the impact of migration and remittances on labor supply in
TRANSCRIPT
Enerelt Murakami, Eiji Yamada, and Erica Sioson
No. 181
January 2019
The Impact of Migration and Remittances on Labor Supply in Tajikistan
Study on Remittances and Household Finances in the Philippines and Tajikistan
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The Impact of Migration and Remittances on Labor Supply in Tajikistan
Enerelt Murakami*, Eiji Yamadaโ , and Erica Siosonโก
Abstract
This paper examines the labor supply effects of migration and remittances in Tajikistan โ a major labor migrant sending and remittance dependent country in Central Asia. We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we effectively address the common methodological issues that result in biased estimates in analyses of migration and remittances. Our empirical work accounts for the endogeneity of migration and remittances with respect to the labor supply decisions of household members left at home, and for the self-selection of migrants and remittance senders through the application of a control function approach. Second, we apply our empirical model to unique high-frequency household panel data that further helps to remedy methodological problems present in cross-sectional studies. The findings suggest that having a migrant member and receiving remittances increases the reservation wages of the household members left at home, thereby reducing their labor supply and economic activity rate. This result is robust to different model specifications and definitions of migration and remittances. Keywords: Migration, remittances, labor market participation, economic activity rate, endogenous switching, Tajikistan * JICA Research Institute ([email protected]) โ JICA Research Institute and SciencesPo Paris โก Asian Development Bank. Institute and University of Tokyo. This paper has been prepared as part of a JICA Research Institute project entitledโStudy on Remittances and Household Finances in the Philippines and Tajikistan.โ We thank William Hutchins Seitz, Joao Pedro Wagner De Azevedo, and other colleagues in the World Bank for their academic as well as administrative efforts to arrange an institutional collaboration between the World Bank and the JICA Research Institute that allowed us to participate in the survey and access the data from the L2TJK project.
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1. Introduction
Tajikistan has experienced unprecedented out-migration since achieving independence in 1991.
In the early years of its independence, migration was mostly driven by cultural and ethnic
motivations triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent civil war. More
recently, however, economic reasons are driving migration, Tajiks are seeking better job
opportunities abroad to improve their earning potential. With productivity, growth, and job
creation not catching up with rapid population growth, only about a half of the total working-age
population was registered employed in Tajikistan in 2017 (World Bank 2017). The lack of job
opportunities at home drives many Tajiks to seek employment abroad, with a popular destination
being Russia due to historical and cultural connections. A recent nationally representative
household survey conducted by the World Bank and the German Federal Enterprise for
International Cooperation (GIZ) (2013) shows that almost 40 percent of households have at least
one member abroad in work, of which about 90 percent are in Russia.
The contribution of labor migrants to the Tajikistan economy is enormous. Remittances
received from labor migrants have constituted 30 to 50 percent of the countryโs GDP since 2006
(World Bank 2017), making Tajikistan one of the most remittance-dependent countries in the
world. The remittance flows provide the most important source of external funds in the country,
surpassing foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) flows by
more than ten times. At the macro level, the remittances sent by labor migrants substantially
contribute to GDP growth and poverty reduction but create an excessive dependency on the
economies of remittance-source countries. Most research on migration and remittances in
Tajikistan focuses on their impacts on economic growth and poverty reduction at the macro level.
However, understanding how these large migrant and remittance flows affect migrantsโ
households and their economic behavior in the home country is also important if the
3
Government is to reduce Tajikistanโs excessive dependence on remittances and exposure to
external turbulence.
Migration and remittances can have various impacts on the labor market decisions of the
left-behind household members (Dรฉmurger 2015). First, migration through remittances may
increase the reservation wage of non-migrant household members and thereby reduce their labor
supply in the local economy. Second, remittances may lift the liquidity constraints faced by
migrant households and create more opportunities for non-migrant household members in
productive entrepreneurship activities. Third, loss of the income contribution of a migrant
household member in the short-run could lead to a non-migrant member who was previously not
engaged in paid employment seeking employment to replace the lost income.
The interest in labor market participation derives in general from its bearing on
long-term economic growth. With migration and remittances figuring substantially in the
development discourse in Tajikistan, the need to determine whether migration and remittances
have a positive, or detrimental, impact on long-term economic growth becomes more urgent.
The labor supply effect of migration and remittances is particularly important for countries like
Tajikistan. Nevertheless, the global evidence is not conclusive on whether international
migration and remittances affect the labor supply of the left-behinds positively or negatively.
Past empirical studies on Tajikistan are limited, with most of them suggesting that the
reservation wage effect discourages the families of migrants from working. For example,
Abdulloev (2013) finds that satisfaction regarding jobs offered in Tajikistan is significantly
lower for families who have international migrants. Using the Tajikistan Living Standards
Survey (TLSS) conducted in 2003, Justino and Shemyakina (2012) find a negative effect on
household labor supply. However, these studies used cross-sectional data which are not ideal
when dealing with the issue of endogeneity of migration and remittances. Furthermore, these
studies used data collected in the early 2000s and do not capture the situation after Russiaโs
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economic decline in 2014 and the resulting stricter regulations on immigrants implemented in
2015.
The objective of this paper is therefore to contribute to the scarce empirical literature on
the impact of migration on non-migrant labor supply in Tajikistan. The contribution of the paper
is twofold. First, we analyze the latest data collected through the ongoing โListening to
Tajikistan (L2TJK)โ project that is being conducted by the World Bank. Employing a Telephone
Assisted Personal Interview (TAPI) technique, the L2TJK collects the socio-economic data of
800 households every two weeks. As of November 2017, the project had collected 32 rounds of
high frequency panel data. At each round, the data show that more than 30 percent of households
have at least one migrant member on average. Since the interviews are conducted frequently, the
data allow us to detect the instantaneous responses of households to various shocks without
severe recall errors. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no study which uses high
frequency panel data similar to the L2TJK on this topic. Second, our empirical strategy
addresses the common methodological issues โ endogeneity and selection bias โ present in
studies of migration and remittances, by applying a control function approach based on
Murtazashvili and Wooldridge (2016). When estimating the impact of remittances and migration
on the labor market participation of household members left behind, we need to consider the
possibility of endogeneity, simultaneity, and self-selection. Decisions on international migration,
remittances, and domestic labor market participation are likely to be made simultaneously or
cause each other. Moreover, migrants and remitters are not drawn from a randomly selected
sample population, but from individuals who self-select into these activities. The advantage of
the Murtazashvili and Wooldridge (2016) approach is that not only does it correct for selection
bias and endogeneity, it also is less restrictive and less computationally expensive compared to
competing models.
Our results show a large reservation wage effect. On average, if a household sends a
migrant, or receives remittances, the labor market participation rate of the left-behind members
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declines by 8 and 11 percentage points respectively. This is higher than the estimates by Justino
and Shemyakina (2012) using a similar definition, whose results range from 5 to 8 percent. With
international migration becoming a familiar and sometimes preferred occupational choice for
many Tajiks, the reservation wage effect can be detrimental to the nationโs growth potential in
the long run, through the slowed development of the domestic labor market and lower human
capital accumulation. This negative effect of migration and remittances has become a concern
for policy makers who try to enhance domestic job opportunities. Job creation remains a
daunting task, as found out by one of the authors of this paper after interviewing some high
officials at the Tajikistanโs Ministry of Labor. Domestic jobs continue to be unattractive, as
wages remain low. With migration to Russia as a familiar occupational option, which provides
better wages, people are not willing to work at the domestic wage level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the recent patterns of
migration, remittances, and the labor market in Tajikistan. Section 3 reviews the related
literature on the impacts of remittances on labor supply. Sections 4 and 5 describe the
methodology and data employed in the analysis. Section 6 presents and discusses results.
Section 7 performs robustness checks for different specifications, and Section 8 concludes the
paper.
2. Migration, remittances, and domestic labor market patterns in Tajikistan
In the neoclassical theory of migration, the reasons why people migrate are often categorized
into push and pull factors that are related to the economic context of the flow of labor (Kurekova
2011). These factors pertain to the relational drivers of migration, both from the migrant-sending
country perspective (push), and from the migrant-receiving country (pull). Both push and pull
factors coincide to make Tajikistan one of the biggest exporters of labor in the region. Large
wage differentials between Tajikistan and Russia as well as other destination countries are often
6
cited as major pull factors, while a shortage of jobs relative to the population growth and low
wages in the former are considered as the main push factors.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of migrant Tajiks in different parts of the world. Data
from the United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN
DESA 2017) shows that Europe hosts the highest number of Tajiks with about 92.51 percent of
the migrant Tajik population being in Europe in 2017, a considerable increase from the 87.53
percent in 1990. Most of these migrants are in Russia, and the majority are involved in itinerant
jobs from spring to fall, often in the construction industries (Erlich 2006). In 2013, the World
Bank and GIZ found that about 40 percent of households in Tajikistan have at least one migrant
member.
