THE HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE, I N SOCIAL SCIENCE:

THE CASE OF ERICH FROMM

KENNETH 0 ' BRI EN

B.A. (Honours) Soc ia l Sciences, U n i v e r s i t y o f L e i c e s t e r , England, 1968

M.A., Socio logy, Simon Fraser U n i v e r s i t y , 1969

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED I N PARTIAL FULFILMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

i n t h e Department

o f

Pol i t i c a l Science, Socio logy and Anthropology

@ KENNETH O'BRIEN 1972

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

A p r i l 1972

Name :

Degree :

T i t l e of D i

APPROVAL I

Kenneth 0 ' B r i e n

Doctor o f Phi 1 osophy

e r t a t i o n : The Humanist Perspect ive i n Soci a1 Science: The Case o f E r i c h Fromm

Examining Committee:

Chairman: Gary Rush

Ernest Becker Senior Superv isor

Ka r l Peter

H e r i b e r t Adam

J e r a l d Zasl ove

John ~ f i a a r Ex terna l Examiner

U n i v e r s i t y o f Cal i f o r n i a , Santa Cruz, Cal i f o r n i a

Date Approved: L$L3L3A97L

I

ABSTRACT

The d i s s e r t a t i o n i s an examinat ion o f E r i c h Fromm's c o n t r i b u -

t i o n t o humanist s o c i a l sc ience and a d iscuss ion o f t h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n .

I t i s suggested t h a t From~n's major c o n t r i b u t i o n i s n o t access ib le t o

s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s i n i t s d i r e c t l y apparent form. As a ser ious c o n t r i -

b u t i o n t o s o c i a l sc ience the immediately apparent meanings, o f Fromm's

ideas which a re rendered a t f i r s t read ing o f h i s w r i t i n g s , a re q u i t e

'decept ive. ' Th is decept ive q u a l i t y i n Fromm's opus has tended t o r e -

s u l t i n a number o f c r i t i c a l a r t i c l e s and books on Fromm which s t r e s s

h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n s as be ing t h a t o f an e t h i c a l ph i losopher r a t h e r than

as a s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t . This type o f judgement has ser ious i m p l i c a t i o n s

f o r t h e present s i t u a t i o n whereby Fronun's work i s g e n e r a l l y regarded

t o be on the pe r i phe ry o f " i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d s o c i a l sc ience" conceptual-

i z a t i o n s and consequent ly f o r advancement o f t he more recen t development

toward t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n o f t he var ious d i s c i p l i n e s which come

under t h e r u b r i c o f t h e s o c i a l sciences ( i .e., soc io logy , s o c i a l psy-

chology, p o l i t i c a l science and anthropology) .

The task o f t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n has been t o e x t r i c a t e a systemat ic

themat ic s t r u c t u r e i n Fromm's opus, through a hermeneutic. Two propo-

s i t i o n s u n d e r l i e t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Fromm's work presented i n t h i s

study. The f i r s t i s t h a t f o r Fromm humanism i s e s s e n t i a l l y a v e h i c l e

f o r t he r e a l i z a t i o n o f se l fhood f o r a l l mankind, where se l fhood imp l i es

t he r e a l i z a t i o n o f man's powers. The second p r o p o s i t i o n i s t h a t Fromm's

work i nvo l ves a cont inuous i n t e g r a t i o n o f soc ia l -psychology and

iii

sociology . A survey of 1 i terature,, on contemporary developments i n

the social sciences, indicate a gradual reawakening of in t e res t i n the

idea of incorporation of a humanist perspective in contemporary social

science. Such an incorporation tends to be increasingly viewed as a

means to ( a ) resolving the problems of an overly pos i t iv i s t i c empiri-

cism i n social science and, (b) providing the basis f o r the systematic

integration, a t the level of meta theory between the social psycho-

logical and the s t ructural level of analysis i n the social sciences.

The most s ignif icant conclusion drawn from the interpretat ive

scheme of the study i s tha t Fromm's work as a whole res t s on a concep-

t ion of social science as an attempted synthesis of the 'key' ideas of

Marx and Freud. The study presents a discussion of themes integrated

t o form a 'hexagon' along the following l ines: a concept of essence; a

sociological diachrony , in which the concept of character i s central ;

the concepts of power and humanism; an anthropology which is constituted

of a philosophical anthropology and ethnography; and a concept of s e l f .

These themes also provide the foci of orientation fo r the various

chapters of the work.

In terms of the foregoing, Fromm's conceptions of social char-

ac ter , his formulations on the nature of man and his a r t icu la t ion of

good and evil are substantive categories of "a second order" predicated

upon the e a r l i e r mentioned conception of social science. This conclu-

sion i s i n contrast t o most of Fromm's c r i t i c s who belong t o two

groups: psychologists in search of a theory of socio-psycho pathology,

and moral philosophers. The former group has tended to ignore the

problem of a humanistic social science, while the l a t t e r group has

emphasized the significance of From's ethical postulates without devel-

oping the interconnection between ethical postulates and the infra-

structural assumptions of social science, and empirical concepts such

as power, character, and so on. I t is asserted i n t h i s study tha t

e i ther treatment does not give f u l l scope to the potent ia l i t ies of

Fromrn's empirical categories of character and social s t ructure. This

disser tat ion is partly based on the proposition tha t when From's

theoretical conception of social science i s extricated from the body

of his writings we find a cogent argument for and a model of humanistic

social science, as well as a more ramified concept of social character.

In the f i rs t instance we find a systematic cr i t ique against much of

contemporary social science. In the second instance we find a view of

social character w i t h a f f i n i t i e s to Weber's ' ideal type' view of

social science. Moreover, in those terms the concepts of 'good' and

' e v i l ' a re conclusions of Fromm's work and not conditions derived from

his ' theore t ica l ' analysis of human nature, as so many of his c r i t i c s

argue.

Throughout the study attention i s focused, where appropriate

on the weaknesses of Fromm's formulations, most of which are substantive,

f o r example his analysis of character and of power necessitate some re-

formulation. Nevertheless his major contribution has been the ca l l fo r

r e f l ec t iv i ty i n social science theorizing, as an ingredient of the

humanistic approach.

I

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The ideas i n t h i s manuscript a re t h e product o f

a l ong h i s t o r y o f search f o r a s y n t h e t i c format f o r ex-

p ress ion o f a range o f a n a l y t i c a l , t h e o r e t i c a l and

p r a c t i c a l problems which come under the r u b r i c o f t he

s o c i a l sciences. While c l e a r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f such a

f.ormat i s impossib le a t t h i s stage o f development o f t he

task, I have developed a c l e a r e r view o f t h e c e n t r a l i t y

o f a humanist ic perspect ive t o such a format. 1 am i n -

debted t o D r . Ernest Becker f o r encouragement and

guidance, i n an area i n which one cou ld e a s i l y become

l o s t , when main ly l o f t y i n t e n t i o n s p r e v a i l . D r . Ka r l

Peter acted as an e f f e c t i v e 'sounding board' f o r many o f

my ideas and provided c r i t i c i s m f o r s p e c i f i c sec t ions o f

t h e work. D r . J e r a l d Zaslove has (worked) provided con-

s i s t e n t advice over t h e l a s t two years, through long

hours o f p a t i e n t , probing discussions. F i n a l l y , I am

indebted t o a 'non-academic' who 1

were too ' specu la t i ve ' b u t po in ted

cou ld n o t t raverse.

i s tened t o ideas wh

d i r e c t i o n s which I

,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x i

I. ERICH FROMM'S CONCEPT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE . . . . . . 1

Socio logy and the I l l u s i o n s o f R e a l i t y . . . . . The Socio logy o f Knowledge . . . . . . . . . Summary Remarks: Fromm's Place on the

Soci 01 ogy o f Know1 edge . . . . . . . . . . I n d u s t r i a l Technology and Soc ia l Science

Knowledge Summary: Kant 's I n f l uence on the M i l i e u x o f Marx and' Freud . . . . . . . .

Fromm's A r t i c u l a t i o n o f Freudian Categories . . , . "Hope," Knowledge and a Theory o f Soc ie ty :

A Summation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11. FROMM'S CONCEPT OF THE INDIVIDUAL . . . . . . . . Some Notes on the Concept o f Human Nature . . . . The Concept o f Essence i n Human Nature . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Human Nature i n the Phi losophy of Soc ia l

Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . From the P ropos i t i on o f Human Nature t o

the Theory o f Human Character . . . . . . . . An O u t l i n e o f Fromm's Theory of Human

Character . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter , Page

111. A DISCUSSION OF ERICH FROMM'S THEORY OF HUMAN CHARACTER AND THE INDIVIDUAL . . . . . . . 106

The Dilemma o f Modern Man as Located i n h i s Character S t ruc tu re . . . . . . . . . 1 24

Freedom from, Freedom and the Soci 01 ogi c a l D i achrony . . . . . , . . . . . . . . 128

The Contemporary Problem o f E v i l : The A u t h o r i t a r i a n Character . . . . , . . . . . 138

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

I V . POWER AND MORALITY: LACUNAE IN PARSONS' SOCIOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

I n t r o d u c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

The Parsoni an Def i n i t i o n s o f Power and M o r a l i t y . . 171

A C r i t i q u e o f : "On the Concept o f Pol i t i c a l Power" . . . , . . . . . . . . . , . 180

Parsons' Empi r ica l and I n t e r p r e t i v e Essays . . . . 191

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

V . FROMM ' S "THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS WRITINGS" AS THE SOURCE OF HIS ANTHROPOLOGICAL PREMISS . . . . 21 0

Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2

The Meaning o f the Theological as Anthropology . . . 21 3

Theology as Anthropology: Two Aspects o f t he T r a d i t i o n . . . . . . . . , , . , . 217

E r i ch Fromm's Anthropol ogy and the S o c i a l i s t Humanist T r a d i t i o n . . . . . . . . 226

The Second Aspect o f the T r a d i t i o n : "Academic Anthropology " . . . . . . . . . . 229

Chapter

i x

Page

An Analysis of the Ideational Aspects of Theology and the Early Christ ian Tradit ion in Fromm's Works . . . . . . . 232

A Presentation of Fromm's Substantive Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . 243

From ' s Analysis of Chris t and the Blending of the Philosophical and Evolutionist Tradit ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

"Primitive Chris t iani ty" and the Early Chris t ian Community . . . . . . . . . . 262

Man: The Messiah Attains Divine Grace . . . . 263

Synopsis . . . . e . . . . e . . . 271

Fromm's Misplaced Cr i t i c s . . * . . . . . 272

Summary . , . . . . . . . . . . . 281

VI. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SELF . . . . . . . . . 299

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . , . . . 346

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355

THE HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE, IN SOCIAL SCIENCE:

THE CASE OF ERICH FROMM

INTRODUCTION

Erich From's l i f e work can be summarized i n the question:

What i s the nature of e v i l , and how i s i t possible to develop a syste-

matic analysis of evi l t ha t i s a t once soc'iological and c l in ica l? Such

a concern i s by no means the sole prerogative of theologians and moral

philosophies. In f a c t , such a concern can be metaphorically expressed

as one s ide of a coin, the other s ide i s the concern with ' s e l f ' which

has been the undergirding of social science from i t s e a r l i e s t formula-

t ion.

Such a bold assertion in a study dedicated to the assertion

tha t Fromm i s a humanist social s c i e n t i s t , cannot unfortunately, move

d i rec t ly t o the examination of Fromm's substantive formulations because

existing in contemporary social sciences a re par t icular conceptions of

what consti tutes social science. In the ' ins t i tu t iona l ized' paradigms

o f social science the conceptions of what consti tutes social science

i s a t radical variance w i t h the implici t conception, of science, of

Erich From. Some discussion of the methodological features of aca-

demic social science, via the paradox of essence and existence, though

a 'detour' is an essential part of th i s disser tat ion. We will attempt

to demonstrate, a f t e r a presentation of Fromm's conception of social

science, t ha t par t of the reason f o r the present malaise i n sociologi-

cal methodology and theoretical development, ex is t s in the "dichotomi - zation" of essence and existence w i t h respect t o the problem of human

nature. We will show tha t i n the case of both grand theory schemes of

xi i

the Parsonian variety and in 'abstracted empiricism' they are caught

i n the misconception of a contradiction between essence and existence.

The significance of a humanist social science, such as tha t of Fromm's

is only adequately expressed against the background of a c r i t ique of

academic social science. B u t some methodologists and 'phi losophers of

social science' (which i s , by the way, a curious misnomer) have been

making the claims asserted here f o r a long time. In have i n mind writers

such as Baraun and Morris Cohen. Writings such as Erich Fromm's are

kept on the periphery of academic social science f o r the simple reason

tha t they are viewed as "value-laden," prescriptive and so on. There

a re , as l a t e r chapters will show, serious weaknesses in some of Erich

Fromm's substantive empirical formulations; b u t the grounds on which

humanism have been excluded are very weak. Morris Cohen's comments on

the nature of - a p r io r i s jus t i fy re i te ra t ion of such an assertion.

Briefly, Cohen points out - a pr ior i principles whose substances tend to

a s se r t uniformities i n nature, are method01 ogic, ass i s t ing sc i en t i s t s

i n the organization of factual knowledge. B u t Cohen a lso warns tha t

the substance o r content of the a pr ior i should be as such as not t o

s h u t out a l l issues making f o r the growth of science. Much will be made

i n t h i s disser tat ion of the analysis outlined by Cohen with spec i f ic

reference to the nature of the social sciences--others pr ior to Cohen

have made these statements bu t in an undifferentiated manner, o r with-

out specif ic reference to the social sciences .' We will extend Cohen's

analysis in order to attack the f a l se separation between formal theo-

re t ica l knowledge and factual knowledge, which underlie the rejection

x i i i

of the concept of human nature whi,ch i s a very central heuris t ic device

of a scheme such as Fromm's. We will also discuss the ways in which

Fromm deals with the concept of human nature in terms of 'essence and

existence, ' imp1 i c i t l y rejecting ei ther the i r r igid separation, or non-

different iat ion i n contemporary social science. One example of confused

non-differentiation exis t s in the work of Talcott Parsons. The spec-

i f i c s of th i s non-differentiation need not delay us here. I t i s dea l t

w i t h in chapter four.

