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The impact of extreme nationalism on a bi-communal society.
The Case of Cyprus
Master: History of Society.
Specialization: Global History and International Relations.
Faculty and University: History and arts/Erasmus University of Rotterdam
Student’s name and number: Costas Siahinian-337222.
Student’s email: [email protected]
Supervising lecturer: Dr B. Wubs.
Second reader: ?
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Contents
-Acknowledgments……………………………………...3
-Abbreviations…………………………………………..4
-Introduction…………………………………………….5
-1.Historiography…………………….………………….9
-2.Cyprus problem at a glance………………………...15 -2.1 Ottoman Era 1571-1878…….………………………..16
-2.2 Cyprus as British colony……………………………..17
-2.3 The road to independence…………………………….20
-2.4 The seed that never flourished…………………..........22
-3.Bi-communal fights 63’-64’………………………….25 -3.1 Constitutional crisis and Makario’s proposals……….25
-3.2 Armed conflict…………………………………………31
-3.3 An attempt for NATO-ization of the problem……….35
-3.4 Grivas, as the solution…………………………………37
-3.5 Acheson plan…………………………………………...41
-3.6 A “hot” summer…………………………………..........44
-3.7 Discussion……………………………………………….49
-Conclusion……………………………………………….56
-Appendices……………………………………………….61 -1. Makarios III………………………………………………61
-2. Georgios Grivas…………………………………………...61
-3. Rauf Denktsah…………………………………………….62
-4. Fazil Kucuk………………………………………………..62
-5. Zurich-London agreements………………………………62
-6. Polycarpos Georgadjis…………………………………….66
-7. «Megali Idea» (Great Idea)…………….............................67
-Bibliography………………………………………………68
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AcknowledgmentsFirstly I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Ben Wubs, who through his guidance and
advices helped me complete this study. Secondly I would like to express my thanks to
Erasmus University and the academic staff for providing me with all the resources I needed
during my studies.
Fani Triantafillidou also deserves a big thank you for all her effort and free time she
invested with me discussing about my topic’s difficulties as well as providing me with
priceless information on how to make it complete. I would be ungrateful not to thank my
dearest friends Sofos, Fedon, Alex and Kris who were always by my side willing to help.
Additionally I would like to thank Kirsten for standing next to me all this year and C. Loizou
(Xosis) for the precious help on the cover background. I would also like to thank Eliana who
has provided me with valuable advices and guidance the last twelve months.
Last but most importantly I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my parents
Yiannis and Sofi who have invested so much in me all these years, and provided for my
education, supporting me every step of the way. Without them none of mine achievements
could be done.
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Abbreviations
1. G/C= Greek Cypriots (might refer also for the community).
2. T/C= Turkish Cypriots (might refer also for the community).
3. E.O.K.A= National1 organization of Cypriot fighters (in Greek:
Ethniki Organosi Kiprion Agoniston).
4. T.M.T= Turkish Resistance Organization (in Turkish: Turk
Mukavemet Teksilati).
5. ΕΛ.ΔΥ.Κ= Ελληνική Δύναμη Κύπρου (Hellenic Force in Cyprus).
6. TOΥΡ.ΔΥ.Κ= Τουρκικά Δύναμη Κύπρου (Turkish Force in
Cyprus).
7. N.I.S= National Intelligence Service (K.Y.Π in Greek).
8. Ι.Δ.Ε.Α= Ιερος Δεσμος Ελληνων Αξιωματικων (Sacred Bond of
Greek Officers).
9. UNFICYP= United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.
1 The word national in Cyprus life is used either for Greek or Turkish mentioning.
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IntroductionCyprus has for the last 50 years been continuously in the stare of the international community
and still remains one of the severe unsettled conflicts of our time. For some, Cyprus has been
interpreted as a problem in the two-sided relationship between Turkey and Greece - both
Western allies - which sets a menace to international peace. A different aspect of this matter
is the one by which others consider Cyprus as fundamentally a trouble, a mainly brutal ethnic
conflict of which was caused due to great power rivalry.2 Therefore, one can assume that
emphasizing these contradictory views, two basic hypotheses arise, which unreservedly report
the way of scholars and different analysts on the matter, view the case of Cyprus:
o First, the minority Turkish Cypriots may be considered as a barrier to the democratic
goal of the majority Greek Cypriot community.3
o Second, the constitutional arrangements of 1960 which were 'forced' on the Greek
Cypriots sharpens the differences between the two communities because by giving
the Turkish community too much powers it made the governance of Cyprus
impossible.4
Hence, based on the aforementioned, the purpose of this thesis is to argue and discuss that the
conflict in Cyprus took place not so much because the constitution was flawed or insufficient
nor because of the inflexibility of a minority community. My hypothesis is that Greek as well
as Turkish nationalism have been deficient in cohesion and so far have failed to develop a
nationalist ideology which connects together both the Greek and Turkish communities. In
other words, I will examine the impact of intense nationalism, which in many cases
dominated the minds of both communities, onto the Cyprus ethnical problem.
Since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 the island is divided in a two
community zones with the Greek Cypriot one legally recognized as the only official state
authority on the island and the Turkish Cypriot one, declaring their autonomy and
independence as a de facto state (November 1983), which is only recognized by Turkey in the
international field. The Turkish invasion of 1974 was not an event that came out of nowhere
and it was well expected and prepared if you look carefully the past 30 years. In general
conception this action has its foundations in the failure of a peaceful coexistence between the
2 E. Kedourie, ‘The Cyprus problem and its solution’ in Middle Eastern Studies 41:5 (2005), 649 – 660.3 Z. Stavrinides, ‘A long journey to peace: The dispute in the Republic of Cyprus’ in Harvard International Review 27 (2005), 84-85.4 Y. Vural and N. Peristianis, ‘Beyond ethno-nationalism: emerging trends in Cypriot politics after the Annan Plan’ in Nations and Nationalism 14:1 (2008), 39-60.
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two main communities of the island (Greek/Cypriots and Turkish/Cypriots). My research
shows that the most crucial period, concerning this problem, is the bi-communal fights of
1963-1964 and based on this era I will try to examine the following research question: What
was the role of nationalism, before and during the bi-communal killings?
Nationalism is a word so used and still so not understandable. This meaning includes so
many things inside and hides so many more behind it. Some people are proud for feeling it,
while others give all their efforts to fight against it. A crucial question about nationalism then
is, whether it is aggressive, by its nature and whether it consequently leads to war and
conflicts. Through the historical recursion of this period and the presentation of the events
that took place I want to give more light in this dark period of Cyprus history and answer
some important questions concerning the role of nationalism in this Middle East area.
Nationalism and ethnicism are not equally mutual ideologies nor is ethnicity in itself always a
problem. But it becomes one when it is mishandled. And this is what this thesis is all about.
To make things more clear, in this part, I will give a brief introduction of the notions
nation/nationalism as well as a short description of the methodology used for the research and
accomplishment of this dissertation. A nation is a large group of people, connected with an
identity. A nation might be ruling itself as a nation-state (Germany) or be just part of another
state (Catalonian nation in Spain). People belonging to the same nation usually share together
the same culture, religion, language and history. This is not an unbreakable rule for all
nations, as Canada-Belgium and many other nation examples, do not share all these in
common. Therefore, a nation is an association of people who share the same feelings of
brotherhood, the same ancestors and believe in a common past. Their biggest achievement is
not their knowledge of the same past, but their willingness to act for the preservation of their
nation.5 But how did the nations emerge? Some historians argue that nations existed even
before the notion was invented. The first declared nation-state was France, after the fall of
the Ancient regime and the French revolution. It was the first time that the concept nation,
politically and cultural, was mentioned as we know it today. Since the 17th century, liberal
philosophers were already against the ancient regimes, propagandizing them and trying to
give the first examples for nationhood and its political implementations. They ignored the
ethnical or cultural elements so that they could give a political meaning to the whole nation
concept.6 During history, a division of nationalism was emerged. This one is based on the
nation and its features. We can find two different types of nationalism according to this
5 Y. Tamir, ‘Review: The Enigma of Nationalism’, in World Politics 47:3 (1995), 418-440.
6 A. Dawisha, ‘Nation and nationalism: Historical antecedents to contemporary debates’ in International studies review 4:1 (2002) 3-22, 10-12.
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theory. The first one is the English-French nationalism. These nations have first of all a
political meaning and a state status. They created a nation out of their state so they can give
more power and stability to the state. They believe that nations emerge over time and changes
through social situations. This kind of nationalism belongs to the constructivist conception of
nationalism. A very different conception of nationalism and nation is the German one.
German nationalism belongs to the primordialistic view and sees the nation as something pure
and from a romantic prospective. For them, nations are cultural creations and not a political
factor. They believe that the state is a result of the national feeling. Nation always existed for
them and when the people realize this and the time is right, then a state will rise and unite the
whole nation.7
Due to the nature of the chosen topic, I strongly believe that the most appropriate
approach concerning the methodology part is the one that refers to the qualitative method. As
it is quite clear from the aforementioned, there is no need or reason to proceed in the
preparation of questionnaires, because this thesis does not quest people’s opinion on the
matter. As a result, due to the fact that this thesis will discuss the case of whether or not
nationalism can be the cause of conflict, I chose to follow the qualitative approach by using
primary and secondary sources and material aiming at a desirable conclusion and thus the
preference of this type of methodology appears to be the most appropriate one. The basic
tools of the qualitative method are my primary findings from the newspaper press of the time
and also an important edition of documents and letters concerning that era. Secondary sources
will “back up” my arguments and give valuable material information to my research.
Not only as a Cypriot, but also as a world citizen, I find this attempt extremely interesting
because the Cyprus problem is one of the biggest problems that United Nations has to deal
with and the fact that Cyprus is the only divided country in the European Union (occupied by
a non-European nation), gives it a special interest by itself. A personal aim although has to be
placed, and this is to try and see the problem from a different angle and put some light in this
dark period, away from sentimentality and chauvinism.
A four chapter dissertation will follow this introduction as well as an epilogue/conclusion
where a synopsis of this research will take place. First, a historiography chapter will follow,
based on my broader concern about nationalism and conflict giving a summary of what’s
have been said on the topic by major scholars. Chapter 2 will be dedicated to the Cyprus
problem and can been seen as a short summary of the islands history mainly in the 20 th
century, to introduce some main points of the problem, from the Ottoman and British era to
the independence process and finally the Turkish invasion of 1974. Next chapter will be the
basic one of this research paper. My general concept will be based on the presentation of the
bi-communal riots of 1963-64, and how did they end up killing each other as an ultimate
7 Dawisha, ‘Nation and nationalism’, 7-12.
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solution, based on my primary source research. The end of this chapter will deal with the
conclusion that arose through the analysis. This discussion will provide significant answers,
in relation to our research question. Last chapter will be a conclusion to summarize what has
been argued in this paper and to respond to the key research question. It will also contribute
towards the question of whether or not nationalism is one of the main causes of the
occurrence of conflicts and disputes, which will be developed in the historiographical debate.
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1.HistoriographyAt this point a historiography on my broader theme will take place. The reason I chose to
present this in a separate section is because I strongly believe that the opinions of specialists
on the matter of the relation among nationalism and the occurrence of conflicts/disputes , is
very important and must be discussed in detail . This will help us link and associate the broad
question with the actual research one. Purpose of this debate is to find out what has been said
about the relation between nationalism and conflicts. It will give us important guidance for
our later examination of nationalism on the Cyprus problem. One of the articles that I will
base my debate on will be the one of S. Van Evera, ‘Hypothesis on Nationalism and War’.8 In
his research article, he asks seven questions and tries to find answers to the connection
between war and nationalism. Most notable questions can be summarized in these three ones:
Does nationalism cause war? What’s the reason for these wars to occur and how do they
occur? Is today’s Europe threatened by nationalism?9 Van Evera gives four immediate
reasons, why nationalism leads to war and then he divides the causes of these reasons into
structural, political, perceptual factors. This thing is an indirect answer to his first question
and we move on now to find out the four immediate causes. First one is that, the more
stateless nationalities exist, the bigger the chance for war. Secondly, if a nationality seeks for
the recovery of its national Diaspora and the annexation of territories, the risk for war is really
big. Thirdly, if nationalities use hegemonic goals against other nationalities war might occur
and finally the forth cause is, if nationalism oppress the minorities which live inside the
nation/state then the possibility for war is really high.10 All these causes might be found
during history, inside the nationalistic movement. As the writer argues, many populations
declare a demand for national statehood while they use to belong into bigger federations or
empires (Yugoslavia-U.S.S.R). This is not easy to be achieved by all nations and it has high
risk to lead into a conflict. Also lots of nations seek to absorb their Diaspora by territorial
expansion and Van Evera sees it as a big disadvantage of nationalism. The biggest
disadvantage of nationalism for Evera is the lack of respect that some nationalisms show to
other nations and to the minorities that live inside its unity. The higher the lack of respect, the
closest we get to war. What Evera found during his research, is that if a nation has achieved
statehood, has limited unity goals, has no aim to rule other nationalities and respect its state
minorities, then the chance for war is limited. But as he explains, this is not easy to achieve,
because most nationalisms use history and education to create a mythical background and
persuade people to be loyal and follow the path it’s needed to fulfill the nation’s purpose. In
some extreme cases, nationalism asks and aims to show its superiority against other nations
8 S. Van Evera, ’Hypothesis on Nationalism and War’ in International security 18:4 (1994), 5-39.9 Van Evera, ‘Hypothesis on Nationalism and War’, 6-7.10 Van Evera, ‘Hypothesis on Nationalism and War’, 8.
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(Nazism Germany and fascist Italy and Japan). Answering the question about today’s threat,
Evera says that the West part of Europe has fewer chances to get involve into a conflict than
the East part. The way that nation/states emerged and especially in the Slavic-Soviet region
leaves few hopes for avoiding conflict. Former empires and federations broke down into
small pieces leaving all the nationalities to claim a piece. The memories of the past crimes,
with the new flexible borders and the cultural differences that nationalism forced into
different populations, combined with all the minorities that still live inside the state (usually
the neighboring state is the mother land of the minority), increases the chances for war. The
fact that the West part of Europe today has less chance to be involved into a conflict
nowadays means nothing to Evera about nationalism in general; because back in the late 19 th
and early 20th century, the west part of Europe with its nationalism, drag the whole humanity
into many wars.11 Evera’s theory is set first in this debate, because it gives a very general idea
about nationalism and its connection with war, but with enough arguments to support it up.
Moving to B.R. Posen’s article about nationalism and mass armies, we find some
interesting ideas and arguments that connect nationalism with war.12 Using his own words
«nationalism is a cause of intense widespread public concern for national security, and a
public predisposition to accept the judgments of civilian or military ‘threat inflators’ of
military dangers from abroad. Since the professional military, in particular, is likely to favor
solutions to perceived threats that stresses the utility of offensive doctrines and plans, a
pressure is created for adoption of national military policies that will cause of exacerbate
conflicts with neighbors». These few sentences include all his thoughts about the connection
of nationalism and war. Based on his research, nationalism is the expected result of the
improvements and new technology on the war industry. New technology and military
innovations improved the battles and increased the casualties of men, and created mass
armies. To support and train this mass army, it needs time and in a war period there is no time
to waste. The only way to have so many men ready to die is to create an identity and convince
the population to support it by any mean. So with this new ideology, we have a list of men
ready to volunteer into the army to support their nation. Nationalism to complete its purpose,
it needs literacy to educate the people and brainwash them with nationalistic and militaristic
ideas. The use of education through schools, church and printed press (books etc) can help
nationalism ideas to be spread through the population more easy. After the consolidation of
nationalism, into a state’s population, the whole industry works in favor of the military.
Nation is taken for granted and this idea helps the increase of military army. These armies are
more effective into a period of conflicts and have more success during war times. This fact
11 Van Evera, ‘Hypothesis on Nationalism and War’, 8-33.12 B.R. Posen, ‘Nationalism the mass army and military power’ in International security 18:2 (1993) 80-124, passim.
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made the rest of the states to follow the nationalistic example and build their own mass army
to defend their territories. This circle when is completed, it delivers massive armies ready to
fight and defend their nations, while this eventually will lead to war.13
Next arguments are the ones that Paret’s paper argues on nationalism and military
obligation. 14 His conclusion is really close to Posen’s one. Paret came to his conclusion, that
nationalism leads to conflicts and massive armies ready to start a war, but through a different
path. Reading his research on how empires ended up with national mass armies, we can see
that it was not always like that (as Posen told us before). He argues that at the beginning of
nationalism, the army was still in the hands of elite and even after the establishment of this
movement; the obligation for military service was not so spread, as a feeling, among the
empire citizens. It was still considered as a matter for professionals, under the auspice of the
state. According to Paret, two things changed the situation towards the mass army and the
high military obligation feeling. The first fact is mainly accepted by most historians and has
to do with literacy and the educational system. He is a big supporter of the idea that education
plays a major role into the spreading of nationalism and helps the military feeling to rise.
Changing up the educational system and making it compulsory up to a certain age, combined
with an increase of printing books, gave nationalism access to more people and the security of
the nation was no longer a matter for few. The second fact that changed the way that people
viewed the army under the nationalistic way of thinking was the uprising of the class struggle
and the socialist ideas worldwide. As Paret argues, this situation put the workers into a
dilemma to choose their side. Either they will be faithful to their nation, or they will be in
solidarity with the global proletarian movement (against nations). The result out of this
decision was the formation of a mass army with nationalistic views and aims, to protect their
nation against the enemy. So up to the 20th century, we had armies ready to kill for their
nation’s safety and a nationalism that was more than connected with militarism, aggression
and violence. 15
Another important article on my topic is the one of B.Denich, about the
dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the role that nationalism played into the genocide.16 While
studying his research you get the opportunity to see clearly how nationalism works in a big
political entity such as Yugoslavia. Nationalism, in this case, was the political movement that
pushed things to the edge from the first place and made them so complicated, reaching into a
genocide point. Nationalism in this part of the world is very much connected with religion
and so their dogma and religion difference made it even more difficult.13Posen, ‘Nationalism the mass army and military power’, 82-124.14P. Paret, ‘Nationalism and the sense of military obligation’ in Military affairs 34:1 (1970) 2-6, passim.15 Paret, ‘Nationalism and the sense of military obligation’ 2-6, passim.16 B. Denich, ‘Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist ideologies and the symbolic revival of genocide’ in American ethnologist 21:2 (1994) 367-390, passim.
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During the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia, the Croatian nationalism had found the opportunity
to kill thousands of Serbian who lived in Croatian territories. This fact gave food for
nationalism on both sides to grow stronger and keep the memories alive. During the Tito era
national differences were put aside by the communist slogan of equality and brotherhood. But
as Denichs research shows clearly, nationalism can keep the memories alive for his own
survival. In the course of the communist years, the various nationalisms under the Yugoslavia
flag, kept growing bigger and started claiming their vital national territory. The things got
even worst when several communist parties turned against each other and became more like
nationalist parties. This led, as Denich argues, into the dismembering of Yugoslavia and the
formation of independent nation states with territorial claims. Now nationalism was ready to
complete its work and with the Serbian nationalism asking for revenge, conflict was not so
easy to be avoided. Nationalism in these countries gave birth to a new terminology for war
crimes. «Thanks» to nationalism; during 1992 (after the dismembering of Yugoslavia) the
world faced the cruelty of the notion «ethnic cleansing».17 The Serbians took their revenge
against the Muslims and Croatians for the massacres against their people fifty years back. A
summary of Denich’s argument is that nationalism was responsible for all the conflict and
hatred between the Slavic people, and it was this movement that armed people’s hands and
made them do all these atrocities.
