the impeachment of the chief justice, the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law in sri...

7/28/2019 The Impeachment of the Chief Justice, the Independence of the Judiciary and the Rule Of Law in Sri Lanka

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POLICYBRIEF

ASYSTEMICCRISISINCONTEXT:

THEIMPEACHMENTOFTHECHIEFJUSTICE,

THEINDEPENDENCEOFTHEJUDICIARYAND

THERULEOFLAWINSRILANKA

NiranAnketell&AsangaWelikala

CentreforPolicyAlternatives

April2013


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ASystemicCrisisinContext:

TheImpeachmentoftheChiefJustice,theIndependenceoftheJudiciaryandtheRuleOfLawinSriLanka

CentreforPolicyAlternatives|April2013

www.cpalanka.org2

The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) is an independent, non-partisan organization that

focuses primarilyonissuesof governanceand conflict resolution.Formed in1996in the firm

belief that the vital contribution of civil society to the public policy debate is in need of

strengthening,CPAiscommittedtoprogrammesofresearchandadvocacythroughwhichpublic

policyiscritiqued,alternativesidentifiedanddisseminated.

Address : 24/228thLane,offFlowerRoad,Colombo7,SriLanka

Telephone : +94(11)2565304/5/6

Fax : +94(11)4714460

Web : www.cpalanka.org,facebook.com/cpasl,twitter.com/cpaslEmail : [email protected]


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www.cpalanka.org3

TABLEOFCONTENTS

1. Introduction.................................................................................................................................................................4

2. TheImpeachmentofthe43rdChiefJustice.....................................................................................................5

2.1 TheConstitutionalandPoliticalBackdrop............................................................................................5

2.2 TheImpeachmentProcess:TheSequenceofEvents........................................................................7

2.3 TheAftermath:ConstitutionalisminCrisis.........................................................................................12

3. PlacingtheImpeachmentCrisisinContext:SystemicFlawsandChallenges..............................15

3.1 AnIneffectiveSeparationofPowers?ThePresidencyandChecksandBalancesunder

the1978Constitution.................................................................................................................................................15

3.2 ParliamentarySupremacyvs.ConstitutionalSupremacy.............................................................22

4. ConclusionandRecommendations..................................................................................................................27

Recommendations:......................................................................................................................................................27


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www.cpalanka.org4

1. Introduction1

The impeachment ofChiefJusticeDr.ShiraniBandaranayakewasthe singlemost contentious

political issue inSriLankain late 2012and early2013.Fourmonthssinceher removalfrom

officeinviolationofdecisionsbytheSupremeCourtandCourtofAppeal,theissueappearsto

havereceded from the publicsquare.While thegovernmentmayappear tohaveresolved the

political crisisoccasionedby the impeachment, theconstitutional crisis that emerged has not

been resolved, leaving a number of troubling questions for the future of the rule of law

unanswered.Canadecisionofacourtoflawbeconsideredbindingiftheexecutiveopposesand

disregards it?What is the role of the judiciaryvis--vis thevirtually unchecked power of the

executivepresidency?IsthejudiciaryindependentofthePresidentandParliament?Howdoes

theclaimtolegalsupremacybyParliamentaffectthewayinwhichitrelatestothejudiciary?

ThisPolicyBriefseekstoaddresstheseissuesandoutlinetheurgentreformsneededtoarrest

theseriouserosionofpublicconfidenceinthejudiciaryandtheruleoflawthathasresultedfrom

theimpeachment.Section2outlinesthepoliticalcontextandsequenceofeventsrelatingtothe

impeachment.Section 3 examines the structuraldefects of the SriLankan constitution,which

enabled the successful ouster of Chief Justice Bandaranayake, notwithstanding rulingsby the

SupremeCourtandCourtofAppealtotheeffectthattheprocessadoptedwasunlawful.Thetwo

mainconstitutionalclaimsenablingtheimpeachmentpresidentialimmunityandparliamentary

supremacy areexamined,in the contextofhow theyhavedeveloped throughoutSriLankas

recentconstitutionalhistory.Theconclusionsfromthisanalysisrevealtheneedforarangeof

constitutionaland legal reforms, from legislativemeasuresneeded to restore amore credible

frameworkforjudicialindependenceandimpartiality,toothermorefundamentalreformstothe

SriLankanconstitutionitself.

1ThisPolicyBriefwaswrittenbyNiranAnketellwithinputfromAsangaWelikala.CommentsfromDr.Paikiasothy

SaravanamuttuandBhavaniFonsekaareherebyacknowledged.SubhashiniSamaraarachiassistedwithresearchforSection2.


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www.cpalanka.org5

2. TheImpeachmentofthe43rdChiefJustice

2.1 TheConstitutionalandPoliticalBackdrop

Dr.ShiraniBandaranayake,thefirstwomanChiefJusticeofSriLanka,tookoathsasthe43 rdChief

Justice beforePresidentMahindaRajapaksaon18th May 2011.While her appointment to the

Supreme Court in 1996 was controversial and unsuccessfully challenged in that court,2her

ascensionto the leadershipoftheapexcourtwasinevitablegivenherseniority.In September

2010beforeDr. Bandaranayakesappointment asChief Justice the governmentrushedan

Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution through the Supreme Court and Parliament. The

EighteenthAmendmentstrengthenedthehandsofanalreadypowerfulexecutivepresidencyby

repealingand replacingsalient elements oftheSeventeenthAmendment tothe Constitution

whichlimitedthediscretionarypowerofthePresidentoverappointmentstokeypublicoffices

andremovingthetwo-termlimitonthepresidency.3TheEighteenthAmendmentalsosoughtto

retroactively deem appointments made prior to its passage that were in violation of the

SeventeenthAmendmentwhichincludedtheappointmentsofseveralJusticesoftheSupreme

Courttobelegal.4BecausetheBillwasdeemedbytheCabinetofMinisterstobeurgentinthe

national interest5, the Supreme Courtwas given a mere twenty-four hourswithin which to

communicate its determination on whether the Bill required a referendum before it could

becomelaw.Anumberof petitioners includingCPA and oneof itsdirectors andheadofits

LegalandConstitutionalUnitRohanEdrisinhamadesubmissionsinoppositiontotheBillatthe

pre-enactmenthearing.Thecasewasheardbyafive-judgebenchoftheSupremeCourtpresided

overbythethenJusticeShiraniBandaranayake,whoheldthattheEighteenthAmendmentBill

did not violate any entrenched provisions of the Constitution,6enabling its passage through

Parliamentwithatwo-thirdsmajority,andwithoutareferendum.

In the first year of its functioning, the Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Bandaranayake

dismissedanumberof petitions challengingseveralconstitutionallysuspectand authoritarian

executiveactions.TheseincludedCPAspetitionchallenginganumberofregulationsunderthe

PreventionofTerrorismAct(PTA)thatperpetuatedsomeofthemostwidelyusedEmergency

Regulations even after thelapseof thestateofemergency7; petitions challenging compulsory

militarytrainingforuniversityentrants8;andpetitionschallengingtheindefinitepostponement

2SeeEdwardFrancisWilliamSilvavs.ShiraniBandaranayake ,1997(1)Sri.L.R92

3AlsoseeAruniJayakody, The18thAmendmentandtheConsolidationofExecutivePower,inRohanEdrisinha&Aruni

Jayakody(Eds.)(2011)TheEighteenthAmendmenttotheConstitution:SubstanceandProcess ,(Colombo:CPA)4Article36(6),ConstitutionofSriLanka5Article122(1),ConstitutionofSriLanka

6InretheEighteenthAmendmenttotheConstitution,SCSpecialDetermination, 1/2010.7CentreforPolicyAlternativesVs.GotabayaRajapakseandothers,SC(FR)Application453/20118CeylonTeachersUnionandfourothersvs.UniversityGrantsCommission ,SC(FR)Application181/2011.


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www.cpalanka.org6

ofanumberoflocalauthorityelections. 9Thesedecisionsledtoawidespreadperceptionthatthe

SupremeCourtunderChiefJusticeBandaranayakewasingeneralacourtthatcouldbeexpected

tobedeferentialtotheexecutive.However,approachingthelatterhalfof2011,tensionsbetween

theChiefJusticeandtheexecutivebegantoappear.

IntheSupremeCourtsdeterminationontheconstitutionalityoftheTownandCountryPlanning

(Amendment)Billpursuantto achallengebyCPA,thebenchledby theChiefJusticeheldthat

sincethesubjectofprivatelandswasadevolvedmatterintermsoftheThirteenthAmendment

totheConstitution,theBillrequiredpriorreferencetoallProvincialCouncilsbeforebeingplaced

ontheOrderPaperofParliament. 10Similarly,initsfirstdeterminationontheconstitutionalityof

theDivinegumaBill, also challengedby CPA, abenchheaded bythe Chief Justice held the Bill

impingedonanumberofdevolvedsubjects,andthusrequiredpriorreferencetotheProvincial

Councils.11Having referred the Bills to theeight constitutedProvincial Councils, inwhich the

rulingUnitedPeoplesFreedom Alliance (UPFA)has controllingmajorities,the President also

referredtheBilltotheGovernoroftheNorthernProvince(theninthprovinceinrespectofwhich

there is as yet noProvincialCouncil constitutedor elected). The Bill was then placedon the

OrderPaperofParliament a secondtime. Itwaschallengedagainbyanumberof petitioners

includingCPAonthebasisthatthesubstantiveprovisionsoftheBillwereinconsistentwiththe

constitution. Some petitioners also contended that the Governor was not empowered to

substitutehimselfinplaceofaNorthernProvincialCouncil,andthathisconsenttothepassageof

theBillwasinvalid.

