the igc 2004 a simulation game objectives - roles & rules of the game cowas – be a european...
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The IGC 2004 A Simulation Game
objectives - roles &
rules of the game
CoWaS – Be a European Decision Maker
Brussels, 22/23.03.2004
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Overview• Session I - today
– Introduction of the “game”• What is an IGC?• The subjects • Distribution of roles
• Session II- tomorrow– The objectives and tasks of a Simulation
Game• Research (Documents and Literature)• Positions papers• Communication
– TacticsBruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Introduction of the game: What are you doing??
Art. 48 TEUThe government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to the
Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties on which the Union is founded.
If the Council, after consulting the European Parliament and, where appropriate, the Commission, delivers an opinion in favour of calling a conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States, the conference shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of determining by common accord the amendments to be made to those Treaties. The European Central Bank shall also be consulted in the case of institutional changes in the monetary area.
The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
thus, only an IGC can change the treaties And you are the masters of the treaties – Heads of States, Prime
Ministers, Foreign Affairs Ministers, Commissioners and European Parliamentarians
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
What is the IGC - 2004
• Post-Nice Process• Laeken declaration• Convention• Draft treaty establishing a
‘European Constitution’• Call of IGC in October 2003
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
The issues at stake:
- already achieved (you are not negotiating in a vacuum):
- Draft Constitutional treaty consensually adopted by European Convention:
- new structure- incorporation of Charta of fundamental rights- distribution of competences- deal on institutional reform
- However!!!: Draft Constitutional Treaty only a ‘good basis’ for the work of the Convention
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Still / again to be settled!!
- not everybody happy with Convention results
- your targets: 1) Reform of the institutions (European
Council; Council; European Commission, EP;)
2) Role of national parliaments
3) Division of Competences
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
And now…to the game - You are performing a role reflecting the ‘real’ composition of the IGC 2004
- Your position is ruffly explained to you in your negotiation dossier (handed out in a minute)
- We are following the official rules of the IGC:
- high level negotiations (each team at least two members)
- unanimity (final result has to be reached consensually)
- EP / Commission participation (they can speak but cannot vote)
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Who participates in the IGC?
• Presidency (2)• Council Secretariat (2)• Member States (Head of State / Prime
Minister, Foreign Minister per Country)
• European Commission (2)• European Parliament (2)
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
1) Presidency (Ireland)
• Small member state • truthful agent and mediator• Most successful process of cohesion policy • afraid of giving-up national sovereignty
Special tasks and rights • The presidency is running the show
– decide on negotiation objectives – Chairing the negotiation sessions (determining the agenda)– Allocating speaking time – call of informal sessions, distribution of ‘non-papers’
• coalition building between allies and partners• Major aim: ‘getting to yes’• Relies on support of secretariat (very close co-operation)
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
2) Council Secretariat
• Crucial role• Formally: simply support of presidency
– minutes / synthesis report – together with presidium – Collecting written interventions– Timing of the meetings
• But: Power of drafters– Importance of the first text– can help to build informal compromise (in mission of
presidency?)
• tension between member states interest and EU interests
• own interests
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
3) European Commission
• Formal role in IGC used to be limited • This time fully involved (exempt voting) • administration or government• proposals by the Commission are based
on current institutional framework • Role of mediator between member
states (any result better than no result)
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
4) European Parliament
• Formally no role in an IGC• However: this time fully included in
negotiations (no voting right) • Neo-federalist position• relationship to national parliaments and
national parliamentarians • Aims to increase its position within the
institutional architecture
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
As to the member states: 3) Germany
- federal state
- size of the country
- relationship to other larges countries
- geographical circumstances (stressing enlargement)
- current economic problems
- German elections in 2002
- Pro-integrationist attitude
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
4) France
• relationship of French president and prime minister
• strong role of government / weak role of assemblée
• centralized state
• “Grande nation”
• elections in 2002
• European cleavage in party system?
• combination of supranational and intergovernmental politics
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
5) United Kingdom
• no written constitution
• devolution process
• opting out EMU
• Eurosceptical people / public opinion
• Thatcher: family of nations concept
• European cleavage in party system?
• Change or continuity with New Labour
• fear of a European super-state
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
6) Italy
• Berlusconi government
• unstable party system
• pro EU politics / linked to long-term federalist approaches
• Italian regions with merely consultative character
• stresses the reduction of the legitimacy deficit
• emphasizes importance of CFSP
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
7) Spain
• absolutely majority for Aznar government
• stressing the importance of cohesion funds
• high support of population for EU
• asymmetrical regionalisation
• problem of terrorism (ETA)
• still problems with UK concerning Gibraltar
• promising economic situation
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
8) The Netherlands
• Consensus model
• Euro-skeptical people
• European cleavage in party system?