Figure 1. Stock of migrant Tajiks in the world by continent, 1990-2017
Source: UN DESA 2017.
The growth of migrant workers shows a consistent number of the Tajik population
engaged in migratory flows. By 1999, according to the TLSS, about 1.5 percent of households
had migrant workers. This grew to 5 percent in 2007. By 2008, the total number of labor
migrants according to the Ministry of Labor was 805,000, compared to 224,000 in 2003
050,000
100,000150,000200,000250,000300,000350,000400,000450,000500,000550,000600,000
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2017
Asia Europe Others
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(Olimova 2010). Brown, Olimova and Boboev (2008) find that 37.3 percent of households had
at least one migrant member and that about 700,000 people, about 500,000 of whom were
working in Russia, were considered temporary migrants.
By the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009, the number of labor migrants had declined by
a fourth, as many Tajik migrants returned to Tajikistan largely because of the global financial
crisis of 2008 and the sharp decline in economic activity within Russia. Before this, migratory
flows from Tajikistan to Russia had heightened during the breakup of the Soviet Union and the
ensuing civil war in Tajikistan. The civil war displaced as much as 20 percent of the countryโs
population (Yormirzoev 2017), becoming the main push factor for migration. The succeeding
years saw a combination of job shortages, demographic pressures and limited land area begin to
push Tajiks to migrate and work, primarily in Russia. While some Tajiks migrate to other
countries to work, Russia remains the main destination for the majority. This results in Tajikistan
being dependent, hence vulnerable, to changes in the Russian economy.
Figure 2. Arrived Tajiks in Russia, 1997-2016
Source: Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Services (2017).
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
8
Figure 2 shows a steady decrease in the number of arriving Tajiks in Russia from 2000 to
2005. From more than 11,000 in 2000, it dropped more than half in 2005. This is most probably
attributable to the migration policy reform that was implemented to simplify the arrivals and
settlements of migrants which affected temporarily employed migrants from the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) member countries, including Tajikistan (Mukomel 2014). By
2007-2008, Russia was implementing liberal migration reform, resulting in a consistent increase
in arrivals, reflected in the steady arrivals of Tajiks until 2008, when the numbers plummeted in
2010 following the Global Financial Crisis. Subsequently, migration rates rebounded and
steadily increased until 2014. From 54,658 entrants in 2014, the numbers however dropped to
47,638 in 2015. This reflects the revision of the visa-granting procedures implemented in 2015
by Russia. However, by 2016, there was a relative increase in numbers as arrived Tajiks
increased to 52,676. This pattern is also reflected in Figure 3 showing a decline in the number of
working Tajiks in Russia by 2015.
Figure 3. Number of Tajiks with work permits in Russia (in thousands)
Source: Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Services (2016).
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
9
The aggregate flow of remittances to Tajikistan is volatile (Figure 4) just like the number
of Tajik migrants which is largely affected by the migration policy of the Russian government.
Migrantsโ remittances account for a significant portion of the small countryโs GDP making it
extremely vulnerable to changes in the Russian economy. Migrant remittance inflows to
Tajikistan experienced a steady increase from 2002 to 2008, almost doubling each year until
2009. In 2009, remittances fell to 1.748 billion from 2.544 billion in 2008, reflecting the impact
of the Global Financial Crisis felt through its impact on Russia. By 2010, remittance inflows to
the country had recovered, accounting for 31 percent of the countryโs GDP or about 2.254 billion
US Dollars.
By 2011, migrant remittances inflows amounted to 2.68 billion US Dollars (41.7 percent
of GDP) and steadily increased until they reached a peak in 2013 at 4.219 billion US Dollars
(43.5 percent of GDP). The share of remittance to the countryโs GDP dropped to 36.6 percent in
2014 after the devaluation of the Russian ruble. This is also backed by the data in Figure 3 where
the numbers of Tajik workers in Russia declined in the same year. The decline in remittances has
been consistent since 2013 with a relative increase in 2016, though the share of remittances to
GDP continued to drop to 26.9 percent in that year. By 2017 migrant remittance inflows were
reduced by more than half at 2.031 billion US Dollars.
10
Figure 4. Remittance inflows to Tajikistan, 2002-2017 (US$ million)
Source: World Bank (2017).
Another important factor to consider driving Tajiks to migrate to Russia is the lack of
employment opportunities in the country. After the civil war in the 1990s, some forms of
employment in the country vanished. A sharp rise in unemployment due to the closure of many
enterprises together with high birth rates became strong push factors in the wake of the Soviet
Unionโs collapse (Olimova 2010). Employment in industrial production declined from 21
percent in 1991 to eight percent in 2003. Most shifted to agriculture, retail trade, services, and
household production while some stopped looking for jobs completely (Olimova 2010). Since
1994-1995, on the other hand, Russiaโs sustained economic growth, comparatively high wages,
ease of migration, and labor shortages have pulled Tajiks towards migrating (Erlich 2006,
Olimova 2010). Tajiks looking for a job elsewhere have found jobs in Russia, filling a demand
for unskilled labor in that country.
So, a combination of high unemployment and high population growth have served as
push factors driving people out of the country to work in Russia. Figure 5 shows the total
population, vis-ร -vis total labor force and the economically active population from 1990 to 2016.
These data show that as the population and the number of people considered as part of total labor
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
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resources constantly increase, the number of people who are economically active does not. The
increase in the economically active population tends to be slow and in certain years even
decrease, but high birth rates have contributed to a rapid and continuous increase in population.
The current median age is around 22 years, suggesting a young population with a potentially
large labor force. However, as noted, while the potential labor force has increased because of
natural population growth, the population engaged actively in the economy has not increased as
fast. Looking at the registered unemployed we see that by the first quarter of 2016, 54,000 Tajiks
were registered unemployed, a drop from the 57,000 registered in the first quarter of 2015.
However, this is not the complete story as many unemployed Tajiks remain unregistered at the
unemployment office.
Figure 5. Population, labor force and economically active, 1990-2016 (in thousands)
Source: Statistical Agency of Tajikistan. (2017), an agency under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan. Retrieved 9, 1, 2017, from http://www.stat.tj/en/.
In a report by the European Union in 2010, job creation was highlighted as among
significant areas of concern (EU 2010). No inventory on job creation is available however and it
becomes impossible to assess the opportunities for employment growth (EU 2010). According
0100020003000400050006000700080009000
10000
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Population Total labor force Economically active
12
to a report by Strokova and Ajwad (2017) for the World Bank, the potential workforce however
is growing but it remains underutilized, most probably attributable to the slow growth of job
creation. The majority of those working are employed in the informal sector in low quality jobs.
More than 60 percent of the total employment in the country is employed in agriculture and
related sectors (Strokova and Ajwad 2017). The service sectors employ about 30 percent of the
employed population, more than the population employed by the industry sector at less than 20
percent. One possible reason is that firms in the private sector remain small and young (Strokova
and Ajwad 2017). In general, Strokova and Ajwad (2017) note that โlabor has moved out of the
more productive sectors, such as industry, into low-productivity services and agriculture sectors,
where domestic job creation is the highest.โ
We can see from the data presented above that a combination of push and pull factors
contribute to many Tajiks leaving for other countries to find work. A couple of conclusions can
be drawn: (1) high birth rates combined with slow job creation, especially in more productive
sectors drive people to look for jobs elsewhere; (2) a combination of the historical relations
between Russia and Tajikistan as well as the higher wages in the former make Russia a preferred
destination for many Tajik migrants; and (3) the number of Tajiks migrating to work in Russia
and most importantly the amount of remittances sent back to Tajikistan remains volatile, affected
by changes in Russiaโs migration policies and its economy.