TheSupremeCourtsdeterminationinrespectofthesecondchallengeheldwiththepetitioners

argumentthatcertainprovisionsoftheDivinegumaBillwereinconsistentwiththeconstitution

andcouldonlybecomelawuponbeingpassedbyatwo-thirdsmajorityinParliament.TheCourt

alsoheldthattheGovernorcouldnotconsent toaBillby assumingthepowersofaProvincial

Council.12

Parallel to thecourtsdeterminations in these important cases, therewere other events that

demonstratedanattempttointerferewithandintimidatethejudiciary.On19 thSeptember2012,

a statement issuedbyMr.ManjulaTillekeratne, Secretary to the JudicialServicesCommission

(JSC) ofwhich the Chief Justice is theexofficio Chairperson waspublished in the Sinhala

press.The statement alleged that efforts were underway to destroy the independence of the

judiciary,andmadereferencestowhatwaslaterrevealedbythePresidenthimselftobeaneffort

byhimtosummonthemembersoftheCommissiontoameetingatTempleTrees(oneofthe

official residences of the President). The statementwas issued in the context of a campaign9BritoFernandovs.MahindaDeshapriyaandothers,SC(FR)Application296/2011.10InreTownandCountryPlanningOrdinanceAmendmentBill,SCSpecialDetermination3/2011.SeealsoCPA,Noteon

theDivinegumaBill,January2013.Accessedat:http://www.cpalanka.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Divineguma-

Bill-Basic-Guide-updated-January-2013-E.pdf11InreaBilltitledDivineguma,SCSpecialDetermination1-3/2012.12InreaBilltitledDivineguma,SCSpecialDetermination4-14/2012.


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against theChiefJusticein the statemedia, vilifyingherand thoseopposedto theDivineguma

Bill.13ThecentralmessageanimatingthiscampaignofvilificationwasthechargethattheChief

JusticewasencouragingseparatismbyupholdingtheThirteenthAmendmentwhichdevolveda

measureofpoliticalpowertoProvincialCouncils. 14SubsequenttotheJSCsfirststatement,onor

aroundthe28thofSeptember2012,Mr.Tillekeratnetoldthemediathat(a)situationhasarisen

wherethereis adangerto thesecurityofallofusandourfamiliesbeginningfromtheperson

holdingthehighestpositioninthejudicialsystem.15Hisfearswererealisedwhenon7 thOctober,

Mr. Tillekeratne was seriously wounded after unidentified individuals assaulted him in a

Colombosuburb.16

Attheheartof the tension between theChiefJustice andtheexecutivewasherwillingnessto

applytheprovisionsoftheThirteenthAmendmenttoBillsapprovedbytheCabinetofMinisters

for passage throughParliament. In the prevailing political culture of centralisation, the Chief

Justices insistence on the basic procedural requirements established by the Thirteenth

Amendmentfortheenactmentoflegislationaffectingdevolvedsubjectsappearstohaveevoked

theseveredispleasureofthegovernment.Moreover,theresistancefromtheChiefJusticetothe

DivinegumaBillwhichwasproposedandisnowimplementedbythePresidentsbrotherand

MinisterofEconomicDevelopment BasilRajapaksawasperceived by the governmentas an

affronttoitsauthority.

2.2 TheImpeachmentProcess:TheSequenceofEvents

On1stNovember2012,thedayonwhichtheSupremeCourtcommunicateditsdeterminationin

respectof thesecondchallenge to theDivineguma Bill totheSpeaker, and also on which Sri

Lanka faced the Universal Period Review at the Human Rights Council in Geneva, several

members ofthe governingUPFApresented theSpeakerwitha resolutioncontainingfourteen

allegationsofallegedmisconduct,signedby117MembersofParliament.17

Seriousconcernsabouttheproprietyoftheprocessthroughwhichtheimpeachmentmotionwas

signed,andthetextoftheresolutionitself,haveemerged.Forinstance,onememberoftheruling

coalitionwhodid not sign the impeachment motion revealed that hewasasked to place his

13SeeCPA,StatementonthePosterAttacksAgainstCPAExecutiveDirector,16thOctober2012.Accessedat:

http://www.cpalanka.org/statement-on-the-poster-attacks-against-cpa-executive-director/Theposterattacksreferred

hereattackedCPAsExecutiveDirector,ostensiblyforhisroleinchallengingtheDivinegumaBill,andarereflectiveofthe

anti-devolutionsentimentthatplayedacentralroleinDr.Bandaranayakesimpeachment.Thetextofoneposter,

translatedintoEnglish,istelling.Itstates:Letussavethepro-peopleDivinegumaActthatbuildsthelivesoffifteenlakhs

oflowincomefamiliesfromthePaikiasothygangthataidsandabetstheseparationofthecountry.14SeeAsangaWelikala(2011)DevolutionintheEasternProvince:Implementation oftheThirteenthAmendmentand

PublicPerceptions ,2008-2010(Colombo:CPA)15DailyMirror,JSCSecretarysaysdangertothesecurity,29 thSeptember2012,accessedat

http://www.dailymirror.lk/news/22281-jsc-secretary-says-danger-to-their-security-.html16SeeCPA,StatementontheassaultoftheSecretaryoftheJudicialServicesCommission(JSC),Mr.ManjulaTillakeratne,

10thOctober2012,accessedathttp://www.cpalanka.org/statement-on-the-assault-of-the-secretary-of-the-judicial-

services-commission-jsc-mr-manjula-tillakeratne/ 17OrderPaperofParliament,6 thNovember2012.


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signature on the motion without even being able to peruse the charges.18The motion also

contained a number of elementary factual errors, including in respect of a reference to

Groundviews,CPAscitizenjournalismwebsite.19

Afewdaysafteritwaspresentedtohim,theSpeakerofParliamentpublishedtheimpeachment

motion in the OrderPaperofParliament, pursuant towhich,on 14th November 2012,eleven

members sevenmembersfromthegovernmentcoalitionand four fromoppositionparties

wereappointedtoaParliamentarySelectCommittee(PSC).20

On18thNovember2012,severalpetitionersfiledwritapplicationsintheCourtofAppealseeking

toprohibitthePSCfromcontinuingwithitsproceedings.21Duringtheprocessofhearingthese

applications, the Court of Appeal referred a question of constitutional interpretation to the

SupremeCourt.On22ndNovember2012thedaypriortothefirstscheduledsittingofthePSC

the Supreme Court issued a carefully worded request that the PSC defer impeachment

proceedingsuntiltheCourtcoulddecideontheconstitutionalityofStandingOrder78A(which

sets out the procedure to be followed by Parliament in the removal of senior judges). The

Supreme Courts unprecedented request a departure from the courts traditional and

constitutionalroleofdeterminingtherightsandobligationsofpartieswasanindicationofthe

CourtsawarenessofParliamentssensitivitytojudicialreviewofitsactions.TheCourtsorder

stated:

..this Court whilst reiterating that there has to bemutualrespect andunderstanding

founded upon the rule of law betweenParliament and the Judiciary for the smooth

functioning of both theinstitutions, wishes to recommend to the members of the

SelectCommitteeofParliamentthatitisprudenttodefertheinquirytobeheldagainst

theHon.theChiefJusticeuntilthisCourtmakesitsdeterminationonthequestionoflaw

referred to [it] by the Court ofAppeal.Thedesirability and paramountimportance of

acceding to thesuggestions made by this Court would be based on mutual respect

andtrust and as something essential for thesafe guarding of the rule oflawand the

18RajivaWijesinha,OnsigningtheimpeachmentresolutionoftheincumbentChiefJustice,23December2012,stating

(i)nthefirstplace,Iwassimplyaskedtocomeoverandsigntheimpeachmentresolution,andtolditcouldnotbesentto

metoreadbeforehand.Obviouslyoneshouldnotsign,orcommittosign,whatonehasnotseen.Accessedat:

https://rajivawijesinha.wordpress.com/2012/12/23/on-signing-the-impeachment-resolution-of-the-incumbent-chief-

justice/#more-566619SeeCPA,PressReleaseontheimpeachmentproceedingsagainstChiefJusticeDr.ShiraniBandaranayake,13 th

November2012.Accessedat:http://www.cpalanka.org/press-release-on-the-impeachment-proceedings-against-chief-

justice-dr-shirani-bandaranayake/ 20Ofthe11memberstoParliamentarySelectCommittee,7membersrepresentedtherulingUnitedPeoplesFreedom

Alliance(UPFA);2memberstheUnitedNationalParty(UNP)andoneeachfromtheTamilNationalAlliance(TNA)and

DemocraticNationalAlliance(DNA).SeeColomboPage,AppointmentstoparliamentaryselectcommitteeprobingSri

LankaChiefJusticecomplete,13 thNovember2012.Accessedat

http://www.colombopage.com/archive_12B/Nov13_1352792368CH.php21DailyFT,OvertotheSupremeCourt,21 stNovember2012.Accessedat:http://www.ft.lk/2012/11/21/over-to-the-

supreme-court/


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interest of all persons concerned and ensuring thatjustice is not only done but is

manifestlyandundoubtedlyseentobedone.22

When the PSC convened the following day, its Chairman ruled that the Committee would

disregardtheSupremeCourtsrequestdespiteobjectionsraisedbyoppositionmembersofthe

Committee. The Chief Justice appeared before the Parliamentary Select Committee shortly

thereafter.23Onthesameday,theSupremeCourtgrantedleavetoproceedinthreefundamental

rightsapplicationschallengingthelegalityofStandingOrder78A.24

On29thNovember,inresponsetoaquestionofprivilegeraisedbyaseniorgovernmentMinister,

the Speaker issued a ruling rejecting any judicial intervention in Parliaments functionswith

respecttoimpeachment,claimingitwasanunlawfulintrusionintoanexclusiverealmreserved

for Parliament.25With this ruling, it was clear that the judiciary and Parliament were on a

collisioncourse,withParliamentappearingtobeunwillingtorecogniseanyjudicialreviewofits

orthePSCsactions.Aconstitutionalcrisiswasbeginningtoemerge.