We will stay a bit longer to the Yugoslavian example and especially to the article of
R.M Kunovic and C. Deitelbaum about the Croatian gender attitudes and the polarization that
nationalism causes.18 They both argue in their article that nationalism causes polarization of
the inside groups (home nation) and of the outside ones too. Polarization might not be the
worst thing, but as they explain, this polarization brings hatred against other ethnical groups.
This hatred will eventually bring war and this is the most important point of their article,
related to my topic. This conflict is needed to polarize the population even more and gives
strength to nationalism. War makes nationalism stronger and completes its work. It’s a cyclic
move that makes the nationalistic movement even stronger and more stable in the society.
According to their article and based on different scholar opinions, nationalism can be divided
into two categories: the ethnic and civic one. The ethnic one is the most dangerous because
you don’t have access to it, unless you got born into it and usually it deals other nation with
hatred and keeps a negative attitude against them.19
L.Greenfeld and D.Chirot’s opinion on my topic is really interesting and their paper on
nationalism is more than convincing. Their research on different kind of nationalisms,
through the years, and especially their analysis on the individualistic (civic) and collectivistic
17 Denich, ‘Dismembering Yugoslavia’, 368-373.18 R.M. Kunovic and C. Deitelbaum, ‘Ethnic conflict: group polarization and gender attitudes in Croatia’ in Journal of marriage and family 66:5 (2004) 1089-1107, passim.19 Kunovic,‘Ethnic conflict’, 1092-1095.
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(ethnic) nationalisms brought some interesting results on the war (conflict) subject. Based on
their findings collectivistic and ethnic nationalism are more close to the aggression conflict
than the individualistic and civic one. The last ones are based on the individual right of every
human to be part of a nation and the line that separates them from other nationalities is not so
clear. Contrary to with these ones, the collectivistic and ethnic ones have a clear image of
what a nation should be and look like. Also the line that separates them from other nations is
perfectly clear. During war times, nations with ethnic nationalism are more aggressive
towards the enemy, in contrary with the civic ones that have a feeling of respect for all
nations and their citizens. 20 All of the arguments that I found and just presented lead to the
fact that nationalism is connected with war and aggression from its very first stages. From its
birth, nationalism has been associated with conflicts and violent actions. Nationalism was
needed to build the nation and to keep the huge amount of soldiers loyal to the nation and
involved in the security matters. Compulsory education and higher literacy levels made the
people realize what nation-state is and made them proud about it, spreading the militaristic
ideas for national security more easy. One of the most integrated and well structured
criticisms on nationalism can be found in the book of the T/C professor Niyazi Kizilyurek.21
Niyazi argues that nationalism creates the process which will legitimize its frictions. For each
nation there is always an enemy, which its existence is shown by nationalism. This enemy
though, plays a major role in the creation of our national identity; while building negative
features for “others” we leave the positive for us. Each nation during its establishment turns
down and gets turned down by other nations, because its very own creation procedure is
based on this separation. The romantic idea that every nation is unique and that they can all
exist together in peace22 is a fraud according to Niazi. This concept ignores nation’s
tendencies to build states. When a state is build by a nation, a fight has to be given for power;
and here is where language, religion and culture must prevail. All these features are
overstated to give a common feeling of safety and nationality to the people. Of course this
excludes other people from belonging to the nation, and an enemy is automatically created.
Nationalism has to give splendor to its nation and that’s why the intellectuals are needed.
They create a glorious past and by spreading it to the people, they “force” them to love their
national uniqueness.23
20 L. Greenfeld and D. Chirot, ‘Nationalism and aggression’ in Theory and society 23:1 (1994) 79-130, passim.21 Nιαζι Κιζιλγιουρεκ, Κυπρος: Το αδιεξοδο των εθνικισμων (Cyprus: A national dead end), (Athens 1999) passim.22 According to the romantic philosopher, Johann Gottfried Herder, a nation is a cultural entity that each person has the need to belong, so that he could be in harmony with himself. All the people who share the same history, language and traditions belong to the same nation (Volksgeist). All the people have the need to belong into a nation besides the ones with weak personality, (Kizilyurek, Cyprus: A national dead end, 103).23Kizilyurek, Cyprus: A national dead end, 103-107.
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Can these results, been taken as universal? Of course not, as we just examined the
arguments of main scholars that support the idea that nationalism promotes or is affiliated
with ear and conflicts. But they can be very useful to give us some first impressions on the
topic; and hopefully lead us to the truth.
2.Cyprus problem at a glanceTo get to know the Cyprus problem, is absolutely necessary to look back into the island’s past
and mention some of the most important things that marked the history of this “martyred”
island. We will get a short glance of the four periods that I find most interesting and relative
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to the topic. First the Ottoman era and the establishment of the Turkish rule on the island will
be examined briefly. Then the colonial period will give as important clues on how the British
ruled the island towards both communities (G/C-T/C24). Afterwards we will see the end of
this British period and the way that both communities were “forced” to accept the new
constitution and the independence that this brought. Last we will short mention the most
crucial events that led to the Turkish invasion and dismemberment of the island from 1960 to
1974. The aim of this chapter is to make more understandable the “character’’ of the island
and to see how both communities lived through time, until the events of 1974, and how their
differences were dealt in time by providing an essential background of the domestic settings
of the ethnic conflict.
Cyprus is a Mediterranean island, the third largest (after Sicily and Sardinia), with its
area reaching the 9,251 square kilometers. Its geographical position lies at the eastern part of
the Mediterranean Sea between Turkey and Syria. The Greek mainland can be found 600
miles away from Cyprus, while the Turkish coast lines are only 40 miles north of the island.
Located at a very important strategic position, between three continents, Cyprus has always
been a crossroad in the Mediterranean Sea. The fact that it has a rich soil (with copper), small
size and long coasts created a constant situation against the island putting it in the center of
each empires interest.25 The most important settlers of the island with by far the greatest
impact on the islands culture and identity were the Mycenaean around 1400 BC and the
Byzantines (AD 300-1192). The first ones brought the Greek language and culture on the
island and spread it in every corner of it. The Byzantines, as the followers of the Hellenistic
period, established the Greek identity on Cyprus and made it truly difficult for any later on
ruler to change it. A significant event that took place during the Byzantine era and played a
major role in Cyprus political life (up today), is the autonomy of the Cypriot Orthodox church
and its full independence with imperial rights for its leader (Archbishop).26 Cyprus population
is estimated to be 1,054,40027 with 79% being G/C, 18% T/C and 3% Armenians,Maronites
and Latins. The last three groups are based on religious and not ethnical criteria and therefore,
according to the 1960 constitution, they belong to the G/C community (by their choice). The
spoken languages of the island are three (Greek-Turkish-English) and due to the multi-
community status of the island, all official documents are based on them. Until the “black
summer” of 1974 (as it is used to be called) the Cyprus population was living together in an
24 See abbreviations.25 List of Cyprus successive rulers can be found on Joseph S. Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic conflict and international politics. From independence to the European Union (Great Britain 1997) 15-16.26 Kyriacos Markides, The rise and fall of the Cyprus republic (Yale University press 1977) 2-3.27 Sum of population in Government controlled area and Northern Cyprus, 2006-2007 data. http://www.pio.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/FC5F3AB325D6BEEAC22574D7002DB767?OpenDocument&sub=1&e= (17-06-2010)http://nufussayimi.devplan.org/population%20%20and%20housing%20%20census.pdf (17-06-2010).
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amount of more than 600 mixed villages and six cities while some purely Greek and Turkish
villages could be found in some parts of the island.28
2.1 Ottoman Era 1571-1878
The conquest and rule of Cyprus by the Ottoman Turks was the second most influential
period on the long history of the island. It lasted for over three centuries and from what has
been written, it was both harmful and beneficial for the island. The Ottoman aim for
conquering the island from the Venetians in 1571 was to stop the piracy in the Mediterranean
Sea and secure their position in the area. With their arrival, they terminated the Latin
persecution of the Orthodox dogma and church on the island.29 We can find three important
changes in the island’s social structure, made by the Ottomans that are still viewable in
Cyprus society: first of all, the destruction of the European feudalism and the redistribution of
the land; second and very important, the restoration of the Cyprus Orthodox church to its
former dominant position and third, the settlement on the island of a significant amount of
Turkish population (forming the 18% of the total Cyprus population). Under the Ottomans,
the Orthodox Church became the most influential and powerful institution on the island, with
its leader (Archbishop) as a national leader (ethnarch) for the Greek majority.30 The Ottoman
administrative system was based on religious differences and separate communities (millets).
Cyprus society was split into two main communities, one for each religion. The Greek one
was ruled by the Orthodox Church and the Turkish one by their Muslim leaders. This system
helped both communities to preserve their ethnical identities and close societies, since all
community issues were taken by their own people. Most notable examples are the area of
education and justice, with priests from both communities serving the law and the educational
rights.31
It is not to be confused though with a “democratic’’ and free administrative system of
the island. The Ottomans ruled with an oppressive militaristic oligarchy and often with
cruelty towards the Greek population. The only thing that kept the unity of this population
together through those hard years; was the Orthodox Church and due to that, its prestige grew
even bigger in the eyes of the G/C society. Church was their link with their motherland and a
counterweight to the local Ottoman power. While the Central Ottoman palace gave power to
the Orthodox Church (to control the Greek community easier), the local government disliked
that and in any given chance for revenge, they were cruel against it.32 Off course this brought
28 Eugene T. Rossides, A handbook on United States relation with Greece and Cyprus (Washington 2000) Cyprus Background 1.Markides, The rise and fall of the Cyprus republic, 2.29 Rauf R. Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle (London 1982) 18.30 Markides, The rise and fall of the Cyprus republic, 3-5.31 Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic conflict and international politics, 16-17.32 During the Greek revolution for independence of 1821, the local Cyprus government (Ottomans) massacred the Cyprus’s Church top hierarchy, accusing them for involvement.
16
the opposite results, with the G/C getting more attached to the church and its Hellenic
ideology. That’s why when the island passed into British hands (1878) the G/C were more
enthusiastic and had their hopes on for their right for self-determination and enosis (union
with Greece).33
2.2 Cyprus as British colony
Based on a top secret document of 1950, which is mentioned in O’ Malley’s and Craig’s
book34, Cyprus was more than necessary to the British. Military officers warned their
government that the only way for the empire to stay powerful in the region was the
continuation of Cyprus’s control. This sub-chapter will make clear that the above statement is
understood.
During 1878, Cyprus became a British protectorate with the Ottoman agreement, in
exchange for the British help against any threat by the Russians. When World War I started
(1914), Turkey supported the Germans, and the island was annexed by the British. Later on,
and based on the Lausanne treaty, Turkey gave up every claim on the island; recognizing the
British annexation. Kemal Ataturk even asked from the T/C to leave the island and settle in
Turkey, an idea that was rejected by the majority of their community. 35 On the 10th of March
1925, Cyprus became an official crown colony.36 From the beginning of the British rule, the
Cyprus Church was making demands for enosis (union with Greece) while the Greek state
was helping the nationalistic feeling on the island to stay active. The demand for self-
determination and enosis had a very small respond from the British rulers. During World War
II, Britain used the demand for enosis to recruit hundreds of Cypriots against the Axis forces,
promising them what they long now wanted and then denied to fulfill it.37 This was an often
trick played by all colonial powers to achieve their goals. Up to the British annexation of the
island (1914), any demand for union with Greece was turned down with the argument that the
island was still an Ottoman property. The freedom that was promised by the crown’s
servicemen was just another form of despotism. The British High Commissioner was the only
authority on the legislative part of the administration of the island, while Britain was gaining
the 17, 5% of all Cyprus income.38 Studying the book-autobiography of Dr. Ishan Ali39, you
can easily understand that the British were following a policy of economical and political
oppression, creating the island’s stagnation. This policy made the schism between G/C and
33 Michael Attalides, Cyprus: Nationalism and international politics (Edinburgh 1979) 25.34 Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig, The Cyprus conspiracy: America, espionage and the Turkish invasion (London-New York 2007).35 James Ker-Lindsay, Britain and the Cyprus crisis 1963-1964 (Mannheim and Mohnesee 2004) 15.36 Ανδρέας Στεργίου and Heinz Richter, Το Κυπριακό με το βλέμμα των ξένων (The Cyprus issue with the eye of a foreigner) (Athens 2006) 38.37 O’Malley, The Cyprus conspiracy, 8-9.38 Ε. Τζελεπη, Το Κυπριακό και οι συνωμοτες του (Cyprus problem and its conspirators) (Athens 1975) 12-16.39 Δρος Ισχάν Αλί, Τα απομνημονέυματα μου (my memoirs) (Nicosia 1980), passim.
17
T/C even bigger. They kept the general idea of the Ottoman millet system alive as an
administrative form and care less for creating a stable environment. Their way of ruling the
island (divide and conquer) brought antagonism between the communities, while their
educational policy made it clear that the aim was against the unity of a Cypriot identity.40 The
British present on the island should remain solid, no matter the cost, for three reasons: first
the island was in a very important position for the oil industries and interests; secondly it was
a natural army base against the threat of Soviet expansion and in favor of N.A.T.O and third,
after the Suez crisis, Cyprus became Britain’s last place for regional and economical
dominance.41 The Americans, which after W.W.II became powerful ad active players in the
region, were in favor of a Cyprus self-determination solution due to their economic interests.
They were not acting towards this solution though, besides some talks with the British,
because the Cypriot demand had as active supporters the east bloc countries. The Cyprus
Communist Party (A.K.E.L) had already a high resonance and Washington saw that as an
open communist threat, blaming partly the British for it.42
During the year 1931, the Cyprus Church self-declared the union with Greece and
called for disobedience on the British authorities. After the denial of their demand by the
British governor, the protesters burned down his house in an enormous event of riot in the
capital of the island, Nicosia. Thousands were arrested and all damages were paid by the
Cypriots.43 After that event, the British had suspended all national activities on the island,
with the T/C community arguing that this was catastrophic for them. In 1948, the colonial
power offered to the island the chance for self-government. While the T/C considered is as a
great chance to live more free, the Orthodox Church rejected it as a plan to “burry” the
demand for enosis.44 Year 1950 could be marked as the year with the most important
developments for the political life of Cyprus. The church organized a plebiscite for enosis
which came up to 95% (suspicions reduce the credit of the plebiscite procedure); while a new
Archbishop was enthroned, Makarios III45, declaring loyalty towards the enosis movement.
Makarios as the leader of the G/C community and the frond man of the Cyprus struggle, tried
to convince Greece to enlist the Cyprus question in the UN agenda. Despite the fact that at the
beginning, the Greek prime ministers did not agree on that (due to good relations with
Britain); Makarios kept asking it and even had some visits to east European and Arab
countries to gain their support (strong anti-colonial and anti-imperialistic movement at that
40 Στεργιου, The Cyprus issue with the eye of a foreigner, 39.41 O’Malley, The Cyprus conspiracy, 2-3.42 Ioannis D. Stefanidis, Isle of discord:nationalism, imperialism and the making of the Cyprus problem (London 1999) 177-178.43 Τζελεπη, Cyprus problem and its conspirators, 19.44 Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle, 19.45 See appendix 1.
18
period). This had worried the Americans and their NATO allies (Greece-Turkey). After
Makarios intense trying, prime minister Papagos set the question at the U.N meeting.46
After the 1950 plebiscite for enosis the T/C reacted with an enormous national
demonstration in Nicosia, showing their opposition to the idea of union with Greece, a point
that was not taken under serious concern at that time. Each community now had its own view
for the island’s future. G/C wanted union with Greece (enosis) and it can be seen as a part of
the wider Pan-Hellenic movement of Great Idea47 for regaining the Byzantine territories,
while T/C were asking now the partition of the island into Greek and Turkish parts (taksim) as
a counter force to enosis. Both movements had the support of nationalistic elements from
their motherland.48 Besides the political struggle for enosis in the U.N, an armed struggle
began to make things more complicated. With the agreement of Greece and the blessings of
Makarios, a terrorist (called by the British) organization was formed by the leadership of
General Georgios Grivas “Digenis”49. E.O.K.A (national organization of Cypriot fighters) had
as an aim the use of terror against the British to turn worlds “eyes” on the Cyprus problem
and achieve freedom and enosis. Their targets were police stations and British military units.
The organization excluded from its side all communists and T/C as national and religious
enemies. They were treated as traitors with their elimination as an extra aim. Lots of G/C and
T/C communists were killed by E.O.K.A fighters and terror was imposed against the Greek-
Turkish friendship.50 According to Mr. Denktash51 believes, the E.O.K.A struggle had nothing
to do with the independence of the island and it was used only as an excuse for the enosis
movement and the termination of the T/C community, leaving them with no option but to
fight back against enosis.52 April 1st 1955, the armed struggle had begun with bombs
exploding in governmental buildings all over the island. The fight kept going for four years
(until 1959) and had as a total result six hundred deaths and more than one thousand
wounded. The “crown” lost 156 servicemen while the majority of civilian casualties were
G/C.53 It is doubtful if the E.O.K.A struggle was effective against the British presence. For
sure it made them furious and much more oppressive towards the island and its population.
The beginning of the E.O.K.A fight rose up the Turkish nationalism in Cyprus and forced the
T/C community to create its own underground terrorist group (T.M.T); with the confrontation
between those two groups as an often event. Britain found the reason she was looking for, to
turn the problem from a colonial to an ethnical. During the E.O.K.A years, the British were 46 O’Malley, The Cyprus conspiracy, 12.47 See appendix 7. 48 Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic conflict and international politics, 18-19.49 See appendix 2.50 Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History. Cyprus: from the Ottomans to Kissinger (New York 1989) 52-53.51 See appendix 3.52 Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle, 22-24.53 O’Malley, The Cyprus conspiracy, 14-16.
19
recruiting T/C to the police force so that they will confront the G/C and change the island’s
status.54 This gave space to both nationalisms to grow in Cyprus society and bring back again
all the mistrust of Greek-Turkish relations from the past. After British exhortation, the
Turkish nationalism was high again and even reached the limits of chauvinism by changing
the Greek names of their villages into Turkish ones.55 That was the British policy, of divide
and conquers and now they had one more reason not to leave it free.
2.3 The road to independence
As we saw in the previous sub-chapter, the Cyprus issue started to push things at the edge,
putting at risk the British sovereignty of the island. The E.O.K.A struggle created important
difficulties for the normal life operation on the island, the T.M.T answer was at the same level
catastrophic, Greece was pushing things in U.N, G/C with Makarios were reaching their
hands towards the east and bloc; while the Americans kept asking for a solution. All the
evidences were against British occupation. Then the colonial power played its last “card”,
which was very successful for them but also the beginning of the Cyprus drama. This “card”
was the official involvement of Turkey in the Cyprus problem and it was pulled by Britain as
an obstacle against the G/C demands. We will see now the involvement of Turkey as well as
the procedures that led to the Cyprus constitution of 1960.
