions of the BSSR, the UkrSSR and theRSFSR.

From the very first days following the accident, theSoviet Government undertook a large complex of meas-ures aimed at eliminating this powerful focus of radio-active contamination and at protecting the population.Thanks to operations on an enormous scale, the damageand losses suffered as a result of the disaster were sig-nificantly curtailed. It was then possible to make thetransition from immediate and urgent measures to a ser-ies of projects aimed at managing the consequences ofthe Chernobyl disaster on the basis of reliable scientificprinciples.

In so doing, it was important to make sure that theextensive and expensive measures being developed andimplemented by government organizations were soundlybased, and that the methods used were correct and ade-quate to the task. That was all the more important inview of the high stakes — namely the health and well-being of millions of people. In these circumstances theGovernment of the USSR considered it essential to availitself of international experience, to co-ordinate its deci-sions with scientists and specialists from various interna-tional organizations who could evaluate the effectivenessof the measures taken to protect the inhabitants of theaffected regions, and to receive recommendations.

Let me express our sincere gratitude to the scientistsof the international community who responded to theappeal of the Government of the USSR to lend theirexpertise.

We are clearly aware of the enormous volume ofresearch that has been performed, of what it cost toensure its quality, given the time constraints, and of thehigh professional standards that each project participantapplied in performing his or her share of the work.

On behalf of the Government of the USSR, Isincerely thank the members of the InternationalAdvisory Committee and personally thank its Chairman,Professor Shigematsu, as well as all the internationalorganizations and participants directly involved in theoperations who made possible the successful implemen-tation of such a large scale project.

We appreciate the efforts of the experts to reflect sucha vast and diverse quantity of factual information in abenevolent and objective way, and also their evaluationof the views of Soviet scientists and specialists aboutways of overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyldisaster. The information acquired through this Projectwill no doubt be of use not only in our country but willmake a meaningful contribution to the new field of dis-

aster science. This assessment of the situation is not aformal act connected with the completion of the Project,but a recognition of the fact that the information derivedfrom worldwide experience is really essential, not onlyfor scientists and decision makers, but also for societyas a whole.

To emphasize this, let me cite a number of examplesof the way in which the multifaceted work performed byspecialists from the international organizations isalready being turned to good use in our country and isproviding assistance in decision making.

The work carried out with the help of the experts onradiation protection measures (discussed in Session 6 ofthis Conference) had a marked influence on the develop-ment of a concept for making the affected regionsinhabitable. It confirmed the idea that it would be expe-dient to adopt two levels of intervention: a lower levelabove which protective measures would begin to beapplied, and a higher level beyond which rigorous meas-ures such as evacuation of the population would beregarded as essential and indeed obligatory. On the basisof the preliminary information contained in Part F of theTechnical Report, on the health impact (Sessions 4 and 5of this Conference), the USSR Ministry of Health modi-fied and adjusted its statistical accounting system forrecording the state of health and morbidity of the popula-tion in the affected regions as well as its epidemiologicalresearch programmes. The Conclusions and Recommen-dations of the International Advisory Committee arebeing used to develop the long term State programme.

Following the conclusion of the Chernobyl Project, Iwould like, on behalf of the Government of the USSRand the Republics, to invite those who were involved inthe project and the members of the International Advi-sory Committee to come to the USSR when the resultsof their work are presented to the scientists andspecialists of our country, as well as to broad segmentsof the population in the RSFSR, the UkrSSR and theBSSR. We believe that presentations of this kind are anessential final link or step in the Project, one ultimategoal of which, in addition to providing an impartialevaluation of the situation, is to bring the authority of theworld's leading scientists and specialists to bear on thetask of instilling confidence in the affected populations,convincing them of the soundness and thoroughness ofthe measures taken to eliminate the consequences of theaccident.

Let me inform you briefly about the present status ofthe cleanup operations. Five years have passed since theChernobyl accident, but the grief of Chernobyl is notassuaged. In the course of those five years the damageresulting from the accident and the expenditure requiredfor dealing with its consequences have run to around25 billion roubles, including the projected costs for this

Opening Addresses

year. More than 130 000 km2 have a 137Cs contamina-tion density above 1 Ci/km2 (37 kBq/m2).

The disaster gave rise to extremely complex scien-tific, technical, ecological, social, legal and moralproblems. By now a large amount of priority work hasbeen done, including the planned evacuation of peoplefrom dangerous regions, agricultural decontaminationprojects, and — most important of all — medical exami-nation of the population and treatment of those sufferingthe effects of radiation.

All this work has been part of the joint Union-Republic Programme of Urgent Measures. Under thisprogramme 218 000 residents of contaminated regionsare to be relocated in the period 1990-1992, and of these87 000 had already been relocated or voluntarily left thecontaminated zones in 1990. In 1991, approximatelyfour million square metres of living space will have tobe constructed, with all the necessary social and domes-tic infrastructure, and corresponding employmentopportunities will have to be provided.

The tasks confronting us today are no less complexthan those of five years ago. Our activities are governedby the Concept for habitability of the regions affected bythe Chernobyl accident. The plan in question wasapproved this year by the USSR Cabinet.

In accordance with international practice, the mainindicator for determining the level of response under thisplan is not the degree of territorial contamination byradionuclides, but the effective dose equivalent. Theproblem confronting us now is that all our operationshave to be undertaken in a manner consistent with thecircumstances as they have evolved and in keeping withdecisions which were made earlier. Therefore, theextent of surface contamination of the land, especiallywith caesium, also has to be considered in resolvingcertain matters connected with social benefits andcompensation.

Under the 'concept', the following criteria have beenestablished to govern the introduction of protectivemeasures: if the average annual radiation burden begin-ning in 1991 is more than 0.1 rem (1 mSv) above thenatural and technical background level, then protectivemeasures are introduced. If, beginning in 1991, theradiation burden reaches 0.5 rem (5 mSv), then suchprotective measures as population relocation becomemandatory.

As before, population relocation remains one of themost complex problems. In the first few years after theaccident people firmly believed, on humanitariangrounds, that one of the most effective protectivemeasures was to evacuate the stricken territories. Thekey territories in this regard were those with a 137Cscontamination of from 15 to 40 Ci/km2 (555 kBq/m2to1.48 MBq/m2).

In connection with the introduction of the 'concept',every effort has been made to explain to people thatresettlement should not be viewed as an end in itself and

that it is not the main activity undertaken on behalf of theresidents of the affected regions. We are trying to makepeople understand that resettlement itself is a seriousrisk factor for human health and is not always necessary.At the same time, however, a person who has resolvedto move receives compensation from the State in orderto do so. Thus, the programme associated with the 'con-cept' is oriented towards making decisions about reset-tlement as serious and responsible as possible, and theintention is to retain the principle that such decisionsmust be voluntary.

At present a single long-term Union-Republicprogramme is being worked out to protect the people ofthe USSR against the effects of the Chernobyl accident.Its primary aim is to care for those on whom the shadowof Chernobyl fell. Above all, this means preventivemedicine, medical treatment and convalescence, arrang-ing for the necessities of life in new locations, caring forthe young, and preserving our cultural heritage. And, inthe final analysis, it also means normalizing social con-ditions and the psychological climate in the affectedregions.

In other words, the efforts of the Government arelargely directed towards providing the conditions essen-tial to a normal, full life and reliably protecting the legalrights and interests of the population — special attentionbeing given to children, women and the elderly as wellas to those who have been directly involved in the acci-dent cleanup operations.

With these aims in mind, the Supreme Soviet of theUSSR passed, on 6 May this year, a law "Concerningthe social protection of citizens exposed to the effects ofradiation as a result of the accident at the ChernobylNuclear Power Plant". Similar laws have been adoptedin all the Republics.

This law defines the status of the territories exposedto radioactive contamination, procedures for sustainingnormal life and activities in those territories, arrange-ments for medical assistance and radiation protection forthose affected by the accident and for social protectionof children and adolescents, and, finally, benefits andcompensation for the population.

About four million persons exposed to the effects ofradiation as a result of the accident fall under the provi-sions of this law, including the 600 000 who participateddirectly in the accident cleanup operations. It alsoextends to the population of certain areas for reasonsother than radiation exposure. Some segments of thepopulation living in areas where the average annualradiation burden was less than 0.1 rem (1 mSv) havealso received compensation in various forms for reasonsdictated by specific social conditions.

The most difficult problem this law had to deal withwas that of ascertaining a causal relationship between ill-ness and disability and the Chernobyl accident, both forparticipants in the cleanup operations and for the inhabi-tants of highly contaminated regions. For children and

10

Opening Addresses

adolescents the Supreme Soviet decided that compensa-tion should be provided in cases where pathology of theblood-forming organs is diagnosed — specifically, acuteleukoses of the thyroid gland (adenomata, cancer) andother malignant tumours.

A source of constant concern is the health of all peo-ple who were affected by the Chernobyl misfortune.This being so, the conclusions and recommendations ofthe international experts are very important for us. Weare naturally very gratified that they largely coincidewith the conclusions of Soviet scientists. In actual fact,analysis of morbidity among the inhabitants of the con-taminated regions has not so far revealed any pattern orfeatures which would enable us to ascribe it beyonddoubt to the effects of the radiation factor as such.

At the same time, we note that epidemiological dataand clinical observations point to certain unfavourabletrends in the state of health of the inhabitants of thoseregions. The incidence of cardiovascular disease,chronic illnesses of the gastrointestinal tract, lung dis-ease and so on has increased. This may be due to naturalchanges in the incidence of certain diseases, changes inecological conditions, disruption of normal patterns oflife and diet, or prolonged psycho-emotional tensionbrought on primarily by the stressful situation beforeand after evacuation. In the light of this situation andother factors which I shall mention presently, we areinevitably concerned about the state of health of ourpeople. For that reason a prognosis for the futurefocused exclusively on anticipated insignificant conse-quences for the health of the inhabitants of the contami-nated regions would be less than cautious.

We have no right to quell our concern with anapproach such as this, especially as the full effects ofradioactive iodine on the thyroid during the first weekafter the accident — particularly in children — are stillnot fully known. We must also improve our arrange-ments for monitoring those who participated directly inthe cleanup operations, because many of them receivedsignificant doses of radiation.

For these reasons we are directing the health servicesto carry out further epidemiological studies and toproduce a reliable statistical interpretation of the results.And on all these matters we are calling for broad inter-national co-operation: there is vast scope for interna-tional research here.

A broad programme is being developed in the USSRwith the aim of rendering medical assistance and provid-ing treatment to people who were exposed to the effectsof radiation as a result of the accident. A public registerhas been compiled of those exposed to the effects ofradiation which by now contains medical and dose dataon 531 000 people.

A special programme called Children of Chernobyl isnow in operation. It was created to provide effectiveprophylaxis against the possible negative effects of theaccident on children, mothers and pregnant women by

raising the standards of medical assistance at all levels.The implementation of this programme will requireinvestments of approximately 900 million roubles overfive years.

In the contaminated regions a series of measures isbeing implemented to bring agricultural production inline with the national standards, which have been mademore stringent on three separate occasions during theperiod of interest. In 1990 the temporary limits forl37Cs contamination of basic agricultural products were2960 Bq/kg for meat and 370 Bq/kg for milk.

To what extent was our agricultural production con-taminated last year? As far as meat is concerned, in allregions the farmers have learned to fatten livestock forslaughter in such a way that the contamination of themeat does not exceed the established limits. Meat con-taining radioactive caesium in excess of the temporarylimits turns up only in connection with the forced slaugh-ter of livestock before the normal fattening process.According to 1990 data, the quantity of such meat didnot exceed a few hundredths of a percent.

The caesium concentration in crops, both fruit andvegetables, grown on land with a contamination of up to40 Ci/km2 (1.48 MBq/m2) was hardly in excess of theinternational standard of 600 Bq/kg.

Of all the basic agricultural products, milk haspresented the most serious problems, even though theamounts of milk contaminated in excess of permissiblelevels have steadily decreased from year to year. InKiev, Mogilev and Gomel provinces less than 1 % of themilk entering the milk processing plants is contami-nated. The largest fractions of contaminated milk arefound in the Zhitomir and Bryansk provinces, wherethey amount to 7% of the total volume.

Radiation monitoring is a rigorous three-stage pro-cess: agricultural products are checked throughout thegrowing period, again during processing, and finallyas finished products. This year there are plans to createadditional public monitoring stations and to developmobile laboratories. Efforts are being made to improveour system for monitoring radioactive contaminationof the environment and to set up information systemsand databanks on radiation conditions. In 1990,121 500 households in the surveillance zone, 5 Ci/km2

(185 kBq/m2) and higher, were registered, as well as217 300 households outside the zone. An airbornegamma survey of 20 provinces was carried out in theRSFSR, the UkrSSR and the BSSR.

To help the population evaluate radiation conditionsin their own dwellings, work places and recreationalestablishments, the Government of the USSR took stepsto increase the output of simple, easy-to-use dosimetricand radiological monitoring devices. In 1991 the plan isto provide the public with 700 000 to 750 000 radiationmonitoring devices, as compared with only 240 000 in1990.

11

Opening Addresses

In addition to radiation itself and the stressful situa-tions arising from the introduction of restrictive meas-ures and the relocation of residents, there were otherfactors that had a negative influence on the social andpsychological state of people in the contaminatedregions, notably inadequate information about radiationconditions and the effects of the accident in their specificregion, as well as misconceptions concerning the workbeing done there. Beginning in 1990 a special informa-tion bulletin called Chernobyl was published with theaim of providing the public with more information. Thispublication is sent directly to all affected areas, includ-ing organizations at the district level.

However, in spite of the large amount of work thathas been done and the great expenses incurred, it hasstill not been possible to resolve all the problemsinvolved in managing the consequences of the accident.For that we need further efforts on the part of everyonein the country and quite possibly the assistance of theinternational community.

The Chernobyl tragedy is another reminder thatplanet Earth is our common home. It glaringly revealedthe vulnerability of our civilization in the face of tech-nology. The pain of Chernobyl summons us urgently tofind solutions to a problem common to all mankind —the protection of our environment. Chernobyl is onemore warning about the terrible force concealed innuclear energy if it gets out of control.

The bitter lesson of the Chernobyl accident has notbeen in vain. In the USSR, practical measures of a tech-nical and organizational kind have been taken to increasethe reliability and safety of operating reactors. Athorough analysis has been made of all factors governingtheir safe operation, particular attention being given tothe competence and training of operating personnel. Atthe same time, practical questions concerning the safeoperation of all elements and units involved in thenuclear fuel cycle are being resolved, including thedecommissioning of power generating units that havereached the end of their useful lifetime.

In the wake of the Chernobyl accident, the problemsof using nuclear energy to achieve economic ends havebeen seriously exacerbated. Not infrequently, peopleliving in the vicinity of operating plants or plants underconstruction pronounce themselves in favour of shuttingthem down or halting construction.

As far as the Chernobyl plant is concerned, scientificstudies are currently being carried out on Unit 4 with aview to ascertaining the condition of the destroyed reac-

tor and the 'sarcophagus': the specialists have come tothe conclusion that the nuclear fuel contained in the sar-cophagus is in a profoundly subcritical state, so that nospontaneous chain reaction would be possible. Designstudies are being done with the aim of improving thereliability and safety of the cover over Unit 4. It has infact been decided that a competition should be held toselect the most appropriate design either for completeburial or for long term conservation of the destroyedreactor.

Misfortune brings people together; that is humannature. The Chernobyl tragedy tore at the hearts ofmillions of people on all continents. Many countriesreached out a helping hand to us. With deep gratitude theSoviet people accepted any sign of sympathy or supportfrom the international community in their time of need.We want to express our gratitude to all Member Statesof the United Nations which supported, at the 45th Ses-sion of the General Assembly, the resolution concerninginternational co-operation in mitigating and overcomingthe consequences of the Chernobyl accident.

We have noted the growth of international co-operation in overcoming and mitigating the conse-quences of the accident both in our bilateral relationswith various governments and in the sphere of multilat-eral collaboration under the auspices of the UnitedNations, the IAEA and other international organiza-tions. The USSR will do everything in its power toensure that this co-operation is effective and that itspreads and intensifies.

We believe that the unique experience of strugglingwith the nuclear threat which came to us through thismisfortune can and must be used in the interests ofmankind, so that a tragedy of this magnitude will neveroccur again, in the USSR or anywhere else on Earth.

The Chernobyl disaster has shown us again and againhow fragile and interdependent is our world, in which allnations and peoples want to live happily, assured of thesafety of future generations. All people of goodwill arestriving to achieve that noble aim, and the peoples of theUSSR extend their full support.

V.A. GubanovUSSR Council of Ministers

State Committee on the Eliminationof the Consequences of the Accident

at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power PlantMoscow, USSR

12

The International Chernobyl Project

M. ROSENDivision of Nuclear Safety,

International Atomic Energy Agency,Vienna

A brief portrait of the International Chernobyl Pro-ject, describing its origin, goals and working methods,may lead to a fuller understanding of the Project'sresults as well as its limitations.

INTRODUCTION

In October 1989, the Government of the USSRformally requested the International Atomic EnergyAgency to carry out:

"... an international experts' assessment of the con-cept to enable the population to live safely in areasaffected by radioactive contamination ... , and anevaluation of the effectiveness of the steps taken ...tosafeguard the health of the population.

The response was a proposal for a multinational teamto undertake an assessment of the radiological situationin the three affected Soviet Republics, with the participa-tion of seven international bodies:

The Commission of the European Communities(CEC),The Food and Agriculture Organization of the UnitedNations (FAO),The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),The International Labour Office (ILO),The United Nations Scientific Committee on theEffects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR),The World Health Organization (WHO),The World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

This became the International Chernobyl Project. TheProject was formalized at a meeting in Moscow inFebruary 1990 attended by some 25 representatives ofthe USSR, the BSSR, the UkrSSR and the IAEA.

The work of recommending an approach to imple-menting the Project was given to a group of ten scientistswho, accompanied by two members of the USSRSupreme Soviet, travelled on a fact finding missionthrough the affected Republics during the last week ofMarch 1990. Their visit enabled them to learn first handabout the requirements of the Project. The group metwith officials in Moscow and in the capitals of theRepublics and with representatives of scientific organi-zations, hospitals, clinics and agricultural centres in theaffected areas and in the cities of Kiev, Gomel andMoscow.

It was only after the group encountered people in theaffected areas that the dimensions of the task becameclear. Plans for the Project had been presented to resi-dents of seven settlements in the three Republics, whowere invited to share their feelings with the scientificgroup and ask questions. Anxiety about children's healthand about the adequacy of the Government's proposedmeasures for limiting the radiation exposures duringtheir lifetime dominated the discussions. There was anatmosphere of mistrust directed towards the authoritiesas well as many members of the scientific and medicalcommunities.

Following the visit of the fact finding group, an Inter-national Advisory Committee of scientists from tencountries and seven international organizations wasestablished to direct the Project and be responsible forits findings. Members were called together from wellknown institutes and universities to represent a spectrumof disciplines, from radiation specialist to medical prac-titioner and psychologist. The twenty-one member Com-mittee met in Kiev and Minsk from 23 to 27 April 1990under the chairmanship of Dr. Itsuzo Shigematsu,Director of the Radiation Effects Research Foundationin Hiroshima, Japan.

The Committee agreed upon a detailed work plan.This would be constrained by a compelling need to com-plete the Project in one year and by the limitations on theresources available. It was clear that the assessment ofthe Chernobyl accident had already involved extensiveefforts and it would not be necessary for the Project toundertake a totally new, comprehensive assessment ofthe situation. Rather, the task would be to assess thequality and correctness of the existing results and to con-duct an independent assessment through field samples,laboratory analyses and internationally recognized cal-culation techniques. Secondly, to be manageable, theinternational assessment would have to focus on the fourkey issues of concern to the population and policymakers:

The true extent of contamination,The past, current and future radiation exposure of thepopulation,The actual and potential health effects,The adequacy of measures being taken to protect thepublic.

An account of the major historical events of the acci-dent would also be prepared which would provide a

13

Opening Addresses

background for fully understanding the complexity ofthe situation and the interrelated nature of the Project'sgoals.

GOALS AND SCOPE

The Project deals exclusively with the radiologicalconsequences for people living in the affected areas atthe time the assessment began in 1990. Thirteen districtsin the USSR have been officially identified as having aground level caesium contamination in excess of1 Ci/km2 (37 kBq/m2). Approximately 25 000 km2 aredefined as affected areas with ground concentrationlevels of caesium in excess of 5 Ci/km2 (185 kBq/m2).Of this total, approximately 58% are located in theBSSR, 32% in the RSFSR and 9% in the UkrSSR. Fromofficial USSR reports, this population is approximately825 000, of which 45% live in the BSSR, 24% in theRSFSR and 31% in the UkrSSR.

It was not the Project's intention to examine the pro-hibited region, approximately 30 km in radius, round thedamaged reactor itself, except to describe the measurestaken to contain the accident in the early post-accidentphase. As the Project was directed at those currently liv-ing in the contaminated areas, the radiological healtheffects to the more than 100 000 people evacuated fromthe prohibited zone round the Chernobyl site were con-sidered only for those currently living in the areas underreview. Nor did the Project address health effects for thelarge number of emergency personnel (the 'liquidators')who were brought into the region temporarily for acci-dent management and recovery work. The health of thisoccupationally exposed population is reportedly beingmonitored at medical centres throughout the USSR.

WORK PLAN

In co-operation with local authorities, the Projectselected a number of settlements in the contaminatedareas of concern in order to perform the necessary sur-veys. Some of the settlements were located in areas ofrelatively high soil surface contamination while otherswere located in areas of relatively low soil surface con-tamination but with the potential for high radiation dosesto people through the food chain. These settlements arecalled 'surveyed contaminated settlements'.

Settlements were also selected outside the contami-nated areas to serve as references for comparison. Theseare called 'surveyed control settlements'. Thirty-fivesettlements were surveyed but not all of them were usedin all the tasks of the Project.

A parallel consideration was the desire of the affectedpopulation for practical information about how theycould deal with the radiological situation. Projectexperts concluded that there was a poor understanding in

the affected areas of the scientific principles underlyingradiation and its effects, as is generally the case through-out the world, and that this was at the root of many ofthe medical and social problems observed. Therefore, inaddition to the main tasks of the Project, several infor-mation exchange activities were carried out in order toraise the level of the local scientific community's under-standing of the problems involved.

PARTICIPATION

The Project was carried out on a completely volun-tary basis by a closely co-operating team of some 200experts associated with research institutes, universitiesand other organizations in 25 countries and seven mul-tinational organizations. The time devoted to the Projectwas volunteered by governments, institutes, companiesor the experts themselves. Nearly 50 missions to theUSSR were completed between March 1990 and January1991. The IAEA Laboratory at Seibersdorf, along with13 laboratories in six countries participating on a volun-tary basis, were involved in the collection and analysisof samples. The IAEA Laboratory carried out an inter-comparison exercise with participating laboratories fromthe USSR. Government authorities and commercialcompanies in five countries donated equipment and sup-plies, radiation monitors and computing time to back upthe work of the Project. Project teams made 2000 meas-urements of external gamma dose rates at indoor andoutdoor locations; over 1000 samples of soil-grassecosystem and milk were collected; nearly 22 000 in-habitants were monitored for either external or internalexposures; and almost 1500 medical examinations werecarried out.

The Project received the full support of the USSR andthe Governments of the BSSR, the RSFSR and theUkrSSR. Assistance took various forms, includingparticipation of local scientists in intercomparisonexercises; extensive discussion with Project scientists;and assistance in the collection and preparation of fieldsamples and in carrying out medical examinations of thepopulation in the affected areas. Most of the logistic sup-port for the Project was provided by the USSR Ministryof Atomic Power and Industry. There were open andfrank conversations with authorities, scientists and,especially, local citizens that greatly helped the interna-tional experts' understanding of the situation.

CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

The Conclusions and Recommendations of the Inter-national Chernobyl Project were approved by the Inter-national Advisory Committee at its meeting in Vienna

14

Opening Addresses

from 18 to 22 March 1991 and they are based upon theradiological and health assessment carried out by theProject. The technical details of these assessments are tobe found in the extensive Technical Report1, to whichreference should be made for detailed information.

The Conclusions and Recommendations are subjectto some constraints and limitations in the design of theProject. Ideally, the Project teams would have had suffi-cient time and resources to examine exhaustively all theinformation available to them and to verify it indepen-dently, as well as to carry out more extensive indepen-dent analyses. Such comprehensive efforts were notfeasible, nor were they altogether warranted. Morelimited objectives were seen to be necessary and wereadopted. A major effort was therefore directed to assess-ing the reliability and accuracy of data, techniquesand methodologies employed to estimate contaminationlevels, doses and health effects, and to evaluating radio-logical protection policies. Sufficient data were alsoobtained independently to enable the Project teams foreach of the four tasks to formulate independentjudgements.

A few issues received comparatively little attention,owing primarily to the unavailability of necessary andsufficient data. For example, it was not possible tocorroborate the early contamination of land and theexposure of the public due to iodine isotopes. Nor werethe early remedial protective actions that were under-taken, such as thyroid blocking by iodine prophylaxisand evacuation, subject to thorough evaluation.

Despite the limitations of time and of financial andhuman resources, the International Advisory Committeeis of the opinion that the Project represents a muchneeded international humanitarian and scientificresponse to the needs of the authorities and the peopleof the USSR who were affected by the Chernobylaccident.

The International Advisory Committee acknowledgesthe many problems inherent in a study of such breadth.Nonetheless, the work has involved leading and eminentinternational scientific investigators and medicalspecialists who endorse its adequacy and its results. It isa significant step in the evaluation of the consequencesof the accident.

1 International Chernobyl Project: Technical Report,IAEA, Vienna (1991).

15

WHO's International Programme on the HealthEffects of the Chernobyl Accident (IPHECA)

P. WAIGHTWorld Health Organization,

Geneva

A Memorandum of Understanding between theWorld Health Organization (WHO) and the Ministry ofHealth of the USSR was signed on 30 April 1990. Itcalled for the development of a long term internationalprogramme to monitor and mitigate the health effects ofthe Chernobyl accident and for the establishment of aninternational centre for radiation health issues.

The International Programme on the Health Effectsof the Chernobyl Accident (IPHECA) envisages a variedrange of activities to provide health care for the exposedpopulations and strengthen emergency response. Theseinclude:

(1) A long term epidemiological study of the healtheffects in the exposed persons;

(2) Assessment and treatment of possible late somaticand genetic effects;

(3) Diagnosis, treatment and prevention of thyroiddisease;

(4) Health implications of the psycho-social effects ofthe accident;

(5) Establishment and maintenance of radiation healthdatabanks;

(6) A retrospective analysis of the projected dose;(7) An independent evaluation of levels of contamina-

tion and of the control measures introduced.

This is, of course, a very wide ranging programmewhose complexity will necessitate development instages. However, initial steps have been taken to im-plement the programme through the establishment ofthe International Centre for Radiation Health Issues(ICRHI). The Soviet authorities are making arrange-ments for the International Centre to be housed inObninsk. Regional affiliated centres have also beenestablished in Kiev, Gomel and Bryansk under an agree-ment between the Ministry of Health of the USSR withthose of the BSSR and the UkrSSR. The city of Obninsk,in the Kaluga region of the RSFSR, has a population of100 000, and is situated about 100 km south of Moscow.It was built during the 1950s and 1960s to house a com-plex of research institutions. In all, fourteen such insti-tutes are currently located in Obninsk, where there is astudy and conference centre with excellent facilities forseminars and meetings of all types.

The nucleus of the proposed International Centre willbe provided by the Research Institute of Medical Radiol-ogy of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR,

which includes the State Registry of more than 500 000persons exposed as a result of the accident. This Instituteis at present composed of two branches, a clinical branchlocated in the city of Obninsk and a research branch situ-ated a little outside the city. It is planned to amalgamatethe clinical departments of pathology, haematology andendocrinology with the epidemiological section (whichincludes the dose registry) and the radiation cytogeneticsdepartment of the research branch, and to use these asthe basic units for the new International Centre. Atpresent, the clinical branch includes groups workingmainly in nuclear medicine, radiology and ultrasounddiagnosis. Efforts are under way to establish a depart-ment for dealing with the psycho-social effects of radia-tion accidents.

Programme support will be provided by other institu-tions located in Obninsk whose activities would berelated to the work of the International Centre. This willinclude, among others, the Hydrometeorology Institute,which is involved in the mapping of radioactive contami-nation, and the Agricultural Radiology Institute, whichis concerned with the study of transport of radionuclidesin the environment and the establishment of transfer fac-tors. An integral part of the epidemiological work of theCentre will be the АН-Union Distributed Register of per-sons exposed as a result of the Chernobyl accident.Information on over 570 000 individuals who have beenexposed to radiation from the accident, including thoseinvolved in the cleanup work, is on file in the Registerand is available. The information has been computerizedand includes biographical details, outcomes of medicalexaminations and estimates of dose. The software hasalready been designed to manipulate the differentcohorts within the Register. Ministries of Public Healthof the RSFSR, the UkrSSR and the BSSR provide themajor portion of the information.

As an initial step, a Scientific Advisory Committeeconsisting of nine senior scientists from as many coun-tries met in Hiroshima from 23 to 26 October 1990. Thismeeting, which was organized in collaboration with theRadiation Effects Research Foundation, which is locatedthere, was also attended by representatives of the IAEA,the CEC, the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare,the Ministry of Science and the Technology Agency ofJapan, the USSR Ministry of Health and the RadiationEffects Research Foundation. The Committee reviewedthe objectives and proposed activities of the International

17

Opening Addresses

Programme, including the Centre, and made recommen-dations concerning its implementation, objectives andpriorities.

The Committee felt that the unique character of themixed internal and external radiation exposure at lowdose rates that resulted from the accident was of greatinternational scientific and medical importance. Theadoption of a single programme would facilitate the co-ordination of all Chernobyl-associated health studies.The Committee recommended that the proposed Inter-national Programme be implemented according to thepriorities which it assigned. It also recommended theestablishment of the proposed International Centre(ICRHI) at Obninsk, the task of which would be the co-ordination and execution of radiation health studies, theprovision of information and the organization of interna-tional meetings. The Committee also recommended that,owing to logistic and financial constraints, in-patientdiagnostic and treatment facilities should not be part ofthe International Centre but should be furnished on acontractual basis.

In recommending that the International Programmebe implemented, the Scientific Advisory Committeeidentified the following six priorities upon which itshould depend:

(1) Epidemiological studies which would include chil-dren with thyroid exposure, emergency accidentworkers and residents who have continued to live incontaminated areas and those who were evacuatedsoon after the accident.

(2) Dosimetric assessments which should be focusedspecifically on the study groups in (1) above.(Where direct dosimetric evaluation is not avail-able, other methods of dose estimation will berequired.)

(3) Mitigation of psycho-social effects through indi-vidual counselling and the provision of full infor-mation. (Furthermore, it will be necessary toestablish a study of the effectiveness of any mitiga-tion strategies.)

(4) Standardized clinical follow-up studies in support ofepidemiological investigations.

(5) Education and training through specialized coursesfor participating staff; short courses for physicianson the medical aspects of radiation accidents; thebasic education programme on radiation effects for

the relevant professionals in the community; andprovision of general information material.

(6) Efficient database management emphasizing unifor-mity of data collection and quality assurance andimplemented by a computer based network system.

I would like to return to the more current events thathave occurred in the development of the programme. Asyou know, in November 1990 the Director-General ofWHO made an appeal to the Member States which havepermanent Missions in Geneva for funds to support theInternational Programme and Centre. Following thegenerous donation of 20 million US dollars by theJapanese Government, a Task Group was convened inearly January 1991 to make recommendations on howthese funds could best be spent. This group identifiedthree pilot projects which required implementation assoon as possible:

(1) A Haematology Project to review the incidence ofhaematological disease in those persons living in thezones of strict control, and to establish an allogenicbone marrow transplantation facility in Gomel;

(2) A Thyroid Project to assess radiation inducedthyroid disease in exposed children;

(3) An Epidemiological Project to establish uniformprotocols and to develop software to facilitate themanipulation of data for future radiation riskestimates.

A fourth project has since been added, which is astudy of the effects of in utero irradiation on children,particularly on the brain.

Following the Task Group Report, the InternationalProgramme (IPHECA) and the establishment of theInternational Centre (ICRHI) were discussed by theExecutive Board of WHO, which endorsed furtherdevelopment of the programme and urged MemberStates to participate actively. The Board emphasized thatthe programme would have to be implemented by meansof voluntary contributions and not through the regularbudget. Further consideration of the programme wasundertaken by the Forty-Fourth World Health Assemb-ly, which passed a resolution by consensus on 15 May1991 to proceed with the implementation of the Interna-tional Programme and the establishment of the Interna-tional Centre.