On6thDecember2012,theChiefJusticeappearedbeforethePSC.Atapproximately4.30pm,she

washandedover300documentsand askedto respond tothemwithina day.Mr.Romeshde

SilvaP.C., Counselfor the ChiefJustice,requestedfurthertime tostudythesedocuments. The

ChairmanofthePSCrefusedhisrequest.Mr.deSilvathenraisedseveralobjectionswithrespect

tothelackofaprocedureandrequestedthatthePSCadoptaproperprocedureinrespectofthe

productionandadmissionofthedocuments;proofofsuchdocuments;burdenofproof;listsof

witnesses;andadmissionofevidence.TheChairmanofthePSCstatedthatthechargeswouldbe

determinedsolelyonthedocumentsmadeavailabletotheChiefJustice.Sincenoprocedurewas

adopted,Mr.deSilva informedthePSCthattheChief Justice couldno longerparticipatein its

proceedings.26In a letter written to the Speaker, Dr. Bandaranayakes lawyers requested the

Speakerto takeactionagainstcertainmembersof thePSCwho,itwas claimed,usedinsulting

andinappropriatelanguageagainsttheirclient.27

On7thDecember2012,thefouroppositionmembersofthePSCalsoannouncedthattheywould

nolongerparticipateinthePSCproceedings,onthegroundsthatanumberofissuestheyhad

22ColomboTelegraph,FullTextOfTheSupremeCourtRequestToTheParliamentarySelectCommittee,Colombo

Telegraph,23November2012.Accessedat:http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/full-text-of-the-supreme-

court-request-to-the-parliamentary-select-committee/23MinutesoftheMeetingsoftheSelectCommitteeofParliamenttoInvestigateintoAllegedActsofMisbehaviourbyDr.

ShiraniBandaranayake,23November2012.24SC(FR)Applications665/2012,666/2012&667/201225ColomboTelegraph,SpeakerChamalRajapaksasRuling;LegislatureWillNotBowToTheDictatesOfExternal

Bodies,23rdNovember2012.Accessedathttp://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/full-text-of-the-supreme-

court-request-to-the-parliamentary-select-committee/26MinutesoftheMeetingsoftheSelectCommitteeofParliamenttoInvestigateintoAllegedActsofMisbehaviourbyDr.

ShiraniBandaranayake,6thDecember2012.27DailyFT,CJslawyerscallforSpeakertotakeactionagainstconductofabusivePSCmembers,15 thDecember2012,

http://www.ft.lk/2012/12/15/cjs-lawyers-call-for-speaker-to-take-action-against-conduct-of-abusive-psc-members/,

lastaccessedon25 thFebruary2013.


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raised had not been addressed. These grounds included the absence of a clear direction

regarding the procedure to be followed by the PSC; whether documents were to be made

availabletotheChiefJusticeandherlawyers;thestandardofproofwhichwouldberequired;the

needtoarriveatadefinitionofmisbehaviour;whethersufficienttimewouldbemadeavailable

totheChiefJusticeandherlawyerstostudythedocuments;andwhethertheChiefJusticeand

herlawyerswouldbegivenanopportunitytocross-examinetheseveralcomplainantswhohad

madethechargesagainsther.28

However, theremainingmembers of the PSCcontinued tohold proceedings on7th December

2012and,intheabsenceoftheChiefJusticeandherlawyers,heardsixteenwitnessesincluding

Justice Shirani Tilakawardene, a sitting judge of the Supreme Court with respect to the

allegations made against Dr. Bandaranayake. Incredibly, the PSC submitted a report to

Parliament thevery next day finding the incumbent Chief Justice guiltyof the1st, 4thand5th

charges contained in the impeachment motion.29These charges accused the Chief Justice of

financial impropriety based on non-declaration of assets and a conflict of interest in a case

involvingafailedinvestmentcompany.

On 19thDecember 2012, the Chief Justice also filed a writ application in the Court of Appeal

askingthecourttoissuewritsquashingtheconclusionsandrecommendationsinthePSCreport,

andprohibitingtheSpeakerfromactingonortakinganyfurtherstepsbasedonthePSCreport.30

Meanwhile,beforeParliamenthadresumedsittingsin2013,theSupremeCourtcommunicated

itsdeterminationon thequestionofinterpretationreferredtoit bytheCourtofAppeal.31The

questionreferredbytheCourtofAppealwas:

IsitmandatoryunderArticle107(3)oftheConstitutionfortheParliamenttoprovidefor

mattersrelatingtotheforumbeforewhichtheallegationsaretobeproved,themodeof

proof,burdenofproof,standardofproofetc.,ofanyallegedmisbehaviourorincapacity

in addition to matters relating to the investigation of the alleged misbehaviour or

incapacity?

Article107(3),theinterpretationofwhichwasinquestion,providesthat:

Parliamentshallby lawor byStanding Ordersprovide forall mattersrelating to the

presentation of such an address, including the procedure for the passing of such a

28MinutesoftheMeetingsoftheSelectCommitteeofParliamenttoInvestigateintoAllegedActsofMisbehaviourbyDr.

ShiraniBandaranayake,7 thDecember2012.29ReportoftheSelectCommitteeofParliamenttoInvestigateintoAllegedActsofMisbehaviourbyDr.Shirani

Bandaranayake,8thDecember2012.30ColomboTelegraph,ChiefJusticefilesactionagainstPSCReport,19 thDecember2012.Accessedat

http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/breaking-news-chief-justice-filed-action-against-psc-report/31ChandraJayaratnevs.AnuraYapaandothers,SCReference3/2012,decided1 stJanuary2013.


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resolution,theinvestigationandproofoftheallegedmisbehaviourorincapacityandthe

rightofsuchJudgetoappearandtobeheardinpersonorbyrepresentative.

In Standing Order 78A, Parliament made provision for a Select Committee of Parliament to

investigate and report on the allegations of misbehaviour or incapacity set out in an

impeachment resolution.However, it did notmake provision for questions of procedure and

evidence pertaining the proof of allegations before it. The Court of Appeals question to the

SupremeCourtevincedsomeconcernwiththisdefault.TheSupremeCourt,whileansweringthe

CourtofAppealsquestionintheaffirmative,wentastepfurther.Thedeterminationsignedby

JusticesAmaratunga,SripavanandDepheldthattheinvestigationandproofofchargesinan

impeachmentmotionmustbeexercisedbyabodyestablishedbylaw.SinceStandingOrdersof

Parliamentarenotrecognisedaslawin termsoftheConstitution,theycouldnotestablish a

bodywith powersto investigateandprovecharges.32Thus,theCourtheldthatanypowersof

investigation and proof must be provided by Acts of Parliament. In short, the Courts

determinationwasaclearaffirmationoftheunconstitutionalityofStandingOrder78A.

Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeal issued judgment in the Chief Justices writ petition,

holdingthatinlightoftheinterpretationgiventotherelevantconstitutionalprovisionsbythe

SupremeCourt,ithadnoalternativebuttoissueawritquashingthePSCreport.33

Notwithstanding these judicial pronouncements, it was clear the governmentwould proceed

withtheimpeachment.Onthe10thand11thJanuary2013,amidstdesperateislandwideprotests

bylawyers,tradeunionists,civilsocietyandcitizens34andindefianceoftheSupremeCourtand

CourtofAppeal,ParliamentdebatedandeventuallypassedamotiontorequestthePresidentto

impeachChiefJusticeShiraniBandaranayake.155MembersofParliamentvotedinfavourofthe

motion, and 49 voted against, while twenty members either absented themselves from

Parliament or abstained from voting, following a parliamentary debate characterised by

regrettable partisanship and unparliamentary language, and which demonstrated little

engagementwiththemajormattersofdemocraticandconstitutionalprincipleinvolved.35

Thegovernmentmovedswiftlythereafter.ThemediareportedthatthePresidenthadissueda

proclamationremovingtheChiefJusticefromofficeon13 thJanuary2013andthatithadbeen

subsequentlydeliveredtotheChiefJustice. 36Twodayslater,MohanPeiriswassworninasChief

32ColomboTelegraph,Impeachment:FullTextofTheSupremeCourtDeterminationToday,3 rdJanuary2013.Accessed

at:http://www.colombotelegraph.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/S.C-Referance-No.-358-2012.pdf33ColomboTelegraph,CJsCase:FullTextOfTheCourtOfAppealDeterminationToday,7 thJanuary2013.Accessedat:

http://www.colombotelegraph.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CAwrit-411-2012.pdf34BBCNews,ColomboprotestsopposeChiefJusticeimpeachment,10 thJanuary2013.Accessedat:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-2097829835ParliamentaryDebates(Hansard),Vol214,No.4,11 thJanuary2013,651.36TheNation,NewCJthisweek?,13 thJanuary2013.Accessedat:http://www.nation.lk/edition/latest-top-

stories/item/14633-new-cj-this-week?.html


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Justice.37IntheSupremeCourt,securityforcesclashedwithlawyerswhileattemptingtosealthe

entrance to the court,38ostensibly to prevent Dr. Bandaranayake from entering the Supreme

Courtcomplex.

2.3 TheAftermath:ConstitutionalisminCrisis

Mr.MohanPeirisP.C.aformerAttorneyGeneral(appointedfromtheprivatebartoheadthe

Attorney Generals department by President Rajapaksa), Legal Adviser to the Cabinet, and

representativeoftheGovernmentofSriLankaatvariousinternationalforaincludingtheHuman

RightsCouncilassumedofficeunderpeculiarcircumstances.WhilethePresidenthadformally

sworn him in, the question of whether Dr. Bandaranayake was lawfully ousted remained

unanswered. If infacther removalwas invalid, it followed that therewasno vacancy forMr.

Peiristooccupy,aquestionpresentlybeforetheSupremeCourt.

Forherpart,Dr.BandaranayakeclaimedthatsheremainedthecountryslawfulChiefJustice.Ina

statementreleasedshortlyaftershevacatedtheChiefJusticesofficialresidenceon15thJanuary

2013,sheassertedthat(i)nthecircumstances,inmycountrywhichisademocracy,wherethe

rule of law is the underlying threshold uponwhich basic liberties exist, I still am the duly

appointedlegitimateChiefJustice.39

Also on 15th January, CPA and its Executive Director Dr Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu filed a

fundamentalrightspetitionseekingtopreventMr.Peirisfromassumingdutiesorfunctioningin

office,onthebasisthattherewasnovacancyintheofficeofChiefJustice.40Thematterispending

beforethe Supreme Court,where counsel forthe petitionershaverequested that thecase be

heardbyafullbenchoftheSupremeCourt.