As it’s been already mentioned, Turkey gave up every rightful claim on the island
after the treaties that ended W.W.II. The only concerning parts were Greece and Britain and
this balance had to change if Britain wanted to keep its colony. After the British denial for
official talks with Greece, London involved Turkey in this game to turn the world’s view
away from the demand of enosis. Now Ankara’s opinion had to be taken in concern while any
given solution to the problem would ensure the British interests (both countries were allies
and members of the Bagdad pact). The element of the T/C minority and its security, gave to
Turkey the excuse for having a word in Cyprus future. A new tactic was born with this
development and the British tried to take it in advantage by encouraging the rise of Turkish
nationalism on the island. The fact that both Turkey and Greece were N.A.T.O allies made the
whole conflict more complicated and both sides were using the allegation of a communist
threat as an excuse for their acts. So while the G/C with Greece and T/C with Turkey were
fighting over Cyprus, Britain could excuse her present on the island as a peacekeeping force.
Now the Cyprus problem could be seen as an ethnical one and not as a colonial, which it
really was.56 During the summer of 1955, the British government invited both Greece and
Turkey for talks in London over the Cyprus issue, with the Turkish side ready to take any
54 Markides, The rise and fall of the Cyprus republic, 24-25.55 Extensive list with the names of all changed villages can be found at the book of Dr. Ishan Ali, Τα απομνημονέυματα μου (my memoirs), (Nicosia 1980).56 Τζελεπη, Cyprus problem and its conspirators, 34-39.
20
chance to claim what up to now had no saying.57 According to Dr. Ali, the Greek government
also accepted the invitation, due to the repeated U.N failures and the constant involvement of
non-N.A.T.O countries to the matter.58 From that meeting, the British had realized that the
only clever move from their side was to give to the island its independence and keep some
areas under their control. This forced the British to call for a tripartite talk in 1959 in the city
of Zurich between Greece, Turkey and Britain and the results were the agreement for the
creation of an independent republic on February 11.59After the agreement of both sides, the
proposals were given in London to each Cypriot community as the best finding solution (a
solution of double enosis was turned down by the Greek side). Both community leaders
(Makarios-Koutsiouk60) agreed and signed the Zurich-London agreements which established
the new Republic of Cyprus. The problem was solved based on the Greek-Turkish talks and
without the participation of any Cypriot community.61 It was a take it or leave it situation that
make Makarios really skeptical about the nature of the new constitution, seeing it as unfair
towards the G/C community and as an end to the dream of enosis.62
The new constitution was based on three signed agreements.63 These treaties were:
the Establishment one which gave to Britain what always wanted, a permanent control of 256
square kilometers of Cyprus land as military bases (Akrotiri-Dekelia), the Guarantee one
which declared Greece-Turkey-Britain as the ensuring powers of the island’s independence
and its normal constitutional balance; and the Alliance one between Greece-Turkey-Cyprus
that allowed them to secure the island from any threat, giving to both motherlands the chance
to keep military units on the island. The second agreement (Guarantee one) made the political
union of this new republic with any other state impossible and so both dreams for enosis and
taksim were shut down (at least constitutionally). The flag of this newly formed state would
be neutral and its official languages both Greek and Turkish.
This was the end (?) of the British rule on the island and the beginning of a new era
for Cyprus. While on the surface, things were considered as positive, the British policy had
created a situation of mistrust between both communities, and it was soon going to explode.64
2.4 The seed that never flourished
57 Στεργιου, The Cyprus issue with the eye of a foreigner, 40.58 Αλη, My memoirs, 9.59 Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic conflict and international politics, 20.60 See appendix 4.61 Ker-Lindsay, Britain and the Cyprus crisis, 19.62 See Glafkos Clerides, My deposition (Nicosia 1989) 83-87 and Κωνσταντινος Σβολοπουλος, Η Ελληνικη εξωτερικη πολιτικη 1945-1981 (Greek foreign policy 1945-1981) (Athens 2005) 133-151 for better research on the agreement sign procedure.63 See appendix 5.64 Ευάγγελος Α. Τοσίτσας, Ιστορια χαμενων ευκαιριων, Κυπριακο 1950-1963 τομος B (the history of lost chances, Cyprus problem 1950-1963 part B) (Athens 1982) 183-190.
21
Cyprus, as a new republic had to build up the trust between both communities and try to get
the best out of the new constitution. In this final part of the chapter we will examine the way
that this constitution was accepted by all interesting parts and see the events that lead us to the
tragic July of 1974.
The reactions for the new constitution were not equal at all sides. Greece officially
saw it as a positive result and a first step towards the solution of the problem. Turkey was also
pleased and saw the agreements as an ethnical achievement. It was the first time that they
gained any official right on an ex-Ottoman territory. The T/C community was mainly
gratified, because the new constitution was providing them with more rights that they ever
hoped, but also had some concerns about the G/C demand of enosis and how this would be
dealt by the new state. On the other hand, the G/C community was mostly disappointment by
the new constitution (although some political parts-left-of Cyprus society saw it as a good
first step) for two reasons. The first one was that the new constitution was unfair towards the
majority of the island and it was equalizing it with the T/C minority, by giving to the second
more rights that it should; and the second reason was that the new state could be seen as the
“tombstone” of all political and armed struggle for enosis. This disappointment was expressed
from the very first days of this new state by its official first president, Makarios III, which
despite his unifying role his only concern was the feelings and worries of the G/C side.65
This new constitution was not easy to be put in action without any frictions; due to
the fact that both sides had the veto right and most of the procedures were left unfinished as a
result of their differences. Based on these difficulties, president Makarios was thinking to
alter some parts of the constitution by abolishing few rights from the T/C community and in a
final stage to declare the Zurich-London agreements as non-valid.66 This brought fear in the
eyes of the T/C because it was seen as a way to eliminate them politically and achieve union
with Greece. Bio-communal fights broke out all over the island and for two years nationalism
was controlling the island, leading it into disastrous results, with the chance of the Turkish
invasion being cancelled twice in the last minute by foreign intervention (extensive report on
these events in the next chapter).67
Meanwhile the political life in Greece had changed totally with the enforcement of a
military dictatorship and the new junta was pushing things for achievement of enosis,
undermining the Cypriot president.68 The Greek regime put its plans in action together with
65 Markides, The rise and fall of the Cyprus republic, 25-27.Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic conflict and international politics, 21-25.O’Malley, The Cyprus conspiracy, 88-89.66 Στεργιου, The Cyprus issue with the eye of a foreigner, 44-47.67 O’Malley, The Cyprus conspiracy, 88-93.68The concerns about the conspiracy against Cyprus government by the Greek junta could be found into different letters of the time. Dr Ishan Ali, Τα απομνημονευματα μου (my memoirs), (Nicosia 1980) 31-41.
22
the G/C ultranationalists and they overthrew the Cyprus government with a coup d’ etat in an
attempt to assassinate president Makarios and impose union with Greece; in 15 of July,1974.69
The Greek intervention in the political life of Cyprus was taken by Turkey as an act against
the unity of the island and its Turkish minority. With this excuse, on July 20 (1974) Turkish
forces invaded Cyprus (with US support on supplies and equipment), violating important
treaties and taking under their command the 3-4% of whole island’s territory.70 Almost a
month later (14-16/8/1974), a second invasion took place by the Turkish forces with the tragic
results of 37, 3% of all Cyprus land under Turkish occupation and a 35% of all G/C
population been forced to become refugee in his own country.71 The act of invasion and
illegal occupation of 1/3 of the island was excused by Turkey as a constitutional right, as one
of the three Guarantee powers, that was took to prevent the killings and secure the order and
safety of the island. The Turkish side still supports this argument, despite the fact that they
declared the autonomy of north Cyprus as an independent state (recognized only by Turkey).72
This chapter dealt with the main events that marked the history of Cyprus, from the
Ottoman era up to the Turkish invasion of 1974. Some events were analyzed more than others
and some were just mentioned, but if we have to summarize it in a few significant facts then
we have to take under consideration the importance of the Ottoman ruling system and the
power that the Cyprus Church was holding since then (as the main spokesman of the G/C
community), the way that the British dealt with both communities and the spreading of
nationalism that they use to control the anti-colonial movement. Also the fact that
communism was seen as an active threat against the U.S-U.K and N.A.T.O interests on the
island, made Cyprus question an international issue with both poles (West-East) interfering
in. All these problems could be overcome with the arrival of independence. Why and how this
never happened, will be examined in the following chapter; as well as why the new beginning
was replaced by the bi-communal killings. My predictions are that the years 1962-64 with all
the heightened nationalism on both communities and the foreign involvement, set the
foundations for the inevitable results of 1974.
69 Hitchens, Hostage to History, 61-62+82-83.70 Further research for the involvement of U.S.A in the Cyprus tragedy can be found on, The Cyprus conspiracy, passim.71 Στεργιου, The Cyprus issue with the eye of a foreigner, 48-52. The numbers were taken by Eugene T. Rosside’s , A handbook on United States relation with Greece and Cyprus, Cyprus background: 2-2.72 Hitchens, Hostage to History, 111-112.
23
3.Bi-communal fights 63’-64As we well examined at the previous chapter, the new constitution did not leave much space
for mutual respect and cooperation between both communities. The trust was gone for each
other and this constitution was tearing them apart, making their schism bigger. President
Makarios had in mind to revise all agreements, even if he had to create this situation. His idea
was really difficult to be achieved, because this constitution was serving the interests of
America on the island, which after W.W.II became the dominant player in the region. Both
countries (Greece-Turkey) were N.A.T.O allies and their rights on the island were securing
24
the U.S ones. Along with the Truman dogma, America installed in both Greece and Turkey,
secret services to prevent any communist threat. This network (called Stay Behind) was
brought in Cyprus by both motherlands in an attempt to reduce the communist influence
among the island’s population; and was ruled by extreme nationalistic paramilitary
organizations in both sides.73 As a first impression this sounds weird; the fact that two rival
nationalistic groups who fought each other, and caused the death of so many people during
the bi-communal killings, had the same superiors. In this chapter we will follow the events
that led to these killings and try to analyze them to see on which level nationalism had an
impact on. Our attempt is not to find out whose fault was it, because the truth has many
aspects, but to see in what point nationalism contributed towards this conflict.
3.1 Constitutional Crisis and Makarios’s proposals
The lack of good will from the two leaders, the suspicion that whole society was under; and
the interference of both motherlands did not leave much space for peaceful coexistence. Most
serious problem was the unwillingness of both sides to work according to the constitution.
Makarios saw it as an unfair system that he was forced to accept and sign and wanted to
revise it for better administrative function. The T/C on the other hand, could not accept any
deviation of the current constitution, seeing all their benefits as rightful ones. Indeed this
constitution was pushing each community away from each other, risking the security of the
state. The most important constitutional problem was about the establishment of separate
municipalities in all five major cities of the island. The separate municipalities were
established with a colonial law that had to be dealt now in an internal conversation in the
parliament. No agreement could be found though, because the G/C wanted to have united
municipalities and the T/C separate ones, and so the British colonial law was still active until
a solution is found. Makarios saw this dysfunction as a result of the Guarantee and Alliance
treaties and accused Turkey for the encouraging the T/C not to cooperate with the G/C so that
she could use the right that the treaties gave her to interfere with Cyprus internal affairs.
Based on this, he expressed his will to revise the constitution. Makarios’s first public speech
about the treaties was at the 4th of Jan. 1962, in a meeting with the Christian Youth (OXEN).
In his speech he said that “even though the treaties can be seen as an important achievement
of the Cyprus struggle, it’s not the end of it and they can also be seen as a way to come closer
to the official goals.” He also accused the treaties for giving more rights that it should to the
T/C community.74 His speech caused the direct reaction of the T/C community, through its
press, which accused him for using the notion minority for the T/C and that this was
unconstitutional, warning him that any change of the existing constitution will mean the end
73 Μακαριος Δρουσιωτης, ΕΟΚΑ Β΄ και CIA:το Ελληνοτουρκικο παρακρατος στην Κυπρο (EOKA B and CIA: the Greek-Turkish Para-state) (Nicosia 2002) 22. 74 Απαντα Αρχιεπισκοπου Μακαριου Γ΄ Τομος Ε΄ Ιαν.1961-Δεκ.1962 (Archbishop Makarios III Collected Works, Vol.E Jan.1961-Dec.1962) (Nicosia 1995) 200.
25
of Cyprus Republic.75 Speeches from both sides, and press articles of that time, clearly show
the nationalistic elation that the communities were “sinking” in. The interior minister,
Polycarpos Georgadjis76, started to reorganize the E.O.K.A members again by creating in each
city an E.O.K.A club. He even spoke open to the people, calling the E.O.K.A spirit for
achievement of the G/C goals, saying that the revision of the constitution is absolutely
necessary and that it will take place, to secure the island’s Hellenism.77 Again the T/C
reaction was intense, calling the minister to apologize for his unconstitutional demands.78
For the next few months the situation was under recession due to the aim of both
leaders to achieve an agreement on the matter. This can be seen in their common press
release.79 While the T/C leader was ready to accept Makario’s proposals for unified
municipalities, the ultra-nationalist politician R. Denktash refused any deviation. Now things
were reaching a dead end with both communities getting ready for a conflict.80 During the
morning hours of 25th of March 1962, two bombs exploded damaging two sacred Muslim
mosques, with the T/C leaders accusing the G/C extreme leadership for purring oil in the fire
with their press announcements.81 The government was shocked and the interior minister
stated that all evidences lead to the conclusion that this was an act by the Turkish
propaganda.82 The ultra-nationalistic elements of both sides were out of control and if anyone
was trying to stop them, he was facing their terror. The best example is the assassination of
two T/C press reporters (23/4/1962) with left ideas by unknown men. All clues lead to the
paramilitary nationalistic organization T.M.T, which had relations with Mr. Denktash. The
last one was bothered by the reporter’s articles which implied that indeed the explosions were
a Turkish propaganda act. During the police investigation for both murders, Georgadjis
(interior minister) gave a tape to the authorities with the recorded voice of one of the reporters
naming his informant, supporting his accusations against Turkey. Both departed reporters
were accused as Greek spies and Georgadji’s associates by the T/C press and politicians.83
Due to lack of evidence both main suspects were not legally prosecuted and the whole event 75 Republication from T/C newspaper in the newspaper Ο Φιλελευθερος (The Liberal), “Αι δηλωσεις του Μακαρίου εματαιωσαν το ταξιδιον του Σαντυς εις Κυπρον» (Makarios’s speech cancelled the business trip of Santi in Cyprus), 6/1/1962.76 See appendix 6.77 Newspaper Η ΜΑΧΗ (The battle), «Οι 4 υπουργοι προσφωνουν» (The four ministers declare), 11/2/1962.78 Newspaper Η ΜΑΧΗ (The battle), «Βιαιη Τουρκικη επιθεσης κατα του υπουργου εσωτερικου» (Turkish attack against the Interior minister), 14/2/1962.79 Newspaper Ο Φιλελευθερος (The Liberal), « Ο Κουτσιουκ εδηλωσεν: ειμαι πολυ ικανοποιημενος απο την συσκεψη ταυτην και την καλην κατανοησιν ητις απεδειχθη οτι υφισταται μεταξυ προεδρου και εμου» (Vice president is pleased with his meeting with the president), 7/3/1962.80 Archbishop Makarios III Collected Works, Vol. E, 610.81 Archbishop Makarios III Collected Works, Vol. E, 613.82 Newspaper Ο Φιλελευθερος (The Liberal), «Η απηχησις εξ εκρηξεως βομβων εις την Λευκωσια» (The echo of the bombs explosion) 27/3/1962.83 Newspaper Η ΜΑΧΗ (The battle), «Ο Ντεκτας ηρνηθη να προσελθη εις την αστυνομια» (Denktash refused to be examined by the police), 28/4/1962.
26
is inexplicable until today. The thing that is worth mentioning here is that both suspects for
this assassination were national rivals and both were associating with underground groups of
their community. Is like both sides had the need to close the mouths that were spreading
reconciliation ideas; and this can be seen in an old document of the T/C elite that was
explaining the ultimate goal for them (partition of the island) and the need to shut any
opposite voice.84 One of these opposite voices was the newspaper of the above mentioned
assassinated reporters. Also information about the G/C involvement in this case can be found
in the book of Dr. Ali (owner of the newspaper) who implies association of both ultra-
nationalist groups to achieve the bi-communal hatred.85 After this incident, no agreement
could be found on the municipal problem, with the G/C parliament members refusing to
renew the colonial law. T/C leadership reacted giving to their local assembly a legislative
right and acting as a parliament passing the law for separate municipalities. In other words,
the G/C move for revising the Zurich-London agreements had as an answer the T/C move for
autonomy of their community.86 Turkey had already expressed her opposition against
Makario’s acts and asked from the Cyprus government to cancel its decision. Makario’s
answer was short and sharp. He warned Turkey to look at her own business.87 As we see both
communities were acting without any sense of reality and were captured by extreme
nationalism: the G/C community was celebrating the memory of the E.O.K.A struggle with
parades in an attempt to demonstrate their power and to show that the struggle is not over yet.
Makario’s speeches were not at all reassuring and he was constantly extolling the E.O.K.A
fight, knowing that this action would cause the T/C reaction.88 Mr Debktash was furious about
these statements and warned the G/C president that this kind of ideas was the reason for so
many G/C deaths in the past and he should remember it.89
Newspaper Ο Φιλελευθερος (The Liberal), «Εις νεας συνταρακτικας αποκαλυψεις προεβη ο υπουργος κ. Πολ. Γεωρκατζης (New shocking revelations were made by the minister Pol. Georgadjis) 22/5/1962.84 Γλαυκος Κληριδης, Κυπρος: Η καταθεση μου Τομος Α΄(Cyprus: My deposition Vol. A), (Nicosia 1988) 215.85 Αλη, My memoirs, 34.86 Newspaper Ο Φιλελευθερος (The Liberal), «Καταψηφισθη το νομοσχεδιο περι των δημων» (Negative vote against separate municipals) , 1/1/1963.Newspaper Ο Φιλελευθερος (The Liberal), «Το υπουργικον συμβουλιον ενεκρινε χθες διαταγμα δια εγκαθιδρθσιν Περιοχςων Διοικησεως και Βελτιωσεως» (The minister council approved yesterday by degree the establishment of united municipals), 3/1/1963.87 Newspaper Ο Φιλελευθερος (The Liberal), «Η Τουρκια χαρακτηριζει αντισυνταγματικη την αποφαση επι του ζητηματος των δημαρχειων» (Turkey calls the municipal law as unconstitutional), 4/1/1963. Newspaper Ο Φιλελευθερος (The Liberal), «Εις ουδενα αναγνωριζουμεν το δικαιωμα επεμβασεως εις την Κυπρον, ετονισεν ο Μακαριος» (We don’t recognize any attempt to interfere into Cyprus issues by no one), 11/1.1963.88 Απαντα Αρχιεπισκοπου Μακαριου Γ΄ Τομος ΣΤ΄ Ιανου. 1963- Μαρτιου 1964 (Archbishop Makarios III Collected Works, Vol. ΣΤ’ Jan.1963- March 1964), (Nicosia 1996) 56.89 Newspaper Χαραυγη (The dawn), «Ο Μακαριος θα αντικρισει κι’ αλλες χιλιαδες ταφους αν προχωρησει στα σχεδια του, απειλει ωμα ο Ντεκτας» (Makarios will face many more graves if he continues with his plans, Denktash threats), 3/4/1963.