18

Session 2

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION

Objectives and presentation of the methodological approach usedF. Steinhausler (Austria)

Results of the intercomparison exercise and data managementV. Valkovic (IAEA)

INDEPENDENT SURVEY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION

Radiological survey of selected settlements in BSSR, UkrSSR and RSFSRP. Zombori (Hungary)

Radionuclides in grass-cow-milk ecosystemsP. Stegnar (Yugoslavia)

Independent verification of the contamination mapsF. Steinhausler (Austria)

ConclusionsF. Steinhausler (Austria)

Rapporteur's Report of Session 2B.W. Wachholz (USA)

DISCUSSION

Yu.S. Tsaturov (USSR): Since the accident, theoperational units and scientific institutions under theState Committee on Hydrometeorology and Environ-mental Monitoring have been collaborating with thevarious bodies of the Academies of Sciences of theUnion Republics, of the Ministry of Health and otherministries and departments in monitoring the atmo-sphere, soils and surface water in areas contaminated asa result of the Chernobyl accident.

First of all, I wish to say that my organization and allthe Soviet colleagues who took part in this work are fullysatisfied with the data presented this afternoon. We sawthose results in March when, in the first phase, the dataprepared by the experts were reviewed. We are happyto note that the suggestions, recommendations and com-ments made here at the Agency by our colleagues inMarch are reflected in the Technical Report and in thepapers presented here today.

I shall try to reply to the questions which Dr. Stein-hausler has raised in his report on his group's work.These relate, first, to the air contamination data, whichunfortunately the independent experts could not obtain.

To be brief, I shall cite a few figures to give an idea ofthe atmospheric contamination within and outside the30-km zone. In the case of the plutonium isotope whichis most critical in inhalation, the concentration was10-i8_10-i9 Ci/L (3 7 x 10-8 _ з 7 х 1Q-9 Bq/L) in

the 30-km zone around the Chernobyl plant, and in thetowns of Pripyat and Chernobyl. These values are lowerby two or three orders than those laid down by the radia-tion safety standards in force in the USSR. Of course,they are somewhat higher than the pre-accident back-ground values, and we attribute this to resuspension ofradionuclides into the air. Likewise, in other zones withlower surface contamination levels the content of radio-nuclides in the atmosphere is lower by several factors often than in the near zone and is comparable with thebackground. The figures for Kiev city are: averagemonthly concentration of plutonium isotopes 5 X 10~21

to 4 X ID'22 Ci/L (1.9 x 1(T10 to 1.5 X КГ11 Bq/L);^Sr: 2 to 10 x 1Q-20 Ci/L (7 X КГ10 to 3.7 x 10'9

Bq/L); and 137Cs: 1 to 9 x 10~19 Ci/L (3.7 to 3.3X 10"8 Bq/L). Such a content of radionuclides in theair layer adjacent to the soil cannot, of course, lead toany appreciable secondary surface contamination due towindborne transfer.

19

Session 2

However, available data show that in the contami-nated areas adjacent to sites with intensive humanactivity (such as farmlands under the plough and dirtroads) there is some increase in the radionuclide concen-tration in the atmosphere. We therefore welcome therecommendations presented today.

As to the question about uncertainty in the analysesof surface, soil, water and air contamination, I under-stand that this uncertainty is attributed by the indepen-dent experts to the preparation of composite maps on thebasis of aerial surveys and ground sampling. We esti-mate this error to be 30-40%. The error in the determi-nation of surface contamination of the soil by caesiumisotopes is, of course, much lower, and we agree withthe estimate given here by the independent experts.

I should like to comment separately on the questionabout the overestimate of strontium and plutonium in theSoviet data. From the point of view of a conservativeobserver, the Soviet officials seem to have been some-what careful in applying the series of various protectivemeasures on the basis of these overestimates. In otherwords, there was an element of conservatism here. Butfrom the standpoint of the Chernobyl laws enacted in theRepublics and in the USSR as a whole, to whichDr. Gubanov was referring in his introductory state-ment, we should bear in mind that if the independentexperts are going to send these overestimates of stron-tium and plutonium to the laboratories only confiden-tially it will be difficult for the official bodies in theUSSR at present to prepare data on settlements wherethe doses should not exceed 0.1 rem/year (1 mSv/year)and to make isodose maps for 0.5 rem/year (5 mSv/year), i.e. in cases where definite decisions are required.Therefore, I request the independent experts, apart fromconfidentially transmitting the data to the laboratorieswhich made these overestimates, to give the names ofthese laboratories at least to the Chernobyl committeesin the UkrSSR, BSSR and RSFSR. As for the contribu-tions of individual laboratories, the maps which werepresented today are based on the data of the State Com-mittee on Hydrometeorology, taking into account thedata of our colleagues in the USSR. We now have adetailed official map as of January 1991. I should like toadd that all data on environmental contamination result-ing from the Chernobyl accident have been summarizedand collected in the recently published book Chernobyl— Radioactive Contamination of the Environment (inRussian).

F. Steinhausler (Austria): I should like to expressmy gratitude to our Soviet colleagues. I shall give youone example of our co-operation. We went into the samevillage, side by side, they with their instruments, wewith ours, and I just want to tell you the result: the ratioof surveying a village, their results devided by ours, was0.96 ± 0.05, call it 1, and I think that says it all: therewere ten foreigners and I don't know how many Soviet

colleagues, and our ratio was 1. Thank you very muchfor helping us do the work.

I'm afraid I cannot be positive about the request forabandoning confidentiality. I must repeat that right fromthe start of this intercalibration exercise we promisedevery participant that only the IAEA Laboratory wouldknow the results, and this confidentiality clause is veryimportant. Perhaps we can work together so that thepractical implementation between the Soviet colleaguesinvolved, the committees which have to take decisionsand Seibersdorf Laboratory can find a common denomi-nator. That is all I can say at the moment and I hope itis satisfactory.

E.F. Konoplya (BSSR): I should point out that fourlaboratories of our Institute [the Institute of Radiobio-logy of the Academy of Sciences of the BSSR] — thelaboratory of radiometry, the laboratory of aerial radio-ecology and radiobiology of water systems, the labora-tory of monitoring and the laboratory of soil radio-chemistry — participated in the international inter-calibration. I am pleased to note today that, on thewhole, the assessment of the radiation situation in theBSSR agrees with that made by the BSSR scientists. Thisshould form the basis for our future work. It is time nowto finish with corroboration of data and proceed to con-structive practical collaboration. I hope that this Confer-ence will be the turning point. I need not go into everykind of radiation contamination of the differentecosystems.

I agree with Dr. Steinhausler's assessment regardingwater systems. The only thing I want to add is that whatseems to be an overestimate of the contamination ofwater systems is not actually so. If dynamic studies hadbeen carried out, quite different results would have beenobtained in other periods of observation because, in fact,the entire radioactivity is concentrated in the bottomsediments and everything that is in the water is beingcontaminated continuously. A constant plateau has nowbeen reached.

There are two points which have not been dealt withsufficiently in the Technical Report and in the presenta-tions — the problem of transuranium elements and theproblem of their aerial transport. I must say that theproblem of plutonium, like that of strontium, is a com-plex one. It should be noted that plutonium contamina-tion above 0.1 Ci/km2 (3.7 kBq/m2) is found outsidethe prohibited zone and people continue to live in thoseareas at present. We agree with Dr. Stegnar's data onthe migration of caesium and its content in breast milkbut we have somewhat different data on migration ofcaesium in various types of soil. We shall take up thismatter when we discuss agricultural problems. It is truethat we have a somewhat different understanding of theratio of 239'240pu and 241Am, and I must add here thatthe data which I am going to present are based on directmeasurement of plutonium in the different environments

20

Environmental Contamination: Discussion

by radiochemical methods followed by alpha spectro-metry. [The speaker showed a slide: a map of the BSSRindicating the sites where the Institute of Radiobiologycarries out continuous monitoring of the radiation situa-tion.] Other institutes and laboratories are also par-ticipating in this work in their areas of competence. Asfor the zones with transuranium elements, the problemis of basic importance for the present situation, forprediction and especially for evaluating the impact onhuman health and on living organisms. I have said that,first of all, we associate 241Am with 241Pu, which hasnot yet been mentioned here. 241Pu is also found in ourarea. It has a short half-life — about 14 years — but itchanges into 241 Am, which has a half-life of 433 yearsand is, in addition, highly toxic. It is an alpha emitter.We have made predictions for transuranium elements inthe case of individual settlements. For example, atMosany in 1988 241Pu amounted to 2300 Bq/km2 and24'Am to 65 Bq/km2. By the year 2030 the activity ofplutonium will be only 320 Bq/km2 but that of the moretoxic 241Am will increase. The situation in this settle-ment will not improve at all but may even get worse.

As for aerial transfer, the content of radionuclides inthe atmosphere was monitored in different settlementsbetween 1986 and 1990. The content is falling everyyear, but even in Minsk in 1988 and 1989 it was higherthan before the incident.

The concentration of plutonium in the air was studiedin different periods of time in different towns of theBSSR (Minsk, Gomel, etc.). In 1990 the plutoniumcontent in the air in Minsk was higher than before theaccident. [The speaker showed a graph depictingchanges in the radionuclide content in the air.] We dis-cuss, in general, a tendency towards a decrease althoughthe fluctuations are substantial. But the picture is not aschaotic as it appears — there is a pattern. If we take thespring months—April and May — we see an increaseeverywhere. The same happens in the autumn months.These are the months of agricultural activity, whichgenerates dust. The dust is transported by air currentsalso outside the contaminated zone. We have the samepicture at Mogilev, which is situated in the relativelyclean zone. If we consider dust suspensions, we shall getthe picture I have described.

Finally, there is one more interesting observation. In1989 there was a forest fire, and at Nedokhojnikij 40 kmaway the atmospheric content of radionuclides rose byseveral factors of ten.

F. Steinhausler: First, I indicated at the beginningwhat our study could not do: it does not lend itself foruse as a substitute for long term investigations, such asstudying seasonal trends. Second, although we invitedour colleagues to provide us with all the informationthey had, I regret to say that these very interesting datawere not supplied, either to our expert teams or to me,so, of course, they could not be taken into consideration.

Finally, I should like to refer to page 17 of theOverview1, where the Recommendations refer veryclearly to the issue as such, as identified by us, recom-mending that water sampling and air monitoringprogrammes should be carried out jointly with interna-tional colleagues.

V.G. Bar'yakhtar (UkrSSR): Although the mainproblem associated with the Chernobyl disaster iscaesium, I should like to draw attention to one smallpoint concerning strontium contamination, which oughtto be reflected in the conclusions. As we all know, onthe left bank of the Pripyat an area of about 20-22 km2

is highly contaminated with strontium — the amount isapproximately 10 000 to 12 000 Ci (3.7 x 1014 to4.4 x 10 l4Bq). This strontium poses a great hazardsince during floods it can be washed out into the RiverDnepr and contaminate the entire Dnepr system situatedin the UkrSSR. This spot is of no danger to the BSSRand RSFSR, since the contamination will flow down-stream. These 10 000 Ci of strontium may appreciablyraise the concentration during the spring floods. Whilethere has been no great rise in the water level (not morethan 5%) at any time during the last five years and, for-tunately, the Dnepr water has been clean all the time, thedanger does exist, as Academicians Paton and Khutsilovand I pointed out as early as 1986.

As always, there are local peculiarities which differfrom the overall picture, but it is these peculiaritieswhich can later alter this picture. The strontium on theleft bank of the Pripyat is a potential threat to the purityof the water in the Dnepr basin.

F. Steinhausler: We have tried to address this sub-ject on page 18 of the Overview by indicating that werecommend that the desorption of strontium from sedi-ments in surface water bodies and its impact on agricul-ture through irrigation practices should be taken intoaccount. That may not do justice to the full problem, asyou have illustrated, but we hoped that by highlightingthe strontium issue and water ecology we would drawthe attention of the regulatory bodies to fund and pro-mote more research in the USSR in that area.

Yu.S. Tsaturov: I should like to say a few words inconnection with Academician Bar'yakhtar's comments.A rise in strontium concentration is indeed possibleduring floods. To elucidate the picture, I will cite datacollected this spring. As a result of submersion of morethan 30% of the flood-plain of the River Pripyat due toice blocking in January this year, the maximum concen-tration amounted to 100-160 pCi/L (3.7-5.9 Bq/L) butremained below the permissible levels in the USSR (in

1 The International Chernobyl Project: An Overview, Reportby an International Advisory Committee, IAEA, Vienna(1991).

21

Session 2

this case, 400 pCi/L (14.8 Bq/L)). Predictive evalua-tions of the possible content of strontium in the Kievwater reservoir show that its concentration may rise to20-30 pCi/L (0.7-1.1 Bq/L), which is higher than theusual by a factor of 3-5 but is lower than the permissiblelevel by a factor of 10-20. During the submersion of thesector of the flood-plain referred to by AcademicianBar'yakhtar, the amount of strontium washed out wasaltogether about 60 Ci (2.2 x 1012 Bq), i.e. 0.5% ofthe total quantity present in the flood-plain. We do notestimate the latter at 12 000 Ci (4.4 x 1014 Bq) butonly half as much — 6000 Ci (2.2 X 1014 Bq).

Academician Konoplya spoke about the problem oftransuranium elements, which was not known to theindependent experts or even to the official interdepart-mental council on radioactivity measurement in theUSSR. It is only today that we learned about these dataon transuranium elements for 1986-1987. In particular,I am puzzled by only one thing: why did the Academi-cian say that Mogilev and Gomel were relatively cleanand that the concentration in the air at Minsk was anorder higher than at Gomel and many times greater thanat Mogilev?

T. Terasima (Japan): May I make a general state-ment regarding the present meeting? On behalf of theJapanese delegation, I greatly appreciate the initiativetaken by the IAEA, in co-operation with many interna-tional bodies, to assess the radiological situation in thethree affected Soviet Republics. I hope that the results ofthe Project encourage local scientific communities andthe people living in the areas affected. I would like topay tribute to the contribution made by ProfessorShigematsu, Chairman of the International AdvisoryCommittee.

I was much impressed by the results reported thisafternoon. I am glad to learn that the water resourcesremained safe and relatively sound. However, I thinkpossible contamination of aquatic biota should be exam-ined and followed up in the future. It may constitute afuture research requirement.

F. Steinhausler: Our measurements indicate thatfiltered water samples and sediment show very differentradionuclide content. The filtered water in summer1990, with one exception, did not show any measurableamount of radioactivity, whilst the radionuclide levels insome of the sediments, not in all, did show the beginningof elevated radionuclide concentrations. In addition (it isin the Technical Report), fish samples showed someindication that radionuclides in fish are starting toincrease in some cases. This is referred to in our Recom-mendation, on page 17 of the Overview, where we statethat the potential for long term contamination of waterbodies, possibly leading to contamination of the aquaticfood chain, should be investigated. We hope that thisRecommendation will create enough interest for theUSSR authorities to pick up the subject for futureresearch.

J. Jovanovich (Canada): How do these contamina-tions of foods and human milk with 137Cs and otherartificial radionuclides compare with 40K and theothers? Have they been measured? Do you have anycomments?

F. Steinhausler: The contributions from 40K, anatural radionuclide, and those from 137Cs are of a verydifferent order of magnitude, depending on the area weare talking about. If we refer to the high transfer areasthen certainly the whole body caesium levels such as inOvruch start to become significant, but in the low levelareas where there is commercially available controlledfood, the contribution from 40K is certainly of a non-negligible magnitude as compared to caesium.

Yu.S. Tsaturov: All our measurements are carriedout jointly with the BSSR Committee on Hydrometeoro-logy. We collaborate in this matter with the Laboratoryfor Atmospheric Studies. As for contamination of theatmosphere in the Minsk and Gomel regions, I made nocomparison. In fact, the contamination in Minsk is thelowest.

A. Eggleton (UK): We can still see elevated levels ofairborne 137Cs in Britain as a result of the Chernobylaccident, and we believe this is due to local resuspensionof material that has been deposited on the ground inBritain. The question of resuspension is quite compli-cated because you have to ask what is the particle sizeof the resuspended material. There is comparativelylittle fine particulate, but that is what most air samplesmeasure. If we had an air sample that measured largerpaniculate sizes, we could expect to see more resuspen-sion, and indeed if we put out a deposition gauge tomonitor the resuspension at ground level, and we inte-grate the deposition on that gauge since the accident, wefind that there is now more deposition from resuspendedmaterial than there was direct deposition during the pas-sage of the cloud over Britain. That does not mean thatthere is a continuing release of material from Chernobyl;it is the material on the ground which is beingresuspended and deposited very locally, so it is hard tomake a definite statement about the resuspensionproblem. It will be important for some purposes butprobably not as a contributor to inhalation dose.

Dr. Valkovic gave details of the intercomparisonexercises with radiocaesium and radiostrontium, but hedid not mention any intercomparison for plutonium. Ithink we all know that measuring plutonium is muchmore difficult than measuring the other two isotopes. Iam also aware that this has been the subject of considera-ble controversy in the USSR, and that there are groupsof people who maintain that the official figures are con-siderably lower than the true values. So I wonder ifDr. Valkovic could tell us what the task force did aboutthis. One final question: what is the scale that these 'hot

22


spots' represent? Are they areas of 1, 5, 10 or 50 metresdiameter?

V. Valkovic (IAEA): We have very little data onplutonium determination from the USSR laboratoriesand from the laboratories in the network, so we havemade no statistical evaluation such as we did for otherradionuclides.

A.K. Gus'kova (USSR): I consider that the mostimportant and direct data on strontium and plutoniumcome from persons who died from various causes — forthe determination of radionuclides in organs and tissue.Our BSSR colleagues have these data, and made themavailable to us in the form of analytical information onthe situation. These data show that the levels of intakeare negligibly low and do not contribute substantially atpresent to the total dose. But the data in the TechnicalReport indicate that the specific contribution of theselong lived nuclides will increase with time. However,the dose and the total activity decrease, and thus theaddition to the dose also remains negligibly small. Allthis argues in favour of continuing the studies on stron-tium and plutonium and stresses the need for a moresober and critical assessment of their real hazards, espe-cially in discussing the matter of resettlement, which isso calamitous and distressing for the people concerned.

P.V. Ramzaev (USSR): I fully agree with ProfessorGus'kova insofar as ordinary living conditions are con-cerned. But there is one other thing that we encounter —contamination of the aerial environment as a result offarming activities. Until recently our Institute [Instituteof Radiation Hygiene, Leningrad], too, was veryoptimistic about the safety of the aerial environment withregard to the intake of strontium, caesium and pluto-nium. However, our latest calculations (subject to verifi-cation under field conditions) show that in the case ofworkers constantly inhaling highly contaminated air inploughed fields, where a considerable amount of dust israised by the wind, the plutonium in the air — thoughnot of a hazardous level — can be significant in compari-son with the level of other radiation components, includ-ing even 137Cs, in terms of both external exposure andintake through food. So, according to the preliminarycalculations, this plutonium dose to these workers can befully comparable with the caesium dose. That is whyI endorse the International Advisory Committee's viewthat the problem of resuspension and analysis of theactual intake deserves attention and further study. Thispoint has not been properly verified on people. Thematter is now under study at our Institute.

F. Steinhausler: With regard to the resuspensionissue and size distribution, we have carried out cascadeimpactor measurements, and, I stress again, howeverlimited they were, we did not find any particles belowthe 3.5 /яп range for l37Cs.

We could detect alpha activity, but the levels wereextremely low, less than 0.5 mBq/m3. This led to us tothe recommendation that a collaborative programme ofair sampling and analysis should be established betweenthe USSR laboratories and the network of internationallaboratories set up by the IAEA in order to obtain moredefinite information on the relevance of resuspensionand inhalation pathways.

A 'hot spot' is reportedly defined as an area up to30 m2 in size which differs in gamma dose rate bymore than a factor of 3 from the established mean valuefor a given settlement. The Soviet authorities have pub-lished tables for many settlements which list the statisti-cally characteristic parameters for gamma dose rate,137Cs and strontium, such as mean, medium, minimum,maximum and number of measurements.

Finally, about the validity of the official plutoniumdata, I would like to refer to the figure on page 15 in theOverview, which shows that, however limited our pluto-nium independent assessment is, it does corroborate theofficial plutonium assessment, so there is very littleroom for the official plutonium data to be too far off the'true' value.

N.O. Loshchilov (UkrSSR): I wish to make a fewcomments to supplement Professor Ramzaev's statementand also on the problem of 'hot spots'. We divide thefallout on the contaminated area into a gaseous compo-nent and a fuel component. The fuel component consistsof hot fuel particles which mainly contain strontium andplutonium and which with time leach out and go into thesoil solution. After leaching out, the strontium becomesaccessible to plants. It is fuel particles a few micro-metres or less than 1 /лп in size which may enter thelungs and, what is worse, are not eliminated. They are,to some extent, dangerous in that they are inhaledduring agricultural activities. We carried out experi-ments during ploughing for almost two months in theBSSR at places where the contamination density was50 Ci/km2 (1.85 MBq/m2). The particles were detectedeven in sealed cabins, and the specific activity ofthe air was, and sometimes exceeded, 10~13 Ci/m3

(3.7 x 10~3 Bq/m3), i.e. above the maximum permis-sible concentrations. Since nobody is subjected to sucha concentration for his whole life or for a whole year,the annual limit of intake for plutonium is not exceeded.Nevertheless, with resuspension into the air, undercertain conditions, very high concentrations of alpha-active particles in the air are quite possible.

S. Finzi (CEC): Within the framework of the Inter-national Research Centre of Chernobyl (CHECIR), oneparticular project is now dealing with resuspension, theimportance of which has been stressed in this discussion.A certain number of Soviet laboratories will participatein the project and I have here a list consisting of theUkrSSR Institute of Agricultural Radiology, the Emer-

23

Session 2

gency Group of the State Committee for Hydrometeoro-logy and the АН-Union Institute of Technical Physicsand Automation. A certain number of European or CEClaboratories will participate, in particular GSF inMunich, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority,CIEMAT in Spain, and the CEA at Fontenay-aux-Roses.

A.J. Gonzalez (IAEA): I feel, after hearing so muchabout resuspension, strontium, plutonium, etc., that wemay be in danger of missing the relevant point of thediscussion. We are not interested in the environmentalcontamination per se; this could be very interesting fora research study, for example at the Chernobyl Centre,etc., but the subject of our direct concern is rather thedose to people and the effects of this dose on thosepeople. The main factor governing radiation dose now iscontamination by caesium. It is not contamination bystrontium; it is not resuspension; it is certainly not 'hotparticles'. Perhaps, therefore, we ought to emphasizethe fact that we were able to corroborate the moreimportant component of the dose to people, which is thecomponent due to caesium contamination, and that allthis discussion we have had on strontium contamination,hot particles, etc., is very helpful for further environ-mental research but has little influence on the dosepeople receive.

P.V. Ramzaev: I should like to reply to Dr. Gonza-lez. I was speaking from the standpoint of dose. I do notmean collective dose, which will be small, but individualdose to a very limited number of people, namely tractoroperators. Because of this plutonium contamination,their effective dose equivalent can be exactly the sameas that due to caesium. In other words, it too does notpose any radiation hazard, a deadly hazard so to say. Weare merely emphasizing that this is a fact and ought notto be ignored. What we need to know is dose and notsimply concentration.

V.F. Demin (USSR): I would like to comment onplutonium in air. I am responsible for the researchcarried out in the shelter in Unit 4 at Chernobyl. We areat present drilling into the core and, during this drilling,plutonium sometimes appears in air. I would say thatonly inside the shelter, in this kind of work, has pluto-nium in air reached any significant levels, and that iswhy I am always very sceptical about any data aboutplutonium in air "somewhere in Minsk", and so on.I think that sometimes people are mixing two issues, theplutonium itself and the alpha-emitters. The content ofradon and its daughters, four or five orders of magni-tude, even inside the shelter is due to the alpha-emitters

more that to plutonium, so I guess that when peoplespeak of alpha-emitters they do not mean plutoniumat all.

A. Bauman (Yugoslavia): I believe that our Instituteof Medical Research in Zagreb happens to be the onlyInstitute that has been determining 90Sr in human bonessince 1964. I have here data of femur and vertebrae forpeople of various ages, who have died unnatural deaths,not from disease. We started the work in 1986 afterChernobyl and waited until the end of that year to see ifthere was any difference in the level of 90Sr in humanbones. After eight months eating post-Chernobyl foodthere was no difference, but by the end of 1987 we foundlarge differences in some cases. I can mention only a fewcases now, but if anyone is interested we can talk later.For instance, for a group of children ranging from new-born to 10 years old, for 1985 the level of 90Sr in femurwas 43 mBq per gram of calcium. In December 1987,it was 110 mBq/g. For vertebrae in 1985 it was 31 mBqand in 1987 it was 64. For the age group of 10-20 years,for 1985 it was 40 mBq/g. In femur for 1987 it was84 mBq/g. For the range of 20-30 years, for vertebraeit was 40 mBq/g. In 1987 it was 75 mBq/g. The sameapplies to the age group 30-40. It decreases slowly withage, and for the age group over 50 it remained the sameas for the last 10 years.

P. Pellerin (France): I know that in the entire worldthere are not ten laboratories able to measure plutoniumcorrectly under 1 Bq/kg.

C.R. Huyskens (IRPA): Dr. Steinhausler, in youroverall conclusions you stated that you are confidentabout the general outcome of the methodology and thequality of the Soviet measurements as compared withthose of the international experts. Did you in yourdiscussions with your Soviet colleagues go back inhistory for the last four or five years in order to get anidea of how much their methods of measurement mighthave changed in recent years? Is your conclusion on thegeneral quality of the measurements also a retrospectiveconclusion?

F. Steinhausler: Our conclusion refers to our visit in1990, to the data collected in 1990 and the assessmentof methodology and equipment as published and offi-cially adopted by 1990. We were unable to re-examineor corroborate historical samples, such as from the veryearly part of the post-accident phase. So I have to saythat our conclusions represent a snapshot of the situationas it presented itself in 1990, including the methodologyadopted in 1989 or 1988, but does not include an assess-ment of historical samples.

24


Rapporteur's Report of Session 2

(B.W. Wachholz)

I am not sure whether this is the easiest or the mostdifficult part of the programme today but I am sure thatsome of you may notice things that I have omitted andothers may take issue with the comments I haveincluded. First, allow me to make a few general com-ments.

It has not been said today, and I think it should bestated, that this was an unprecedented accidental releaseof radionuclides. It called for policies and decisions thathad not been addressed before by other countries or bythe international community in an operational sense. Theresponse was an enormous effort involving very manypeople under what must have been tremendous scien-tific, economic, political and social pressures. Afterdecisions have been made in such an environment, it iseasy to suggest what should have been done differentlyor what should have been added to what was done.Perhaps those who made these decisions have also hadsecond thoughts by now and if they were to do it againthey would do things a little differently. We don't know.However, I think it commendable that the Governmentof the USSR, having gone through that experience,invited the international community to look over theirshoulder to evaluate, to review and to criticize theirdecisions and actions, to conclude whether such deci-sions and actions were reasonable and appropriate, andto recommend further courses of action. That in itself isalmost unprecedented following an accident of thisnature.

The first review presented this afternoon concernedreleases resulting in large areas of land contamination,not as a planned release, not under ideal wind conditionswith the wind blowing in a single direction, not in termsof setting up and preparing monitoring stations inadvance, but exactly the opposite: winds blowing indifferent directions at different times, resulting inheterogeneous depositions over the several political enti-ties involved. This must have made it extremely difficultto carry out appropriate and comprehensive monitoringactivities.

We have heard this afternoon that the objective of theTask Group was to review the environmental monitoringdata and the method of assessing environmental con-tamination. This was done by reviewing the theoreticalassumptions and methodologies, by reviewing the data-bases, experimental procedures, sampling techniques,analytical procedures and instrumentation, and by carry-ing out an intercomparison exercise. The Task Groupalso carried out its own independent assessment, involv-ing a large variety of environmental samples: soil,undisturbed soil cores, agricultural areas, playgrounds,air, indoor radon, indoor gamma dose rates, gamma

dose profiles along roads, 'hot particles', biomonitors,water of various types, foodstuffs, and so on. This wasdone within certain constraints that were imposed byreality: a single point in time, a limited number of sites,and a limited number of people. The best that could bedone was to try to verify and corroborate what hadalready been done. The results you have seen and heard:that in general there is very good corroboration, particu-larly with respect to caesium, with perhaps a less posi-tive correlation for strontium and plutonium. There is asmall question mark, primarily due to the limited num-ber of grab samples the team was able to obtain, thatwater and commercial foods are below the recom-mended radionuclide contamination values. Moreover,there may be exceptions to this generalization at a locallevel for homegrown foods and for wild foods. Withthese general conclusions one could stop and say thatcorroboration was good, and that could be the end of theevaluation. But the Task Group went beyond thesegeneral conclusions and identified areas and subjects thateither should be further addressed or should be a subjectfor research.

Several of these topics have been talked about in theopen discussion just ended. This discussion dealt mainlywith two areas, air sampling data and monitoring ofplutonium and strontium. As I understand it, these airmonitoring data were not available to the Task Group atthe time it was doing its surveys, but it is interesting andreassuring to see that such data exist and that they arebeing shared. We heard about air sampling in Pripyat,air sampling in Chernobyl, air sampling following aforest fire, and air sampling in fields ploughed by trac-tors. One of the several comments made was that air-borne 'hot particles' are not a significant risk for thepublic, and that is probably true. On the other hand, itmight be a significant risk for certain selected segmentsof the public, perhaps critical populations, perhaps thefarmers, nor have I heard anything about children play-ing in areas where there may be contamination andresuspension. I think all this tells us that it is perhapsjustifiable to carry out additional studies to determine thedegree of hazard resulting from resuspension, whetherof plutonium or of beta-emitting particles, because theimpression I get is that right now we really do not know.Therefore, consideration should be given to the questionof whether 'hot spots' are a hazard and to what extentthey are a risk with regard to skin contamination, inhala-tion and ingestion, including perhaps something asremote as particles being lodged in farmers' eyes.Unfortunately, when the Task Group was making itsown measurements in the field, the weather was not co-operative, so these points could not be verified. On the

25

Session 2

issue of strontium, we also heard that there is migrationdown the river, or the potential for migration. Strontiummigration may be an area for future study.

One or two other areas are perhaps conspicuous bytheir absence from the discussion, although I think theywere briefly touched on in the presentations. Forinstance, the area of uncertainty has been mentioned buthas not been elaborated upon. Related to that is the ques-tion of quality assurance procedures in terms of verifica-tion of particular numbers that have been presented. Itis certainly desirable, no matter where in the world alaboratory is located, to be able to have confidence inwhatever number one receives in the results. While airmonitoring with respect to plutonium was mentioned,one area that was conspicuously absent from the discus-sions is the subject of air monitoring for the radioactiveiodines at times soon after the initial accident. It wouldbe very desirable to know what if any data exist in terms

of iodine concentrations in air. As we shall hear in thenext day or two, and as you know better than I do, theissue of thyroid disease, especially thyroid cancer, is avery prominent one; consequently, the absence of anydata or of any reference to data on iodine in air is par-ticularly important. Similarly, there may be otherimportant radionuclides with short half-lives that werereleased at the time of the accident and which are alsono longer available for monitoring. This would seem tobe something that needs to be addressed, if for no otherreason than to put it to rest.

Finally, I think we all realize that the public healthaspects of the tragedy rightfully deserve priority, butthat programmes to assess the consequences of the acci-dent, both environmental and human, deserve very care-ful attention in planning and implementation, so that, aswas said earlier today, benefit can be derived both by theaffected Republics and by the world at large.

26

Session 3

RADIATION EXPOSURE OF THE POPULATION

Objectives and approachL. Anspaugh (USA)

The USSR dose assessment methodologiesL. Anspaugh (USA)A. Bouville (USA)

IAEA independent dose measurementsA. Bouville (USA)

Independent dose assessment and comparisons with reported valuesB.C. Bennett (UNSCEAR)

ConclusionsB.C. Bennett (UNSCEAR)

Rapporteur's Report of Session 3B.W. Wachholz (USA)

DISCUSSION

E.P. Petryaev (BSSR): I share the concern ex-pressed yesterday and today about the transfer of 'hotparticles' in the air and their possible intake into thelungs. For a number of years we have been studying thedispersion of hot particles on the soil surface and in theatmosphere and the content of hot particles in the lungs.I should like to present this material. [The speakershowed a number of slides, which are not reproducedhere.]