The Lawyers Collective,a grouping of concerned lawyersinstrumental inorganisingprotests

againsttheimpeachment,statedthatwhiletheycontinuedtoopposetheunlawfulimpeachment

ofChiefJusticeBanadaranayakeandtheappointmentofhersuccessorinprinciple,itwastheir

obligationtoappearbeforeanybenchoftheSupremeCourt(implyingtheywouldappearbefore

Mr. Peiris). They warned of serious threats to the security of lawyers opposed to the

impeachment.41Shortlythereafter,threeseniorlawyerswhowereinstrumentalinopposingthe

37Dailymirroronline,MohanPeirissworninasChiefJustice,15 thJanuary2012,Accessedat:

http://www.dailymirror.lk/news/25007-mohan-peiris-sworn-in-as-chief-justice.html38DailyFT,TwotoTangoasMahindaSwearsMohaninasCJ,16thJanuary2013.Accessedat:

http://www.ft.lk/2013/01/16/two-to-tango-as-mahinda-swears-mohan-in-as-cj/39TheHindu,IamstilltheChiefJustice:Bandaranayake,15January2013.Accessedat:

http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/i-am-still-the-chief-justice-bandaranayake/article4309817.ece 40TheColomboTelegraph,Dr.SaravanamuttuFilesFRAgainstNewCJAppointment:FullTextOfThePetition15th

January2013.Accessedat:http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/dr-saravanamuttu-files-fr-against-new-cj-

appointment-full-text-of-the-petition/ 41ColomboTelegraph,WeWillContinueToCarryOutOurObligationsLawyersCollective,23January2013.Accessed

at:http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/we-will-continue-to-carry-out-our-obligations-lawyers-collective/


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impeachment received threatening letters from an anonymous group self-identified as the

PatrioticFront.42

Later,on23rdJanuary2012,aceremonialwelcomeforMr.Peiriswasboycottedbymanylawyers

includingofficebearersoftheBarAssociation,inkeepingwitharesolutionadoptedataspecial

meeting of the Association.43That resolution called onPresident Rajapaksa to reconsider the

impeachmentofDr.Bandaranayakeandstatedthatintheeventshewasremovedwithoutregard

totheruleoflawandnaturaljustice,theBarwouldnotwelcomethepersonappointedtoreplace

her.44The ceremonialwelcome forMr. Peiriswas covered exclusively by the statemedia,but

more than 30 journalists from the privatemedia, both print and electronic, who arrived in

Hulftsdorptocovertheevent,werepreventedfromenteringtheSupremeCourtpremises.

The governmentsuse offorceto enforce the Presidentsdecision toappointMr. Peiristo the

officeofChiefJusticeappearstohavecausedlawyersprotestsandpublicconcerntorecede.A

senseofapathyandinevitabilityispalpable,butisneverthelesspunctuatedbydefiantassertions

ofindependencefromtheBar.45TherecentelectionofMr.UpulJayasuriyaavocalcriticofDr.

BandaranayakesimpeachmentasthePresidentoftheBarAssociationandtheproceedingsat

its39thAnnualConvocationexemplifythisdefiance.Inarevealingsymbolicgesture,Dr.Shirani

Bandaranayake was invited to preside over theevent as ChiefGuest, an honour traditionally

reserved for thesittingChiefJustice.Mr.MohanPeiriswasnot invitedto attend. The keynote

speakerJusticeC.V.VigneswarananoutspokenretiredjudgeoftheSupremeCourtdelivered

aforcefulspeechinwhichhedrewspecificattentiontothequestionofthevalidityofMr.Mohan

PeirissappointmenttotheofficeofChiefJustice,stating:

We must remember that the so-called Impeachment process against Chief Justice

Dr.ShiraniBandaranaikewaslegallyfaulted.BoththeSupremeCourtaswellastheCourt

ofAppealgavedecisionsinthisregard.SolongasCompetentCourtsofLawhaveheld

that the process adopted was faulty, then those who advocated such Impeachment

shouldhavegonetotherelevantCourtorCourtstohavesuchordersordeterminations

quashed.Theydidnotdoso.Bynotdoingsoadilemmaarises.IftheexistingOrdersare

notreversedbyaFullerBenchandinfactdogetconfirmedinthefutureitwouldappear

Thestatementalsoreferredtothreatsagainstlawyerswhoopposedtheimpeachment,statingWearealsogravely

concernedwiththeseveralthreats&actsofintimidationonmembersofourfraternity,suchasdeaththreatsonleading

memberswhocampaignedagainsttheimpeachmentofHonorableChiefJusticeBandaranayaka,theassassination

attemptonMr.Wanninayake,shotsfiredoutsidetheresidenceofBASLPresidentMr.RajapaksePC,andtheattackona

ladylawyer(whowishestoremainanonymous)byunidentifiedmotorcyclistswhoattemptedtostrangleher.42ColomboTelegraph,RomeshdeSilva,JayampathiWickramaratne,MASumanthiranAndJCWeliamunaReceive

ThreateningLetters18 thJanuary2013.Accessedat:http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/romesh-de-silva-

jayampathi-wickramaratne-ma-sumanthiran-and-jc-weliamuna-receive-threatening-letters/43TheBBCNewsAsia,SriLankalawyersboycottchiefjusticeceremony23 rdJanuary2013.Accessedat:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-2115593244TheLawyersCollective,GiveJusticetoourChiefJustice:BarAssociationpassesthreeresolutionsunanimously,15th

December2012.Accessedat:http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/1369045DailyFT,LawyersCollectivecallsBASLConvocationHistoricandUncompromising1 stApril2013.Accessedat:

http://www.ft.lk/2013/04/01/lawyers-collective-calls-basl-convocation-historic-and-uncompromising/


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thatallstepstakensofarbythedefactoChiefJusticewouldbeillegal.Thenirreparable

harmanddamageswouldbesustainedbylitigantswhosecaseswereheardbyaperson

whocannotbedeemedtobetheChiefJusticeofthisCountryundertheLaw.

IfthedefactoChiefJusticecontinuesto actasifhisconductisvalidinLawandhears

Applications, constitute Benches and makes Orders and Determinations so positively

andconfidentlyexpectingaDivisionalBenchtoreversetheOrdersalreadymade,evenif

they do reverse the Orders already made in the future, then the integrity and

impartiality of the Honourable Judges who make such orders would come into

question.46


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3. PlacingtheImpeachmentCrisisinContext:SystemicFlaws

andChallenges

The impeachment of the 43rd Chief Justice was enabled by the swift and unconstitutional

legislativeandexecutiveactionsofanalreadypowerfulgovernment.Thegradualweakeningof

constitutional first principles the separation of powers, constitutional supremacy and the

independenceofthejudiciaryovermanydecadesprovidedthelegalandpoliticaltoolswhich

enabled the government to effect an unconstitutional impeachment. The systemic flaws and

contradictionsintheconstitutionalarchitectureofthestatethatledtotherecentimpeachment

have been features of anessentially illiberal democracy that has been inplace ever since Sri

Lankabecamearepublic,andwhichhavepropelledacoursetowardspopulistauthoritarianism.

3.1 AnIneffectiveSeparationofPowers?ThePresidencyandChecksand

Balancesunderthe1978Constitution

The Second Republican Constitution of 1978 introduced a new system of government, the

dominantcharacteristicofwhichisthelargeconcentrationofpowerintheexecutivepresident. 47

The executive branch is headed by the President, who appoints a Cabinet of Ministers from

amongMembersofParliament.Theprincipalauthorofthe1978Constitutionandfirstexecutive

president,J.R.Jayewardene,hadlongadvocatedapresidentialsystemforSriLanka.In1966,he

expressed his support for theFrenchmodel,which in his view provided a strong executive,

seatedinpowerforafixednumberofyears,notsubjecttothewhimsandfanciesofanelected

legislature; not afraid to take correct but unpopular decisions because of censure from its

parliamentaryparty.48

PowersoftheOvermighty49ExecutivePresident

Under the 1978 Constitution, the President is Head of State, Head of the Executive and of

Government, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. 50 In addition, the President

possesses the power to pardon offenders;51commute sentences;52make appointments to the

higherjudiciary,theofficeofAttorneyGeneral,membersofexecutiveCommissionsincludingthe

ElectionsCommission,BriberyCommission,PoliceCommissionandPublicServiceCommission 53

47JosephA.L.Cooray(1995)ConstitutionalandAdministrativeLawofSriLanka,(Colombo:Hansa),16348J.R.Jayawardene(1993)MenandMemories:AutobiographicalRecollectionsandReflections (NewDelhi:Vikas),91.49AtermcoinedinrespectoftheSriLankanPresidencybyC.R.deSilva, TheOvermightyExecutive?ALiberalViewpoint

inC.Amaratunga(Ed.)(1989) IdeasforConstitutionalReform(Colombo:CouncilforLiberalDemocracy),31350Article30(1),ConstitutionofSriLanka.51Article34(1)(a),ConstitutionofSriLanka52Article34(1)(c),ConstitutionofSriLanka53Article41(A)(1),ConstitutionofSriLanka


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andGovernorsofProvinces. 54Besidestheseconstitutionalpowers,thePresidentalsoexercisesa

widerangeofpowersassignedtohimbylegislation,mostnotableofwhichisthepowerinterms

of the Public Security Ordinance to declare a state of emergency andpromulgate emergency

regulations.55

Further,aswehavenotedpreviously,theEighteenthAmendmenttotheConstitutionremoved

existing term limits on the Presidency.56Article 38(2) provides for the manner in which a

Presidentmaybeimpeachedonthegroundsofpermanentincapacityorintentionalviolationof

theConstitution,treason,bribery,misconductorcorruptioninvolvingtheabuseofthepowersof

his office, or any offence under any law, involving moral turpitude. However, a motion to

impeach the Presidentmust besignedby two-thirdsof theMembers ofParliament, or in the

alternative, a simplemajority ofMembers with the Speaker assenting. If the Supreme Court

determinesthatthePresidentispermanentlyincapableofcarryingouthisdutiesorguiltyofany

oneoftheimpeachableoffences,ParliamentmayvotetoimpeachthePresident,butonlywitha

two-thirdsmajority.TheprocedureforimpeachingaPresidentisclearlymoreexactingthatthe

correspondingprovisionsforimpeachingaJusticeoftheCourtofAppealorSupremeCourt.