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Any attempt for solution was either blocked by local nationalist politicians or by the
interference of Turkey. The Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Erkin, declared that an
agreement is impossible to be reached due to the G/C need for changing the constitution. This
could never be accepted by the Turkish parliament.90 The Greek government had also similar
ideas and criticized the Cypriot president for acting without taking under consideration the
Turkish factor. Greek minister of foreign affairs showed his dissatisfaction on Makario’s
policy, warning him that if he continues he will lose the Greek support.91 But few days later
the Greek government was under a crisis and they changed their Prime minister. Makarios
found the chance he was looking to start the procedure for the revision of the constitution.
The Cypriot president knew that he couldn’t expect support from the West and he needed
some strong allies to support his actions. He reached for help from the Soviet bloc and
managed to put Cyprus into the Non-Aligned movement in an attempt to gain more support.
He even got the support of the Cyprus Communist party to continue his constitutional
changes.92 But along with this help, he earned some enemies that saw his actions as an attempt
to reinforce the independence and skip the enosis dream. Besides the T/C, general Grivas was
now against him with his ultra-right supporters. Parts of the clergy too, declared their
agreement on Makario’s policy and called him to align with the E.O.K.A goals.93
Makarios now had to find a way to gain at least some British support for his changes
and gave order to his minister of foreign affairs, Spyros Kyprianou, to approach the leader of
the British House of Lords, Edward Heath, and discuss with him the opportunity of cancelling
the Guarantee treaty; and Cyprus as fully independent to be just member of the
Commonwealth and stay attached only with U.K. Mr. Kyprianou explained the need for
constitutional revision, for Cyprus to stay away from the Greek and Turkish interference,
describing the island’s situation and warning about the visible chance for armed conflict; due
to the fact that Turkey was secretly organizing the T/C in paramilitary groups on Cyprus
ground. The British were not in favor of these changes but asked the G/C side to inform them
in detail. This fact pleased the Cypriot government and it was seen as a positive answer
against their demands. The procedure for revision had to pass from a first stage of informing
Britain with three documents about the problem and its suggested solutions. If the British
answer was positive then the same documents would be sent to the Greek and Turkish
90 Newspaper Χαραυγη (The dawn), «Δεν θα παρεκκλινουμε ουτε κατα κεραια απο τις αποψεις μας» (We will not accept any change), 10/5/1963.91 Σπυρος Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Α΄ (The crucial documents of the Cyprus problem Vol. A) (Athens 1983), YOI-29, Top secret letter to the Cypriot president by the Greek foreign minister (in page 229).92 Newspaper Χαραυγη (The dawn), «Το Α.Κ.Ε.Λ δινει την αμεριστη συμπαρασταση στο προεδρο της δημοκρατιας» (A.K.E.L gives its full support to the President of the government), 16/5/63.93 Newspaper ΕΘΝΙΚΗ (National), «Ο Διγενης διαψευδει εντονωτατα οτι παρεσχε την συνγκαταθεσιν του δια την αναθεωριση της Ζυριχης» (Grivas “Digenis” denies any support towards the revision of Zurich constitution), 18/8/1963.
28
government, informing them also. Britain’s main concern was the Turkish refusals and
worries about the fact that a totally independent Cyprus would be vulnerable and exposed to
the communist ideas and it might fall under the Soviet influence but again she didn’t express
her total disagreement on the subject, fearing a U.N involvement. The “crown” just asked that
any constitutional change should be done under the T/C agreement. Turkey would never
accept this, as an N.A.T.O ally, unless some important moves were made to block these
communist ideas on the island.94 The Cypriot president ordered immediately the president of
the Cyprus Parliament, lawyer Gkafkos Clerides, to start the procedure for the constitutional
arrangements. In his autobiography, Clerides states that these changes were seen as a first step
for the political elimination of the T/C community and its downgrading as a minority.95
Makarios kept declaring the need to change the treaties for better administration of the island,
with Turkey now warning directly the Cyprus government for reverberations in case they
continue their plans. This gave hope and brought enthusiasm among the T/C community,
which now was openly accusing the Cyprus government and dreamed scenarios about
partition.96
What Makarios did not understand is that he was acting on his own, without any real
support by any participant state. Greece was supporting the need for constitutional changes,
but only if the T/C agree on it. Britain had also similar ideas but now she was not the super
power of the past, with America taking that place and giving all her support to the Turkish
demands. Last the only support that Makarios had was from the Soviets, but only in the
diplomatic field, and this was not enough.97 Important secret documents that are discussed in
M. Droushiotis book show that Turkey was really positive on Makario’s acts, because these
acts were giving her the right to claim the partition of the island.98 The Turkish plan was
hoping that after the parliament’s abolishment by the Cypriot president, the T/C community
will form their own state with Turkey’s help. Until then Turkey would secretly arm the T/C
and organize them to deal any threat. Based on these Turkish documents, conflict was
inevitable but they would not be charged with this responsibility. They would wait first at
Makario’s acts, which was their opportunity to interfere in the island. All the British attempts
for a solution were reaching a “dead end”, finding the negative Turkish-T/C answer and the
relentless efforts of the G/C leader to revise the treaties. The official British decision was to
encourage Makarios for his changes only if the T/C were satisfied by them. Despite this
decision, Britain gave the “OK” to her Higher Commissioner, Arthur Clark, to be involved in
94 Μακαριος Δρουσιωτης, Η πρωτη διχοτομηση: Κυπρος 1963-1964 (The first partition: Cyprus 1963-1964) (Nicosia 2005) 67-71.95 Κληριδης, Cyprus Vol. A, 167.96 Republication from T/C newspaper in the newspaper Ελευθερια (Freedom), «Η διχοτομησις, η μονη λυσις οπτασιαζεται η ‘’Χαλκιν Σεσι’’» (Partition, the dream of “Halkin Sesi”), 10/8/1963.97 Κληριδης, Cyprus Vol. A, 168.98 Δρουσιωτης, The first partition, 89-92.
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the preparation process for Makario’s proposals.99 Giving to both communities the same
hopes and support, Britain had to know that this was leading towards a conflict, and so we can
assume that this was its plan or that the whole government was ignorant against the
consequences of its acts.
Makario’s list with the 13 points of modification was now ready and was given to
both Britain and the T/C leaders. These proposals were:
1. Abandonment of the Veto right both president and vice-president of Cyprus
Republic.
2. Vice president could replace the president in case of temporal absence or
weakness of the second.
3. G/C president and T/C vice-president of the parliament should be elected
by the whole parliament body and not from the separate community bodies.
4. Vice president of the parliament could replace the president in case of
temporal absence or weakness of the second.
5. The constitutional provisions, that secured the separate majority votes for
the establishment of specific laws in the House of the Parliament, should be
abolished.
6. United municipalities should be established.
7. Consolidation of the administration of Justice.
8. Abolishment of the discrimination of the security forces into police and
gendarmerie.
9. The number of units in the security and defense forces should be determined
by new law.
10. Amendments should be taken, according the percentage of G/C and T/C
population and the proportion of their participation in the public service and
defense forces of the government.
11. Reduction of the members of the Public Service Commission from ten to
five.
12. All the decisions the Public Service Commission makes should be taken by
simple majority.
13. The Greek Community Assembly should be abolished and the Turkish one
should be modify to a minority assembly for the T/C.100
Each one of Makario’s suggestions was attached with an explanation note about the reasons
he chose to change it. Only two out of the total thirteen proposals were improving the T/C
99 Δρουσιωτης, The first partition, 108-109.100 Νικος Κρανιδιωτης, Ανοχυρωτη Πολιτεια: Κυπρος 1960-1974 Τομος A (Defenseless State: Cyprus 1960-1974 Vol.A)(Athens 1985) 83-85.
30
relations towards the constitution (second and third). Surprisingly Makarios did not abolished
the Guarantee or Alliance treaties but this was part of his next plan, in a try to achieve
unfettered independence and later on the most wanted union with Greece. Nevertheless these
changes were constitutional ones and therefore Turkey and the T/C could never accept them.
We saw how the G/C side dealt with its demands for constitutional changes and how
the T/C side supported by Turkey had no disposal to accept that demands. The British attitude
played an important influence on both communities trying to keep all parts equally satisfied
and convincing them for its support. Everyone on the island now was sure that the political
disputes would be taken out in the streets as bi-communal conflicts. The atmosphere was
tense and the whole Cyprus society was waiting for the “ticking” bomb to explode.
3.2 Armed conflict
The end of 1963 found Cyprus society divided into two opposite groups and a tense political
scene. This event led into the first bi-communal conflict during the Christmas period of 1963.
This part of the chapter will follow the evidence and facts from the Turkish rejection of
Makario’s proposals to the first armed bi-communal conflict.
While president Makario’s proposals were still on the table, the Turkish government of
Ankara interfere and rejected any constitutional change, before the T/C answer was know.
This gave no chance to the T/C leaders to decide their own fate or separate their position from
their motherland; and forced them to accept the Turkish answer.101 Both communities, as we
already mentioned, had their underground paramilitary organizations, mainly established in
the island as annexes of their motherland information offices, which belonged to the anti-
communist American network “Stay Behind”. For the G/C side, three main underground
groups were found with the AKRITAS one as the most known (for its action and members).
The other two groups had limited influence and can be seen as a personal ambition by some
powerful men.102 The idea for an armed group, which could be seen as the continuation of
E.O.K.A and a way to fulfill its original goal, was in the plans of the G/C side. The man that
gave “flesh” to this idea was the powerful minister of interior, Polycarpos Georgadjis. During
one of his meetings with the Greek officials, Georgadjies asked for a secret military help from
the Greek minister of foreign affairs. He explained to the Greek minister that Turkey was
military organizing the T/C and guiding them to create constitutional problems to excuse her
invasion. That’s why a secret military help from Greece was necessary needed. The official
Greek answer was negative and the Cypriot demand was out of any discussion. No
paramilitary help would be given to Cyprus by Greek government.103 The answer came with
101 Hitchens, Hostage to History, 55.102 Δρουσιωτης, The first partition, 117-121.103 Newspaper Ο Φιλελευθερος (The Liberal), «Ο κ. Π. Γεωρκατζης απεστειλε σφοδροτατην επιστολην προς τον κ. Ε. Αβερωφ ευθυς μετα τας διεξαχθεισας εις Αθηναα συνομιλιας των επι της Κυπριακης κρισεως» (Georgsdjies letter towards Greek minister, after their meeting for the Cyprus crisis), 14/4/61.
31
fierce against the Cypriot demand, but this did not stand as an obstacle against the plans of the
nationalistic elite. They asked the same help from the later Greek dictator, Georgio
Papadopoulo, who back then was a N.I.S officer and a Ι.Δ.Ε.Α member.104 This time the
answer was positive and the first weapons reached the AKRITA group, by member of the
Greek army, without the knowledge of the Greek government. The involvement of
Papadopoulos into the creation of this “outlaw” group was something that could be expected
due to the fact that he was the link between the Greek and Cypriot parts of the “Stay Behind”
network. The AKRITAS group was firstly anti-communist and had as an aim, the armed
resistance against the T/C and as a final goal the enosis dream. The excluded once again the
communists from any struggle activity and accused the communist party as anti-national and
its supporter as traitors.105 During the summer of 1963, and while Makarios was preparing his
proposals, the AKRITA organization was preparing an armed struggle against the T/C with
the help of EΛ.ΔΥ.Κ (Greek military forces in Cyprus) officers. They build their main office
in one of the Metohion Abbey residences and established training centres for recruiting
members. Important political figures of later Cyprus life were holding the top positions in the
organization. Its leader was P.Georgadjis and second in command Tassos Papadopoulos
(Cypriot President for the years 2003-2008). They prepared a general action plan, which was
also named AKRITAS, to follow Makario’s changes. The plan’s target was to question the
treaties and revise the constitution so any given right to the T/C community could be
abolished. Any T/C reaction would be taken as a threat and armed measures would be taken
to bring back the order and achieve union with Greece.106
While the G/C side was preparing their underground groups, the same thing was taking
place in the opposite front. T.M.T and ΤΟΥΡ.ΔΥ.Κ (Turkish forces in Cyprus) had their own
plans for dealing with the upcoming struggle. A Turkish document, which was later found at
the office of a T/C minister, was explaining the intentions of the T/C side and what their
reaction would be in case of a constitutional collapse. The document was arguing that a
Turkish invasion is not the number one priority, but the establishment of a separate T/C state
is. This new state would be recognized by Turkey and a migration policy would be forced to
some Turkish people, to move into the island. All T/C who were living at the Greek part of
the island would have to move to the Turkish one, so that the new state could support itself.
This was the plan in case the G/C would change the constitution. If the latest ones were not
104 See abbreviations. 105 Kρανιδιωτης Διονυσης, Ο Αττιλας πληττει την Κυπρον (Attila’s strike on Cyprus) (Athens 1976) 108. Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Α΄ (The crucial documents of the Cyprus problem Vol. A), top secret document from the General AKRITAS to all group members to inform them about the AKEL communist party (in page 216) and an announcement to all member of AKRITAS group, how to deal with the communists (in page 221).106 The plan’s prototype document was saved and published for political purposes in the newspaper ΠΑΤΡΗΣ (Country), «Ουδεν εκ των σχεδιων του Ακριτα εφηρμοσθη» (None of AKRITA’S plans were accomplished), 21.4.1966.
32
doing the first step then the document was encouraging the T/C people to be patient and make
the constitutional “life” hard for the administration of the island, hoping for a G/C reaction. 107
Both communities were once again under irrational nationalistic feelings. The G/C wanted
constitutional changes that would lead to the collapse of each treaty and achieve enosis. On
the other hand, the T/C wanted a separate state for their community; and their constitutional
rights were helping them reaching their goal (by creating troubles in the governmental
administration).
The last half of 1963, found Cyprus in a crucial crossroad and Greece under another
political crisis. None of these things seemed to stop Makario’s plans, not even the Turkish
factor who was very upset by all these developments. The first act of this conflict begun with
the explosion of a G/C hero statue by the G/C paramilitary groups as an act of propaganda
against the T/C. Anti-Turkish protests took place in Nicosia and all underground groups were
on alarm.108 One day later the Turkish parliament rejected all the G/C proposals with the T/C
leaders accepting it as their own decision. On the 21st of December an event took place that
generalized the conflict between both communities. After a street check that was made by
AKRITA’S troopers, members of both communities exchanged gun shots that had as a result
the killing of two T/C civilians. For the next two days, conflicts were spread all over the
island. Despite any common request by both community leaders, the killings continued and in
some areas (Kaimakli-Neapoli-Omorfita) they were really harsh.109 The G/C paramilitary
forces surrounded the T/C population and forced them to live without any electricity, water,
food supplies and communication. The Turkish orders towards its minority, was to be patient
and all world could see that their demand for partition was rightful as the T/C were once again
the victim. Both sides were blaming each other for these killings and no common ground
could be found. The Turkish side propose as a solution, the creation of a neutral zone under
the British control and the security of both sides by their motherland’s forces. Makarios
rejected this idea as an attempt for foreign invasion on the island. Then Turkey asked from
Greece and Britain to secure the peace on the island otherwise she would have to act alone
and warned the Cypriot president for the consequences of his community’s acts. During the
Christmas day of 1963, on 2:30 pm, Turkish air planes flew above Nicosia and war-ships
passed out of Kyrenia. These moves, combined with the relocation of ΤΟΥΡ.ΔΥ.Κ forces,
were seen as possible invasion plan; and the G/C (under panic) warned for T/C hostage
execution. Turkish respond came immediately: ΤΟΥΡ.ΔΥ.Κ forces took over their control the
main road towards Kyrenia while T.M.T units’ occupied the St. Ilarionas castle. This way
they kept under their control the road towards the sea, so that Turkish forces could reinforce
107 Κληριδης, , Cyprus Vol. A, 219-222.108 Δρουσιωτης, The first partition, 133.109 Archbishop Makarios III Collected Works, Vol. ΣΤ’, 157.
33
them. Makarios then asked help from the Greek government but once again the answer was
negative, due to unstable political climate and American pressures.110 The G/C side was
desperate and weak to face the consequences, so Makarios was forced to accept the
supervision of the island by the British. This was the price that Cyprus had to pay. After long
discussions an agreement was signed at 30 of December, to set the boundaries of a neutral
zone that would keep apart both communities. This zone was named “green line” after the
colour of the pencil that was used to draw it on the map.111
This crisis led to the breakdown of the Zurich agreements and the hatred between both
communities. Worldwide opinion was against the G/C side and the T/C was seen as the
victims. Actually this is what Turkey wanted and now she had every right to claim partition
and official recognition of the T/C state. The T/C vice president and all T/C parliament
members left from the Cyprus government and formed their own authorities. The T/C
population was forced to move into the T/C enclaves by fear for retaliation from the G/C or
by T.M.T’s orders. This situation had as a result the isolation of the T/C community and its
economic stagnation. T.M.T took advantage of this situation and by forcing a terror campaign
against the Greek-Turkish friendship; they managed to keep both people in hate. Both ultra-
nationalists from each side had the same goal: to prevent the peace and coexistence of Cyprus
people. Both goals (union with Greece and T/C separate state) could be achieved only through
the island’s partition.112
Through this bi-communal conflict period, nationalism and foreign interests played the
most crucial role. Both sides with their underground paramilitary groups did not respect the
human life and replaced it with atrocities on civilians. Turkey saw that as a chance to keep
important positions on the island for her upcoming invasion. Britain was once again active on
the island, guarding the neutral zone, but now also serving U.S interests ;as U.S.A became the
new world superpower and cold war was at its peak.
3.3 An attempt for NATO-ization of the problem
While the year 1963 was about to end, Cyprus was living its own tragic days with the threat
of the Turkish invasion being more than close. Makarios had turned his hopes towards the
Soviets and after a meeting in their embassy, the Soviets promised to inform their superiors in
Moscow. The positive Soviet answer, for supporting the G/C demand, was seen by the
Westerners as an open threat against the influence of the island. America could not leave the
communist influence free to be spread on the island; and the best option was to keep the issue
inside the NATO influence by putting official NATO units as peacekeeping forces on the
island. They wanted to NATO-ize the bi-communal problem and therefore the whole island.
110 Δρουσιωτης, The first partition, 139-145.111 Στεργιου, Cyprus issue with the eye of a foreigner, 74-75.112 Στεργιου, Cyprus issue with the eye of a foreigner, 44-45.
34
Makarios was encouraged by the Soviet support and decided to move on to his second
step towards the implementation of his plans. After the constitutional changes, now he was
accusing the Alliance and Guarantee treaties as a step to break the “chains”. He informed all
U.N members (besides Greece-Turkey-Britain) for his attempt, with a letter on January 2nd
1964.113 The British minister of Colonies was furious with Makario’s act, and accompanied
with his High Commissioner, he went to presidential house to ask from Makarios to recall his
decision. Despite Makario’s first refusal, the British threats for evacuation of all peacekeeping
forces from the island, forced him to recall his action and specify that the treaties have to
change; but only with the right way.114 This attempt by Makarios was discussed at the British
council of Ministers and the result was that all measures should be taken to prevent U.N
involvement and to keep the Cyprus problem under NATO’s “umbrella”. They called for a
London conference between all Guarantee powers and both Cyprus communities for a
solution to be found. Again both communities were blaming each other for the killings and
even expressed officially their differences on the island’s future. G/C side wanted to abolish
the treaties and keep the island independent, for the achievement of enosis; while the T/C
were asking for a divided island into two autonomous states. In other words: partition.115
Duncan Santys, head of this conference took both demands and proposed a plan for reformed
constitution that will secure the T/C autonomy, with NATO units as security forces. Despite
the acceptance of this proposal, by Greece and Turkey, the G/C side refused it. Makario’s
strong denial brought pressure on his government by all three Guarantee powers in an attempt
to force him to accept it. Turkey was threading for an invasion; and Britain ordered her forces
to withdraw back to their bases.116 Seeing that the G/C side had no desire to cooperate, the
British asked for the American help and warned them that if no solution was found the island
would be soon under the communist influence. U.S officials were thinking of a way to
convince Makarios to invite them, so the problem would not pass under U.N jurisdiction. A
meeting between the U.S president (L. Jonson) and the U.S defence minister (R. McNamara)
gave birth to another plan that had to be done with the British cooperation. Again the Cyprus
government was against the American solution and was only accepting the U.N
involvement.117 Anglo-American officers kept trying to convince Makarios to accept the
NATO forces on the island as the answer towards the bi-communal problem, but without any
results. Makarios was counting on the east block and non-alignment movement’s support, in a
U.N discussion, and he was seen as a serious obstacle against the U.S interests.
