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Jonathan Webber Rethinking Existentialism Draft: January 2016

10.TheImperativeofAuthenticity

Existentialism is the theory thatweought to recognise and respect thehuman freedom

encapsulatedintheslogan‘existenceprecedesessence’.Itis,asSartrepointsout,aformof

humanismthatgroundsallmoralvalueinthestructureofhumanexistence,ratherthanin

humanachievementsorpotentialforachievement(EH:ref).Butthisethicaltheorystands

in tensionwith the theoryofhumanexistence that it refers to.For tosay thatexistence

precedesessence is,aswehaveseen, tosaythat thereasonsweencounter in theworld

reflectthevaluesatthecoreofourprojects,whichwehavechosenandcanchange.What

reason could therebe, therefore, that requiresus to endorse anyparticular value?How

could there be reason for everyone, irrespective of their existing commitments, to

undertakeanyparticularproject,suchastheprojectofauthenticity?

Onestrategy foranswering thisquestion is toargue that inauthenticityhas implications

thataredisvaluedby the inauthentic individualnomatterwhat theirotherprojectsare.

FanonandSartrepursuethisstrategyprimarilywiththepsychoanalyticaimofuncovering

and countering sources of distress. In this context, they aim only to derive what Kant

describesasa‘hypotheticalimperative’,animperativetoundertakesomemeanstoanend

thatonealreadyhas.Thegoalistoovercomethedistress,themeansisconversiontothe

project of authenticity. Sartre wants to derive a moral conclusion from the same

considerations, because he thinks that the distress he diagnoses is a necessary

consequenceof inauthenticity.But this strategycannotsucceed,aswesaw inchapter9.

For it can at best provide reasons for authenticity that might be outweighed for an

individualbycontraryreasonsthataregroundedintheirprojects.Anditsconclusiononly

rulesoutcommitmenttotheideathatpeoplehavefixednatures,whichdoesnotseemto

setmuchconstraintonpermissiblebehaviour.

Existentialist eudaimonism therefore fails as a moral position. The imperialist

entrepreneur who subjugates thousands of people in pursuit of their own goals, for

example, might reasonably conclude that the benefits from continuing this practice

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outweighanybenefitsofgivingitupoutofrespectforhumanfreedom,ormightconclude

thatauthenticityonlyrequiresthattheyareawarethatthepeopletheysubjugatehaveno

fixednatures.Beauvoiroffers analternative route to the imperativeof authenticity. She

aimstoderiveitnotfromtheinternalcontradictionsoftheprojectof inauthenticity,but

rather from the structure of human existence itself. If this argument succeeds, the

imperativewill be not hypothetical but categorical. It will apply to all creatureswhose

existenceprecedestheiressence,irrespectiveoftheirexistingprojects.Anditwillrequire

themtovaluehumanfreedom,notmerelytorecogniseit.

1.AKantianMoralCogito

In her works of the 1940s, Beauvoir rests hermoral philosophy on this claim that the

imperativeofauthenticityfollowsfromthenatureofhumanexistence.Moreprecisely,she

arguesthatthefactthatwefreelyadoptvaluesthatshapeourexperienceentailsthatwe

ought to treat this feature of human existence as objectively valuable. She occasionally

asserts this entailment without explanation (MIPR: 189; EA: 57-8). She does sketch an

argumentforitinheressayTheEthicsofAmbiguity,butsobrieflythatshecanseemtobe

offeringnothingmore than a series of unsupported assertions (EA: 71-2). This explains

why Iris Murdoch, in her review of The Ethics of Ambiguity, criticised Beauvoir for

providingnoargumentfortheclaimthattheimperativeofauthenticityfollowsfromthe

existentialistconceptionofhumanexistence(1950:127).Beauvoirdoesclearly indicate,

however, that these remarks in TheEthicsofAmbiguity are intended to summarise the

argument of her earlierworkPyrrhusandCineas (EA: 71). To identify her argument for

authenticity,weneedtoturntothatwork.

IfthesummaryinTheEthicsofAmbiguityobscurestheargumentbybeingtooconcise,its

full statement inPyrrhusandCineas obscures it by beingnowherenear concise enough.

Thisshortbook,firstpublishedin1944andunavailableinEnglishuntil2004,iswrittenin

thestyleoftheclassicalFrenchessaypioneeredbyMicheldeMontaigne.Herargumentis

regularly illustrated and substantiated by references to literature and examples from

medieval European politics, the development ofWestern art, the postulates of classical

physics,andthetensions inChristiantheology.There isnoclearsummaryoftheoverall

sequence of thought to ensure that itsmessage is properly conveyed, though there is a

liberalsprinklingofanecdotes,witticisms,andaphorismstokeepthereaderentertained.

Itcanreadlikeaniterativelydigressivestreamofconsciousness.Itcanseem,thatistosay,

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like a breathless rush to expound a host of novel ideas without the editorial discipline

requiredtoensurecoherenceandclearoveralldirection(Sandford2006:12,18).

Yetwe should take seriouslyBeauvoir’s claim inTheEthicsofAmbiguity, publishedonly

threeyears later, thatthisessaypresentsanargumentfortheimperativeofauthenticity

onthebasisoftheideathatexistenceprecedesessence.IfwereadPyrrhusandCineaswith

thisinmind,wecanfindinitspagessuchanargumentthatdeservesseriousattentionin

moral philosophy. This argument parallels in the moral domain the structure of the

argumentDescartes develops for thepossibility of knowledge. It begins fromapremise

that the reasoning subjectmust accept.Descartes begins his argumentwith the claim ‘I

think’,whichhearguescannotbedoubtedbythethinker(1984:16-17). It isacommon

criticismofDescartes thathe isonlyreallyentitledat thispoint to thepremise ‘there is

thinking’ or ‘there are thoughts’ (e.g.Nietzsche1998: § 17). Beauvoir’s parallel opening

premisecouldnotbesubjectedtoasimilarobjection,sinceherargumentbeginsnotwith

thethoughtthatIvaluethings,butwiththethoughtthatsomethingsarevaluable.