3. Literature review
The impacts of migration and remittances on other development indicators such as consumption,
immediate well-being, increases in per-capita income, and on compensation for negative shocks
have been substantiated in the literature (see Ratha 2013; Acosta, Calderon, Fajnzylber and
Lรณpez 2008; Hildebrandt and McKenzie 2005), while the long-term effects of migration and
remittances especially on productivity remain inconclusive. This inconclusiveness has been
13
attributed to several methodological issues such as selection bias, reverse causality, and omitted
variable bias (Adams 2011). Given this, we identify three strands of literature that discuss the
impacts of remittances on labor supply: first, that remittances can decrease participation in the
labor market; second, that remittances have no effect on the labor supply; and third, that
remittances can increase liquidity allowing households to invest in human capital.
Following the neo-classical model of labor supply, it is assumed that individuals allocate
time to both market and non-market activities. According to this perspective, the decision in
allocating time to these activities is determined by a number of factors such as wage and
non-labor income (Cox-Edwards and Rodriguez-Oreggia 2009). Labor-leisure theory notes that
remittances if considered as non-labor income can decrease the propensity of non-migrant
household members to participate in the labor market. Receipts of remittances can thus increase
the reservation wage of members left in the household. Studies such as Acosta (2007), Acosta,
Lartey, and Mandelman (2009), Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2005) and Chami, Hakura, and
Montiel (2012) also contribute to the evidence that remittances can have negative effects on
labor supply and hours worked by members left in the home country. Kim (2007) in a study on
Jamaica using fixed-effect regression looked at the factors that drive a wedge between
productivity and reservation wages and note that recipient household heads regardless of gender
tend to work fewer hours than non-recipient heads. One criticism of the Kim (2007) study,
however, is that it did not control for selection in the receipt of remittances (Adams 2011).
Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah (2005) note the negative effect of remittances on growth
and productivity. Chami, Hakura and Montiel (2012) conclude that positive technological
shocks can induce labor supply through an increase in real wages, and that remittances in
response can contract, reducing demand for leisure over labor, which in effect would increase the
labor supply. Acosta (2007), in a study using a two-stage least-squares model and instrumental
variable approach on a four-year panel survey in El Salvador, highlighted the importance in
14
looking at groups and noted that women are more likely to quit the labor market than men, but
that both men and women do reduce hours worked when their households receive remittances.
While the perspective that remittances can reduce the labor supply has dominated the
literature, it has not been unchallenged. If remittances are considered as labor income and as
income that otherwise the migrant member would contribute to the household if he or she has not
left the country, then there should be no effect on labor supply. Jansen, Vacaflores and Naufal
(2012) indicate that if remittances are not just a gift from relatives, nor additional non-labor
income, but are in fact a household decision regarding labor allocation, then these inflows may
not have such huge impacts on a householdโs domestic work effort. In this vein, studies such as
Assaad (2011), Cabegin (2006), Cox-Edwards and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2009), and Funkhouser
(1992) argue that there is no effect.
Another interesting finding is that while involvement in the formal labor market has
decreased among remittance-receiving households, involvement in the informal sector has
increased suggesting that household members of remittance-receiving households tend to favor
work that provides more mobility and flexibility. This is supported by the Funkhouser (1992)
study using fixed effects that showed that an increase in remittances would have a negative
impact on the labor force participation of members left in the household but would also have a
positive impact on self-employment. This study however was not without shortcomings. Adams
(2011) note that like the Kim (2007) study, Funkhouser (1992) did not control for selection in the
receipt of remittances and therefore the results could be biased.
Cabegin (2006), on the other hand, used the two-stage probit-OLS method in a study on
remittance-receiving households in the Philippines. In a study that corrected the biases in the
Funkhouser (1992) and Kim (2007) studies, she noted that for married couples, the participation
in migration abroad of one partner can change the labor participation and supply of the other
partner. Her findings are somewhat similar to Acosta (2007) though she argued that this operates
differently for men and women. She further found that having school-aged children can reduce
15
market participation for married women in respect to full-time paid employment. The effects
however are limited for married men, though the results suggest that an increase in a migrant
wifeโs remittances can reduce the likelihood of non-employment for men. The resulting change
in the labor supply can be a function of the change in roles household members assume upon the
out-migration of the migrant member.
This is especially true if it is the household head that migrates. In a 2007 study on the
labor market inactivity of migrant-sending households in Moldova, Gรถrlich, Mahmoud and
Trebesch (2007) offer a new perspective on understanding labor-leisure theory as it applies to
remittances and migration. They argue that the inactivity in the labor market of
remittance-receiving households is not because they consume more leisure, but because of
intra-household labor substitution and increased university enrolment. This was further
elaborated by Assaad (2011) in a study on the labor supply responses of women left behind in
Egypt. Using cross-sectional data from the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey of 2006, this study
found that while a male household memberโs migration can induce women in rural Egypt to
respond to this migration by increasing their labor supply, women are more likely to engage in
unpaid family work. The reason for this is that the a household memberโs migration ultimately
meant loss of labor for the remaining members, and women are expected to replace this labor.
Finally, another group of studies point to the positive impacts of remittances in terms of
the increase in liquidity allowing households to invest in human capital, and to some extent
financial capital. Calero, Bedi, and Sparrow (2009), using data from Ecuador, note that
remittances can facilitate human capital investments. They used data on availability of bank
offices in source countries as instruments to understand whether remittances can increase school
enrollments. They also found out that remittances are being used to fund education when
households are faced with economic shocks. Nsiah (2010) also came to a similar conclusion, on
a much larger scale. In their study on remittances and growth in Africa, they found that
16
remittances can provide alternative ways to finance investments thereby overcoming liquidity
constraints.
This study on the impact of migration and remittances on the labor supply of left-behind
household members aims to contribute to this debate. It is a response to the call for empirical
evidence on the impacts of migration and remittances in Tajikistan. As mentioned, the
importance of labor market participation lies on its bearing on long-term economic growth. With
many Tajiks migrating and with remittances constituting substantial shares in the countryโs GDP,
the need to determine whether migration and remittances have a positive, or detrimental, impact
on long-term economic growth becomes more urgent.
4. Methodology
Estimating the impact of remittances or migration on the labor market participation of household
members left behind needs to consider the possibility of endogeneity and self-selection. In other
words, remittances and migration are endogenous to the labor market participation of household
members left behind, because a household can self-select into the status of sending migrants or
receiving remittances by an unobserved cause, which simultaneously affects their labor market
participation at home. Furthermore, a shock to the labor supply of left behind members (e.g., job
losses) can be a direct cause of the migration/remittance decision. Because of these omitted
variables and the impact of reverse causality, simply regressing the labor market participation on
migration/remittance status by OLS will deliver a biased estimate.
In the presence of endogeneity and self-selection bias, the estimation must consider the
unobserved heterogeneity that simultaneously affects remittances/migration and labor market
participation decisions. To correct for this endogeneity and selection bias, we employ a control
function approach to estimate an endogenous switching regression model for panel data
following Murtazashvili and Wooldridge (2016). This model is a type of two-stage estimation
17
where the first stage (the regime switching equation) estimates the determinants of the regime
switching variable, and the impact of the regime switching variable on the outcome is estimated
at the second stage (the outcome equation). We use a traditional endogenous switching
regression model that allows different coefficients across two different regimes in the outcome
equation of the following form:
๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐1(๐๐) = ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐1๐ฝ๐ฝ๐๐ + ๐๐๐๐1๐๐ + ๐ข๐ข๐๐๐๐1๐๐, ๐ก๐ก = 1,โฏ ,๐๐ and ๐๐ = 0,1 (1)
Where: ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐1(๐๐) is the outcome variable, the labor market participation of members left behind, of
household ๐๐ in round ๐ก๐ก specific to the regime ๐๐ = 0,1.
In our case, ๐๐ = 1 indicates that the household has (a) migrant(s) or is receiving
remittances, and ๐๐ = 0 means otherwise; ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐1 is the vector of explanatory variables; ๐๐๐๐1๐๐ is
the household-specific unobserved heterogeneity in the regime ๐๐; ๐ข๐ข๐๐๐๐1๐๐ is an idiosyncratic
error term; and ๐๐ is the number of rounds in the panel data.1 We assume that the explanatory
variables ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐1 may contain continuous endogenous explanatory variables (EEVs) and strictly
exogenous explanatory variables ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐1 with respect to the idiosyncratic error, ๐ข๐ข๐๐๐๐1๐๐ . In our
model, ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐1 contains only the strictly exogenous variables ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐1, which are uncorrelated with
๐ข๐ข๐๐๐๐1๐๐.
