the impact of dual use controls on uk science: results from a pilot study
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The impact of dual use controls on UK science: results from a pilot study. Dr Caitr í ona McLeish & Dr Paul Nightingale Sussex Day 16 th March 2005. Background to the pilot project. Basic question:Have attempts to secure life sciences against misuse affected its practice in the UK? - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Dr Caitríona McLeish & Dr Paul NightingaleSussex Day 16th March 2005
The impact of dual use The impact of dual use controls on UK science:controls on UK science:
results from a pilot results from a pilot studystudy
Background to the pilot projectBackground to the pilot project
Basic question: Have attempts to secure life sciences against misuse affected its practice in the UK?
Anecdotal evidence from the USA and Germany that governing dual use has impacted on practice of science
Reclassification of scientific knowledge
Redirection of science
Spread of technical capabilities
Global affects of biosecurity controls
What is happening in the UK?
Highlights: legal barriers against misuseHighlights: legal barriers against misuse
2001 Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act
Part 7 and part 14
Schedule 5 pathogens and toxins
19 viruses, 5 rickettsiae, 13 bacteria, 11 toxinsInclude genetic material or GMO containing a sequence
Notify if keeping or using these pathogens
Notify who has access to these pathogens
Disposal requirements for these pathogens
Highlights: other legal barriers against misuseHighlights: other legal barriers against misuse
1974 Biological Weapons Act
Ratifies the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
Criminal offence to develop produce stockpile acquire or retain any biological agent or toxin of a type and in a quantity that has no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes
Any weapon, equipment or means of delivery designed to use biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict
Amended by Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001
Criminal offence to transfer or make arrangements to transfer
Applies to acts done outside the UK but only if they are done by a UK person
Highlights: other legal barriers against misuse Highlights: other legal barriers against misuse (continued)(continued)
2000 Terrorism Act
Providing or receiving instruction or training in the making or use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons
Inviting another person to receive such training, inside or outside the UK
Inciting another person to commit an act of terrorism wholly or partly outside the UK where the act includes … poisoning
Reference to Sections 23 and 24 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (administering poison, and administering poison so as to endanger life)
1. How institutions operate under biosafety and biosecurity regimes
2. Have the new biosecurity requirements impacted on current R&D programmes?
Are their concerns about future impacts?
3. What is the perception of current interaction between scientific practitioners and the government designers of these regulations?
Could this interaction be improved?
Pilot project objectivesPilot project objectives
Project methodsProject methods
Needed to create a community
Scientists, funders of science, biosafety personnel and biosecurity officials
Practioners connected to listed pathogens and toxins
The sample was constructed using standard bibliometric methods
plus triangulation with other datasets
Core sample of 100 Use of a control group not associated with listed pathogens Total sample size was 128
Project methods (continued)Project methods (continued)
Questionnaire
Needed to effectively communicate across barriers Sections of questionnaire: background information, impact on
administrative costs and benefits, institutional costs and benefits and perceptions
Validated over a six month period
Interviews
27 in-depth interviews
Exploration of questionnaire responses and test general trends
The project achieved a 53% response rate (68 usable responses)
Profile of the sampleProfile of the sample
All practising scientists in the sample worked with listed agents
71% with pathogens, 76% with toxins 91% with the genetic material
71% overall responsibility for research projects
68% day-to-day managers of laboratories
53% actively engaged in research
56% previously interaction with officials
Majority of total respondents located in university/teaching institutions (68%)
Government labs (9%) and commercial R&D facilities (6%)
Typical institution size: 11 and 100 active researchers
91% hazard group 2, 74% hazard group 3
79% under conditions of containment
General findingsGeneral findings
Results suggest introduction in the UK has not had the same negative impact as has been reported in the US and Germany
Success of implementation related to
1. Pre-existing security and biosafety measures
2. A responsive approach to regulation by the implementing body
3. Flexible and socially responsible reaction by the scientific community
Future implementation could be more difficult
How did the sample get its information?How did the sample get its information?
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Receipt oftargeted HSE
material
Proactivescanning of
H&S literature
Receipt oftargeted
informationfrom other
governmentagencies
Personalscanning of
wider sources
Receipt oftargetedDEFRAmaterial
Informationfrom other
bodies
Other
‘‘Biosecurity’ procedures in place prior to 2001Biosecurity’ procedures in place prior to 2001
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Containment Access byshort-termworkers
Acquisition Disposal Access byoccasional
visitors
Offsitetransfers
Onsitetransfers
Proposals topublish
Changes to operational procedures since 2001Changes to operational procedures since 2001
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Increasedattention tobiosafetymeasures
Morerigorous
(safety) riskassessment
Improvedrecording andregulation ofpossession
Increasedrequirementsfor material
safety
More attentionto ethicalreviews
Review ofpersonnel
with currentaccess
Increasedsecurityauditing
requirements
Increasedtraining
requirements
Increasedscreening for
proposedaccess
Suitability ofdata for
publication
Major complications or setbacks experienced since 2001Major complications or setbacks experienced since 2001
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
No majorcomplicationsor setbacks
Diff iculty inobtaining
pathogens ortoxins
Increasedmandatorybiosafety
requirements
Increasedmandatorybiosecurity
requirements
Changes tow aste disposalrequirements
Increasedmandatory
licencerequirements
Other Diff iculty inobtainingpieces ofequipment
Who ought to have responsibility for protecting Who ought to have responsibility for protecting the life sciences against misuse?the life sciences against misuse?