Ihavetoacceptthispremise,accordingtoBeauvoir,becauseitisanessentialstructureof

humanexistencethattheindividualvaluestheendstheypursue.Thisis,aswehaveseen

throughout this book, the basic ontological claim of existentialism: existence precedes

essence;theindividual’sbehaviourisultimatelyexplainedbytheirpursuitofvaluesthat

they have set for themselves. From the first-person perspective, those ends appear

phenomenologicallytobevaluableandaretreatedinpracticeasvaluable.Ifstayingalive

is one ofmy projects, then it seems tome inmy unreflective experience thatmy life is

valuableandItreatitassuch.JustasDescartesdoesnotneedtospecifywhatit isthatI

think,orwhatthosethoughtsareabout,BeauvoirdoesnotneedtospecifywhatvaluesI

acceptintheinitialpremise.AllthatisrequiredisthatIacceptthatmyendsarevaluable.

AndIdoacceptthis,shethinks.AlthoughIcanreflectivelydecidethatnothingisvaluable,

myunreflectiveexperienceandactioncannotembodythisnihilism. ‘Ilive,evenifIjudge

that life isabsurd, likeAchillesalwayscatchingupwith the tortoisedespiteZeno’ (P&C:

100;compareEA:55-6).

JustasDescartesaimstoderiveanobjectiveconclusionfromhissubjectivestartingplace,

so Beauvoir aims to derive the conclusion that I ought to treat the basic ontological

structure of human agency as objectively valuable. Descartes does not merely want to

establish that knowledge is possible, however. He wants to show how it is possible,

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thereby establishing which beliefs are knowledge. Beauvoir’s conclusion sets similar

constraints in therealmofvalue.The imperativeofauthenticityrequiresthatwedonot

treatasvaluableanyendsthatconflictwiththevalueweoughttoplaceonhumanagency

(P&C:137-8;MIPR:189;EA:71).

ThisoutcomecloselyresemblesoneofKant’sformulationsofthecategorical imperative,

theinjunctiontotreathumanity,orrationalagency,‘whetherinyourownpersonorinthe

personofanyother,alwaysatthesametimeasanend,nevermerelyasameans’(1997:

4:429).Kantdefinesan‘end’assomethingvaluedforitself,a‘means’assomethingvalued

foritscontributiontoanend.Someendsaresubjective,onKant’sview,havingtheirvalue

onlybecausetheyarepursuedasends.Buthumanityisan‘objective’end,havingitsvalue

irrespective of whether anyone recognises it (1997: 4:428). Beauvoir does not indicate

thissimilarityinPyrrhusandCineas,whereheronlycommentsonKant’sethicsarguethat

it is incapableofprovidingpracticaladvice inaworldwherepeopleareopposedtoone

another’s ends (P&C: 127, 131, 138). However, she soon comes to acknowledge the

similaritybetweenherunderlyingtheoryandKant’sformulaofhumanity(MIPR:189;EA:

17, 33). But before reconstructing her argument for thisKantian conclusion, it isworth

seeingwhyherargumentitselfisCartesianratherthanKantian.

2.FromSubjectiveEndstoObjectiveValue

Kant has been read as arguing in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals that the

imperativetotreatrationalagencyasanendinitselfcanbederiveddirectlyfromtheidea

ofrationalagencyasthecapacitytopursueends.AsareadingofKant,thisismistaken.He

isclearthathedoesnotintendtoestablishanymoralimperativeinthepartofthebook

containing these comments (G:444-5).The first sectionof theGroundwork analyses the

concept of moral goodness to show that it is the concept of obedience to a categorical

imperative.Thesecondanalysesthisconceptofacategoricalimperativeinordertoshow

what such an imperative would be if there were any. The statement of the formula of

humanity occurs in this second section. His argument there is intended to show that if

thereisanycategoricalimperative,thenitcanbestatedastheformulaofhumanity.Itis

notanargument that there isanysuch imperative.Theargument thatwearesubject to

thecategoricalimperativeisinthethirdsectionofthebookanddoesnotexplicitlyreferto

theformulaofhumanity.

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Despite this, it is worth considering an argument for the formula of humanity that has

been assembled from Kant’s comments in the paragraphs surrounding it in the second

sectionoftheGroundwork.ForthisargumentresemblesBeauvoir’s:bothbeginfromthe

ideaof rationalagencyorhumanexistenceas thecapacity to setandpursueends;both

aim to establish the objective value of that capacity. The argument derived fromKant’s

comments,however,doesnotsucceed.Thereasons for its failurewillhelpus tosee the

strengthsofBeauvoir’sargument.Ratherthanconsidereveryvariationoftheneo-Kantian

argument, we will focus on the version that has received the most attention, the one

propoundedbyChristineKorsgaard.Her initial statementof it argues that thevaluemy

endshavedependsonmysettingthemasends,whichentailsthevalueofmycapacityto

doso,andsincethisvaluedoesnotdependonanysubject’sattitudetowardsthatcapacity

itisanobjectivevalueratherthanasubjectivevalue(1986:196-7;seealso1997:xxii).1

Various objections have been raised against this argument. For our purposes, themost

important isthat itcannotestablishtheobjectivevalueofrationalagencyingeneral. If I

accept that the foundationof thevalueofmyendsmust itselfbevaluable, thenIamled

only to the value ofmy own rational agency,my own capacity to set and pursue ends.