We will show tha t Fromm's aim a t i ts 'highest ' l eve l , i s

c l in ica l and s t ructural e v i l , tha t i s t o show t o what extent patho-

logical forces are in some senses inherent in man, and t o what extent

i t i s ins t i tu t iona l ly determined was 'resolved' a t two levels . The

f i r s t was by dissecting human nature into essence and existence and

stressing essence as "negatively defined," tha t i s as 'freedom t o , ' and

existence i s viewed in terms of man's essential nature, his needs which

are partly social ly directed but not social ly given. A t another level

we see Fromm attempting t o integrate psychoanalysis, sociology and a

specif ic type of anthropology. The more obvious concept of social char-

ac t e r i s part of an empirical framework which l i e s , then, midway between

these two levels . In other words the concept of social character i s

part of a conceptualized diachrony, and the two cannot be divorced with-

out some d is tor t ion . To sum u p what has been said in the foregoing

paragraphs, Fromm's conception of social science tends to r e j ec t the

divorce between purely normative and ' toughmi nded' social science, as

providing any viable direction f o r our understanding of evi 1. The f i r s t

xi v

is too r e l a t i v i s t i c , the second ha? an implici t conception of human

nature, though overtly denying t h i s , which i s unhistorical . Fromm

accepts the principle of alternativism as a way out, and the l a t t e r is

the foundation of his humanistic social science. Thus human nature i s

made u p of essence and existence as quai i t i e s .* Fromm assumes an exis-

ten t ia l position which most resembles tha t of Otto Rank in i t s existen-

t i a l leanings, s t ressing however, the largely unconscious aspects of

the psycho1 ogi cal consequences of man Is bei ng expel 1 ed i nto the worl d

and displaced from i t against his wil l - - this i s t rue of the species f o r

Fromm. B u t From also s t resses the his tor ical aspect, i n the notion

of contradiction and of ontogenetic development, and of social izat ion.

This section i s a lso outlined in my discussion "Fromm the Proposition

of Human Nature t o the Theory of Human Charactert1 and the section follow-

ing i t "An Outline of Frommls Theory of Human Character"; both in

chapter two.

The link between the work on human nature and the work on social

character, t ha t is between 'presupposition, ' i n the specif ic sense

adopted in this disser tat ion, and sociological analysis requires an

"anthropological centre." T h i s i s provided in chapter f ive . B u t t h i s

whole discussion so f a r gives the impression tha t a l l t h i s i s quite

obvious in Erich Frommls writings, and this i s not the case. So perhaps

this is the point a t which to introduce the author 's conception or

approach to Fromm.

HERMENEUTICS: TOWARD A ,SYSTEMATIC INTERPRETATION OF ERICH FROMM'S HUMANISM

Hermeneutics i s b r i e f l y defined as the science o f i n t e rp re ta -

t i on . But i t i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n according t o g iven ru l es o r pat terns.

It i s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which f a c i l i t a t e s o r 'presides over ' an

exegesis ". . . t h a t i s , over the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a p a r t i c u l a r t ex t ,

o r a group o f signs t h a t may be viewed as a text.'13 Since there i s no

simple theory o f hermeneutics, Ricoeur suggests t h a t i t i s concerned

w i t h a mapping o f the area o f 'symbols ' o r double meanings and the

areas i n which the various tex tua l i n t e rp re ta t i ons o f a sub jec t conf ront

one another, sho r t o f a theory o f language, we s h a l l term our attempted

approach a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Fromm's humanistic soc i a l science, herme-

neut ic . There i s one fu r the r c r i t e r i o n which j u s t i f i e s our use o f the

term: a hermeneutic i s an attempt t o const ruc t a s i ng l e t e x t a t a l eve l

o the r than t h a t g iven by the author. I n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n our concern

i s no t genera l ly w i t h p lac ing Fromm w i t h i n the t r a d i t i o n o f humanistic

soc i a l science i n general. This i s so f a r two reasons, f i r s t because

Fromm does n o t e x p l i c i t l y propose a t heo re t i ca l program f o r h i s view of

soc i a l science theory, secondly because he admits of no ph i losophica l

t r a d i t i o n s . There i s a f u r t h e r reason f o r a hermeneutics and t h a t i s

between a f i r s t reading o f Fromm's w r i t i n g s and a r e f l e c t i o n on c e r t a i n

'key' signs o r use o f terms, double meanings emerge. The concern here

i s n o t w i t h the 'meanings' o f h i s w r i t i n g s given a t a f i r s t reading,

b u t w i t h the under ly ing 'meanings, ' which provide, as t h i s d i s se r t a t i on

w i l l at tempt t o demonstrate, a s i ng l e systematic exegesis o f Fromm's

w r i t i n g s .

xv i

The discourse i n this disser tat ion then and the adopted proble-

matic can be more adequately c r i t i c i zed in terms of the form of in te r -

pretation given From. The conclusions from the interpretat ive approach

adopted here: does not regard Fromm's 'thought, ' his conception of

social science as developing chronologically, over the years. Some of

the more important concepts and insights appear to have been developed

i n the 1960's as well as in the 19301s, f o r example h is concept of

menotheistic de i t i e s are among his e a r l i e s t and l a t e r writ ings, "The

Dogma of Christ" (1930) and You Shall be as Gods (1966), nevertheless

they const i tute two of the main components of From's anthropology, and

so on. Nevertheless the interpretat ive schema which emerges a t the end

of th i s study i s integrated and provide us with an al ternat ive view of

the problematics usually associated with Fromm's writings , and an a1 t e r -

native interpretat ion of humanism to Fromm's apparent meaning.

I t i s with the foregoing approach to interpretat ion tha t the

f i r s t chapter in the study i s en t i t led "Erich From's Concept of Social

Science." Within the body of his writings his discussion of Marx and

Freud i n 1962 provide a base upon which to reconstruct a problematic

which is antinomous in relat ion to the interpretat ion, given, on f i r s t

reading. T h i s a l so allows us to pursue antecedent philosophical strands

of thought, rarely explicated by Fromm himself, and so elucidate an

assemblage of key terms and concepts which together lead to the proble-

matic and Fromm's solution of i t . 4

We turn now to the admitted intel lectual t radi t ions of From

and the senses in which they a re related t o this study. As will become

x v i i

cleare r i n the f i r s t sect ion o f th,e f i r s t chapter o f t h i s study, Fromm

has a grounding i n a t l e a s t two broad and no t always c l e a r l y defined

boundaries, both o f which are i nd i c i es o f h i s p a r t i c u l a r theore t i ca l

formulations. The f i r s t and most important i s what Paul A. Robinson

has termed the 'Freudian l e f t . l5 The secqnd, much less c l e a r l y a r t i cu-

l a t e d t r a d i t i o n i s the American 1 i be ra l t r a d i t i o n o f the ea r l y 1950's

o f which a good example i s perhaps David Riesman whose studies o f char-

ac te r were c l e a r l y inf luenced by Fromm. There are two f u r t h e r s ta te -

ments i n Robinson's study w i t h which I am i n general agreement: the

f i r s t i s t h a t F rom 's r e l a t i onsh ip t o the Freudian l e f t i s ambivalent

compared t o Robinson's three subjects, t o the ex ten t t h a t a1 though F r o m

stands t o the l e f t o f Freud he i s a "sexual conservative.'16 F r o m then

i s a l e f t Freudian who i s ambivalent t o the thes is t h a t a t the l eve l of

i nd i v i dua l psychology and the evo lu t ion o f c i v i 1 i z a t i o n there i s r ea l

s ign i f i cance f o r sexual i ty , bu t he has attempted t o explore the rad ica l

po ten t i a l i n Freud. More important ly , what Fromm has i n common w i t h

the Freudian l e f t i s the anthropological ideas which under1 i e such a

connection and the elaborat ion and development o f t h i s element. For

the i nd i v i dua l sexual i ty , Fromm eschews, he subs ti tu tes an emphasis on

the matr iarcha l and pa t r ia rcha l p r i nc i p l es i n t h i s anthropology. And

t h i s has a l l the advantages and disadvantages from which any 'sexual

constancy' f a c t o r would su f f e r . I n the f i n a l analysis, what Fromm,

Marcuse, etc. have i n common i s a re len t less extension o f the l e f t

Freudian elements f o r sel fhood, o r i nd i v i dua l 1 ibe ra t ion . The second

theme i n Robinson i s t h a t Marcuse and Fromm be1 ieve t h a t Freud and Marx

x v i i i

were revo lu t ionar ies of comparable, s ta ture . But as i s obvious from the

l a t e r polemic between both men what Fromm meant by the rad ica l ism o f

Freud and Marcuse's meaning d i f f e r markedly.

While Fromm disassociated h imsel f from the ' pan-sexual ism' o f

the Freudian l e f t he compensated h i s work i n another area, apar t from

i nd i v i dua t i on and freedom, t h a t i s , the development o f a comprehensive

theory o f society, and p a r t i c u l a r l y a study o f author i tar ian ism and

Nazism w i t h the I n s t i t u t e f o r Social Research i n the 1930's .7 There i s

l i t t l e doubt t h a t Fromm exercised some in f luence on the ea r l y members

of the F rank fu r t I n s t i t u t e , espec ia l ly Theodor Adorno and the former's

ea r l y work Escape From Freedom, bear traces o f t h i s interchange.

Robinson suggests t h a t Fromm's formulat ions o f author i tar ian ism and

Nazism were h i gh l y inf luenced by Wilhelm Reich's e a r l i e r work The Mass

Psycho1 ogy o f Fascism, though Fromm's study appears t o a t t r i b u t e

greater value t o Reich's Charakteranalyse (1933) .* A t the same t ime

Fromm's cons is tent re fusa l t o be dubbed a neo-Freudian i s probably

cor rect . There are two reasons f o r t h i s : the f i r s t i s t h a t h i s longest

co-operative i n t e l l e c t u a l ventures outs ide o f h i s work i n Mexico seemed

t o have been w i t h the transplanted Frank fu r t School which contained a

mixed group o f soc ia l s c i en t i s t s , and h i s work i n the founding o f

Dissent. The second i s Fromm's ea r l y independence from many o f h i s

f e l l ow exiles.' I n the f i r s t instance there was a strong emphasis on

the c r ys ta l 1 i z i ng o f ideas through theore t i ca l concepts. Henry Pachter

explains Fromm's ' e x i l e ' t o Mexico i n terms o f ea r l y transcendence of

h i s o r i g i n a l i n t e l l e c t u a l her i tage i n Europe.

This takes us t o the second important i n f l uence i n Fromm's i n - I

t e l l ectual career. Fromm 1 i ke many o f the younger refugee i n t e l 1 ectuals

has been h i g h l y in f luenced by the American pol i t i c a l and i n t e l l e c tua l

environment, which was a more cons is tent adaptat ion g iven t h e i r soc ia l

democratic p o l i t i c s i n Germany. I n terms o f the p o l i t i c a l environment

of the 1930's t o 19501s, Fromm l i k e Pachter had an ambivalent r e l a t i o n -

sh ip t o the 'Establishment, ' they were n o t German na t i ona l i s t s , c r i t i c a l

of aspects o f America's domestic po l i cy , b u t c e r t a i n l y n o t a n t i -

American on Ameri c a m s f o re i gn pol i t i c s . This posture i s bes t expressed

i n two o f Fromm's works The Sane Society and May Man Preva i l . lo 1n

these terms Marcuse's p o l i t i c a l c r i t i q u e o f Fromm i s a v a l i d one, under-

stood from the perspect ive o f the r ad i ca l youth p o l i t i c s o f the 1960's.

A pol i ti cs which i s a n t i -col on i a1 i s t and more c l e a r l y Marx is t compared

t o the environment o f fea r , i n t i m i d a t i o n and subsequent c louding o f

ideas w i t h which 'Marx is t ' th inkers had t o contend i n the McCarthyi t e

era. E r i ch Fromm's humanism then has been shaped by a number o f fo rces

inc lud ing d i r e c t experience o f two World Wars, which re in fo rced h i s re-

j e c t i o n o f nat iona l ism and coercion as forces o f soc ia l change. A t the

same t ime Fromm has expressed h i s concept o f the s e l f and o f a l i ena t i on

n o t through a simple r e - i n t e rp re ta t i on o f h i s t o r i c a l events, b u t as w i l l

become c l e a r i n t h i s study, a complex t heo re t i ca l paradigm which what-

ever i t s weaknesses, has few para1 1 e l s , i n contemporary soc ia l sciences.

FOOTNOTES XX

'see Morris Scient if ic Method, pp. 332-368.

Cohen, Reason and Nature: An Essay on the Meaning of Glencoe, Free Press, 1964, f i r s t published in 1931,

See E . Fromm, "Freedom, Determinism and Alternativism", i n The - Heart of Man: I t s Genius for Good and Evil, New Y o P ~ , Harper & Row, 1964.

' F O ~ a brief discussion of hermeneutics see Paul Racoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, t r . Denis Savage, New York, Yale University Press, 1970, p. 8, & 26. For part of Ricoeur's writings on hermeneutics with respect t o philosophy and the sociology of know1 edge see his History and T r u t h , t r . Charles A. Kel bley, Evanston, North Western University Press, 1965, pp. 57-62.

4 ~ h e s e key terms and the i r a l te rna t ive hidden meaning a r e presented i n the conclusion of the study.

k f . Paul A. Robinson, The Freudian Left: Wi 1 he1 m Reich, Geza Roheim, Herbert Marcuse, New York, Harper & ROW, 1969.

'~obinson's precise terminology i s t h a t Fromm is a "rabid sexual conservative" (p.5). This i s a play on words, Fromm dropped the emphasis on genital sexual i t y with his rejection of the "biological organici sm" . There is no evidence to support the inference t h a t he dropped the l a t t e r because of his reject ion of the former. B u t l i k e Reich and Marcuse, Fromm is a pol i t ical a c t i v i s t as well, abandoning the 'detached', cl inical pre- occupation of Freud.

70ne must of necessity e x 1 ude a personal biography of Erich Fromm, who of a11 the radical psychoanalyses and German refugee t radi t ion has paradoxically remained re la t ive ly anonymous. L i t t l e i s known about Fromm's personal l i f e apart from the usual information on the dust-jackets of his, books and what Fromm has himself chosen t o reveal in his writings. Neither c r i t iques nor intel lectual biographies including In the Name of Life (1971) provide precise information on his background. I have arrived a t the con- clusion tha t t h i s "privacy" of Fromm i s related to his exp l i c i t d i s l ike of group therapy (which involves sharing of personal information) and Fromm's commitment t o individual ism i n the sense of 'personal 1 iber ty ' . Within the context of the mass, public, market oriented society which Fromm has char- acterized as America, i t i s d i f f i c u l t not t o share this bias. A t any ra t e , Fromm was born in Germany i n 1900, the only child of an orthodox Jewish family (pampered by his own admission). He also had a thorough education i n the Old Testament and Talmud, and Jewish t radi t ion , by three rabbinical scholars (Ludwig Krause, Mehemia Nobel and Salman Rabinkow) . His ideas were also influenced by Hermann Cohen, a Kantian philosopher. Fromm studied sociology and psychology a t Heidelberg, Frankfurt and Munich as well as the Psychoanalytic. Ins t i tu t e of Berlin. He has been in cl inical practice since 1926. Fromm emigrated to the U.S.A. i n 1932 and taught a t various colleges i n c l u d i n g , the New School for Social Research, Columbia University, and as head of the Will iam Alanson White Ins t i tu te , which he helped found, a s well

xxi

>

a s the National University of Mexico. He i s now pa r t i a l ly r e t i r ed and re- sides a t Cuernaxaca, Mexico.