Moreover,thePresidentmaintainsoverridingcontroloverthelegislativebranchwherehisparty

(usually)holdsa majority inParliament.57Article43(3)empowers the Presidentto appointas

Prime Minister a Member of Parliament who in his opinion commands the confidence of

Parliament.ThePresidentalsoappointsCabinetMinistersfromamongMembersofParliament,

and may consult the Prime Minister on such appointments, if he deems such consultation

necessary.Whatthismeans inpracticeis thatwherethePresidentspartyholdsamajorityin

Parliament, the Presidenthasan almostabsolute discretiononwhohe decides to appoint as

Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers. As Head of Cabinet, members of which control the

legislativeagendainParliament,thePresidentcontrolsParliamentindirectly.Further,sincethe

lossofmembershipinthepoliticalpartyunderwhichaMemberofParliamentwaselectedalso

occasionsthelossoftheMembersseat,58thePresident isableto ensurebackbencher loyalty.

Together,thesefactorscontributetooverridingpresidentialcontroloverParliament.

Even where the Presidents party does notcontrolParliament, his powers ofdissolution and

prorogationprovidesignificantleversofcontrol. 59Moreover,whilethePresidentmustappointa

PrimeMinisterwhoenjoysthesupportofthehouse,heisfreetoassignCabinetportfoliostoany

54Article154B(2),ConstitutionofSriLanka55Section5,PublicSecurityOrdinance,No.25of1947.56SeeRohanEdrisinha&AruniJayakody(Eds.)(2011) TheEighteenthAmendmenttotheConstitution:Substanceand

Process,(Colombo:CPA)57Articles43(2),43(3)and44(1),ConstitutionofSriLanka.58Article99(13)A,ConstitutionofSriLanka59Article70(1),ConstitutionofSriLanka.


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Member of Parliament, or even himself.60Combined, these factors permit heavy presidential

interferencewiththeworkofParliament.

TocomplementthesesweepingpowersoverParliamentarethepowersofappointmentoverthe

entirehigherjudiciarynamelytheChiefJustice,JusticesoftheSupremeCourt,Presidentofthe

CourtofAppealandJusticesoftheCourtofAppeal.ThePresidentalsoenjoysblanketimmunity

ofsuitduringthependencyofhistenure,subjecttotwoexceptions.Thefirstexceptiontothis

immunity,providedbytheConstitution,excludesanyproceedingsinrelationtoactscommitted

bythePresidentinhiscapacityasaCabinetMinister.61Thesecond,developedcautiouslybythe

Supreme Court, permits collateral challenges against anact of thePresident in limited cases

whereasubordinatereliesonthatacttojustifyhisownconduct.62Thebreadthofthisimmunity

issweeping:noproceedingsarepermittedtobeinstitutedorcontinuedagainstthePresidentin

any courtortribunal inrespect ofany acts oromissions,whether committed inhis publicor

privatecapacity.63Moreover,sincetheremovalofthetwo-termlimitthatonepersonmayhold

presidentialofficebytheEighteenthAmendment,thisalsomeansthatthepersonholdingthis

officemayenjoyimmunityforlife,providedhesucceedsingettingelectedcontinuously.

Thus,thePresidentunderthe1978ConstitutionpresidesovertheStateasapowerfulexecutive

head,withcontroloverParliamentandprotectionfromjudicialscrutiny.Thedominanceofthe

President over the executive branch and of the executive over the legislative and judicial

branchesunderminesthenotionalseparationofpowersthatwasintroducedthroughArticle4

oftheConstitution,whichspecifiesthedistributionofsovereignpowersofgovernmentacross

thethreebranches.64Thus,notwithstandingoccasionalassertionsbythejudiciaryofthedoctrine

oftheseparationofpowersoroftheirownindependenceguaranteedbytheConstitution,65the

Presidencyhasloomedlargeoverthejudiciary.

Wewillexaminetworelevantcasesofpresidentialinterferencewiththejudiciaryinamanner

that undermined the judiciarys independence.Thesecasestudies illustratethe point that the

impeachment of the 43rd Chief Justice Dr. Shirani Bandaranayake was only the most recent

symptomofadeeplyflawedconstitutionalstructurethataffordspre-eminencetotheexecutive.

60Article44(2),ConstitutionofSriLanka.61Article35(3)(proviso),ConstitutionofSriLanka62.SeeKarunatilakavs.Dissanayake,1999(1)Sri.L.R157,17663Article35(1),ConstitutionofSriLanka.64Article4specifiesthattheexecutivepowerofthePeopleistobeexercisedbythePresident,thelegislativepowerofthe

PeoplebyParliament,andthejudicialpowerofthePeoplebyParliamentthroughcourtandothertribunalsestablished

bylawortheConstitution.65SeeforinstanceInreNineteenthAmendmenttotheConstitution,2002(3)SriLR85,101.


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ImpeachmentproceedingsagainstChiefJusticeNevilleSamarakoon

NevilleSamarakoonQ.C.wasappointedChiefJusticebyPresidentJayewardeneshortlyafterthe

latterassumed presidential officein terms of thenew constitution in1978.The appointment

itselfwasthe subjectof criticismbecause ofMr. Samarakoons close ties to thePresident.66A

number of controversial issues pertaining to the judiciary arose immediately after the

promulgation of thenewconstitution, not least ofwhichwas thenon-appointment of sitting

judgesintheapexcourtundertheprevious1972ConstitutiontothenewlyconstitutedSupreme

Court. However, Mr. Samarakoon did not appear to oppose this dismissal of Judges by the

Constitution.67

By1983,however,thecumulativeeffectsofanumberoffactorsresultedinfrictionbetweenthe

President and the Chief Justice. The first was the Parliamentary Select Committee appointed

pursuant to a petition by Minister Gamini Dissanayake in March 1983 against Justices

WimalaratneandColin-Thom.68ThepetitionwasinstancedbyacomplainttothePresidentby

Mr.K.C.E.deAlwis,ajudgeandmemberoftheSpecialPresidentialCommissionofInquirysetup

by the then United National Party (UNP) government to inquire into the conduct of its

predecessorUnitedFront(UF)government.InawritapplicationfiledbyFelixDiasBandaranaike

(aformerMinisteroftheUFgovernmentbeinginvestigatedbytheCommission)againstMr.de

Alwis,JusticesWimalaratneandColin-Thomwerescathingintheircriticismoftheconductof

Mr.deAlwis,andissuedawritof quowarrantodisentitlinghimfromparticipatingintheworkof

theCommission.69ItwasinresponsetothisjudgmentthatMr.deAlwismadehiscomplaint.70

Later, in June 1983 just onemonthprior to theanti-Tamil pogromof Black July alleged

governmentsponsoredmobsprotestedoutsidethehomesofthreeSupremeCourtjustices.The

attackwasinresponsetoajudgmentissuedbyJusticesColin-Thom,RatwatteandSozaholding

that the Statewasresponsiblefor the unlawful detentionofa seniorleftactivistMs.Vivienne

Gunawardeneandherhusband,andthattheInspectorGeneralofPoliceshouldtakedisciplinary

measures against the officers involved.71Almost immediately thereafter, mobs arrived at the

judges residences. Both the benchandbarresponded angrily tothisbrazenthreat to judicial

66BasilFernando,RememberingNevilleSamarakoonChampionofJustice,(1991)SocialJustice,2:25,22.67BasilFernando,SriLanka:ExecutivePresidentialSystemandtheJudiciaryanoverview ,22ndNovember2012.

Accessedat:http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-237-201268RajanHoole,(2001),SRILANKA-TheArroganceofPower:Myths,DecadenceandMurder,(Colombo:UTHR(J)),

Chapter7.69Bandaranaikevs.deAlwis,1982(2)Sri.L.R66470RajanHoole,(2001),SRILANKA-TheArroganceofPower:Myths,DecadenceandMurder,(Colombo:UTHR(J)),

Chapter7.71Gunawardenavs.Perera,1983(1)Sri.L.R305


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independence.72Yet,noonewasprosecutedfortheseincidents.Instead,theofficersconcerned

werepromoted.73

Later, in the aftermathofthe July pogromand the enactmentof the SixthAmendment to the

Constitutionwhichrequiredjudges,lawyersandotherofficialstotakeanoathswearingthat

theywouldnotadvocatetheestablishmentofaseparatestatewithinSriLankaanissuearose

aboutwhether,pursuanttheAmendment,theJudgesceasedtoholdofficeuntiltheysworethe

SixthAmendmentoath.TheAttorneyGeneralarguedthatthecaseinvolvingthebanningofa

JaffnabasedpublicationTheSaturdayReviewwhichwaspartlyarguedbeforetheenactment

oftheSixthAmendment,mustbeheardanewsince the Judgeshearingthecasehadceasedto

holdofficesincethelasthearing.Infact,thedoorsto theCourtwereshutuntilthejudgeshad

taken the oath. S.Nadesan Q.C. appeared forthe petitionerand contested the position of the

AttorneyGeneral,arguingthattheJudgescontinuedtoholdofficeevenafterthepassageofthe

SixthAmendment, and that Judgescannotceasetoholdofficeunlesstheyareremovedon the

grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. While the Court appeared disinterested in

hearingthematteratfirst,74thejudgmentofSupremeCourtwasanemphaticexpressionofthe

independenceof the judiciary, holdingthatsitting Judgesof the Courtcannotbe removedby

operationofaconstitutionalamendment.75

Inthemidstofthistumult,inJanuary1984,thepressreportedthattheCriminalInvestigation

DivisionofthePolicewasinvestigatingapossibleassassinationattemptontheChiefJustice.76

ItwasinthiscontextofturmoilthatChiefJusticeSamarakoonmadecertaincriticalcomments

againstthePresidentataprizegivingofacommercialtutoryinColombo.ASelectCommitteeof

Parliament was constituted to inquire into the incident, but despite a finding of guilt, the

governmentbelatedlyrecognised the need to framestandingordersfor the inquiry. Thiswas

doneinhaste,andStandingOrder78Aoddlyplacedinachapterdealingwithrulesofdebate

cameintoeffectandanotherSelectCommitteewasconstituted.AfterrigoroussubmissionsbyS.

NadesanQ.C.appearingforChiefJusticeSamarakoon,theSelectCommitteesplitonpartylines.

