the interlinking of turkey's domestic and foreign policy in the akp's third term

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Analysis

The Interlinking of Turkey’s Domestic and

Foreign Policy in the AKP’s Third Term

by Joshua W. Walker

August 10, 2011

O f f i c e s

Analysis

Washington, DC• Berlin • Paris • Brussels

BelgraDe • ankara • BuCharest • WarsaW

Summary: In the wake of the

AKP’s victory and the resigna-

tion of Turkey’s top military

commanders six weeks later,

there is no longer any doubt who

has exclusive control over foreign

policy. Turkey now must prove it

is able to transcend its long tradi-

tion of “democracy without demo-crats” both internally and exter-

nally. The AKP government has

won a mandate in its third term

to write a new social contract

and be a true inspiration for its

region. Having spent the last two

terms demanding a global role

for Turkey, the AKP now has its

wish in the “Arab Spring,” but

must deliver if it wants to be seen

a credible mediator rather than

simply a rhetorically bombastic

and ineffective regional power.Without a harmonic and symbi-

otic voice, Turkey risks losing

the inuence it has carefully

cultivated over the last decade.

Managing the interdependency

between a democratizing and

fractious domestic political scene

with an ambitious foreign policy

vision in Ankara for the AKP will

be of critical importance.

urkey’s global rise over the courseo the last decade is well-documentedand being studied by many countriesand commentators who ocus on theincumbent Justice and DevelopmentParty’s (AKP) stewardship o a “new”urkish oreign policy. Tis is only logical given that the re-orientationo urkey’s 21st century oreign policy coincided with the emergence o thesel-condent Prime Minister Recepayyip Erdoğan and his AKP. Elected

in 2002 with 34 percent o the popular vote against the backdrop o corruptincumbent parties and re-electedagain in 2007 with 47 percent, underthe cloud o military intererence ande-proclamations, the AKP success-ully navigated and conquered urkishpolitics to become a predominant orceeven beore the June 12, 2011, elec-tions.

In the wake o the AKP’s victory withclose to hal o the popular vote, andthe resignation o urkey’s top military commanders six weeks later, there isno longer any doubt who has exclusivecontrol over oreign policy in a way unprecedented or civilian leadersand a single party in modern urkishhistory. urkey now must prove it isable to transcend its long tradition o

“democracy without democrats,” inwhich one group within the heteroge-neous, polarized polity – most recentlythe AKP – captures the state, only toenact policies and rules that enableit to monopolize power and governwithout compromise.

Turkey Today

urkey today is simultaneously moredemocratic and more engaged in

the world than at any time since theoundation o the urkish Republic in1923. Yet at the same time, it has moretensions with its Western allies thansince its 1974 operation in Cyprus.Further progress hinges on a serieso remaining domestic challenges,most importantly the writing o anew constitution, that is complicatedby its current oreign policy posture.Unlike during the Cold War, whenurkey’s overriding national interestswere ocused on internal enemiesand the larger threat o the SovietUnion, urkish oreign policy today is complicated and inter-related withits own internal developments as animportant capitalist, Muslim-majority,secular democracy, which is beingcareully watched amidst the backdropo historic regional changes. Te “new”



Analysis

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Analysis

Turkey nds itself in the

uncomfortable situation of being

a ip-opping regional power,

confronting accusations it used

to lob at the West for its double

standards and hypocrisy in the

region.

oreign policy o urkey championed by the three-term

ruling AKP has brought with it a realignment and re-eval-uation o Ankara’s traditional positioning in world politics.No longer simply a bridge or instrument “o” or “rom”the West, urkey has established its own agency in the lasttwo terms o the AKP through a pro-active oreign policy that seeks to balance its pragmatic interests and principles.Whether or not this will continue to be possible in theAKP’s third term remains to be seen.

urkey’s domestic political transormation and its democ-ratization under the AKP have played an important role inthe expansion o urkey’s international relations. Despite

the traditional hostility o urkey’s secular Kemalist elitetowards its Muslim and Soviet neighborhood in avor o amore comprehensive partnership with the more powerulWest, the popular sentiment o most urks remains skep-tical towards the West1 as evidenced by polling done by Pew.Consequently, in periods o democratically elected civiliangovernments, urkey has pursued closer relations with itsneighborhood. Tis is most clearly demonstrated by theoreign policy initiatives o Prime Ministers Menderes andÖzal, long beore the AKP.