Korsgaard claims that it is incoherent to value one’s own rational agency but not other

people’s(1986:196).Shedoesnotsaywhy,butperhapsherthoughtisthatthecapacityto

setendsisthesameineveryoneanditisincoherenttotreatcasesdifferentlythatarein

factthesame.However, it is incoherenttotreatcasesdifferentlyonlywhentheyarethe

sameintherelevantrespect.Ifthevalueofmyrationalagencyisestablishedonthebasis

thatitgroundsthevalueofmysubjectiveends,thenmyrationalagencyisdifferentfrom

everyone else’s in the relevant respect. Nobody else’s capacity to set ends grounds the

value ofmy subjective ends. It is perfectly coherent to valuemy rational agency as the

groundofmysubjectiveendswithoutvaluingotherpeople’srationalagency.

1Sartre’scommentsontheinconsistencyofbadfaithinExistentialismIsaHumanismhave

beenreadassuggestinganargumentlikethis(Poellner2015:238).But,aswesawinthe

lastchapter,themostthiskindofargumentcouldshowwithintheframeworkofSartre’s

initialformofexistentialismisthatweoughttovalueourownprojects,notthatweought

eventorecogniseourfreedomoverthoseprojects.

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Alternatively,perhapsKorsgaardintendstobearguingthatifIrecognisethegroundingof

thevalueofmyownsubjectiveendsinmyownrationalagency,thenImustalsorecognise

thatthevalueofotherpeople’ssubjectiveendsisgroundedintheirrationalagency(see

1996:123;1997:xxii).ButthiswouldassumethatIrecognisethevalueofotherpeople’s

subjective ends. This assumption fails to recognise the subjectivity of subjective ends.

Korsgaard treats subjective ends simply as conditional values, so that what makes a

subjectiveendsubjectiveisthatitsvalueisconditionalonitbeingwilled(see1996:123-

4).Butthisisnotwhatitisforvaluetobesubjective.Kantrightlydefinesasubjectiveend

as something that ‘hasaworth forus’ (1997:4:428).Mysubjectiveendsarevaluable to

me,sotheirvaluecanbeusedinanargumentintendedtoleadmetosomeconclusion.But

other people’s subjective ends are only valuable to them. (Theymay coincide with my

subjectiveends,butthatdoesnotmeanthatIvaluethemasotherpeople’sends.)SoIdo

notneedtoacceptthevalueofotherpeople’ssubjectiveendsasapremise.

Anyattempttoderivethevalueofrationalagencydirectlyfromitsstructureassettingthe

valueofendswillbecaughtinthisdilemma.Eitherthepremiserefersonlytothevaluemy

own ends have forme, in which case themost it can establish is the value ofmy own

capacitytosetthatvalue.Orthepremisereferstothevalueofallsubjectiveends,inwhich

case I can reject its claim that other people’s subjective ends are valuable.Kant himself

doesnotfallfoulofthisdilemma,becausehedoesnottrytoderivetheobjectivevalueof

rationalagencydirectlyfromthecapacitytosetends.Hisargumentfortheobjectivevalue

of rationalagencyrestson theargument in the thirdsectionof theGroundwork thatwe

are subject to moral imperatives.2We are not concerned here with identifying which

interpretationofKantiscorrect,butwearenowinapositiontoseeclearlytheproblem

thatBeauvoir’s argument inPyrrhusandCineas is trying to solve:howcananargument

reachtheconclusionthatrationalagency,ratherthansimplymyownrationalagency, is

objectivelyvaluable,iftheonlystartingpremisethatImustacceptisthevalueofmyown

subjectiveends?

2Inhermostrecentpaperonthe formulaofhumanity,Korsgaardno longerattemptsto

deriveitdirectlyfromthevalueofsubjectiveends.Instead,shedevelopsareconstruction

ofKant’sargumentthatrestsonthethirdsectionoftheGroundwork.Specifically,sherests

itonthatclaiminthatsectionthatIamrationallycommittedtotreatingmyownrational

agencyaslegislatingvalueinasharedkingdomofends(Korsgaardforthcoming,§III).

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3.AReconstructionofBeauvoir’sArgument

Beauvoiraimstoestablishthe imperativeofauthenticityonthebasisof thestructureof

human existence. Her argument is therefore distinct from Kant’s, which combines an

argumentthatanycategoricalimperativemustbeexpressibleintheformulaofhumanity

with an argument thatwe are subject to a categorical imperative. But it is also distinct

fromKorsgaard’s, fortworeasons.Oneisthat itbeginsfromaproperrecognitionofthe

subjectivity of the individual’s subjective ends.This iswhatmakesBeauvoir’s argument

distinctivelyCartesian:itstartsfromapremisethatthereasoningindividualmustaccept,

accordingtohertheoryofhumanexistence.ThesecondisthatBeauvoir’sargumentdoes

not aim to derive the objective value of human existence directly from this premise.

Rather, she proceeds via the axiological concept that Kant deploys in his formula of

humanitybutwhichKorsgaardignoresinformulatingherargument:theideaofameans.

Somethingisvaluableasameans,accordingtoKant,ifitisrequiredforsomevaluableend

(1997: 4:428). I might value exercise as something that contributes causally to good

health,forexample,orvalueafreepressasanessentialconstituentofdemocracy.

More precisely, Beauvoir’s argument proceeds via her concept of a ‘point of departure’

(pointdedépart),somethingthatisvaluableasapotentialmeansirrespectiveofwhether

itiseveractuallydeployedasameans.Thisideaisrequired,sheargues,inordertomake

senseofthevaluethatweaccordourends.Forinpursuingourendsweaccordthatvalue

tothoseends,nottoourpursuitofthem.Thismeansthatwevaluetheendbeingachieved.