A soil radiograph taken 40 km from Pripyat shows aspot which clearly indicates hot beta particles. Amicrophotograph shows the isotopic composition of thevarious particles. Most of them are particles enriched bycerium and plutonium, and there are particles which aremade up almost entirely of 106Ru. There are particles(and this is characteristic for particles from the Mogilevprovince) enriched with caesium. The content of theseparticles on the surface varies, but attains very highlevels, particularly for the near zone where we observedup to 10 particles per cm2. They are generally found onthe surface or in the first 1-cm layer of soil. Naturally,agricultural work and lifting by the wind may lead tointake of these particles into the lungs. So far we havestudied autopsy material from the lungs from about300 people whose deaths were due to various causes.Samples of lung were also obtained after operations. Adefinite relationship between the content of particles and

the concentration of radioactive substances on the sur-face was found. For the near zone (zone of about 60 km,i.e. the Mogilev province), hot particles were found inthe lungs in about 70% of the 300 samples. In a typicalradiogram of a sample weighing about 10 grams, thespots indicate what was found directly in the lungs.Therefore, when we are discussing external and internaldoses and when we are examining the effect of radioac-tivity on the organism, it seems that, despite thearbitrary nature of the dose which may be received bythe lungs as a result of such heterogeneous distributionof radioactivity in the lungs, this question has to be takeninto account and I think that this process may beextremely important. Here I agree with Professor Ram-zaev who spoke about this yesterday.

L.R. Anspaugh (USA): After several trips to theUSSR, I am absolutely convinced that 'hot particles' doexist. I have certainly seen many radiographs in severalof the laboratories I visited.

The really important question is: What do they meanin terms of dose and health effects? Up to now, althoughI have seen very interesting data on the fact that hot par-ticles are in the soil, on the plants and in some cases inthe lungs, the next important questions are: How manyof them are there and how much activity is actually inthe lung? So if it is possible to convert such data intoactivity, we would certainly be happy to examine themand revise some of our calculations.

27

Session 3

At the present time, unfortunately, we must base ourcalculations upon models of resuspension which doapply to particles that have been measured throughoutthe world. Our conclusion in terms of dosimetry is thatthe hot particles themselves, although they certainlyexist, are not a major contributor to the total dose. Sowe believe that the major component of the dose comesfrom the external exposure from material deposited onthe ground and from caesium that is ingested. Every-thing else, including the strontium and whatever comesinto the body via hot particles, is much less significant.We certainly have not seen any data from our Soviet col-leagues that would indicate otherwise. If there are suchdata we would like to see them, and we do hope therewill be some additional special experiments on resuspen-sion so that we can further evaluate this process.

A.J. Gonzalez (IAEA): Dr. Anspaugh has alreadyaddressed this recurrent problem of the radiological sig-nificance of 'hot particles'. I have myself addressed theproblem in the Academy of Sciences of the BSSR, fol-lowing an invitation from Dr. Stepanenko when wevisited the BSSR. At the risk of repetition, I should saythat there is a very clear recommendation from the Inter-national Commission on Radiological Protection whichbasically indicates that a given activity incorporated intoa tissue as hot particles carries less risk of cancer induc-tion than the same activity uniformly distributed in suchtissue. This is so for very simple reasons: the potentialfor generation of stochastic effects depends on the num-ber of cells which are target cells. If the activity is uni-formly distributed, the number of target cells will behigher, and therefore the risk will also be higher. Thephotographs showing tissues with necrosis due to hotparticles presented here are very impressive but havelittle relevance to radiation protection. What thesephotographs indicate is that there are hot particles in thetissues and that necrosis has eventually occurred aroundthem, but the number of cells at risk of becoming cancercells is lower than if the activity were uniformly dis-tributed, just because the activity is concentrated in a hotparticle. I should also like to recall Dr. Anspaugh's owncomment that the full contribution of resuspension seemsto be very minor. If this small contribution is in the formof hot particles it is even better. The overall risk of car-cinogenesis will be lower.

P.V. Ramzaev (USSR): I would like to make someshort remarks on the large volume of work carried outby our esteemed scientific colleagues under the auspicesof the International Advisory Committee. I think every-one will agree that a tremendous amount of importantwork has been done. I would like to make threecomments.

First, no explanation is given here for the discoverymade by the Committee and scientists of the discrepancybetween the 137Cs intake and the accumulation which

has been postulated very frequently in scientific litera-ture in the last few years. We were faced with thisproblem 30 years ago in regions of the far north where30 000 shepherds and reindeer breeders had at that timethe same quantity of 137Cs in their bodies as the inhabi-tants of the Chernobyl region now. There the wholebody dose was up to 5 /xCi (1.9 x 105 Bq). And wesaw there that if one took the intakes based on what theysaid in terms of what and how much they ate, and if onetook the amount of caesium which would be ingested inthat case and compared it with the quantity actuallyfound in their bodies, there was a discrepancy of a factorof 2 to 3, and sometimes 5. But it turned out to be asimple matter: if, together with the intake, one took intoaccount the caesium elimination pathway and saw howmuch was expelled from the organism, one would seethat the amount of caesium actually excreted under nor-mal conditions by no means corresponded to the intake.

In evaluating the intakes, we do not make correctionsfor cooking or for inaccuracies in estimating intake, andin the long run these inaccuracies accumulate andbecome significant. There have been conjectures that thecaesium is absorbed less in these regions than elsewhere,and even the supposition that only a fifth is absorbed.But it turned out that this was not the case. If you takethe ratio of 137Cs excreted in urine and faeces, you willsee that in fact at least 80% of the caesium is expelledwith urine. Moreover, for the accumulation one took thelongest period for excretion from the organism. Inpeople leading active lives it is shorter; the caesium isexpelled quicker. This brings me to the second conclu-sion regarding the discrepancy between intake andaccumulation of caesium in the body.

My second remark is that everywhere in the Reportthe half-time of l37Cs in the environment is given as14 or 7 years. The actual process of the removal ofcaesium from the first stage (this is evident from milkand meat) has been taking one to two years for the lastfive years, and not fourteen or seven years. We realizethat in future this excretion will slow down, but this cor-rection should have been made in the dose calculations.

Finally, the reiterated statement in the reports andpapers that data were not provided seems very strange.There is a whole series of allusions to the fact that dataon iodine were not provided. I suggest that the Commit-tee should correct this misrepresentation. Either data donot exist, or they were classified as secret, or you did notask for them. I can tell you (I represent here the RSFSRand our Institute was responsible for these matters onthe regions in the RSFSR) that we were not asked forthe information which you say was not presented. Inparticular, none of us was asked for data on iodine. Theyin fact exist. I want to clarify this so that the impressionis not given to those present and to the world at large thatthe USSR did not present something that should havebeen presented. At least this was not the case in theRSFSR.

28

Radiation Exposure: Discussion

L.R. Anspaugh: Dr. Ramzaev, I can make somecomments on your three separate points. It is unfor-tunately true that the lack of correlation between themodel predictions and the observed concentrations ofcaesium was observed throughout Western Europe, fol-lowing the Chernobyl accident. I think there are severalreasons for this. One, as you suggested, is that peopledo not really eat what we think they do; we have perhapsnot taken adequate account of the loss of caesium fromfood when it is processed, and I think the more impor-tant consideration in this case of our own comparisonwas that this was a comparison, a prediction, based uponthe food uptake in the region, without consideration ofthe food restrictions. So I think the most importantaspect is that food restrictions were in fact working quitewell.

Your second point was on the environmental half-time of caesium. The 14 year half-time is contained inthe official Soviet methodology. Material was presentedto us, or was contained in the Soviet methodology,indicating that the real value was something more like7.5 years, and many Soviet scientists have in fact alteredthe official methodology to provide what they think is amore realistic estimate, based upon this shorter half-time. The estimates from the independent project arereally based upon a more complex consideration whichwas derived from the global fallout results.

Your final point, on the thyroid iodine data, raises avery complex issue. While we were making our severalvisits to the USSR, it was a difficult time in the sensethat we had neither a common language nor a commonculture. It was thus difficult for us to ask properly, at theproper time, for all the data that would be necessary. Wecertainly did not mean to imply that any data weredeliberately kept from us, but only that we did not havethe basic measurements that went into the thyroid calcu-lations in the sense of the very raw data of the thyroidmeasurements. There were hundreds of thousands ofthem, so we were only adding a very cautionary notethat said, since we did not have those direct measure-ments, we could not perform the calculations ourselves.However, we have reviewed that procedure very care-fully, and many papers have been published on it. Wehave had extensive conversations with Soviet scientistsabout the methodology, and we certainly believe that itis scientifically sound. Our only comment was that,perhaps only because we did not ask for them directlyenough at the time, we did not have the raw data on theactual exposure measurements of the thyroid itself thatwere made in the USSR.

L.A. Il'in (USSR): I also highly appreciate the tre-mendous amount of work done by leading internationalexperts working in the field we are discussing heretoday. At the same time, I would like to make the fol-lowing comments.

Let us look back and imagine the position of Sovietscientists who were responsible for problems of stan-dardization and the establishment of intervention levelsat the time of the accident. If you put yourselves in thisposition, then you will understand that we didn't haveany alternatives and that we were bound to be conserva-tive in the philosophy we adopted for the introduction ofthe various parameters in the calculations which wemade. I wonder how we, and in particular our friends inthe USSR, would have looked if the data which you havenow presented had been the reverse of what they are.We were deliberately conservative and, as rightlystressed by the experts, we introduced the 90% quantile.I personally, for example, do not agree with the prin-ciples adopted by the ICRP when it examines the aver-age individual dose in making similar types of calcula-tions. We took as a basis the principle of the maximumprotection of the critical population groups and excludedall possible underestimates in our calculations. Thus, ifby taking into account the statements made by theesteemed expert group, you now look again at the datawhich they present on the lifetime dose, then the safetyfactor introduced by us into the calculation of the totalexposure dose for the incorporation of radionuclides andthe effect of external gamma radiation fields is at leasta factor of two, or, according to our estimates, two tothree for those levels which you saw now. If youintroduce a correction for a factor of two they virtuallycoincide fully with those given by our foreign experts intheir independent evaluation.

Secondly, it unfortunately so happened that, in theregions of Polesskoe, which were heavily contaminated,there were very high caesium transfer coefficientsassociated with the presence of a very large quantity ofhumus substances in the soils which have the ability toform a complex compound with caesium. In the 1960s,members of our Institute [the Institute of Biophysics,Moscow] studied caesium transfer coefficients resultingfrom global fallout in these very regions. We took thehalf-time of caesium in the soil to be 14 years, from asense of prudence, although we assumed that in futurethis half-time was bound to decrease.

My second point is that, with regard to the dataprovided by Dr. Bouville on various evaluations of sur-face caesium concentration, particularly in the town ofBragin, one has to be able to admit one's mistakes. Thedata were obtained by other organizations by means ofannual refinements. In our Institute, under our pro-gramme 'SDACHA', we combined all the data obtainedfrom these regions and included them in the processing.Therefore, the density contrasts to which Dr. Bouvilledrew our attention are up to about five, but we gave ourforeign colleagues the information (we used materialfrom 1989) after we had received the final informationfrom the official sources of the Meteorological Commit-tee. Incidentally, we gave all the information which we

29

Session 3

have in the Institute, including the information onproblems of exposure of the thyroid gland.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to men-tion the problems met with in making retrospectiveevaluations of thyroid dose commitments. These prob-lems are extremely complicated and it was impossible tosolve them even during the first days after the accident.I remember that the measurements on our colleagues inthe UkrSSR — former members of our Institute fromLeningrad — were made by experts, and there were100 000 or more of these measurements. But, in addi-tion to this work, the local radiological and civil defenceservices involved were, unfortunately, largely incapableof carrying out such measurements. This was no fault ofthe scientists, but rather the fault of our system. There-fore, our Institute in particular has been working onreviewing the dose commitments, because when thework was being done in 1986 in Chernobyl we did nothave data on the density of iodine fallout and we still donot have them. Nor do we have them yet for atmosphericiodine concentration. Therefore, the only thing to do isto establish an evaluation model retrospectively and touse adequate calculation methods. We are engaged onthis at present.

I have just one small request, which comes, it is true,rather late, and concerns the fact that in the Report pre-pared by the Committee there is one discrepancy whichI personally find very worrying. In the section on doseevaluation, it is stated that one of the problems was toevaluate the short lived radiation component in the firstdays of the accident. Dr. Bouville referred to this in hisstatement and he said that, according to your evalua-tions, the contribution of short lived radionuclides to thetotal annual exposure dose did not exceed 10%. Thisconclusion is important to us for the simple reason thata number of people in the USSR, including people whoclaim to be scientists, are attempting to undermine thereliability of our dose commitment evaluations by main-taining that we did not take these doses into account andthat they are therefore a determining factor in possiblefuture pathology. Of course I am not referring to dosesto the thyroid gland. Therefore, in the answers to Dr.Bouville's questions, I would like it to be stated moreclearly, particularly since scientific representatives ofour Republics are also here today, what the opinion ofthe expert group is on the contribution to the annualexposure dose for 1986, as well as for 1986 to 1990, ofshort lived nuclides for intake by inhalation, for the dosefrom the cloud and for the dose from the surface topopulations which resided during the initial period in thecontaminated areas. I am naturally not asking you for aprecise answer, but I would be very interested in whatyou would estimate the order of this contribution to be:is it 5%, 40% or 70%?

B.C. Bennett (UNSCEAR): I could answer the lastquestion rather specifically. Measurement experience in

many countries of Europe took account of these shortlived emitters. From available data, UNSCEAR has esti-mated the total transfer factor to be 105 ;uSv perkBq/m2 of caesium, with the dose due to the short livedemitters of 6 /xSv per kBq/m2 (15 units outdoors x theshielding/occupancy factor of 0.4), so that is approxi-mately 6% of the total dose. This is in countries furtheraway from the accident site. Near Chernobyl, I wouldexpect the short lived emitters to be somewhat moreimportant, but on the whole the external exposures fromcaesium become dominant in the longer term. The onlyother point Professor Il'in made that we could commenton is that we certainly recognize the overestimation theSoviet scientists intended to introduce in their doses, andthis was substantiated by our results. It is common prac-tice; it is something all scientists would do to make surethat they do not underestimate the doses. This is impor-tant in order to provide adequate radiological protectionfor the population. The problem in doing this, however,is that then you might take excessively stringent protec-tive measures and your estimates of health effects wouldbe exaggerated, so this must all be kept in perspective.You must estimate doses as realistically as possible inorder to make the most reasonable judgements aboutrelocation, evacuation and estimated health effects thatmight eventually occur as a result of these exposures.

L. Anspaugh: I think Professor Il'in is quite right insaying that if the order of the doses were reversed, theheadlines would be very different from what they arenow. And I would like to draw attention to page 26 ofthe Overview, where we recommend that probabilisticdose assessment models be developed, so that it wouldnot be necessary to make only a conservative doseprediction. The most realistic estimates could then bemade and it would be possible to look at the distributionof dose in terms of percentiles. It would also be possibleto explicitly address the question of the uncertainty in thedose assessment.

K.I. Gordeev (USSR): During work on the manage-ment of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, Iparticipated directly in the work of the group of Sovietscientists concerned with the development of methodolo-gies for calculating and evaluating internal and externalexposure doses and with evaluating the effectiveness ofthe protection measures which were carried out toreduce the effect of radiation on the population living inthe radioactively contaminated areas. I would first liketo thank the esteemed foreign colleagues, and in particu-lar Dr. Anspaugh, Dr. Bouville and Dr. Bennett, for thework they have done in examining in detail all aspectsof our activities. Listening to their reports, I can now besatisfied that they fully understood our difficulties andour needs.

I would like to offer some clarification about the con-tribution made by short lived nuclides, gamma emitters,

30

Radiation Exposure: Discussion

in the formation of the external gamma radiation dose.In this case, we simply have direct experimental data. Itis well known that at a distance of up to 50 km round theChernobyl nuclear power plant, dosimeters set up beforethe accident were positioned everywhere. Thus, whenthe release from the fourth unit occurred, thesedosimeters were in the field and the integral dose wasrecorded by each dosimeter, of which there were 50.When the release had ceased, these dosimeters wereremoved and the dose formed from the fallout productswas calculated. Naturally, there is a difference betweenthe integral dose registered by the dosimeter and thedose which was caused by the fallout products — it isthat dose which formed the cloud and that dose which itis stated was not taken into account. I should point outthat this dose at all distances from 5 to 50 km did notexceed 20% of the annual dose for the area.

With regard to the dose calculated for a longer periodof time, naturally the contribution of this dose declinessharply. Moreover, it was introduced with a safety fac-tor into the calculation methodology, and I should pointout that our colleagues have somewhat underestimatedthe contribution of short lived nuclides. They simplyattributed this to a certain overestimate on our part of theexternal radiation dose for the first four years withrespect to the doses which were obtained by independentexperts. This is because we took into account 131I,144Ce and other nuclides which here I did not see asshort lived gamma emitters. I should point out that thetransfer coefficient from the fallout density to thegamma dose rate used by us was 0.18 to 0.26 whereasthe experts took a coefficient of 0.1. This explains ourslight overestimate of the short lived gamma radiationcomponent and a certain underevaluation on the part ofthe experts. In general, of course, what we wanted wasconfirmed by the experts. It was impossible to predictand calculate the measures without having some kind ofminimum safety margin. I think that the safety margin

we selected indicates that we foresaw the developmentof events very accurately.

L. Anspaugh: I think that if we made this kind ofcomparison anywhere in the world the results wouldprobably come out about the same. I also think thatdifferences in calculations and parameters can easilylead to a difference of a factor of two or three, and weconsider this to be good agreement, particularly in thelight of your very deliberate cautionary moves to makesure that the doses were not underestimated. I think ourbottom line conclusions must not be lost, and we shouldnot spend too much time looking at the minor differ-ences; we were certainly very satisfied with the overallresults and thought the agreement was very good.

S.T. Belyaev (USSR): I have one semi-question,semi-suggestion. Your main results are presented as adose assessment for the first four years. It would be veryuseful to have annual dose estimates, say for 1990,because this is the best understood quantity for the wholepopulation; it is certainly the basic quantity for futureprojections.

T. Matsuzaki (Japan): The Overview says thatdoses were overestimated by a factor of two to three.Could you comment on the thyroid dose? Might there bea possibility of over- or underestimation?

A. Bouville (USA): This is a very difficult questionto answer since Dr. Bennett and I do not have muchinformation about the thyroid doses. We know they werecalculated but we do not have the raw data. However,Dr. Bennett showed with his indirect estimation that wehave the right order of magnitude. This estimation isvery uncertain; I personally feel that we know the rightorder of magnitude of the thyroid doses, but it is verydifficult for us to say whether they are under- or overes-timated because of the high degree of uncertainty. Thatis a task for independent assessment.

Rapporteur's Report of Session 3

(B.W. Wachholz)

We have heard a great deal about dose reconstructionand dose assessment this morning. I should like to startby trying to put these results into some sort of context.

Yesterday we heard about environmental monitoring,corroboration of monitoring results, laboratory inter-comparisons and sampling as well as some concernabout future needs regarding 'hot particles', resuspen-sion, migration, quality assurance and uncertainties. Allthis information will ultimately be a major database forexposure and dose estimates. Why do we want dose esti-

mates? I can think of several reasons and I would liketo mention two or three. First, in order to provide a basisfor the IAEA's response to the request from the USSR,there is a need to determine the exposures and doses topersons residing in particular locations, with particularlife-styles, under certain conditions, i.e. the controlledareas. It is also necessary to estimate anticipatedexposures and doses to people who were to relocate else-where. This is probably the primary reason for attempt-ing to undertake the assessment of exposure and dose

31

Session 3

estimates. However, there are other reasons why onewould wish to estimate exposure or dose. One is able toidentify those individuals, subgroups or populationswhich might need or wish to be more closely monitoredand followed for possible future health effects on thebasis of their past or anticipated exposures. Finally, ifthere are to be reasonable, rigorous epidemiologicalstudies in the future, there must be individual doses thatcan be calculated and assessed, perhaps even doses tospecific organs such as the thyroid, bone marrow, andso on.

It is clear that since these reasons focus increasinglyon the individual, there is an increasing commensurateneed for individual, and therefore more difficult, doseestimates. The dose and consequent risk of living in acertain area can often be approximated by using averagevalues and coefficients, but by the time we get to theother end of the spectrum with large scale epidemio-logical studies, every effort must be made to estimateindividual doses. This point was emphasized yesterdayby our distinguished Chairman in referring to the exten-sive efforts that have been made to address dosimetrystudies in Japan. It is difficult to overestimate the impor-tance of dosimetry and dose reconstruction.

Let us review briefly what we have heard this morn-ing. (If anyone here is not familiar with the processesinvolved in dose reconstruction, I suggest reading thefirst three paragraphs of the Introduction to Part E of theTechnical Report.) We heard this morning a review ofdose methodologies carried out in the USSR, includingboth external and internal dosimetry. These dose recon-struction methodologies were based upon data obtainedfrom both direct measurements (e.g. whole body countsfor caesium and thyroid measurements from iodine) andindirect measurements (e.g. dosimeter readings, expo-sure rate measurements, ground deposition values ofcaesium and strontium). Some of these were not alwaysas clear as one might wish, but there were obviouslysufficient bases for reviewing and assessing them.

Specific dose assessments in seven settlements werecarried out by the Task Group, whose methodologieswere based upon both measurements and modelling, andincluded both external and internal exposures. Theresults of these independent assessments were comparedwith similar assessments made by Soviet scientists forthe seven settlements. Considerable time was spent com-paring the two assessments, and we have heard severaltimes that there were factors of approximately two tothree difference between them (i.e. the Task Group doseassessments were usually lower than the Soviet assess-

ments by a factor of two to three). I would like to re-emphasize what Dr. Anspaugh mentioned earlier: con-sidering all the uncertainties and all the parameters thatmust go into these calculations, I think the comparisonis very close. I doubt that it would be much closer evenif carried out under more desirable circumstances. I cansay that in the USA we are engaged in retrospectivethyroid dose calculations due to iodine resulting from theatmospheric nuclear weapons tests at the Nevada testsite; we are going back nearly 40 years in some of thesecalculations, and it is not an easy thing to do. I think wecan all appreciate the complexities and the difficultiesthat have been encountered, and I think it is reassuringthat the two independent approaches should result gener-ally in comparable findings.

The issue of 'hot particles' was raised again and thereseem to be differing opinions about their relative impor-tance. I think all this points to is the need for furtherstudies to identify how prevalent such particles are, whatthey are made of, and whether or not they are biologi-cally significant. The issue of caesium transfer in soilwas touched on and responded to. The issue of dataavailability was raised, and I am sure that the TaskGroup would welcome any additional data that perhaps,being unfamiliar with the language and circumstances,they did not ask for in an appropriate manner and or atan appropriate time. I am sure that they would welcomeany additional information that anyone can give them.The issue of short lived isotopes was raised and wasaddressed by various people, some more precisely thanothers. Finally, one or two questions were asked aboutICRP methodologies and philosophies, but I don't thinkthis is the time to go into that subject.

I shall close with one or two observations. First of all,with regard to the reasons I gave as to why one woulddo dosimetry in the first place, it is clear from the Reportand discussions that there is a reasonable basis for esti-mates of average exposures and doses in terms of com-munity locations and populations. It is also clear that thedata currently available are not yet detailed enough togive the individual exposures that would ultimately benecessary for longer term epidemiological studies. Theissue of uncertainty was raised again, with its com-panion, quality assurance, but I don't think we need dis-cuss them any longer. Nevertheless, continued dosereconstruction efforts are anticipated, and reference hasbeen made to studies commencing in July of this year aswell as some forthcoming meetings, so I have no doubtthat we shall be hearing more about dose reconstructionof exposed populations in the USSR.

32

Session 4

HEALTH IMPACT

Objectives and approachF.A. Mettler (USA)

INDEPENDENT CLINICAL HEALTH STUDIES

General health situationCardiovascular disorders

H.D. Royal (USA)

HaematologyA. Kuramoto (Japan)

DISCUSSION

L.A. Buldakov (USSR): I would like to ask aboutthe range in the ten year old age group. Does this meanexactly ten years, or is it 10-12 or 10-14 years? I wouldalso like to ask about the range in other age groups.

F.A. Mettler: For practical purposes it is exactly twoyears, exactly five years, exactly ten years, exactly fortyyears. It is not a range; every one of those children andpeople was born in that year. In some cases we actuallyhave it down to three months of that year (e.g. January,February, March of 1985), but they are not age ranges,they are specific slices in that year, and they are exactlythat age.

Question from a Japanese participant: Did youalso examine the mitotic connected anomalies quantita-tively? This was a very useful examination, for example,

for the victims of the Oak Ridge criticality accidentmany years after exposure.

F.A. Mettler: We did not examine that. You have toremember that, in many cases, we were hundreds ofkilometres from an airport. You will also see later thatwe had some difficulties in doing cytogenetics becauseof the time it took to get to the laboratories where thisanalysis had to be done. For immune studies we res-tricted ourselves to fairly routine things that could bedone in the field, and I think that helps us to understandDr. Kuramoto's remark that there are very sophisticatedimmunological tests, but these require laser cell sortersand very competent people with superb access to sup-plies. These tests might be very interesting to do in thefuture, but we just could not do them on this trip. Thatis why we have to say that we cannot rule out subtleimmunological abnormalities, but there are no hugeabnormalities.

33

Sessions 4 and 5


ThyroidM.C. Sheppard (UK)

CancerK. Mabuchi (Japan)

DISCUSSION

A.K. Gus'kova (USSR): Are you acquainted withthe Osechenskij and Ivanov data for the BSSR? Thismaterial has been published and it fully confirms yourview that there was only an increased frequency ofchronic lympholeukosis and a general but slight ten-dency for the disease rate to rise even before the acci-dent. Our BSSR colleagues have these data and theycould provide you with a copy.

F.A. Mettler (USA): Perhaps I should answer thequestion. Yes, we actually saw some data like that, butI think the conclusion of our expert epidemiologists wasthat the tumour registry system was not good enough forfirm conclusions to be made. We did see a lot of data inthe BSSR and UkrSSR and we looked at everything asa whole. On one hand, there is no evidence to suggestan increase; on the other hand, one might ask whetherthere could be an increase that was not detected by thesystem. We think that is possible. We don't know theanswer.

A.J. Gonzalez (IAEA): I presume that your healtheffect numbers from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki datacorrespond to doses which are about two orders of mag-

nitude higher than the doses that the dosimetry group hasgiven for the Chernobyl general population living incontaminated areas. To obtain the same statisticalpower, if the Chernobyl doses are two orders of mag-nitude lower than in Japan, the number of people in thesample would have to be four orders of magnitudehigher, and obviously we do not have so many people inthe contaminated areas. In addition, we have all thedemographic problems that you have indicated relativeto studying Chernobyl: problems with the registries,lack of data, old data, etc. Given these constraints, doyou believe that there is really a chance of any lateeffects being detectable in the future by any epidemio-logical study? I am not suggesting that we should notundertake epidemiological studies, but it is convenient toput them into a realistic perspective.

K. Mabuchi: That is the point; I think we should.There are many problems, but none of them is insoluble.I think we can solve them.

F.A. Mettler: There may be subgroups of childrenwhere thyroid cancers are very easy to see, so theanswer to Dr. Gonzalez' question is, yes, it is possibleto design studies where you can clearly see differencesbetween control and specific exposed populations.

34

Health Impact: Discussion

Session 5

HEALTH IMPACT (cont.)


Foetal and genetic anomaliesF. Mettler (USA)

DISCUSSION

J. Nauman (Poland): I am concerned about the con-clusion you reached that there are no visible results ofradiation in your study. I should like to ask, isn't it truethat you have no real control group with which to com-pare your malformation rate? Isn't it true that geneticchanges should be expected only ten, twenty or thirtyyears later, as you said, and isn't it true that yourcytogenetic study showed that the background and thenumber are not sufficient for any conclusion to be made?I am a little concerned, therefore, about whether yourconclusion that you do not see any effects of radiation iscorrect. You cannot arrive at any conclusions at allbecause of timing, numbers, etc.

F.A. Mettler: I agree. The data are not statisticallypowerful enough, for cytogenetics particularly. I said atthe beginning that we were going to raise some questionsand not solve them all. I think this is one of the areaswhere we were able to review only Soviet data and morework is needed. We are not prepared to say that thisstudy is powerful enough to indicate that there was nodifference relative to cytogenetic effects.

J. Nauman: If you did not find any changes relatedto the radiation, you cannot in fact make any conclusionsat this moment.

F.A. Mettler: Are we talking about malformationsnow?

J. Nauman: I am talking about malformations, aboutgenetic changes, and about the cytogenetic study. Infact, for malformations you had no control group fromprevious USSR studies from 1987 which would showany difference because, as you said, there are no data.

F.A. Mettler: For malformation rates in some areasthere are previous data, and they are not significantlydifferent.

J. Nauman: Yes, but you told us that intelligencequotient and the head size are most important and thatyou did not have data on them.

F.A. Mettler: That's right. I agree with you com-pletely that intelligence quotient is interesting and thatthere are no background data.

J. Nauman: Do you agree that there is no reason toarrive at any conclusions concerning long term geneticchanges on the basis of the time elements of this study?

F.A. Mettler: Absolutely.

J. Nauman: Thank you.

F.A. Mettler: I think you will know the answer torecessive genetic changes seven generations from now.A little later I will show you at least the future risk esti-mates that have been proposed by the ICRP on the basisof all the other studies.

T. Terasima (Japan): I have listened to Dr.Mettler's report with great interest, and I believecytogenetic studies are extremely important in assessingradiation exposure. Scoring of chromosome aberrationsdepends entirely on age; it increases with age. The valueis somehow affected by cytotoxic drugs and by medicalradiographs, so in evaluating the chromosome data, thepersonal history of a medical X ray must be taken intoaccount. As the scope of the present study is verylimited, I hope that our Soviet colleagues will carry onwith a similar line of cytogenetic studies. Although it istedious, I think it would be rewarding.

A.J. Gonzalez (IAEA): I feel that Dr. Nauman'sintervention could leave us in a state of uncertainty onthe genetic impact of the accident, and this is somethingwith which I personally do not agree. It is not true to saythat we cannot draw any conclusions about hereditaryeffects. We know a lot about genetic effects already. Weknow that in all the epidemiological studies we havedone (with only one exception, which we can discussseparately) there is no statistical evidence of hereditaryeffects. We know that the hereditary effects we are look-ing for have a very low probability of occurrence and atremendously high background rate. According toUNSCEAR figures, the probability of incurring ahereditary effect of any sort is nearly 1. Over that high

35

Sessions 4 and 5

background we are looking for hereditary effects inareas where very low doses have been incurred (as ourdosimetry group has confirmed) and where the expecta-tion of the effects occurring and being detected is there-fore very small. Thus, it is not surprising that the studiesdid not find anything. To decide that because of such astatistical constraint the conclusion of this study has zerovalue is an exaggeration. This is a confirmatory study;it is not an epidemiological study in itself.

Y. Nishiwaki (IRPA): Some of my colleagues inJapan are collecting samples of teeth from the dentists inGomel and, by measuring the electron spin resonance(ESR)1 of the enamel, they can measure the possibletotal radiation dose received by an individual. By thismeans it is possible to estimate the total dose received inthe past. The Technical Report, however, only tells usthe dose four years after the accident. One of my former

students, who is involved in this study, remarked that ifthe total recorded dose is low, we do not know whatproportion of the dose is due to medical or dental X raysand natural radiation and how much (if any) is due toChernobyl fallout. If, of course, the total recorded doseis high, then the proportion due to causes other thanChernobyl fallout can be considered negligible.

According to ESR dosimetry, most people received insig-nificant doses but there is still a small percentage of peoplewith significant high doses. The reason is unknown, but itis assumed that some of the children who played at the 'hotspots' while unattended by parents might have received ahigher dose. (Added by Y.N.)

36



NutritionR.M. Parr (IAEA)

DISCUSSION

Question from a participant: Dr. Parr, can you tellme how many of the 76 persons who participated in theiodine study were children, women, pregnant womenand men? Obviously, the iodine intake is different foreach of these categories.

R.M. Parr: The intake data were for adults only, andI think there was approximately an equal number of menand women.