* ~ e f . E. F r o k , Escape From Freedom, New York, Avon Books, p. 172.

' ~ e f . Henry Pachter, "On Being An Exile" i n The Legacy of the German Refugee Intel lectuals , Salmagunde, Nos. 10-1 1, Fall 1969 - Winter 1970, pp. 12-51 , esp. pp. 35-36.

bid., pp. 39-40. Pachter has mentioned in h is essay, the pol i t i - ca1 environment during McCarthyite days in which the New School of Social Research had t o survive, i e . by the use of "Aesopian" language in which the use of the word 'a l ienat ion ' meant capitalism and reason, revolution. More t h a t fo r a l l Fromm's concern he has not pub1 ished a systematic c r i t ique of McCarthy, as the more conservative Parsons did. Though the former has made frequent references t o McCarthyi sm.

I

CHAPTER I

ERICH FROMM'S CONCEPT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

What holds t rue f o r psychology holds t rue also fo r sociology. I f I am not concerned with society, then my thinking about society has no focus; i t i s nothing more than a blind groping, even i f the blindness i s hidden by a collection of data and impressive s t a - t i s t i c s . 1

The foregoing i s an apt summary of Erich Fromm's conception of

social science. The statement i s a lso s igni f icant because i t i s taken

from the s ingle work in which tha t wri ter could be said t o expl ic i t ly

a r t i cu la t e his "philosophy of the human sciences ." In Beyond - The Chains - Of I l lusion, Fromm ar t icu la tes three aspects

of an in te l lec tua l position which i s fundamental t o a l l of his work, re-

gardless of changes in many of his substantive ideas. First of a l l

Fromm believed tha t much of sociology and conventional psychology in

current times have not penetrated beyond the " i l lusions of rea l i ty" t o

some of the core features of social rea l i ty . Secondly, the implication

emerging from the f i r s t point i s that until the social sciences penetrate

beneath these " i l lusions ,I' they would lack a firm commitment to the moral

ideas crucial t o humanity's "ultimate" welfare. That i s t o say Fromm

refuses to divorce moral philosophy from social science. Thirdly, the

t i t l e of From's book suggests tha t Marx and Freud influenced some of

Fromm's more basic perspectives on man and society.

I will discuss these three points and t h e i r related implications

f o r a "radical sociology." I will suggest tha t i n so f a r as we can grant

1

2

t ha t these ideas taken together cons ti tute Fromm's conception of soci a1

sciences, his widely discussed theories of the individual and of human

nature can only be adequately established and cr i t ic ized w i t h i n the

framework of such a conception of the social sciences. The approach

being suggested here will proceed a t differing levels of complexity and

will attempt t o unravel, i n a tour de force, some of the intr icacies of

Fromm's thought.

There is a radical difference between the approach t o an under-

standing of Fromm's work attempted in th i s chapter and some of the re-

cent cr i t iques of Fromm in ~ n ~ l i s h . ~ Here I am asserting tha t Fromm i s

jus t a strongly a social sc i en t i s t as he i s a moral philosopher and

psychoanalyst. Moreover I am suggesting . . tha t from th i s vantage point

his moral philosophy i s a "second order strategy" which can only be ade-

quately appreciated when Fromm i s viewed as a social sc i en t i s t . That is

t o say Fromm's ethical system i s predicated upon his outlook on social

science, the former i s dependent on the extent t o which Fromm has devel-

oped a philosophy of the social sciences. 3

I t is c lear from his work tha t From himself does not separate

clear ly between his moral philosophical assertions and his epistemologi - cal and social s c i e n t i f i c postulates. I t i s the underlying rationales

f o r t h i s approach which require re-examination. Some of the reviews and

cr i t iques of Fromm's work have tended to ignore the distinction a1 to-

gether, o r a l ternat ively t o look a t the development of his thought chron-

ologically. The weight of discussion in th i s chapter will delineate

Fromm's conception of soci a1 science by concentrating on two of Fromm ' s

I

3

works--Beyond - The Chains - O f I 1 l u s i o n (1962) and - The Revolut ion - O f Hope T-

(1968). P a r t o f t h e r a t i o n a l e f o r the f i r s t choice has a l ready been

made. One a d d i t i o n a l p o i n t i s t h a t Fromm i s more r e l i a n t on Freud than

he i s on Marx. The r a t i o n a l e f o r choice o f the second work i s i t s p o l -

emical q u a l i t y and Fromm's i m p l i c i t b u t v i t a l statements on s c i e n t i f i c

and techno1 og i c a l knowledge. When examined t h e ou tl i nes of a r a d i c a l

epistemology can be recognized. The p o s i t i o n o u t l i n e d here i s a depar-

t u r e from Schaar's ana lys is o f t he s i g n i f i c a n c e o f Fromm's work f o r

soc i a1 science. 4

John Schaar's otherwise a u t h o r i t a t i v e c r i t i q u e o f Fromm s u f f e r s

from a number o f shortcomings. F i r s t o f a1 1 Schaar suggests t h a t Fromm's

r a t i o n a l e f o r h i s own moral phi losophy r e s t s on h i s view t h a t " s c i e n t i f i c

knowledge o f man i s inadequate. '15 Secondly i n s t r e s s i n g Fromm's

" a t t i t u d e " t o contemporary s o c i a l science Schaar does n o t present an ade-

quate statement o f s o c i a l science, and the re fo re underestimates the fun-

damentals o f t h a t s o c i a l science, and i n t h e f i n a l ana lys is the r e a l

power of Fromm's c r i t i q u e o f s o c i a l science. For example Schaar

summarizes h i s ana lys i s by suggest ing t h a t Fromm i s searching f o r a

midd le p o s i t i o n , between n a t u r a l ism and supernatural ism, i n the form o f

"normative humanism" as h i s answer t o the quest ion o f the nature o f

e v i l . Schaar suggests t h a t Fromm uses the r h e t o r i c o f s o c i a l science

b u t i t " c l u t t e r s " h i s analysis.6 Fromm i s a l l e g e d l y skep t i ca l of s o c i a l

science assumptions o f man. Fur ther Schaar presents the f o l l o w i n g

summary o f what contemporary soc ia l science i s a l l about:

Modern s o c i a l science s tud ies how men l i v e and what they do. Per- haps when we have c o l l e c t e d enough behavioural data and observed enough connections among them we s h a l l have the measure o f man h imse l f .7

Schaar goes on t o suggest t h a t contemporary s o c i a l sc ience i s p r i m a r i l y

concerned w i t h t h e " p u b l i c th ings about man," t h a t t h i s k i n d o f s o c i a l

science has become u n c r i t i c a l . I suggest t h i s i s on l y p a r t o f the case.

I w i l l discuss the two foregoing c r i t i c i s m s o f Schaar and my own

uneasiness w i t h Schaar's view o f s o c i a l science, a f t e r which I w i l l

a t tempt a more coherent and systematic statement o f Fromm's conception

of s o c i a l science. I f we take Schaar's j u s t p o i n t , i t i s by no means

c l e a r from h i s book what Schaar means when he suggests t h a t Fromm regards

modern s o c i a l science knowledge as ' inadequate. ' I t i s q u i t e v a l i d t h a t

emp i r i ca l s o c i o l o g i c a l knowledge o f the 'pub1 i c th ings , ' o f man's merely

p u b l i c r o l e s does n o t t e l l us enough about man. But t h i s i s a t ru ism. 8

It i s c l e a r from Edward S h i l s ' recent a u t h o r i t a t i v e ana lys is t h a t socio-

l ogy was from i t s e a r l i e s t i n c e p t i o n a "heterogeneous aggregate of

t op i cs . " From Shi 1 s ' account the concern w i t h fundamental moral issues

i s on l y one aspect o f the soc io log i ca l t r a d i t i o n . S h i l s a l s o r e l a t e s

t h a t the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f modern socio logy va r ied i n t ime and

q u a l i t y i n d i f f e r e n t pa r t s o f Europe and the Un i ted s ta tes .' Louis

A1 thusser has a more scath ing a t tack on the contemporary p re ten t ions of

much o f the s o c i a l sciences engaged i n and devoted t o "prec ise pragmatic

i n t e r e s t s , b u t having as t h e i r o n l y u n i t y a " techn ica l p rac t i ce . ,I 10

A1 thusser 's c r i t i c i s m s may have underrated the possi b i 1 i t i e s f o r ideo-

l o g i c a l c r i t i q u e s o f contemporary theory and p r a c t i c e w i t h i n the

5

spec ia l i zed area known as the socio logy o f knowledge. I n l ess pess im is t i c

tones I r v i n g Louis Horowi tr concludes tha t :

. . . The r a t i o n a l i s t b e l i e f i n human l i f e as a value t o be preserved cond i t ions s o c i a l science i n a unique way. For here alone values and human i n t e r e s t s are as much f a c t o r s o f ana lys is as desc r ip t i ons o f processes. 1 1

Modern socio logy i s n o t a l l about the p u b l i c th ings about man, no r i s

t h i s a l l t h a t Fromm i s saying. What F r o m i s saying i s t h a t contemporary

s o c i a l science has tended t o narrow i t s focus t o a very s u p e r f i c i a l view

o f soc i a1 r e a l i t y . Moreover t h a t whatever the subs t a n t i ve weaknesses of

" e a r l y s o c i a l science" i t s founding concern was a moral one. The more

o r l ess exc lus i ve focus on " r o l e theoryn--as man i s i n t r i c a t e l y i n t e r -

connected connected t o the wider techno1 ogi c a l and mater i a1 i s ti c develop-

ment o f the w ider soc ie ty from the Middle Ages onwards--has had as a

consequence modern s o c i a l sciences ' abandonment o f i t s bas ic responsi - b i li ty t o the "system man. "I2 I n s h o r t Fromm i s c a l l i n g f o r mora l l y

responsib le s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s and a s o c i a l science dedicated t o " l i f e N

r a t h e r than t o "death." F r o m ' s c a l l i s r e i t e r a t e d i n the t h i r d book of

a t r i o l o g y by Ernest Becker:

. . . , the science o f man i n soc ie ty must be a superordinate value science; one which has opted f o r human progress, and which has a c l e a r and comprehensive, compel l ing idea o f what c o n s t i t u t e s such progress. The task o f such a science would be the incessant imple- mentat ion o f human we1 1 being.13

Fromm's concern then i s t y p i c a l of a whole corpus o f work i n the

s o c i a l science. I t i s w i t h regard t o the dilemma which face s o c i a l

s c i e n t i s t s and the choices made by ,them t o reso lve t h i s dilemma. H i s

c r i t i q u e of the nature and value o f s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c knowledge must be

understood w i t h i n t h e framework o f t h a t c r i ti que . Robert F r i e d r i chs i n

h i s recent book has p u t the problem as fo l l ows :

The a c t i v i t y o f s o c i o l o g i s t s as s c i e n t i s t s , . . , , are always and i n p r i n c i p l e nested i n a '1 arger frame t h a t inc ludes the i n t r a s u b j e c t i ve, t he unique and t h e e x i s t e n t i a l . And i t i s because we are never able t o e x t r i c a t e ourselves from t h a t context , even when we take on the " r o l e " o f s o c i o l o g i s t as s c i e n t i s t , t h a t the image o f man r e s i d e n t w i th i , n the r h e t o r i c o f science may serve as a p'owerful t o o l i n the s e r v i ce o f a more fundamental l y and humane paradigm. 14

The foregoing statement disproves Schaar's t h e o r i e t h a t Fromm's

model o f man f i n d s i t s l eg i t imacy n o t p r i m a r i l y i n h i s s o c i a l science

b u t i n h i s moral phi losophy. Schaar s ta tes :

Fromm's r e a l answer t o the quest ions, how do we know a common core o f human a u a l i t i e s e x i s t s , and i f i t does e x i s t , what a re i t s con- t e n t s i s 'a h i l o s o h i c pos i t i on , r a t h e r than a - s c i e n t i f i c conclu-

1 5 7 r t P d --

sion.

Schaar's statement imp l i es t h a t a s c i e n t i f i c epistemology which could

poss ib l y develop a "common core o f human q u a l i t i e s " would be devoid o f

ph i losoph ic assumptions. Th is i s o f course n o t poss ib le and a t bes t

Schaar 's statement betrays a misconception o f science whether n a t u r a l o r

s o c i a l . Th is problem i s w e l l discussed by Horowitz i n h i s ana lys is of

t he p h i losophi c presupposi t ions o f pragmatism, pos i t i v i sm, and d i a l e c t i c s

as s c i e n t i f i c methodologies. Horowi t z concludes w i t h the view t h a t a

"value f r e e " s c i e n t i f i c method01 ogy--wi tness the development o f

pos i tivism--became inc reas ing ly s t e r i l e .16 One o f t he few po r t i ons of

Schaar's work in which he attempts t o posit a position of his own renders I

Schaar's own conception of social science very close t o tha t of the

logical empiricists who asser t tha t a positing of values in science i s

only possible when s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s complete, since such a science

does not e x i s t knowledge can be judged only on the basis of i t s adequacy

i n a par t icular s i tua t ion . This conclusion i s derived from Schaar's

cr i t ique of Fromm's attempt t o derive a common core of values from

history. Now history i s f o r Schaar a record of "reactions of men t o the ---- conditions of t h e i r 1 ives . --- "I7 [ I t a l i c s mine]

In contrast t o Schaar's rather limited view of Fromm's contri bu-

tion t o and commitment t o social science, Friedrichs ' analysis puts the

problem in an a1 ternat ive perspective. Friedri chs ' statements summarize

the problem which modern theoris ts faced w i t h the system paradigm of T .

Parsons and the Marxian based confl ic t paradigm; have as the i r ultimate

problem. P u t generally the implications of the system paradigm i s to-

ward the "pr ies t ly mode ," whereas the implications of the conf l ic t para-

di gm tend toward the prophetic mode. Fri edri chs suggests :

The s c i e n t i s t as p r i e s t would address his professional and communal l i f e t o confronting, evermore intimately the r e l i a b i l i t y ordered core of nature and natural man and would seek t o mediate between i t and the flux tha t i s the evident world of the layman. . , . Anything tha t would threaten r e l i a b i l i t y in the precipitation of order--the '

unique, the private , the absolute--mus t be re1 i nqui shed as heresy. Indeed from this point of view the "prophetic" mode i s the focal threa t , f o r i t i s dedicated t o change, not order; r isk not r e l i ab i l - i ty; "subjective" standards, not "objective" perception. 18

Of the "prophetic" mode t o which Fromm, by his refocusing on the aliena-

t ion concept of ear ly Marx, i s viewed as having contributed t o the para-

digmatic dichotomy in sociology, Friedrichs has th i s t o say:

Simply put, i t means only t h a t those enamoured of the prophet ic pos- t u re f i n d t h e i r spec ia l f o r t e t o be c r i t i c i s m ra the r than construc- ti on . l 9

Whatever doubts can be ra i sed about F r i ed r i chs ' analysis o f the

'prophetic mode1'--and one could argue t h a t a t the general t heo re t i ca l

l e v e l o f socio logy i t "constructs" by suggesting what k i nd o f perspectives

sociology "should" adop t - - i t i s c l e a r t h a t what Fromm means by the s ta te -

ment t h a t sociology should penetrate beneath the " i l l u s i o n s o f r e a l i t y "

i s much more than i s expressed i n Schaar's use o f the term "inadequate."