Once the end is achieved, argues Beauvoir, any value it has must reside in its being a

potentialmeans,a ‘pointofdeparture’, for furtherends.Thisvalueasapotentialmeans

restsonthecapacitytouseitasameans,whichisthecapacitytosetandpursueends,but

itdoesnotrestonanyparticularinstanceofthiscapacity.Anachievedendisapotential

means for anyone pursuing a relevant end. The value of a potential means therefore

derives from the value of rational agency or human existence in general, a value that

humanexistencethereforehasirrespectiveofwhetheranyonerecognisesthatvalue.

Thisreasoningcanbeclarifiedbysettingitoutasasequenceofnumberedpropositions.

Theopeningpremiseis:

(1)Someendsarevaluable.

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Beauvoirconsiderseachofustobecommittedtoacceptingthispremise,whetherweare

awareofitornot,becausewedoinfacttreatsomeendsasvaluableinaction.Thisisthe

natureoftheprojectsthatshapeourexperience.Thesecondpremiseclarifiesthattotreat

anendasvaluableistotreatitsvalueasattachingtothatend,ratherthantomypursuitof

it:

(2)ItisincoherenttotreatanendasvaluableandasvaluableonlybecauseItreat

itasvaluable.

Totrytobringsomethingaboutistotreatitasvaluable.Itmaybevaluedasameanstoan

endorasanend.Butnothingcouldbevaluedasameansunlesssomethingisvaluedasan

end (P&C:112).On reflection, it can seem tous that our ends seemvaluable tousonly

becausewepursuethemasends.Butthisreflectivethoughtthreatensourcommitmentto

thoseends.Itdoesnotclarifythekindofvaluetheendhas,butrathermakestheendseem

arbitraryandunjustified.It isthisreflectivethreattoourvaluesthatBeauvoirconsiders

to be the experienced problem of absurdity, as we saw in the last chapter. The third

premise draws out an implication of this point that we treat our ends themselves as

valuable:

(3)Totreatanendasvaluableistotreattheachievementofitasvaluable.

Totreattheachievementofanendasvaluableistotreattheachievedendashavingsome

propertythatmakesitvaluable.Thiscannotbethatitisanend,sinceonceitisachievedit

isnolongerpursued.Ifthereistobesomethingvaluableaboutthisend,thenitmustbe

thataddingittotheworldwouldbevaluable.Whatcouldmakethisvaluable?

(4) Anachievedendisa‘pointofdeparture’forotherends;apotentialmeans.

(5) The existence of a potential means is necessary for a subjective end that

requiresthatmeans.

(6)Anachievedend,therefore,isvaluable.

If thereasoninguptothispoint iscorrect, thenitshowsthattotreatanendasvaluable

commitsone to treating theachievementof thatendasvaluable,whichcommitsone to

the idea that its value lies in its being a potentialmeans for other ends. But this value,

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Beauvoir argues, requires that the capacity to use the achieved end as ameans is itself

valuable.

(7)Thisvalueofanachievedenddependsonthecapacitytosetendsforwhichit

isameans.

(8)Thecapacitytosetends(humanagency)isthusvaluable.

Sinceproposition(8)isintendedtofollowlogicallyfromthecommitmenttothevalueof

one’sends,acommitmentthataccordingtoexistentialismwecannotavoid,theargument

this far aims to show that we ought to treat human agency as valuable. Finally, the

argument thenconcludesthat thisvalueof thestructureofhumanexistencemustbean

objectivevalue,ratherthanasubjectiveone:

(9)Thisvaluedoesnotdependonhumanagencybeingpursuedasanend.

(10)Therefore,humanagencyisobjectivelyvaluable.

Fromthefactthatwedotreatourownendsasvaluable,then,Beauvoirhasarguedtothe

conclusion that we ought to treat human existence, or human agency, as objectively

valuable. If this reasoning is right, then the imperative of authenticity, the requirement

thatweall value thebasic structureofhumanexistence, follows logically from thevery

structureofhumanexistenceitself.Thisambitiousargumentisverysubtle,however,and

notallof itscommitmentshavebeenelucidated inthisreconstruction,sothenext three

sectionsofthischapterwillclarifyitfurther.

4.TheCommitmentsofBeauvoir’sArgument

WearelikelytomisunderstandtheimplicationsofBeauvoir’sargumentifwefailtokeep

inmind that it isonlyanargument,whichMontyPythonrightlydefinedasa connected

seriesofstatementsintendedtoestablishadefiniteproposition(Chapmanetal1989:87).

Beauvoir’s argument, that is to say, is an epistemic device. It is intended to lead the

individualfromthevaluetheyplaceontheirownendstotheimperativetotreathuman

existence as objectively valuable. It is not an attempt to trace the contours of the

metaphysicsofvalue.Thestepfromonepropositiontothenextisintendedtoarticulatea

relationof logical implication,nota relationofmetaphysicaldependence.Theargument

doesnotclaim, therefore, that thevalueofanenddependson itbeingable tobecomea

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potentialmeans once it has been achieved. Neither does it claim that any end that can

become a potential means is thereby valuable. So the argument is not subject to the

objection that some ends cannot become potential means or the objection that some

morallydisvaluableendscanbecomepotentialmeans.