From the same participant: I think the InternationalCouncil for the Control of Iodine Deficiency Disorders,the European Thyroid Association and the EuropeanCommunity advise the iodine intake for children to beover 50 /Ag and for pregnant women to be over 200 ^g.The recommended intake of 120 /*g mentioned in yourpresentation is only an average. I was concerned aboutthe iodine intake when Dr. Sheppard showed us the datayesterday. I asked him later whether the data came frommen or women, because thyroid goitre occurs muchmore often in women than in men.

R.M. Parr: You are quite correct. The recom-mended requirements are different for men, women andchildren. To save time, I only presented the data foradults, but if follow-up studies are conducted, we wouldcertainly recommend that they focus upon the populationgroups most at risk, which would include women andchildren.

F.A. Mettler (USA): We collected enough data to beanalysed for probably the next five years. We intend togo back and look at certain things, for example dividingout the sexes, and particularly to look at thyroid volumeversus thyroid stimulating hormone (TSH). I don't thinkanyone has ever done this kind of thing before.

We also said that there were nodules. We would liketo know how many people have a single nodule, howmany have multiple nodules, what is the average size,and so forth. We shall probably investigate this later, butwe have not had time to do it yet.

Question from a (Russian-speaking) participant:Could you tell me why the experts did not check the vita-min balance? A lot of Soviet research in the contami-nated area, and I am talking particularly about the firstfew years after the accident, revealed clear evidence ofvitamin deficiencies owing to the limitations placed onthe consumption of vegetables, fruit, etc. Have you anydata on this important diet component, and why are younot studying it?

R.M. Parr: I think you have touched upon an impor-tant point. Certainly vitamins are of interest, but owingto lack of resources, we did not include the analysis ofvitamins in our study. However, I should like to makethe point that the anthropology data showed values fullyconsistent with expected growth rates for children and,therefore, just on the basis of these data, one wouldconclude that vitamin deficiencies, if present at all, arenot seriously affecting growth and are therefore notseriously affecting health.

F.A. Mettler: There is also a little more informationto be obtained from the haematology. I think you saw thered cell-size distribution curves: typically they tended tobe on the low side, which, if anything, would suggestiron deficiencies. If there had been significant vitaminB12 deficiency there should have been large red cellsinstead of small ones. So again, from the haematologydata, vitamin deficiency did not seem to be a majorproblem.

37

Sessions 4 and 5


Psychological disordersТ.К. Lee (UK)

DISCUSSION

Question from a (Russian-speaking) participant:You said that evacuation and stress are causing a reduc-tion of life expectancy by a factor of two in middle-agedpeople who had to be evacuated. Could you pleaserepeat that and confirm that I have understood you cor-rectly, since this is an extremely important problem, andcould you tell us where this is stated and who proved it?Could you give a more concrete answer to this question?

You said that life expectancy decreases by a factor oftwo in adults and middle-aged people when they areevacuated, or that they lose their joy in life. Can youstate more clearly where these data can be consulted andwho produced them, and confirm that I didn't misunder-stand you?

Т.К. Lee: Such a question is not answered simply.The consequences of relocation depend upon the lengthof time people have been expecting it, their prepared-ness, whether they go to favourable or unfavourable cir-cumstances, whether the relocation is voluntary orinvoluntary, and so on. However, the sheer disruptioncan take its toll in the case of elderly people. These con-clusions are drawn from a large body of literature whichhas recently been summarized in a review paper which,quite coincidentally, is referenced in the TechnicalReport under the name of Lee.

J. Nauman (Poland): Did you ever ask people livingin the control settlements whether they believed theywere living in a non-contaminated area? That might havean effect on the stress and so forth.

F.A. Mettler (USA): Yes, actually.

J. Nauman: How many responses were there?

F.A. Mettler: It was very interesting, because mostof the control villages we went to had not, of course,been overrun by physicians before, so we were anunusual sight, and when we arrived some of the villagersbegan to be afraid that their village must in fact be con-taminated, and that was why we had come to look atthem. We said we thought the village was quite clean butthat we would still like to look at the villagers. While wewere making the physical examinations we asked thevillagers whether they wanted to be relocated, and wefound that 20% of the people in the control villages saidthey did. Our doctors were instructed to ask why. About10% of the people said they wanted to move because it

was obvious that their village was contaminated but thatthe authorities (whether from Moscow or the Republic)had not yet arrived to tell them. They knew it would takea long time to inform all the villages. About an equalnumber knew the village was quite clean but wanted tomove because they were afraid of another accident, withthe wind blowing their way next time.

S.T. Belyaev (USSR): If a group of people are notsignificantly contaminated but live in an area officiallydesignated as contaminated, what, in your opinion,would be the psychological effect on those people?

T.R. Lee: My leader and I agree that we do not havea view on that because it is not part of our remit and itis a major political problem that can only be sorted outby our colleagues in the USSR. It will be discussed latertoday, I understand.

A. Eggleton (UK): I think we all know that financialcompensation is being paid to some of the population inthe more contaminated areas, and I would like to askwhether the psychological effect of this was studied bythe Task Group and, if so, with what result?

T.R. Lee: No, I am sorry to say that was not studied,so we do not know the effect. I think that some of themajor political and policy decisions affecting Chernobylwere made before the Task Group got to work.

F.A. Mettler: Let me just add that it was clear to usin some of the contaminated villages we visited that theamount of the financial compensation had been changingfor some time and that the scheme itself seemed to bechanging. But the arrangements may have been differentin the different places we visited so I don't think it is aneasy matter to get to the bottom of.

A.F. Tsyb (USSR): I would like to ask whether youhave studied possible interrelations between psycho-logical and medical factors and how the constant stress,which has lasted several years now, is affecting the stateof health of the public.

T.R. Lee: We have not been able to study it. It oughtto be studied in the future and the expectation is thatprolonged stress and uncertainty of the kind experiencedby the population could well have some longer term con-sequences. These, I suppose, would most likely take theform of gastric disorders, depression, alcoholism, andso on. But the future looks fairly bleak unless theproblem is tackled decisively, so that people knowwhether they are going or staying.

38


Future risksConclusions

F.A. Mettler (USA)

Statement by A.K. Gus'kova,Institute of Biophysics, Moscow

Statement by V.G. Bar'yakhtar,Vice-President of the UkrSSR Academy of Sciences, Kiev

Statement by K.K. Dushutin,Director of the Chernobyl Scientific Centre, Pripyat Scientific Production Unit, Chernobyl

Statement by E.F. Konoplya,Director of the Institute of Radiobiology, BSSR Academy of Sciences, Minsk

Statement by the Chairman of the BSSR Committeeon the Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident

Statement by N.D. Tron'ko,Director of the Kiev Institute of Endocrinology, Kiev

Rapporteur's Report of Sessions 4 and 5K. Duncan (UK)

Statement by A.K. Gus'kova,Institute of Biophysics, Moscow

First of all I would like to point out that the researchmethodology used by the international experts wasunusual and no research of this type has been carried outin the USSR. As a rule, our own colleagues have eitherinvestigated specific populated areas as a whole, ororganized children's collectives, or else other specificgroups of people from one professional group have beenselected for study. Therefore no comparison of thesedata is possible. I agree entirely with Dr. Mettler thatmany of the inconsistent findings came from Sovietstudies which were poorly organized from an epidemic-logical point of view. Where scientific standards weremaintained, the information we obtained was similar tothe International Project on the whole.

We can provide some additional information forcertain groups of children. For instance, 2000 pregnantwomen were studied in the UkrSSR during 1986. Thestate of health of the mothers, main health indices, andeven special tests on the newborn babies were allnormal. It is interesting to note that pregnancy problemswere particularly numerous in 1987 when migrationprocesses were more intense, both in the mothers and,

to a lesser extent, in the children, though all of the valueslie within the boundaries of statistical significance. A lotof Soviet data confirms that there was a drop in the birthrate in 1987. I would point out that a similar processof demographic changes occurred, for example, inJapanese cities affected by the nuclear explosions,though there it was significantly more extended.

The birth rate in our study groups returned practicallyto its original level by 1988-1989. Psychometric testswere performed on certain children in a somewhatadapted form. In the BSSR, child development corres-ponded to the age related norms in the control group andno divergences were found. It is interesting to note, forexample, as far as the establishment of rhythmic electri-cal activity in the cerebral cortex is concerned, not onlywas there no sign of retardation but rather two thirds ofthe children exhibited signs of accelerated formation ofbrain activity. I would also like to pass on a little infor-mation about reconstruction of doses using othermethods. Each has its own limitations. Glycoproteinmutations can only be used for people with specific typesof zygote and not for everyone. At high doses we are

39

Sessions 4 and 5

obtaining satisfactory results using this method. We areworking in collaboration with a laboratory in the UnitedStates of America. However, even with these people, wedid, for example, for our most serious patient whoreceived a high dose, get a very idiosyncratic ESR signalfrom the teeth. His signal could have led to an erroneousdose evaluation.

Chromosome aberrations in lymphocytes are, I think,only an effective evaluation tool when one is trying tolocate people with extremely high doses, as was done byDr. Mettler, or to label a group which differs signifi-cantly from the control group where there is some doubtconcerning the radiation effects from which they may besuffering. There would not be much point, I think, inperforming such tests on thousands of people at thesedose levels. In our experience, elimination of aber-rations over these periods of time, even where doses arehigh, is such that it would be very difficult to identify thedose received in 1986 with any confidence.

The psychological damage is clearly the most impor-tant factor, as Professor Lee has said. What is the bestway of alleviating this? I do feel that it is very importantto realize that this factor is due not so much to a convic-tion that danger exists or does not exist, but rather to anuncertainty, a lack of constructive plans for the future.Here, as a doctor, I feel that we must work on locationwith individuals and small groups and try to help themfind a sensible perspective on the risks and a point totheir lives for the immediate future, thus relieving theuncertainty. Mass measures aimed at thousands ofpeople are of no use here. This problem must be solvedin specific terms in each region, each Republic, eachvillage, and with specific groups of people, if we wishto provide real help. Educational programmes shouldalso be clearly differentiated. Our experience has shownthat a high level of knowledge can, of course, be of helpin finding a solution, but at the same time it is verydifficult to correct instantly, so to speak, the internalpathology picture in this way. Many things have alreadybeen fixed, reinforced by the press and by politicalevents.

The major faults in our work which the TechnicalReport reveals are indeed only to be expected. We havehad little to do with statistics and have been but illacquainted with this type of statistical indices; therefore,it was something of a surprise for many doctors to findout how many people had this or that illness. As far asI can see, we have not identified all the problems yet,even at this basic level. Therefore, these five years canonly serve as a background indication, which must bematched to international diagnostic standards to provideus with a basis for further investigation.

With regard to methodological standards and agegroup specific controls, it must be said that our countryis indeed very large and that even inside the country wemay find that the indices vary a great deal from place toplace. I once worked on a large programme comparingthe state of health of reactor operators from the sixRepublics and, when we had selected our controlgroups, we found that the differences between the con-trol groups from the six Republics were greater than thedifferences between irradiated personnel and the controlgroups. Therefore, the selection of an adequate,dynamic and unbiased control group is extremelyimportant.

I feel sure we are going to need help with equipment.This is a big problem even for those collectives who aredealing with the highest risk group — the people who arealready ill. I would like to take this opportunity ofexpressing our gratitude to our Japanese colleagues, inparticular, who have helped provide my clinic with theequipment we need for people suffering from radiationsickness. This group is a very small one, and you willrealize how great our problems are if we then begin tostudy potentially healthy people. It is even more difficultto study healthy people than sick people. For this weneed more techniques, more equipment, more statisticalapparatus. I therefore entirely agree that, though thehealth services must keep an eye on everyone, the scien-tists must draw their conclusions on the basis of selectedgroups of carefully chosen people who are at the greatestrisk; the work should be goal oriented and it should bewell organized along the same lines as the internationalexperts' work.

In conclusion, I would request that the methodo-logical experience which this group obtained during itswork be summarized in a special monograph on themethods they used in order to find out as quickly as pos-sible the fate of people who had been exposed to somespecific factor. It is not so much the findings that areimportant as the methodology itself which was used toidentify needs, the main reference sources, goal orientedselection, and representative sampling of an enormousgroup of people. It seems to me that it is worth sum-marizing this experience as it would be useful in anysimilar situation.

Once again, I would like to express my deep gratitudeto our colleagues for all their comments and for the tact-ful way they made them. This is a great and importantlesson for us. And of course — and this is the mostimportant thing — we are happy to find out that thepeople we have been so worried about have not sufferedany notable damage over these first five years, and thatthe doses are lower than we could have supposed.

40


Statement by V.G. Bar'yakhtar,Vice-President of the UkrSSR Academy of Sciences, Kiev

The statement I am about to make was preparedjointly by myself and the Head of the Medical RadiologyDivision of the UkrSSR Ministry of Health.

We are extremely grateful for the enormous amountof work that has been done and I feel sure we shallderive great benefit from it. Many points have beenclarified, but I feel equally sure that a lot of seriousproblems remain. We must remember that the TechnicalReport, when it is published, will be an independentdocument and the conclusions in it must be very care-fully thought through.

Everyone here knows that two large groups wereselected for observation, and Dr. Mettler has alreadystressed that the health of cleanup staff and evacuees isalso of great concern to us, particularly in the UkrSSR,of course; but our colleagues who took part in the mis-sion are also not indifferent to this matter.

I would like to tell you about some data we havegathered in the UkrSSR on the 'cleanup staff, thepeople who during 1986-1987 did a lot of work in theimmediate vicinity of the reactor. These data are theresults of observations carried out by scientists inapproximately 30 institutes of the UkrSSR Academy ofSciences and Ministry of Health.

There are 129 000 cleanup staff living in the UkrSSR.What problems do we have here? We only have precisedata on received doses for 56 000 of these people,i.e. about half. These doses range from 100 mSv to200 mSv. Special cases suffering from acute radiationsickness were excluded from the cleanup staff category;this group amounts to 187 people in the UkrSSR, andjust over 1000 people who received radiation burnsduring the operation. In 1986, the people in this categorywere aged 25-40.

One conclusion which we can already draw is that weshould of course have been drafting people aged 35-40and older and not people aged 20-25. We can say thisnow and I can even explain why. These people areexhibiting a number of effects.

First of all, there is distinct impairment of theimmune system. Groups of approximately 500 peoplewere selected and subjected to special medical examina-tion. This work was carried out by the Institute ofBiochemistry of the UkrSSR Academy of Sciences, theInstitute of Oncology and Radiology of the Academy ofSciences and the Scientific Research Institute ofOtolaryngology, the Institute of Urology, the Khar'kovMedical Institute, and the Khar'kov Institute of MedicalRadiology. Impairment of the immune system was foundamong approximately 80% of the cleanup staff exam-ined. As I am by training a physicist and only started toinvestigate these problems from the radiological point ofview in 1986, I shall not go into any further detail as

regards the effect on killer and phagocytic cells since Iam afraid of getting lost.

Secondly, the number of cases of thrombosis showeda clear tendency to rise. Here the trend is as follows: ifon average we have 14 cases per 100 000 people in theUkrSSR, this figure has risen sharply between 1989 andthe beginning of 1991. Up to 1989 we had only 13 or 14cases among cleanup staff. As of 1991 we have 20, andto date there are about 10. Correspondingly, the deathrate has risen.

Thirdly, and this is one of the main reasons why wenow see clearly that young people should never havebeen used, sexual disturbances have been found amonga third of the cleanup staff. As a matter of interest,according to the medical records approximately everythird member of the cleanup staff has an illness of thiskind.

There is definite impairment of the hearing functionrelated to impairment of the adaptational and compensa-tory characteristics of this system and of the vestibularysystem. This work was all carried out in the Kiev Ear,Nose and Throat Research Institute and the Kiev Scien-tific Research Institute of Urology. Approximately500 people were examined and approximately 40 % havethis type of problem. Qualitative and quantitativechanges in the blood have been found among cleanupstaff — leucocytosis with a shift of the blood count to theleft. Approximately 1100 people were examined andabnormalities were found in 24%. I could also talk aboutsuch simple matters as the fact that there has been a risein all types of pathology, but that would be trivial.

I would now like to speak briefly about the state ofhealth of the public. I shall be discussing some data onthe more highly contaminated regions, i.e. the Polesskoedistrict. This area was mentioned in the Report but therethey were only talking about the Polesskoe districtproper, whereas my data for the Polesskoe district alsoincludes the Narodichi district. People living in thesedistricts, as we have already heard from the reports oncontamination and doses, received doses of approxi-mately 20-50 mSv. In individual villages — and thisseems to have been fairly reliably proved — higherdoses did occur, i.e. 120, 150 and in some cases evenas high as 200 mSv. This is true of villages such asYasen, Shevchenkovo, and Vilyuj. We can find thesame trends here as among the cleanup staff, only ofcourse less pronounced. Here I shall be referring to dataproduced by the АН-Union Scientific Centre of Radia-tion Medicine and the Kiev Institute of Paediatrics. Theyexamined children in these districts who were alsosuffering from impairment of the immune system,although the state of their immune systems does seem tobe improving and returning to normal of late.

41

Sessions 4 and 5

The Kiev Scientific Research Institute of Paediatrics,Midwifery and Gynaecology, together with the Dnepro-petrovsk Medical Institute and the Vinnitsa Institute,carefully monitored the state of health of pregnantwomen. Significant changes were found as of 1989,some even in 1988. Cases of prenatal toxicosis increasedby a factor of 1.5, cases of anaemia by a factor ofapproximately 1.5, uterine bleeding by a factor of 1.5and in some villages by a factor of 3. Premature birthsincreased in number by a factor of 1.5 to 3. I do under-stand that, when the International Advisory Committeewas at work — and I had the honour of being one of itsmembers — these data were still in an unprocessed andunchecked state since they are for 1990, but I would likethe Committee to know about them.

I would now like to raise once again the question ofchildren, and it is with regret that I must point out thatwe have definite evidence of chromosome aberrations inchildren. All this means, I think, that we should be a

little more cautious about our conclusions. I refer inparticular to the page of our final document where it isstated: "Current health effects (i.e. for 1991) —Reported adverse health affects attributed to radiationhave not been substantiated either by those local studieswhich were adequately performed or by the studiesunder the Project.'' This statement seems to me to be toooptimistic. I would like to see a more cautious formula-tion here since, in its present form, it is unacceptable.

I would once again like to express my thanks for thehelp the International Advisory Committee gave to thewhole Union and in particular to the UkrSSR. I have nodoubt that it is needed. I would like to ask you,Mr. Chairman, to request Dr. Rosen, as the representa-tive of the IAEA, to put together a joint researchprogramme for the next five years, particularly since,according to all the data, this will be the time when earlyserious consequences should begin to manifest them-selves.

42


Statement by K.K. Dushutin,Director of the Chernobyl Scientific Centre, Pripyat

Scientific Production Unit, Chernobyl

I would like to quote the Recommendation on page 35of the Overview on potential delayed health effects, thatconcentration on prospective cohort studies of selectedhigh risk populations should be endorsed. We have datafrom a comprehensive, clinical, medical and biologicalresearch programme on the state of health of5000 cleanup staff who have been working in the 30 kmzone around the Chernobyl plant since 1986 and are stilldoing so. We have found that the effect of the harmfulfactors in the 30 km zone is complex. Apart from theradiation effects, other biogenic factors, i.e. chemical,physiological and psychogenic, have a significantinfluence on the metabolism.

The most significant health changes have been foundin the immune system. These usually set in significantlyearlier than clinical disease symptoms, and therefore theresearch workers concerned feel that the universality ofthe autoimmune reaction provides us with a means ofidentifying people who are on the borders of healthpathology, i.e. risk groups. The most sensitive pointamong the group of cleanup staff who were examinedwas the haemopoietic system. Ultrastructural and meta-bolic changes in the haemopoietic systems cause animpaired resistance and an increased risk of onco-haematological diseases. Biological research at amolecular level has revealed early effects of low dosesof ionizing radiation. Here, the model which most fullyreflects the state of the biological membranes in themetabolism as a whole is the surface cell membrane oferythrocytes. The various factors present in the 30 kmzone round the Chernobyl plant induce changes in themicroelement composition of organs, tissues, cells andtheir enzymes, increase the rate at which cobalt, copperand zinc are eliminated from the metabolism, and shar-ply reduce the content of the latter in key enzymaticsystems. The stressing and overstressing of the adapta-tional mechanisms of the metabolism can increase theoccurrence of psychic disturbances, illnesses of thenervous system, psychosomatic, neuroendocrine andautoimmune diseases which affect working capacity andlife expectancy.

In our opinion, the data we have obtained show thatin future the research workers should concentrate onthree risk groups: children who have received highdoses to the thyroid gland, evacuees from the town ofPripyat, and cleanup staff. If no changes are detected inthe state of health of members of these risk groups thepublic can be reassured. However, the conclusionspresented here today in the report of the InternationalChernobyl Project concerning the state of health of thepublic will not, we feel, allay fears since, unfortunately,the project did not evaluate the risk groups, not evenchildren who have received doses to the thyroid gland,but rather evaluated the whole population in specificpopulated areas.

I would like to present some information concerningthe Chernobyl Scientific Centre. The research which isbeing carried out in the Centre at present covers fiveareas: development and testing of new technologies fordecontamination of materials, buildings, equipment andmanagement of radioactive waste; radiation monitoringin the 30 km zone; study of the medical and biologicalconsequences of the accident including the effects oncleanup staff; study of the radiological aspects anddevelopment of new technologies to enable contami-nated territories to be used for agricultural production;and study of the general radioecological features of theChernobyl accident. Acceptable working conditionshave been established, and laboratory equipment andliving conditions are also satisfactory. Five projectshave been announced for Chernobyl and are beingreviewed by the government organizations: two projectswith the Republic of Korea, one project with Japan, onewith Switzerland, and one with Finland. In addition, sixprojects have been prepared in collaboration with theCommission of the European Communities. The forth-coming research into the consequences of the accident,which is being planned as part of the InternationalProject could, we feel, actively involve the ChernobylScientific Centre.

43

Sessions 4 and 5

Statement by E.F. Konoplya,Director of the Institute of Radiobiology,

BSSR Academy of Sciences, Minsk

The problem we are discussing today is a very com-plex one. It is of vital importance both at this presentmoment and for the future. In this context, I would liketo say first of all that I agree with the position andproposals of Dr. Bar'yakhtar and of Dr. Dushutin,whose data are mainly on the cleanup staff. We havedata on the BSSR population. I should add that we havea unique opportunity here to evaluate the influence of theaccident on the health of the population, most particu-larly since we were performing systematic research inthe Narovlya district even before the accident, using theprogrammes and methodologies of the World HealthOrganization, so this is a good opportunity to evaluatewhat happened in 1986. I agree with the comments madeby Dr. Bar'yakhtar to the effect that discussions as towhether there is an increase in illness in the contami-nated regions have become trivial and secondary for us.This is a stage we have already passed, and most peopleadmit that there has been a rise. We have sufficientstatistics in the Ministry of Health's data processingsystem and the Ministries of the three affected Repub-lics; indeed, even the Deputy Health Minister of theUSSR himself confirmed this in the Committee of theSupreme Soviet of the USSR in 1989.

At present we are discussing the mechanisms andcauses of this increased rate of illness in contaminatedregions. Generally speaking, I think we should certainlynot rule out the radiation factor, and I would endorse theproposal made by Dr. Dushutin that we must assumethat various harmful factors are having a complex effecton the metabolism, and an unexpected one. Since thedata on the immune system and genetic factors in theTechnical Report were not complete, I would like toreport some research which should be of interest. [Thespeaker showed a number of slides, which are notreproduced here.] We have done some basic work on theendocrine system and I must say that the changes wehave found in the endocrine, the immune and othersystems occur in phases, and therefore the data whichthe experts produced and which indicated that there wasno change in the T-4 content may be entirely valid; wealso have not found any changes.

Changes in the immune system have been seen in anexperiment which we started in 1986, and since this isa scientific conference I think it is acceptable to reportan experiment on animals which have spent six monthsor a year in contaminated districts — i.e. in Cherikov

and Slavgorod. When the animals had been in Cherikovfor six months there was no evidence of changes inimmunity in the blood, but there were already changesin the immunogenetic organs. After a year, we couldalready detect changes in the immunity indices in theblood. The same is true in Slavgorod.

And now for the population. We tried to divide thepopulation into various groups according to the subse-quent exposure dose prognosis: people living in areaswhere the predicted dose is 10 rem and 30 rem maxi-mum. The control group was the Minsk district. Theresearch was performed in the Krasnopol'sk district ofthe Mogilev region. We have not only already foundchanges in the immune system, but these changes havecaused a reduction in the number of lymphocytes, andthere are changes in complements and immunoglobulins,etc. However, we are detecting differences which aredependent on the predicted dose. With respect to theimmune system I would draw three main conclusions:first, immunity against infection is reduced, and second,autoimmune processes increase. Here we are talkingabout the Minsk region (control group) and theRaulyatsk region. There is an increase in antigens in thefunctions of the thyroid gland and the liver, i.e. auto-immune processes increase. Third, there is a reductionin immunity against tumours, as we found last year inparticular and the year before, and this is worrying.Here, the control group was Minsk, Krasnopol'e andNarovlya. Immunity against tumours is impaired. Andnow the genetic changes. The data come from an investi-gation carried out during 1986 and 1987. The researchhas been followed up in subsequent years. In all thepopulated areas where we carried out research the num-ber of chromosome aberrations is on the increase, andspecifically those types of changes which are charac-teristic of radiation induced effects. Alongside our studyof chromosome aberrations, we evaluated the function-ing of the genetic apparatus of the cell which synthesizesDNA and protein and we have quite a lot of material onthis. What does this tell us? It tells us thatat present there is already instability of genome, andcurrently we have the capacity to carry out monitoringin order to identify high risk groups. Our laboratory atthe Institute has signed an agreement with the IAEAlaboratory at Seibersdorf and we shall be carrying outjoint research on evaluation of the immune system andmonitoring.

44


Statement by the Chairman of the BSSR Committeeon the Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident

It is very important to us that people who help toshape public opinion, particularly teachers, who spendmost of their time with children, and general practi-tioners, believe in the International Advisory Commit-tee's report and believe that it reflects the reality of thesituation. However, certain statements in the Russiantranslation we have been given will undermine confi-dence in what we have been told today. What do I meanby this?

Disturbances in thyroid gland function — this ques-tion is at the top of the list for most of the people whohave been affected in the BSSR — are concentrated inone area where such problems are endemic. In one townwith 100 000 inhabitants, scientists from the LeningradPaedological Institute who have set up an organizationjointly with the Swedes examined 10 000 children aged12-14. According to their data, 20-30% of thesechildren have thyroid gland problems, and this is a highfigure. They do not blame this on radiation effects.People from the 30 km zone were evacuated to this townin 1986. There are about 300 children there. Ninety per

cent of the children in this category have thyroid glandproblems. It is stated in the report that nodules in thethyroid gland were found only very rarely amongchildren. I would like this excluded from the revisedtext.

And another thing, with regard to neoplasms. Four-teen cases of cancer of the thyroid gland have been offi-cially registered in the Gomel region in 1990. I under-stand that many people realize that local doctors canmake mistakes and can classify illnesses incorrectly, butthis particular fact has been checked at the ScientificResearch Institute in Minsk and confirmed by Moscow.Up until 1985 only one such case had been registered.And yet here we have a statement to the effect that thereis only hearsay evidence of such tumours. This under-mines confidence in the International Project and in thepeople who, I have no doubt, performed their work ingood faith. I would therefore ask that these sections beamended in consultation with the Soviet delegation totake account of the information that we have, before theyare released to the public and the press.

45

Sessions 4 and 5

Statement by N.D. Tron'ko,Director of the Kiev Institute of Endocrinology, Kiev

Our Institute started to study the dynamics of thyroidgland function and structure on 12-15 May 1986, i.e.two weeks after the accident at the Chernobyl nuclearpower plant, in children who had been hospitalized inthe clinic at our Institute and who came from the 30 kmzone and regions where very strict monitoring had beenenforced. We found that thyroid hormone levels inchildren who had been exposed to the radiation were nodifferent from the control group. There was an excep-tion, and yesterday, in a report of one of the scientists,it was noted that during the first stage of the investiga-tion increased thyroxine levels had been found in a smallgroup of children. This situation normalized itself after6-8 months.

Another problem which is causing us some concern,and the representatives from the BSSR have just beentalking about this, is the problem of cancer of the thyroidgland. The clinic in our Institute is a specialized institu-tion and most children suspected of having cancer of thethyroid gland are sent to it. For instance, in 1990,20 cases were operated on for cancer of the thyroidgland. For the sake of comparison, in previous years —1985, 1986, 1987, 1988 — one or two cases were oper-ated on. All the cancer cases which were operated onwere verified. These cases of thyroid gland cancer wereclassified carefully according to sex, age and dwellingplace. Total dose levels to the thyroid gland from 131Iand other short lived radioisotopes, iodine radio-

isotopes, were produced by Professor Likhtarev fromthe АН-Union Centre of Radiation Medicine in Kiev forboth internal and external exposure. The materialremoved during the operations was subjected to amorpho-histological examination. Of course, the ques-tion presents itself: in theory, there should be no addi-tional cases of cancer of the thyroid gland by this point.The experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has shownus that the latent period is ten years; on the MarshallIslands, the first case of cancer of the thyroid gland wasdetected eight year,s later, and according to certain datafrom the reference sources even that is rather soon. It ispossible that this sudden outbreak of cancers of thethyroid gland is a result of the better medical care ofchildren in comparison with the period before theaccident.

I would like to look at this problem from anotherpoint of view, however. If we consider the insalubriousecological situation, a possible combination of the actionof iodine radionuclides and internal exposure, and thefact that many districts, including the Chernikov district,have endemic goitre, all these factors could reduce thelatent period to some extent. This should definitely notbe excluded. Since we have over 8000 children in theUkrSSR who have received high absorbed doses to thethyroid gland, I do not share the optimistic view that thefirst radiation induced thyroid gland cancers will appearonly after ten years.

46


DISCUSSION

C. Dotres (Cuba): The William Soler Children'sHospital, Havana, has been treating 4265 children fromtwo to eighteen years old in a programme of medicalcare of children from the areas affected by the Cher-nobyl accident. Several of our observations were similarto the results we heard yesterday afternoon and thismorning.

The children fall into four main groups: 3% withoncohaematological conditions (70 of these had variouskinds of leukemia, two of which required bone marrowtransplantation); 17% requiring hospital admission;60% needing only ambulatory care; and 20% withgeneral health problems. From the radiation dosimetricpoint of view, the estimate of equivalent dose for exter-nal irradiation, measurement of 137Cs activity, anddetermination of the equivalent effective dose integratedover 70 years of life, have shown that the children fromChernobyl treated in Cuba fall into the category of lowdose cases. The biological indicators of radiation inju-ries employed in the radiobiological studies of the casedid not show any significant influence of the factorspresent in the children. It was obvious that among the4265 children treated in Cuba there were some whosecondition was not related to exposure to ionizing radia-tion, while other children require a long term follow-upto assess the correlation between their clinical conditionsand the results of the dosimetric and radiobiologicalstudies.

J. Nauman (Poland): I think it would be safer if weadded something to the very important statement thatno health disorders could be attributed to radiationexposure. I would like to add something to the effect thatdisorders related to the stochastic effects of radiationshould not be expected to be seen before 1995.

Comment from a Japanese participant: Dr. Mettlermentioned future studies. I should like to comment onthe methodology of clinical and laboratory examina-tions. According to our experience in Hiroshima andNagasaki, examination methodology has changed con-siderably during the last 30 years, so it may be importantto record the conversion date when one technique isreplaced by another. Hiroshima and Nagasaki reportsrevealed recently an increase in parathyroid hyperfunc-tion, so may I suggest screening the serum calcium levelto detect this in the future?

P.V. Ramzaev (USSR): I wish to bring two facts toyour attention and thus add a little Republican "fat to thefire" of our discussions. I have health data from theRSFSR for these regions. Cases of cancer in contami-nated districts started immediately in 1986 in theRSFSR. Before that point, the figure was negligible andyet in 1986 there was immediately a 15 % rise in cancers,and the level has remained there. What does this tell us?