113 Archbishop Makarios III Collected Works, Vol. E, 333.114 Δρουσιωτης, The first partition, 160.115 Galo Plaza, ‘Report of the United Nations Mediator Galo Plaza to the secretary general (1965)’, http://www.cyprus-conflict.org/materials/galoplaza/galoplaza2.html#gp-4 (07-06-2010).116 Detailed report on Κληριδης, Cyprus: My deposition Vol. A, passim. 117 Κρανιδιωτης, Defenseless State Vol. A, 111.
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Back in Cyprus, G/C paramilitary forces were attacking T/C villages and the conflicts
were still active. Turkey was insisting on the American help, otherwise invasion was the only
solution. A very intense anti American climate was developed on the island among the G/C as
the Americans were considered a Turkish ally that would support any T/C demand. Makarios
now agreed that an international force might be needed to secure the island, but his fear
against the NATO plans was keeping him negative towards this solution. The Turkish
government was planning to invade the island and so she was trying to find the American
reaction against this plan. While seeing that America was a strong ally and no actions would
be taken against her, in a possible invasion, Turkey informed for her will to act; and a plan
was made to secure the American interests on the island. Due to a last minute cancel, of the
invasion, the U.S policy was turned towards the subversion of Makario’s recourse to the
Security Council for the abolishment of the Guarantee treaty (which was giving to Turkey the
right to secure the island’s order). Also a second aim was put, to persuade Ankara to delay
any attempt for invasion while the issue was under Security Council discussion.118 A
diplomatic struggle now had just begun in the Security Council for Cyprus to proof that she
was the victim of this problem and that she was under a Turkish threat. Despite the fact that
two of the permanent members of the council were close Turkish allies (U.S-Britain), Cyprus
achieved a victory that up to day is its main “weapon” against the Turkish invasion and
occupation of 1974. With the U.N resolution on 4th of March, the Security Council was
recognizing the Cyprus demand recalling all U.N members to respect the U.N charter and the
Cyprus government to take all actions needed to stop the bi-communal killings. But the most
important result of this resolution was that the reference on the Cyprus government was made
only towards the G/C side (while the T/C one left and established their own authorities) as the
only legal authority on the island. This was seen as a very important victory of the G/C
government, against the so called T/C state.119 Based on this resolution, on March 15th 1964, a
U.N peacekeeping force was established and dispatched on the island (UNFICYP120). In a
period of few months a significant number of UNFICYP units (from Canada-Austria-
Denmark-Finland-Ireland-Sweden-Britain) were securing the peace on the island. This force
was supposed to stay on the island for a three month period, but since then the agreement is
renewed up today.121 Makarios saw this as a positive step towards his plan and after the
Turkish denial, for withdrawing her forces back to their bases; he accused the Alliance treaty
and made an official statement that he was not attached by this treaty any more.122
118 Δρουσιωτης, The first partition, 183-201.119 Στεργιου, Cyprus issue with the eye of a foreigner, 76-77. 120 See abbreviations. 121 UNFICYP web page, http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1&tt=graphic&lang=l1 (07-06-2010).122 Δρουσιωτης, The first partition, 205-206.
36
Once again the foreign interests were put above the security of the Cypriot people and
nationalism was the way to do that. American and British governments were involving in an
attempt to apply the NATO influence; Turkey was using the bi-communal killings to secure
her interests on the island; the Soviets saw that as the opportunity to keep the NATO
influence away and both Cypriot communities were still under nationalist frenzy. The plan for
dismemberment of the island, as a way to secure all Greek, Turkish and NATO interests was
seen more clear now.
3.4 Grivas as the solution
After the Anglo-American failure to convince Makarios to accept the NATO military forces
as peacekeeping units; U.S were searching for alternative scenarios to control the island.
Maakarios’s openings towards the Soviet block and the non-aligned movement, created a
non-official cooperation between Greece, Turkey, Britain and U.S to prevent the soviet
influence on the island. Two were the ways to achieve this: either to support Makario’s rivals
as a counterweight on Cyprus political life or to make sure that a plan is ready to be imposed
with both communities’ agreement.
On January 1964, General Georgios Grivas “Digenis” was mobilized and an attempt
was made to put him back in the active political scene of Cyprus.123 His political “come back”
in Cyprus was already discussed inside the business and political circles of Nicosia and
Athens, with his greater supporter (businessman Sokratis Iliades) promoting him to the U.S
ambassador as the only solution that could save Cyprus and have great support from the G/C
population. Greek government was also supporting this idea, with the Greek foreign minister
(S. Venizelos) being openly against Makarios and promising his replacement.124 The Greek
government was sure that all paramilitary groups of G/C community would also go against
Makarios and support the Greek plans. Grivas was aware of the Greek plan for Makario’s
replacement and during one of his speeches; he revealed the Greek proposal towards his
name.125 The idea for supporting Grivas against Makarios during the next elections of the
island was quickly rejected and replaced by the option to give him the leadership of all
Cyprus military units. The pioneers for this idea were the Americans that after the beginning
of the bi-communal killings, they took active part on the issue. The Americans were really in
favor of Griva’s return and were supporting the upcoming rivalry between him and Makarios.
Based on G. Boll, American official, it was easier to work with Grivas than with Makarios.126
123 Grivas after the E.O.K.A struggle had left from the island and migrated in Greece occupied with the underground political scene124 Παλαμας Ξ. Χριστιανος, Διπλωματικο τριπτυχο (diplomatic triangle) (Athens 1979) 149.125 Σπυρος Παπαγεωργιου, Απο Ζυριχην εις τον Αττιλαν Τομος Α’ (from Zurich to Attila Vol. A) (Athens 1980) 299.126 George W. Ball, The past has another pattern (New York 1982) 357.
37
On January 14th the information of Grivas upcoming returned was published in the
Cyprus press and his plans were now familiar to Makarios. The Cypriot president was well
informed about Griva’s underground plan and openly accused him for being ignorant and this
was making him a Turkish ally without even knowing it.127 At a convention that was held in
Athens, Grivas expressed his loyalty towards the E.O.K.A struggle, promised he would
respect the T/C rights and opposed to Makario’s will to ask support by the Soviets, as well as
against the constitutional treaties. The results of this convention were known a year later by a
local newspaper that published them.128 A small delegation stated pressing for Grivas return,
asking Makarios to invite him to be the leader of all Cyprus forces. Makarios was cautious
against this solution (even if he knew that he couldn’t control the paramilitary forces on the
island); due to his knowledge that Turkey and the T/C would not accept Grivas involvement.
The same delegation was cooperating with the Americans to get any help for Greek support.
The only problem now, was Makarios and the Turkish resistance against Grivas name. After
Georgadjis support, on Grivas side, Makarios was forced to invite him to join the political life
of Cyprus.129
The same month, new bi-communal killings took place at the city of Paphos, which
had as a result the blocking of the T/C area of the city. Turkey immediately warned Makarios
to solve this problem otherwise she would have to do it with force. On Makarios-Grivas first
meeting, the issue of defending Cyprus against the Turkish threats was discussed with the
Greek Prime minister. According to the newspaper ΗΜΕΡΑ (Day), which was expressing
Grivas ideas, Makarios and Papanderou (Greek Prime minister) wanted to solve the problem
on diplomatic level; while Grivas wanted military action (proposed the establishment of an 42
000 men army)130 Makarios then proposed back that this responsibility should be given to
Grivas (we know that he was forced to propose this, by the situations that brought Grivas
back to the political elite). The Greek leader, propose something that put Makarios out of this
difficult position; Griva’s arrival should be done only in the case of a Turkish invasion,
because his name is still not so acceptable by Turkey.131 Few days after this meeting, a Greek
letter towards the NATO military commander came to cause a new conflict between Makarios
and the Americans. Greece was complaining to the Americans about the new Turkish threats
for invasion. NATO responded with a call towards the Greek government, to cooperate with
Turkey for a bilateral invasion, in an attempt to secure island’s peace. Makarios saw that as an
127 Archbishop Makarios III Collected Works, Vol. ΣΤ’, 362-363.128 Newspaper Πατρης (Country), «Οταν η Κυπρος εφλεγετο απ’ ακρου εις ακρον το περυσινον συνεδριον των Αθηνων επετυγχανε την αναβιωση της Ενωσεως» (while Cyprus was on fire, the convention in Athens was putting enosis back on the table), 26-1-1965.129 Newspaper Η Μαχη (the battle), «Επικοινωνουν...» (They are in contact...), 03-03-1964.130 Newspaper Ελευθερια (freedom), «Επροταθη η δημιουργια στρατιωτικου σωματος 42 000 Ελληνοκυπριων» (proposition for a military force, with 42 000 Greek Cypriots), 31-0301964.131 Κρανιδιωτης, Defenseless State Vol. A, 158.
38
open threat for dismemberment of the island by NATO, and asked from the Communist
newspaper of the island, to publish it as secret breaking news.132 Greek government denied the
publication and promised military help to Cyprus, to make up for the misunderstanding. After
Makarios agreement 2 000 well trained (special forces) men, reached the island with fake
Cypriot identities.133 Again this action was combined with a new campaign, to promote Grivas
arrival, and a request to both Greek and Cypriot government to accept this public demand.
The real reason for this campaign was to inform Makarios that a new era is coming with
Griva’s arrival and he should realise that. Makarios was forced to accept it, because any
denial would be interpreted as an enosis refusal. Grivas was now appointed as the leader and
commander of Cyprus Nation Guard and his first goal was to build it up.134 The Greeks also
agreed but proposed back that again Grivas should stay and work from Greece (under the
authority of the Greek army), and his orders would be transferred to Cyprus by one officer of
his choice. This was made to control Grivas acts and have him under their authorities.135
While the bi-communal killings were still active, the T/C needed to expand their
territorial enclaves and the G/C had as target to limit them down and take control over the
Turkish positions. One of these important positions, Saint Ilarionas elevation, had to be taken
under G/C control and an unexpected operation was designed by Georgadjis and Karayiannis
(Griva’s official) to help them accomplish this goal. The press gave way more attention to the
killings and it was seen as a brutal ethnical cleansing against the T/C community. The Cypriot
policy made both Greece and Turkey furious.136 Grivas was now like a lion in the cage,
anxiously waiting for the day that he would return to Cyprus and all forces would be under his
direct commands. His supporters were still pushing the Greek government to give him
permission to leave for Cyprus. The government of Athens, after discussing it with the
Americans, realized that this would be possible as a way to limit Makario’s power and only
with the Turkish agreement. Athens then decided to send Grivas secretly at the island, without
informing Makarios. For sure Turkey was aware of that, not officially though, and no reaction
was made. The same night that Grivas was informed, he took the boat for Cyprus along with
500 ultra-nationalist, well trained, students which belonged to his supporters. Among them
132 Newspaper Χαραυγη (The Dawn), «Το ΝΑΤΟ κατεστρωσε τα σχεδια Τουρκικης εισβολης στην Κυπρο» (Turkish invasion of Cyprus, is a NATO plan), 18-03-1964.Newspaper Το Βημα της Λευκωσιας (Nicosias’s step), «Ο Μακαριος διερρευσε το σχεδιο Λεμνιστερ για διχοτομηση το 64’» (Lemnister plan for Cyprus’s dismemberment was reveal by Makarios), 04-01-1996.133 Κρανιδιωτης, Defenseless State Vol. A, 177.134 Newspaper Ελευθερια (freedom), «Ο Μακαριος προτεινει διορισμον του Διγεβη ως ηγετου της εθνοφρουρας» (Makarios gave to Grivas, the leadership of Cyprus National Guard), 12-04-1964.135 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Α’(The crucial documents of the Cyprus problem Vol. A), General Grival notes towards the Greek minister of Defence clarifying his position in the army (in page 306).136 Στρατηγος Καραγιαννης Γεωργιος, Οι μαχες της Μανσουρας (Mansoura’s battles) (Nicosia 2003) 25-31.
39
was the later on Greek dictator, Stylianos Patakos.137 With his arrival, Grivas asked for new
military equipment, and Makarios answered that he already took care of that; and the Soviet
market was ready to help him. Grivas did not like that but because it was their first meeting he
didn’t want to show bad cooperation. As soon as Grivas arrival was known, the Greek state
ordered him to leave the island and come back to Athens; with surprisingly hearing his
refusal. Grivas had evidences that the Americans wanted him on the island, so he felt free to
turn down the Greek order. This is shown clear on a secret document that was send by
General Grivas to the Greek defence minister on 20.06.196 4.138 Turkey also saw Griva’s
arrival as a positive step against Makario’s power, while the British press called him: Cyprus’
saviour. As the British reporters Brendan O’ Malley and Ian Craig show in their book, Grivas
had the U.S support due to his anti-communist history and as Ball W. George comes to add,
the plan for Maakario’s replacement by Grivas was under the State Department umbrella.139
Despite Makrario’s approval for only 2000 troops (Greek military help), the Greek
minister of defence had secretly send almost 10 000 men and enough weapons to build up an
army. Again all these were done secretly and so all leftist were excluded from this special
force, in an attempt to prevent any information leak towards the Americans. This was the idea
of the Greek defence minister, Garoufalias, but the American national archive denies all
these. An important amount of documents show that the Greek soldiers arrived as part of a
secret NATO plan and they were paid in U.S dollars.140 The majority of this force belonged to
the ΙΔΕΑ movement that was associated with the American anti-communist network “Stay
behind”. This Greek force was Grivas way to control Makarios, who refused official NATO
involvement as we already saw. Grivas wanted to have control over the Greek forces of the
island, and not only on the Cypriot ones, a thing that was for now impossible and out of
conversation for the Greek government.141
The Americans had managed to trap Makarios. With Griva’s involvement, enosis was
back on the track as well as the partition dream for the T/C. Along with the Greek military
“help” a Turkish one was noticed on the T/C side of the island (on the only T/C enclave that
137 Γεωργιος, Mansoura’s battles, 43.Newspaper Η Μαχη (the battle), «Ειναι και παλι αναμεσα μας» (he is among us once again), 24-06-1964.138Σπυρος Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β’ (the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B’) (Athens 1983), General Grivas report on 20-6-1964 to the Greek Prime Minister, minister of defence and foreign affairs; about his recall back to Greece (in page15).139 O’Malley, The Cyprus conspiracy, 208.Ball, the past has another pattern, 257.140 Δρουσιωτης, The first partition, 246.141 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β’(the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B’), General Karayiannis report (30-6-1964) to president Makarios, about his concerns (in page75) and Karayiannis letter towards Grivas, warning him about his actions (in page127).Γαρουφαλιας Πετρος, Ελλας και Κυπρος: Τραγικα σφαλματα, ευκαιριες που χαθηκαν (Greece and Cyprus: Tragic mistakes, lost opportunities) (Athens 1982) 120.
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had access to the sea, Mansoura). NATO had found a way to reduce Makario’s influence and
Grivas was ready to take advantage of it. Tragedy was near.
3.5 Acheson plan.
It was June of 1964 that the Turkish government, after the pressure from extreme ultra-
nationalist elements of the army, decided to invade the island. The reason for this act was the
constant military actions from the G/C side towards T/C villages. T.M.T was well aware that
its propaganda and provocation actions would lead the G/C against them and Turkey’s game
would be accomplished.
Based on Ankara’s plan, the T/C would proclaim part of Cyprus as Turkish territory
and Turkish forces will invade to back this decision up. As soon as Turkey’s plans were
reveal to the Americans, its ambassador in Ankara was ordered to inform Ismet Inonu
(Turkish president) that America was against this invasion. Inonu then promised that he
would postpone the invasion for 24 hours (until the 5th of June) so that the American
government might have time to study the whole situation and express its opinion. President
Johnson’s reply, the next day, was made with a serious warning against Turkey, to cancel all
invasion plans for Cyprus. His argument was that Turkey’s unilateral action was not covered
by the Guarantee treaty (only bilateral actions were allowed). He also stated that a possible
Turkish invasion, might cause a Greek-Turkish war and the Soviets are waiting this to
interfere. This was not a result that NATO wished. The American president promised that any
solution would have to secure the Turkish interests and the safety of the T/C population. He
called the Turkish president on a meeting in Washington to talk this over.142 After the
American ultimatum, the Turkish president cancelled his plan for immediate action. Based on
this crisis, America took over the lead of a diplomatic action to solve the Cyprus problem, and
invited the Greek Prime Minister (Georgios Papandreou) for a meeting in Washington with
his Turkish counterpart (who already had accepted the American invitation). Papandreou was
now in dilemma. Despite his leading place in the Greek government, when it was for the
Cyprus issue he was really weak. Makario’s influence on the Greek people was huge and no
Greek politician could stand against his will. Makrio’s will was enosis and only enosis of the
whole island with Greece, an unrealistic solution that was very difficult to be achieved.
Nevertheless Papandreou accepted the invitation for a meeting with the Turkish and
American president in the U.S capital. As M. Drousiotis argues in his book, American records
show that the U.S wanted this problem to be solved immediately and by any price, because
the Soviets were waiting to get Cyprus under their influence. The Greek Prime Minister
agreed and proposed immediate union of the island with Greece in an attempt to eliminate the
142 Κρανιδιωτης, Defenseless State Vol. A, 190.