It may well be, for example, that I value listening to music as an end, but my regular

achievementsofthisendcannotbeusedbyanyoneasameanstoafurtherend.Myloveof

musicmightbeusedasameansbymusicianswhoaimtomakemoneyfromtheirart,of

course, but perhaps no particular event of my listening tomusic can, once it has been

completed,beusedasameans.YetImighthaveaimedatbringingaboutthateventasan

end.Beauvoir’sargumentdoesnotdenythis.Allthatisrequiredfortheargumentisthat

some end that I value would become a potential means once it is achieved. Neither is

Beauvoir’s argument committed to the idea that an end that cannot become a potential

means isnot truly valuable, or is absurd. For the conclusionof the argument is thatwe

musttreathumanexistence,thesettingandpursuitofends,asobjectivelyvaluable.This

conclusion is perfectly consistent with the idea that the ends we pursue are valuable

because they are expressions of that objectively valuable structure of human existence.

Theargumentisconsistent,thatistosay,withthemetaphysicaldependenceofthevalue

ofendsonthevalueofthecapacitytosetandpursuethem.

The conclusion of Beauvoir’s argument does set a constraint on the value of ends,

however.Foritentailsthatweoughtnottreatanendasvaluableifitisincompatiblewith

the objective value of human existence. This rules out ends that involve killing people,

because this is the destruction of something objectively valuable. It also rules out the

suppressionofwhatisobjectivelyvaluableinpeople,theircapacitytosetandpursuetheir

own ends. Slavery is an extreme form of this suppression, but any form of coercion or

subordination isa failuretorespect thisobjectivevalue.Beauvoir’sargument, therefore,

entails that our ends must respect the existence and autonomy of any human agents

affectedbythem.Yetthisdoesnotrestricttheendsthatthereasoningsubjectcantreatas

valuable in order to accept the opening premise. At that stage of the argument, all that

mattersisthatthereasoningsubjecttakessomeendtobevaluable.Ifdoingsoleadstothe

conclusionthattheendoughtnotbetakenasvaluable,thenitistheendthatneedstobe

rejected,nottheargument’sconclusion.

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Although the conclusion sets this constraint, the argument should not be read as

concluding that I should respect thevalueofhumanity,or rationalagency, inorder that

my ends will be valuable. Because the problem of absurdity plays a significant role in

Beauvoir’sarticulationofherargument,shecanseemtoberecommendingmoralityasan

antidote to absurdity. Read in this way, Beauvoir’s argument aims to establish the

hypothetical imperative ‘to avoid absurdity, respect the value of humanity’. Thiswould

seem an objectionably egotistical basis formorality (Sandford 2006: 19). It would also

allowonetoevadetheconstraintsofmoralitybytakinguptheironicattitudethatitdoes

notmatterwhetherone’sownendsaretrulyvaluable.Butthisreadingmistakesthelogic

oftheargument.Theconclusionisthecategoricalimperativethatyouought,irrespective

ofyourownaims,torespectthevalueofhumanagency.Thisisnotarguedtobeameans

to establishing the value of your own ends. The argument is that this categorical

imperativeislogicallyimpliedbythevaluethatyoudoinfactplaceonyourends.3

Theargumentasawholecanbestatedasaconditional.Ifyouareanagentthatpursues

endsandtreatsthemasvaluable,thenyououghttotreatthiskindofagency(whetherin

yourownpersonorinanyoneelse)asobjectivelyvaluable.Butthisisnotahypothetical

imperative.Inahypotheticalimperative,theantecedentreferstosomeendthatyoumight

or might not pursue, such as ‘if you value your health, then you should take regular

exercise’.IntheconditionalstatementofBeauvoir’sargument,theantecedentrefersonly

3Beauvoirseemstohavereadherownargumentinthismistakenway.Intwovolumesof

her autobiography,writtenmore than a decade and a half afterPyrrhusandCineas, she

chastises her younger self for thinking that the individual ‘should hammer out his

"project" insolitarystate,andonlythenaskthemassofmankindtoendorseitsvalidity’

andforplacing ‘asearchforthemeaningof life’at thecoreofherethics,addingthat ‘to

lookforreasonswhyoneshouldnotstamponaman’sfaceistoacceptstampingonit’(PL:

549-50;FC:77).These criticisms,which target theargumentofPyrrhusandCineas both

directlyand indirectlyas thephilosophicalbasisof themoralessaysshepublishedsoon

afterit,readPyrrhusandCineasasrecommendingarespectforhumanityonthegrounds

that it gives one’s own life meaning. If we read it more sympathetically, however, her

argumentseems intended toestablishnot that stampingonpeople’s faces threatens the

meaning of one’s own actions, but that stamping on people’s faces is categorically

unacceptablebehaviorfromahumanagent.

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tothekindofcreaturethatissubjecttotheimperative.Thefactthattheargumentcanbe

expressed as a conditional statement, that is to say, simply reflects the fact that the

imperativeofauthenticityappliesonlytoagentsthatvaluetheirownsubjectiveends.Only

things thatexist in theway thatweexist,only thingswhoseontological structure isour

formofagency,arerequiredtotreatthatformofagencyasobjectivelyvaluable.Forthose

subjecttotherequirement,however,theimperativeiscategorical.

Itmight seem, therefore, that one can reject the argument by rejecting the ontology of

human existence thatmotivates it. Beauvoir’s aim in this argument is to show that the

existentialist theory that thereasonswe find inexperienceareshapedby thevalueswe

freely adopt and can replace entails that we ought to treat the capacity to set ends as

objectivelyvaluable.Buttheexistentialisttheoryoftheoriginsofreasonsdoesnotappear

amongthepremisesoftheargument.Thereasoningsubject ledthroughtheargumentis

notaskedatanypointtoaccepttheexistentialisttheoryofagency.Rather,theroleofthat

theory is to substantiate the claim that the reasoning subject must accept the opening

premise.But thisdoesnotmean that thebestway topersuadesomeone that theydo in

fact have ends, goals that they value in themselves, is to argue for the full existentialist

conceptionofhumanagency.Thebestwaymightratherbe for thatperson toreflecton

what theycareabout. If theexistentialistsareright, thispersonshouldcometosee that

theydohaveendsthattheyconsidervaluableinthemselves.