Nevertheless, the majority UNP members stopped short of holding theChief Justice guiltyof

misbehaviour,butwerehighlycriticalofhisspeech. 77Mr.Samarakoonwaspermittedtoretire

quietly,butaclearmessagehadbeendeliveredtothejudiciary.TheexecutivewithParliament

72TamilTimes,NothingwilldeterussaysSupremeCourtandBarAssociationcallsforindependentcommissionof

inquiry,2:8,June1983,pg.3.Accessedat:http://www.noolaham.net/project/32/3117/3117.pdf73TheLankaGuardian,PavidiHandacase/TheVivienneGoonewardeneAffair,

15thDecember1993.Accessedat:http://www.noolaham.net/project/80/7928/7928.pdf74TamilTimes,OfNadesanandJudges16:2,15 thFebruary1997,pg.15,18.Accessedat:

http://www.noolaham.net/project/36/3550/3550.pdf75SeeInreNineteenthAmendment,note57.AlsoseeVisuvalingamvs.Liyanage,1983(1)Sri.L.R203.76TamilTimes,AssassinationThreatonChiefJustice3:4,February1984,page9.Accessedat:

http://www.noolaham.net/project/32/3124/3124.pdf77Dr.NihalJayawickreme,WhenPresidentJRJayewardeneTriedToImpeachChiefJusticeNevilleSamarakoon,10 th

November2012.Accessedat:http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/12285


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in towwascapable of threateningthe security of tenure, and even thephysical security of

judges.Aprecedentforthetumultuouseventsof2012hadbeencreated.

Non-constitutionoftheConstitutionalCouncil

TheSeventeenthAmendmenttotheConstitutionwascreatedthroughmultipartysupportasa

response to the erosion of the rule of law. The Amendment was a creditable attempt at

depoliticising public sector appointments, as well as establishing transparency and

accountabilityin publiclife.78Its centrepiecewastheConstitutionalCouncil, consistingof the

PrimeMinister,SpeakerofParliament,LeaderoftheOpposition,onepersonnominatedbythe

President,fivepersonsnominatedbythePrimeMinisterandtheLeaderoftheOpposition,and

onepersonnominatedbyagreementbetweenMPsnotbelongingtothegovernmentorthemajor

partyinopposition.ThisCouncilwasthengiventheexclusivepowertomakerecommendations

to the President in respect of appointments to the Elections Commission, the Public Service

Commission, National Police Commission, Human Rights Commission, Bribery Commission,

FinanceCommissionandDelimitationCommission.79

Inrespectofappointmentsto thehigher judiciary theSupremeCourtandCourtofAppeal

members of the Judicial Services Commission, Attorney General, Auditor General, Inspector

General of Police, Ombudsman and Secretary General of Parliament, nominationswere to be

madebythePresidenttotheConstitutionalCouncil,whothenhadtheauthoritytoapproveor

disapprovethePresidentsnomination.

Whiletheschemecontemplatedbytheamendmentappearedtoworkwellforatime,shadowsof

a looming constitutional crisis began to appear when President Kumaratunga rejected the

Councilsnominee asChairmanofthe ElectionsCommission.When this failure toappoint the

ConstitutionalCouncilsnomineewas litigatedin the Courtof Appeal,theCourtdismissedthe

applicationonthebasisthatthePresidentwasshieldedbyblanketimmunityunderArticle35of

theConstitution.80

When the first Constitutional Councils term ended in 2005, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna

(JVP)andtheIlankaiThamilArasuKadchi(ITAK)disagreedonwhethertheJVPwasentitledto

participate in discussions on nominating the tenth member to the Council. On this basis,

PresidentMahindaRajapaksawhohadbeenelectedinNovember2005refusedtoconstitute

theCouncil.WhileitwasopentothePresidenttoseekanopinionfromtheSupremeCourtunder

Article129oftheConstitutiononwhethertheJVPwasentitledtoparticipateinnominatingthe

tenthmember,and/orwhetherhecouldconstitutetheCouncilintheabsenceofonemember,he78ElaineChan,SriLankasConstitutionalCouncil, (2008)LawandSocietyTrustReview18.1,2.79Article41AH(amendmentssubsequentlyrepealed),ConstitutionofSriLanka.80PublicInterestLawFoundationvs.AttorneyGeneral,2004(1)Sri.L.R169


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didnotdoso.81Instead, thePresidentproceeded tomakedirectappointmentsto anumberof

offices including to the Supreme Court and the Courtof Appeal, despitebeingbound by the

ConstitutiontomakethoseappointmentsinconsultationwiththeConstitutionalCouncil.These

appointmentswere facially unconstitutional, in thatArticles41B(1) and41C(1)provided that

nopersonshallbeappointedbythePresidentotherthanbytheconsultativeprocessbetween

thePresidentandtheConstitutionalCouncil.

The implications of the Presidents actions were grave. On the one hand, the Presidentwas

engaginginacourseofactionthatwasdirectlyinviolationoftheConstitution.Ontheother,if

the appointments he was makingwere in fact unlawful,would the decisions made by those

appointees also be deemed unlawful? Would decisions of the Supreme Court issued by

unconstitutionallyappointedjudgesbevalid?Weretheyjudgmentsatall?

Inevitably, a legal pronouncement on these issues was left to the Supreme Court,82though

ironically,byabenchcomprisingthethenChiefJusticeAsokadeSilva,JusticeP.A.Ratnayakeand

JusticeChandraEkanayake,allofwhomwereappointedtotheirrespectivepositionsdirectlyby

thePresident inapparent violationof theSeventeenthAmendment.TheSupremeCourtheard

arguments in two connected cases. The first was a fundamental rights petition against the

PresidentchallenginghisfailuretoconstitutetheConstitutionalCouncil.Thesecond,filedbyCPA

andMr.Rohan Edrisinha, challengedtheappointment ofthenAttorney GeneralMohan Peiris.

Althoughthecaseswereoriginallyfiledin2008,counselforthepetitionerswerenotheardin

support of the application until late 2010.When the Court eventually issued its judgment in

March 2011, it dismissed the twopetitions on thebasis that the immunity conferred on the

President by Article 35 precluded judicial scrutiny.83The impenetrable veil of immunity had

prevailed,withdisturbingramificationsfortheruleoflaw.

Presentaspastrecurringcrises

The two incidents detailed here demonstrate two specific challenges to constitutionalism

presentedbythe1978Constitutionthatre-emergedduringtherecentimpeachmentcrisisthe

PresidentscontroloverParliamentandappointmentstothejudiciaryandthepreclusionofany

meaningfulchecksandbalancesonpresidentialpowerthroughtheimmunityprovidedbyArticle

35.TheimpeachmentofChiefJusticeBandaranayakewascharacterisedbystrategiesadoptedby

81Foradescriptionofthegamutofdeadlockbreakingmechanismsandalternativearrangementsavailabletothe

Presidenttoresolvetheissueinrespectofthetenthmember,seeAruniJayakody, The18thAmendmentandthe

ConsolidationofExecutivePower,inRohanEdrisinha&AruniJayakody(Eds.)(2011) TheEighteenthAmendmenttothe

Constitution:SubstanceandProcess,(Colombo:CPA),27-29.82AnearlierpetitionCentreforPolicyAlternativesvs.P.RamanathanandothersCA[Writ]Application890/2006filed

intheCourtofAppealintheformofaquowarrantoapplicationagainstthemembersoftheHumanRightsCommission,

challengingtheirappointmentsonthebasisthattheyweremadeinviolationoftheSeventeenthAmendmenttothe

Constitution,waswithdrawnaftertheCommissionersceasedtoholdofficein2009.83SumanasiriLiyanagevs.MahindaRajapaksa,SC(FR)297/2008;CentreforPolicyAlternativesvs.AttorneyGeneral,

SC(FR)578/2008.Judgmententeredon18March2011.


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thegovernment,whichdeliberatelydisregardedboththeconstitutionandthesuperiorcourts.

Theforegoing discussion demonstrateshow the inadequaciesof the constitutional framework

facilitated such action, andmoreover, a history and a political culture of extra-constitutional

behaviouron the part of unchecked executives. It is likely that these factors encouraged the

present government to unconstitutional conduct and even to push the boundaries of

unconstitutionality.

3.2 ParliamentarySupremacyvs.ConstitutionalSupremacy

Thedoctrineofparliamentarysovereignty,championedbytheEnglishParliamentinthecourse

ofitslongstrugglewiththemonarchy,wasdefinedbyDiceytomean:

Parliamentthusdefinedhas,undertheEnglishconstitution,therighttomakeorunmake

any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of

EnglandashavingarighttooverrideorsetasidethelegislationofParliament.84

Thistraditionaldoctrineentailedanumberofpropositions:1)ParliamentcanpassanyActasit

pleases; 2) Parliament cannot bind itself or a successor; 3) Parliament cannot abolish the

limitationonbindingitselforasuccessor4)Parliamentrecognisesnorivallegislativeauthority

and4)thecourtsrecognisethesovereigntyofParliamentinthatthecourtswillnotdeclarean

ActofParliamentinvalidandwillnottakenoticeofhowanActofParliamentwaspassed.85

WhiletheBritishParliamentcontinuedtooperateundertheassumptionthatitwassovereign,

when Ceylon obtained independence in 1948, it did so under a written constitution. That

constitutionprovidedthatParliamentshallhavethepowertomakelawsforthepeace,order

and good governmentof the island.86Thisphrasewould havemeant plenary and unfettered

legislativeauthority87,hadnotsection29(2)imposedcertainrestrictions,primaryofwhichwas

a restrictiononcommunity and faithbased discriminatorylegislation.88Further, section29(4)

providedthatanyamendmentoftheprovisionsoftheconstitutionwouldrequireatwo-thirds

majority. While the question of whether section 29(2) was unalterable, or only imposed

procedural constraints was a key political and constitutional debate at the time, the 1972

ConstitutionwaspromulgatedwiththespecificintentionofinstitutingasovereignParliament.