Let ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2 denote our regime-switching endogenous binary variable, taking the value 1 if
a household has (a) migrants or receives remittances and 0 otherwise. By substituting the
following counterfactual framework:
๏ฟฝ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐1
(0) = ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐1๐ฝ๐ฝ0 + ๐๐๐๐10 + ๐ข๐ข๐๐๐๐10๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐1
(1) = ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐1๐ฝ๐ฝ1 + ๐๐๐๐11 + ๐ข๐ข๐๐๐๐11
1 As explained in Section 5 below, our data consists of ๐๐ = 32 rounds.
18
into a generic expression for ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐1(๐๐); ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐1 = (1 โ ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2)๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐1
(0) + ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐1(1), we can rewrite the regime
dependent outcome equation (1) into a switching regression equation with constant coefficients
as:
๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐1 = ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐1๐ฝ๐ฝ0 + ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐1(๐ฝ๐ฝ1 โ ๐ฝ๐ฝ0) + ๐๐๐๐10 + ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2(๐๐๐๐11 โ ๐๐๐๐10) + ๐ข๐ข๐๐๐๐10 + ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2(๐ข๐ข๐๐๐๐11 โ ๐ข๐ข๐๐๐๐10)
= ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐1๐ฝ๐ฝ0 + ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐1๐พ๐พ1 + ๐๐๐๐10 + ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2(๐๐๐๐11 โ ๐๐๐๐10) + ๐ข๐ข๐๐๐๐10 + ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2(๐ข๐ข๐๐๐๐11 โ ๐ข๐ข๐๐๐๐10) (2)
In equation (2), the regime-switching variable, ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2 , interacts with both time-invariant and
time-varying observable and unobservable variables. Following Murtazashvili and Wooldridge
(2016), we allow for the correlation between unobservables and the strictly exogenous
explanatory variables by applying the Mundlak (1978) device.
Let ๐๐๐๐๐๐0 โก ๐๐๐๐10 + ๐ข๐ข๐๐๐๐10, ๐๐๐๐๐๐1 โก ๐๐๐๐11 + ๐ข๐ข๐๐๐๐11, and ๐ฃ๐ฃ๐๐๐๐1 โก ๐๐๐๐๐๐1 โ ๐๐๐๐๐๐0 and assume that
๐๐๐๐๐๐0 = ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐๐0 + ๐๐๐๐๐๐0 (3)
๐ฃ๐ฃ๐๐๐๐1 = ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐๐1 + ๐๐๐๐๐๐1 (4)
Where: ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐ = 1๐๐โ ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐=1 , and (๐๐๐๐๐๐0, ๐๐๐๐๐๐1) are assumed to be independent of ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐.
The assumptions (3) and (4) impose strict exogeneity of ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐ with respect to the
idiosyncratic errors (๐ข๐ข๐๐๐๐11,๐ข๐ข๐๐๐๐10). Substituting (3) and (4) into (2) gives:
๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐1 = ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐1๐ฝ๐ฝ0 + ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐1๐พ๐พ1 + ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐๐0 + ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐๐1 + ๐๐๐๐๐๐0 + ๐๐๐๐๐๐1 (5)
The binary response correlated random effects model for ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2 is given by:
๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2 = 1[๐ ๐ ๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐ฟ๐ฟ2 + ๐๐๐๐๐๐2 > 0] (6)
Where: 1[โ ] is an indicator function, ๐ ๐ ๐๐2 is a round fixed effect, and:
19
(๐๐๐๐๐๐0,๐๐๐๐๐๐1, ๐ฃ๐ฃ๐๐๐๐2) are assumed to be independent of ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐, and ๐๐๐๐๐๐2~๐๐(0,1) (7)
The error term ๐๐๐๐๐๐2 is allowed to have serial correlation within the panel (๐๐). We are
interested in estimating the structural equations of a householdโs labor force participation rate
and economic activity rate as given by Equation (1) with a reduced form selection equation for a
migration state or a remittance receipt state given by Equation (6). Under the assumption (7), we
can write:
E(๐ฃ๐ฃ๐๐๐๐2|๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2, ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐) = โ(๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2, ๐ ๐ ๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐ฟ๐ฟ2) (8)
Where: โ(โ) is the generalized error function,2 determined by:
โ(๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2,๐ ๐ ๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐ฟ๐ฟ2) = ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2๐๐(๐ ๐ ๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐ฟ๐ฟ2)
โ(1 โ ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2)๐๐(โ ๐ ๐ ๐๐2 โ ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐๐๐2 โ ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐ฟ๐ฟ2) (9)
Where: ๐๐(๐ ๐ ๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐ฟ๐ฟ2) is the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). Then, we assume that:
E(๐๐๐๐๐๐0|๐ฃ๐ฃ๐๐๐๐2) = ๐๐0๐ฃ๐ฃ๐๐๐๐2 and E(๐๐๐๐๐๐1|๐ฃ๐ฃ๐๐๐๐2) = ๐๐1๐ฃ๐ฃ๐๐๐๐2 (10)
Where: ๐๐0 = 0 and ๐๐1 = 0 imply that selection is exogenous. By iterated expectations:
E(๐๐๐๐๐๐0 + ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2๐๐๐๐๐๐1|๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2, ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐) =
๐๐0โ๐๐๐๐2(๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2,๐ ๐ ๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐ฟ๐ฟ2) + ๐๐1๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2โ๐๐๐๐2(๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2,๐ ๐ ๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐ฟ๐ฟ2) (11)
2 See Murtazashvili and Wooldridge (2016) for the definition.
20
These generalized error terms are added into Equation (5) to correct for the endogeneity
of the regime switch variable, ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2 (migrate/not migrate or remit/not remit). Then Equation (5)
becomes:
๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐1 = ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐1๐ฝ๐ฝ0 + ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐1๐พ๐พ1 + ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐๐0 + ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐๐1 + ๐๐0โ๐๐๐๐2(๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2,๐ ๐ ๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐ฟ๐ฟ2)
+๐๐1๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2โ๐๐๐๐2(๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2,๐ ๐ ๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐ฟ๐ฟ2) + ๐๐๐๐๐๐ (12)
E๏ฟฝ(๐๐๐๐๐๐)๏ฟฝ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2, ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐๏ฟฝ = 0 (13)
Where: ๐๐๐๐๐๐ is the implied error in Equation (11).
To consistently estimate the coefficient of (12), we follow a two-step procedure as
proposed by Murtazashvili and Wooldridge (2016). In the first stage, we estimate a pooled probit
model of the following form for the selection equation (6):
P(๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2 = 1) = ฮฆ(๐ ๐ ๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐ฟ๐ฟ2 + ๐๐๐๐๐๐2) (14)
and obtain generalized residuals from the estimated coefficients as:
๏ฟฝฬ๏ฟฝ๐๐๐๐๐2 = โ๐๐๐๐2๏ฟฝ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2, ๏ฟฝฬ๏ฟฝ๐ ๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐๐๐๏ฟฝ2 + ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐ฟ๐ฟ2๏ฟฝ = ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2๐๐๏ฟฝ๏ฟฝฬ๏ฟฝ๐ ๐๐2 + ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐๐๐๏ฟฝ2 + ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๏ฟฝฬ๏ฟฝ๐ฟ2๏ฟฝ
โ(1 โ ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2)๐๐๏ฟฝ โ๏ฟฝฬ๏ฟฝ๐ ๐๐2 โ ๐ง๐ง๐๐๐๐๐๐๏ฟฝ2 โ ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐ฟ๐ฟ2๏ฟฝ (15)
In the second stage, we estimate the structural equation (12) for the household labor
force participation rate by adding generalized residuals obtained in the first stage as additional
explanatory variables. The empirical model is given by:
๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐1 = ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐1๐ฝ๐ฝ0 + ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐1๐พ๐พ1 + ๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐๐0 + ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2๐ง๐ง๏ฟฝฬ ๏ฟฝ๐๐๐1 + ๐๐0๏ฟฝฬ๏ฟฝ๐๐๐๐๐2 + ๐๐1๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2๏ฟฝฬ๏ฟฝ๐๐๐๐๐2 + ๐๐๐๐๐๐ (16)
๐๐ = 1,โฏ ,๐๐, ๐ก๐ก = 1,โฏ ,๐๐
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In our empirical model, ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐ contains only exogenous variables. Thus, we estimate the model
(16) by pooled OLS for all N and T. As the model (16) has a generator regressor problem, we
bootstrap to obtain standard errors. The joint significance of (๐๐0๏ฟฝฬ๏ฟฝ๐๐๐๐๐2, ๐๐1๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐2๏ฟฝฬ๏ฟฝ๐๐๐๐๐2) in (16) implies
the endogeneity of self-selection of the migration or remittances. We test this by the Wald
statistic with two-degrees of freedom.