Socioloav and the "11 lus ions o f Real i t v "

A t another l e v e l o f analysis E r i ch Fromm attempts t o stand on the

shoulders o f Marx.and Freud i n order t o penetrate the " i l l u s i o n s o f

r e a l i t y . " The main asser t ion i n t h i s sect ion o f the work i s t h a t Fromm's

conception o f soc i a l science i s p r i m a r i l y grounded i n h i s i n t e rp re ta t i ons

o f and attempted synthesis o f Marx and Freud, r a t he r than p r i m a r i l y i n

the Judai c -Ch r i s t i an and Zen-Buddhist re1 i g i ous t r a d i t i o n s .20 The fo r -

mer conclusion acquires leg i t imacy when we d i s t i ngu i sh Fromm's work as

having developed i n two i n t e r r e l a t e d dimensions. The f i r s t I have termed

h i s socio logical-epistemological , and the second, h i s h i s t o r i c a l and

empi r ica l . This chapter w i l l examine the f i r s t dimension only. There '

are two aspects o f Fromm's work, which form p a r t o f the f i r s t dimension:

the sociology of knowledge aspect; and Fromrn's analysis o f the r e l a t i o n -

sh ip between advancing indus tri a1 techno1 ogy and i t s soci a1 and i n s ti tu -

t i o n a l consequences and soc i a l science knowledge.

The Soci 01 ogy o f Knowledge

Here F r o m ' s asser t ion i s t ha t v a l i d soc ia l science knowledge can

only come from the soc ia l s c i e n t i s t who i s engaged i n l i f e . The soc ia l

s c i e n t i s t must according t o Fromm have "hope" f o r man's growth both as

ind iv idua l ( the heal thy character) and as soc ia l being. The soc ia l

th inker who i s f i x a t e d t o a supe r f i c i a l not ion o f s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t i v i t y ,

who destroys a l l emotional concern w i t h and subst i tu tes i t w i t h an

acqu i s i t i on o f techniques whether s t a t i s t i c a l o r so le l y l i n g u i s t i c , does

no t accumulate rea l knowledge. Fromm summarizes t h i s pos i t i on as

f o l l ows :

It i s assumed t h a t s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t i v i t y demands t ha t thoughts and theor ies concerning man be emptied o f a1 1 emotional concern w i t h man.

E a r l i e r on the same page F r o m notes:

Reason flows from the blending o f r a t i ona l thought and fee l ing . If the two funct ions are t o r n apart, th ink ing deter iora tes i n t o sch izo id i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t and feel ' ing deter iora tes i n t o neu- r o t i c 1 ife-damaging passions. f f

I n terms o f Werner Stark 's d e f i n i t i o n o f the sociology o f knowledge as

being both "a doct r ine and a method a doct r ine o r theory which w i l l show

exact ly what the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s o f soci a1 substructure and i n t e l l ec tua l

Superstructure are: . . . ' I; Fromm's e a r l i e r quoted statement can be

taken as a summary o f h i s sociology o f knowledge.22 S t a r t makes two

fur ther assert ions which correspond c lose ly t o the ideas o f Fromm. The

j u s t i s t h a t the knowing subject i s no t an i so l a ted i nd i v i dua l , the

10

second i s t h a t the perceiver and "knower o f the external world" i s no t

separate from man as a member o f "a concrete soc ie ty . '23 1n epistemo-

l o g i c a l terms Fromm i s qu i t e v a l i d l y asserti,ng t h a t w i thout the valua-

t i o n of hope we cannot as sc ien t i s ts , assign any meaning t o the soc ia l

f ac t s which we comprehend. I n the development o f h i s work Stark f u r t h e r

develops the categories which determine the content o f i n t e l l e c t u a l

ideas by de l inea t ing the "macrosoci 01 ogy o f knowledge ," t h a t epistemo-

logy which f i x e s i t s a t t en t i on t o in f luence o f the i nc l us i ve soc ie ty i n

determining the form and content o f ideas. The microsociology o f know-

ledge i s concerned w i t h the precise ways i n which the author i t i e s which

con t ro l un ive rs i ty f inanc ing and research in f luence through these cont ro ls

the form and content o f s c i e n t i f i c knowledge.24 Frommls concern i n - The

Revolut ion - O f Hope whi ch a macrosoci 01 ogy o f knowledge.

Fromm's i n q u i r i e s and t h e i r impl ica t ions f o r h i s views on know-

ledge does no t f o l l ow the orthodox procedures o f other scho lar ly works.

Most o f - The Revolut ion O f - Hope, i s d i rec ted t o the technological soc ie ty

and the process o f dehumanization a t d i f f e r i n g leve ls o f the soc ia l

s t r uc tu re o f the Uni ted States o f America. This dehumanization has

tended t o mani fest i t s e l f i n a loss o f "hope." For Fromm:

To hope i s a s ta te o f being. It i s an inner readiness, t h a t o f i n - ' tense bu t not-yet-spent activeness. . . . Hope i s a psychic concom- i t a n t t o l i f e and growth .25

Fromm bel ieves t h a t hope, i t s existence, o r i t s loss i s p a r t o f the char-

ac te r s t r uc tu re of members o f technological soc ie t ies . Where soci a1

Sc ien t i s ts as members o f modern soc ie t ies have hope, they " re la te " i n a

11

fash ion t o s o c i a l problems which tend t o r e s u l t i n p o s i t i v e theo r ies and

conclusions. That i s t o say, t o a s o c i a l science perspect ive which ex-

presses the preference f o r "growth and l i f e . "26 Where s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s

l a c k hope, they tend t o subscribe t o s o c i a l science ideas which support

o r are ambivalent t o the mechanical i n man and soc ie ty . The knowledge

produced by t h i s k i n d o f s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t lacks v i s i o n . Fromm summarizes

t h i s idea as fo l l ows :

It seems t h a t t h e g rea t minds o f a hundred years ago saw what would happen today, o r tomorrow, w h i l e we t o whom i t i s happening b l i n d ourselves i n order n o t t o be d i s tu rbed i n our d a i l y rout ine.27

Contrast ing the work o f t h inke rs o f the s t a t u r e o f John S t u a r t - M i l l and

Veblen, who pa radox ica l l y though n o t l i v i n g a t t imes o f t he complet ion

o f the i n s ti t u t i onal i z a t i on o f advanced techno1 ogy , were s ti 11 able t o

perceive some o f t he d isas t rous consequences f o r man and growth w i t h

contemporary soc i a1 th inke rs , Fromm s ta tes :

The f a s c i n a t i o n w i t h the merely mechanical i s supplemented by an i n - creasing p o p u l a r i t y o f conceptions t h a t s t ress the animal na ture of man and the i n s t i n c t i v e roo ts o f h i s emotions o r ac t ions .28

The reference i n the fo rego ing statement i s t o the works o f Konrad Loreng

and Desmond who Fromm contends want t o combine the "emotions o f a p r i -

mate w i t h a computer- l i ke b r a i n ." The alarm w i t h which Fromm responds t o

t h i s r e v i v a l o f ideas--which are a t bes t crude expressions o f Darwinism--

can be found i n the work o f o t h e r th inkers , though i n more "scho la r l y

tones." Marvin H a r r i s c r i t i c i z e s attempts t o es tab1 i sh a t h e o r e t i c a l

paradigm f o r c u l t u r a l anthropology concepts o f t he i n d i v i d u a l which have

12

t h e i r genesis i n the " e t i o l o g y o f t he i n d i v i d u a l and psychological com-

plexes. '12' Whatever the o ther t h e o r e t i c a l problems o f Fromm's theo r ies

i t i s c l e a r t h a t John Schaar i s inaccurate i n h i s asse r t i on t h a t Fromm's

s o l u t i o n t o the problem o f a l i e n a t i o n denies the necess i ty o f s o c i a l

science (p. 166). I n f a c t Fromm's c r i t i q u e o f a l i e n a t i o n i s as a form

o f s o c i a l pathology which produces charac ter d isorders which v i t a l l y

a f f e c t the form and content o f soc ia l science knowledge.30

L a t e r we w i l l examine the coherence o f Fromm's ideas i n h i s own

counter p resenta t ion o f a theory o f human nature and character s t r u c t u r e

which i s i n d i r e c t oppos i t ion t o the "crude Darwinism" o f Lorenz and

Morr is .

Summary Remarks: Fromm's Place i n the Sociology o f Knowledge

Fromm exp la ins the substant ive content o f t he ideas and concepts

of s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s as w e l l as the forms o f those concepts i n terms o f

the exis tence o r l a c k o f hope o f the authors. Nevertheless, what Fromm

has f a i l e d t o do i s t o discuss whether there i s some one t o one r e l a t i o n -

sh ip between the presumed existence o f "hope" and the r e l a t i v e value of

the ideas themselves. The s i n g l e i n d i c a t i o n o f h i s views on t h i s p o i n t

i s a s h o r t sentence (p. 29) i n - The Revolut ion - O f Hope; i n which he imp l ies

t h a t the po l i ti c a l i deol ogi c a l "conservat i sm" o r " rad i c a l ism" o f a w r i t e r

i s n o t d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o t h a t w r i t e r ' s hope o r l a c k o f it. It should

be noted t h a t t h i s q u a l i t y o f i n t e l l e c t u a l stance may be d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d

t o Fromm's ease i n t a k i n g ideas from wide ly sca t te red f i e l d s and th inke rs

of sometimes va ry ing p o l i t i c a l persuasions.

Frommls assertion tha t the responsibil i ty of the social s c i e n t i s t I

influences the content of know1 edge finds s u p p o r t w i t h Fri edri chs and

Sheldon Wolin. Friedrichs summarizes his analysis of the competing para-

digmatic frames i n sociology: system and confl ic t , the modes of scien-

t i s t s adhering t o e i the r of these frames, pr ies t ly and prophetic and the

consequences f o r th i s process on the advancement of socio1,ogy as a

science. Friedrichs put the en t i r e problem in to the framework of the

body of knowledge, techniques which we ca l l sociology and the s c i e n t i s t

as man. Fri edri chs suggests :

Thus when one extends the domain of man's accountability he en1 arges his responsibil i ty. And th i s i s exactly what the epistemology of sociology as a social science i s . uniquely equipped t o do. . . . I t demonstrates, . . . a universali ty of concern seldom shown even by our avowedly universal is t ic religious t radi t ion. . . . For the cog- n i t i v e conditions fo r such qual i t ies are la id down when one uncovers the determinate dimension i n any human action. I t undergirds as well the substantive realization so central t o the sociol ogi cal stance, t ha t man is not man except i n community: tha t he cannot simply choose i n the privacy of his exis tent ia l selfhood the path tha t will guarantee social maturity and ethical sens i t iv i ty b u t t ha t he i s largely dependent upon responsible interaction with others fo r his in'tegrity. Sociology can in a very real sense, then claim a prime pos'ition within the role tha t a mature Heidegger could grant science as a whole: t ha t of the shepherd of ~e ing .31

The above statement aptly i l l u s t r a t e s Fromm's position very well, t ha t

soci 01 ogis ts as members

the t rad i t ions of the d

Sheldon Wolin in

have a responsibil i ty, one tha t i s inherent in

i sc ip l ine . 3 2

Pol i t ics - And Vision (1960) provides the second

example which i 11 ustrates my argument about the correctness or val i di ty

of Fromm's assertions on "hope of the sc i en t i s t . " B u t where Friedrichs

writes of "responsibil i ty," Wolin writes about the significance of

" v i s ion " f o r meaningful p o l i t i c a l theory. Wolin s ta tes :

I f t h e imag inat ive element i n p o l i t i c a l thought were merely a method- o l o g i c a l convenience which enabled the t h e o r i s t t o handle h i s mater- i a l s more e f f e c t i v e l y , i t would ha rd l y warrant the extended a t t e n t i o n we have g iven i t. . . . It ( imaginat ion) has been the medium f o r ex- p ress ing the fundamental values o f the t h e o r i s t ; i t has been the means by which t h e p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t has sought t o transcend h i s - t o r y . 33

Wol i n extends h i s conceptua l iza t ion o f p o l i t i c a l theory by suggest ing . .

t h a t p o l i t i c a l v i s i o n may be a rch i tec ton ic , t h a t i s the attempt t o mould

the perceived p o l i t i c a l phenomena t o some v i s i o n o f the Good. For ex-

ample the work o f P la to , o r a l t e r n a t i v e l y Frornm's view o f s o c i a l i s t

s o c i e t y would be r e l e v a n t examples. But t h e v i s i o n ca'n be re1,igious o r

economic, o r as i n the case o f Hegel the s o c i e t y o f the f u t u r e can

"acquire temporal depth" o r i g i n a t i n g i n a view o f h is tory .34 Whatever

the nature o f the v i s i o n Sheldon suggests t h a t a l l " long l a s t i n g " p o l i -

t i c a l thought has t h a t v i s i o n , over and above the substant ive weaknesses

i n the content o f t he ideas. The Wolin t h e s i s can be app l ied t o socio1,ogy

as w e l l . The po in t , however, i s t h a t "v is ion , " " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " o r

"hope" a11 p o i n t t o the conclus ion t h a t t he th inke r , s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t has

a choice n o t e n t i r e l y dependent on the paradigmatic framework o f the

d i s c i p l i n e . Th is choice gives the t h e o r i s t a perspect ive which e i t h e r

supports o r denies growth i n Frommian terms. 35

I n d u s t r i a1 Techno1 ogy and Soci a1 Science Knowledge

The second aspect o f Fromm's soc io log i ca l epistemology has t o do

w i t h h i s ana lys is o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between advancing i n d u s t r i a l

techno1 ogy and i t s soc i a1 and i n s ti t u t i onal consequences and soc i a1

science knowledge. Fromm's conception o f s o c i a l science i n i t s chrono-

l ogy o f development i s a process whereby s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s have, due t o

a k i n d o f inverse d i a l e c t i c a l process i n Western s o c i e t i e s "gathered

more and more in fo rmat ion about l ess and less . '36 Yet t h i s process o f

h i s t o r i c a l c r i ses , p a r t l y as consequences o f the s t r u c t u r a l developments

o f i n d u s t r i a l soc ie t i es ; has escalated and each t ime threatened man's

e x t i n c t i o n . Fromm's demand f o r a "moral ly committed" science i s a l o g i -

c a l outcome o f h i s asser t ions i n the foregoing context . But Fromm dev-

eloped t h a t contex t as a t h e o r e t i c a l synthesis o f Marx and Freud. 3 7

The aim i n t h i s p a r t o f the d iscussion w i l l be t o a r t i c u l a t e the

imp1 i c a t i ons f o r soc i a1 science o f t h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l syn thes iz ing

process. Th is task i s a d i s t i n c t one from t h a t o f asse r t i ng t h a t

Fromm's theory o f human nature and character are products o f h i s attemp-

t e d synthesis and thereby proceeding t o examine t h i s theory o f human

nature. A number o f d i f f i c u l t i e s appear t o necess i ta te t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n .