Clearly there was an immediate effect. We immediatelysent a lot of doctors there and started to check this. Thesecond fact is an unpleasant one: the number of congeni-tal malformations has risen by a factor of 5; 140 caseshave been reported. We are now looking into this.However, I wouldn't go so far as to say that this isdefinitely caused by the radiation. Why? Because in oneregion, the Krasnogorsk region, which was the mostcontaminated, and in the Bryansk region, there were sig-nificantly less cases than in the Novozybkov districtwhich is not contaminated. That is one point. Secondly,it turns out that the local health services in one districtare very careful about recording every case and inanother region they don't pay much attention to it. Imake this point because it shows that we have toorganize our research seriously and carefully. We haveeven had some cases of hypothyroid disease; this isincreasing, but I would refrain from making any defini-tive comments on this yet. I therefore support theproposal put forward by the representatives of theUkrSSR and BSSR — and the Committee is also inagreement with this — that we should start serious andlarge scale work.

Comment from a participant: Many details havebeen put forward about the possibility of thyroid cancer,and this is certainly a very important subject. But let me,as a physician, remind you that cancer of the thyroid iscertainly the most curable of cancers, and nobody has todie of it if it is properly treated. It is very important todevelop follow-up treatment.

F.A. Mettler (USA): The Chairman has asked me toreply. I think we all agree that there are populationgroups (such as emergency accident workers and evacu-ated persons) which may have health effects that havenot been covered by this International Project and whichought to be examined. That is clear. It is also clear, andI think we all agree, that we are not likely to have foundstochastic effects at this time, and we need to look forthem in the future. Much of the data just presented byour Soviet colleagues as slides were shown faster thanI could assimilate them and, as I have not seen most ofthe data before, I cannot comment. Data that have beenverified since the International Project was completedare 20 cases of thyroid cancer. These have been con-firmed by the pathologists at my Institute, at my request.It is possible for the latent period for thyroid tumours tobe 5-10 years; certainly there are some tumours follow-ing extremely high doses where you can drop the latentperiod back a bit. I don't think we know the answerabout the thyroid cancer because the baseline data anddetection methodology are not clear. It is also possiblethat techniques have changed from thyroid palpation tothyroid ultrasound and that detection methodologies aredifferent. I am not sure I shall know the real answer foranother five or ten years, but I agree that it is worthstudying.

47

Sessions 4 and 5

Rapporteur's Report of Sessions 4 and 5(K. Duncan)

For two days we have considered various aspects ofmeasurements, and several speakers felt it necessary topoint out that dosimetry was not an art form in itself buthas an important relationship to what happens in thehuman dimension. For the last two sessions we havebeen talking about the human dimension, and I thinksome of the tenseness of some of the recent discussionsymbolizes that transition from what you might call pureobjective science to something which has a very con-siderable subjective element in it. The public has fromtime to time an almost mystical belief in doctors. Thisvaries in time and place but it puts an enormous burdenon my profession. Some people are convinced thatpresenting a possibly damaged body to a physician is initself a constructive act. This has moved on to a situationwhere some of us feel that the whole business of screen-ing needs to be looked at much more intellectually andmuch more strictly scientifically, a point which was elo-quently put by Dr. Gus'kova in her statement.

One extremely interesting suggestion, whichDr. Mettler has summed up three times so I do not needto do so again, was that the details of the very strictmethodology employed ought to be carefully recorded.It was worth spending time yesterday to talk about suchdetails as making sure that the glassware all came fromone particular batch, that the reagent came from one par-ticular batch, and so on, in very great detail. There is avery real danger of what you might call in other terms'snatch samples1 for epidemiology. It has to be very,very rigorous.

I think Dr. Mettler was right when he said yesterdaythat this has been an unprecedented review. I am notaware of anything on this scale that has ever been donebefore. He was also at great pains to point out that youhad to have a marriage, if that is the right word, betweenbiological propositions and statistics. It is no good justgoing fishing in a pond and seeing what fish come out;you must have a very systematic review. I do not intendto go through all the parts of the presentations — thatwould take too long — but I'll just highlight one or twopoints.

Dr. Royal pointed out, and it was mentioned again inthe discussion afterwards, that there is a danger that ifyou look carefully enough you always find something,and if you look more carefully you find even more. Thatis a lesson which has to be related to the strictness of thedesign and execution of these studies. Dr. Kuramotopointed out that one of the by-products of this type ofstudy was that sometimes — often — it was possible topick up individual problems and help individual cases.But, you know, although it is a rather unpopular topic,we ought to make it quite clear that there is a cost

involved in all this. It is not good enough to say: "Yes,I did this huge study, and I found one man who had oneleg shorter than the other." You have to be able to showthat there is a real benefit from any studies undertaken.

We also heard about the Cuban findings, but, withoutmore details about the population studied, and withoutstudying the published findings, I cannot usefully com-ment. Then, in yesterday's discussion, Dr. Gonzalezemphasized the importance of ensuring that any studyundertaken is of sufficient statistical power, i.e. highenough doses and enough people. The importance of thiswas pointed out again when the Conclusions and Recom-mendations were discussed. I wonder if I would be step-ping outside my present limited role if I make a plea forthis to be foremost in people's minds when they are talk-ing about epidemiology. One problem we have encoun-tered in many countries is that small studies with no realprospect of success have been pursued. These, ofcourse, produce ambiguous results but have been quotedall over the world, depending on how anyone wishes tointerpret them.

At the opening of the Conference we heard about theWorld Health Organization's developments at Obninskand it seems to me that these have a vitally important co-ordinating role. This calls for a lot of scientific humility.It is quite natural for a scientist to want to guard his orher own data and to want the fame of publishing in hisor her name, but it is wrong if this leads to a lot of small,fragmented studies when a bit of planning, which I thinkis being offered, could lead to a really effective, largescale study. We do need it. I am quite sure that much ofthe doubt and ambiguity running through all the discus-sions of the last two days are related to this kind of scien-tific uncertainty.

Today we heard from Dr. Mettler about the difficul-ties of reporting and definition when talking in terms ofabortions, malformations and all the various confound-ing factors. Dr. Parr then told us about the nutritionalaspects, and about some of the non-radiation factors, thepossibility of lead as a confounding factor, and so on.Then we came to Professor Lee's paper. One thing iscertain, that this accident has had profound psycho-logical consequences; that is beyond debate. But I thinkit would be wrong to treat that fact on its own, becausethe whole problem of radiological protection has pro-found psychological overtones. This is merely anextreme example of the phenomenon.

It is customary for doctors and scientists, when theyare faced with the unpleasant publicity which this fieldoften attracts, to turn round and savage the nearestmedia person, whoever it may be. It is not entirely fairto blame journalists, broadcasters and people of that sort

48


because they have been given a pseudo-authority bypseudo-scientists in very many cases; this was madequite clear in some of yesterday's discussion.

There is a great burden of responsibility on scientiststo speak only in scientific terms. Not reputation, notfame, not money, but only honesty matters. As to thefuture, Dr. Gus'kova, in her statement, talked about theneed for further education, and we have all been agree-ing with her. Perhaps because of her medical back-ground, which I share, I was much impressed by heremphasis of the fact that you can have great campaigns,you can have educational programmes, you can publishas much as you like, but in the last analysis it is oneperson talking to another and getting the trust of thatother person. This places a heavy burden on the medicalprofession who, rightly or wrongly, is trusted to do thatwell. Therefore the first responsibility (who guards theguards?) is to make sure that the medical profession istrained well enough to take on that heavy task success-fully. I have been struck by the humanity and scientifichumility of the people making presentations here todayand yesterday. There has been no attempt to overstatewhat this Project has achieved.

We have seen that ridiculous word 'radiophobia' con-signed to the wastepaper basket, or whatever is used ina modern office, and we shall go on later to talk aboutcosts and benefits, whichever is relevant. It seems to me,and I make no apology for repeating what several peoplehave said, that there are three conclusions I would liketo leave you with:

(1) The best must be done for those affected, whetherin the mind or in the body. (It is far more difficultto evaluate what is the best than always to listen tothe loudest voice. There are many things to considerin deciding what is best for the individual or thegroup.)

(2) There are lessons to be learned in order to ensure,not that no accident will ever happen again, but thatwe learn from our mistakes as we have donethrough the long years of history.

(3) The huge task of education and information goesahead, nationally and internationally, dispassion-ately, without faction, without rancour and with asmany facts as the scientists and the doctors can pro-vide for its implementation.

49

Session 6

PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Objectives and approachEvaluation of protective measuresP. Hedemann Jensen (Denmark)

EVALUATION OF RELOCATION

Comparison with international guidanceN. Kelly (CEC)

Cost-benefit analysisJ. Lochard (France)

Decision conferencesG.S. French (UK)

SummaryN. Kelly (CEC)

ConclusionsP. Hedemann Jensen

Rapporteur's Report of Session 6K. Duncan (UK)

DISCUSSION

S.T. Belyaev (USSR): While Task Group 5 wasworking, a Committee in the USSR was formulating anew concept of living conditions for the people in theseterritories.1 We are grateful for the influence of theTask Group on discussions which helped us to preparethis concept. It has now been accepted officially, but insome sense also rejected officially. I would like todescribe the main features of this concept for safe living.Ideally, it is purely radiological protection policy and itis very simple if no other factor exists. But the Cher-nobyl situation, which we have been studying for fourand a half years, is very different. First of all, there wereinadequate decisions on countermeasures and incom-plete information. All this produces a post-accident syn-drome, with negative health effects. It all goes round,one factor influencing another. This was the situation.

1 "Concept for habitability of the regions affected by theChernobyl accident."

So what would be the approach to introducing this con-cept for living? First of all, how many people are welooking for? Then, let us say, the two levels we havebeen hearing about: 'no action' and relocation limit.

If we think about it, the number of people is very sen-sitive to this 'level', because a little push moves youfrom say 800 to 4 million and so the question suddenlyarises: what population group are we dealing with? Thisis the first problem, how to choose this 'no action' level.We certainly need it, and we always tend to push thislevel lower and lower and include more and more peoplesomehow connected with Chernobyl. That is the firstproblem. Now, how to proceed? First of all, when weintroduced the countermeasures, we reduced the dosesin each place and somehow pushed the line to this point.That is a good policy. Without any relocation, we justmake the total dose lower and lower. Now we have quitea different position. We have not only dose, but we havesociopsychological effects of different kinds. Theseinclude the excitement, the stress, of people living indifferent territories. There is a spectrum of excitation,

51

Session 6

and experts here have already mentioned this stage ofexcitation or stress. It does not depend very much ondose.

Sometimes the people living in a certain area becomeexcited at more or less the same degree and even higher.Now, what kind of countermeasures should weintroduce? Of course, the ideal policy would be just topush for some settlement, or group of people living inthese conditions, at a certain dose and with a certainexcitement. This would be the ideal. How can weachieve it? Suppose we decide on relocation of popula-tion. Well, it may go from large dose to great excite-ment. It should be understood that it may be moredangerous to health to be in one place than in another.How do we start to undertake the kind of counter-measure suggested? First, we have already decided totake into account the annual programme of all relocationbelow 40 Ci/km2 (1.5 MBq/m2) and even below this.

Our first statement is that no more mandatory reloca-tion is needed! Our first premises, the radiological, non-radiological, and sociopsychological factors and, ofcourse, the negative health effects of relocation, are con-sidered. The first and main principle is that no additionalmandatory relocation is needed. We understand thatsome countermeasures, which somehow mean restric-tion of life-style, of agricultural production, and so on,produce some excitement (stress, anxiety), so somecountermeasure should already be agreed. We have onevery good countermeasure: just to improve agriculture.These are the main principles and criteria. First, weintroduce a 'no action' level, which we take as 1 mSvper year (about 5 Ci/km2 or 185 kBq/m2). The totalnumber of people living in this territory would be a littleless than one million. Then we introduce, not the reloca-tion level, but the control level, which I would like toexplain. Suppose we eliminate some countermeasuresand some restrictions; then perhaps there is less socialanxiety but a little higher dose (but how far can we goin this direction?) and then we introduce this controllevel. Control level means that the dose should be notmore than 5 mSv per year. That is the essence of thisconcept and it has been approved. The concept was acompromise with almost all of the scientific communityand most government institutions, but it was approvedby the Committee of the Supreme Soviet and was admit-ted as a basis for the law. In this law, the level of 5 mSvper year is now considered to be the level for mandatoryrelocation.

It is my own opinion of course, that if I myself amliving in a certain place and do not want to move, thenmandatory relocation is just a violation of human rights.That is my opinion.

L.A. Buldakov (USSR): Mankind has fallen into thetrap which mankind itself had set. Experts know that,among the various harmful factors, the radiation factoris perhaps the least harmful. But this is not known to the

public at large, who do not want to reconcile themselvesto the fact that for 50 years they have been fed false-hoods. They hold on to their firm belief that anyradiation which is slightly higher than the backgroundis fatal. It is very difficult to make them change theirminds. Therefore, when we developed the 'safe livingconcept' and concluded that such a level would be alifetime dose of 350 mSv, it was not a random value.This value was based on world experience in radiology,which shows that, in the case of short term irradiation,doses below 1000 mSv produce no noticeable effects.We made a correction for the particular sensitivity ofchildren, by a factor of about three, divided thesefigures and obtained the value of 350 mSv. From thestandpoint of radiology and not from that of radiationprotection alone, we understood that the effects couldappear in the case of very long exposure over a lifetimeand therefore decided on the new term 'lifetime dose' —350 mSv. However, this value raised a storm in ourcountry. We were accused of being inhuman simplybecause the concept that the action of radiation hadno threshold had been ignored. Unfortunately, we hadtaken a step beyond what was customary with us, i.e.we had decided on some threshold (350 mSv), meaningthat the risk was much smaller than the benefit. In ourcountry human life and health are regarded as the mostvalued treasures, and nobody will let you calculate interms of money when it is a question of human health.Thus, having accused us of inhumanity, all the otheropponents of this concept began to lower the dose, andtherefore Boris Yeltsin and Neale Kelly are both right intaking us to task for choosing too low a dose for decisionmaking. But the situation was such that it was impossibleto take a really meaningful dose, for example 1000 mSv.We are grateful to Task Group 5 for its criticism of thosewho adopted 350 mSv. However, it must be made clearthat this value was adopted on the basis of radiobiologi-cal parameters, considering the possible risk, althoughwe realize that it is negligibly small and cannot alwaysbe determined.

One other thing I should like to add. Here today therewere references to the state of health — that there areactual data confirming that such levels of radiation didnot affect the genetic or carcinogenic structures. At lowradiation doses the mechanism of action is quite differ-ent; this was reported in Paris at Professor Duboire'sconference. But it is very difficult for us to prove this,to prove what nobody wants to believe. If the TechnicalReport and the Overview had very clearly given suchvalues or such conditions, I am sure it would have beena great help to our people.

V.F. Demin (USSR): I have some comments on thatpart of the report of Task Group 5 which deals with theanalysis of the effectiveness of the countermeasures, andI speak as a person who was involved in the USSR in thepreparation of similar and other scientific data used in

52

Protective Measures: Discussion

taking decisions on protective measures. It has alreadybeen pointed out here that not only the radiological butalso the non-radiological risk factors must be taken intoaccount. This point is very important. When we includeother risk factors, the scope of optimum decision makingbecomes wider and the possibilities are greater but, atthe same time, the task becomes more complex becauseof the multiplicity of factors and the need to preparemuch more additional data. Task Group 5 has alreadyreferred to the paucity of their data. This reflected theactual state of affairs in the USSR at that time. It was notthe case, as has been noted by one of the other groups,that they had approached the wrong organization. But itshould be clear that these data are of exceptional practi-cal significance. The price of such accurate data is meas-ured, in the best case, in thousands of millions of roublesand, in the worst case, in tens of thousands of millionsof roubles.

To demonstrate what is essential, I should like torefer to data obtained recently. The collection of data onthe effectiveness of the various countermeasures iscontinuing; unfortunately the work is proceeding slowlyin spite of its great importance. As for the effectivenessof some countermeasures — this does not apply to allfactors — we have used here the well known assumedrelationship between man-rem and man-days lost. Hereare some extremely generalized, simplified ideas aboutthe data which have now appeared. I want to refer to twoitems which are highly relevant to what has been dis-cussed here: agricultural measures and measures relatedto improvement of medical care. These measures, espe-cially the agricultural ones, are highly specific; specificto the region and specific to the characteristics ofdevelopment of the USSR national economy. They arehighly effective. If we had been able to formulate acorrect strategy, the effectiveness of these countermeas-ures would have enabled us to improve our decisionmaking strategy substantially and to reduce to someextent the total costs mentioned. The data available toTask Group 5 were very limited and sometimes I thoughtthey were below some threshold of significance. Inevaluating the results achieved by this Task Group, Imust say that they handled and utilized most brilliantlythe small amount of data at their disposal, made the max-imum number of recommendations and, above all, theydemonstrated what the risk analysis technique currentlyavailable to the international community was capable of.There is still a lot of work to be done before this tech-nique can yield results of practical importance.

Two numbers are given [ш a slide which cannot bereproduced here]} in the estimate of economic losses:20-25 and 30-40. The former was obtained from somemodels based on some concept of optimality. The lattervalue is the result of an attempt to assess those trendswhich, if they persist, would lead to such values. It mustbe emphasized that this is not the arithmetic sum of allcosts and detriments but values adjusted for 1986. The

arithmetic sum may be much higher. People who knoweconomics will understand that this is how it should bedone. The cost of ineffectiveness may be reckoned inthousands of millions and even tens of thousands ofmillions of roubles.

J. Jovanovich (Canada): I have been most impressedwith this Conference and with all the conclusions, andI would like to add something concerning cost andbenefit. We understand what cost is and we understandbenefit as a benefit to the health of a population.Whenever I, as a nuclear physicist, come to a gatheringlike this, we always talk about the nuclear physics, aboutthe radiation; we never talk about the air pollution.Just two weeks ago, at an international conference inAnaheim, it was reported that air pollution in Americancities has accounted for an estimated 60 000 deaths ayear, making it among the nation's top killers. This isnot a crackpot report and it is nothing new. I havealready heard it from the Office of Technology Assess-ments of the Congress of the USA nine years ago where,using linearity hypothesis, familiar to us, they havebeen estimating 51 000 deaths per year. Now, if I have10 billion dollars or 10 billion roubles and want toimprove the health of the population, I have to decidewhether to spend that money on relocating peoplebecause of the 100 mSv or on cleaning up smoke stacks.We should not forget that we live in a real world, andthat there are other technologies more dangerous to thehealth of populations than nuclear power, including theChernobyl accident.

A.J. Gonzalez (IAEA): I have just a moment agoreceived an unofficial translation of an article fromIzvestia of the day before yesterday which I believe isvery relevant to today's discussion. It states that on thatsame day a new Soviet law was published, which wouldestablish the following limits for the relocation of peopleliving in areas affected by radiation. It seems that (a)obligatory relocation with full compensation for loss ofproperty should be considered when the average doseexceeds 5 mSv; (b) the population in areas with dosesexceeding 1 mSv could stay on or be relocated uponrequest, also with full compensation for property loss;and (c) people in areas with less than 1 mSv per yearwould have special status and be entitled to somebonuses and compensation without relocation.

I ask myself what the consequences of this law wouldbe if the USSR authorities decided, for instance, to con-trol radon exposure in dwelling houses, following asimilar policy. The average global dose for radonassessed by UNSCEAR is in the order of 1 mSv and Ican imagine that in the cold climate of northern USSR,with airtight houses, the levels can be higher than that.I do not want to enter into the internal politics of theUSSR, but I am very concerned about the implicationsof this law for radiation protection, and I should like tohear the comments of Task Group 5 on this point.

53

Session 6

P. Hedemann Jensen (Denmark): I would like tomake two comments. The first concerns Dr. Belyaev'sstatement that "this is a violation of human rights". Thestatement speaks for itself. Regarding the work done byTask Group 5, we have not evaluated this two-tiersystem because when we ended our study the work wasstill in progress. However, our conclusions are veryfirm. We say that there can be no justification on radio-logical protection grounds for the adoption of a morerestrictive policy if consideration is limited to thecost and risk reduction alone. This should be stronglyresisted. Secondly, if this new criterion that we have notevaluated is more restrictive, then it could not be justi-fied. But as we have not evaluated it, we cannot be veryfirm about it at the moment. If it turns out to be morerestrictive, then our conclusion is clear: it could not bejustified.

Y. Nishiwaki (IRPA): In making a cost-benefitanalysis, if all the factors involved are precisely knownthere would be no problem. But often, as in the case ofradiation protection and nuclear safety, many factors areuncertain. In this case it is a problem of decision makingin a 'fuzzy environment'. Risk estimated by the expertmay be considered to be objective risk, but risk per-ceived by the general public is subjective risk based onsubjective evaluation. If a subjective evaluation is made,it very often does not follow conventional binary logic.When subjective evaluation appears it would be moreappropriate to use Lukasiewicz multivalued logic or'fuzzy logic'. Let us take a simple example. To theexpert, anywhere in the world, a dollar is a dollar. In thecase of the general public, a dollar perceived by a verypoor person is quite different from a dollar perceived bya billionaire. In just the same way, risk estimated by theexpert is a totally different concept from risk perceivedby the general public, although the same word is used.We must take this difference into account and we mustmake a greater effort to carry out scientific studies onthe structure of psychological effects in order to solvethis problem.

Comment by a participant: There are many coun-tries where a large proportion of the population receivesmuch higher doses than 5 mSv per annum from radonand its daughters. Governments and populations affectedby this radon irradiation do not bother about the situa-tion. So we should rather compare the variability of situ-ations in the world, the natural variations of doses, andso on, and not look at only one problem. We are livingin a complex world and we should take care that peoplewho are relocated are not relocated to regions wherethey receive more irradiation through radon.

P. Pellerin (France): I would like to supportDr. Nishiwaki's comment. Chernobyl is a very bigdisaster. It was triggered by the explosion of the reactor,but radioactivity has not very much to do with thepresent situation. We must recognize that this is perhapsone of the biggest disasters in the history of humanitybecause the consequences will last a very long time, butperhaps a major error to be avoided is to attribute thisdisaster to radioactivity. Radioactivity has played itsrole, but we should perhaps consider now all the socio-economic consequences which cannot be solved bymeans of technology only.

Question by a participant [referring to the previoussession}: There were a large number of interrupted preg-nancies in Europe because of fear of Chernobyl. Did theTask Group ask any questions about interrupted preg-nancies among the population of Chernobyl?

F.A. Mettler (USA): We did not ask specificallyhow many medical abortions are being done in connec-tion with Chernobyl. As I indicated this morning, therewere about five times more abortions than live births,but we did not go into the reasons.

Comment from a (Russian-speaking) participant:I should like to support the experts' and the Committee'sviews on how and where the modest resources of ourcountry can be spent more effectively and also wherethese could be invested much more effectively on radia-tion work. I will give only one example. Our estimatesshow that in the USSR the average dose from all sourcesof radiation is 420 mrem (4.2 mSv) per annum. Of this,1.9 mSv is due to the natural background and 1.2 mSvto medical practices. If we consider that the harm fromthe doses referred to here amounts to purely stochastic,probabilistic effects since the individual doses in thiscase are immaterial, we have to take collective doses.Thus the collective dose in the USSR for 70 years, theperiod over which collective doses are calculated atpresent, is 8400 million rem. The collective dose fromChernobyl in the USSR territory is 20-30 millionman-rem. This means that, from the standpoint ofcollective dose and harmful consequences, about whichwe are concerned, there are still in our country 300Chernobyls to which nobody there pays any attention.

Comment from a (Russian-speaking) participant:For lack of time I cannot comment on Dr. Gonzalez'communication. As for the protective measures and themeasures involving compulsory relocation at a level of1 mSv, it seems there is some error or inaccuracy in thetranslation. We are willing to have these things clarifiedindividually and to help in sorting them out. It is a verycomplicated matter.

54

Protective Measures: Discussion

Rapporteurs's Report of Session 6(K. Duncan)

I thought before the meeting started that the report ofthis working group might well be one of the mostinteresting because it brought together so many humanaspects and added them to the technical aspects, so thisis a very different chapter from its predecessors. It goescloser and more overtly to the frontier between science(including medicine in this case) and politics, economicsand social science, if I may use that term in front of thisaudience. The apparent contradiction in the conclusionsis explained on page 42 of the Overview and was madeextremely clear by Dr. Hedemann Jensen in hisintroduction, so I need not go into it again.

I should like to make one or two points before I dealwith the various speakers. Here is one that came out ofthe intervention right at the end. There are all sorts ofproblems of interpretation, not only the linguisticproblem of going from Russian to English, but inter-pretation of what people mean by particular terms; thiswas brought out very clearly by Dr. Kelly, and I shallreturn to it later. I believe that in this field the hardestthing to do is to do nothing. There is a certain parallelwith medicine in this. When I was a medical student,many years ago, we were all taught to be very aware ofwhat our teachers called the 'furor therapeuticus'. Thiscan be loosely translated as the desire to do something,whether or not it is in the least useful. In medicine, weoften dealt with the problem by using what is called aplacebo. A placebo is something that is harmless andusually very cheap; at least we hoped it was harmless.In our present case, the desire to take some specificaction has far more serious consequences than anythingthat faced us in that other sphere. Dr. Hedemann Jensen,in his introduction, pointed out that matters went farbeyond radiological protection here, and all these otherthings had to be taken into account; he emphasized verystrongly that the idea that more means better was proba-bly a fallacy. It is a fallacy that is very easy to fall into,because you feel that if you have done something and gotsome improvement, it is worth doing a little more, anda little more, and a little more. It takes courage to decidethat enough is enough, and that enough money has beenspent.

The question of relocation was dealt with byDr. Kelly, and when you think of the number of varia-bles that are brought into that subject, the number ofthings that have to be considered, I think one can havenothing but sympathy for the people who have to takethese difficult decisions and have to take them, as hesaid, on the hoof, very often without enough clearexplanation.

Then we come to Dr. Lochard and the question ofcost-benefit. To many listeners this term rings coldly. Itis an unhappy choice of words but it was not put over

in an inhuman way at all; it was never meant to beinhuman, nor does the whole discipline need to beinhuman, but it does sound so. People say emotionally,and so much emotion comes into this, that you cannotput a monetary value on a human life. In one sense youcannot and in another sense you must, because, peoplealso say you cannot spend too much on health. Whatabsolute nonsense! You could spend the country's wholeresources on health and you would be very much worseoff at the end. Only the doctors would be very muchbetter off.

Then, I had, at my great age, a culture shock fromDr. French. The sort of medical managers I had as ayoung man, and the sort of managers I have met inindustry, must be rotating at a very high speed in theirgraves at all these consultations. Now, consultation wasalways a clear matter when I was a lad. Whoever wassenior said: "This is what I propose to do and anyonewho disagrees may leave."

I was very impressed with the discussions followingthe presentations, and quite apart from many quantita-tive and priority answers they produce, they are veryvaluable for getting people to be clear in their ownminds. What Dr. Kelly said leads to the next question:It's all very well, this sort of decision conferencebetween all the people involved in making these verydifficult decisions. I can see that in a well led group suchas this one you could get a great deal of combining ofminds. What I am not clear about, and what did notemerge from the discussion, was how you take the nextstep, having cleared all the scientists' minds, all theadministrators' minds, all the politicians' minds (if sucha thing is possible), how do you go from that stage tocommunicating back to all the people out there who aregravely concerned? Dr. Kelly took issue with the impo-sition of terminology, and I mentioned it very briefly atthe beginning of this summary. There is clearly a failureof understanding of some of the radiological protectionprinciples, and there is clearly a great need for some ofthat to be debated, not so much in an open forum butbetween consenting scientists in private. I think there isa very obvious need to get a lot of that hammered out,not necessarily in the light of the press, and certainly notnecessarily in the light of an accident.

This leads to something else. It was quite clear frommuch of what was said in Dr. Hedemann Jensen'spresentation and elsewhere that there had not been, cer-tainly for people in general, enough understanding ofwhat might be happening. And there was clearly a need,which I'm sure we all feel, for much public discussion,not in the heat of an accident but before an accident, withwhat you might call local liaison committees or whateverthe term is, so that the risks are all explained, so that

55

Session 6

emergency procedures are understood and can bepractised, and so that the emergency procedures do notcome out of a clear blue sky, at some terrible time in themorning. People need to know that there has been plan-ning, that something can be done, and that something isbeing done.

Another point that came out very clearly fromDr. Kelly's presentation, and again in some commentsfrom the floor, was that there is a very real danger ofradiation being put in a box, as it were, and regardedoutside the context of industrial pollution and theenvironment in general. Somebody mentioned thatnuclear radiation from reactors was regarded separatelyfrom radon. That sort of thing contributes very much tothe problems of decision makers.

I have said something risky. I said I thought that someof the discussion about some of these technical pointshas to take place between professional people privately.This is dangerous because one of the difficulties thewhole nuclear business is facing is the accusation ofsecrecy. I think that charge can probably be prevented,after the private discussions, by a full and extensive dis-cussion of the conclusions. But there is no need to publi-cize all these very complicated things; it just confusespeople even more.

In conclusion, I should like to say that it is easy withhindsight to see in every case what should and should nothave been done. I think of one of the aphorisms ofHippocrates: experiment perilous, decision difficult.The experiments were perilous here; the decisions thathad to be made were difficult. An enormous burden ofresponsibility had to be carried at very short notice atmany levels, and it is very easy to criticize. What isimportant is to turn events to good account for thefuture, and that seems to me to have been what we weredoing here for the last few days. Let me suggest threeadditional recommendations that have occurred to mewhile I have been talking:

(1) Emergency measures must be preplanned and madepublic, and information to the public must beincreased.

(2) A clear understanding of radiation policy andpreventive measures must be achieved through thecorrect use of words. Precise terminology must beagreed in scientific and not polemical debate.

(3) Communication must be greatly increased andimproved at all levels.

56

Session 7

MANAGEMENT OFCONTAMINATED AGRICULTURAL AREAS

Current situationA.W. Randell (FAO)

Agricultural protective measuresMJ. Crick (IAEA)

DISCUSSION

L.A. Il'in (USSR): I would like to make a few com-ments. Three years ago in the USSR, our laboratory atthe Institute of Biophysics in Moscow, in co-operationwith colleagues from other institutes, developed a spe-cial method for decontaminating milk using specialfilters, which was intended for use on private farms. Itwas based on the compound 'Ferrozin', which Dr. Crickhas just shown you, and which was also developed by usfor these systems. Together with our colleagues from theUkrSSR and the RSFSR, we have carried out large scaletests of this method on over one-and-a-half thousandindividual farms. The high level of effectiveness of thismethod was confirmed, as the system can deal with fivelitres of contaminated milk per minute, reducing thecaesium concentration in the eluate by an order of mag-nitude. At the same time, with our colleagues fromSverdlovsk we have developed a compound called'Befezh'. This compound consists of Prussian Blueassociated with carboxymethyl cellulose, which isintended as a feed additive for cattle consuming contami-nated produce. The results have been very significant,and I would therefore like to use this example once againto emphasize the urgent need for a joint programme ofco-operation. The principles followed by our Norwegiancolleagues are similar except that, unlike us, they useboluses, whereas we are using two systems. I must saythat the reaction of the population has been very interest-ing. We have been working in a region in the south ofthe Gomel province, in the UkrSSR in the Rovenskprovince, and in the RSFSR in the Bryansk province,and the population showed great interest in the use ofthese systems, which consist of a rather simple installa-tion. These installations, and particularly the filters, canbe easily replaced, and the population obtains milkwhich is virtually free of contamination. Judging fromthe present meeting therefore, I think that everyonewould benefit greatly if these two programmes could becombined in the future. The main problem, as always,

is practical implementation. We need to have a goodcustomer. Our colleagues on the programme have comeup against the same problem, but I think this only con-firms the fact that independent scientists have reachedthe same conclusions, and the results have been verypositive. The figures shown by Dr. Crick are suffi-ciently close to those we obtained in the USSR. Just onesmall obstacle remains: to introduce these methods, onthe basis of objective assessment, into the lives of thepeople living in these areas.

F.P. Kurchenko (USSR): I would like to expressmy point of view on a number of questions. The datapresented here provide rather detailed information onthe scale of the measures taken in agro-industrialproduction to reduce the amount of both internal andexternal irradiation to the population living in the con-taminated areas by reducing the radionuclide content inhuman foodstuffs and by organizing radiometricmonitoring of these foodstuffs. At the same time, a num-ber of comments have been made in the TechnicalReport and at this Conference, and recommendationshave been made to improve the activity of radiologicalscientific research institutions and agricultural adminis-trative bodies. We are in full agreement with this. Itmust be admitted that there has been a tendency for the^Sr content in the soils and in agricultural produce toincrease, particularly at low concentrations of radio-nuclides. We would be very grateful if the IAEA couldassist in providing the radiological control services withthe necessary sets of standard reagents and apparatus,and could provide the opportunity for a number ofSoviet specialists to visit appropriate scientific and prac-tical institutes in Western Europe for training, thus con-tributing to the undertaking of further planned inter-calibration of the apparatus as well as unification andstandardization of the analysis methods used. It wouldbe even more effective if the work in a given area couldbe carried out jointly by Soviet and internationalspecialists.