84A.V.Dicey,IntroductiontotheStudyoftheLawoftheConstitution, 1.85L.J.M.Cooray,(1984),ConstitutionalGovernanceinSriLanka,(2ndedition)(Colombo:StamfordLake) 11986Section29(1),Ceylon(Constitutional)OrderinCouncil,1946.(SouburyConstitution)87Note75,ConstitutionalGovernanceinSriLankawhereL.J.M.Cooraynotesthatthephrasepowertomakelawsfor

thepeace,orderanfgoodgovernmentoftheislandwasconstruedwidelytomeanplenarylawmakingpowerasample

astheImperialParliamentintheplenitudeofitspowercanbestow127.88Section29(2)read(2)Nosuchlawshall-(a)prohibitorrestrictthefreeexerciseofanyreligion;or(b)makepersons

ofanycommunityorreligionliabletodisabilitiesorrestrictionstowhichpersonsofothercommunitiesorreligionsare

notmadeliable;or(c)conferonpersonsofanycommunityorreligionanyprivilegeoradvantagewhichisnotconferred

onpersonsofothercommunitiesorreligions,or(d)altertheconstitutionofanyreligiousbodyexceptwiththeconsentof

thegoverningauthorityofthatbody,so,however,thatinanycasewhereareligiousbodyisincorporatedbylaw,nosuch

alterationshallbemadeexceptattherequestofthegoverningauthorityofthatbody:


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Fundamentaltothisprojectwaseliminatingtheprospectofjudicialreviewoflegislation.Asone

ofthe1972Constitutionscreatorsexplained:

Wearetryingtorejectthetheoryoftheseparationofpowers.Wearetryingtosaythat

nobodyshouldbehigherthantheelectedrepresentativesofthepeople,norshouldany

personnotelectedbythepeoplehavetherighttothrowoutthedecisionsofthepeople

electedbythepeople.Whyareyousayingthatajudgeonceappointedshouldhavethe

righttodeclarethatParliamentiswrong.89

AsAsangaWelikalanotesinarecentpublication,amajorsourceofdiscontentwiththeSoulbury

Constitution was on account of the government and opposition labouring under a quasi-

theological obsessionwith the Diceyan orthodoxy in regard to parliamentary sovereignty, in

whichanythingshortofillimitablelegislativeomnicompetenceseemedtodenoteanabsenceor

loss of sovereign independence90 Thus, the impetus for giving effect to the notion of

parliamentarysovereigntywasinfactfuelledbyamisplacedconflationofsovereignstatehoodas

amatterofinternationallaw91,withparliamentarysovereigntyasunderstoodintheorthodox

versionoftheEnglishdoctrine.

This fundamental category errorhaspersisted in theimagination of theSri Lankanpolitical

elite,and continuesto fuel resistanceto enablingmeaningful judicial reviewof parliamentary

action. The 1978 Constitution, which provided for a limited form of pre-enactment judicial

review, anddid not expressly affirm the principle of parliamentary sovereignty in the same

manner as the 1972 Constitution, nonetheless seemed implicitly to perpetuate some of the

theoreticalassumptionsabouttheultimatesupremacyofParliament.Itcertainlydoesnotreflect

aclearandunequivocalrejectionofthedoctrine.Inanycase,forthereasonsdiscussedinsection

3.1above,the1978Constitutionsimprovementsontheprovisionsconcerningtheindependence

ofthejudiciarywereonlymarginallybetterthanitspredecessor.92Whilethe1972Constitution

limitedjudicialreviewandjudicialindependenceinthenameofparliamentarysovereignty,the

1978Constitutionunderminedthosevaluesbyengorgingthepoweroftheexecutive,themakers

ofwhichwere rathermoreconcernedwith the searchforexecutivestability.93Asaresult,the

89M.J.A.Cooray, JudicialRoleundertheConstitutionofCeylon/SriLanka,citedinProf.C.R.deSilva, TheIndependence

oftheJudiciaryUndertheSecondRepublicofSriLanka,inC.Amaratunga(Ed.)(1989), IdeasforConstitutionalReform ,

(Colombo:CouncilforLiberalDemocracy),485.90AsangaWelikala,TheFailureofJenningsConstitutionalExperimentinSriLanka:HowProceduralEntrenchmentledto

ConstitutionalRevolution,inAsangaWelikala(Ed.)(2012)Republicat40:ReflectionsonConstitutionalHistory,

TheoryandPractice ,(Colombo:CPA),19891SeeforinstanceArticle2(1),CharteroftheUnitedNations,recognisingthesovereignequalityofstates.92Foranargumentinfavourofthepropositionthatthe1978Constitutionwasmorecompatiblewiththeindependence

ofthejudiciarythanitspredecessor,seeProf.C.R.deSilva, IdeasforConstitutionalReform ,487-489.ProfdeSilva

wherehecitestheentrenchmentoftheapexcourtsthroughtheconstitutionandintroducingtheprerequisiteofproved

misbehaviourtotheimpeachmentofajudgeasexamplesofimprovements.Unhappilythough,therequirementof

provedmisbehaviourappearsnottohavebeenofanymeaningfulsignificance,atleastinrespectofthe43rdChief

Justice.

93Dr.A.J.Wilson,(1980)TheGaullistSysteminAsiaTheConstitutionofSriLanka1978 (London:MacmillanPress),

1.


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1978 Constitution orchestrated what Rohan Edrisinha terms a devaluation of Parliament;94

reducing theMember ofParliamentto amere cog in thepartywheel95in addition toother

formsofcontrolwehavediscussedinsection3.1.Morerecently,thegrowthinthenumbersof

parliamentariansbelongingtotheexecutivewherenearlyeverysinglegovernmentmemberof

ParliamentisasalariedmemberoftheexecutiveunderminesthetraditionalroleofParliament

asacheckontheexecutivebranch.

This undermining ofParliamentwasnot, however, reflected in Parliaments rolevis--vis the

courts.Aswenotedpreviously,the1978Constitutionprovidedforanattenuatedformofjudicial

reviewoflegislation.96Asamatterofdraftinghistorytoo,the1978formulationdescribingthe

exerciseofjudicialpowerdidnotmarkaradicaldeparturefromthe1972formulation.TheFirst

Republican Constitution laid down that the National State Assembly (the legislative body)

exercises judicial power through courts and other institutions created by law...97The 1978

Constitutions formulation, remarkablysimilar, also lays down that the judicialpower of the

Peopleshall beexercisedbyParliament through courts,tribunalsand institutionscreatedand

established,orrecognized,bytheConstitution,orcreatedandestablishedbylaw...98However,

courtshavegenerallyunderstoodthephrasebyParliamentthroughcourtstomeanthatcourts

are subjectto the jurisdictionallimitations imposed onthembythe constitution orstatute as

relevant.99Whilethisappearstobeasomewhatunobjectionabledistributionofcompetences,it

isnotablethatwhileexecutivepowershiftedfromtheNationalStateAssemblytothePresident

in1978,acorrespondingchangedidnottakeplaceinrespectofjudicialpower.

This fundamental continuity of Parliaments position in respect of the judicial branch has

effectively stymied any bold assertion of residual judicial power. Indeed the judiciarys own

understandingofitspowershascontributed,inpart,toadeepconservatisminitsdealingswith

Parliament. For example, the Supreme Court dismissed CPAs arguments in a constitutional

challenge brought in respect of the Monetary Law (Amendment)Bill after the Bill had been

passedbyParliamentwith a numberof significant amendments made only at the committee

stage.Becausepre-enactmentreviewoflegislationtakesplaceimmediatelyafteraBillisplaced

ontheOrderPaperofParliament,amendmentstoBillsmadeatthe(later)committeestageare

notsubjecttothescrutinyoftheSupremeCourt.Thisanomalycreatesaloopholethroughwhich

unconstitutional provisions may be enactedwithout judicial review. CPA argued that where

committeestageamendmentsareincluded,theSupremeCourtmustpreventabuseofprocessby

94RohanEdrisinha,SriLanka:ConstitutionswithoutConstitutionalism.ATaleofThreeandaHalfConstitutions ,inRohan

Edrisinha&AsangaWelikala(Eds.)(2008) EssaysonFederalisminSriLanka ,(Colombo:CPA),3295Gunawardenavs.Abeywardena,SC51/87(Spl.),SupremeCourtMinutesof18January1988.96Article121,ConstitutionofSriLankapermitspre-enactmentjudicialreview,whereacitizenispermittedtofilean

applicationintheSupremeCourtwithinoneweekofaBillbeingplacedontheorderpaperofParliament,onthebasis

thattheBillorselectedprovisionsareinconsistentwiththeConstitution.TheCourtisthengiventhreeweeksinwhichto

makeitsdetermination.InrespectofBillsdeemedurgentbyCabinet,thePresidentrequeststheSupremeCourtto

pronounceonitsvalidity.Thecourthasonlytwenty-fourhourswithinwhichtocommunicateitsdetermination.97Article5(c),FirstRepublicanConstitutionofSriLanka,1972.98Article4(c),ConstitutionofSriLanka99SeeFarookvs.Raymond,1996(1)Sri.L.R217,228.


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assertingpost-enactmentreviewinrespectofthoseamendments.Dismissingthepetition,100the

courtcitedarticle80(3),whichstates; (w)herea Bill becomeslawuponthe certificate ofthe

PresidentortheSpeaker,asthecasemaybe,beingendorsedthereon,nocourtortribunalshall

inquireinto,pronounceuponorinanymannercallinquestionthevalidityof suchActonany

ground whatsoever. The petitioners were, in effect, asking the court to exercise a residual

judicialprerogativetocheckabuseofprocess.Whilethecourtmayhavetakenamoreexpansive

viewoftheirpowertocheckblatantabuseofprocessbytheexecutiveinParliamentbyreading

into article80(3) anexception inrespectofcommitteestage amendments, itinsteadchoseto

adopt a more modest approach, significantly undermining a citizens right to challenge

unconstitutionallegislation.