I w i l l r a i s e these problems b r i e f l y w i thou t engaging i n systemat ic d i s -

cussion o f them. The f i r s t and obvious p o i n t i s t h a t Fromm's i n t e l l e c -

t h i n k i ng over

deceptive simp

the impression

t o the general

t u a l development i s n o t y e t completed (witness the sub t le s h i f t s i n h i s

the years) . Second h i s w r i t i n g s d i s p l a y a s t y l e and

l i c i t y which a t f i r s t tends t o g i ve the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t

t h a t Fromm i s f a r more i n t e r e s t e d i n conveying h i s ideas

reader than he i s i n main ta in ing a susta ined d ia logue

w i t h academic soc i a1 s c i e n t i s t s , about the natures o f t h e i r enqu i r i es . Th i rd , a r i s i n g p a r t i a l l y from the above "deceptive q u a l i t y , " are the

problems o f del i n e a t i ng from these pub1 i c messages, a coherent p h i 1 osophy

o f the soc ia l sciences which r e t a i n s Fromm's i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y o r ien ta -

t i o n . Fromm does n o t p rov ide anywhere a susta ined c r i t i q u e o f the s o c i a l

sciences. 3 8

Robert Merton once suggested . . t h a t t he twen t ie th century "socio log-

i c a l conception t h a t s c i e n t i f i c d iscover ies emerge from the e x i s t i n g c u l -

t u r a l base and consequently become . . . , almost i n e v i t a b l e . " The

i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f these d iscover ies i s due t o the cumulat ive nature o f

soc io log i ca l l i k e a1 1 s c i e n t i f i c knowledge.39 We f i n d Bernard Chartes '

dictum an ap t d e s c r i p t i o n o f t he nature o f Fromm's soc io log i ca l epistem-

ology. Fromm be l ieves t h a t h i s i n s i g h t i n t o the nature o f s o c i a l r e a l i t y

i s t he product o f h i s having stood on t h e shoulders o f Marx and Freud. 40

Fromm perceives the d i f f e r e n c e between h i s contemporaries and himself as

d e r i v i n g from h i s dual perspect ives . Fromm proposes the rudiments o f a soc i 01 ogi c a l epistemol ogy whi ch

he asserts i s common t o Marx and Freud. Th is epistemology i s c o n s t i t u t e d

of th ree postu la tes : f i r s t l y , Marx and Freud be l ieved t h a t " o f a l l one

must doubt"; secondly, Marx and Freud be l i eved noth ing human t o be a l i e n

t o them; and t h i r d l y , they be l ieved t h a t t h e " t r u t h s h a l l make you

f ree . lt4'

The th ree rudiments o f Marx and Freud become an i n t e l l i g i b l e m o t i f

when the second rudiment (noth ing human i s a l i e n t o the knowing s e l f ) i s

e laborated t o mean t h a t the knowing s e l f on l y begins t o approximate

r e a l i t y , when i t ceases t o regard i t s e l f as a " s p l i t o f f ob jec t " and be-

come me, y e t remains a l so n o t me. Th is paradoxical and r a t h e r clumsy

17

Fronuni an usage completes his attempt t o magnify the Marxi an-Freudi an I

epistemology fo r Fromm's own intel lectual development .42 I t i s i n the

philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) tha t some of the elements of

th i s epistemology have the i r roots. We will examine some of the Kantian

elements of Fromm's assertion (of the knowing subject taking the perspec-

t ive of the other) because Fromm does not c lar i fy i n his analysis ["Some

Related Ideas" in Beyond - The Chains - of Il lusion] what being p a r t and ye t

not par t of the other involves. A t points Fromm's perspective resembles

Max Weber's verstehen. B u t such a conclusion raises problems because

i f Fromm stands on the shoulders of Marx and Freud then t h e i r ant i -

Kantian formulations would influence Fromm's methodology.

The three elements of the Marxian-Freudian motif are not as unique

as a t f i r s t appear, what is unique are the ways in which they were inter-

preted and developed by these thinkers. I t i s important t o c lar i fy

Fromm's part icular method01 ogy since the organi zati on of ideas i n his

work and discussion of these ideas depend largely on his resolution of

the t radi t ional p h i losophi cal and onto1 ogi cal division w i t h i n which a1 1

the social sciences developed. When Fromm attempts t o stand on Marx's

and Freud's shoulders he i s attempting t o reconci l e epistemological

elements which are parti a1 ly i rreconci 1 i ble.

The irreconci l i b l e elements which constitute a philosophical and

epistemologi cal di chotomy arose from the questi on: i s knowledge of

r ea l i ty gained through - a pr ior i conceptual categories , as the rational i s t s

tended t o believe since Platois time? Or, i s r ea l i ty independent of

human cognition but apprehended only th rough the senses? Kantian

18

philosophy i s an attempted reso lu t jon b u t i n Marx and Freud as w e l l as

others a f t e r Kant, the question was re-opened. But i n the eighteenth

century Kant i n h e r i t e d the questions i n the form o f two con t rad ic to ry

ph i losophies t h a t o f the r a t i o n a l i s t s and the emp i r i c i s t s .

Kant proposed a synthesis which asserted t h a t human knowledge

consists o f both "pure reason and sensory experience." His epistemology

asserts t h a t we cannot know "things-in-themselves" (noumena) , b u t only

as they appear i n our experience (phenomena) .43 Kant res tored the 01 d

concept o f Reason and avoided the charge o f idea l ism by asser t ing t h a t

objects o f percept ion are p a r t l y formed by the categories o f the observ-

i n g subject.44 Kant's philosophy suggests t h a t the categories o f the

i n t u i t i o n funct ioned syn the t i ca l l y i n the process o f cogn i t i on t o estab-

l i s h order, u n i t y and interdependence t o objects on which the human

i n t e l l e c t focus. These questions were un iversa l and developed i n the

course o f 1 i f e . For Kant then, the mind was the centre o f knowledge. But the

categories o f the i n t e l l e c t are too ls and there fore no t s u f f i c i e n t f o r

knowledge. Thus from the t ime o f Kant the main problem i n philosophy

focused on "how we come t o know. "45 Man's knowledge o f the na tu ra l and

soc i a l wor ld was seen t o be no t an exact r e f l e c t i o n o f those worlds, bu t

phenomenal knowledge. The u n i t y and order o f those worlds by i n t u i t i o n - -

the f o m s o f space and time--and the categories o f understanding. I n

asser t ing r e a l i t y t o be the co ro l l a r y o f the s u b j e c t i v i t y o f human con-

sciousness, Kant es tab l ished the basic framework f o r a sociology of

knowledge, j u s t be pos i t i ng the existence o f i n t u i t i o n and understanding

19

as p e c u l i a r t o man as a whole as observing subject ; secondly by estab- I

l i s h i n g the contex t f o r t he Hegelian-Marxian and Freudian " l e v e l o f con-

sciousness" as i n f l u e n c i n g t h e qua1 i ty o f the human knowledge

problem. 46

Summary: Kant 's In f l uence on the I n t e l l e c t u a l M i l i e u x o f Marx and Freud

It cannot be overstressed t h a t what Fromm discusses as "The Com-

mon Ground" o f Marx and Freud: doubt, humanity and t r u t h , do n o t on l y

f i n d t h e i r modern fo rmula t ions i n Kant, more so than i n any o f Kant 's

predecessors; b u t doubt, humanity and t r u t h c o n s t i t u t e too general a s e t

o f c r i t e r i a f o r t h e s p e c i f i c soc io log i ca l epistemology on which Fromm

a l l e g e d l y stands. An examination o f Beyond The Chains O f I l l u s i o n , i n -

d ica tes an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y format i n so f a r as the chapter "Common Ground"

i s n o t a d e t a i l e d ana lys is and the impor tant methodological ideas which

r a i s e epistemological quest ions are re legated t o the end o f the book.

Most o f the middle po r t i ons o f t he book are presentat ions o f t he con-

c lus ions o f Marx and Freud r a t h e r than discussions o f the epistemological

roo ts o f those conclusions. 47

Kant 's phi losophy r a i s e d r a d i c a l issues f o r the epistemological

statuses o f t he n a t u r a l and s o c i a l sciences. With regard t o the l a t t e r -

T a l c o t t Parsons has argued w i t h Kant 's asse r t i on t h a t a l o g i c a l pre-

r e q u i s i t e f o r emp i r i ca l knowledge being i n t u i t i o n . The r a d i c a l dualism

imp l ied i n t h i s p o s i t i o n reaches i t s most acute focus i n " r e l a t i o n t o

man--at t he same t ime a phys ica l and a s p i r i t u a l being. 11 48

20

One e l ement of the Kanti an epistemology was general i zed by Hegel I

and i t s e l f became the attempt a t a s t i l l d i f f e r e n t synthesis: Kant's

i nd i v i dua l i s t i c reason, i n t u i t i o n and understanding. Where Kant had

asserted t h a t the norms t h a t regulate mental a c t i v i t y are a se t o f - a

p r i o r i independent categories, w i t h experience prov id ing the condi t ion

f o r a l l knowledge; Hegel he ld t h a t these categories were located i n the

Giest, bu t only manifest and work themselves ou t i n the we1 t g i e s t ( i n -

d i v idua l consciousnesses) . I n another sense Hegel 's epistemology i s a

reac t ion against Kant f o r the former 's d i a l e c t i c a l process i s const i t u -

ted o f a mutual determination between the mind and the world.49 This i s

the background t o the Marxi an epi s temol ogi ca l sys tem.

I n the case o f Freud the epistemological t r a d i t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t .

Fromm has remarked o f Freud:

Freud had a deeper i n s i g h t (than Marx) i n t o the nature o f the pro- cess o f human thought, a f fec ts , and passions, even though he d i d no t transcend t he p r i nc i p l es o f bourgeois society.50

F rom 's c la im t h a t Marxian method and Freudian psychology can be syn-

thesized can p a r t l y be substant iated i n the empi r ica l analysis and use of

h i s t o r i c a l data under ly ing Fromm's work. Such an i 1 l u s t r a t i on however,

does no t lessen the epistemological d i f f i c u l t i e s of Fromm's work.

Fromm's A r t i cu l a t i on o f Freudi an Categories

F i r s t , Fromm asserts t ha t Freud l i k e Marx before him developed a

concept o f human nature as the most c ruc i a1 element o f h i s thought. This

human nature was defined i n terms o f psychic and mental charac te r i s t i cs . 5 1

Secondly, t ha t Freud's 'model of human nature, ' the concept of a natur- ,

a l l y inherent l ib ido , which i s the driving force, the movement toward

the "pleasure principle" ; is a materi a1 i s t based doctrine .52 Thirdly

tha t Freud postulated the potential of the l ibido t o be the same i n each

individual and ye t i t s manifestation i s cul tural ly variable, and indivi d-

ually variable. Fourthly, t ha t Freud's anthropology i s based on an

assertion t h a t i n the ' s t a t e of nature' uninhibited evolution of l ibido

toward the 'pleasure pr inciple ' resulted i n complete individual s a t i s -

fact ion, b u t no crea t iv i ty and ci vi 1 i zat i on. Fifthly , t ha t the evolution

of c rea t iv i ty and c iv i l iza t ion necessitates a dialect ical repression in

soci a1 and ins t i tu t iona l means and individual internalization of tha t

repression. Fromm suggests tha t Freud's use of the foregoing categories

makes fo r Freud the skeptic and a skeptical view of the his tor ical

process and the future. 53

The question can be asked whether Fromm i s postulating what are

i n f ac t Freud's conclusions as though they were the s ta r t ing point of

Freud's analysis. Paul Ricoeur has an a1 ternative view of Freud's phil-

osophy and one t h a t i s more systematic. Rather than begin with the

assertion tha t Freud was a skeptic, Ricoeur begins from the position

tha t Freud was concerned a t f i r s t w i t h developing a natural science of

psycho1 ogy , one tha t could represent psychi cal processes as quantitatively

determined.54 This natural science of psychology i s , according t o

Ricoeur, only one 'cycle ' of Freud's attempt t o view a l l consciousness

"primari ly as ' f a l se ' consciousness "--an attempt which Freud shares with

Marx and Nietzsche, as thinkers schooled with the problem of Cartesian

doubt. There are two f u r t h e r cyc les o f Freudian epistemology a r t i c u l a t e d I

a t two f u r t h e r and d i s t i n c t l e v e l s o f ana lys is . The second l e v e l o f

ana lys is R i coeur terms Freud's theory o f consciousness as a reduc t i ve

and demyst i fy ing hermeneutics , t h a t i s t he science o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 55

The t h i r d l e v e l o f ana lys is deals w i t h Freud's r e t u r n i n psycho a n a l y t i c

focus t o a myth01 og i c a l p h i 1 osophy , the emblems o f which are Eros ,

Ananka, and Thanatos . 5 6 Ricoeur es tab l ishes the th ree fo rego ing frameworks as frameworks

w i t h i n which psychi c a l f a c t s are given q u a n t i t a t i v e frames o f reference.

That i s t o say Freud perceived h i s psychical f ac ts , f o r example the

dynamics o f ego and i d , as though they were q u a n t i f i a b l e f a c t s and h i s

frameworks were frames o f reference w i t h i n which t o v a l i d a t e t h e i r ex i s -

tences and f u n c t i ons . Nevertheless, R i coeur s ta tes :

I t should be noted t h a t Freud does n o t say much about the o r i g i n and nature o f what he c a l l s ' q u a n t i t y . ' As f o r i t s o r i g i n , i t comes from ex te rna l o r i n t e r n a l e x c i t a t i o n s and covers p r e t t y much the idea perceptual and i n s t i n c t u a l s t i m u l i : the n o t i o n Q serves t o u n i f y under a s i n g l e concept anyth ing t h a t produces energy.57

The n o t i o n Q then becomes i n Freudian epistemology a qua1 i ty o f any as-

pec t o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l . I d , Ego and Superego then become p r i n c i p l e s . Ricoeur p o s i t s Freud's p r i n c i p l e o f i n e r t i a which i s equ iva len t t o the

i d . "The p r i n c i p l e o f i n e r t i a means t h a t the system tends t o reduce i t s

own tensions t o zero, i s t o discharge i t s q u a n t i t i e s , t o g e t r i d of

them." The p r i n c i p l e o f constancy i s equ iva len t t o ego. Th is means

t h a t t h e system tends t o main ta in t h e l e v e l of tens ion a t a minimum.