57

Session 7

Specialists in agricultural radiobiology have beenvery interested to hear of the proposals for the greateruse of models to predict the levels of radionuclidecontent in foodstuffs. I should mention that such predic-tion models were in fact developed some time ago in theUSSR during the cleanup operations following the radia-tion accident in the Southern Urals, and were used in theorganization of a system of measures which, in general,was implemented both in the conditions there and in theearly stages of the cleanup operations following theaccident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Someaspects of this prediction model were included in therecommendations concerning agricultural productionpublished in 1991. This is the most recent of over 100recommendations on the management of agriculturalproduction. We were pleased to note the good sense ofthis recommendation and we shall suggest a wider appli-cation of this prediction model to our administrativebodies. At present, the agricultural experts say thatcrops can be grown in areas with up to 40 Ci/km2

(1480 kBq/m2) without significant restrictions, andsome crops can also be grown where the level ofcontamination is up to 80 Ci. (This is to answer thequestion asked by Dr. Randell.) We feel that land needonly be taken out of agricultural production and putunder forest when there is a level of over 80 Ci/km2

(2960 kBq/m2). In other areas, agricultural activity canbe carried out with just a few special recommendations,restrictions and measures to be observed.

We would like to draw your attention to a problemwhich we may now encounter, which also arises in someaspects of the research carried out by Professor Lee. TheUSSR Ministry of Health has now suggested stricterstandards for animal husbandry and in particular formeat. Five years after the accident the problem of con-taminated meat may arise once again. As you are aware,after all of the measures have been implemented, thesituation of meat production in the USSR is as follows:in 1986, 5.68% of the meat produced in the contami-nated areas was contaminated and in 1990 this figurewas 0.01%. When the new standard is introduced thepercentage of contaminated meat may be increased sub-stantially because at present the radiation measuringequipment available in the USSR is not capable of reli-able measurement of the new levels. The new level is740 Bq/kg. We have a request to make in this connec-tion. I understand that it is a complicated matter, but wewould request that the possibility be considered ofproviding assistance in the form of Canberra and Selenadevices.

We have a problem with milk. In general, we sharethe views expressed by Dr. Crick but we would like tosay that we have been working on this problem, asreported by Academician H'in, since 1986. And we havestudies which show that 'ferrocyanides' and a number ofother preparations are effective. The measures which wehave implemented have reduced the level of contami-

nated milk from 30% to less than 2% in 1990. We haveparticipated fully in developing the internationalprogramme; we are also making use of the achievementsof foreign research workers, and we are now implement-ing them on a comparative basis with our own studiesand results, with the aim of providing contamination-free milk in the private sector as well as in the publicsector. But as you know, there are a few organizationalproblems in obtaining contamination-free milk in theprivate sector. We are certainly even more activelyinvolved in the implementation of these internationalprogrammes in the sector concerning the wider applica-tion of caesium binding technologies in both the produc-tion and processing of foodstuffs. I would not like totake this opportunity of twisting your words; I wouldonly like to say that in the course of our work we canprovide any interested scientists concerned with agricul-tural problems with any of the necessary material in ourpossession which was obtained following the visit ofexperts to the USSR. I have such material with me now.

I would like once again to thank the internationalexperts for their generous assistance to Soviet agricul-tural specialists.

R.M. Nordin (Malaysia): In his last comment ontrade, Dr. Randell mentioned the trade situation withSouth East Asia, where the people concerned are refus-ing to accept food exported from the region. CanDr. Randell tell us what was the previous situation con-cerning trade between the region and South East Asiaand what is the current situation? What other areas arerejecting food from the Republics? Is there any reasonwhy you singled out South East Asia in your statement?You mentioned that you are trying to clear this problemwith the Codex Alimentarius. I understand that theCodex Alimentarius has already discussed the matterand may be finalizing the text now in Kuala Lumpur.

A.W. Randell (FAO): South East Asia imports andexports quite a lot of food, and its imports from Europein general were severely restricted after Chernobyl.South East Asia probably imposes the severest limits oninternational trade for radionuclide contamination, andwe do not quite understand why they are as low as theyare. We think the Codex Alimentarius levels are per-fectly adequate, and we will be taking this up at theCodex Alimentarius meeting in July this year. We alsohave a small problem, not quite as severe as with SouthEast Asia, with the West Asian countries, although theyare quite willing to accept the Codex Alimentariuslimits. In 1986, after a very severe drop in the earlymonths after Chernobyl, trade tended to pick up and infact increase in Europe as a lot of meat moved up intothe Scandinavian countries to replace meat that was lostthere. So you can see what free market economy can dofor trade in adverse situations.

I think the use of Prussian Blue is developing into thesort of problem faced by farmers all over the world

58

Contaminated Agricultural Areas: Discussion

when they are dealing with different ways to tackle aproblem. There are economic advantages to differenttechniques, depending on the situation. And the eco-nomic effectiveness of the different Prussian Blue tech-niques, in the bolus or the filters, will probably requirefurther study. I am certain that the local populations aregoing to have a wonderful time deciding which of thesetechniques they would like to use. This would give thepeople concerned a say in how they deal with theproblem, which would be a good thing in any case. Itwould also respond to local circumstances and the localeconomic situation, even at a very micro-level, which isalso beneficial. The bolus technique works on meat andnot only on milk. Basically, with the bolus, all we aredoing is putting the bolus ahead in the production systemrather than behind. Speaking of behind, the bolus alsoworks on binding the caesium in the other output ofcattle and preventing the caesium from re-entering theenvironmental system from the dung. The work done bythe Ministries of Agriculture of the three Republics hasbeen quite extraordinary, and there is a great deal moreto do.

FAO and the IAEA are working together, particu-larly through the Joint Division here in Vienna, and weshall be working together with people from the three

Republics and from other countries on the application ofagricultural countermeasures. Two consultants meetingshave already taken place and more are planned. We arevery impressed by the openness shown by the agricul-tural people in the affected Republics, and working withthem is really a delight. As the situation develops and aschanges are made, the problem of providing instrumentsand techniques for control of contamination in meat willof course have to be tackled by the USSR, perhaps withoutside help. FAO has been working with developingcountries in setting up training courses for control ofradionuclide contamination in food and explaining topeople how to apply control. In other words, if you get10 Bq/kg over the established limit, don't shout panicstations, but react calmly and find out what the situationreally is. Perhaps even take another sample and tryagain.

This is FAO's approach and we shall very likelybe publishing it, so it might be that through our co-operative efforts with the IAEA, we can make contactwith the USSR. Our biggest difficulty is that we have aconstitutional impediment to working directly with theUSSR because, unfortunately, the USSR is not a mem-ber of FAO. Perhaps that will change one day.

59

Panel Discussion

The Lessons Learned

M. Rosen (IAEA): The Panel has been called to talkabout the lessons learned. I could start by concentratingon one problem that is inherent in any large accident: thedifficulty of communication, particularly the difficultyof separating the facts from the plethora of informationthat becomes available. Certainly a major objective ofthe International Chernobyl Project was to clarify thecurrent situation and to separate the facts from themyths. The Project concentrated on assessing the healtheffects of contamination and radiation exposure andassessing the protective measures taken. As you areaware, this was accomplished first by reviewing theexisting material for reliability and accuracy, whichentailed visits to numerous institutes, hospitals andgovernment agencies, and, second, by independent fieldwork on the part of scientists and physicians.

This Project was the first systematic and methodicalstudy by independent international experts. Most impor-tant, its results are documented in the three volumeswhich have been made available to you for scrutiny. Theinformation obtained by the study led the Project expertsto numerous conclusions. Without restating or sum-marizing these conclusions, let me just mention a few inthe medical area, concerning health effects. The Projectexperts concluded that there were no health disordersthat could be attributed directly to radiation exposure.They also noted that the official data did not indicate amarked increase in the incidence of leukaemia or cancer.They did state that there could be a statistically detecta-ble increase in the incidence of thyroid tumours in thefuture. These few conclusions were the results of thework of a group of 28 physicians, which does not neces-sarily mean that these results are absolutely correct, butthey are the outcome of a systematic and controlledstudy. Yesterday, however, we were presented withresults of Soviet studies which indicated a significantincrease in immune system disorders in the BSSR and ofcurrent cases of thyroid cancer in the UkrSSR. Unfor-tunately, this information had not been made available tothe Project experts. But the situation does allow us tolook ahead, and I would urge individuals and institutesto make their information available to the internationalcommunity.

I hope that this Project has shown the need for theentire international community to assist the people in theaffected areas. We know the Soviet scientific communityneeds equipment and assistance, and we know thatpeople in the local communities need further medicalcare and other assistance to ensure that they can livehealthy and productive lives. Knowing the facts of thesituation will allow us to channel international assistanceto the areas where it is most needed and can be best used.

G.O. Gotovchits (UkrSSR): I represent the body[the UkrSSR Ministry for Protection of the Populationfrom the Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident]which was entrusted with the responsibility for decisionmaking and for the comprehensiveness and effectivenessof the protective measures to be implemented. I wouldtherefore like to make a few comments on this problemin connection with the report of the InternationalAdvisory Committee. We have great respect for thework that has been done, and we value enormously theprofessionalism of those people who have performedthis work, their highly refined methodology, their greattechnical capacity, and their selflessness. We areextremely grateful to everyone. However, as a practicalman, I would like, with your permission, to draw yourattention to certain significant features of the realisticevaluation of the situation in connection with thematerial put before us.

First, the evaluations of environmental contaminationseem to agree overall. However, we feel that more atten-tion should be paid to the role played by 'hot spots' inthe overall picture, which Dr. Bar'yakhtar particularlymentioned in his statement. The problem of high stron-tium and radionuclide contamination levels in the watermeadows of the Pripyat river is worrying; this river isa main artery of the Dneper basin, the water from whichis used by approximately 32 million people in theUkrSSR. In certain circumstances this could have seri-ous negative consequences. There are similar points,other examples, and I think that ignoring them herecould lead us to draw unjustifiably liberal conclusions.

Second, with regard to state of health, whichDr. Rosen has just been talking about, and possiblechanges thereto (I also refer to the statements madeby Dr. Bar'yakhtar, Dr. Konoplya, Dr. Tron'ko,Dr. Dushutin and others), this is an extremely signifi-cant problem which has not been taken into account inthe Report and is therefore not included in theprogramme of the Conference. Here we are talkingabout significant numbers of people — cleanup staff,evacuees, and people who are still living in the morehighly contaminated areas. The latest data from thescientists and health service specialists in the UkrSSRand BSSR seem to indicate, unfortunately, that there arenegative trends (in order to save time I won't quotefigures) such as, to cite the main ones: impairment of theimmune system; a rise in the number of sexual distur-bances; disturbances of the functioning of the hearingand vestibulary systems; qualitative and quantitativechanges in the blood count; leucocytosis; a definiteincrease in diseases of the respiratory organs, the gastro-intestinal tract and the cardiovascular system. The

61

Panel Discussion

increase in gynaecological problems amongst women iscause for serious concern. Moreover, scientists at theАН-Union Scientific Centre of Radiation Medicine havereliably proved that there is an increase in psychogeneticeffects, and there are also worrying data, such as thosewhich Dr. Tron'ko was talking about, on cancer of thethyroid gland. The attempts of the experts of the Inter-national Project to determine the health effects of theradiation in isolation, so to speak, i.e. not taking intoaccount other environmental contamination factors,including chemical contamination, is also cause for con-cern. The energy effect was not investigated. Perhaps anapproach of this kind may be justified from a purelyscientific point of view, but these materials are also validin applied terms since they will be used to make deci-sions which will affect the fate of hundreds of thousandsof people. Problems of this kind should be reflectedmore extensively and in greater detail in the researchmaterials.

In the evaluation of protective measures, where men-tion is made of the extremes (in the opinion of theexperts) which were gone to with respect to evacuationof large numbers of the population in areas of theaffected Republics, it seems to me that this conclusiondoes not take into account several extremely significantconcomitant factors. These conclusions are, we feel,based only on an evaluation of the contamination leveland dose commitments; they take no account of thereduction in the amount of agricultural land available,rescheduling of production activities, reduction in thequality of fodder, the fact that local products and for-estry products could not be used, the drop in the employ-ment rate; in short, the disruption and total destructionof the normal way of life and working environment ofthe population, which meant that people simply couldnot live there. I must stress that in all these cases this wasdone in accordance with the declaration concerninghabitation of contaminated territories (the laws passed inthe country as a whole and in the Republics state thatevacuation must be voluntary); only in this way was afinal decision taken. We also feel that the potentialsources of danger which, alas, still exist cannot bedisregarded. Here I am talking about the destroyedUnit 4 of the plant, the so-called sarcophagus, dozens ofburial sites for highly radioactive waste in the 30 kmzone which, as we know, are being monitored, but aboutwhose fate more fundamental decisions must be taken inthe future. All of these sources of risk are not local incharacter — they are a potential risk not only for theaffected Republics but for the whole world. In addition,it would be wrong not to take into account the psycho-logical influence of these factors on the public in sur-rounding areas.

As a result of these and other problems which havebeen dealt with in the statements made by my colleagues— though we understand that it was clearly impossibleto examine and solve all these problems in the limited

time available, and certain topics were not included inthe framework of the project — nevertheless, if we con-sider our responsibility from the point of view of deci-sions which will need to be taken for the future andpossible further developments, I would like to draw twoconclusions. First, we should not think of this work asbeing finished, but rather we feel it should go on untilwe have found clear and well founded answers to all theproblems we have uncovered during these discussions.Second, we feel that some of the basic conclusionswhich have been drawn concerning the radiological con-sequences of Chernobyl are too optimistic and couldtherefore be deleterious not only to the cleanup plan butalso to nuclear safety problems in general.

We cannot, unfortunately, agree entirely with theconclusions concerning the overall health effects of theradiation on the population in affected areas as set out inthe draft document. The representatives of the BSSR andthe UkrSSR have prepared a statement on this matterwhich will be submitted to the Chairman. We would askyou to look at our opinions, comments and proposals andto make suitable corrections to the final version of theTechnical Report.

Comment from a (Russian-speaking) participant:1

On the whole, I assess positively the work done by theInternational experts and I think it will help to reassurethose people in the USSR who say even now that themeasures taken by the Government to protect the healthof the population from the effects of radiation wereinadequate. I agree with my colleagues from theUkrSSR that the chapters of the Technical Report deal-ing with environmental contamination, protective meas-ures and radiation exposure of the population basicallyconfirm the vast amount of work done by the Sovietscientists in the first few days and those that followed.

We have been taken to task for overestimating a num-ber of values, but I agree with Academician II'in thatwhen in May 1986 a decision had to be taken in an hour,those who were to take the decision had no other choicebut to go for stricter measures and stricter conditions.Moreover, the health of children in terms of the condi-tion of the thyroid is a very important matter in theBSSR, where the southern part of the endemic areas wasaffected. There were 500 000 children among thoseaffected by iodine. The studies carried out by our Lenin-grad colleagues have shown a number of changes in thethyroid among children. I feel that right from the outsetour Government should have paid more attention to thisproblem and the studies should have covered both thecleanup workers (the 'liquidators') and the large groupof children affected by iodine in April 1986.

It is regretted that the names of this and the subsequent twospeakers were not spoken into the microphone and weretherefore not recorded.

62

Panel Discussion

The conclusions in the Technical Report chapteron protective measures are also important for theBSSR — 70% of its total affected population live in the1-5 Ci/km2 (37-185 kBq/m2) zone. But, consideringthe soils, even in the 1-5 Ci/km2 (37-185 kBq/m2)zone, people in individual settlements received higherexposure doses than those in the zone studied at Bragin,Veprin and other towns. This was due mainly to thetransfer of large amounts of caesium to plants. In partic-ular, the people in these areas obtained cattle feed fromlarge forest tracts. As a result, there was 'contaminated'milk and hence high exposure of a large part of the popu-lation. There is another bad feature of the soil in thePolesskoe marshland — for two years the same fieldyielded clean crops and then in the third year the back-ground increased by two or three orders. This requiresfurther study, and we have sought the co-operation ofinternational organizations in finding a final solution:how to reorient agriculture, what is to be done by thepeople who have been accustomed over centuries to liveon the gifts of the forest but who now find themselvesdeprived of them.

I want to thank all the participants of the InternationalProject, and I hope that this collaboration with interna-tional organizations will continue for the benefit ofmankind.

Comment from the Representative of the StateCommittee on Elimination of the Consequences of theChernobyl Accident, RSFSR: I wish to thank the inter-national experts for their work. In the RSFSR there arealso problems associated with eliminating the conse-quences of the Chernobyl accident — medical, technical,sociopsychological, economic and many others. Theseproblems can be overcome in the long term only withinternational collaboration under a comprehensive All-Union programme, with collaboration between the threeaffected Republics and in collaboration with the inter-national community. We positively assess the documentsreporting the work of the experts. This work should con-tinue since many problems remain, including those ofthe population of the contaminated areas, the 'liquida-tors' and so on. Moreover, it will serve as the basis forfuture studies, which need to be continued for manyyears in order to corroborate the results.

Comment from a (Russian-speaking) participant:The Project has been completed. We consider it to be ofinternational significance, given the participation —more than 200 scientists from 22 countries — and theresults of its assessments. These results are not onlynational; they will be useful for the whole world. Whatis impressive about this Project is that its results can beanalysed by everyone — by an expert who has read theTechnical Report, or by a member of a public interestgroup or an administrator who has read the generalConclusions and Recommendations. The results can alsobe used in writing public information brochures. It will

undoubtedly help people to learn more about Chernobyland its consequences. Indeed, the results of this Projectin many respects assure us that our actions were correctand that adequate measures were taken to ensure protec-tion of the population from radiation. This is one of themost important conclusions, and there is no doubt thatthe results will be useful now, when a long termprogramme of activities for the affected areas is beingprepared. We again express our gratitude to all thosewho took part in the Project. However, every new studyraises new problems, and these have been mentionedhere. We appeal for further international co-operation inthe study of the health of the 'liquidators' and in thestudy of the action of iodine on the thyroid of children.The project is ending but nobody should get the impres-sion that the Chernobyl problem is being closed. Theissue is highly complex — a tangle of radiological,social, psychological and stress problems for hundredsof thousands of people. These problems remain, and Ishould not like to say that they grew out of nothing. TheChernobyl problems are extremely complicated andrequire further study and more hard work.

F.A. Mettler (USA): Many points have been raised,and I agree that nobody should go away from here think-ing this is the end of studying the problems of Cher-nobyl. We have certainly made it clear that we thinkthere are things worth studying in the future, and thatthere are populations of significant interest which wehave not examined in this Project. Not because they arenot important, but because they were not part of therequest to us by the Government of the USSR. Certainlythe decontamination workers are important; certainlythere are high risk subgroups and certainly there arethose people who suffered the acute radiation syndrome,and so forth. Our Project was limited to the task that wewere given, and we are perfectly willing to agree thatthere are many other things to do that may in fact bemore important. It was difficult for us, in terms of datareview, in terms of viewing things and, as I pointed outto you earlier, there were basically two kinds of thingswe could do: one was to review data for those low preva-lence diseases, and the other was to look for internalcoherence in that data and for consistency with data weobtained from other sources on the same topic. I was notprivileged to get all that BSSR data until about half anhour ago, but I would like to give you some idea aboutit. I think it shows some of the problems that we had,and you can judge for yourselves.

It is important to look carefully at the data that ourBSSR colleague has mentioned to you. He suggests thatthe data show clear evidence of immune problems(especially in children) that are manifested by increasesin all sorts of diseases. Since I have only had thismaterial in my possession for 30 minutes I took theliberty of photocopying nine sequential tables (Nos106-114), from the document Main indicators of health

63

Panel Discussion

in Gomel and Mogilev regions, issued by the ScientificInstitute of Radiation Medicine of the Ministry of Healthof the BSSR, Minsk, in 1991. [They are reproduced atthe end of this Panel Discussion as Tables I-IX.] Thesedata relate to strict control areas (i.e. highly contami-nated) in Gomel and Mogilev regions and cover theyears 1976 through 1989. This allows us to look at year-to-year variations, trends before and after the Chernobylaccident, and anomalies in data collection.

Table 106 [reproduced here as Table /] shows theincidence of meningitis in children. Incidence of infec-tions is important since any depression of the immunesystem should result in increases of both viral and bac-terial infections. We can see for strict control areas inthe Gomel region that the incidence of meningitis in1988 (2.0) and 1989 (2.1) was in fact lower than in anyyear preceding the accident. In the Mogilev region thehighest number of meningitis cases was seen in the years1982-1985, not after 1986.

Table 107 includes similar data on chickenpox inchildren. There is a minimally increasing trend but thehighest incidence in the Gomel region was in 1983before the accident. Changes are also reported that spantwo orders of magnitude from year to year in the samedistrict (for example 28.8 (1982), 313.7 (1983) and 5.6(1984).

Table 108 relates to measles in children. This tableclearly shows a much lower incidence of disease sincethe accident compared to the period 1980-1985.

Tables 109 and 110 (viral hepatitis in adults and chil-dren) both show no change since the accident and, infact, both show that the incidence was higher in 1983than in any year since the accident.

Tables 111 and 112 relate to respiratory diseases inadults and children respectively. Incidence rates overallare higher since the accident but there has been a cons-tantly rising trend since 1976. Both tables also showinteryear and intervillage variation that are difficult toexplain. The magnitude of these variations is much morethan the increasing trends. For example in Table 111reported incidence rates vary from about 1000/10 000(10%) to 47/10 000 (0.47%) within the same districtyear to year and between villages for the same year.

Table 113 (viral morbidity in adults) shows reportedincidence that is highest in 1976 for both contaminatedareas Gomel and Mogilev. There was clearly a reportingproblem in 1987 with incidence rates dropping from200-300/10 000 in 1986 to 9/10 000 in 1987 and thenback up to 500-600/10 000 in 1988.

Table 114 (viral morbidity in children) again showsimmense variation from year to year for given districts.The variation is one to three orders of magnitude. [Thespeaker presented several more tables and discussedthem. ]

In summary, the data reveals major problems in datacollection methodology which have caused statisticalnoise that is much greater than the claimed radiation

effects. These Soviet data should be subjected to a rigidstatistical analysis before conclusions are drawn fromthem.

We tried to perform a scientific study which had con-trol groups and quality control and which hopefully wasbeyond reproach. We tried to leave a trail as to exactlyhow we did everything, so if somebody wants to repeatour results they can follow our path exactly. There is noquestion that our study is limited to the rural population,and this is because we were looking for people in theareas of highest contamination. There is no question thatI would certainly look at groups of 'liquidators', that Ithink they are probably very important, and that theymay ultimately show more health effects.

I think nobody is willing to walk away from thismeeting and say there will be no radiation inducedcancer deaths in the regions we studied; we would notexpect them at this point in time. Our study is reallylimited to a screening examination which would pick upmajor but not minor health issues. It is important torealize that there are sick people in these regions. Whenyou have a screening examination that picks up 15% ofadults we think should see a doctor or who are seeing adoctor at that moment, that is not an insignificantnumber. And we excluded hypertensives from thatgroup, so we know that there are more who should bein the care of a doctor. We know that if we had madeadditional types of tests on each person we would havefound more disease.

There certainly may be health effects worth studyingin the future. Well organized studies with appropriatecontrol groups are needed, together with the best dosi-metry that people can get. We have suggested that theseactivities be co-ordinated through one central group, inthis case WHO, so that scientists working in one areawill have some idea that another group is working inanother area, and they can all use the same methodol-ogy. What we do not want in the future is an agreementin one Republic to study thyroid one way and an agree-ment in another to study it in a different way so that wewould not be able to compare the results. We mustachieve uniformity amongst both Soviet and inter-national investigators if we hope to get useful data.

There are many children in the areas we have dis-cussed. We know there are children in all these areaswith leukaemia from various causes, and I think all ofthem deserve treatment. Not just because we are callingthem Chernobyl children or because we say it is due toradiation. I don't care what the cause of the leukaemiais: they all deserve equal treatment.

P. Hedemann Jensen (Denmark): I would like tocomment on Dr. Gotovchits' statement that in our evalu-ation of the protective measures we only took into con-sideration the radiological, the radiation, the radio-activity factors. That is correct, but it is not the wholestory. We tried to separate the variables in the decision

64

Panel Discussion

process, and the radiological factor is only one input fordecision making. Our conclusions were very clear: wesaid that the criteria should not be more restricted; theyshould be strongly resisted unless there are overridingconsiderations of a social nature. So I think the messageis clear, and we know that the driving factors in thedecision process have been other than those of purelyradiological protection. May I draw your attentionto Table 21 in Part G of the Technical Report. Wehave heard that plans exist to relocate more than200 000 people. The criterion for relocation, althoughI understand it has changed now, was 40 Ci/km2

(1.5 MBq/m2). The table that I mentioned indicates thatabout 15 000 people are living in the contaminated areas,above 40 Ci/km2 (1.5 MBq/m2). However, 200 000 areto be relocated owing to the social nature of the problem,so I do not completely agree that we only took radio-activity into account. We said clearly that social con-siderations should be considered.

L.R. Anspaugh (USA): I would like to make a fewsummarizing comments about the doses. There has beensome emphasis on the fact that we concluded that ourindependent estimates were somewhat lower than theofficial doses from the USSR and that Task Group 5 hasbeen somewhat critical of the deliberate conservatism inthe doses that were calculated with the official methodo-logy. I would like to speak for a moment as a doseassessor in the sense that I know that when you areoperating under great pressure it certainly is possible tomake a mistake. If you are reconstructing doses thathave already occurred, that is not so bad, because youhave the opportunity to check your work carefully andmake corrections. But if you are projecting doses intothe future for real people, the impact of a mistake ismuch worse, and the result could do serious harm.There are therefore very strong pressures to be conser-vative, and I think most international models seem to bequite conservative, even though this may not be theoriginal intention.

I should like also to draw attention to the fact that inmore recent times Soviet methodology does in fact useactual data, and this is as it should be. It is unfortunatethat in our country and in others there are some peoplewho refuse to look at data because they are absolutelyconvinced that models are better than data. Perhaps weshould call this disease 'computergenic distonia', withmy apologies to the interpreter. The dose assessmentmethods used in the USSR are indeed very similar tothose in use elsewhere, and they certainly appear toreflect a great deal of experience in modelling as well aswith the data required.

Returning to the issue of conservatism, I think, as Imentioned before, that the only solution is to developgood, probabilistic models, so that the full range ofvariation in results can be examined and used. However,to have developed a probabilistic model is certainly not

enough as it is extremely difficult to make sure that suchmodels are accurate. Thus the model validation studiesare extremely important and I think these are best doneon an organized, international basis. So I return to ourrecommendation that Soviet scientists participate in suchstudies. This is particularly true because I think theyhave access to many data sets that could be used in thevalidation models and could be developed and used inother countries. Finally, I think that if there were everto be another accident anywhere near the scale of Cher-nobyl, we would really need flexible, fully validatedmodels that can be used to project dose very rapidly tothe people affected, with the proviso that we can substi-tute our calculations of atmospheric transport by realdata of the simplest nature, which is typically externalgamma exposure rate measurements.

To conclude: there is an old saying, that you neverknow a man until you walk in his footprints, perhapswearing his shoes. And we certainly looked very hardfor those dusty old shoes that had gone down this road,and we tried to put them on and walk where the peoplehad gone before us. That is why we certainly have agreat deal of respect for the Soviet dosimetrists.

F. Steinhausler (Austria): During the last 48 hoursI have been confronted in numerous interviews byquestions like: "Is Chernobyl only half as bad as wehave seen it over the past four years?" and "Is the foodreally not so bad as we have been told?" and "Does thewater not contain any radioactivity?" In other words,did Chernobyl not happen?

When we faced the situation 18 months ago, it lookedcompletely different. We were told: "Don't believe thefigures you are given; don't trust the published map,"and ' 'It may be all a big cover-up in any case.'' That wasthe situation in March 1990. And then one is confrontedby people who are worried or frightened, who do notdare to eat and drink what they produce, and this ishappening in an area covering tens of thousands ofsquare kilometres and involving hundreds of settle-ments. And behind you, there are 71 colleagues who aretrying to find the truth, who are asking themselves: "Isthis map, given to us by our Soviet colleagues, correct?Are the milk and food data correct? Do they know howto measure? Do they know how to analyse? Is it safe forthose people to live in that area?" The only way toanswer these questions is to go out and measure, to goto the laboratory and find out how they do it, ask themto collaborate with you, give them unknown samples tomeasure, which is about the hardest test you can give toa scientist. Our Soviet colleagues did this, and then putall the data together. The end result was: yes, the mapsare correct. They are not perfect; they could not be per-fect. They were made under enormous time pressure andwith constraints. I wish I could say that we would havedone better, but I don't think we could.

65

Panel Discussion

Our Report is not a whitewash, with everything cleanand perfect. Anyone who reads the Technical Report orreads the Recommendations and Conclusions does nothave to read between the lines. It is stated quite clearlywhere there are areas that need improvement, whetherin analytical quality assurance control, or participationin international intercomparison exercises. But the mainconclusion does not change. It is: yes, our Sovietcolleagues know what they are doing.

How does this help the people in the settlements whoasked us: "Can we eat the food? Can we drink thewater?" I don't think it helps them if we state repeat-edly, against the facts of measurement, that food is con-taminated, soil is poisoned, water cannot be drunk,when the measurements clearly indicate the contrary. Inmost of the water measurements, for instance, we couldnot detect any radioactivity. Not because we usedunsuitable equipment, but because there isn't any. AndI think this has to be stated and spelled out very clearly.We can help these people, not by reviving their fear, butby believing in the measurements our Soviet colleaguesmade and which have been officially corroborated. Thisis the only way we can give these people back the trustthat they need.

There are indeed problems in the environment whichwe did not want to cover up, or make less of, such asin the aquatic environment, which has a long term poten-tial for a problem, and we have indicated this. Radio-activity does not disappear overnight; it is in the sedi-ment. We have stated this, we have measured it, and ourSoviet colleagues know it. It can show up in fish and inother components of the aquatic environment. We didmeasure radioactivity in food, but we made it quite clearthat commercially available food is under very goodcontrol. It is the privately produced food and food col-lected in forests, against official advice, that is danger-ous. Soviet scientists cannot eliminate caesium frommushrooms grown in forests, and neither can anyoneelse. They can only tell people not to eat mushrooms.

In summary, I would say that the environment doesshow radioactive contamination. Our Technical Reportdoes not diminish the levels, but it puts them intoperspective and on an objective, numerical basis that theoutside world can scrutinize and check. That is the onlyway science can progress; not by rumours and certainlynot by frightening people in the affected areas. Finally,I think it is very unfair to a large segment of the scien-tific community — in this case, our Soviet colleaguesand the other 199 members of the team — to suppose thatwe have been trying to cover up facts or whitewash thesituation. We have not. We have been trying very hardto give a true picture, and I think our Soviet colleagueshave been trying to do the same.

A. Carnino (IAEA): The work of Task Group 1 wasvery different from that of the others. The HistoricalPortrayal contains a great deal of information and was

intended to make the rest of the study easier to under-stand. As a result of the work done by Task Group 1,I should like to recommend that a book be written on thehistory of the accident up to the present time, containingas much information as possible. I believe this wouldhelp to decrease the distrust of the authorities felt by somany people in the affected Republics.

I have found, in the course of interviewing many peo-ple, that official communications on radiation protectionscience are very difficult for the general, non-technicalpublic to understand, even though they have to live withit. It is important that information given to the public isclear, consistent and coherent. Co-operation between thethree Republics to this end would perhaps lessen theuncertainties, and thus the stress, experienced by somany people living in the affected areas.

A. Eggleton (UK): I was somewhat disturbed at thePress Conference two days ago to hear a rather equivo-cal answer to a question on what was going to happenabout the presentation of this Technical Report in theUSSR in the near future. Early progress reports on thisstudy indicated that there were definite plans to sendteams to the USSR to explain the outcome of the studyto the general public. What I heard at the Press Confer-ence suggested that those plans were very vague andincomplete, and I think we would all welcome anauthoritative statement on the future presentation of thisReport to the population of the USSR.