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
9) Sweden
• long tradition of neutrality
• Importance of welfare state
• Consensus / negotiation model
• open access to the public state
• recent changes / erosion of specific swedish model
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
10) Denmark
• basically against a constitution
• role of a referendum
• Eurosceptical people and
• new government (Anders Fogh Rasmussen)• Strong role of Danish parliament in EU questions
• European cleavage in party system?
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
11) Poland
• importance of agriculture
• size of the country
• new constitution of May 1997
• heavy problems in administration building
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
12) Hungary
• elections in 2002
• increased economic growth
• reduced unemployment
• problems with reform of public administration
• people are very much in favor of application
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Part II: Simulation Games- Overview
• What are Simulation Games?– Functions– Objectives– Structure of a Simulation
• Acting in Simulations– Preparing Negotiations– Actor Analysis– Tactics
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Simulation Games
• ... can show and explain complex and even unknown structures
• ... can develop "soft skills" of participants – observing, negotiation and moderation skills
• ... can show and explain social and intercultural behaviour:– connected to everyday experiences – build-up a knowledge base of behavioural skills
• ...can be easily used by actors with different cultural background: – it confronts and addresses prejudices – and stereotypes of other cultures
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Objectives I - Research
– on the current constitutional debate in the EU
– on general background of the institutional architecture
– on specific interests of country or institution represented by the team
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Objectives II – soft skills
• Improvement and grounded experience of EU negotiations
• Improvement of communication skills • Improving drafting capabilities (position
papers/ treaty text) • Complexity of Multi-lateral bargaining
and the art of arguing
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Deliverables - The Position Papers
• Important deliverable (for each group)• Maximum paper
– Contains your positions (as shown to the others)– Indicate some room of manoeuvre – Indicate possible allies (to make your position stronger)
• Precise language / short (3 pages)• Should help to guide you through the negotiations• Minimum Paper
– Define your fall-back positions– Only to be shown to the teaching staff
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Sample Assessment Sheet
• factual knowledge• research skills• presentation skills• communication skills• negotiation skills• position papers • Academic papers
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Before you start working: Strategies and Tactics
Constitution?- between dynamics and status quo- are you dying for change or dying for Nice?
- Good negotiation position anyway?
Avoiding conflicts?- starting with identifying controversial issues or searching for consensus
Cleavages?- national vs. European level - federal / parliamentary vs. Intergovernmental approach- smaller vs. larger member states
Preparing negotiation
• Set goals– identify obstacles, and fix a time line
start by clearly stating the goal you hope to achieve– Try to get deals done even before the negotiations start
• Fix sub-goals – Identify smaller obstacles that could stop you from
reaching the main goal– Give them numbers until a deadline– or fix a sub-goals set-out from the start to the end
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Actor analysis
• Culture:– Research the cultures of those with whom you
are negotiating
• Personality– Research the personality and likely approach
they will take
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Tactics
• "it ‘s not me"
• warning of consequences
• good & bad guy/girl (cop)
• risk of the rival
• fictional deadline
• done deal
• win-win
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Tactics I
• "it‘s not me" – claim that you are not responsible for the decision. If faced
with this, always try to go to the one who is responsible! – NB: if you use this, it risks undermining your authority as a
negotiator
• warning of consequences – "if you do not do x, then y will happen". – Dangerous: the claim is likely to become public some day,
and may actually provoke y! Alternatively, they may call your bluff, and if nothing happens, your credibility is damaged
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Tactics II
• good & bad guy/girl – one person plays tough, the other is conciliatory. – Especially when you are negotiating on two levels
• risk of the rival – "if you do not do this deal with me, I will go to your
rival„
• fictional deadlines – "we have to do this before x date, as otherwise y".
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Tactics III
• done deal – the issue is solved before the meeting starts by
the assistants or juniors
• win-win – identify those issues where both sides gain
from a deal: preferably the low cost, high value
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne
Methods I
• Official framework set by the presidency– Time table
– Rules of procedure
– Request for official papers
– Presenting compromises or first txt
• You can get active as well– Start initiatives
– Get active with possible allies
– Distribute ‘press releases’
Methods II
• How can you do that?– Use Email (we’ll set up a mailing list)– Use the Internet (you might want to create a
website)
• Important:– first consult in your group– Then go outside
Expected Results
1) Do a better Job!!! Negotiate and draft those parts of the European “Constitution“ where the December European Council failed
2) Play your role reasonably There should be no result which is obviously
running in total contrast to your original position !
Bruno Scholl, University of Cologne