5. Data
We utilize data from the World Bankโs Listening to Tajikistan (L2TJK) survey. This
phone-based high frequency panel survey monitors a variety of indicators including migration,
income and employment, the wellbeing and life satisfaction of households, and access to water
and electricity services. A sample of 800 households was drawn from a nationally representative
face-to face survey of 3000 households in Tajikistan conducted in the spring of 2015. Our
analysis covers 32 rounds of the L2TJK survey from May 2015 to November 2017 in which
households were initially interviewed at 10-day intervals, changing to two-week intervals after
the sixth wave of the data collection. Households who refused to participate were replaced with
households from the same primary sampling unit (PSU). The Japan International Cooperation
Agency Research Institute (JICA-RI) joined the World Bank to contribute to the financing of the
L2TJK survey from the 31st round and added additional questions that cover special issues
about migration and remittances to the survey questionnaire form.
For each round of the L2TJK survey, we obtained information on household
characteristics such as the number of employed and unemployed, the number of children under
18 years old, the number of the elderly above 60 years old, and the household headโs age, gender,
and educational level. While this high-frequency panel dataset is unique, it is not free of
limitations. Due to the nature of the data collection method that makes the high frequency
22
household panel data possible, most indicators are collected at household level. Therefore,
individual level data for health, education, and labor market participation are not observed,
leaving us unable to estimate more detailed results by gender and age. Despite this limitation, the
high frequency panel dataset improves the efficiency of econometric estimates and allows us
greater capacity to capture variations in household behavior regarding labor supply.
Table 1. Summary statistics of variables of interest by migrant status
Total sample Non-migrants Migrants
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Remittance receiving 0.098 0.002 (omitted) 0.304 0.005 Migrant sending 0.323 0.003 (omitted) 1.000 0.000 Labor force participation rate 0.209 0.001 0.237 0.002 0.150 0.002 Economic activity rate 0.337 0.002 0.374 0.002 0.260 0.003 Household size 6.703 0.019 6.234 0.020 7.687 0.036 Number of the elderly aged above 60 0.432 0.004 0.402 0.005 0.496 0.008 Number of children below 18 2.634 0.011 2.544 0.013 2.824 0.021 Number of disabled 0.152 0.003 0.165 0.003 0.126 0.004 Household head's age 53.55 0.085 52.558 0.107 55.632 0.132 Male headed 0.792 0.003 0.807 0.003 0.763 0.005 Female headed 0.208 0.003 0.193 0.003 0.237 0.005 Head's marital status: Married 0.784 0.003 0.782 0.003 0.789 0.004
Divorced 0.035 0.001 0.041 0.002 0.021 0.002
Widowed 0.152 0.002 0.141 0.003 0.175 0.004
Separated 0.009 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.004 0.001
Not registered 0.012 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.007 0.001
Single 0.008 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.004 0.001 Head's education level, years 10.891 0.018 10.995 0.022 10.673 0.029 Number of observations 25,550 17,303 8,247
Source: Authorsโ computation based on the L2TJK.
23
Table 2. Summary statistics of variables of interest by remittance status
Non-remitters Remitters
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Remittance receiving (omitted) 1.000 0.000 Migrant sending 0.249 0.003 1.000 0.000 Labor force participation rate 0.216 0.001 0.142 0.003 Economic activity rate 0.348 0.002 0.241 0.005 Household size 6.571 0.019 7.914 0.072 Number of the elderly aged above 60 0.421 0.004 0.538 0.014 Number of children below 18 2.597 0.011 2.980 0.039 Number of disabled 0.155 0.003 0.128 0.008 Household head's age 53.282 0.090 56.014 0.242 Male headed 0.796 0.003 0.759 0.009 Female headed 0.204 0.003 0.241 0.009 Head's marital status: Married 0.784 0.003 0.789 0.008
Divorced 0.036 0.001 0.021 0.003
Widowed 0.150 0.002 0.175 0.008
Separated 0.009 0.001 0.004 0.001
Not registered 0.013 0.001 0.008 0.002
Single 0.008 0.001 0.004 0.001 Head's education level, years 10.928 0.019 10.554 0.057 Number of observations 23,044 2,506
Source: Authorsโ computation based on the L2TJK.
Based on the main interview data, we constructed variables for migration and remittance
status, labor force participation rate, and economic activity rate of the household members
remaining in Tajikistan (see Tables 1 and 2). The remittance receiving status variable was
constructed as a dummy variable to account for the receipt of remittances by a household from
its migrant members during a survey round. Similarly, the migration variable is a binary variable
that takes on the value of 1 if a household has sent at least one member abroad. These two
dummy variables serve as regime-switchers in our structural model of labor force participation
and the rate of economic activity. We use both remittances and migration as regime-switchers
because many Tajik migrants are short-term seasonal migrants and do not remit but bring the
money home with them. Later, we also show our results with continuous variables for remittance
amount and number of migrants as a robustness check.
The data show that 32.3 percent of the total households have at least one migrant
member; however, only 9.8 percent receive remittances from their migrant members. The
summary statistics also suggest that households with migrants have lower labor force
24
participation and economic activity rates than non-migrant sending households. The indicators
are even lower for remittance receiving households than migrant sending households.
In total, we have two dependent variables and two regime-switching variables, leading
to four endogenous switching model specifications. Each endogenous switching model has one
component that is the endogenous regime-switching variable. Thus, we need at least one
instrument in the first stage probit model that is not included in the structural model. We
employed two instruments: monthly wage rates at the migration destination and the number of
migrants at the primary sampling unit (PSU).
The instrumental variables (IVs) were chosen on the basis of the theoretical and
empirical literature of migration. The Harris-Todaro (1970) model predicts that the most
important determinants of migration are the wage differentials between home and destination.
However, it is difficult to construct a variable for wage differentials because wage data can only
be observed for an individual in either home or foreign countries, but not simultaneously. Thus,
for a practical reason, we use wage data from destinations, assuming that wage rates are higher
in foreign countries than at home. For these wage data, we compiled information on monthly
wages in local currencies from the major destination countries, including Russia, Kazakhstan,
China, Turkey, South Korea, the United States, and Ukraine from the corresponding months and
quarters of 2015 to 2017 that match with the L2TJK data. Monthly wage data for Russia came
from the Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service. Data for Kazakhstan came from the
Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan Committee on Statistics. Hourly
wage data for Turkey came from the Turkish Statistical Institute and data on the quarterly wage
of migrant laborers in China came from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. To enable
comparison, the amounts in local currencies were converted into US Dollars using historical
exchange rates from the United States Department of the Treasury. For non-migrant sending
households, we took the average wage of the all destination countries except the United States
and South Korea as a negligible share of Tajik migrants work in these countries.
25
Table 3. Summary statistics of IVs
Instrumental Variables Mean Std. dev. Min Max Number of migrants in PSU 2.29 1.94 0 11 Wage rate at destination 3995.97 953.71 2578.44 13501.08 Number of observations 25,550
Source: Authorsโ computations.
Finally, the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) theory emphasizes the
importance of the network effect of migration as a key determinant of labor migration.
Particularly, it argues that using personal networks in the destination could reduce migration
costs and thereby promote more migration. Past empirical studies that test the NELM hypothesis
often use the number of migrants in the community or the presence of return migrants as proxies
for a migration network. Thus, we follow past literature and use the number of migrants in the
community as a proxy for the migration network. In this paper, we use the PSU as a community
as it is the smallest unit that the sample could be drawn from. The surveyed sample has 150 PSUs,
each containing 5-10 households. We constructed the instrumental variable by adding up
migrant households in the PSU. Table 3 summarizes the two instrumental variables.
6. Results and discussion
We applied the approach described in Section 4 to four separate cases with combinations of two
endogenous regime-switching variables and two response outcome variables. We take a
householdโs migration and remittance receiving statuses as regime-switching variables, and
householdโs labor force participation rate and economic activity rate as response outcome
variables. In the first stage, we estimate two pooled probit models of migration and remittances
status respectively for all households and rounds. Since each structural model has one
26
endogenous component, we need to include at least one instrumental variable in the first stage
probit models for robust estimations. As described in the previous section, we have two
instruments: wage rates in destinations and the number of migrants in the PSU. By selecting
wage rates and the number of migrants as instruments, we assume that they have no direct effect
on household labor supply decisions once we control for household migration or remittance
decisions. Table 4 reports the first stage coefficient estimates for the probit models.