V.A. Gubanov (USSR): I wish to reply to the ques-tion about how this material will be presented in ourcountry. As I pointed out on the first day of the Confer-ence, the data will be available to the scientific commu-nity at large and to all sections of the public. For thispurpose, we are inviting advisers, experts and membersof the International Advisory Committee to our countryto present these data, conclusions and recommendations.There is agreement in principle; only the dates and dura-tions have to be fixed.

I would like to clarify one basic point connected withrelocation. A figure of 218 000 has been given for thepopulation to be relocated, and it is reflected in ourprogramme of urgent measures for 1990-1992. Whatwe mean is that we shall give an opportunity to thesepeople, if they so wish, to move out. We have plannedphysical and financial resources for this number of per-sons. This does not mean that they are to be relocatedcompulsorily.

C.J. Huyskens (IRPA): I should like to make a fewshort remarks about the dosimetry conclusions. It wassaid at the beginning of this Conference that attempts atachieving a better dosimetry should be made not just ina general way, but that attempts should also be made tobring individual dosimetry to the best possible state ofknowledge, especially for those groups which are to befollowed up in the future, such as the 'liquidators'.

66

Panel Discussion

General information or average figures on dosimetryshould be avoided and not taken as a starting point forcorrelation with health effects.

You all know from experience that it is tremendouslydifficult to find any relation between health effects anddosimetry data. The general public is not very wellaware of the details and pitfalls of dosimetry. We cannotafford another such accident, not only because of theradiological consequences, but surely also because of thesocial consequences. We must not only pay great atten-tion in the next few years to research on what we canlearn from Chernobyl about the radiological conse-quences but should give the same attention, the samework force, to the prevention of such accidents in thefuture.

Comment from a (Russian-speaking) participant:I wish to comment on Dr. Mettler's statement in theReport. It contains negative as well as positive figures.Our speakers have pointed out that the incidence of alldiseases has not risen but only that of some cardio-vascular diseases. I should like to quote some data.Take, for example, ischaemic heart disease. In theNarovlya district (mentioned by Dr. Konoplya) in 1985there were 0.23 cases per 1000 persons; in 1989 in theBragin district there were 9.24; in the Narovlya district2.41, 7.55; in the Krasnopol'e district 1.55, 5.58.1 shallnot go into more detail. We have to work over thesestatistics and find methods. I agree with Dr. Mettler, butwe should look not only at the positive but also at thenegative figures.

Notes on Tables I-IX

Tables I-IX are transcribed from photocopies of Tables 106-114 from the document Main indicators of health inGomel and Mogilev regions issued by the Scientific Institute of Radiation Medicine of the Ministry of Health of theBSSR, Minsk, in 1991. They are reproduced here in unedited form to illustrate remarks made during the Panel Discus-sion by Dr. F.A. Mettler. The underlinings have been added by Dr. Mettler.

67

Panel Discussion

TABLE I. Meningitis in Children

Таблица 106. Заболеваемость детского населения контролируемых районов Гомельской и Могилевскойобластей менингококовой инфекцией (на 10 000 детей)

Районы 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981

Гомельская

БрагинскийБуда-КошелевскийВетковскийДобрушскийЕльскийКормянскийЛельчицкийЛоевскийНаровлянскийХойникскийЧечерскийОктябрьский

По области

2,21,7

-----

8,31,61,62,6

-

2,2

1,10,83,12,53,0

--

2,1-

3,22,8

-

2,7

.

2,61,0

-1,51,43,24,3

-1,78,7

-

2,7

Могилевская

Быховский 1,4КлимовичскийКостюковичскийКраснопольский 1,4Славгородский 2,3Чериковский 1,7Горецкий 3,0Глусский

По области 1,8

1,4 2,2 3,71,0 1,0 6,2

1,9 2,9.

1,2 1,43,5 3,6

1,6-

2,1 2,1 2,7

6,0-

1,0-

1,6-

4,0-

3,3

4,6--

3,41,61,895,7

3,3

1982

область

1,2-

1,11,74,5

-

1,14,2

-3,53,0

-

2,8

область

3,2--

4,84,83,82,5

-

3,7

1983

3,61,81,10,92,9

-3,3

-3,27,91,5

-

3,2

5,72,21,2

-

1,7-

3,3-

3,9

1984

2,51,82,83,52,9

--

2,11,62,71,52,1

3,1

4,91,2

-3,4

-4,07,42,0

4,5

1985

2,53,85,31,85,8

--

2,2-

1,86,2

-

3,7

4,9-

6,3-

7,12,04,12,1

4,8

1986

1,52,85,6

-3,0

-2,42,2

-3,66,82,1

3,1

3,21,24,01,89,15,92,48,7

3,7

1987

3,90,96,3

---

2,42,32,11,29,12,1

3,1

3,2----

2,10,84,2

3,2

1988

3,71,92,61,8

--

1,22,3

-2,3

-

-

2,0

2,41,34,0

-1,9

14,91,62,1

3,2

1989

3,72,95,70,91,6

-1,24,8

-

1,1--

2,1

1,62,62,62,32,06,21,6

6,38

2,7

Примечание: достоверных данных о заболеваемости детского населения Гомельской области менингококовой инфекцией в1976-1978 гг. нет.

68

Panel Discussion

TABLE II. Chickenpox in Children

Таблица 107. Заболеваемость детского населения контролируемых районов Гомельской и Могилевскойобластей ветряной оспой (на 10 000 детей)

Районы 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

Гомельская область


По области

96,6101,7113,4182,793,9

148,781,929,8

193,612,1

238,060,8

67,857,833,0

192,364,271,016,1

137,0261,7

38,688,472,0

27,4112,9113,2279,1129,928,845,123,4

391,8249,1149,340,8

70,7183,0152,8338,6

55,9313,7

56,2583,798,438,1

307,791,7

158,877,877,2

151,886,8

5,69,2

217,0314,5178,6223,1

21,3

22,844,323,4

282,153,613,948,8

252,2458,1109,9253,1

67,4

73,4111,339,3

212,7231,3111,4

4,8155,6332,1

77,755,914,9

76,5217,6

82,3244,5114,1

-148,886,4

127,7145,8369,1102,1

9,3161,981,3

264,3138,148,553,6

193,091,354,8

198,2206,3

94,460,840,0

271,2230,7270,2

34,1285,7406,3267,8132,7172,3

222,1 210,8 226,1 280,1

Могилевская область

213,1 247,9 264,2 215,1 197,8 265,8

БыховскийКлимовичскийКостюковичскийКраснопольскийСлавгородскийЧериковскийГорецкийГлусский

176,7222,0136,042,557,666,182,465,7

150,040,659,3

150,743,252,6

109,5257,1

209,0142,4116,259,429,247,283,3

120,0

261,7108,386,4

201,611,823,6

128,0133,9

123,3248,4

34,724,1

147,680,894,489,1

323,998,970,832,2

1,688,754,1

269,1

227,859,6

120,7372,695,2

167,977,5

316,7

203,3113,3151,9126,767,8

141,291,7

180,4

322,182,441,345,841,4

272,099,246,9

195,134,9

219,0128,155,492,182,6

157,5

292,7168,3160,0364,8125,5147,068,0

363,0

(а)(а)(а)55,179,2(а)35,5

285,1

159,856,4

135,1348,9

11,553,1

112,2376,6

237,488,3

270,1168,240,1

127,0172,178,7

По области 193,1 161,3 182,7 212,2 199,3 194,7 282,8 193,6 228,7 237,8 260,1 202,5 221,6

Примечание: достоверных данных о заболеваемости детского населения Гомельской области ветряной оспой в 1976-1978 гг. нет.

(a): Number illegible on photocopy received.

69

Panel Discussion

TABLE III. Measles in Children

Таблица 108. Заболеваемость детского населения контролируемых районов Гомельской и Могилевскойобластей корью (на 10 000 детей)

Районы 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989



По области

-0,82,01,6--

11,36,34,8---

112,434,214,474,4

-13,533,076,6

246,850,0

188,73,9

20,76,9

22,34,3

50,752,210,8

--

30,3133,3

6,0

81,035,328,6

117,477,615,12,2

68,18,2

101,3249,3

8,2

19,651,8

2,682,445,2

6,720,4

8,128,34,6

1,313,917,49,6

62,12,1

37,53,1

2,59,42,12,7

47,81,41,2

89,1

3,634,7

43,80,9

1,8

13,33,6

42,915,3

2,1 100,0

11,89,3

10,10,9

27,12,46,82,1

36,127,312,5

6,2 67,5 24,5 86,2 24,6 19,7 21,7


4,8 10,8

50,0

4,00,9

4,41,2

34,92,27,1

60,0

1,22,4

4,4 0,4


По области

43,244,0

6,3-1,21,73,81,5

22,8

138,66,95,6-

22,2163,230,7

1,6

84,4

26,93,0

92,4-

11,127,3

6,3140,0

64,8

18,0248,5122,3193,4108,8

18,918,4

-

64,7

112,023,734,710,33,2

13,5158,4

10,9

77,9

4,6-

12,459,3

109,737,7

-3,6

13.4

35,7-9,24,81,6

67,912,516,7

44,1

8,1-7,4

36,7-

152,927,5

5,9

14.7

--

п,з3,41,74,00,8

14,3

26.8

3,3115,7

-14,012,57,8

66,92,1

20,6

---

11,1-3,9--

1,9

6,62,5-----

19,1

3,7

1,6-----0,8-

0,7

--------

oj.

Примечание: достоверных данных о заболеваемости детского населения Гомельской области корью в 1976-1978 гг. нет.

70

Panel Discussion

TABLE IV. Viral Hepatitis in Adults

Таблица 109. Заболеваемость населения контролируемых районов Гомельской и Могилевской областейвирусным гепатитом А (на 10 000 населения)

Районы 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981



По области

6,47,46,5

13,726,919,711,024,1

7,014,95,7

17,6

12,9

19,132,7

9,927,914,114,913,18,69,2

26,46,4

28,9

20,0

14,616,017,031,312,915,85,63,55,1

25,611,45,3

14,2

9,916,528,714,510,640,6

9,99,8

11,926,527,015,2

17,3

16,328,531,916,327,027,221,113,121,212,848,320,8

23,9

76,921,313,616,055,031,315,942,755,520,843,8

5,1

30,3



11,19,4

20,926,919,912,719,05,4

15,721,418,823,929,2

7,18,46,6

8,810,013,121,7

9,35,89,4

33,4

16,847,622,927,319,513,714,813,0

18,525,522,223,428,422,229,012,7

14,831,815,025,327,812,636,325,2

1982

область

74,263,735,259,148,480,523,646,191,119,820,134,0

43,2

область

15,813,713,432,834,414,241,124,9

1983

34,151,954,849,340,361,656,760,157,038,744,173,0

50,5

22,854,221,511,060,834,435,663,2

1984

14,923,732,728,025,726,531,123,326,319,132,938,9

26,7

24,529,418,818,717,136,652,638,0

1985

14,620,018,628,345,328,318,618,828,812,312,328,2

21,4

27,117,225,526,317,39,4

29,511,0

1986

11,916,914,917,916,623,718,524,928,6

9,019,59,1

19,7

21,29,9

28,111,617,239,115,64,4

1987

7,86,99,0

21,820,321,229,111,716,49,1

28,321,1

15,3

11,720,129,9

3,48,2

19,14,86,6

1988 1989

12,0 27,033,3 64,0

9,7 49,722,4 11,819,8 49,09,7 33,1

29,5 28,013,1 46,814,6 62,114,7 27,84,0 14,7

14,9 46,8

19,3 38,2

11,8 32,026,0 27,017,8 23,12,6 61,07,6 12,75,4 34,18,4 51,7

12,4 40,4

По области 13,6 15,6 15,2 20,2 22,1 32,2 43,2 29,7 26,6 20,9 16,0 18,6 40,2

71

Panel Discussion

TABLE V. Viral Hepatitis in Children

Таблица НО. Заболеваемость детского населения контролируемых районов Гомельской и Могилевскойобластей вирусным гепатитом А (на 10 000 детей)

Районы 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989


По области


По области

35,664,911,9

12,320,520,6


22,840,763,726,620,992,622,720,819,069,376,345,1

40,455,677,337,251,555,468,134,058,134,7

138,056,9

244,850,014,925,6

137,368,137,6

132,6185,053,8

139,110,0

203,6198,386,8

161,7113,4189,062,6

112,8280,3

56,150,773,5

97,6139,3122,0137,791,2

135,6167,4136,7164,5113,3126,2181,3

27,554,651,161,458,849,370,140,441,949,184,6

102,1

44,334,934,052,795,745,832,632,661,331,523,473,9

23,430,239,330,935,822,944,028,962,517,942,417,0

9,812,912,748,237,524,354,8

9,129,812,087,350,0


26,0 42,9 21,6 50,4 45,9 39,2 39,7 57,7 52,5 71,5 44,7 26,220,0 47,5 23,2 126,8 65,6 67,4 23,4 126,8 67,1 39,8 12,2 31,3

58,9 56,5 51,6 70,5 74,1 55,9 77,4 25,0 33,9 50,9 18,5 8,248,2 49,4 15,3 33,8 54,0 62,9 67,7 167,8 36,2 32,1 30,9 17,0

7,321,4

125,0

32,141,635,7

50,087,232,7

32,196,767,3

22,6109,277,8

74,5101,7184,3

106,0150,493,9

23,571,923,4

98,027,917,4

29,22,4

12,8

14,8100,0

14,748,244,410,258,316,321,751,2

1,814,6

25,,4,3

50,5 42,6 24,8 55,3 53,7 32,6 23,0 49,4 37,5 55,7 80,0 61,6 39,2,3,2,6,1

),4

60,

21,10,17,40,

66,7182,3170,0

31,586,585,163,5

111,9152,188,541,8

119,2

39,7 57,8 75,0 110,5 126,3 60,2 46,3 43,3 34,5 43,9 92,9

77,249,449,4

165,936,075,0

155,7121,3

34,0 37,3 39,9 52,3 57,1 71,7 81,0 105,4 70,0 61,6 45,4 35,4 45,7 103,3

Примечание: достоверных данных о заболеваемости детского населения Гомельской области вирусным гепатитом А в 1976-1978гг. нет.

72

Panel Discussion

TABLE VI. Respiratory Diseases in Adults

Таблица 111. Заболеваемость населения контролируемых районов Гомельской и Могилевской областейОРЗ (на 10 000 населения)

Районы 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989



По области


По области

211,1545,8

1051,31384,7894,9328,3598,5823,7

652,17116,0831,8

1031,8

1702,1

1182,6750,4668,2392,5296,1609,0996,6717,6

1569,7

431,6348,9

1118,41373,51330,8254,7647,2842,9768,4157,4832,6

1140,9

1788,5

1331,9689,2726,6386,5251,2717,9

1130,8539,5

1757,3

363,9385,2

1247,61048,71419,7292,2644,2603,5708,8

83,8991,6

1286,0

1722,5

1274,3819,8547,5344,9110,3630,0

1045,9460,8

1626,4

416,4514,5

1422,31255,21536,0208,0737,9856,8884,941,5

1032,81423,3

1774,2

1299,7609,2778,9346,6

1269,5630,7

1158,6769,3

1775,0

514,9 639,9438,6 462,0

1571,4 1369,1971,1 1251,2

1628,0 1943,6326,8 553,9625,3 956,8

1536,9 1350,01070,2 1089,0

153,3 141,3758,8 818,9

1376,8 1657,1

1747,9 1781,2


1176,5 1137,9744,3 793,7883,9 917,0311,9 411,8956,4 862,3587,1 663,4

1176,3 1135,5795,6 826,4

1728,4 1799,3

779,9428,9

1157,71249,51789,0565,1757,8

1364,1972,5109,4692,4

1289,6

1679,7

область

1262,8597,5819,3410,8469,9831,4

1165,0621,5

1630,0

638,9363,6973,9

1035,71991,71071,9725,9

1263,91061,9

143,3776,0

1288,2

1752,4

1128,0128,1950,6455,7413,6858,4

1304,5772,2

1806,6

735,2418,6841,7

1091,22141,7269,1967,4

1519,01069,4490,5647,0

1616,7

1860,5

1433,9153,1112,3628,7416,5801,3

1463,7729,7

1900,4

612,8355,1763,2

1015,11762,3

62,08807,5

1303,4960,7

453,51714,0

2344,6

1715,3

1237,71378,6928,1503,1834,9787,5

1524,8750,4

1792,3

358,0543,4555,6444,9

1785,260,31

681,5126,1891,8345,9765,7

2203,6

1797,6

1242,41112,0765,4568,8894,1713,0

1523,2584,5

1955,0

522,9761,4919,1694,6

1460,547,4

521,91065,31082,2607,1960,8

2031,2

1740,9

1140,41024,9633,5365,5652,4653,9

1381,8477,1

1799,1

893,4 685,3709,6 899,0745,1 529,7

1191,4 1582,22445,4 2153,7

50,9 428,0797,6 784,6

1212,1 697,01719,3 1367,7915,5 1088,0

1050,2 906,22249,5 2143,4

1993,1 2152,4

1305,1 1425,31551,5 1348,8721,7 750,4736,7 1204,0665,3 572,9686,7 762,6

1782,7 (а)741,3 598,6

2176,4 2052,9

(a): Number illegible on photocopy received.

73

Panel Discussion

TABLE VII. Respiratory Diseases in Children

Таблица 112. Заболеваемость детского населения контролируемых районов Гомельской и Могилевскойобластей ОРЗ (на 10 000 детей)

Районы


По области

1976 1977 1978 1979

1815,21082,22740,23453,24359,7

379,01858,82550,02482,5

127,62367,13931,4

4520,4

1980 1981


2177,5 2464,4814,5 716,4

3169,1 3258,53273,6 4494,93827,3 4880,6

808,1 1647,81441,5 2073,14853,2 4523,93482,3 4010,0

257,3 169,82121,1 2194,23186,3 3364,0

4376,3 4749,7

1982

область

3182,11335,32941,84475,74513,41739,72394,54900,03436,1

199,11850,74400,0

4682,8

1983

2897,61269,62512,13843,04479,43347,92085,43757,13541,9197,35

2053,83795,8

4723,5

1984

3496,31438,91587,04191,25350,0667,6

2693,15014,92937,1

787,51806,24542,6

5140,3

1985

2860,8967,0

1124,53281,34118,8

95,832187,24756,53150,0

793,71695,38315,2

4732,1

1986

1743,81670,81136,01439,14746,3

71,431878,64700,02137,5

579,52106,86617,0

4655,1

1987

2105,92203,72008,91884,53695,3

44,291428,62959,93446,81560,23207,35239,6

4793,6

1988 1989

3453,7 2870,41801,0 2725,51316,0 1378,63691,1 5054,16758,7 5338,7

55,88 950,82141,7 2341,22941,9 1650,06173,9 3629,22567,9 2492,03001,8 2147,36114,6 5608,5

5188,5 5395,8



По области

3191,11135,01105,4646,6760,0

1342,42631,31204,5

3731,7

3768,61006,9519,4581,2543,2

1950,93294,51250,8

4358,1

3327,61321,2845,7506,3175,0

1829,13235,71133,3

4327,8

2978,21197,91506,8447,5369,7

1879,23787,21667,9

4770,3

2947,4 2800,01436,6 1813,01604,2 1849,4450,0 778,0

3317,5 2816,11734,6 2032,13236,0 3233,61640,0 1436,4

4871,8 5046,1

3750,01566,01736,8738,7

1253,22711,32799,2

959,3

4680,7

3336,64070,01718,5771,7888,1

2733,33528,31666,7

5129,9

4061,55037,61978,81298,31034,52584,03955,41298,0

5381,7

3567,54656,61648,11135,11691,12582,44406,61483,0

2137,3

3595,13467,11648,01120,42174,52496,14960,71678,3

5633,4

4009,03166,31426,0634,7

1722,62316,74940,31487,2

5579,6

4412,3 4933,34341,0 3742,91423,0 1413,01455,3 3709,11444,2 1440,02163,8 2245,85963,4 4366,42261,7 1666,0

6454,4 5805,0

Примечание: достоверных данных о заболеваемости детского населения Гомельской области ОРЗ в 1976-1978 гг. нет.

74

Panel Discussion

TABLE VIII. Viral Morbidity in Adults

Таблица ИЗ. Заболеваемость населения контролируемых районов Гомельской и Могилевской областейгриппом (на 10 000 населения)

Районы 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981



По области

124,5678,1721,5597,8715,3168,3330,6342,2945,2182,8248,1442,3

836,7

56,888,679,2

163,4261,2119,9103,423,2

286,851,4

241,125,9

305,3

16,834,036,056,4

152,03,4

47,717,999,3

8,143,2

-

144,5

7,210,246,732,914,514,112,727,653,6

3,03,7

10,0

36,3

182,8136,8201,4313,6539,0

89,8160,2290,1267,1

3,0191,1384,1

519,6

38,318,4

207,3393,6393,9285,9166,3265,5500,7

91,9168,9193,1

557,3

1982

область

98,824,657,4

103,154,177,427,481,1

101,4105,865,858,0

153,0

1983

93,427,541,3

217,153,2

-15,6

148,8201,8

1,932,9

158,3

370,1

1984

207,8175,777,6

480,0388,0184,2256,0248,6479,4

76,6188,8597,0

721,3

1985

131,517,777,6

340,8-7,1

63,5174,480,695,830,3

331,3

313.0

1986

.100,029,366,4

134,0-

10,068,7

-49,1

3,35,1

328,9

1987

18,39,4-

31,71,9--2,0-8,08,7-

9,1

1988 1989

34,3 141,766,0 87,011,8 56,3

406,8 343,5181,3 73,2

8,6 9,737,8 8,029,3 96,1

249,1 0,5528,6 97,1140,4 87,2

1037,1 46,3

601,5 417,4



606,2452,8294,5

47,0115,3417,1242,6177,3

216,3169,0396,7

54,1162,1107,1615,6

44,0

90,40,8

141,018,912,6

130,873,450,0

79,510,0

105,72,4

33,532,828,721,5

34,1373,8117,183,3

214,487,2

521,8274,6

548,5179,491,116,3

199,032,6

467,2235,5

122,428,453,917,043,259,329,845,6

41,6-

47,10,4

70,02,2

34,1103,4

381,2126,2142,6

0,4165,0197,381,8

285,6

362,5121,4182,382,695,156,3

170,9136,4

71,722,786,10,5

169,845,6

3,342,3

14,2-

80,10,5--1,4-

411,8 354,3135,9 26,0228,2 79,2

29,6 11,0143,6 195,6

1,5190,7 161,9152,9 97,3

По области 590,2 27,3 154,4 94,4 435,8 607,0 167,4 255,9 516,6 327,6 215,8 8,7 553,0 331,2

75

Panel Discussion

TABLE IX. Viral Morbidity in Children

Таблица 114. Заболеваемость детского населения контролируемых районов Гомельской и Могилевскойобластей гриппом (на 10 000 детей)

Районы 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989



По области


По области

4,33,4

127,56,57,5-

17,510,434,9

2,41,3

19,6

365,2280,3246,4535,5916,7

74,3274,5393,6374,2

5,6212,7552,9

45,526,7

478,7834,2609,0450,7238,7567,4

1150,0250,4433,3348,0

378,656,0

206,6211,3104,5113,798,953,2

380,3217,5

86,6234,7

389,039,3

145,1662,3

54,4-9,0

389,8491,9

2,792,3

572,9

688,8625,9164,1

1205,3258,8111,3452,9683,0

1201,6168,8347,7

1585,1

335,442,521,3

635,7-4,2

175,6545,748,4

248,776,6

956,5

-159,436,0

135,5204,5

-20,295,6

-12,53,44,3

0,9

27,3

129,699,0

274,71215,2269,8

5,9122,6737,2

8,71151,2267,3

2658,3

242,696,1

147,1693,741,917,9

7,1238,1

2_J123,0129,174,5

45,5

73,7 795,1 1204,7 344,5 875,6 1468,5 719,2 803,9 11,7 1508,1 816,8


647,3 400,7 248,6 115,0 427,1 1026,2 300,0 130,1 773,0 446,3 252,9 54,1 1382,8 1142,3682,0339,6

31,5200,0591,5406,1

94,0

201,0203,7101,5264,2

94,7918,1

87,3

-157,1

15,69,7

278,292,9

106,7

5,2151,5

6,635,332,122,421,4

560,2131,644,8

538,1176,9804,8256,4

233,7250,6

16,9661,3

30,2745,1514,6

64,9112,666,175,8

232,192,590,7

-59,3

-86,49,8

60,0211,8

108,2130,0

1,7196,6672,0143,0867,4

291,615,282,5

205,492,2

318,2229,8

84,1105,3

-149,1131,4

10,743,5

112,357,7

370,353,2

298,1

435,0393,6

6,587,034,1

234,0

152,5153,2

928,9 526,7 289,3 152,4 647,1 1440,2 532,1 653,2 1296,5 780,4 518,6 16,1 1431,0 752,4

Примечание: достоверных данных о заболеваемости детского населения Гомельской области гриппом в 1976-1978 гг. нет.

76

Director General's Closing Remarks

I said at the opening of the Conference that if theChernobyl study and the discussions here will help toclarify the radiological consequences in the threeaffected Republics the study would have served itspurpose. I trust that the determination of those whoparticipated in the study to respect scientific principlesin their inquiry has been amply demonstrated in yourreading and discussion of the Report, and that the resultsalso have been found to be highly relevant. It has beenin line with the scientific principles that we respect in theIAEA to subject this Report to an open, international,scientific discussion among experts, and I know thatyour discussions in the course of this week have beenintense. We welcome that. Only through an open, criti-cal debate in the international scientific community canwe achieve a true picture.

I am reminded of a passage in a book by BarbaraTuchman about the Middle Ages, A distant mirror,where she writes that the question of the cause of theplague was submitted to the faculty of Paris University.After very long deliberation the faculty officiallyreported that the plague was due to a particular constel-lation of the stars. Such obscurities are serious, becauseif you have a completely wrong diagnosis, you cannotfind the right remedy, and it is only by means of rationalinquiry that the right remedies will be found. I think theinquiries made by the International Advisory Committeeand the critical discussions of these inquiries representa contribution to such a search for truth.

My impression is that the points that have attractedmost criticism were about matters which were notincluded in the Report. I think you will have perceivedthat the limitations designed or experienced were cer-tainly not intended to influence the overall picture; theywere made for practical reasons. Reference has beenmade repeatedly to the decontamination workers and tothe people who were evacuated. I think there is a clearconsensus that it is highly desirable that the present studybe supplemented by studies of these groups. There is noquestion about it. But I think there is a reason why it wasdecided not to include these groups in the study and notto insist that they should be. There is very great concernin contaminated areas which are inhabited, be it in the

UkrSSR, the BSSR or the RSFSR, as to whether peoplewould need to be evacuated and whether they wouldneed to subject themselves to highly restrictive diets.These problems do not arise in the case of those whowere sent as decontamination workers or those whowere living there but were evacuated; they are nowliving in areas which are not contaminated and they arenot eating contaminated food. That is not to say that theyare an uninteresting group, but I think it was understand-ably agreed that these groups were not to be included atthe present stage, and this without any prejudice to theneed to study them later. That was the reason why it wasdeemed acceptable not to study these groups. There isalso the practical problem that they are now dispersedover a huge country.

I would like to end by saying that this Project wouldhave been impossible without the contribution of themany individuals, like you, Professor Shigematsu, likethe members of the International Advisory Committee,the many Soviet scientists who helped us, the staff in thisorganization and others, and the many governments thathave assisted by donating the time of their scientists orgiving equipment. This organization, the IAEA, as oneof the participants, has been living at zero growth in realterms in our budget for eight years, and I understand thatthis Project has cost us about US $500 000 alto-gether, although the cost of the entire Project is muchgreater. The work has been completed in a short time,and we are grateful for the intensity with which it hasbeen pursued. I hear that the WHO is planning to under-take a very large project and that they are already practi-cally sure of having at least 20 million dollars at theirdisposal. We welcome this. We welcome further supple-menting studies in the search for the truth in order tofind the best remedies to help the people.

Let me thank you all for what you have done in thisstudy and for the discussions that have taken place hereduring this week. Thank you.

Hans BlixDirector General

International Atomic Energy AgencyVienna

77

Chairman's Closing Remarks

I am very happy to be able to close this Conferencewhich has achieved such fruitful results owing to theefforts and co-operation of everyone here. Please allowme to repeat what I said in my opening address. Ourreport does not mean the end of the Chernobyl Projectbut should rather be considered the starting point forfurther international co-operation.

A tragedy such as the Chernobyl accident must neverbe repeated. We can, however, be proud that so manyinternational experts in a number of disciplines fromvarious countries and organizations have workedtogether in a friendly and enthusiastic manner towardsthe same goal: to serve the Chernobyl victims. We arewell aware that this goal could not have been attainedwithout great co-operation and support from our Sovietcolleagues. It is my sincere hope that this kind of inter-national teamwork for peaceful purposes will beencouraged.

My deepest thanks are due to all those who con-tributed to this work: members of the InternationalAdvisory Committee, consultants, task group leadersand all the experts who participated, the Secretariat ofthe Project and the many officials of the USSR, theBSSR, the UkrSSR and the RSFSR who gave their timeand efforts.

Finally, will you please join me in expressing ourthanks to those who worked so hard behind the scenesto prepare and service this meeting: IAEA secretaries,interpreters, engineers and all the others.

Itsuzo ShigematsuDirector

Radiation Effects Research FoundationHiroshima

Japan

79

List of Participants

Abdulla, M.

University of Lund,

P.O. Box 5133,

S-220 05 Lund, Sweden

Abu Bakr, A.

Division of Technical Co-operation Programmes,

International Atomic Energy Agency,

Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,

A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Acharya, S.

United States Department of Energy,

1000 Independence Avenue,

Washington, DC 20585, United States of America

Al-Matooq, M.

Permanent Mission of Iraq to the IAEA,

Johannesgasse 26,


Alvarez-Miranda, A.

Spanish Atomic Forum,

Boix у Morer 6,

E-28003 Madrid, Spain

Anderer, J.

Division of Nuclear Safety,




Andrasi, A.

Central Research Institute for Physics,

Hungarian Academy of Sciences,

P.O. Box 49,

H-1525 Budapest, Hungary

Anspaugh, L.R.Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,

P.O. Box 5507/L-453,

Livermore, CA 94550, United States of America

Anstee, M.J.

United Nations,



Aoki, Y.

University of Tokyo,

7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku,

Tokyo 113, Japan

Asculai, E.

(Scientific Secretary)





Barabanova, A.





Bar'yakhtar, V.G.

Academy of Sciences of the UkrSSR,

Kiev, UkrSSR

Bauerstam, U.

National Institute of Radiation Protection,

P.O. Box 60204,

S-104 01 Stockholm, Sweden

Bauman, A.

Institute for Medical Research and Occupational

Health,

University of Zagreb,

P.O. Box 291,

YU-41000 Zagreb, Yugoslavia

Beets, C.

Permanent Mission of Belgium to the IAEA,

Operngasse 20b,


Belyaev, S.T.

I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy of

the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry of

the USSR,

123182 Moscow, USSR

Benini, A.Division of Nuclear Safety,




Bennett, B.G.

United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects

of Atomic Radiation,



Bennett, L.

Division of Nuclear Power,




Berunek, J.

Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission,

Prague, Czechoslovakia

Bianco, A.