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Theinstitutions
themselves
The scientificcommunity at
large
Governmentofficialsprimarily
involved withhealth or
safety
Bodies thatfund research
Othergovernment
officialsprimarily
involved insecurity
Governmentofficialsprimarily
involved inexport
controls
Scientificjournals
The Police Industrialorganisations
Which biosecurity policies are worth considering?Which biosecurity policies are worth considering?
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Increasedsecurity
checks oncurrent
personnel
Increasedscreening of
newpersonnel
Procedures toauthorise and
control of f -site transfers
Increasedmaterialcontrol
Scrutiny byfundingbodies
Scrutiny byscientif icjournals
More rigorous(safety) riskassessmentof proposed
w ork
More rigorousethical reviewof proposed
w ork
Codes ofconduct
Denyingaccess to
nationals f romcountries of
concern
Analysis
Important to recognise these are pilot study results
Results are indicative rather than conclusive
Results suggest that the sample believes implementation of new biosecurity controls in the UK has been conducted very successfully
79% regarded the current balance as satisfactory
Possibility that research was performed too early
The lack of substantial disruption is an important finding
Suggests science and security do not necessarily have to be in conflict with one another
Analysis (continued)
Three factors that have contributed to the successful implementation (thus far) of UK biosecurity controls:
1. Pre-existing biosafety measures which ensured a degree of biosecurity prior to ATCSA
2. A responsive approach to regulation by the implementing body
3. A flexible and socially responsible reaction to the new controls by the UK scientific community
Factors influencing successful implementation 1: Factors influencing successful implementation 1: biosafety and biosecuritybiosafety and biosecurity
Recurring theme in this project
Implementation of UK biosecurity measures has drawn heavily on the biosafety model
‘Flexible system’ has since created procedures to deal with a range of security issues
Concentrated on tightening existing practices rather than introducing radically new requirements
Some of the procedural changes might as easily have occurred as a result of the periodic reviews of biosafety as specifically in response to biosecurity legislation
Factors influencing successful implementation 2: Factors influencing successful implementation 2: the implementation processthe implementation process
Effective implementation is challenging
Implementing body has come close to producing a textbook example of successful change management
Exploited pre-existing links and channels of communication
Biosafety as avenues into the scientific research community
Non-confrontational approach
Has to some extent been responsive to the organisational culture of the scientific community
However, only 21% of the sample supported the police taking the role of protecting the life sciences
Current low support may increase once direct communication begins
Factors influencing successful implementationFactors influencing successful implementation 3: 3: the response of the scientific communitythe response of the scientific community
Proactive response of this sample of the scientific community
Recognised that scientific research does not exist within a moral or social vacuum
Recognised the need to be responsive to public concerns
General awareness about current issues relating to misuse was quite low
Much higher level of awareness about how a scientist might unknowingly contribute
Believed awareness could improve if there was an opportunity for increased interaction with designers of biosecurity policies
Factors influencing successful implementationFactors influencing successful implementation 3: 3: the response of the scientific community (continued)the response of the scientific community (continued)
Many in the sample repeatedly expressed their desire to be better guardians of their science
Requires a better understanding
Their desire to have more active engagement unlikely to be a result of any perceived direct benefit
Stems from revulsion towards the possibility of their legitimate science being misused
Concerns about the impact of inappropriate regulations
Risk management and the scientific communityRisk management and the scientific community
Project findings suggest a major change in how the scientific community conceives of risk and attempts to manage it
Social legitimacy of scientific knowledge is increasingly dependent on scientists engaging with wider society
Consistency of project responses suggests a subpopulation of the scientific community that
Recognises the risks of misuse of scientific knowledge
Recognises the importance of perceptions of that risk
Recognises their role in responding to those perceptions
Policy issue: provide them with the time and resources they need to effectively engage in policy making
Final reflectionsFinal reflections
Thus far implementation of UK biosecurity controls seems to have been performed with limited negative impact on the scientific community
Less disruptive in the UK than has been reported for the US and German scientific communities
Necessary to regularly review the impact of dual use controls on UK science
This project has developed and validated a methodology to identify relevant members of the scientific community and obtain such information
Final reflections (continued)Final reflections (continued)
Biosecurity policies need a two-stage implementation process
First stage is securing adherence with minimal costs
Second stage is culture change within the scientific community
Second stage may require a change in to the type of interaction currently undertaken to take into consideration
Cultural norms
Work practices
An appreciation of these norms and practices will
Reduce potential resistance to new or extended biosecurity legislation
May encourage full and effective participation in UK efforts to reduce the threat from biological weapons