Regional Dynamism

Te rise o the AKP and the “Anatolian igers,” repre-senting the new business elites o the urkish heartland inKayseri, Konya, or Gaziantep rather than the traditionalWestern centers o the Marmaris, has redened the oncedominant narrative o urkey’s heartland being economi-cally backwards and too religiously conservative, as theKemalist elites and military once propagated. oday, urkey under the AKP operates according to a new vision o thecountry’s long-term economic and geopolitical objectives,turning away rom its once exclusively Western orientationand instead towards its own regional neighborhood. Tisre-orientation is marked by the concepts o “zero problemswith neighbors” and “strategic depth,” as explained by thecurrent Minister o Foreign Aairs Ahmet Davutoğlu. Tedirect impact this has had on business and trade is a reo-cusing o attention and energy within rather than beyondurkey’s immediate neighborhood.

1 This has been seen in polling most recently completed by the Pew Global Attitudes

Project http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_report_detail.aspx?id=85899362116

Despite the initial successes o urkish oreign policy in

opening new markets and expanding into its neighbor-hood, throughout the Arab Spring, Ankara has been orcedto conront the new realities o the Middle East. Havinginitially inspired great admiration in both the Arab worldand the West or its early embrace o changes in unisia andEgypt, urkey misjudged Libya by initially rejecting sanc-tions and even opposing NAO’s involvement, losing muchcredibility beore changing course. Now with the ongoingprotests and brutal repression by the AKP leadership’s“brother” Bashar Assad, Ankara has only reluctantly spokenout as Syrians poured across the border and continue tobe killed during protests every day. Syria has been the

showcase o AKP’s policy o engagement in the MiddleEast thereore the time it has taken or them to “run outo patience” with Assad will be consequential or urkey’suture role in the region. urkey nds itsel in the uncom-ortable situation o being a ip-opping regional power,conronting accusations it used to lob at the West or itsdouble standards and hypocrisy in the region. Now the EU,urkey, and the United States nd themselves in the sameboat without any tangible benets.

Unlike previous oreign ministers such as Abdullah Guland Ali Babacan that spoke soly and in unison with the

prime minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s tenure has been raughtwith domestic disagreements over important oreign policy issues such as Armenia, Cyprus, and Israel to name only the most recent instances. Te voice o the prime ministerhas typically drowned out the work and voice o the oreign



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Analysis

Perhaps the greatest foreign

policy challenge for the AKP in

its third term will be balancing

its historically close “strategic

alliance” with America and its

ongoing membership association

with the EU amidst the new

economic realities of Western

crisis and a newly assertive foreign

policy with its neighbors.

ministry that has tried to navigate these treacherous waters

without awakening populist nationalism within domesticpolitics. Without a harmonic and symbiotic voice, urkey risks losing the inuence it has careully cultivated overthe last decade. urkey’s so power that is oen extolled inits active diplomacy as a regional leader is no longer justabout trade and diplomacy. It also calls or active supportor democracy, human rights, and the rule o law. Addition-ally, having zero-problems with the people and regimes o the region is becoming increasingly impossible. As regimessuch as Syria kill their own people, ractions within Ankaradisagree over undamental urkish responses, causingurther conusion.

Balancing Turkish Foreign Policy in the AKP’s Third Term

Te perceived decline o the West versus the rise o the Eastin the 21st century, has animated the AKP to strategically pursue its own sense o urkey’s destiny with its 360 degreeso “strategic depth” with great success. Having spent thelast two terms demanding a global role or urkey, the AKPnow has its wish, but must deliver i it wants to be seen acredible global mediator rather than simply a rhetorically bombastic but ineective regional power. Beneting romurkey’s economic and regional dynamism, the AKP seems

poised to continue to prioritize its Anatolian roots ratherthan the traditional Western business community that hasbeen unable to politically challenge them. Te outstandingquestion now is whether the AKP will perpetuate the oldpattern o enshrining its own preerences at the expense o others in urkey’s deeply divided polity and the eect thiswill have in its international behavior.