41
Soviet danger. The Americans answered that any solution should be done within Greek-
Turkish cooperation.143
This problem was leading nowhere and a solution had to be found. America accepted
the involvement of U.N and entrusted the ombudsman position to Sakari Tuomioja (UN
representative for Cyprus); and proposed that the position of his assistant should be given to
the American diplomat Dean Acheson. Greek government was convinced to accept this
agreement and now the Americans had once again an official “voice”; covered by U.N’s
auspices. These talks were put on schedule for July 1964 in Geneva, with representatives
from Greece, Turkey, Britain and U.N (Tuimioja-Acheson). 144 The government of Cyprus
was not even invited, since the whole plan idea was to put aside Makario’s influence. The
Cypriot president was not in favour of these talks and stated that any agreement it should be
first discussed and be approved by the Cypriot people.145 Based on the Greek report from
Geneva, Acheson’s approach could be summarized in five points:
1. Turkey’s safety should be secured with an access towards the Mediterranean Sea.
2. Protection of the T/C population of the island.
3. Unfettered Independence and the problems that this causes to the Turkish interests.
4. Partition: Turkey’s ideal solution, but inefficient to stop the bi-communal killings.
5. Enosis: A possible solution, but it has to match Turkey’s demands.
After Acheson’s analysis, it was pretty clear that Turkey would not accept the Unfettered
Independence of the island. Only after giving her permanent military bases in Karpasia
(Cyprus area) and Kastelorizo (Greek island); along with two self govern T/C provinces on
the island, Turkey would accept enosis.146 Despite all these efforts for securing the T/C safety,
Turkey was looking forward for double enosis (G/C side with Greece and T/C side with
Turkey) and was putting pressure on America to promote this solution. Turkish government
even presented a map with all the areas that wanted to be included in a double union solution
(it was more or less the same areas that she occupied during the 1974 invasion). Ankara’s
excuse was that the original given territories (first draft of Acheson plan) had no port and the
military backup of the T/C community was impossible in case it was needed. Both Greek and
Turkish representatives took the Acheson plan back to their government for an official
answer. The Greek government had no intension to give a part of Cyprus to Turkey and
suggested that the Greek island Kastelorizo could be exchanged for Cyprus. Also Greece was
143 Δρουσιωτης, The first partition, 261-263.144 Δρουσιωτης, The first partition, 264-265.145 Newspaper Ο Αγων (The struggle), «Μακαριος: Δεν θα δεχθωμεν οπους αποκλειοντας την Ενωσι» (Makarios: we will not accept their conditions against enosis), 10-07-1964.146 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β’(the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B’), records from the meeting in Washington between the Greek Prime minister and the American president (in pages 45-67) and reports (27-29/6/1964) from that meeting towards the Cypriot government (in pages 67-69).
42
proposing that Turkish military forces could be parked inside the British bases on the island.
Turkey on the other hand, paid less attention to this plan and was asking officially for double
union.147
Despite the huge gap between both demands, this plan was seen a great chance to
solve the problem by both countries. Both parts were satisfied on the security that this plan
was giving towards the T/C community and the only debate now was on the military bases
that Turkey was claiming. Turkish aim was that an area of 25% of the island’s territory should
be given to them, while the American offer was close to 15%. They both agreed on 20% of
Cyprus land and now the U.S was trying to pursuit them to have these bases under rental
status. Ankara refused but Washington was counting on a Greek offer to equal things up.
Papandreou though, was in a difficult position due to Makario’s denial for any given
American solution. Once again, Makarios was counting on the socialist support in a U.N
resolution. After many hours of talk with the Greek Prime Minister, Makarios convinced him
to refuse the Acheson plan and leave from the Geneva talks.148 Makarios was seen as a
national hero by both G/C and Greek societies. A huge crowd was gathered at Nicosia airport
to welcome him back from Greece. In his statement he thanked the Greek government for
resisting against the dichotomous U.S plans and announced his decision (which the Greek
support, as he said) to enlist the Cyprus problem in the General Assembly of the U.N.149 The
Americans were very upset by Makario’s move and blamed the Greek government for been
responsible for that. Papandreou apologized for Makario’s intensions and stated that no
solution can be found while Makarios is there. It was impossible to change his mind and no
cooperation could be achieved unless his demands are satisfied. He even stated twice that
Makarios was his enemy now and that he would do anything for a solution to be found. His
plan was to reach an agreement in Geneva, by putting Makarios out of the scene. His plan
would be accomplished with Griva’s help and the Greek military forces of the island.150
Griva’s answer was positive, despite the fact that he did not like the idea of a sovereign
Turkish military base on the island. But if this was the price for enosis then he was ready to
pay it.151 New Greek proposals were placed on the negotiation table despite Turkey’s looming
denial.152
147 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β’(the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B’), records from the Acheson plan talks (in pages 266-268).148 Κρανιδιωτης, Defenseless State Vol. A, 218-219.149 Newspaper Χαραυγη (The Dawn), «10 Οκτωβριου: Η εγγραφη στη Γενικη Συνελευση του Ο.Η.Ε» (10th of October: Cyprus problem will be enlisted to U.N), 31-07-1964.150 Δρουσιωτης, The first partition, 282.151 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β’(the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B’), Grivas letter (3/8/1964) towards the Greek minister of foreign affairs, about the Acheson plans (in page 255).152 Γεωργιος, Mansoura’s battles, 61-63.
43
Acheson’s plan was considered to be a good debating base for the solution of the
Cyprus problem. All parts, besides the Cypriot government, were more or less willing to
agree on it with some changes. America wanted Makarios out of the scene and it was only
discussing the issue with Greece and Turkey. The Greek government was trapped; on one
hand between her interest (that were secured by America) and on the other, by Makrio’s
influence that was not letting her discuss any non U.N solution. The T/C community was
represented only by Turkey, and the last one was very close to implement her goals on the
island. Both communities were living in hate and constant battles were a common thing. This
summer was about to be, very “hot”.
3.6 A “hot” summer.
Solving the Cyprus problem, with militaristic action, was always the intension of Turkey. She
was more powerful and superior than both Greece and Cyprus. Only a month ago, Ankara
was ready to invade the island and after the U.S involvement they cancelled it the last minute.
Makario’s denial for any U.S solution combined with his acts against the T/C community,
was giving to Turkey the motive she was looking for to excuse her invasion. To make sure
that the Acheson plans were officially “dead”, the Cypriot president was supporting a small
sized conflict.153 As it seems, both sides were looking to solve their differences with an armed
conflict. Turkey wanted partition of the island, and Makarios was seeking for the unfettered
independence that would lead him to enosis. This common need for conflict was expressed in
August 1964 in the broader area of the T/C enclave Mansouras-Kokkinon. This particular
enclave was the second most important for the T/C community (after the one in Nicosia) and
the only one that was militarily protected. This enclave was giving to the T/C access towards
the sea and it was used by Turkey to reinforce the community with guns and soldiers. That’s
why the G/C elite had as a first goal the elimination of this enclave and the regaining of the
control over its territory. One of Griva’s first acts was to give orders to Karayiannis to
develop an action plan for taking over this enclave, despite the fact that the second had orders
from Greece not to be involved in any actions against the T/C without their approval.154
During the day that Geneva talks begun, Turkish paramilitary forces occupied the
Lorovounos elevation which had an important strategic position and Grivas ordered
immediate military action in an attempt to evacuate the area. Karayiannis which was loyal
towards the Greek orders, asked from U.N.F.I.CYP to evacuate the elevation; and the answer
was negative because this elevation (according to U.N.F.I.CYP) was important for the safety
of the T/C.155 After Makario’s rejection on the Acheson plan, Turkey found the opportunity to
threaten once again for invasion. The atmosphere on the island was pretty hostile, between the
153 Κρανιδιωτης, Defenseless State Vol. A, 218.154 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β’(the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B’), Grivas report on the Mansoura battle (in page 140).155 Γεωργιος, Mansoura’s battles, 76.
44
two communities, with all clues leading towards an armed conflict. One of the clues that lead
to this conclusion was Rauf Denktash’s illegal arrival on the island (at Kokkina area). He was
escorted by Turkish military officers and by the founder of the T.M.T organization.
According to his words, on an interview given to a Canadian reporter, he came to Cyprus
from Turkey to be close to his community member during the big battle. Turkey, in his words,
“...decided to invade Cyprus and free its people”. This would take place after the U.S invasion
of Vietnam.156
It was the 5th of August, when a U.N.F.I.CYP division left from the Akoni elevation,
which was near the Lorovouno one (that was occupied by Turkish forces). Cyprus National
Guard took advantage of this U.N.F.I.CYP move and during the night, Cypriot forces
captured the empty elevation. When the Turkish forces came face to face with the National
Guard the next morning, they started firing against them with guns and mortars.157 Grivas was
away that day in a meeting in Athens, and when he was informed he returned immediately to
Cyprus. He now had two options, to deal with it: the first one was to use limited act against
the T/C forces, so that he could regain control over their position; while the second one was to
eliminate all the Turkish forces in the wider area of Kokkinon-Mansouras. The council of
ministers adopted the first option which was the least risky.158 This decision was against the
promise that Cyprus gave to Greece for avoiding any official conflict. This can be verified by
Makario’s concerns against Griva’s plan. He requested from Grivas, to inform the Greek
government first and wait for their answer. Makarios was in favour of this military action, so
he trusted Griva’s word that he would inform Greece. The last one just informed the Greek
army about his intensions, but he did not wait for a respond. He designed the whole plan by
himself, without taking in mind any advice by the military elite. After many hours of delay,
the attack sing was given late in the afternoon. Due to darkness the whole plan failed.159
Karayiannis was totally against this action, respecting the promise that was given to his
government, and blamed Grivas for this failure. The Greek official was also against the
involvement of ΕΛ.ΔΥ.Κ in this action and stated that only during a war, Greek forces will
help Cyprus. Grivas was confident to go on according to his plan with all the means he had,
and if the conditions were positive he was going to exterminate the T/C enclave. According to
general Karayianni’s report, Makarios also agreed with this plan, despite Greece orders to
156 Republication from a Canadian source to the Cypriot newspaper Τελευταια ωρα (Last hour), «Ειδα τον Ντεκτας στα κοκκινα...» (I saw Denktash at the Kokkina vilage), 14-08-1964.157 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β’(the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B’), General Karayiannis report on the Mansoura-Kokkinwn area actions (in page 133).158 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β’(the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B’), Grivas report about the Mansoura-Kokkinon battle and all that preceded it (in page 143).159 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β’(the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B’), Grivas report on Mansoura Battle (in page 144).
45
avoid any conflict. 160 Karayiannis was trying to prevent this action but during his meeting
with military officers, he was informed that the Lorovouno elevation was captured without
any difficulties by G/C forces.161 Grivas then ordered general attack and purging the villages
Mansoura and Kokkinwn. The first houses were already under G/C occupation and the T/C
population was forced to evacuate the villages with the help of U.N, due to the bombing that
took place by sea.162 Despite any U.S and U.N pressures towards Makarios, the Cypriot
president refused to cease fire. He was totally supporting Griva’s plan and hoped that the T/C
enclave of this area would be soon destroyed. Not even the Greek efforts were enough to stop
Makario’s will (the message of the Greek Prime Minister was not even taken under
consideration).163
While the T/C enclave was under attack, the defending forces were calling Turkey for
help. They were asking immediate air force support to prevent the demolition of the particular
enclave. 30 000 Turkish soldiers were ready to invade the island and forces were ready to
support them by air and sea. The Turkish foreign minister informed his American counterpart,
that action will take place but only for purposes of intimidation. The Americans then
informed Georgadjis, in an attempt to prevent any general conflict between Greece and
Turkey. During the morning hours of the 8th of August, the Turkish council of ministers,
decided to bomb the G/C forces in Mansoura area. In total, 35 invasions against military
positions took place, while the villages Pachyammos, Pomos, Polis Chrysochoy, Pyrgos and
Kseros were bombed by Turkish forces. The whole Turkish action lasted for two hours and
besides all the damages and killings it also affected the spiritual moral of both communities.
The T/C moral was now high, unlike the G/C one that was wrecked.164
The Cypriot government had already discussed the chance for general attack against
the T/C enclave and after Greece’s opposition; this plan was dropped out for the moment.
Grivas then resigned from his position (general commander of the Cypriot National Guard)
due to his opposition to follow the Greek orders.165 Now the government of Cyprus was
160 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β’(the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B’), General Karayianni’s report on the four day actions in the area Mansouras-Kokkinon (in page 135).161 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β’(the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B’), General Ilias Proko’s report about the events that occurred during August 1964 (in page 177).162 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β’(the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B’), General Karayianni’s report on the four day actions in the area Mansouras-Kokkinon (in page 136).163 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β’(the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B’), Plan letter (8/8/1964) from the Greek defence minister to the military command of Cyprus (in page 111) and Grivas letter towards the Greek king (in page123).164 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β’(the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B’), General Ilias Proko’s report about the events that occurred during August 1964 (in page 181).165 Γεωργιος, Mansoura’s battles, 80.
46
facing the most dramatic days of the past eight months of dispute. They were informed that
Turkish ships were floating near Cyprus waters and the probability for general invasion was
higher than ever. Cypriot National Guard was weak, and without Griva’s leading skills the
problem was even bigger. Makarios was asking from Greece to support him in case of a
Turkish invasion. Greek minister of defence, Garoufalias, refused and proposed that any
resistance should be done with only Cypriot forces.166 Again no general invasion took place,
but Turkish air forces attacked G/C villages with napalm bombs killing 53 civilians and
injuring 153.167
Every time that a Turkish threat for invasion was up, the Cyprus government was
warning for retaliation with the execution of T/C population. This was once again the answer
of Makarios. The Greek Prime Minister had told the Americans that if Turkey enters Cyprus
territory then the G/C will take it as an invasion and they will immediately “take care” of the
T/C population. This threat became later on an official decision of the Cypriot government
and an ultimatum was given to Turkey warning her to stop all actions.168 The same ultimatum
was given to the American embassy in Nicosia and the American president was immediately
informed. After many attempts by the Anglo-Americans, Makarios was finally convinced to
postpone his decision without giving any new deadline. In the meantime, American officials
were very upset with the Greek weakness to control Makarios and they second thoughts about
Griva’s contribution to that. Theirs conclusion was that Makarios should be sidelined by
immediate enonsis. Of course this had to be discussed with Greece and Turkey first.169
Regardless of Greece’s anger against Makarios, Prime Minister Papandreou asked from
Grivas to accept his position back and agreed with his plans for purging the T/C enclave of
Kokkinon. The same day, later on, a Greek squadron flew above Nicosia’s sky. Greek orders
were given to the Cypriot forces, to be ready to attack the T/C enclave. This again would
happen without any official help from Greece.170 By the time that this operation was ready to
start, a U.N Security Council resolution was calling an immediate ceasefire. The G/C attack
was cancelled. The next few Turkish threats were dealt with nerve and so any general conflict
was prevented. The Greek position towards this crisis was of great importance, because
166 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β’ (the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B’), Manuscript letter of Petros Garoufallias about the occurring events of 9/8/1964 (in pages 114-115).167 Λεωνιδας Φ. Λεωνιδου, Γεωργιος Γριβας Διγενης-Βιογραφια-Τριτος τομος 1959-1971 (Georgios Grivas Digenis-Biography-Volume: C 1959-1971) (Nicosia2008) 216-220.168 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β’(the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B), General Karayianni’s report on the four day actions in the area Mansouras-Kokkinon (in page 137).169 Δρουσιωτης, The first partition, 315.170 Παπαγεωργιου, Τα κρισημα ντοκουμεντα του Κυπριακου Τομος Β (the crucial documents of the Cyprus problem, Vol. B), Greek’s Prime Minister Letter (9/8/1964) towards General Grivas, through the Greek embassy in Cyprus (in page 116) and Plan letter (9/8/1964) from the Greek defence minister to the military command of Cyprus (in page 117).
47
literally they prevented a huge massacre on the island. If Makarios was not forced to change
his mind and the executions were taking place, Turkey for sure would have invaded the island
with full forces.
After the military act on Mansoura’s area, the political scene in Cyprus had changed a
lot. Makarios once again had turned for help towards the Soviet bloc, since Greece refused to
help him militarily during the Mansoura conflict. This turned to be another issue of
controversy between Makarios and the West; and gave one more reason for the Americans to
try to solve it under NATO’s auspices. America was now pressing the Greek leader to find a
solution that would help them be part of it. Papandreou then suggested the immediate union
of Cyprus with Greece, as the only safe solution for the island to escape the Soviet influence.
The Americans started to see this idea (immediate enosis) as very interesting and it could be
forced with two ways: either with a coup d’ etat against Makarios by Grivas, proclaiming
union with Greece, or with a simultaneous resolution from both parliaments (Greek and
Cypriot). At any case, Turkey should be satisfied by the exchanges that she would get for
allowing the union. Acheson solution was once again the base for negotiation about this
agreement. But just like before, the Turkish demands were not satisfied by the Greek
proposals. The Greek government then proposed to the Americans, that a coup d’ etat should
take place by Greek forces on the island, imposing union with Greece, before any agreement
with Turkey is done. This would be possible only if U.S and Britain could control the Turkish
reaction. Again after many proposals from both sides, Greece and Turkey were unable to
reach into an agreement and the Soviet influence was getting stronger on Makario’s policy.171
The bi-communal killings were stopped for the next three years, but the schism was
fatal. After the new wave of bi-communal killings, during the November of 1967, the U.S
policy was turned officially against the Cypriot president. Cooperating with the Greek junta
they planed his elimination. This came up with the tragic event of 1974 (coup d’ etat in
Cyprus by the Greek junta and the Turkish invasion). The Turkish invasion of 1974 can be
seen as the final solution of this tremendous dispute or as a convenience way to service the
foreign interests. Both motherlands now had permanent forces on the island and military
bases that easily can serve NATO interests. British interests enjoy the freedom that two huge
military bases gives to them; and both communities could build their own version of the
problem, praising their nation and creating an enemy. All parts were satisfied, besides the one
that was looking for the truth and wishes to see all Cypriots (G/C and T/C) enjoying their
common land, away from chauvinism and bigotry.
3.7 Discussion.
At this part of the chapter, we will discuss the outcomes of my above analysis. Based on the
facts that were presented, we will analyze the impact of nationalism on the Cyprus tragedy. 171 Δρουσιωτης, The first partition, 223-246.
48
Both G/C and T/C nationalism will be examined, along with the influence they had from their
motherland. An evaluation of the British and American involvement will take place as a way
to find the motives behind their interests for involvement.
In both G/C and T/C narratives of the Cyprus problem, the main ideas that exist are
that this conflict was inevitable and they always blame the other community (or the foreign
interests) for this situation.172 If we want to examine the inevitability of this conflict, then
there are two ways to do that. The first one is the cultural, religious and linguistic differences
that separate both communities and lead to the unbridgeable gap (according to Samuel
Huntington’s theory173); and the second one the two opposite nationalism that existed on the
island (Greek and Turkish). Huntington’s theory is very popular among the G/C nationalistic
circles. For them, the divergence between the Greek-Christian and Turkish-Muslim is an
enough reason for the gap to stay unbridgeable. This interpretation serves both ultra-
nationalist sides. It helps them to forget or even ignore their own faults on this friction, and
also secures the perpetual hate between Greek and Turkish people, securing their interests.
For the T/C this means permanent partition of the island and for the G/C nationalists means
eternal battle, until the victorious end, which will bring the dream of enosis.174 Huntington’s
argument cannot convince us for its true worldview. From the analysis of the bi-communal
killing events, no official gaps are found that lead to an eternal conflict, neither unabridged
differences that can excuse this hate. For centuries, a harmonious coexistence of these two
religious groups was taking place in Cyprus. They had been living together in mixed villages
and cities all over the island. Mixed marriages were an often event and most of the times,
religious holidays were celebrated together. This can be verified by the unique religious group
of Linovamvakes that were living on the island. This group of people were both Christians
and Muslims at the same time. Even on linguistic matters, the G/C dialect is very close to the
T/C one and both communities could easily communicate. One more evidence that shows that
Huntington’s argument is false (at least not universal) is the common riots by farmers and
workers against the Ottoman and later on British tyranny. Despite the arrival of nationalism in
the Cypriot society, no violent conflict took place until the mid 50s. But of course nationalism
put the foundations for their differences to be seen; and this led to the first conflicts (during
the E.O.K.A struggle 1955-59). From the moment that both communities were defining
themselves as Greeks or Turkish, an enemy was visible.175 The second way that the inevitable
conflict on the island can be seen is the existence of two opposite nationalisms. First, the G/C
nationalism and identity can be placed in the romantic/primordialistic cultural nationalism;
172 Markides, The rise and fall of the Cyprus republic, passim.173 Samuel Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ in Foreign Affairs 72:3 (1993) 22–49, passim.174 Αλεξης Ηρακλειδης, Κυπριακο: Συγκρουση και επιλυση (Cyprus problem: Conflict and solutions), (Athens 2005) 199-201.175 Ηρακλειδης, Cyprus problem, 202-205.