But the divergence between i n e r t i a and constancy tends t o g i ve r i s e t o a

23

"secondary" process, called the principle of perceptual neurons, which

is equivalent to the super-ego.

Within the context or cycle of Freud's biological scientism the

id , ego and super-ego are consequences of the operations on the principles

of i n e r t i a , constancy and neurons. Here the third or perceptual neuron

principle becomes a Freudian contrivance fo r changing quantity in to

quality. In terms of his conception of the individual as a complex out-

come of the operation of the three principles, Freud gives the appearance

of having established a paradigm which could actual ly a r t i cu la t e quali - t a t ive differences in character as an outcome of the spec i f ic operation

of these forces. However th i s i s not the case f o r as Ricoeur concludes:

. . . the whole system rests on the simply postulated equivalence between unpleasure and the r i s e in the level of tension on the one hand, and between pleasure and the lowering of the level on the other. 58

What Ricoeur presents as a Freudian epistemology resting on ana-

l,ogues, Marcuse (1962) presents as the more fami l i a r dual t r iads of

phylogeneti c and ontogeneti c growth and the inverted dialect ical process

1 inking both t r iads . Marcuse presents a summary of Freud's metapsycho-

logy and philosophy i n chapter I of -- Eros And Civilization. The phylo-

genetic aspect of Freud's paradigm i s dialect ical ( in the sense that

his tor ical movement consists of rebel1 ion and change which resul ts i n

destruction of old forms of despotism and incorporation of the old forms

i n higher organizational forms of societal repression). The stages in

this phylogenesis consists of an early stage of the primal horde

characterized by the s i ngul a r primal patriarchal domination. Marcuse ,

terms this stage "biologically justified authority .ll6' Soci a1 order

based on physical force results in fear and jealousy on the part of the

younger, weaker males and leads to rebellion and the next stage of

"brother-clan" societies, the main features of which are the incest

forbidding fami ly and "domination by several . " Symbolically the murdered

father survives as god. This i s the beginning of civilization for Freud,

for i t i s the s t a r t of rationality and the progress of the reali ty prin-

ciple, Subsequent stages realize a diversification and differentiation

of institutions with what Marcuse terms "rewarded inhibition. &1

The s,ignificance of the foregoing analysis rests on the assertion

that ontogenetic progress i s the increasing internalization by the in-

dividual organism, from early infancy of the parallel forces of fear

repression and compromised freedom. 1162

Marcuse's presentation of Freud's epistemology i s based on a

philosophy of history and social psycho1,ogy which suggests t h a t :

If absence from repression i s the archetype of freedom, then civil- ization i s the struggle . . against this freedom.63

Further, Marcuse suggests t h a t Freud's dialectical conception of history

toward increasing unfreedom rests on a metaphysical conception of

'energies ' (Ricoeur Is term) moving toward the:

Replacement of the pleasure principle by the reali ty principle. . . . the great traumatic event in the development of man--in the development of the genus (phylogenesis) as well as of the individ- ual (ontogenesis). According ' to Freud this event i s not unique b u t recurs throughout the history of mankind and of every individual .64

Phylogeneti c repression, finds i t s para1 lel in the ontogeneti c I

development of individuals and the "victory" of the superego over the id.

The notion of the adult individual implies a history of internalized re-

pression. The causal roots of anxiety and mental illness are located in

the dual processes of expanding institutions of social control and in

the nature of the super-ego's relationships t o the id and the ego. The

successes of increasing civilization also rest on these dialectically

connected forces.

As has often been noted Erich Fromrnts overriding concern in his

writings i s with "soci eta1 and individual freedom. " The question remai ns

whether Fromrn can develop a social theory of human freedom i f he i s

standing with one foot on the Freudian and the other on the Marxian

sys tem. Freud's soci 01 ogi cal epistemology rests on the metaphysical

assertion t h a t the material witnesses t o civilization are inherently in-

compatible with 'freedomt i f the latter i s perceived in terms of

"absence from repression ," lack of domination of man by man, and so on. 65

In this sense Freud may be a pessimist, perceiving l i t t l e hope for man

as a whole, b u t rather viewing psychoanalysis as a major form of individ-

ual liberation, t o the extent t h a t individuals can become conscious of

their own internalized repressive mechanisms. In this conclusion reason

i s i tself an inseparable derivative of the reality principle.

The contradiction between the Marxi an and Freudian phi 1 osophies

rests on the different conceptions of human reason since for Marx

reason, t h o u g h n o t relative configurations of human consciousness, i s

inherent in human nature. Georg Lukics ' History -- And Class Consciousness

26

the ambiguity o f Marx's p o s i t i o n i p t h i s connect ion by asse r t i ng t h a t

Marx used the d i a l e c t i c t o emphasize the epistemological problems o f

theory and p r a x i s o r consciousness and h i s t o r i ca1 process [ I n ~ u k s c s '

Marxism h i s t o r i c a l process and consciousness can be t rans1 ated i n t o

terms human reason and consciousness] . 6 6

"Hope," Knowledge and a Theory of Society: A Summation

What mat ters i s n o t t h a t a new i n s i g h t i s necessar i l y t he l a s t word o f t r u t h , b u t t h a t i t i s f r u i t f u l , t h a t i t i s conducive t o f u r t h e r discovery, and more t h a t t ha t : t h a t i n d iscover ing t r u t h , man chan- ges h imse l f because he becomes more awake and can t ransmi t t h i s g rea te r awakedness t o those who f o l l o w a f t e r him.

[Fromm, 1962, p. 153)

Fromm i s concerned w i t h e s t a b l i s h i n g the hypothesis t h a t t he ep is -

temologies o f Marx and Freud have s i m i l a r foundations. These founda-

t i o n s take us back t o the problems w i t h which d iscussion i n t h i s chapter

opened. These have t o do w i t h the ' i l l u s i o n s ' which shroud s o c i a l r e a l i t y ,

knowledge o f s o c i a l r e a l i t y which take the forms o f : ' v i a b l e ' s o c i a l

theor ies i n t h e case o f s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s and inc reas ing l e v e l s c f

consciousness, i n t h e case o f o rd ina ry members o f soc ie ty ; and consequent

changes i n the nature o f soc ie ty . I n t h i s sense t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t

p o i n t o f s i m i l a r i t y between Marx and Freud i s "hope," i n Fromm's estima-

t i o n . Fromm argues t h a t he accepts "hope" as a fundamental pos tu la te of

h i s work and i n so doing stands on the shoulders o f Marx and Freud.

Moreover, the bas is o f t h a t "hopeN i s f o r human freedom, both i n d i v i d u a l

and s o c i a l . I n Fromm's terms therefore, s o c i a l theory 1 i-ke i t s s o c i e t a l

Counterpart, developing consciousness , t o be "v iab le " must be 1 inked t o

ef for ts toward human freedom. ThSs assert ion i s fundamental t o Marxism

sociology, t h a t i s t o say, t o Marx's epistemology. But, what i s i t s

status i n Freud's philosophy? An answer t o t h i s question necessitates

a d i s t i n c t i o n between reason and consciousness. The problem o f reason

pu t i n Kantian terms i s taken t o mean "pure reason," t h a t i s t o say

" t o the human facu l t y of comprehending, through conceptual thought, the

t rue good and the r igh t . "67 I n Kant's C r i t i que -- O f Pure Reason (1787),

the question posed, "how much and what can the understanding and reason

know apar t from a l l experience?; has a basic assumption t h a t homo-

sapiens can i n a speculat ive anthropology be conceived as endowed w i t h

reason. This i m p l i c i t assumption discusses reason as d i s t i n c t from par-

t i c u l a r sense representat ions. Here the Kantian assumption i s t ha t what

renders homo-sapiens, a d i s t i n c t specie, i s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f the - a

p r i o r i judgement, t h a t i s a "necessary Judgement. " Kant asserts :

For i f we e l im ina te from our experiences everything which belongs t o the senses, there s t i l l remain ce r t a i n o r i g i n a l concepts and ce r t a i n judgements der ived from them, which must 'have ar isen completely a

68 -

p r i o r i , independently of experience. . . .

Again i n terms o f Kantian categories a d i s t i n c t i o n can be made between

Reason and Consciousness i n the context o f a speculat ive anthropology if

the l a t t e r i s taken t o mean knowledge i n order o f time, i .e., empi r ica l

knowledge, which by d e f i n i t i o n involves Kant's three f o l d synthesis

(apprehension, reproduct ion and recogni t ion) . This involves personal

awareness o f experience of s e l f , now as subject, now as object . 6 9

With in the context o f the foregoing d i s t i nc t i ons i t could be

argued t h a t Freud may have confused Reason and Consciousness, seeing I

both as dependent on the progress o f c i v i l i z a t i o n , hence the s i g n i f i c a n c e

o f h i s theory o f i nhe ren t organismic d r i ves and t h e i r determining func-

t i o n . Marx, however, makes a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between Reason and Con-

sciousness which i s i m p l i c i t i n h i s organ iz ing concepts. The ana lys is

o f t h i s chapter and the fo rego ing conclusions can be summarized by sug-

ges t ing t h a t Fromm's p o s i t i o n i s an o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n o f t he p o s i t i o n s

o f both Marx and Freud. I n Richard Evans' book: Dialogue With E r i c h -- Fromm (1966), F r o m r e i t e r a t e s an e a r l i e r asse r t i on (1962) t h a t t o com-

prehend Freud's epistemology ana lys is must begin from the ph i l osoph ica l

p o s t u l a t e t h a t Freud's o v e r r i d i n g concern was t r u t h ; assuming , o f course,

Freud's psychoanalysis t o be the l o g i c a l outcome o f a l l o f h i s e a r l i e r

work. Fromm s t a t e s i n Beyond - The Chains O f I 1 lus ion : -

While f o r Marx t r u t h was a weapon t o induce s o c i a l change, f o r Freud i t was the weapon t o induce i n d i v i d u a l change; awareness was the main agent i n Freud's therapy.70

Fromm's reasoning i n - The Dialogue, takes the f o l l o w i n g form: t o the

ex ten t t h a t Marx and Freud were preoccupied w i t h d iscover ing the t r u e

nature o f man and soc ie ty , t h e i r ep i s temol ogi es emphasi zed ne i t h e r " f r e e

w i l l " no r determinism. Q u i t e c o r r e c t l y Fromm views the epistemologies

of these th inke rs as having been determined by t h e i r phi losophies:

Spinoza, Marx and Freud saw no s u b s t i t u t e f o r t r u t h . For them the b i b l i c a l i n j u n c t i o n appl ies: i t i s t r u t h which w i l l make one free. . . . It was t h e p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n o f Spinoza, Marx and Freud t o have been a t t he same t ime determin is ts and inde te rm in i s t s .71

It i s t h e content ion o f t h j s chapter t h a t Fromm proposes an i n t e -

g r a t i o n o f t he ph i losoph ica l p o s i t i o n s o f Marx and Freud as a bas is f o r

a new k i n d o f s o c i a l sciencee7' I n a t tempt ing t h i s task Fromm has d e l i n -

eated the strands o f ph i losoph ica l ideas common t o both th inkers , b u t

has tended t o smooth over some o f t he epistemological d i f f i c u l t i e s inher -

e n t i n any attempted i n t e g r a t i o n . The conclusions o f i n t e g r a t i o n have

been synthesized i n Fromm's phi losophy o f ' a l t e r n a t i v i s m ' as mediat ing

between t h e extremes o f ' f ree-wi 11 ' and 'determinism. '73 But t h e spec-

i f i c epistemological cond i t ions o f 'a1 t e r n a t i v i s m ' remain unclear ,

though Fromm's concept o f character and h i s theory o f human nature are

der ived from the phi losophy o f ' a l t e rna t i v i sm. ' It i s t o t h i s problem

t h a t d iscussion o f Fromm w i l l focus ( i n the f o l l o w i n g chapter) i n an

attempt t o f u r t h e r e x p l i c a t e the meaning and s ta tus o f Fromm's theo re t -

i c a l system.

FOOTNOTES . .

' ~ f . E r i c h F rom, Beyond The Chains O f I 1 l us ion : MJ- Encounter - w i t h Marx and Freud (New York:= and S c h u s t e K 1962),. 153. ---

L Apart f rom John Schaar 's c l a s s i c c r i t i q u e , Escape From A u t h o r i t y : The Perspect ives --- O f E r i ch F r o m (1961 ) , there i s no o the r s i n g l e ex tens ive X systemat ic c r i t i q u e o f Fromm i n Engl ish. An i n t e r e s t i n g and somewhat b iog raph ica l ana lys i s o f Fromm's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o socio logy by W. R. De Manse, "Lo P s i c o l o g i a Soc ia l de E r i c h Fromm," Revista Mexicana De Socio- l o g i a (Mexico: Univers idad Nacional I n s t i t u t o De Invest igac iones Socia les) Jan.-Apri l , Vol. 27, No. 1, 1965, pp. 219-240; d i f f e r s s l i g h t l y from Schaar's i n i n t e r p r e t a t i on.

3~ s t r e s s t h i s p o i n t because o f t he th ree major c r i t i q u e s ( i n Eng l ish) of Fromm's p o s i t i o n , t h e most extensive, Schaar Is devotes n ine pages o n l y t o t h e s p e c i f i c problem o f F r o m ' s phi losophy o f the s o c i a l sciences. The most recent , Rubin Grotesky, Pe rsona l i t y : The Need For L i b e r t y And Rights (1967) i s a p o l i t i c a l ph i l osoph ica l c r - q G n d i g - nores t h e r o b l e m almost e n t i r e l y . Harry Wells ' , The F a i l u r e O f Psycho- ana lys is : ---- From Freud t o Fromm (1963), i s r a t h e r trunca-aze a l - though recogn iz ing Fromm's debt t o Kar l Marx attempts t o discuss some o f Fromm's most impor tant ideas from the perspect ive main ly o f psycho- ana lys i s and t o debate around Freudian rev is ion ism. Frank Isaac 's un- publ ished Ph .D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , "The Concept o f Human Nature: A Phi loso- p h i c a l Ana lys is O f t h e Concept o f Human Nature I n the Wr i t i ngs O f G. W . A l l p o r t , S. E. Asch, E. Fromm, A. H. Maslow and C. R. Rogers," U n i v e r s i t y o f Maryland (1966), takes up t h e problem o f Fromm as s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t b u t main ly w i t h i n t h e con tex t of the debate between h o l i s t s (Kar l Popper) and method01 og i c a l i n d i v i d u a l ism.