As required by the two-step estimation procedure, the probit models in Table 4 also
include time averages of all explanatory variables except for the time-invariant variables, and
regional and time dummy variables as they are perfectly collinear with the constant term. The
results in Table 4 suggest that most estimated coefficients are statistically significant and the
directions of the effect of household characteristics on migration and remittance decisions are
consistent across the models, with larger magnitudes for the migration decision in general.
The results suggest that larger households with a married, older, and female head tend to
send migrants abroad. Households with more elderly members aged over 60 tend to send
migrants and receive remittances, whereas households with handicapped members are less likely
to send migrants and receive remittances. Having more children below 18 years of age
significantly reduces the probability of having a migrant household member. Finally, the
educational level of household head is negatively related to migration and remittances.
The explanatory variables that serve as instruments in our endogenous switching model
are statistically significant in both probit models. As the number of migrants in the PSU
increases, the probability of sending migrants and receiving remittances increases. This is
consistent with the migration literature that suggests that the migration network is an important
determinant of the decision to migrate. While we did not consider the wage differentials as
predicted by the Todaro model, our results suggest that higher wages at the migration
destinations attract migrants and increase the probability of sending remittances. We exclude
these two explanatory variables (the number of migrants in the PSU and the wage rate in the
27
destination) from the structural equations of the household labor supply to exploit them as
instruments. Thus, it is assumed that the number of migrants in the PSU and the wage rate in a
destination have no direct effect on labor supply decisions at home.
Table 4. First stage coefficient estimates: Determinants of the migration and remittance decisions Remittances Migrants Household size 0.065 0.147
(5.30)*** (12.33)*** Number of elderly (60+) 0.004 0.049
(0.100) (1.290) Number of children (<18) -0.044 -0.141
(-2.26)** (-7.82)*** Number of disabled -0.085 -0.145
(-2.86)*** (-5.53)*** Head's age 0.041 0.057
(4.80)*** (7.57)*** Head's age squared 0.000 -0.001
(-4.23)*** (-7.00)*** Female headed 0.245 0.274
(5.98)*** (6.99)*** Head's marital status (Reference: Married)
Divorced -0.316 -0.385
(-3.80)*** (-5.27)***
Widowed -0.129 -0.064
(-2.61)*** (-1.37)
Separated -0.461 -0.958
(-2.79)*** (-5.99)***
Not registered marriage -0.239 -0.521
(-1.94)* (-4.70)***
Single -0.520 -0.896
(-2.70)*** (-4.37)*** Head's education in years -0.027 -0.014
(-2.84)*** (-1.70)* Time averaged variables Yes Yes Regional dummies Yes Yes Time dummies Yes Yes Instruments
Number of migrants in the PSU 0.155 0.279
(18.36)*** (31.12)***
Wage rate at destination 0.0002 0.005
(16.32)*** (63.07)*** Constant -3.892 -20.77
(-17.94)*** (-61.07)*** Number of observations 25,550 25,550 Source: Authorsโ estimates. Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses. Time variables are survey rounds.
28
In the second stage of the estimation procedure, the structural equations of the
household labor supply are augmented with the generalized residuals obtained from the
estimates of the first-stage probit models to correct for the endogeneity and the self-selection
bias. Table 5 reports on the parameter estimates of the household labor supply as measured by
household labor force participation and economic activity rates.
Table 5. Second-stage coefficient estimates: the determinants of labor force participation and economic activity rates Dependent variable Labor supply Labor supply Economically active Economically active Regime-switcher variable Remittance Migrant Remittance Migrant Remittances/Migrants -0.112 -0.080 -0.198 -0.097
(-2.55)** (-3.56)*** (-3.36)*** (-3.69)*** Household size -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 -0.004
(-2.63)*** (-3.90)*** (-0.82) (-1.56) Number of elderly (60+) -0.022 -0.028 -0.040 -0.049
(-4.86)*** (-5.21)*** (-6.30)*** (-6.64)*** Number of children (<18) -0.023 -0.024 -0.042 -0.044
(-10.59)*** (-10.44)*** (-14.88)*** (-13.29)*** Number of disabled -0.038 -0.047 -0.043 -0.053
(-14.83)*** (-17.00)*** (-13.14)*** (-15.29)*** Head's age 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005
(1.93)* -1.620 (4.93)*** (4.00)*** Head's age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-1.51) (-1.18) (-4.10)*** (-3.46)*** Female headed -0.020 -0.027 -0.024 -0.039
(-4.71)*** (-4.37)*** (-4.64)*** (-5.42)*** Head's marital status (Reference: Married)
Divorced 0.097 0.096 0.092 0.090
(9.18)*** (7.93)*** (10.30)*** (7.86)*** Widowed 0.000 0.005 -0.021 -0.009
0.000 -0.740 (-3.22)*** (-1.04) Separated 0.222 0.247 0.206 0.211
(9.47)*** (10.80)*** (9.35)*** (8.45)*** Not registered
marriage -0.036 -0.039 -0.048 -0.045
(-3.73)*** (-4.28)*** (-3.94)*** (-3.16)*** Single 0.058 0.051 -0.015 -0.027
(2.82)*** (2.08)** (-0.73) (-1.06) Head's education in years 0.005 0.005 -0.003 -0.003
(4.61)*** (4.67)*** (-2.40)** (-2.19)** Time averaged variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Rounds Yes Yes Yes Yes Interactions with remittances/migrants
Household size 0.002 0.008 0.007 0.008
-0.670 (2.92)*** -1.190 (2.34)** Number of elderly
(60+) 0.026 0.019 0.036 0.033
(1.92)* (2.37)** (1.94)* (2.93)***
29
Number of children (<18) 0.012 0.005 0.007 0.006
(2.07)** -1.400 -0.870 -1.190 Number of disabled 0.034 0.034 0.065 0.059
(3.68)*** (6.19)*** (4.99)*** (7.42)*** Head's age 0.009 0.005 0.012 0.006
(3.02)*** (2.51)** (3.28)*** (2.56)** Head's age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-3.28)*** (-2.58)*** (-3.27)*** (-2.29)**
Source: Authorsโ estimates. Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses. Time variables are survey rounds.
All the regressions reported in Table 5 contain full sets of regional and time dummy
variables, time-averages of time-variant variables, and interactions of all variables with the
dummies for whether the household has a migrant member or whether the household received
remittances from its migrant members respectively. All continuous variables were de-meaned
before being interacted with the regime switching dummies. Therefore, the estimated coefficient
on the regime switching dummy variables can be meaningfully interpreted as average treatment
Female headed -0.017 0.017 0.009 0.048
(-1.35) (1.83)* -0.560 (4.40)*** Divorced -0.068 -0.046 -0.062 -0.047
(-2.64)*** (-2.23)** (-1.66)* (-1.97)** Widowed 0.025 -0.012 0.011 -0.034
-1.470 (-0.95) -0.530 (-2.39)** Separated -0.223 -0.263 -0.120 -0.108
(-3.65)*** (-6.89)*** (-0.97) (-2.00)** Not registered marriage -0.022 0.008 -0.055 -0.023
(-0.69) -0.330 (-1.06) (-0.76) Single 0.152 0.073 0.266 0.129
(2.68)*** -1.330 (6.15)*** (2.59)*** Head's education in years -0.007 -0.003 0.000 0.004
(-2.56)** (-1.89)* -0.010 -1.510 Time averaged variables with interaction Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions with interaction Yes Yes Yes Yes Rounds with interaction Yes Yes Yes Yes Generalized residuals from Stage 1 0.068 -0.023 0.119 -0.019
(7.85)*** (-3.32)*** (11.21)*** (-1.98)** Interacted generalized residuals -0.057 0.030 -0.082 0.032
(-3.57)*** (3.79)*** (-3.86)*** (3.11)*** Constant 0.119 0.113 0.310 0.331
(6.19)*** (5.19)*** (13.44)*** (12.09)*** Number of observations 25,550 25,444 25,550 25,444
30
effects. The remaining coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of migration/remittances on
the labor supply rates for households with given average characteristics.
To prove the validity of the endogenous switching model, we test the joint significance
of the generalized residuals terms using the Wald test with two degrees of freedom. In all models,
we reject the joint insignificance of the generalized residual terms at p=0.01 level of significance,
validating that the regime switching is endogenous.