49
based in the separation that I explained in the introduction chapter. The G/C nationalism gives
emphasis on the Greek identity of the island and its people. Based on these features, enosis
was the only goal for Cyprus and it was seen as the return of a lost territory to its motherland
(part of Megali Idea176). In the G/C historical narrative, the Hellenism of the island plays a
crucial part of its identity. The Mycenaean settlement and the Greek Kingdoms of 3rd and 4th
century are overstated. The toughness of the Cypriot Hellenism is shown as prove of its
originality and as a way of resistance, against all the foreign rulers. This way they excuse and
degrade facts that don’t help their narrative (like the fact that Cyprus was never a single
independent Greek state).177 Despite all these anachronisms, it’s without any doubt that the
ancient Greek and Byzantine character survived all these years and gave its stigma to Cyprus.
This especially happened when the two apparently opposite identities of Hellenism and
Orthodoxy became one in the Greek collective identity.178 Again based on these features, it
was more than clear that along with the arrival of nationalism, the Cypriots would become
either Greeks (with union) or G/C. The few Latins, Maronites, Armenians and G/C with non
Greek name, indicate that the island is not as Greek as these nationalists want to think. During
the days of independence (1960), most of the G/C were influenced by nationalism and had the
feeling that the enosis dream was deprived. Neo-nationalism, combined with the traditional
right-wing nationalism, was the main ideology on the island; and any attempt for
rapprochement (between both communities) was seen as derogatory. Today though, the
majority of G/C nationalists don’t seem to support so much the dream of union with Greece,
but they are focused to prove the Hellenic identity of Cyprus.
If the ancient Greek and Byzantine identity marked Cyprus so deep, then one more
influence for sure can be added to the Cypriot identity. This influence was neither Greek nor
Orthodox. It’s the Muslim print from the Ottoman period and the T/C community that still
exists. The T/C nationalism was a result of the ardent Greek one and their ethno genesis or
ethno-awaking came late. This awaking gave an ally to the British rulers against the G/C
demand for enosis, something that the G/C interpreted as unacceptable.179 For almost half a
century (until 1974) the T/C were mostly against any G/C initiative and action. Although the
massive politicization and mobilization of their community came late, it was still a defensive
one and mostly against enosis. For the T/C, enosis was seen as a nightmare and they were
underlining the fact that this would bring their destruction.180 The T/C nationalism was softer
than the G/C one and the British authorities were encouraging them to reach the G/C level for
176 See appendix 7.177 Ηρακλειδης, Cyprus problem, 207-208.178 On how weird it looks, to a non-Greek, the matching of Hellenic and Orthodox identity; see Tom Nairn, “Cyprus and the theory of nationalism” in Peter Worsley & Paschalis Kitromilides (ed.) Small States in the modern world (Nicosia 1979) 26-33.179 Ηρακλειδης, Cyprus problem, 219.180 Attalides, Cyprus, 36-45.
50
their own benefit. In fact, after 1945, the T/C nationalism became more massive and intense.
Demonstrations against enosis by T/C students was an often event and their settled opinion
was always to keep the colonial status. Otherwise the island should be given to its previous
owner (Turkey).181 The education of the T/C is also selective and serves their national
interests. T/C pupils learn that the G/C are not Greeks, but they just speak Greek. They are
just the remains from all foreign rulers. In contrary, they are informed that they are truly
Turks and their roots can be found in Cyprus since 1571. They are taught that the island was
conquered heroically after a great battle; and for three centuries, the Ottomans were ruling the
island with justice and freedom towards all residents. Despite all these, the ungrateful
Christians rebelled against the Ottomans during the year 1821; following the Greek example.
Finally, they are told that Cyprus is Anatolia’s extension; and based on their own text books,
Greece once dreamed to become bigger and the Megali Idea had to be imposed in Cyprus too.
Since then they have been trying to achieve enosis by any mean, without ever achieving it.
The Turkish invasion and occupation of 1974 is known as the great salvation that mother
Turkey gave to them.182
It is obvious that both diametrically opposed national narratives do not contribute to
the rapprochement, since they reject the “other” as their eternal enemy. These narratives were
not created out of nowhere and for sure the assistance of both motherlands had something to
do with it. In the next few sentences, the relation between each motherland and community’s
nationalism will be examined. Besides the official exclusion of both solutions (enosis and
partition), the new independent state of 1960 did nothing to limit the involvement of Greece
and Turkey over the island. The abolishment of the British rule opened the doors for both
motherlands to strength their strings with each community, and to influence its policy. This
way, all national interests were promoted on the island. Many of the occurred conflicts that
brought the bi-communal killings were due to the Greek and Turkish involvement. After the
declaration of Cyprus independence, both communities had strengthened their relations with
their motherland through educational, religious, cultural and army bonds. Just like the
colonial era, education remained separate and it was guided by each motherland. Greece and
Turkey were sending text books and teachers to the island, and all school knowledge was
based to praise their nation. Their target was to show that Greek-Turkish friendship is an
illusion and no historical example supports it. Evra’s argument about the role of education
and history towards the spread of nationalism, as we examined it in the historiographical
chapter, is once again apposite in the Cyprus’s case. Education helped each nationality to
build a mythical background about its nation and history kept all national memories and
181 Stefanidis, Isle of discord, 2907-211.182 Niyazi Kizilyurek, “National memory and Turkish Cypriot text books” in International Textbook research 21:4 (1999) 390-391.
51
conflicts of the past alive; contributing towards the bi-communal hate. The Greco-Turkish
antagonism and rivalry was moved from each country into the society of Cyprus. Besides the
educational system, this rivalry was promoted by each religious elite. Both elites had as target
to control their community forcing them to stay loyal to their religion, which in both cases is
attached to each nation. Greek and Turkish nations are both really connected with Orthodoxy
and Islam. Militarily now, both countries had the need to keep forces on the island. This could
only happen if the both Cypriot communities were under martial status. The constitution of
1960, allowed them to establish forces on Cypriot ground. Let’s not forget that both forces,
belonged to the N.A.T.O alliance; and Cyprus was in a very good strategic position. Last but
not least, cultural links were set to complete the nationalistic “puzzle”. After 1960, all
national holidays were celebrated separately and each community was using its motherlands
flag and anthem, instead of the Cypriot one (no Cyprus anthem was ever established). The
G/C community was celebrating the Greek revolution of 1821 and the E.O.K.A struggle of
1955-59, while the T/C one was celebrating the conquest of Cyprus by the Ottomans and the
Turkish victory over the Greeks in Minor Asia conflict. All these, under the supervision of
each motherland, created a state of suspicion between both communities and among its
people.183 The creation of these alliances between the metropolitan countries and their satellite
communities had military and political aspects. Besides the promotion and equipment of each
community with paramilitary forces, both motherlands had built a diplomatic network to
support any demand by its community to the international field.184 The above mentioned
ethnic ties with Greece and Turkey were basically the main reason for foreign involvement in
Cyprus, because at the same time that they were enforcing national interests on the island,
they were also securing the American and British ones.
Until 1974, Cyprus problem had passed through two different stages. Until 1960 it was
a colonial issue and it was settled by the new constitution and the independence of the island.
Then from 1960 this problem was transferred basically between the differences of each
community and the involvement of Greece, Turkey and Britain as the Guarantee powers.
Later on, during the cold war, the American and Soviet interests “clashed” over the island too.
We already examined the relationship of both motherlands towards the creation of a national
feeling among the island. This relationship was based on the separation of the Cypriot society
into friends and enemies. It’s now time to evaluate the British and American policy over this
problem, to see what results the impact of these policies gave in this conflict. Britain is
considered to be the biggest culprit of the Cyprus problem for three main reasons. Firstly due
to British policy, Turkey was involved in Cyprus future and had demands over the island.
Secondly, it was British initiatives that gave life to the new constitution and the 1960 treaties
183 Στεργιου, Cyprus issue with the eye of a foreigner, 70-74.184 Στεργιου, Cyprus issue with the eye of a foreigner, 77.
52
(which the G/C saw as unequal). Third of all, Britain did nothing to actually prevent the
Turkish invasion of 1974, even that she had forces landed on the island. Despite these facts,
Britain cannot be blamed for continues plot against Cyprus. Of course the Cyprus problem
gave to Britain the chance she was looking for, to promote her interests over the island. First
of all, she had the chance to secure her presence on Cyprus territory. She achieved the most
painless solution over the upcoming end of colonialism, just by putting both communities in a
state of fear and hatred. That’s how Britain earned the military bases on the island. Along
with these bases, the new constitution was naming her as an ally and guarantor power, of this
newly formed state. All markets were open for British products and no constitutional change
could be achieved without her assent. After her replacement by United States (as the most
powerful nation), Britain’s influence was used to secure the U.S and N.A.T.O interests. This
can be easily seen through the Anglo-American cooperation over the island’s problem. British
denials, against Makario’s requests for U.N solution is another fact that indicates the
“crown’s” disposal for securing NATO’s interests.185 As we saw, the second most active
involvement on the Cyprus problem was the one by U.S. especially during the period we
examined (bi-communal conflicts of 1963-64). Since the Cyprus problem became worldwide
known (1954), the American police was focused on four targets:
1. Containment of the Soviet influence and expansion.
2. Avoidance of conflict between two of her N.A.T.O allies (Greece and Turkey).
3. To keep the British forces on the island, and secure the N.A.T.O presence
4. To stop the Communist Party (A.K.E.L) from getting the power.
When U.S learned that two of their N.A.T.O allies were close to get into a war, all of their
efforts were put to avoid it and find a solution. America’s strong anti-communist policy did
everything to prevent the Soviet influence on the island. As we already examined the anti-
communist network “Stay Behind”, created Intelligence Offices in Greece and Turkey and
promoted the establishment of sub units in each Cypriot community. These units created their
own paramilitary forces and in the name of the communist threat, they were terrorizing the
whole island. America’s worst fear was a possible intra-N.A.T.O conflict that would give the
chance to the Soviets to interfere and put Cyprus under their umbrella. The new constitution
was seen very positively by the Americans and made them change their priorities. Their new
policy targets were:
1. Political stability on the island, so they can benefit with the Greek, Turkish and British
cooperation against the Soviet influence
2. The island should have a Western orientation (economic growth and democratic
institutions)
185 Ηρακλειδης, Cyprus problem, 236-240.Ker-Lindsay, Britain and the Cyprus crisis 1963-1964, 121-123.
53
3. U.S should secure its access to all communication facilities of the island.
4. The sovereignty of the British military bases should be never challenged.
Makario’s plan to revise the treaties was a challenge against all these American interests and
he had to be stopped. This could only be achieved with the Greek-Turkish cooperation and
America had now a new extra goal to achieve (Acheson plan).186 Reaching the end of this
evaluation about each country’s foreign interests on the island, we cannot leave behind the
Soviet one. Although the Soviet Union was never officially involved in the Cyprus problem
by itself (they were only accepting Makario’s requests for political and military help), it
becomes more than clear that their power was used by the G/C side as a counterweight
against the American involvement. President Makarios, and his government, asked many
times help by the Soviets and most of the times the answer was positive. This of course was
not because U.S.S.R thought that the G/C demands were right (at least not only for that), but
to expand its influence over the Middle East and Mediterranean region. Once the Soviets had
realized that Cyprus was for good under the influence of the West, and very few things could
change that, their interest over the island faded away.187
These were the events that led to the bi-communal killings of 1963-64, as history has
shown us. Most of the official records are still locked and no access can be given to them, as
many of the lead protagonists of these years are still alive. These events were examined under
my concern, nationalism, in an attempt to see its impact; and as my evidences shows, Cyprus
history is full of nationalistic influence.
186 Ηρακλειδης, Cyprus problem, 300-301.Ker-Lindsay, Britain and the Cyprus crisis 1963-1964, 124-125.187 Ker-Lindsay, Britain and the Cyprus crisis 1963-1964, 125-127.Δρουσιωτης, The first partition, 350-353.
54
ConclusionThrough the analysis of the Cyprus bi-communal killings of 1963-64, the results would give
us the answers we were looking, for the impact of nationalism over this problem. This
research was made to find out what was nationalisms role into this dispute, which had as a
result the bi-communal killings. Although my hypothesis was based on the impact of
nationalism; through the analysis of this period extra evidences obtained that came to show us
a new factor that was almost as equal as the impact of nationalism. This evidence was the
involvement or meddling into the Cyprus society by all big foreign forces, in an attempt to
secure their interests over the island. But until we reach the conclusion, we had to pass
through several stages. First an introduction of both nation and nationalism notions was given,
to set the boundaries of what nationalism meant for this research. The outcome was twofold,
as the nature of nationalism is. We were introduced to the French model, which is more close
to a political entity; and the German model, which is a cultural one. A historiographical
debate took place after the introduction, where my broader concern about nationalism’s
reverberations on societies and its association between state conflicts, was discussed. This
debate gave me the incentive that I was looking for, to examine the Cyprus problem under
nationalism’s perspective, because most of the scholars I used agree that nationalism for sure
plays a major role in bi-communal or among nations conflict. This cannot mean anything,
unless if we place our hisotiographical findings and the theories that were presented there,
55
inside the framework of the Cyprus’s problem. Through this procedure, interesting evidence
arise about the effect or impact of nationalism in our case. First of all S. Van Evera’s
arguments about the relation between nationalism and conflict can be matched on the Cyprus
example. Cyprus was always the place that two nationalities were living together stateless;
and after the involvement of Turkey, both of them were state-seeking. This gave chance to
both motherlands, to use their influence in an attempt to prevail with annexation strategies
(both of them were claiming the right to rule the island and its people). Both of nationalities
had hegemonic goals (especially the G/C site); and drastic measures were needed in order to
be achieved. Makarios will to change the constitutional agreements, was against the T/C
opinion and the G/C demand for domination and sovereignty had to be achieved only with the
oppression of the opposite voice. The T/C community was seen as a minority and not as an
equal community. On the other hand, T/C had always in mind the partition of the island as
their way to rule a part of it, against the G/C majority of the island. According to Evera, if a
nation has achieved its statehood, has now limited unity goals and no aim to rule other
nationalities; then the respect towards any minority is true and the chance for conflict is
limited. Cyprus case is clearly the opposite of Evra’s perfect state of nation and all of our
evidences give many chances for a conflict or war to break up. 188 Posen’s argument that
nationalism creates massive armies, ready to be sacrificed in the name of its nation; can be
also used in Cyprus’s case. As we saw, the need for a united Cypriot army (National Guard)
was necessary to deal with the T/C and Turkish threats. The Turkish factor was seen as the
enemy that wanted to prevent the expansion of the Greek nation and the best way to deal with
that was the recruitment of civilians as soldiers. An army like that had to be build and its
foundation had to be the national pride. Nationalism is used, to keep the people of certain
nation united and focused on their national goals. This is done by polarization; and as
Kunovic and Deitelbaum argue in the historiographical chapter, this polarization is used in
favour of the inside group (G/C or T/C community), but also against the outside group. This
polarization will automatically shape the enemy and it will lead towards the final conflict.
While the level of polarization in each community was reaching its high top, the enemy was
seen more clearly; as well as the measures that had to be taken against them. Another
argument that can be linked from the historiographical findings about nationalism’s
involvement in cases of conflict, it’s its connection with religion. Just like the Yugoslavian
example; also in Cyprus, past memories based on religious differences, came back to the
surface as an excuse for all retaliation atrocities for this “so called” perpetual battle between
Islam and Christianity. Out of sudden, the G/C felt the need to take revenge for the 400 years
of Ottoman sovereignty over their lands and the Minor Asia catastrophe, blaming Islam for
being a imperialistic and bloodthirsty religion; while the T/C were afraid that the same policy
188 Van Evera, ‘Hypothesis on Nationalism and War’, 8.
56
that was used against the Turkish population of Crete, would be used here also as an attempt
to force the Great Idea plan for reinstatement of the Byzantine Empire. Through the analysis
of the notion nationalism (introduction chapter), two certain models arose: the French-British
model which can be named as individualistic (civic) and the German one, Collectivistic
(ethnic). Based on Greenfeld and Chirot, the “ethnic” one is more close to conflicts than the
“civic” one. Both Greek (G/C) and Turkish (T/C) nationalisms belong to the collectivistic
(ethnic) category, and you have to be born Greek or Turkish to belong in their nation. Greek
nationalism has its roots based on religion-language-blood and culture while the Byzantine
territory is considered to be the actual size of the nation. It is built on traditions and
mythological doctrines. Not even the Orthodox dogma can ensure Greek-ness to a person as
he has to for fill all criteria.189 The same thing happens with Turkish nationalism; as being
Muslim means nothing if you don’t have Turkish blood. Their nationalistic movements,
combines their Ottoman features with their Ancient Turkish ones.190 Both of nationalities are
based on the pureness of the blood and the divine image of their nation. This result, as
Greenfelt argues, is very dangerous and increases the chances for a brutal conflict; as it did. 191
Last, the strong resonance which the Communist Party of Cyprus had, made the spreading of
nationalism easier and gave an extra motive for the two nationalistic movements to came to
conflict. As Paret’s arguments declare, the rise of the class struggle and socialist ideas played
a major role for the consolidation of nationalism.192 People had to choose between nationalism
and internationalism. While the first one was seen as love and loyalty towards their nation, the
second was considered an act of betrayal. The Communist Party of the Cyprus (A.K.E.L.) was
the enemy of both nationalistic movements and many member of it, lost their lives from
paramilitary fire. Most underground acts that were made by ultra-nationalist organizations
were excused in the name of the Soviet and communist threat.
Following the historiographical chapter, an introduction to Cyprus’s history was necessary to
get familiar with the identity of this Mediterranean island. A short description of every
important historical period of the island was given, with our attention being focused on the
relation between the two ethnical/religious communities. Three facts can be mentioned here to
summarize this chapter. First, the island has a clear Greek stigma on its identity which is still
viewable. Secondly, the Turkish minority can be seeing as a pure Cypriot element; due to its
500 years presence on the island. As much Cypriots the G/C are, the same thing can be said
for the T/C. Third and most important fact of this chapter, is the British colonization of
189 A. Triandafyllidou, M. Calloni, A. Mikrakis, ‘New Greek Nationalism’, in Sociological Research Online 2:1 (1997) http://www.socresonline.org.uk/2/1/7.html, 4.1-4.7.190 David Kushner, ‘Self-Perception and Identity in contemporary Turkey’, in Journal of Contemporary History 32:2 (1997) 219-223, passim. 191 Greenfeld, ‘Nationalism and aggression’, 86-88.192 Paret, ‘Nationalism and the sense of military obligation’, 4-5.