4 ~ c h a a r , OJ-. a. , pp. 33-42. Schaar takes the p o s i t i o n t h a t F r o m ' s conception of s o c i a l science i s s e t o u t i n th ree works: The Sane Soc ie t (1955) ; --- The Ac t O f Loving (1956) and "Man I s Not A Thing," Sat- d e v i e w - O f L i t e r a t u r e , March 16, 1957, pp. 9-11.

' ~chaar , - i b i d . , p. 37.

%chaar, i b i d . , p. 35.

7 ~ c h a a r , i b i d . , p . 38.

* c r i t i q u e s of t h i s type vary. T a l c o t t Parsons i n the 1968 i n t r o - duc t i on t o h i s S t ruc tu re O f Soc ia l Act ion: A Stud I n Soc ia l Theory With Reference t o A Group O f ~ z e n t European W r i ~ e d e ~ Y o r k : Free p r e s s ) m e i d e ~ i e s t h e p r o b l e m a s a growi-ricism, a wish t o be iden- t i f i e d w i t h the hard sciences, p. VII.

' ~ h i l s ' ana lys is of sociology t o the present day though d i f f e r e n t from Robert F r ied r i chs ' 4 ~ o c i o l d g y Of Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1970), i s i n many ways s i m i l a r . Both u t i l i z e Thomas Kuhn's The St ruc ture O f S c i e n t i f i c Revolutions (Chicago: Un ive rs i t y o f Chicago P r z , 1 9 6 2 ) - t o forward the no t i on o f s c i e n t i f i c paradigms. Though Shi 7s (p. 760 and 818) denies t h a t socio logy i s a " rea l science." L i ke Robert Nisbet, - The Social ogi ca l T r a d i t i o n (Basic Books, 1966), pp. 5-6, Shi 1s sees the "un i t y which transcends spec ia l i za t i on i n socio logy" as r e s t i n g on a com- mon d i vo t i on t o a small number o f "Key words" (p.-819). d is bet de l i n - eated f i v e u n i t ideas. See Edward Sh i ls , "Trad i t ion , Ecology, and I n s t i - t u t i o n I n the H i s t o r y O f Sociology, DAEDALUS: Journal O f the American Academy O f A r t s And Sciences, Fa1 1 1970, Vol . 99, No. 4, "The Making O f Modern Science: Biographi ca l Studies, pp . 760-825.

1•‹cf. Louis Althusser, "On the M a t e r i a l i s t D ia l ec t i c : On the Unevenness O f Or ig ins ," i n For Marx, t rans1 ated from the French by Ben Brews te r , A1 l e n Lane (London: Penguin Press, 1969) , p . 171 . A1 thusser recommends t h a t we move t o a Marx is t the0r.y a s i m i l a r recommendation was made by Georg ~ u k h c s i n H is to ry And Class ~onsciousness i n 1923, and t o some extent by Sa r t i e i n Search For A Method.

l lc f . Louis I r v i n g Horowitz, Phi loso h , Science And the Sociology O f Knowledge ( I l l i n o i s : Charles C. Thomas 961), p. 132. - - -7-P

12cf. E r i ch Fromm, - The Rev01 u t i on - O f Hope: Toward - A Humanized Technology (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 4.

13cf . Ernest Becker, The St ruc ture O f E v i l : An Essay On the U n i f i - ca t ion O f the Science O f Man-(New York: ~ e o r g e a z i l l e r , 1 9 6 8 ) T - ...- - p . x i 1 1 . The two o therworks o f the tri 1 ogy are The B i r t h And Death Of

----- Becker concludes t h a t a u n i f i e d soc ia l science would contain the f o l l ow - ing: a) I nva r i an t po in ts o f reference i n the i nd i v i dua l actors: man's need f o r a symbol ica l ly predicated sense o f pr imary s e l f value. (Pre- c i s e l y because o f the importance o f symbols i n human phylogenesis which creates a d i s j unc t i on w i t h nature (p. 56)) ; b) A s t r uc tu ra l - funct iona l model o f the i n s t i t u t i o n s o f society; c) A problem f o r analysis a t the present moment i n h i s t o r i c a l t ime. (Becker suggests a l i ena t ion , again r e i t e r a t i n g Fromm's pos i t i on ) ; d) A focus f o r con t ro l l ed soc ia l scien- t i f i c i nqu i r y . This best provided by a value-expl i c i t psych ia t ry work- i n g w i t h i n l ega l democratic safeguards (p. 174). I n Revolut ion I n Ps c h i a t r , Becker traces the appropr ia t ion o f the problem o f m e n t a r i d k i s s - d o - c u l t u r a l problem) by medical psych ia t ry ; the symbolic meanings of i nd i v i dua l ac t ion and the i n a b i l i t y of conventional psych ia t ry t o cope w i t h t h i s symbolism i n i t s e i t i o l o g y and diagnosis on the one hand and the re1 a t i v e f r u i t f u l ness of the ideas of th inkers l i k e Dewey on the o ther (pp. 22 passim). We w i 11 r e t u r n t o Becker I s p a r t i cu l a r treatment 0s the soc i a l sciences l a t e r i n the thes is .

1 4 ~ o b e r t F r i e d r i chs (1 970) , x. - c i t . , pp. 299-300.

15schaar, E. - c i t., p. 35.

161rv ing Horowitz (1961), *. - c i t . , Ch. I V "Phi losophic Methods And Soci a1 Understanding ," pp. 42-52.

17schaar, 9. - c i t. , p. 35. For an ana lys is o f l o g i c a l empir ic ism as a form o f behaviourism see Maurice George Andet "The Concept O f Purpose I n Modern Systems Theory," unpubl ished M.A. thes is , Simon Fraser Un ive rs i t y , 1970, pp. 75-86. Eugene J. Meehan, Value Judgement - And Soc ia l Science: S t ruc tures - And Processes ( I l l i n o i s : Dorsey Press, 1969) has i m p l i c i t theory o f human behaviour and h i s t o r y which resembles t h a t o f John Schaar (pp. 127-135 o f Meehan's book).

1 8 ~ r i e d r i chs , x. - c i t., p. 107.

191bid., p. 75. It i s worth no t ing t h a t both R. N isbet (The - S o c i o l o g i c a l ~ r a d i t i o n ) , p. 35 and E. Becker (The St ruc tu re O f Evi 1 , esp. pp. 3-14 and -hasize t h i s aspect o f the soc io log i ca l t r a d i t i o n as g i v i n g socio logy i t s p a r t i c u l a r and l a s t i n g o r i e n t a t i o n .

2 0 ~ n subsequent chapters o f t he work I w i l l suggest t h a t Fromm's work as a whole has t o be approached i n two dimensions f i r s t , t he theor- e t i c a l and soc i 01 og i ca l e p i s temol ogy and the h i s t o r i c a l and emp i r i ca l . I n the sec t i on under d iscussion we are p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h the f i r s t . Secondly, I am s imply n o t i n g a t t h i s stage t h a t t he p o s i t i o n t h a t Fromm's work i s l a r g e l y dependent on Marx and Freud i s i n r a d i c a l con t ras t t o some o f t h e conclusions o f scholars on Fromm's work. I have i n mind John Schaar (1961), p. 47 and Harry Wells (1963), pp. 185-187.

"c f . E. Fromm, - The Revolut ion Of Hope: Toward - A Humanized Tech- nology (New York: Bantam Books, 1 9 6 8 r Z . 42.

2 2 ~ f . Werner Stark, The Sociology O f Knowled e: An Essay I n A i d O f A Deeper Understandin O f t h e H is t o r y Ideas LondK. Routledge & -- Kegan Paul ,

_P_ 7-

2 3 ~ b i d . , p. 14. S tark suggests f u r t h e r i n the t e x t t h a t w i thou t a system o f values "we should never be ab le t o focus any s o c i a l f a c t " (p. 16). Horowi t z , x. m., (1961 ) focuses on the socio logy o f know- ledge and s o c i a l change, esp. pp. 36-37.

2 4 ~ b i d . , pp. 20-21. It i s c l e a r t h a t Fromm's "socio logy of know- ledge" i s i n c o n t r a s t t o and i s o f a d i f f e r e n t order from Kar l Mann- heim's ' r e l a t i o n i s m ' and Max Sche ler 's " r e l a t i v e conso l ida t ion . " Horowi t z , E. - c i t., pp. 40-41 .

25~romn, E. G., pp. 12-13.

2 6 ~ f . E r i c h Fromm, The Hear t 'Of Man: I t s Genius For Good And E v i l (Harper and Row, 1 9 6 4 r The'concepts o f " l i f e " and "growth" which - are sub-themes o f t h i s work w i l l be f u l l y developed i n a subsequent sec t i on o f the work.

27~romm, w. - i t . , Revo lu t i o r iO f - Hope, p. 30.

2 9 ~ f . Marvin O f Theories O f Cu l tu re - -

3 0 ~ o h n Schaar, o . c i t . , 1961. Chapter 111, "Al ienat ion," pp. 159-235, f o r a c r i t i c a f anfisis o f Fromm's theory o f a l i e n a t i o n and i t s s ta tus i n Fromm's s o c i a l science.

"Fr iedr ichs , x. - c i t., pp. 316-317.

3 2 ~ t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t F r ied r i chs does n o t accept F r o m ' s p o s i t i o n i n a t l e a s t one sense, t h a t t he e a r l y Marx provides an epistem- o l o g i c a l bas is f o r a "science of hope." However the r e j e c t i o n by Fr ied- r i c h s i s imp l ied . I b id , , p. 300.

3 3 ~ f . Sheldon S. Wolin, P o l i t i c s V is ion : C o n t i n u i t fi I nnova t i on - I n Western Thought ( L i t t l e , Brown and Company, , 1960 P. 19.

3 4 ~ b i d . , pp. 19-20.

3 5 ~ h e term paradigm i s used i n the sense postu la ted by Thomas Kuhn i n The S t ruc tu re O f S c i e n t i f i c Revolut ions (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y Press o f C h i c a K 1 9 6 2 ) . n T i s work Kuhn makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between "normal" and "ex t ra-ord i nary" science. I n "normal Science1' i .e . , a f i e l d o f s tudy charac ter ized by progress, "an unpara l l e led i n s u l a t i o n . . . from t h e everyday demands o f t he l a i t y ( i .e., the mass o f o rd ina ry members of t h e wider soc ie ty ) and o f everyday l i f e " ; the paradigm which i s a "net- work o f commitments ," "a c r i t e r i a f o r choosing problems"; g i ve r i s e t o a s e t o f r u l e s f o r d e f i n i n g research problems, v a l i d a t i n g procedures and so on. Kuhn ' s frame o f reference i s the empi r i c sciences . To the ex ten t t h a t much o f t he s o c i a l science d i s c i p l i n e s are n o t character ized as l1normal sciences ," they are "ex t ra-ord inary sciences .I1 Whereas i n "normal science" we i n t e r n a l i z e as " r e a l " t he th ings (phenomena) t o which the concepts we acqu i re r e f e r (Fr iedr ichs , p. 51 ) . I n "ex t ra-ord inary science" (i .e., one charac ter ized by change and i n s e c u r i t r a t h e r than accumulation of elements o f empi r ic knowledge exc lus i ve l y 7 we have t o r e - de f i ne cons tan t l y our concepts, assumptions and metaphysical and ep i s tem- o l o g i c a l problems. I n o the r words what Kuhn terms " i n s u l a t i o n from the w ider soc ie ty " i s n o t poss ib le on a number of planes and therefore acqui- s i t i o n of r e l e v e n t values i s poss ib l y eas ier . Where F r e i d r i chs (1970) uses t h e term paradigm f o r socio logy, Percy Cohen ( ~ o d e r n Socia l Theory,

London: Heinemann Educational Book?, 1968), t a l k s about meta-theories i n socio logy w i t h two se ts o f features: a n a l y t i c and normative, i .e., theor ies which i nco rpo ra te statements which are ax iomat ic and proposi - t i o n a l and which e labora te a s e t o f i d e a l s ta tes " t o which one may asp i re" (p. 2). The p o i n t I wish t o make here i s t h a t t o the ex ten t t h a t r u l e s o f v e r i f i c a t i o n and v a l i d i t y are subordinate t o paradigmatic assumptions o r commitments , the problem o f " v i s i o n " o r "hope" cannot be s imply dismissed as e t h i c a l and the re fo re u n s c i e n t i f i c . Summarizing Kuhn's "demys t i f i ca t i on o f sc ien t ism" f o r values o r "vision/hopeH e tc . i n the above sence, i n s o c i a l science avid James Harding (The Ideology And Logic O f Scient ism, unpubl i shed Ph .D. D isse r ta t i on , Simon Fraser Un ive rs i t y , A p r i l , 1970) had t h i s t o say:

Technology and i t s uses shape the f u n c t i o n o f science and t h e c lass o f problems w i t h which i t deals. And s ince t h e uses o f technology r e l a t e t o t h e system o f p o l i t i c a l and economic power, t h e system o f power i n s o c i e t y can a f f e c t t he very core o f t he s c i e n t i f i c method. (P. 109)

3 6 ~ t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t t h i s statement w i t h regard t o modern science r a i s e s t h e problem o f the changes i n the not ions o f "ob jec t i ve " and "sub.iective" Reason which i s e x c e l l e n t l y t raced i n Max Horkheimerls book he E c l i p s e O f Reason (Oxford u n i v e r s i t y Press, 1947)). Hork- h e i m e r T r i v e s a t ac-ion w i t h regard t o s c i e n t i f i c knowledge, which i s s i m i l a r t o Fromm's, al though ~ o r k h e i m e r i s c r i t i c a l o f ~ rommls phi losophy (pp. 16-19).

37~romm, OJ-. B., Beyond The Chains - O f I l l u s i o n (1962), p. 9.

3 8 ~ o date avai 1 ab le D i s s e r t a t i o n and P e r i odi ca l Abstracts reveal f o u r Ph.d. d i s s e r t a t i o n s and a hos t o f a r t i c l e s on Fromm ( i n Eng l ish) .

39~ f . Robert Merton, On The Shoulders O f Giants: A Shandean Post- s c r i p t (New York: Free Press,1965), p. 367. M e r t o n r e i t e r a t i n g t h e aphorism of t h e "dwarf on the shoulders o f q ian ts " i s enabled t o see f u r t h e r than the g i a n t h imse l f , ra i ses the ailemma o f whether i n s o c i a l sciences, each succeeding generat ion stands on the shoulders, o r i n faces o f those t h a t have gone before (pp. 267-268).

40~ f . E. Fromm, -- The Sane Soc ie ty (New York: H o l t , R inehar t & Winston, 1955), p. v i i i .