Thedoctrineofparliamentarysovereignty,havingoutlived the1972Constitution,has alsore-

emergedinmoreexplicitterms.Aswehavenoted,themostrecentassertionofparliamentary

supremacywasmadeindefenceofParliamentsdecisiontoproceedwiththeimpeachmentofthe

43rdChiefJustice,despiteanopinionoftheSupremeCourtandajudgmentoftheCourtofAppeal

deemingtheprocessunconstitutional.Inhisspecialrulingrejectingthenoticesissuedonhimself

andmembersoftheSelectCommitteeofParliamentbytheCourtofAppeal,theSpeakerstated:

NopersonorinstitutionoutsideParliamenthasanyauthoritywhatsoevertoissueany

directiveeithertomeasSpeakerortoMembersoftheCommitteeappointedbyme.This

is amatterwhich falls exclusivelywithin thepurview of Parliaments authority. The

established law in this regard was exhaustively surveyed by my distinguished

predecessor, thelateHon. AnuraBandaranaikein his historic rulingdelivered in this

august Assembly on 20th June, 2001. It is clear from this ruling that the matters

concernedfallwithintheexclusivedomainofParliamentandthatnointerventioninany

formbyanyexternalagencyisconsistentwiththeestablishedprinciplesoflaw,andis

therefore to be rejected unreservedly as an unacceptable erosionof the powers and

responsibilitiesofParliament.101

Therulingcameamidstamediaflurry,withgovernmentministersandapologistsproclaiming

theincompetenceofcourtstopronounceonparliamentaryacts.Eventhemainoppositionparty

theUNPappearedtosupportthisinvocationofparliamentarysupremacy. 102Therulingby

Anura Bandaranaike, alluded to in Speaker Rajapaksas ruling, was made in response to an

interimorderissuedbytheSupremeCourtrestrainingSpeakerBandaranaikefromappointinga

SelectCommitteetoinquireintothechargespresentedbyanumberofparliamentariansagainst

100InreMonetaryLaw(Amendment)Bill,SCSpecialDetermination8/2003,April2003.

101RulingbytheHon.SpeakerontheQuestionofPrivilegeraisedbytheLeaderoftheHouseregardingSupremeCourt

Notices,ParliamentaryDebates(Hansard)Volume213No.9,29November2012,1835.

102Ibid,1836.Iwouldliketomakeparticularmentionoftheview,clearlyexpressedbytheHon.Leaderofthe

Oppositioninthecourseofhisintervention,thatthepurportedNoticesconstituteanunwarrantedinterferencewiththe

powersandproceduresofParliament,andareinvalid.ThiswasstatedwithgreatclaritybytheHon.JosephMichael

Pereraaswell.


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thethenChiefJusticeSarathSilva.ThatordertoowasbasedonanapprehensionthatStanding

Order78Awhichprovidedforinvestigationsandfindingsofguiltagainstasittingjudgebya

PSCwasinconsistentwithArticle4(c)underwhichjudicialpowerwastobeexercisedthrough

courts. Speaker Bandaranaikes ruling in Parliamentrefusing to recognise the validity of the

courtsdecisionwasheavilylacedwithreferencestoEnglishparliamentaryconventionsandwas

acategoricalreaffirmationofthesupremacyofParliament.TheSpeakerdeclared:Ideemita

singularhonourthatfatehasbestoweduponmeasSpeakerofthisaugustAssembly,byaffording

me the historic opportunity of reaffirming the principles underlining the supremacy of

Parliament (emphasis added).103The impending constitutional crisis, on that occasion, was

avertedbythedissolutionofParliamentbythePresident.However,theinternalcontradictions

within the constitutional architecture of the country that recognised the Supreme Courts

exclusive jurisdiction to interpret theconstitutionon theone hand,104whilekeeping alive the

notionofparliamentarysupremacyontheother,hadnotbeenresolved.

Thus,morethanadecadebeforethecontroversysurroundingtheimpeachmentofthe43 rdChief

Justice, Parliament had through its thenSpeaker set itself ona collision course with the

judiciaryby invoking the supremacyofParliamentand refusing to recogniseordersmade by

courts.When that eventuality came, the overmightyexecutiveweighed inagain, affirmingthe

Speakersdecisiontoproceedwiththeimpeachmentindefianceofcourtorders.

103PresInformSpeakerhaspowerappointSelectCommittee,June21.2001.Accessedat:

http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca200106/20010621power_to_appoint_Select_Committee.htm104SeeArticle125(1),ConstitutionofSriLanka.Alsosee Premachandravs.Jayawickreme,1994(2)Sri.L.R90,98-100.


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4. ConclusionandRecommendations

The recent impeachment of the43rd Chief Justicehas revived important questions about the

healthofSriLankasdemocracy.Theviciousassaultontheindependenceofthejudiciarywhich

saw judicial officers being attacked, lawyers threatened and judgments violated was

outrageouswhenit happened,but inthe lightoftheconstitutionalweaknesses, the historyof

executivebehaviourandthecultureofpoliticsoutlinedabove,itwasalmostpre-ordained.The

Rajapaksaregimesintoleranceofdissentandcontemptforvaluesofconstitutionalismhasbeen

welldocumentedelsewhere.However,aswehaveargued,thedeclinedidnotcommencewith

the advent of the present regime. Instead, the regime inherited a constitutional and political

structure that entrenched positions that undermine the independence of the judiciary. Chief

among these are an overmightypresidency, and a political culture that has demonstrated an

enduringattachmenttothenotionofaParliamentthatissovereign.Structurallyanddoctrinally,

therefore,thepresentgovernmentinheritedaframeworkofgovernmentthatcouldreadilybe

deployedandindeedimproveduponastheEighteenthAmendmentdemonstratestoachieve

its own objectives of regime consolidation through the hyper-centralisation of power, and

without anymeaningful constitutional constraints that could prevent the realisation of such

undemocraticaims.

Recommendations

There are a number of reforms that are urgently needed in the light of the numerousviolations of legal and political principles associated with constitutional democracy that

werehighlightedintheunlawfulimpeachmentofthe43rdChiefJustice.Whilewearefirmly

of theview that a fundamental and thoroughgoing overhaul of Sri Lankasconstitutional

orderisnecessaryinordertoadequatelyaddresstheunresolvedissuesofdemocracyand

pluralism that have bedevilled our post-independence history, the specific matters that

require attention inregard tojudicialindependenceand the ruleoflawarethefollowing,

whichentailbothconstitutionalandstatutoryreforms.

A more robust articulation of constitutional first principles is necessary, including theprinciplesofthesupremacyoftheconstitution,theseparationofpowers,theruleoflawand

theindependenceofthejudiciary.

Thesevaluesneedtobereinforcedbyaproperframeworkanddistributionofconstitutionalpowersandfunctionsbetweenthethreeorgansofgovernment.Inparticular,independently

ofthedebateabouttheabolitionorreformofthecurrentinstitutionalformoftheexecutive


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presidencyandthealternativesthereto,thereneedstobemuchmoremeaningfulchecksand

balancesontheexecutive.

These include a strengthening of the oversight role of Parliament and the provision forcomprehensive judicial review of executive action. It follows that the pervasive legal

immunitycurrentlygrantedto thepresidentmust beabolished, inparticular immunityin

respectofactsoromissionsundercolourofoffice.

ToreinforcetheindependenceofParliament,theremustbeaconstitutionallimitationonthenumberofministers(bothCabinetanddeputies),andalimitationonMembersofParliament

holding any other remunerated office connected with the executive (e.g., as presidential

advisors).While the most appropriate framework on governing crossovers involving a

balance of principles between representation and conscience require further public

discussion,acompleteprohibitiononanyministerialorotherremuneratedexecutiveoffice

beingacceptedby anyMemberofParliamentthatcrossesoverfromtheoppositionto the

governmentbenchesmustbeimmediatelyintroduced.

The much-abused urgent bill procedure, which attenuates parliamentary and judicialsupervisionofthelegislativeprocess,mustbeabolished.

The doctrine of the supremacy of parliamentmust unequivocally be repudiated, and thesupremacy of the constitution reaffirmed. In doing so, both legislation and other

parliamentary action must be subject to comprehensive judicial review. In improving

accessibility to public law remedies and procedures (the writ and fundamental rights

jurisdictions) through repealing time limits and other procedural impediments, the first

instance fundamental rights jurisdictionmust bedevolved on the ProvincialHigh Courts,

withprovisionforappealstotheCourtofAppeal,andtotheSupremeCourtonmattersof

law.Thejudicialpowertoreviewtheconstitutionalityofanylawmustbemadeavailableto

anycourtinanyproceeding,subjecttoanecessaryappealsprocedure.

TheEighteenthAmendmenttotheConstitutionmustberepealedforthwith,includingbythe

restoration of the two-term limit on presidential office. The framework for key public

appointments that wasestablished under theSeventeenth Amendmentmust be restored,

with necessary amendmentsto ensureoperational effectiveness, which shouldinclude an

expressprovisionprecludinganypresidentialdiscretioninappointmentsrecommendedby

theConstitutionalCouncil.

Theindependenceandimpartialityofjudgesneedtobeconstitutionallyreaffirmed,inlinewith contemporary standards reflected in numerous restatements of best practice in


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internationalandCommonwealthinstrumentsincludingtheBangalorePrinciplesofJudicial

Conductand the LatimerHouse Guidelines. Inaccordancewiththe ordersoftheCourt of

AppealandtheSupremeCourtintheBandaranayakeimpeachmentprocess,legislationmust

beenactedimmediatelytoprovidefortheproceduretobefollowed,themodeofproof,the

burdenofproofandthestandardofproofofanyallegedmisbehaviourorincapacity,andthe

rightoftheChiefJusticeorotherjudgeofthesuperiorcourtstoappearbeforeandbeheard

byanyParliamentarySelectCommitteeinpersonorbyrepresentative.Anyimpeachmentof

asittingjudgeshouldbecontingentonapriorfindingofguiltbyacourtoflaw.Judgesshould

notbeimpeachedonthebasisoffindingsoffactbyMembersofParliament.

The government must constructively engage international mechanisms and UN specialproceduressuchastheUNSpecialRapporteurontheIndependenceofJudgesandLawyers.

Critically,undertakingsandguaranteesmadetointernationalbodiesmustbeimplemented

ingoodfaith.Thisassumesgreaterimportancegiven thatthe governmentrepresentedby

theAttorney General in the cases involvingDr.Bandaranayakes removal objected to the

Supreme Court and Court of Appealexercising judicial reviewover Select Committees of

ParliamentconstitutedintermsofStandingOrder78A.Thispositionstandsinstarkcontrast

totheunequivocalrepresentationsmadebyagovernmentdelegationtotheHumanRights

Committee(thetreatybodyfor theInternational ConventiononCivil andPoliticalRights)

thatSelectCommitteesofParliamentconstitutedintermsofStandingOrder78Adoattract

judicialreview.105

105UNHumanRightsCommittee(HRC),UNHumanRightsCommittee:FourthPeriodicReport,SriLanka,18October

2002,CCPR/C/LKA/2002/4,para.302.Accessedat:http://www.refworld.org/docid/3efb5b894.html


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