Ente Nazionale per 1'Energia Elettrica,

Viale Regina Margherita 125,

1-00198 Rome, Italy

81


Binner, W.Osterreichisches Forschungszentrum Seibersdorf GmbH,A-2444 Seibersdorf, Austria

Birol, E.Permanent Mission of Turkey to the IAEA,Zieglergasse 5,A-1070 Vienna, Austria

Bobyleva, O.A.Department of Radiation Hygiene of the

Ministry of Health of the UkrSSR,Kiev, UkrSSR

Boeri, G.Direzione per la Sicurezza Nucleare e Protezione Sanitaria,Comitato Nazionale per la Ricerca e per lo Sviluppo

dell'Energia Nucleare e delle Energie Alternative,Via Brancati 48,1-00148 Rome, Italy

Borodastov, G.V.Working Group of the Ministry of Atomic Power

and Industry of the USSR on Implementation ofthe International Chernobyl Project,

Staromonetny 26,Moscow, USSR

Borovikov, V.Permanent Mission of the BSSR to the IAEA,Erzherzog Karl-Strasse 182,A-1220 Vienna, Austria

Borras, C.Pan American Health Organization,525, 23rd Street NW,Washington, DC 20037, United States of America

Bouville, A.National Cancer Institute,c/o Environmental Measurements Laboratory,376 Hudson Street,New York, NY 10014, United States of America

Bridi, D.Agency's Laboratory,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Brubaker, T.RAD Elec. Inc.,9000 Brieryie Road,Richmond, VA 23229, United States of America

Buchtela, K.Atominstitut der Osterreichischen Universitaten,Schuttelstrasse 115,A-1020 Vienna, Austria

Buldakov, L.A.Institute of Biophysics of the Ministry of Health

of the USSR,123182 Moscow, USSR

Burkart, K.Kernforschungszentrum/FTU,P.O. Box 3640,D-W 7500 Karlsruhe 1, Germany

Burkart, W.Institut fur Strahlenhygiene,Ingolstadter Landstrasse 1,D-W 8042 Neuherberg/Munich, Germany

Burmester, K.Bundesamt fur Strahlenschutz,Sessenerstrasse 80,Salzgitter, Germany

Bush, W.R.Division of Nuclear Safety,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Bussurin, Yu.N.Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry of the USSR,11910 Moscow, USSR

Carnino, A.Division of Nuclear Safety,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Chang, J-O.Division of Nuclear Safety,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Chelyukanov, V.V.State Committee for Hydrometeorology of the USSR,Moscow, USSR

Christensen, G.C.Institutt for Energiteknikk,P.O. Box 40,N-2007 Kjeller, Norway

Congdon, M.Division of Nuclear Safety,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Cooper, E.L.Agency's Laboratory,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Coppee, G.H.International Labour Organisation,4, route des Morillons,CH-1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland

82


Cortes-Того, E.

Division of Life Sciences,




Coulon, R.

Institut de protection et de surete nucleaire,

Commissariat a 1'energie atomique,

B.P. 6,

F-92265 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex, France

Crick, M.J.





Danes!, P.R.

Agency's Laboratory,




Dargie, J.

Joint РАО/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in

Food and Agriculture,




Dekner, R.





Delves, D.


International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,


Demin, V.F.

I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy of

the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry

of the USSR,

123182 Moscow, USSR

Dircks, W.

Department of Administration,




Djuric, G.

Yugoslav Radiological Protection Association,

Slobodana Penezica 35,

YU-11000 Belgrade, Yugoslavia

Dones, R.





Dong, Bainian

Permanent Mission of China to the IAEA,

Steinfeldgasse 1,


Dotres, C.

Ministerio de Salud Publica (MINSAP),

7924 Calle Vento, Alta Habana,

Havana, Cuba

Dreicer, M.

(Programme Manager)





Dubinchuk, V.

Division of Physical and Chemical Sciences,




Duke, B.

Economic Commission for Europe,

Palais des Nations,

CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland

Duncan, K.

(Formerly: National Radiological Protection Board)

Westfield, Steeple Aston,

Oxfordshire OX5 3SD, United Kingdom

Dushutin, K.K.

Pripyat Scientific Production Group,

Chernobyl, UkrSSR

Eberhard, C.Office of Nuclear Technology and Safeguards,

United States Department of State,

Washington, DC 20520, United States of America

Edvardson, K.


P.O. Box 60204,


Efremenkov, V.M.

State Committee of the BSSR on Rectification of

the Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident,

House of the Government,

220010 Minsk, BSSR

Eggleton, A.

AEA Technology,

Building 551, Harwell, Didcot,

Oxfordshire OX 11 ORA, United Kingdom

83


Erwin, R.A.Division of Nuclear Safety,



Esmaili, A.Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran

to the IAEA,

Jauresgasse 9,A-1030 Vienna, Austria

Esteve, J.International Agency for Research on Cancer,150, Cours Albert Thomas,

F-69372 Lyon Cedex 08, France

Fairobent, L.United States Department of Energy,M/S EH1, 1000 Independence Avenue,Washington, DC 20585, United States of America

Fazarinc, A.University Institute for Public Health and Social Care,

Trubarjeva 2,YU-61000 Ljubljana, Yugoslavia

Finzi, S.Nuclear Safety Research,Commission of the European Communities,Rue de la Loi 200,

B-1049 Brussels, Belgium

Flakus, F-N.Division of Nuclear Safety,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Franzen, F.Division of Nuclear Safety,


Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

French, G.S.School of Computer Studies,

University of Leeds,

Leeds, W. Yorkshire LS2 9JT, United Kingdom

Fritelli, L.Direzione per la Sicurezza Nucleare e Protezione

Sanitaria,Comitato Nazionale per la Ricerca e per lo Sviluppo

dell'Energia Nucleare e delle Energie Alternative,Via Brancati 48,1-00148 Rome, Italy

Frohlich, F.Agency's Laboratory,



Fry, F.A.National Radiological Protection Board,Chilton, Didcot,

Oxfordshire OX 11 ORQ, United Kingdom

Gadola, A.Ente Nazionale per 1'Energia Elettrica,Viale Regina Margherita 137,

1-00198 Rome, Italy

Gaensbacher, J.Agency's Laboratory,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Garcia, O.Centro de Proteccion e Higiene de las Radiaciones

(CPHR),Calle 20, No. 4110e/18A у 47,

Playa La Habana, Havana, Cuba

Centner, N.E.Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd,

Chalk River Laboratories,

Chalk River, Ontario, Canada K8H 2W8

Gil, E.Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear,Justo Dorado 11,E-28040 Madrid, Spain

Gillon, L.Centre d'etude de 1'energie nucleaire,

Boeretang 200,B-2400 Mol, Belgium

Gittus, J.British Nuclear Forum,22 Buckingham Gate,

London SW1, United Kingdom

Gonzalez, A.J.Division of Nuclear Safety,International Atomic Energy Agency,


Gordeev, K.I.Institute of Biophysics of the Ministry of Health

of the USSR,

123182 Moscow, USSR

Goto, S.Chubu Electric Power Co.,

73 Brook Street,

London W1Y 1YE, United Kingdom

Gotovchits, G.A.State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the

UkrSSR on Protection of the Population from the

Consequences of the Accident at the ChernobylNuclear Power Plant,

Kiev, UkrSSR

84


Govaerts, P.Centre d'etude de 1'energie nucleaire,

Boeretang 200,

B-2400 Mol, Belgium

Gregoric, M.Rep. Adm. for Nuclear Safety of Slovenia,

Kardeljeva Ploscad 24,

YU-61113 Ljubljana, Yugoslavia

Grey, J.A.Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization,

Lucas Heights Research Laboratories,

Private Mail Bag 1,

Menai, NSW 2234, Australia

Grodzinskij, D.M.Institute of Botanies of the Academy of Sciences

of the UkrSSR,Vladimirskaya 54,

252000 Kiev, UkrSSR

Gubanov, V.A.

State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers on

the Rectification of the Consequences of the Accident

at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant,

Gorkij Street 33,

Moscow, USSR

Gus'kova, A.K.

Institute of Biophysics of the Ministry of Health

of the USSR,

123182 Moscow, USSR

Gustafsson, M.

Swedish State Power Board,

Vattenfall, PUSR/2,

S-162 87 Vallingby, Sweden

Gutierrez, J.Institute de Proteccion Radiologica у Medio Ambiente

de CIEMAT,

Avenida Complutense 22,E-28040 Madrid, Spain

Gwynne, M.

United Nations Environment Programme,

IAEA Office, United Nations,

Room B426, Palais des Nations,


Hamada, R.

Permanent Mission of Tunisia to the IAEA,

Ghegastrasse 3,


Hance, R.J.

Joint РАО/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in





Нага, Н.Chubu Electric Power Co.,

73 Brook Street,London W1Y 1YE, United Kingdom

Hashimi, J.A.Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the IAEA,

Hofzeile 13,


Hedemann Jensen, P.

Department of Health Physics,Ris0 National Laboratory,

P.O. Box 49,

DK-4000 Roskilde, Denmark

Hefner, A.

Osterreichisches Forschungszentrum Seibersdorf GmbH,

A-2444 Seibersdorf, Austria

Heinzelmann, M.Forschungszentrum Jiilich GmbH,

P.O. Box 1913,

D-W 5170 Jiilich, Germany

Henrich, E.Bundesanstalt fur Lebensmitteluntersuchung und

Forschung,

Abt. Strahlenschutz,

Berggasse 11,


Hide, K.Division of Nuclear Safety,



Hill, J.British Nuclear Forum,

22 Buckingham Gate,

London SW1, United Kingdom

Hille, P.

Institut fur Radiumforschung und Kernphysik,

Universitat Wien,


Ho, N.

Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the IAEA,Praterstrasse 31,


Hochmann, R.





Hoe, S.

Civil Protection Agency,

16 Datavej, Birkered,

DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark

85


Hofkirchner, P.United Nations,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 500,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Hogg, G.R.Permanent Mission of Australia to the IAEA,Mattiellistrasse 2-4,A-1040 Vienna, Austria

Hosoda, Y.Radiation Effects Association,Institute of Radiation Epidemiology,1-9-8 Uchikanda 1, Chiyoda-ku,Tokyo 101, Japan

Hu, ZunsuChina Institute for Radiation Protection,P.O. Box 120,Taiyuan, 030006 Shanxi, China

Huyskens, C.J.International Radiation Protection Association,Eindhoven University of Technology,P.O. Box 662,NL-5600 MB Eindhoven, Netherlands

Ignatenko, E.I.Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry of the USSR,11910 Moscow, USSR

Ilari, O.Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for

Economic Co-operation and Development,38, boulevard Suchet,F-75016 Paris, France

IPin, L.A.Institute of Biophysics of the Ministry of Health

of the USSR,123182 Moscow, USSR

Iljas, J.Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the IAEA,Gustav Tschermak-Gasse 5-7,A-1180 Vienna, Austria

Irlweck, K.Institute of Inorganic Chemistry,University of Vienna,Wahringerstrasse 42,A-1090 Vienna, Austria

Itakura, S.Atomic Energy Bureau, STA,Policy Division,2-2-1 Kasumigaseki 2, Chiyoda-ku,Tokyo 100, Japan

Ivanov, S.I.Ministry of Health of the USSR,Moscow, USSR

Ivanov, V.K.Institute of Medical Radiology of the Academy

of Medical Sciences of the USSR,Korolev 4,Kaluga Region, Obninsk, USSR

Iwasaki, T.National Institute of Radiological Sciences,Anagawa 4-9-1, Chiba 260, Japan

Jarvis, F.International Confederation of Free Trade Unions,Rue Montagne aux Herbes Potageres 37-41,B-1000 Brussels, Belgium

Jovanovich, J.Department of Physics,University of Manitoba,Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada R3T 2N2

Jurina, V.Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic,Bratislava, Czechoslovakia

Kabanov, L.Division of Nuclear Safety,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Kaltenecker, H.United Nations Educational, Scientific and

Cultural Organization,7, place de Fontenoy,F-75007 Paris, France

Katz, M.Permanent Mission of the United States of America

to the IAEA,Obersteinergasse 11/1,A-1190 Vienna, Austria

Kayser, P.Ministere de la Sante,Rue Fr. Faber 6,L-1135 Luxembourg

Kelly, N.G.Directorate General for Science, Research and

Development,Commission of the European Communities,Rue de la Loi 200,B-1049 Brussels, Belgium

Kenik, LA.Council of Ministers of the BSSR,Lenin Square,220600 Minsk, BSSR

Kenneke, A.Office of Governmental and Public Affairs,US Nuclear Regulatory Commission,Mailstop 385,Washington, DC 20555, United States of America

86


Kerekes, A.Frederic Joliot-Curie National Research Institute

for Radiobiology and Radiohygiene,P.O. Box 101,Budapest, Hungary

Khashaba, A.K.Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the IAEA,Formanekgasse 38,A-1190 Vienna, Austria

Kienzl, K.Federal Environmental Agency,Ministry of Environment, Youth and Family,Spittelauer La'nde 5,A-1090 Vienna, Austria

Kimura, T.Permanent Mission of Japan to the IAEA,Prinz Eugen-Strasse 8-10,A-1040 Vienna, Austria

Kirchmann, R.International Union of Radioecologists,Maison des associations internationales,University of Liege,Oupeye, Belgium

Kislyak, S.University of Foreign Affairs,Smolenskaya Semnaya,Moscow, USSR

Kohler, H.Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Kolb, H.Forum fur Atomfragen,Hohe Warte 38,A-1190 Vienna, Austria

Kolechov, I.I.Permanent Mission of the USSR to the IAEA,Erzherzog Karl-Strasse 182,A-1220 Vienna, Austria

Komarov, E.N.Leningrad Scientific Research Institute of

Radiation of the Ministry of Health of the USSR,189646 Leningrad, USSR

Konoplya, E.F.Institute of Radiology of the Academy of Sciences

of the BSSR,Minsk, BSSR

Korun, M.Institut Jozef Stefan,Jamova 39,YU-61111 Ljubljana, Yugoslavia

Kostenko, Yu.V.Permanent Mission of the UkrSSR to the IAEA,Erzherzog Karl-Strasse 182,A-1200 Vienna, Austria

Kromp, W.Institute of Solid State Physics,University of Vienna,Strudlhofgasse 4,A-1090 Vienna, Austria

Kriiger, W.Bundesamt fur Strahlenschutz,Dienststelle Berlin,Waldowallee 117,D-O 1157 Berlin, Germany

Kudryashov, A.S.Permanent Mission of the USSR to the IAEA,Erzherzog Karl-Strasse 182,A-1220 Vienna, Austria

Kuhar, B.Zavod R Sloventje Za Varstvo,Bohoriceva 22a,Ljubljana, Yugoslavia

Kumar-Frauendorfer, E.Austrian Foreign Ministry/University of Vienna,Minoritenplatz 3,Dr. Karl Lueger-Ring 1,A-1010 Vienna, Austria

Kunz, R.Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the IAEA,Wagramerstrasse 14,A-1220 Vienna, Austria

Kuramoto, A.Research Institute for Nuclear Medicine and Biology,Hiroshima University Hospital,Kasumi 1-2-3, Minami-ku,Hiroshima 734, Japan

Kurchenko, F.P.Council of Ministers of the USSR,State Commission for Foodstuffs and Supplies,Moscow, USSR

Kuroda, M.Joint Inspection Unit,United Nations, Palais des Nations,CH-1211 Geneva, Switzerland

Lacanale, L.Permanent Mission of the Philippines to the IAEA,Nedergasse 34,A-1190 Vienna, Austria

Laitano, R.F.Centre Ricerche Energia Casaccia,Ente Nazionale per 1'Energia Elettrica,P.O. Box 2400,Rome, Italy

87


Landa, E.R.

United States Geological Survey,

World Meteorological Organization,

431 National Center,

Reston, VA 22092, United States of America

Lauridsen, B.

Ris0 National Laboratory,

P.O. Box 49,


Lederman, L.





Lee, Т.К.

Department of Psychology,

University of St. Andrews,

St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9JU, United Kingdom

Lettner, H.

Division of Biophysics,

University of Salzburg,

Hellbrunner Strasse 34,

A-5020 Salzburg, Austria

Levin, I.

Nuclear Research Center-Negev,

Israel Atomic Energy Commission,

P.O. Box 9011,

Beersheba 84190, Israel

Li, Deping

China Institute for Radiation Protection,

P.O. Box 120,

Taiyuan, 030006 Shanxi, China

Lochard, J.

Centre d'etude sur revaluation de la protection dans

le domaine nucleaire,

Commissariat a 1'energie atomique,

B.P. 48,

F-92263 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex, France

Loshchilov, N.O.

Scientific Research Institute of Agricultural Radiology,

Kiev, UkrSSR

Louvat, D.





Lovranich, E.

Osterreichisches Forschungszentrum Seibersdorf GmbH,

A-2444 Seibersdorf, Austria

Lubin, E.

Beilinson Hospital,

Petah Tiqva, Israel

Lutsev, S.D.

State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers

on the Rectification of the Consequences of the

Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant,

Gorkij Street 33,

Moscow, USSR

Luykx, F.

Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection,

Commission of the European Communities,

Rue de la Loi 200,


Ma, Xiuseng

Permanent Mission of China to the IAEA,

Steinfeldgasse 1,


Mabuchi, K.

Radiation Effects Research Foundation,

5-2 Hijiyama Park, Minami-ku,

Hiroshima 732, Japan

Malatova, I.

Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology,

Centre of Radiation Hygiene,

Srobarova 48,

CS-100 42 Prague 10, Czechoslovakia

Maldonado, H.

Comision Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear у Salvaguardias,

Avenida Insurgentes Sur 1806,

GL Florida, Delegacion Alvaro Obregon,

01030 Mexico City, Mexico

Maringer, F.J.

Bundesversuchs- und Forschungsanstalt Arsenal,

Faradaygasse 3,


Marti, J.

Federal Office of Public Health,

P.O. Box 2644,

Bollwerk 27,

CH-3001 Bern, Switzerland

Matsuzaki, T.

Radiation Protection Policy,

Nuclear Safety Bureau, STA,

2-2-1 Kasumigaseki 2, Chiyoda-ku,

Tokyo 100, Japan

Matsuzuru, H.

Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute,

Tokai, Ibaraki-ken 319-11, Japan

Matveenko, I.I.

Republican Centre for Radiation Control,

Minsk, BSSR

Merkulov, G.N.

Permanent Mission of the USSR to the IAEA,

Erzherzog Karl-Strasse 182,



Mettler, Г.А., Jr.

Department of Radiology, School of Medicine,

University of New Mexico,

915 Camino Salud NE,

Albuquerque, NM 87131, United States of America

Meyer, H-F.

Division of Public Information,




Moberg, L.C.


P.O. Box 60204,


Moore, B.





Moriguchi, Y.

Permanent Mission of Japan to the IAEA,

Prinz Eugen-Strasse 8-10,


Moschini, G.

Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare,

Via Romea 4,

Legnaro (Padua), Italy

Moyukhov, A.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the BSSR,

Minsk, BSSR

Mrabit, K.





Mukherjee, R.Division of Life Sciences,




Napalkov, N.P.

World Health Organization,

Avenue Appia,


Nauman, J.

Department of Endocrinology,

University Medical School,

Banacha la,

PL-02-097 Warsaw, Poland

Nesterov, M.

(Interpreter)

Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry of the USSR,

11910 Moscow, USSR

Nishiwaki, Y.

International Radiation Protection Association,

Jagdschlossgasse 91,


Nofal, M.





Nordin, R.M.

Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the IAEA,

Prinz Eugen-Strasse 18,


Ogris, R.Agency's Laboratory,




Okakura, S.

Office for the Public Acceptance of Nuclear Energy,

1-3-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku,

Tokyo 100, Japan

Ottoy, H.

KMI,

Ringlaan 3,


Ouvrard, R.





Palacios, E.

Comisi6n Nacional de Energia Atomica,

Avenida del Libertador 8250,

Buenos Aires, Argentina

Papadimitropoulos, P.Permanent Mission of Greece to the IAEA,

Argentinierstrasse 14,


Park, C.M.

Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute,

P.O. Box 7,

Daeduk-Danji, Taejon 305-353, Republic of Korea

Park, W-S.

Department of Safeguards,




Parr, R.M.





89


Pavlicek, P.Division of Public Information,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Pellerin, P.Service centrale de protection centre les

rayonnements ionisants,B.P. 35,F-78110 Le Vesinet, France

Peng, ZhaoshengPermanent Mission of China to the IAEA,Steinfeldgasse 1,A-1190 Vienna, Austria

Perminov, S.(Interpreter)

Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry ofthe USSR,

11910 Moscow, USSR

Persson, B.A.National Institute of Radiation Protection,P.O. Box 60204,S-104 01 Stockholm, Sweden

Petryaev, E.P.Department of Radiation Chemistry VI,BSSR State University,Minsk, BSSR

Pettengill, H.J.United States Department of Energy,1000 Independence Avenue,Washington, DC 20585, United States of America

Piasecki, E.Polish Atomic Energy,Golawicka 9 m 108,PL-03-550 Warsaw, Poland

Piermattei, S.Direzione per la Sicurezza Nucleare e Protezione

Sanitaria,Comitato Nazionale per la Ricerca e per lo

Sviluppo dell'Energia Nucleare e delle EnergieAlternative,

Via Brancati 48,1-00148 Rome, Italy

Pinto, F.United Nations Development Programme,Room DCI-2056, TAD/BPPE,United Nations,New York, NY 10017, United States of America

Piskov, I.Permanent Mission of Bulgaria to the IAEA,Schwindgasse 8,A-1040 Vienna, Austria

Placer, A.Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear,Justo Dorado 11,E-28040 Madrid, Spain

Plug, K.Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the

Environment,P.O. Box 20951,Leidschendam, Netherlands

Pokutnyj, P.P.Pripyat Scientific Production Group,Chernobyl, UkrSSR

Popov, D.Permanent Mission of Bulgaria to the IAEA,Schwindgasse 8,A-1040 Vienna, Austria

Pramov, C.Permanent Mission of Bulgaria to the IAEA,Schwindgasse 8,A-1040 Vienna, Austria

Ramzaev, P.V.Leningrad Scientific Research Institute of

Radiation Hygiene of the Ministry of Healthof the RSFSR,

197101 Leningrad, USSR

Randell, A.W.Food and Agriculture Organization of the

United Nations,Via delle Terme di Caracalla,1-00100 Rome, Italy

Rank, D.Bundesversuchs- und Forschungsanstalt Arsenal,Faradaygasse 3,A-1030 Vienna, Austria

Ricks, R.Radiation Emergency Assistance Center,Oak Ridge Associated Universities,P.O. Box 117,Oak Ridge, TN 37831-0117, United States of America

Rietveld, H.M.Energieonderzoek Centrum Nederland,P.O. Box 1,NL-175526 Petten, Netherlands

Robertson, D.E.Pacific Northwest Laboratory,P.O. Box 999, MS P8-01,Richland, WA 99352, United States of America

Rogov, A.N.Permanent Mission of the USSR to the IAEA,Erzherzog Karl-Strasse 182,A-1220 Vienna, Austria

90


Rolevich, I.V.Radiobiology Institute of the Academy of Sciences

of the BSSR,2 Godinskaya Street,220600 Minsk, BSSR

Rosen, M.(Vice-Chairman)

Division of Nuclear Safety,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Royal, H.D.Mallingkrodt Institute of Radiology,510 South Kings Highway Boulevard,St. Louis, MO 63110, United States of America

Ruiz, J.Permanent Mission of Spain to the IAEA,

Gonzagagasse 15/2,A-1010 Vienna, Austria

Salo, A.Lepolantie 54,SF-00660 Helsinki, Finland(Formerly: Surveillance Department,Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety,

Helsinki, Finland)

San Martin, R.Ministerio de Industrie,Paseo de la Castellana 160,E-28046 Madrid, Spain

Sanmuganathan, M.Secretariat of the Policy-Making Organs,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Sarmiento, F.Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear,Justo Dorado 11,E-28040 Madrid, Spain

Schelenz, R.Agency's Laboratory,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Schneider, T.Centre d'etude sur revaluation de la protection dans

le domaine nucleaire,Commissariat a 1'energie atomique,B.P. 48,F-92263 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex, France

Schulman, M.United States Department of Energy,ER-70, 1000 Independence Avenue,Washington, DC 20585, United States of America

Schwarz, G.Gesellschaft fur Reaktorsicherheit,Schwertnergasse 1,D-W 5000 Cologne, Germany

Sheppard, M.C.University of Birmingham,Queen Elizabeth Hospital,Edgbaston, Birmingham,Warwickshire B15 2TH, United Kingdom

Shigematsu, I.(Chairman)

Radiation Effects Research Foundation,5-2 Hijiyama Park, Minami-ku,Hiroshima 732, Japan

Shimooka, K.Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Shinohara, K.Environmental Protection Section,

Tokai Works, PNC,Muramatsu 4-33, Tokai-mura,Naka-gun, Ibaraki-ken 319-11, Japan

Sigurbjornsson, B.Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques

in Food and Agriculture,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Skjoldebrand, R.(Formerly: International Atomic Energy Agency)

Skornik, K.Division of Nuclear Safety,



Smales, E.Department of Health and Social Security,Hannibal House, Elephant and Castle,London SE1 6TE, United Kingdom

Smith, K.Nuclear Installations Inspectorate,St. Peter's House, Stanley Precinct,Bootle, Merseyside L20 3LZ, United Kingdom

Stadk», K.Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation forEconomic Co-operation and Development,38, boulevard Suchet,F-75016 Paris, France

Steger, F.Osterreichisches Forschungszentrum Seibersdorf GmbH,A-2444 Seibersdorf, Austria

91


Steger, G.EG + G GmbH,Hohenlinder Strasse 12,D-W 8000 Munich, Germany

Stegnar, P.Institut Jozef Stefan,Jamova 39,YU-61111 Ljubljana, Yugoslavia

Steinhausler, F.Institute of General Biology, Biochemistry

and Biophysics,University of Salzburg,A-5020 Salzburg, Austria

Stepanenko, A.V.Academy of Sciences of the BSSR,66 Lenin Avenue,220077 Minsk, BSSR

Sterlinski, S.Central Laboratory for Radiological

Protection,Konwaliowa 7,PL-03-194 Warsaw, Poland

Stern, E.Licensing Division,Israel Atomic Energy Commission,P.O. Box 7061,Tel Aviv, Israel

Stichler, W.Division of Physical and Chemical Sciences,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Stieff, L.RAD Elec. Inc.,5310 H Spectrum Drive,Frederick, MD 21710, United States of America

Stoll, E.Department of Energy,CH-5303 Wurenlingen, Switzerland

Strachnov, V.Agency's Laboratory,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Streit, S.Osterreichisches Forschungszentrum

Seibersdorf GmbH,A-2444 Seibersdorf, Austria

Suomela, M.T.Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety,P.O. Box 268,SF-00101 Helsinki, Finland

Szepesi, T.FAF/Austria,Hermanngasse 21/1/3,A-1070 Vienna, Austria

Sztanyik, L.B.Frederic Joliot-Curie National Research Institute

for Radiobiology and Radiohygiene,P.O. Box 101,Budapest, Hungary

Taylor, R.H.Nuclear Electric pic,Bridgewater Road, Bedminster Down, Bristol,Avon BS13 SAN, United Kingdom

Terasima, T.Nuclear Safety Commission,3-2-1 Kasumigaseki 2, Chiyoda-ku,Tokyo 100, Japan

Togo, Y.Permanent Mission of Japan to the IAEA,Prinz Eugen-Strasse 8-10,A-1040 Vienna, Austria

Tron'ko, N.D.Institute of Endocrinology and Metabolism

of the Ministry of Health ofthe UkrSSR,

Kiev, UkrSSR

Tsaturov, Yu.S.State Committee for Hydrometeorology of

the USSR,Moscow, USSR

Tsyb, A.F.Institute of Medical Radiology,Korolev 4,Kaluga Region, Obninsk, USSR

Tuor, S.ETH-IMS,Auf der Mauer 2,CH-8001 Zurich, Switzerland

Turvey, F.Nuclear Energy Board,3 Clonskea Square,Dublin 14, Ireland

Unger, K.Permanent Mission of Germany to the IAEA,Wagramerstrasse 14,A-1220 Vienna, Austria

Valkovic, V.Agency's Laboratory,International Atomic Energy Agency,Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria

92


van der Steen, J.

NU KEMA,Beeklaan 6,

NL-6865 VH Woorwerth, Netherlands

Vetrov, V,A.Joint РАО/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in




Vilain, G.(Viscount Georges Vilain)

Permanent Mission of Belgium to the IAEA,

Operngasse 20b,A-1040 Vienna, Austria

Villanueva, C.Permanent Mission of Mexico to the IAEA,

Turkenstrasse 15,


Villaros, P.Office of the Director General,



von Baeckmann, A.

Department of Safeguards,




Voronezhtsev, Yu.I.

Supreme Soviet of the USSR,

Moscow, USSR

Vychtil, P.Federal Ministry of Health, Sport and

Protection of Consumers,

Radetzkystrasse 2,A-1031 Vienna, Austria

Wachholz, B.W.Radiation Effects Branch,

National Cancer Institute,

Executive Plaza North, Room 530,

Bethesda, MD 20892, United States of America

Waight, PJ.World Health Organization,

Avenue Appia,


Warming, L.

Ris0 National Laboratory,

P.O. Box 49,


Wehrstein-Werner, E.




Wenisch, A.Forum fur Atomfragen,

Strudlhofgasse 4,


Willis, J.D.(Observer)

Greenpeace,

Keizergracht 176,

NL-DW 1016 Amsterdam, Netherlands

Xue, Weixian

Permanent Mission of China to the

IAEA,

Steinfeldgasse 1,


Yiftah, S.

Technion-Israel Institute of Technology,

Haifa 32000, Israel

Zeiller, E.





Zeisler, R.Agency's Laboratory,




Ziemer, P.L.

United States Department of Energy,

1000 Independence Avenue,Washington, DC 20585, United States of America

Zombori, P.

Central Research Institute for Physics,Hungarian Academy of Sciences,

P.O. Box 49,

H-1525 Budapest, Hungary

Zupnik, A.

Bernoullistrasse 4/32/7,


Zvonov, N.

Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry of

the USSR,

11910 Moscow, USSR

93

HOW TO ORDER IAEA PUBLICATIONS

An exclusive sales agent for IAEA publications, to whom all ordersand inquiries should be addressed, has been appointedfor the following countries:

CANADAUNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNIPUB, 4611-F Assembly Drive, Lanham, MD 20706-4391, USA

In the following countries IAEA publications may be purchased from thesales agents or booksellers listed or throughmajor local booksellers. Payment can be made in localcurrency or with UNESCO coupons.

ARGENTINA

AUSTRALIABELGIUM

CHILE

CHINA

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

FRANCE

HUNGARY

INDIA

ISRAEL

ITALY

JAPANPAKISTAN

POLAND

ROMANIASOUTH AFRICA

SPAIN

SWEDEN

UNITED KINGDOM

USSRYUGOSLAVIA

Comision Nacional de Energfa Atomica, Avenida del Libertador 8250,RA-1429 Buenos AiresHunter Publications, 58 A Gipps Street, Collingwood, Victoria 3066Service Courrier UNESCO, 202, Avenue du Roi, B-1060 BrusselsComisidn Chilena de Energfa Nuclear, Venta de Publicaciones,Amunategui 95, Casilla 188-D, SantiagoIAEA Publications in Chinese:China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation, Translation Section,P.O.Box 2103, BeijingIAEA Publications other than in Chinese:China National Publications Import & Export Corporation,Deutsche Abteilung, P.O. Box 88, BeijingS.N.T.L., Mikulandska4,CS-11686Prague1Alfa, Publishers, Hurbanovo namestie 3, CS-81589 BratislavaOffice International de Documentation et Librairie,48, rue Gay-Lussac,F-75240 Paris Cedex 05Kultura, Hungarian Foreign Trading Company,P.O. Box 149, H-1389 Budapest 62Oxford Book and Stationery Co., 17, Park Street, Calcutta-700 016Oxford Book and Stationery Co.,Scindia House, New Delhi-110001Heiliger & Co. Ltd.23 Keren Hayesod Street, Jerusalem 94188Libreria Scientifica, Dott. Lucio de Biasio "aeiou",Via Meravigli 16, 1-20123 MilanMaruzen Company, Ltd, P.O. Box 5050,100-31 Tokyo InternationalMirza Book Agency, 65, Shahrah Quaid-e-Azam, P.O. Box 729, Lahore 3Ars Polona-Ruch, Centrala Handlu Zagranicznego,Krakowskie Przedmiescie 7, PL-00-068 Warsawllexim, P O. Box 136-137, BucharestVan Schaik Bookstore (Pty) Ltd, P.O. Box 724, Pretoria 0001Diaz de Santos, Lagasca 95, E-28006 MadridDiaz de Santos, Balmes 417, E-08022 BarcelonaAB Fritzes Kungl. Hovbokhandel, Fredsgatan 2, P.O. Box 16356,S-10327 StockholmHMSO, Publications Centre, Agency Section,51 Nine Elms Lane, London SW8 5DRMezhdunarodnaya Kniga,Smolenskaya-Sennaya 32-34, Moscow G-200Jugoslovenska Knjiga,Terazije 27, P.O. Box 36, YU-11001 Belgrade

Orders from countries where sales agents have not yet been appointed andrequests for information should be addressed directly to:

Division of PublicationsInternational Atomic Energy AgencyWagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria

the international chernobyl project - iaea · the technical report of the international chernobyl...

Documents