Perhaps the greatest oreign policy challenge or the AKP inits third term will be balancing its historically close “stra-tegic alliance” with America and its ongoing membershipassociation with the EU amidst the new economic realitieso Western crisis and a newly assertive oreign policy withits neighbors that could lead to urther tensions betweenthe country’s perceived interests and principles. Managingthe interdependency between a democratizing and stabledomestic political scene and ambitious oreign policy visionin Ankara or the AKP will be o critical importance.

A new challenge or the West will be to actively engageurkey and encourage the AKP’s activism to live up to the

principles set orth in its ambitious oreign policies o the

rst two terms. rying to bully urkey into cutting o rela-tions with Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, Iran, or any actor willonly generate backlash against the West that it can ill-aordrom one o the most important democracies and econo-mies in the region. Divergent interests will sometimes leadto disagreements, which can be minimized by emphasizingthe overriding common interest in a democratizing, ree-market Middle East that looks to the transatlantic commu-nity or assistance in the short-run.

Creating a New Social Contract for Turkey

urkey needs constitutional reorm, and the AKP has inter-preted its electoral victory as giving it a popular mandateto create a new social contract or the country. Te primeminister’s desire to turn urkey into a presidential ratherthan a parliamentary system may have to wait, as he rstmust address the perennial Kurdish issue. However, only a new constitution can create the necessary space or apolitical solution that still seems a long way o. Te newsocial contract cannot simply be an alliance o convenience



Analysis

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Analysis

About the Author

Joshua W. Walker is a ransatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall

Fund.

About GMF

Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) is a non-

partisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedi-

cated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between

North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF

does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the

transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members o the policy

and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on

transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to osterrenewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition,

GMF supports a number o initiatives to strengthen democracies.

Founded in 1972 through a gi rom Germany as a permanent memo-

rial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on

both sides o the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Wash-

ington, DC, GMF has seven ofces in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels,

Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller

representations in Bratislava, urin, and Stockholm.

About the On Turkey Series

GMF’s On urkey is an ongoing series o analysis bries about urkey’scurrent political situation and its uture. GMF provides regular anal-

ysis bries by leading urkish, European, and American writers and

intellectuals, with a ocus on dispatches rom on-the-ground urkish

observers. o access the latest bries, please visit our web site at www.

gmus.org/turkey or subscribe to our mailing list at http://database.

gmus.org/reaction.

between the AKP and Kurds, which is not sustainable in the

long run. Aer all, previous coalitions, rom the army andthe le (post-1960), to the army and the right (post-1980),to the Islamist/liberal alliance o the 2000s have oundered.Rather, it will need to include all o urkey: social demo-crats, Kemalists, Alevis, and women who ear the AKP’sconservative hegemony. Te AKP has clearly mastered thegame o electoral democracy but knows it can only leavea lasting legacy i it can carry urkey across the thresholdwith a new constitution; thereore the party will do every-thing in its power to cultivate a political coalition to makethis happen.

Te new AKP government must rise above rhetoric tolive up to the mandate it has won in the latest election towrite a new social contract and be a true inspiration or itsregion. Rather than simply criticizing the AKP or its aults,the West owes Ankara a genuine good aith eort to work together towards resolving oreign policy issues such asArmenia or Cyprus while accurately reecting the enormity o the domestic tasks ahead such as writing a new constitu-tion and the Kurdish question. Te majority o urkey’spluralist political community demands a civilian constitu-tion based on democratic principles that may not be asliberal as some urks and Westerners would like. However,

helping urkey maintain its inuence as a model democracy in the region and aspirant or global status is in everyone’scommon interest.

the interlinking of turkey's domestic and foreign policy in the akp's third term

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