5.TheValueofaPotentialMeans

Beauvoir’sargumentaimstoestablishtheobjectivevalueofapotentialmeansasastepon

thewaytothevalueofhumanity.Weshouldtreatapotentialmeansashavingobjective

value,ratherthansubjectivevalue,becauseweshouldseeitsvalueasdependentonlyon

itspossibilityofbeingdeployedasameans,noton theactualityofanyone inparticular

deployingitasameans.Theargumentholdsthisobjectivevaluetobeimpliedbythevalue

ofmyachievableends:because Iamcommittedto thesebeingvaluableonceachieved, I

mustaccepttheirbeingvaluableaspotentialmeans.Atthispoint,however,anobjection

might be raised thatwouldparallel theobjection againstKorsgaard’s argument thatwe

consideredinsection2.WhyshouldIacceptthatanachievedendisvaluableasapotential

means in general, rather than simply as a potential means for me? If the value of my

achievedendweredependentonlyon itbeingapotentialmeans formyownsubjective

ends,thenapotentialmeanswouldhaveonlysubjectivevalueandthemosttheargument

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could establishwould be that I ought to treatmyownhumanity or agency, rather than

humanityoragencyingeneral,asobjectivelyvaluable.

To accept this alternative, however, would be to undermine the argument’s opening

premise that some ends are valuable. For this conclusion would set only minimal

constraintontheendsthatIcouldadopt.Itwouldprecludetherebeinganyvalueinends

thatkilledme,enslavedme,or impairedmyability tosetandpursuemyownends.But

withinthatconstraint,anythingthatIwilledwouldbeequallyvaluable.Theproblemhere

parallelsonehornofthefamousEuthyphrodilemma,whichpointsoutthatifthereareno

constraintsonwhatGodcanproclaimtobegood,thenGod’sproclamationsarearbitrary

ratherthanvaluable(EA:41).Perhapsthatproblemcanberesolvedbyappealtofeatures

ofGod,buttheparallelproblemforexistentialethicscouldnotbesolvedinthatway.The

idea that just about any endwould be valuable if Iwere to pursue it asmy end seems

incoherent.ForitwouldnotmatterwhetherIachievedanyparticularend,becauseIcould

instead simply replace itwith just about anyotherpossible end.This isnot to treatmy

endsasvaluable,buttoacceptthattheyarearbitrary.

In itself, this does not show thatmy ends are indeed valuable rather than arbitrary. If

acceptingthevalueofmyendsintheinitialpremisecouldbeshowntoentailthatmyends

areinfactarbitrary,thenwewouldhavetoacceptthattheinitialpremisewasmistaken.If

we indeed cannot live except by treating our ends as valuable, thenwewould have to

concludethatlifeisabsurd.Beauvoir’sargumentshows,however,thattheinitialpremise

doesnotentailthisconclusionthatunderminesit.Forwedonotneedtoaccountforthe

valueofthepotentialmeansintermsofourownagency.Wecaninsteadunderstanditas

valuableasapublicpotentialmeans.Beauvoir’sargumentleadsfromheretoaconclusion

that is consistent with the premise that some ends are valuable. If her argument is

successful,therefore,thereasoningsubjectworkingthroughtheargumentshouldaccept

atthatstageoftheargumentthatthevalueoftheirownachievedendsconsists inthese

endsbeingpotentialmeansforrationalagency,orhumanexistence,ingeneral.

Itmightbeobjected,however,thatthevalueofmyachievedendasapotentialmeansfor

other people does not require the value of human agency in general. For the value of a

potential means might instead consist in the possibility of its being deployed by other

peopleasameanstowardsendsthatIforeseeandvalue.Perhaps,thatistosay,itsvalue

mightbeconferredbymysubjectiveends,butimplythevalueofotherpeople’sagencyin

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bringing about those ends. Themost we could conclude from this would be that other

people’sagencyisvaluablewhenitmightbedeployedtofurthermyownsubjectiveends.I

wouldberequiredtovaluetheagencyonlyofpeopleinapositiontofurthermysubjective

ends.Indeed,ifthevalueofotherpeopleisdeterminedbytheirroleinbringingaboutmy

own subjective ends in this way, then their valuewould not rule out killing, enslaving,

coercing,orsubordinatingthemwheneverdoingsowouldbeexpedienttofurtheringmy

ownends.

Beauvoir obviates this objectionbypointing out that a potentialmeans canbe used for

purposes incongruent with my ends. ‘Everything that comes from the hands of man is

immediatelytakenawaybytheebbandflowofhistory’,shewrites,‘andgivesrisearound

ittoathousandunexpectededdies’(P&C:109;seealsoP&C:117,135).Anachievedend

cannotbevaluableonlyasapotentialmeanstomyends,sinceitspotentialtodefeatmy

endswouldcanceloutthisvalue.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatitsvalueisconferredbythe

ends to which it is put by other people. For this would lead to an infinite regress: if a

necessaryconditionofthevalueofsomeendisthatitbeusedasameanstosomefurther

valuableend,thenthesamenecessaryconditionappliestothisfurtherend,andsoon.An

infinitechainofnecessaryconditionscouldnotbefulfilled,sonoendsormeanscouldbe

valuable; our ‘transcendence’, or pursuit of ends, ‘would be dissipated in time’s elusive

flight’(P&C:106;seealsoP&C:112).Forthesereasons,accordingtoBeauvoir’sargument,

thevalueofanachievedendmustconsist in itspossibilityofbeingdeployedasameans,

whichentailsthevalueofthecapacitytouseitasameans.