According to the summary statistics reported in Tables 1 and 2, on average, the labor
force participation and economic activity rates are lower for migrant sending and remittance
receiving households. This observation is supported by our estimates of the structural equations
as presented in Table 5. The average treatment effect coefficients of the migration and
remittances are all negative and highly statistically significant, implying that migrant sending
and remittance receiving households have lower labor supply rates. In terms of magnitude, the
negative impact of remittances is larger than that of migrants. Our results show that the presence
of a migrant member reduces the labor force participation rate of the remaining household
members by 8 percentage points, while the receipt of remittances reduces it by 11 percentage
points. Furthermore, the response of the economic activity rate is larger than that of the
participation rate. Having a migrant member reduces a householdโs economic activity rate by 9.7
percentage points compared to the 19.8 percentage point reduction due to the receipt of
remittances.
Our results are consistent with past research in the Tajikistan context. Justino and
Shemyakina (2012) also observe negative impacts from migration and remittances on the labor
force participation of both men and women, although they do not correct for the endogeneity and
selection bias of migration and remittances. In terms of the degree of the impact, their findings
show that receiving remittances and having a migrant member reduces the labor force
participation rate of men by 8 percent and 1 percent respectively. The impacts for women are 5
percent and 2 percent respectively.
31
The effects of other determinants of household labor supply rates depend on whether the
household has a migrant member and receives remittances. For non-migrant and non-remittance
receiving households, large households with more young and old dependents, having
handicapped members and with a female head are likely to have lower labor force participation
rates, whereas the household headโs age and education may increase their participation rates.
The effects on the economic activity rates for non-migrant and non-remittance receiver
households also follow the same pattern.
For migrant supplying and remittance receiving households, the effects of the
determinants should be discussed in conjunction with the results of the first stage probit model.
Because migrant households tend to have fewer children aged below 18 and a lower number of
disabled members, having these dependents increases their labor force participation rates,
perhaps due to an increased need for income to take care of them. Also, older female-headed
migrant households are more likely to participate in the labor market. The educational level of
the household heads of migrant households is positively related to the economic activity rate, but
negatively with the participation rate, indicating some degree of mismatch in the labor market.
7. Robustness check with alternative specifications
We conduct several robustness checks to confirm the validity of our main results. We estimated
three panel data models with both binary and continuous endogenous variables. For the
continuous endogenous variables, we use the amount of remittances received and the number of
migrant household members. The models that we estimated include an Anderson-Hsiao (1981)
type dynamic panel model, a standard fixed-effect model, and a lagged-dependent variable
(ANCOVA) model. The results are consistent with our main results, although the magnitude of
the estimates is slightly lower except for the impact of the economic activity rate coefficients on
the remittance status. For both continuous endogenous explanatory variables, the negative
32
effects are significantly and consistently observed, which further supports our findings in
relation to the regime-switching regression. Generally the magnitude of the impact of
remittances is larger than that of migration, implying that remittances have much larger income
effect that discourages labor market participation on non-migrant household members.
Our benchmark panel model for robustness check is as follows:
๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐ = ๐ฝ๐ฝ๐ท๐ท๐๐๐๐ + ๐พ๐พ๐๐๐๐๐๐ + ๐๐๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐,๐๐โ1 + ๐๐๐๐ + ๐๐๐๐๐๐ (17)
Where: ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐ is the outcome variables such as labor supply and economically active labor
participation; and ๐ท๐ท๐๐๐๐ are key explanatory variables of interest, such as the status of remittance
and migration. In addition to the discrete dummy variables we use in the main text, ๐ท๐ท๐๐๐๐ also
includes the continuous treatment variables, amount of remittance and number of migrants from
each household. ๐๐๐๐ represents household ๐๐โs time-invariant unobserved characteristics, and ๐๐๐๐๐๐
is a mean-zero idiosyncratic shock.
If there is a serial correlation, meaning that the past idiosyncratic shock, ๐๐๐๐,๐๐โ1, is
correlated with the current outcome, ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐, it is well known that the standard fixed effect model
will not give a consistent estimate. For the variables related to labor supply, it is highly probable
that past shocks can affect the present decision. This is the reason for including the lagged
dependent variable, ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐,๐๐โ1, in the right-hand-side of (17).
In practice, we use the first differenced equation of (17) so that we can eliminate ๐๐๐๐:
๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐ = ๐ฝ๐ฝ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ท๐ท๐๐๐๐ + ๐พ๐พ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐๐๐ + ๐๐๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐,๐๐โ1 + ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐๐๐ (18)
In addition to our key identification challenge, the endogeneity of ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ท๐ท๐๐๐๐ , ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐๐๐ is obviously
correlated with ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐,๐๐โ1 as both have the common unobservable ๐๐๐๐,๐๐โ1 . A conventional
approach to deal with this endogeneity is to instrument ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐,๐๐โ1 with ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐,๐๐โ2 as suggested by
33
Anderson and Hsiao (1981). Thus, in (18) we instrument two endogenous variables ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ท๐ท๐๐๐๐ and
๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐,๐๐โ1 by the first-differenced PSU level number of migrants, the first-differenced wage rate at
the destination, and ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐,๐๐โ2.
The regression results for equation (18) are summarized in Table 6. The results are
similar to our main results, both in terms of the sign and the magnitude of the estimates.
Furthermore, the order of the magnitude among different combinations of
dependent-explanatory variables is also consistent with that of our main results. Columns (1) and
(5) of Table 6 report the results when ๐ท๐ท๐๐๐๐ is the dummy of receiving remittances. Receipt of
remittances reduces the labor force participation rate by 9.2 percentage points and the economic
activity rate by 27.1 percentage points. Columns (2) and (6) show the results when the
remittance dummy is replaced by the log of the remittance amount. The results are consistent
with the results using the remittance dummy, and they suggest that doubling remittances reduces
the labor force participation rate by 1.3 percentage points and the economic activity rate by 3.9
percentage points. The effect of the presence of migrant(s) is displayed in columns (3) and (7).
The labor force participation rate declines by 3.2 percentage points if there is at least one migrant
in the household. The effect is even larger for the economic activity ratio, with an 8.6 percentage
points decline. As the continuous counterpart of the dummy of the presence of migrants, we
estimate the effect of the number of migrants as reported in columns (4) and (8). Adding one
migrant will reduce the labor force participation by 1.8 percentage points while reducing the
economic activity rate by 5.2 percentage points.
This Anderson-Hsiao estimator, though being widely used, requires the assumption
that ๐๐๐๐๐๐ is not serially correlated, which could be too strong in some cases. Angrist and Pischke
(2009) suggest testing the robustness with two alternative specifications, the fixed-effect
estimation, and the lagged-dependent estimation (sometimes called โANCOVAโ) which can
jointly give a nice โbracketโ (the upper-bound and the lower-bound) for the estimate. The fixed
34
effect estimation ignores the lagged dependent variable from equation (17). We take the first
difference and estimate:
๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐ = ๐ฝ๐ฝ๐น๐น๐น๐น๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ท๐ท๐๐๐๐ + ๐พ๐พ๐น๐น๐น๐น๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐๐๐ + ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐๐๐ (19)
Instead, in the ANCOVA model, we drop ๐๐๐๐ from (17) and estimate:
๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐ = ๐ผ๐ผ + ๐ฝ๐ฝ๐ด๐ด๐ด๐ด๐ท๐ท๐๐๐๐ + ๐พ๐พ๐ด๐ด๐ด๐ด๐๐๐๐๐๐ + ๐๐๐ด๐ด๐ด๐ด๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐,๐๐โ1 + ๐๐๐๐๐๐ (20)
The results of the estimation of (19) and (20) are reported in Tables 7 and 8, respectively.
For all the estimates, the results are similar to the corresponding values in Table 6. Estimates in
the columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) of each table are qualitatively the same as the corresponding
main results which appear in columns 1 to 4 of Table 4, respectively. Table 9 summarizes the
coefficient across different specifications, so that the reader can easily compare the results. From
all of the estimation results, it is highly probable that our estimates of the impact of remittances
and migration on the labor supply of left-behinds, which is significantly negative and sizable, are
stable across different empirical specifications.
