The Institutional Revolution

A New Look at Aristocrats and Dueling

The Odd Institutions of the Pre Modern World

…

including Dueling.

What do the following people have in common?

Well, of course ….

They all engaged in duels (famous ones).

Almost Every Duel Portrayed in a Hollywood Movie is Factually Incorrect

There were actually three types of duels:

1. The Judicial Duel/ Trial by Combat

2. The Chivalrous Duel

3. The Duel of Honor.

Characteristics and Facts of Duels of Honor

1. The cause of duel was trivial: insults, touching, slur, `coolness of manner', accusation of lying.

2. Outcome was irrelevant with respect to social standing.

3. Regulated by strict sets of rules.

4. Held in private, always nominally illegal, but if legitimate ….

5. Reconciliation was common after the duel.

6. No defensive weapons allowed.

7. Lethalness of duels fell over time, mostly through choice of weapons: rapiers, sabres, pistols.8. Begins c. 1500. Ends mid 19th century.

9. Was the sole domain of the ruling aristocracy, until the end of dueling.

An (odd) Group of People: Pre-Modern Aristocrats1. Existed from c. 1500 to c. 1880 - 1911

2 Did not live in a castle.

5. But collectively they were more numerous and powerful.

7. They had a complicated social code of conduct.

8. From 1880-1911 they voluntarily dismantled their system, sold off much of their estates.

4. Individually, their land holdings and powers were smaller than earlier feudal lords.

3. Had no direct military powers.

6. Completely engaged in court life and civil administration.

Peers: Small, rigid, powerful Very wealthy.

Gentry: relatively large, socially flexible, little authority.

Much less wealth.

Why Did This Group of People Exist?

Answer: Prior to the IR, direct measurement of performance almost impossible.

So, alternatives were found.

One alternative, especially for “public service” jobs, was to grant an office by patronage and trust the appointee.

An appointed servant could be trusted, if they stood to lose if they cheated.

Two methods were used “signal” if a servant could be trusted.

1. If you were a person of means, you could invest in Visible “Sunk” Assets.

An Enormous “seat” in the middle of nowhere.

Take large parcels of land out of production.

Spend enormous sums on “Port”

Fox hunts, picnics, parties.

These Visible Investments were SUNK. A Peer could be severely punished for bad behavior by being “fired” from public service.

Hence, the lifestyle aristocrats are criticized for had a productive role.

All of these Methods Worked as Long as You had substantial Wealth to Invest.

But what if you were a marginal gentleman, or A young John Churchill?

2. If you were a marginal gentry, you could spend your Time in “Sunk” Investments.

Economists call this type of investment Social Capital:

-private time investments

-only yield income through the recognition of others

- not private property.

- acquired through education (Latin), marriage, “useless” social skills, family, “loyal” service.

Consider the Bennets in Pride and Prejudice:

Why does Elizabeth Bennet have to play piano for Lady Catherine?

Why is everyone so concerned about parties, and dances?

The Problem with Social Capital:

*Difficult to observe because it depends on the quality of interpersonal associations.

How does social capital work to encourage Trust?

* It is a form of hostage capital. The investment is sunk.

The Solution to the Problem:

*Because investments and depreciation are not observable, a screen is needed to make sure the investment is made.

* Dueling was the screen.

If you accepted a duel: participate in society.

If you rejected a duel: expelled and social capital is worthless.

“...in a state of highly polished society, an affront is held to be a serious injury. It must, therefore, be resented, or rather a duel must be fought upon it; as men have agreed to banish from their society one who puts up with an affront without fighting a duel.” Dr. Johnson

Dueling was Designed so that:

1. Pretenders (Mr. Wickham) always reject duels.

2. Investors (Samuel Pepys) always accept duels.

3. The marginal “aristocracy” always prefer to invest, rather than pretend.

4. Low social capital “commoners” are not allowed to duel.

Dueling was designed to:

* be difficult to fake

* be easy to verify

* be unenjoyable in and of itself

Dueling was costly because:

* excluded large numbers from service

* often resulted in death or injury

* created an incentive to invest in dueling skills

* cheating had to be policed.

EVIDENCE: Does the Social Capital Hypothesis Explain Dueling?

1. Limits on Participation.

* Royalty, higher ranking officers, officers in battle

* Lower members of society never allowed to duel.

-John Churchill

- business men vs. law makers

2. Cause, Identity of Challenger/Challenged, Consequence ... irrelevant.

* limitless number of grounds for duels.

* reconciliation common

* No change in social standing based on outcome: Vice President Col. Aaron Burr.

3. All attempts to make the Probability of Death random.

* rules to prevent expert or staged duels, ``choice of weapon''.

* rules to prevent ``dumb'' shooting.

*minimum firing rules, fixed times, postponement due to nerves, loss of weapon, impaired vision.

* short, smooth bore pistols, with no aiming beads.

* turn and fire rules.

* first blood rules.

4. Role of seconds ... prevent cheating.

* helped prevent illegitimate duels.

* made collusion more difficult.

* made the duel as fair as possible.

* both insisted and rejected duels.

* would make the duel public to the right people.

5. US more lethal when cost of investment is lower.

•The cost of acquiring social capital is a substitute for the probability of death. Basically you need a higher level of death to keep the pretenders out.

6. No patronage, no dueling.

* English Commonwealth.

* China

* Decline of Patronage/Dueling in 19th century.

* Women

* Jews

Conclusion:

-perhaps the pre-modern era isn’t so impossible to understand.

-Individuals were just as interested in growth as we are, they just operated under different constraints.