57
Cyprus and the way that its people was used to secure the British presence on the island. It
was with British initiatives, that the gap between these two communities got wider; and
allowed Turkey to have a rightful saying on Cyprus’s future. Next in line was my main
chapter, where the bi-communal killings of 1963-63 were presented and analyzed through
historical documents and secondary sources. This chapter covers the whole period, from the
very first steps of this newly formed state (1960) and Makarios’s will to change the
constitution in 1962, to the first armed conflict and the involvement of America. The last part
of that chapter was dedicated to a discussion about my findings and the influence of
nationalism. An evaluation of all foreign policies on the island (Greek-Turkish-British-
American-Soviet) was also necessary to draw a conclusion, after the importance that this
factor played during our examined period. Through this discussion, it becomes clear enough
that both nationalism and foreign interests had a great impact on the bi-communal killings and
Cyprus’s tragedy. Nationalism was brought to the island, as an impact of the massive
nationalistic movement that was developed in the early 20th century. It started as an attempt
from Greece to for fill its “Megali Idea” dream and ended separating the people into distinct
communities, in an attempt for one of the two to prevail. This was realized by the foreign
powers and it was seen as the easiest way to serve their interests. For sure nationalism was
needed, to keep both people united with their past and roots; but it also armed the society of
Cyprus with hate and bigotry. The T/C were not seeing any more as compatriots, but as a
threat towards Cyprus’s Hellenism. As it is proven by my findings, nationalism was later used
to serve foreign interests that wanted this island armed and divided. The communist threat
(along with the Soviet expansion) was an enough excuse for N.A.T.O’s plans to be put in
action. So as a final answer towards my research question we can certainly say that
nationalism was the main stream that pushed things towards this end. The thing that made
both Cyprus ethnical communities to look each other as an enemy was the extreme
nationalism. Its effects separated them and armed their communities. Even that it was not the
first time these both communities were alarmed by nationalism, it’s the first time that it
reached into mass conflict and killing. This was something new for Cyprus’s society and the
responsibility for its arrival can be almost equally given to both motherlands, and their need
to keep the island under their sovereignty, and also to the foreign interest; that for centuries
now have been fighting over the island. Both of them played a major role in this period and it
is like each one was securing the interests of the other. Foreign interest needed to keep both
communities under national elation; and national hate was secured by the impact of this
extreme nationalism.
So from my point of view, this research was successful; because not only it has
provided me with interesting findings and knowledge, but it’s also one of the first times that
the involvement of nationalism into Cyprus problem is examined under scientific recognized
58
criteria and arguments. If the society that nationalisms tries to control is multicultural, then
the possibilities for conflict are even bigger. Whether it is one major nationality against
minorities, or two equally sized nationalities, nationalism will push things towards the
ultimate prevalence. It might not be enough to prove that nationalism brings war and conflict
but it is more than clear that it’s a reason that might cause problems, especially in
multicultural societies. If the state is united under one nationality, like Germany or Japan,
then the enemy is found in an external factor, which prevents the nation to grow. It’s as
Niyazi Kizilyurek states:
“For nationalism, there is always an enemy that its existence prevents us to be complete. This
enemy is needed to create a stable and united nation. If you can’t define your enemy, then you
can’t define yourself; and your nation cannot stand out proud among others….”193
Cyprus is the perfect place for a state to be established, beyond any nation. All
nationalist struggles have failed, and brought only hate and conflicts. The attempts for
national victory, gave to the island the result of a divided land and an even more divided
Cypriot identity. Inefficient nationalistic efforts were unable to crystallize a national identity
or to create a new political one that could represent the whole Cyprus population. Cyprus
became a place where people are lost between the local, political and national identities.
Nationalism was not able to find any sufficient political expression and so today is all about
who is more Greek or Turkish in the island. Inside the G/C community, nationalism is
expressed with a demand for the principle of majority, while in the T/C community is
expressed with a demand for secession. None of these demands can bring the two people
closer and together. Nationalism in Cyprus is an obsolete ideology and its internal
contradictions and controversies have led both communities into troubles and failures. These
troubles can be solved only with solutions beyond any nationalistic logic. If Cyprus wants to
be ever united, then nationalism should be removed from any political dream. Then Cyprus
can be an island where all people, with all of their identities (Greek-Turkish-G/C-T/C-Nicosia
resident-Famagusta residence) can co-exist together peacefully. Let’s hope that all old
nationalists leave their lust for national victory behind and build a state beyond any nation,
which will be an example for the whole world society, to leave in peace and harmony.
193 Nιαζι Κιζιλγιουρεκ, Cyprus: A national dead end, 103.
59
Appendices1. Makarios III (Quote from Anwers.com): (born Aug. 13, 1913, Pano Panayia, Cyprus
— died Aug. 3, 1977, Nicosia) Archbishop and primate of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus
and president of Cyprus (1959 – 77). Son of a poor shepherd, he was ordained in 1946;
he became bishop in 1948 and archbishop in 1950. A supporter of Cyprus's union with
Greece, opposing both independence and partition, he negotiated with the British
governor of Cyprus (1955 – 56) but was arrested for sedition and exiled. In 1959 he
accepted independence for Cyprus and was elected president, with a Turkish vice
president. Twice reelected, he fled Cyprus following an attempted coup by the Greek
Cypriot National Guard (1974). Despite a subsequent invasion by Turkey and the
establishment of a separate Turkish Cypriot state in the north, he resisted partition of the
country.194
2. Georgios Grivas “Digenis”: Georgios Grivas (born on May 22,1897, in Trikomo village
of North East Cyprus), also known by his military name “Digenis”, was a Cypriot general
in the Greek army and the leader of both EOKA and EOKA B’ (guerrilla and paramilitary
organizations). He was known for his strong national pride and for his hatred against
Turkey and communism. He was accused for adopting fascist ideologies and for the
execution, under his command, of many Turkish Cypriots, British soldiers and people
associated with communist ideas. Up to day, he still has strong supporters but also strong
enemies in Cyprus life. He participated in the Asia Minor campaign of 1922 and as many
support; his experience from there marked the rest of his life, shaping his ideas for ever.
During the German-Italian-Bulgarian occupation of Greece in World War II he created
194 Answer.com, ‘Britannica Concise Encyclopedia: Makarios III’ http://www.answers.com/topic/makarios-iii, 29/5/2010.
60
the Organization X, which its acts still remain controversial. He was the co-founder and
military leader of E.O.K.A organization, a guerilla group that fought the British during
the late period of Cyprus colonization (1955-59) and had as an aim the union with
Greece. As a continuation of E.O.K.A, he created E.O.K.A B’ and had as a target the
assassination of President Makarios III and the overthrown of Cyprus Republic by
enforcing the union with Greece. He died out of heart failure at the age of 75 (Jan. 27,
1974) six months before the coup d’ etat (that was made by his paramilitary organization)
of July 1974 and the Turkish invasion that this action caused.195
3. Rauf Denktash: Rauf Raif Denktash (born in Paphos of Cyprus at 26 Jan. 1924) is the
founder and first president of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (T.R.N.C), a de facto
state that is only recognized by Turkey. He was the president of T.R.N.C until 2005.
Known for his nationalistic ideas and ethnical pride, he helped the founding of the T.M.T
organization as a resisting act against the E.O.K.A struggle for union of Cyprus with
Greece. He was been accuse for having extreme ultra-nationalistic ideas and for ordering
the assassination of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots communists as well as
general opponents. Like Georgios Grivas, his reputation is also high in Cyprus with many
supporters and enemies.196
4. Fazil Kucuk: Fazil Kucuk was the first Turkish Cypriot Vice President of the Republic
of Cyprus. He was born in Nicosia at 1906, and during his studies in Istanbul-Lausanne-
Paris he obtained a medicine degree. He was always interested in politics and during the
British colonization of Cyprus he was fighting for the rights of the T/C community,
publishing the newspaper “Halkin Sensi” (The voice of the people). He was one of the co-
founders of the “Association of the Turkish minority of the island of Cyprus” also known
as K.A.T.A.K party. His disagreement with some other members, forced him to leave and
establish the “Turkish Cypriot National Union Party”. He represented the T/C community
during the London-Zurich conferences and did manage to secure constitutional safeguards
for his people. He was elected as the first Vice president of the newly formed state and
despite all the conflicts of the 60s he remained at his position until 1973. He died the year
1984, few months after the unilateral declaration of Independence of the auto-proclaimed
Turkish Republic of Cyprus.197
195 Λεωνιδας Φ. Λεωνιδου, Γεωργιος Γριβας Διγενης-Βιογραφια-Πρωτος τομος 1897-1950 (Georgios Grivas Digenis-Biography-Volume: A 1897-1950), (Cyprus 1995).Λεωνιδας Φ. Λεωνιδου, Γεωργιος Γριβας Διγενης-Βιογραφια-Δευτερος τομος 1950-1959 (Georgios Grivas Digenis-Biography-Volume: B 1950-1959), (Nicosia 1997)."The Survivor". Time Magazine, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,905841,00.html February 28, 1972 and Retrieved 2008-04-24.196 People and life, ‘Rauf Raif Denktash’,http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/people/famous/ppl-raufdenktash.htm, (29/5/2010). Ηρακλειδης, Cyprus problem, 219-230.197 People and life, “Dr Fazil Kucuk”, http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/people/famous/ppl-drfazilkucuk.htm, (30/5/2010).
61
5. Zurich-London agreements: quoted from¨ ΚΥΠΡΟΣ - ΝΕΤ 198 :
DRAFT TREATY CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
CYPRUS. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of
Greece and the Republic of Turkey of the one part and the Republic of Cyprus of the
other part; Desiring to make provisions to give effect to the Declaration made by the
Government of the United Kingdom on the 17th of February, 1959, during the
Conference at London, in accordance with the subsequent Declarations made at the
Conference by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, by the Representative of the
Greek Cypriot Community and by the Representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community;
Taking note of the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee signed to-day by the Parties to this
Treaty; Have agreed as follows:—
ARTICLE 1:The territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall comprise the Island of Cyprus,
together with the islands Iying off its coast, with the exception of the two areas defined in
Annex A to this Treaty, which areas shall remain under the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom. These areas are in this Treaty and its Annexes referred to as the Akrotiri
Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area.
ARTICLE 2: (1) The Republic of Cyprus shall accord to the United Kingdom the rights
set forth in Annex B to this Treaty. (2) The Republic of Cyprus shall co-operate fully with
the United Kingdom to ensure the security and effective operation of the military bases
situated in the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, and
the full enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights conferred by this Treaty.
ARTICLE 3: The Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom
undertake to consult and co-operate in the common defense of Cyprus. ARTICLE 4: The
arrangements concerning the status of forces in the Island of Cyprus shall be those
contained in Annex C to this Treaty. ARTICLE 5: The Republic of Cyprus shall secure to
everyone within its jurisdiction human rights and fundamental freedoms comparable to
those set out in Section I of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on the 4th of November, 1950, and the
Protocol to that Convention signed at Paris on the 20th of March, 1952. ARTICLE 6:
The arrangements concerning the nationality of persons affected by the establishment of
the Republic of Cyprus shall be those contained in Annex D to this Treaty. ARTICLE 7:
The Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom accept and undertake to carry out the
necessary financial and administrative arrangements to settle questions arising out of the
termination of British administration in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. These
arrangements are set forth in Annex E to this Treaty. ARTICLE 8: (1) All international
198 ΚΥΠΡΟΣ-ΝΕΤ, Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance treaty, http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/English/appendix_a.html, (29/5/2010).
62
obligations and responsibilities of the Government of the United Kingdom shall
henceforth, in so far as they may be held to have application to the Republic of Cyprus,
be assumed by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. (2) The international rights
and benefits heretofore enjoyed by the Government of the United Kingdom in virtue of
their application to the territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall henceforth be enjoyed by
the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. ARTICLE 9: The Parties to this Treaty accept
and undertake to carry out the arrangements concerning trade, commerce and other
matters set forth in Annex F to this Treaty. ARTICLE 10: Any question or difficulty as to
the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty shall be settled as follows:— (a) Any
question or difficulty that may arise over the operation of the military requirements of the
United Kingdom, or concerning the provisions of this Treaty in so far as they affect the
status, rights and obligations of United Kingdom forces or any other forces associated
with them under the terms of this Treaty, or of Greek, Turkish and Cypriot forces, shall
ordinarily be settled by negotiation between the tripartite Headquarters of the Republic of
Cyprus, Greece and Turkey and the authorities of the armed forces of the United
Kingdom.(b) Any question or difficulty as to the interpretation of the provisions of this
Treaty on which agreement cannot be reached by negotiation between the military
authorities in the cases described above, or, in other cases, by negotiation between the
Parties concerned through the diplomatic channel, shall be referred for final decision to a
tribunal appointed for the purpose, which shall be composed of four representatives, one
each to be nominated by the Government of the United Kingdom, the Government of
Greece, the Government of Turkey and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus,
together with an independent chairman nominated by the President of the International
Court of Justice. If the President is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or of
the Republic of Cyprus or of Greece or of Turkey, the Vice-President shall be requested
to act; and, if he also is such a citizen, the next senior Judge of the Court. ARTICLE 11:
The Annexes to this Treaty shall have force and effect as integral part of this Treaty.
ARTICLE 12: This Treaty shall enter into force on signature by all the Parties to it.
DRAFT TREATY OF GUARANTEE
The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part, I. Considering that the recognition
and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of
Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their
common interest, II. Desiring to cooperate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created
by that Constitution, Have agreed as follows: ARTICLE I: The Republic of Cyprus
undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and
63
security, as well as respect for its Constitution. It undertakes not to participate, in whole
or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly
declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with
any other State or partition of the Island. ARTICLE II: Greece, Turkey and the United
Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of
the present Treaty, recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and
security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic
Articles of its Constitution. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake
to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or
indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.
ARTICLE III: The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the
integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the
United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance
with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia
on today's date. ARTICLE IV: In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present
Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with
respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those
provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each the
three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-
establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty. ARTICLE V: The present
Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The High Contracting Parties shall
proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of
the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
DRAFT TREATY OF ALLIANCE
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey,
I. In their common desire to uphold peace and to preserve the security of each of them,
II. Considering that their efforts for the preservation of peace and security are in
conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, Have agreed
as follows ARTICLE: The High Contracting Parties undertake to cooperate for their
common defense and to consult together on the problems raised by that defense.
ARTICLE II: The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression,
direct or indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the
Republic of Cyprus. ARTICLE III: For the purpose of this alliance and in order to
achieve the object mentioned above, a Tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the
territory of the Republic of Cyprus. ARTICLE IV: Greece and Turkey shall participate in
the Tripartite Headquarters so established with the military contingents laid down in
64
Additional Protocol No. 1 annexed to the present Treaty. The said contingents shall
provide for the training of the army of the Republic of Cyprus. ARTICLE V: The
Command of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation, for a period of one
year each, by a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer, who shall be appointed
respectively by the Governments of Greece and Turkey and by the President and the
Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus. ARTICLE VI: The present Treaty shall enter
into force on the date of signature. The High Contracting Parties shall conclude additional
agreements if the application of the present Treaty renders them necessary. The High
Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible with the registration of the present
Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in conformity with Article 102 of the
United Nations Charter.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL No. I
The Greek and Turkish contingents which are to participate in the Tripartite Headquarters
shall comprise respectively 950 Greek officers. Noncommissioned officers and men, and
650 Turkish officers, noncommissioned officers and men. II. The President and the Vice-
President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in agreement, may request the Greek and
Turkish Governments to increase or reduce the Greek and Turkish contingents. III. It is
agreed that the sites of the cantonments for the Greek and Turkish contingents
participating in the Tripartite Headquarters. their juridical status, facilities and exemptions
in respect of customs and taxes. as well as other immunities and privileges and any other
military and technical questions concerning the organisation and operation of the
Headquarters mentioned above shall be determined by a Special Convention which shall
come into force not later than the Treaty of Alliance. IV. It is likewise agreed that the
Tripartite Headquarters shall be set up not later than three months after the completion of
the tasks of the Mixed Commission for the Cyprus Constitution and shall consist. in the
initial period, of a limited number of officers charged with the training of the armed
forces of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish contingents mentioned above
will arrive in Cyprus on the date of signature of the Treaty of Alliance.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL No. II
ARTICLE I: A Committee shall be set up consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus,
Greece and Turkey. It shall constitute the supreme political body of the Tripartite
Alliance and may take cognizance of any question concerning the Alliance which the
Governments of the three Allied countries shall agree to submit to it. ARTICLE II: The
Committee of Ministers shall meet in ordinary session once a year. In a matter of urgency
the Committee of Ministers can be convened in special session by its Chairman at the
request of one of the members of the Alliance. Decisions of the Committee of Ministers
shall be unanimous. ARTICLE III: The Committee of Ministers shall be presided over in
65
rotation and for a period of one year, by each of the three Foreign Ministers. It will hold
its ordinary sessions, unless it is decided otherwise, in the capital of the
Chairman's country. The Chairman shall, during the year in which he holds office, preside
over sessions of the Committee of Ministers, both ordinary and special. The Committee
may set up subsidiary bodies whenever it shall judge it to be necessary for the fulfillment
of its task. ARTICLE IV: The Tripartite Headquarters established by the Treaty of
Alliance shall be responsible to the Committee of Ministers in the performance of its
functions. It shall submit to it, during the Committee's ordinary session an annual report
comprising a detailed account of the Headquarter’s activities.
6. Polycarpos Georgadjis: Polycarpos Georgadjis was a Cypriot politician, known for his
service as the first Minister of Interior of Cyprus Republic and as an E.O.K.A fighter
during the colonial era. He had a mysterious life, due to his involvement into paramilitary
organizations such as the “AKRITAS” one (who had as target the elimination, of the T/C
community and the communist ideas; and as an aim the union with Greece). He was one
of president Makarios stronger supporters and turned to be one of his most devoted
enemies. He was been accused for involvement into an attempt against Makarios life. A
week later (15/3/1970) he was murdered and his death still remains a mystery.199
7. «Megali Idea» (Great Idea) : was the main ideology of the Greek state, but also of the
Greek mentality in general, since the establishment of the Greek state, 1830.200 At the
beginning, it was just a notion in the minds of the Greek politicians and people, but in the
20th century this idea was put into action, with all the national claims for the irredentist
land and their hopes for better border settlement. Due to the fact that important territorial
attachments were made in the name of «Megali Idea» the full concept had never been
achieved. The reasons for this failure are very important if we want to understand Modern
Greek history. First of all, the biggest blame goes to the inadequate of the Greek
politicians and military leaders. Greece was never a state with calm and stable political
life and the fact that many coup took place in its history, speaks for its own. They did not
have a solid political line to follow and this made the foreign affairs policy, very difficult.
A second, but also important reason, for the failure of «Megali Idea» was the key role of
the Great European Powers that always interfered in the region for their own benefits.201
England, France, Russia, Germany are responsible for Greece’s failures but this is not an
199 Ανδρεας Νεοφυτου, Πολυκαρπος Γιωρκατζης: Οι τελευταιες του στιγμες (Polycarpos Giorgadjis: His last moments), (Nicosia 1994), passim.200Θ.Καλαϊτζακη, ‘Η Μεγαλη Ιδεα ως κεντρικος αξονας της Ελληνικης Εξωτερικης Πολιτικης (1830-1932) in Στρατιωτικη επιθεωριση (Ιαν-Φεβ 2006), [(Great Idea as the main idea of Greeks foreign policy (1830-1932) in Military review (Jan-Feb 2006)], 42-51.201 Καλαϊτζακη, ‘Great Idea as the main idea of Greeks foreign policy (1830-1932)’, 42-43.
66
excuse for the Greek politicians. Most of the fault belongs to them and to the way they
treated major national problems.
Bibliography:
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