35
Table 6. Anderson-Hsiao estimation (Equation 18) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES ๐ฅ๐ฅLabor Supply
๐ฅ๐ฅLabor Supply
๐ฅ๐ฅLabor Supply
๐ฅ๐ฅLabor Supply
๐ฅ๐ฅEconomically Active
๐ฅ๐ฅEconomically Active
๐ฅ๐ฅEconomically Active
๐ฅ๐ฅEconomically Active
๐ฅ๐ฅRemittance -0.0921**
-0.271***
(0.0460)
(0.0610) ๐ฅ๐ฅRemittance
Amount
-0.0134**
-0.0396***
(0.00676)
(0.00898)
๐ฅ๐ฅMigrants
-0.0322**
-0.0860***
(0.0138)
(0.0170)
๐ฅ๐ฅNumber of migrants
-0.0178**
-0.0518***
(0.00862)
(0.0107)
๐ฅ๐ฅLabor supply (t-1) 0.106*** 0.108*** 0.105*** 0.105***
(0.0233) (0.0234) (0.0233) (0.0233)
๐ฅ๐ฅEcon. Active (t-1)
0.0888*** 0.0934*** 0.0945*** 0.0942***
(0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0191) (0.0191)
Observations 22,611 22,611 22,611 22,611 22,611 22,611 22,611 22,611 R-squared -0.112 -0.115 -0.092 -0.091 -0.223 -0.224 -0.084 -0.083 Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Regions YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Rounds YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Dependent variables are the labor force participation rate in level for the columns (1) to (4), and the economic activity rate for the column (5) to (8).
โRemittance Amountโ is the log of (1 + remittance amount) to included households without remittance received into the sample. โNumber of migrantsโ is the raw number of migrants in the household. The first stage results can be provided upon request.
36
Table 7. First-differenced equation model (Equation 19)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Labor Supply
Labor Supply
Labor Supply
Labor Supply
Economically Active
Economically Active
Economically Active
Economically Active
Remittance -0.0803*
-0.257***
(0.0439)
(0.0592) Remittance
Amount
-0.0117*
-0.0376***
(0.00643)
(0.00867)
Migrants
-0.0268**
-0.0772***
(0.0126)
(0.0158)
# of migrants
-0.0145*
-0.0469***
(0.00797)
(0.0100)
Observations 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 R-squared -0.002 -0.003 0.012 0.012 -0.116 -0.112 0.011 0.011 Number of hhid 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Rounds YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The first stage results can be provided upon request.
37
Table 8. ANCOVA model (Equation 20) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Labor
Supply
Labor
Supply
Labor
Supply
Labor
Supply
Economically
Active
Economically
Active
Economically
Active
Economically
Active
Remittance -0.129***
-0.202***
(0.0151)
(0.0197)
Remittance
Amount
-0.0174***
-0.0268***
(0.00198)
(0.00260)
Migrants
-0.0410***
-0.0628***
(0.00455)
(0.00583)
# of migrants
-0.0278***
-0.0433***
(0.00315)
(0.00401)
Observations 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007
R-squared 0.396 0.399 0.419 0.417 0.400 0.407 0.437 0.436
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regions YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Rounds YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The first stage results can be provided upon request.
38
Table 9. Results summary across different specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) Dependent Variable
Remittance/migration Variables
Regime-Switching model Anderson-Hsiao Fixed-Effect ANCOVA
Labor Supply Remittance -0.112** -0.0921** -0.0803* -0.129***
Remittance Amount N.A. -0.0134** -0.0117* -0.0174***
Migrants -0.080*** -0.0322** -0.0268** -0.0410***
# of migrants N.A. -0.0178** -0.0145* -0.0278***
Economically Active
Remittance -0.198*** -0.271*** -0.257*** -0.202***
Remittance Amount N.A. -0.0396*** -0.0376*** -0.0268***
Migrants -0.097*** -0.0860*** -0.0772*** -0.0628***
# of migrants N.A. -0.0518*** -0.0469*** -0.0433***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
39
8. Conclusions
Out-migration has increased rapidly in Tajikistan and is likely to rise further in response to the
economic incentives offered by neighboring countries, especially Russia. Private remittances
from migrant workers contribute to Tajikistanโs economy excessively, at its highest in 2008
making up almost 50 percent of its GDP. While remittance receipts in Tajikistan have recently
been in decline because of migrants returning from Russia and the economic slowdown in
Russia, migration remains to be a lucrative and preferred choice of occupation for many Tajiks.
This paper has explored the labor market impact of overseas out-migration and
remittances in Tajikistan using the unique high frequency household panel data, L2TJK. The
analysis covered 32 rounds of the L2TJK survey collected between 2015 and 2017. To consider
the possibility of endogeneity and selection bias in the migration and remittances decisions, we
employed a control function approach to endogenous switching regression for panel data
developed by Murtazashvili and Wooldridge (2016). The advantage of applying the control
function approach to endogenous switching regression is that it is less restrictive as it allows
serial correlation in the error term as well as heterogeneities to be correlated with time-varying
explanatory variables. This approach is less computationally expensive than the alternative full
information maximum likelihood approaches.
Our results show that having a migrant member or receiving overseas remittances can
reduce labor force participation and economic activity rates of the remaining household
members. The remaining household membersโ participation in the labor market is more
responsive to remittances than to migration. This result is in line with past empirical studies of
the type in Tajikistan and other countries, as well as previous theoretical constructs. Our findings
suggest that migration and remittances raise the reservation wages of members left in the
household according to the labor-leisure theory that states that remittances, when considered as
40
non-labor income, can decrease the propensity of non-migrant household members to participate
in the labor market.
The results of the study add to the debate on how remittances and migration can
ultimately impact on development. There are several channels through which remittances and
migration can affect the wellbeing of households โ as a buffer to shocks, by increasing the
per-capita income of households, through improvements in access to education, health, and
other well-being indicators of household members, among others. This paper looked at one
channel, one that is important in assessing long-term economic growth.
The policy implications of the results depend on what migrant households are doing
instead of working. If they are taking on unpaid household work previously borne by migrant
members, it could imply a need to improve the wage labor market. Detailed information about
the time use of household members is not available in Tajikistan and limits the possibility of
performing more detailed analysis disaggregated by age and gender. This paper shows that
collecting such data can improve our collective knowledge of the impact of migration and
remittances on domestic labor supply. While the results show that migration and remittances
may have a negative impact on the labor market supply of the household members left behind,
the results do not deny the possibility of remittances and migration having a positive impact on
other outcomes. Thus, this paper encourages further study to piece together a more complete
picture that would allow us to suggest better policy responses on how to channel such
remittances into development.
41
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Abstract (In Japanese)
่ฆ็ด
ใฟใธใญในใฟใณใฏใไธญๅคฎใขใธใขใซใใใไธป่ฆใช็งปๆฐ้ๅบๅฝใงใ็งปๆฐใใใฎ้้ใซๅฏพใใ
ไพๅญๅบฆใ้ซใใๆฌ็จฟใฏใใฟใธใญในใฟใณใซใใใฆใๅบ็จผใ็งปๆฐใจ้้ใๆฌๅฝใซๆฎใๅฎถๆ
ใฎๅดๅไพ็ตฆใซไธใใๅฝฑ้ฟใๆค่จผใใฆใใใ็งปๆฐใป้้ใๅฎถ่จใฎๅดๅไพ็ตฆใซไธใใๅฝฑ้ฟ
ใๅทกใฃใฆใฏใๅพๆฅใใๅ ็ๆงใฎๅ้กใๆๆใใใฆใใใๆฌ็จฟใงใฏใใณใณใใญใผใซ้ขๆฐ
ๆณใ็จใใฆ้ซ้ ปๅบฆใฎๅฎถ่จใใใซใใผใฟใๅๆใใใใจใซใใใๆขๅญ็ ็ฉถใงใฏ่ฆใใใช
ใใฃใๆนๆณใงๅ ็ๆงๅ้กใฎๅ ๆใ่ฉฆใฟใฆใใใๅๆ็ตๆใฏใ็งปๆฐใฎ้ใๅบใใจ้้ใฎ
ๅใๅใใซใใใๅฎถๆใฎ็ไฟ่ณ้ใไธๆใใๅดๅใป็ตๆธๆดปๅใธใฎๅๅ ใๆธๅฐใใใใ
ใจใ็คบๅใใฆใใใใใฎ็ตๆใฏใๅๆๆๆณใ็งปๆฐใป้้ใฎๅฎ็พฉใๅคใใๅ ดๅใงใๅๆง
ใซ่ฆณๅฏใใใ้ ๅฅใงใใใใจใ็คบใใใใ ใญใผใฏใผใ๏ผ็งปๆฐใๆตทๅค้้ใๅดๅๅๅ ใ็ตๆธๆดปๅ็ใๅ ็็ในใคใใใณใฐใใฟใธใญ
ในใฟใณ