6.WhyTheArgumentCouldNotBeShorter

TwointerpretationsofPyrrhusandCineasattributetoBeauvoirshorterargumentsforthe

objective value of human agency in general. Both are grounded in comments that she

makesinPyrrhusandCineasandbothareencouragedbyherratherambiguoussummary

inTheEthicsofAmbiguity (EA:71-2).One is theargument thatmyendscanbevaluable

only if they are carried forwardbyotherpeople (Arp2001:25; Sandford2006:17-18).

ThisisprimarilybasedonBeauvoir’sclaimtowardstheendofheressaythatmyactions

will ‘fallbackonthemselves, inertanduselessiftheyhavenotbeencarriedofftowarda

newfuturebynewprojects’pursuedbyotherpeople(P&C:135).However,sheisnothere

contradicting her earlier rejection of this idea as requiring an infinity of necessary

conditions.Rather,thisstatementistheopeningstageofabriefdialecticalargumentthat

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draws together points already made with the aim of establishing that to treat an

achievableendasvaluableistotreatitsachievementasthecreationofapotentialmeans

forotherpeople(P&C:135-6).

Thesecondshorterargument thathasbeenattributedtoBeauvoir is focusednotonthe

potentialofmyownendstobedeployedasmeansbyotherpeople,butontherole that

other people already play in my pursuit of my own ends. There are two parts to this

interpretation.Oneisthattheworldisalreadyrepletewiththeproductsofotherpeople’s

projects,whichIcandeployasmeanstomyends(Arp2001:64).‘ThehousethatIdidnot

buildbecomesminebecauseIliveinit’,asBeauvoirputsit(P&C:94).Theotheristhatthe

ends Ipursueare inherentlysocial: theirmeaning isconferredon thembyotherpeople

(Arp2001:64;Tidd2004:35).‘Thewriterdoesnotwantonlytoberead;hewantstohave

influence’,Beauvoirwrites,andthe‘inventorasksthatthetoolheinventedbeused’(P&C:

132).Accordingtothis interpretation,otherpeople’scapacitytopursueends isvaluable

because itprovidesmeansandmeaning formyownends.However,aswehavealready

seen,anargumentthatholdshumanitytobevaluableonlyinthepursuitofmyownends

would not rule out killing, enslaving, coercing, or subordinating other peoplewhenever

doingsowouldbeexpedienttofurtheringmyownends.Itwouldnotruleout,asBeauvoir

points out, a selective respect for only those who do further my ends (P&C: 130-1). It

thereforewouldnotreachtheconclusionthatBeauvoiristryingtoestablish.

A third shorter argument would combine elements of Korsgaard’s argument for the

formulaofhumanitywithoneoftheconsiderationsagainstaccountingforthevalueofa

potentialmeansintermsofone’sownsubjectiveends.Thishybridargumentwouldnotbe

concernedwiththevalueofapotentialmeans,butwouldinsteadproceedfromthevalue

of subjective ends directly to the objective value of humanity. If the value of my end

depends onmy pursuit of that end, this argument would run, thenmy end is valuable

eitherbecauseitiswilledbyarationalhumanagentorbecauseitiswilledspecificallyby

thisrationalhumanagent.Butthefoundationofthevalueoftheendcannotbespecifically

myagency,sincethiswouldleadtotheconclusionthatmyendsarearbitraryratherthan

valuable, forreasons thatparallelonehornof theEuthyphrodilemma.Somysubjective

endisvaluableonlybecauseitispursuedbyarationalhumanagent,whichestablishesthe

objectivevalueofrationalhumanagencyingeneral.

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However,weshouldnotaccepttheopeningpremiseof thishybridargument.Beauvoir’s

argument itself provides reason not to accept that my subjective end is valuable only

because Ipursue it asanend.Forherargument restson theclaim that it is incoherent,

fromthefirst-personperspectiveofthereasoningsubject,toconsideranendvaluableand

toconsideritsvaluetoconsistinmypursuingitasanend.Theintuitiveplausibilityofthis

claim, which forms premise (2) in the reconstruction of her argument in section 3, is

substantiatedbythepointthatparallelsonehornoftheEuthyhrodilemma:ifthevalueof

anendisnotconstrainedbyanythingotherthanmypursuitofitasanend,thentheendis

arbitrary rather than valuable. Beauvoir’s argument begins from the recognition that I

mustaccept,indeeddoaccept,thatsomeendsarevaluable.Icannotaccept,therefore,that

thevalueoftheseendsconsistsinmypursuingthem.

Thispointdoesnotcontradicttheideathatsubjectiveendscanbevaluableasexpressions

ofhumanagency,becausethisideaiscompatiblewiththerebeingotherconstraintsonthe

valueofsubjectiveends.IfweaccepttheconclusionofBeauvoir’sargument,thatistosay,

thenwemustacceptthatsubjectiveends incompatiblewiththevalueofhumanity,ends

that involvekilling,enslaving,orcoercingpeople, forexample,aredisvaluable.It follows

from this that the value of an end does not consist in it being willed by the person

pursuingit.Forsomeendsthatpeoplepursuearedisvaluableintheseways.Butwecan

stillholdthatendscompatiblewiththevalueofhumanagencyarethemselvesvaluableas

expressions of human agency. If Beauvoir’s argument as reconstructed in section 3 is

sound,thenwecanacceptthatourendscanbevaluableinpreciselythisway.Allofthisis

also consistent with the further claim that some of our ends are valuable as providing

potentialmeansforexpressionsofhumanagency.

7.AnExistentialistKantianEthics

Thecoreclaimofexistentialismisthatthevaluesthatshapeourexperienceandbehaviour

are ones thatwehave freely chosen and can replace. This iswhat the slogan ‘existence

precedesessence’means,aswehaveseenthroughoutthisbook.Itcanthusseemtoentail

that there are no objectivemoral values that restrict the permissible choice of projects.

Beauvoir’sargumentinPyrrhusandCineasisaparticularlysophisticatedresponsetothis

reading of existentialism. It does not simply aim to establish that existentialism is

consistentwithamoral imperative that canboth constrainandground thevalueofour

ownends.Itaimstoestablishthismoralimperativebyachainoflogicalimplicationsfrom

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apremise that the reasoning subjectmust accept. It aims to establish the imperative of

authenticityonthegroundsofthesamesubjectivevaluingthatthecriticsofexistentialism

interpretasprecludinganyobjectivevalue.

Beauvoir’s argument, that is to say, presents a sophisticated solution to the problem of

establishingtheobjectivevalueofhumanagencywhentheonlyopeningpremisethatthe

reasoning subjectmust accept thevalueof theirown subjective ends.Her strategy is to

argue that this opening commitment entails that Imust think ofmy subjective ends as

havinganobjectivevalueonceachieved.Itisthisvalueasapotentialmeans,ratherthan

asanactualmeans,thatprovidesthebridgefromthesubjectivityofthevalueofmyown

ends to the objective value of human agency in general. The categorical imperative of

authenticity, that we must value the structure of human agency as the setting and

pursuing of ends, is claimed to be establishednot as something external tomyprojects

thatImustrespect,butasanimplicationofmyprojects,whateverthosehappentobe.If

theargumentissuccessful,Beauvoirhasshownthattheimperativeofauthenticityis‘self-

legislated’, meaning that its authority derives from the agency of the individual who is

subjecttoit,eventhoughitdoessoirrespectiveofthatindividual’schoices.

It is therefore no threat to the individual’s autonomy. Rather, as Kant argued, if an

imperative is legislated by the structure of agency, then the individual is not truly

autonomous,not fully self-governed,unless they accept the authorityof that imperative

(19974:440-1;seeReath1994:§§3-5).Againsttheideathatanindividual’sauthenticity

consistsintheirpursuitofwhateverendstheysetforthemselves,Beauvoir’sargumentis

that authenticity requires one’s ends to be constrained by the imperative to respect

human agency. Failure to obey this categorical imperative is inauthentic, because it is a

failuretoactinawaythatisconsistentwithone’sownstructureasanagent.Thisisnotto

say,however, that there is someprior imperative thatwemustbehave inways thatare

consistentwithour structure as an agent.The conclusionofBeauvoir’s argument isnot

thehypotheticalimperativethatweshouldrespectotherpeople’sagencyifwewanttobe

consistent,orthatweshoulddosoifwewanttobeauthentic.Theargument’sconclusion

is a categorical imperative:weought to respecthumanagency. If the argument is right,

this imperative is implied by the structure of our agency, sowe cannot be authentic or

consistentunlessweobeyit.

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Beauvoir argued inPyrrhusandCineas that this imperative requires us to strive for the

conditions people need in order to exercise their agency fully. Respecting the value of

humanity requires aiming to ensure ‘health, knowledge, well-being, and leisure’ for

everyone ‘so that their freedom is not consumed in fighting sickness, ignorance, and

misery’(P&C:137).Sheacceptedthatthismoraloutlookaslimitedbydilemmasinwhich

one cannot respect the agency of everyone concerned, arguing that sometimes we are

‘condemnedtoviolence’(P&C:138).Therearesituations,thatistosay,inwhichitisnot

possibletokeepourhandscleanandourconscienceclear(P&C:127;MIPR:189-90).But

latershesawthisproblemasadecisiveobjectiontotheethicsshehadbuiltonthevalue

ofhumanagency.ShedescribedPyrrhusandCineasascontaining‘astreakofidealismthat

deprivedmyspeculationsofall,ornearlyall,theirsignificance’(PL:550).Shewrotethat

ofallherbooks,TheEthicsofAmbiguity‘istheonethatirritatesmethemosttoday’,inpart

becausethemoralityitarticulatesis‘ashollowastheKantianmaxims’(FC:75-6).

It is unclear, however, whether these comments concern the foundation of her earlier

moralphilosophyor theparticularpracticalethicalclaimsthatshemadeonthebasisof

thatfoundation.‘Iwasinerror’,shewrites,‘whenIthoughtthatIcoulddefineamorality

independentofsocialcontext’(FC:76).Thiscouldbearejectionoftheideaofanabstract

categorical imperative of authenticity defined and established independently of the

agent’shistoricalsituation.Oritcouldbetheclaimthatthepractical implicationsofthat

imperativecannotbedefinedindependentlyoftheagent’shistoricalsituation.Ratherthan

takeherownlaterrejectionofhermoralphilosophyatthisstageofhercareerasareason

to reject it ourselves, therefore,we should assess the structure and implications of her

argumentfortheimperativeofauthenticityourselves.Wehaveseenthatitisadistinctive

argumentthatwithstandstheanalysiswehavesubjecteditto.Itpromisestoestablishthe

categoricalimperativeofauthenticity,perhapswiththefurtherimplicationthatweshould

treat as valuable any human endeavours within the constraints of that imperative. For

these reasons, the argument deserves careful attention in contemporary moral

philosophy.

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