41 Fromm, 2. m., Beyond - The Chains - O f I l l u s i o n , p. 13.

4 2 ~ b i d . , p. 149-151. Th is aspect o f Frommls ana lys is i s r a t h e r truncated-at a m o t i f i s n o t recognizable u n t i l chapters ii and x i of Beyond The Chains O f I l l u s i o n are brought together . For a s i m i l a r statement i5Tthe'lme Kt n o t me," see Norbert E l i a s l "Involvement And Detachment ,I1 B r i t i s h j ou rna l o f - ~ o c i ology , Vol . 11, 1956, p. 226-252.

4 3 ~ y r e j e c t i n g Hume's scept ic ism, which h e l d t h a t men cou ld n o t a r r i v e a t general and necessary laws about emp i r i ca l f a c t s , Kant was u l t i m a t e l y seeking an answer t o the epis temological problem o f how can statements der ived n o t f rom experience o r from l o q i c a l in fe rence a t t a i n t h e s ta tus o f o b j e c t i v e knowledge. C f . Gunther, iemmling, -- Road To Sus i c i o n : A Study o f Modern M e n t a l i t y and the Sociology - o f Knowledge New York: meredi t h v u b l i s h i n g Co., 1 9 6 r p.57. e-

4 4 ~ a n t ' s ana lys i s o f the na ture o f these categor ies-- there were twelve i n a1 1--were ca tegor ies o f understanding, which i s an element o f t he human mind. There was a l s o the element o f i n t u i t i o n w i t h i t s con- s t i t u t i v e elements o f space and t ime. C f . Immanuel Kant, C r i t i q u e o f - Pure Reason, tr. by Norman Kemp (London: Macmil lan , 1956). -

4 5 Reml ing , x. - c i t . , p. 59. See a l s o Werner Stark, The Socio- O f

i s t o 7 O f Ideas Ph y o f t e K ~ t ~ o r m u l a t i o n o f t he " i s o l a t e d i n t e l l e c t u a l ,'I esp. pp. 13- 14.

4 6 ~ h e problem o f t he i n t e l l e c t u a l as a member o f a c lass i n a Marxian soc io logy o f knowledge and the s u b l a t i on of Hegel ' s concept ion o f epistemology as being n o t a c l e a r break w i t h Kant ianism i s discussed i n my ana lys i s o f Georg ~ u k i c s ' H i s t o r y - And Class Consciousness i n K. 0 ' Br ien: The Sociology o f L i t e r a t u r e : Georg Lukacs , unpubl ished M.A. t hes i s , Simon Fraser U n i v e r s i t y ( l969) , pp. 77-109. S i m i l a r l y Kant 's in f luence on Freud's epistemology i s discussed i n Ricoeur, OJ-. - c i t . , pp. 344-375.

4 7 ~ h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f these conclusions become c l e a r when one con- s ide rs t h a t Kant 's epistemology i s the bas is o f systemat ic doubt i n modern phi losophy. Remml i n g , 9. -. c i t 9 p. 61 .

4 8 ~ f . T a l c o t t Parsons: The S t ruc tu re Of Soc ia l Act ion: A Study i n --- Socia l theory w i t h spec ia l r e f K n c e t o a g r E i p - T T 6 c m r o p e a n Wr i te rs , Vol . T ( ' ~ e w York: Free P r e s c 7 4 w p . C

49~ f . Emi 1 Oester iecher: Consciousness And Soc ia l Act ion: Toward A S t r u c t u r a l - D i a l e c t i c a l concept ion o f a c t i o n and thought, unpubl ished Ph.d. d i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y o f I l l i n o i s , 1968, p. 14. See a l s o Reml ing , x. - c i t . , p. 66.

50~romm, x. - c i t . , Beyond --- The Chains O f I l l u s i o n , p. 173.

510f t he concept o f human nature, Fromm d is t i ngu i shes between the concept o f human nature and " t h a t o f c e r t a i n a t t r i b u t e s o f man common t o a l l , " t h a t i s "essen t i a l a t t r i b u t e s " and the essence o f man o r human nature which may comprise a l l these essen t i a l a t t r i b u t e s o r more, "and may poss ib l y be de f ined as something from which the var ious a t t r i b u t e s

follow." See E . Fromm, The Nature Of Man: Readings selected, edi ted, - and furnished, with an introductory essay by Erich Fromm and Ramon Xirau -The Macmillan Co., 1968), p. 4.

5 4 ~ f . Paul Ricoeur, Philosophy -- And Freud: An Essa On Interpreta- t ion, t r . by Denis Savage (Yale University Press ,T&~T-ZI. In t h i s - elaboration of Ricoeur's Terry lectures (1960) , Ricoeur gives a herme- neutic and symbol i c interpretation to Freud's psychoanalysis and psycho- logy. Ricoeur a l so takes the position tha t in order to get a t Freud's epistemology, the s c i e n t i s t has to momentarily ignore the Freudian ont- ology and analyse the logical and symbolic s t ructures of the Freudian paradigm. - Ibid. , pp. 3-19.

5 5 ~ b i d . , p. 59.

5 9 ~ h i s i s a recapitulation of Freud's position as s e t out in The Future -- Of An I l lusion (1907) and Civilization -- And I t s Discontents (1961).

6 0 ~ f . Herbert Marcuse, -- Eros And Civi 1 ization: A Philosophical !nqyiry -- i n t o Freud (New York: Vintage Books, 1962 edi f ion) , p . 57 . I t 1s important t o note tha t Marcuse begins his analysis of Freud's epistem- ology by focusing on Freud's "myth01 ogical philosophy."

651bid. I t is necessary t o s t r i k e dis t inct ions between "freedom" as r e tu rn tosome s t a t e of unchecked fulfilment of the pleasure principle and freedom in the sense being discussed here. I t i s not c lear tha t Freud conceived a his tor ical process in an overall "cyclical fashion" (Toynbee) and therefore whatever the par t icular disagreements between Marcuse and Fromm, the definit ion of freedom as "non-repressive civi 1 iza- tion" i s common ground. See also Beyond - The Chains - Of I l lusion, p . 177,

%ee Georg ~ u k s c s : Geschi chte und K l assenbewuss t s e i n , pub. Neuwied Luchtenhand, 1968, p. 17. '

6 ? ~ f . Herbert Marcuse, Negations : Essays I n C r i t i c a l Theory (Beacon Press, 1968) .

68~ f . Immanuel Kant, C r i t i que O f Pure Reason, tr . Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmi 11 an, 1963) , p. 42.

69~ f . Graham Bi rd , K a l t ' s Theory O f Knowled e: An Out l i ne O f Centra l Arguments I n the C-iKe -- O f ~ u r ~ R d n d ~ : Routledge, Kegan Pa-.-SKal so Marcuse, 9. a., Negations . Marcuse sug- gests t h a t i n Kant 's philosophy: "Reason i s the locus o f the f i n a l un i t y , t o t a l i t y , and u n i v e r s a l i t y o f knowledge: the f a c u l t y t h a t un i f i e s the r u l es o f the understanding under p r i nc i p l es (p. 53) . Nevertheless Kant has two d i f f e r e n t concepts o f reason, these are i n t e r twined. Reason as the u n i f y i n g t o t a l i t y o f man's cogn i t i ve f a c u l t y "as which i t i s the sub- j e c t o f the ' c r i t i q u e s ' o f pure and p r a c t i c a l reason; and reason . . . , as a s i ng l e f a c u l t y t h a t r i s e s 'above' the understanding, as the f a c u l t y o f those ' Ideas' t h a t can never be adequately represented i n experience and have a merely regu la t i ve func t ion" (pp. 53-54). Marcuse argues t h a t f o r Kant the t r a n s i t i o n t o p r a c t i c a l concepts occurs through reason i n the second sense. Marcuse s ta tes : " the ' Idea ' i s transformed i n t o a ' pos tu la te ' and the 'pos tu la te ' i n t o a ' f a c t ' o f p r a c t i c a l reason" ( P * 54).

70~romn, 9. - c i t . , Beyond - The Chains - O f I l l u s i o n , p. 16. -3 .I

"Cf. Richard Evans, Dialogue --- With Er i ch F r o m (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 96-97.

CHAPTER I I

ERICH FROMM'S CONCEPT OF THE INDIVIDUAL

. . . I regard man as a f reak o f nature, because although he i s an animal, he i s t h e on ly case.of a l i v i n g organism having awareness o f i t s e 1 f . l [Er ich Fromm, 19661

E r i c h Fromm's theo r ies o f human charac ter and p e r s o n a l i t y a re pred-

i c a t e d upon h i s conceptua l iza t ion o f human nature. The uniqueness o f

F r o m ' s conceptua l iza t ion o f human nature, considered w i t h i n the wider

contex t o f h i s work as a whole, l i e s i n i t s e x p l i c i t n e s s and t h e urgency

w i t h which i t i s formulated. I t should be noted, o f course, t h a t t h e

primacy o f human nature concepts i n s o c i a l psychology theor ies , as a

s p e c i f i c approach i s by no means unique t o ~romm. For i n general t he re

appears t o be a connect ion between the c a l l f o r an i d e o l o g i c a l l y u n i f i e d

s o c i a l science committed t o humanist ends and the methodological proced-

u re o f s o c i a l psychology through asser t ions and concepts o f human nature. 3

Fromm h imse l f i s as a s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t c o m i t t e d t o developing t h i s con-

nec t ion and s p e c i f y i n g some o f t h e concerns o f such a s o c i a l science.

The p r o p o s i t i o n proposed by t h i s thes i s i s counter t o Schaar's

general eva luat ion o f E r i c h Fromm's work. Schaar argues t h a t Fromrn's

work as a whole r e s t s on e t h i c a l pos tu la tes which are - a p r i o r i p resc r ip -

t i ons . The e t h i c a l p r e s c r i p t i o n i s an at tempt t o de l i nea te t h e condi-

t ions , f o r "1 i v i n g we1 1." That i s t o say t h a t Fromm wants t o del i nea te

the s o c i a l and psychological cond i t ions which w i l l ensure t h a t t h e q u a l i t y

38

39

o f human 1 i f e w i 11 progress .4 Schaar goes on t o suggest t ha t from the

foregoing vantage p o i n t Fromm's theories are c l u t t e red by appeals t o

science but:

. . . the bas ic presuppositions and in ten t ions of h i s work have very l i t t l e t o do w i t h science.5

With in the framework o f Schaar's analysis o f Fromm, the former suggests

t h a t Fromm's aim i s t o develop a science o f man which w i l l b u i l d a " t rue

model" o f human nature.6 The o u t l i n e o f Fromm's work, then according t o

Schaar, i s o f a th inker who begins w i t h given e th i ca l - a p r i o r i s about

'how' man should l i v e , develops a theory, a model o f man which makes

claims t o soc ia l science, b u t i s a t .bottom a p resc r i p t i ve analysis, de-

ve l ops a character study and theor ies o f personal i ty on t h i s "phi losophy . " I n t h i s endeavour Fromm i s portrayed as drawing on various sources, i n -

c lud ing re1 i g i o n and sociology. From Schaar 's vantage po in t then, and

i m p l i c i t i n h i s c r i t i q u e i s the idea t h a t Fromm's c r i t i q u e o f soc ia l

science i s incomplete and a t the end o f h i s approach ra ther than a t the

core o f h i s work.

The propos i t ion o f t h i s thesis i s p a r t l y the converse o f Schaar's.

I n my own analysis, I argue t h a t Fromm begins w i t h a conception o f

soc ia l science which i s p a r t l y the outcome o f a c r i t i q u e o f the under-

l y i n g assumptions o f much contemporary theory. Fromm thus moves t o

develop a theory of man and soc ie ty and a character study and personal i ty

theor ies. From t h i s vantage po in t assumptions about man's nature and

e th i ca l p resc r ip t ions can be modified. To ' t e s t ' t h i s propos i t ion

e n t a i l s a discourse on the nature o f s o c i a l science and the p lace o f

e t h i c a l values o r p r e s c r i p t i o n s i n an app l ied s o c i a l science.

Human nature can never be observed as such, b u t on l y i n i t s s p e c i f i c mani fes ta t ions i n s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s . It i s a t h e o r e t i c a l cons t ruc - t i o n which can be i n f e r r e d from empi r ica l study o f t he behaviour o f man. I n t h i s respect, the science of man i n cons t ruc t i ng a 'model o f human nature ' i s no d i f f e r e n t from o the r sciences which operate w i t h concepts o f e n t i t i e s based on, o r c o n t r o l l e d by, in ferences from observed data and n o t d i r e c t l y observable themselves.7

Human nature i s i n f e r r e d from a study o f human behaviour, and i s n o t an

a p r i o r i p ropos i t ion , on l y complete ana lys is o f t he s o c i a l cond i t ions -

and psychological tendencies under ly ing the o r i e n t a t i o n s o f behavi our

can reveal human nature. What i s s c i e n t i f i c about t h i s p o s i t i o n ? Before

d iscussing t h i s quest ion what i s meant by human nature requ i res c l a r i t y .

, Some Notes on the Concept o f Human Nature

E r i c h Fromm does n o t s imply asse r t t h a t h i s model o f human nature

i s the cu lminat ion o f an e n t i r e l y empi r ica l ana lys is o f human behaviour.

t l i s work i s an at tempt t o develop some essen t ia l pos tu la tes as gu ide l ines

fo r h i s s o c i a l psychology and y e t avoid the charge o f having pos i ted un-

tes tab le propos i t ions which l i e ou ts ide the scope o f h i s s c i e n t i f i c

analys is , on the one hand. On the o ther hand, Fromm attempts t o devise

the maximum u t i l i t y from h i s empi r ica l ana lys is . Fromm s t a t e s t h i s

inherent d i lemma as f o l lows:

I s i t necessary t o come t o the conclus ion t h a t there i s no human nature? Such an assumption seems t o imp ly as many dangers as those inhe ren t i n the concept o f a f i x e d nature. I f there were no essence common t o a1 1 men, i t may be argued there could be no u n i t y of men,

there could be no value o r norms v a l i d f o r a1 1 men, --- there could no t even be the science of psychology o r anthropology, which has as i t s --- subject matter "man." Are we no t then caught between two undesirable and dangerous assumptions : the react ionary view o f assuming a f i x e d and unal terable human nature, and the r e l a t i v i s t i c one t h a t leads t o the conclusion t h a t man shares w i t h other men only h i s anatomical and phys io log ica l a t t r i butes?8 [ I t a l i c s mine]

It i s c l ea r from the foregoing statement then t h a t i n procedural

terms the problem o f a concept o f human nature i s interconnected w i t h the

problem o f soc ia l science, f o r Fromm, over and above the substantive

weaknesses o f a concept o f human nature.

What does Fromm mean by a concept o f human nature? I n phi losophi-

ca l and methodological terms, Fromm makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between the

'essent ia l a t t r i b u t e s ' o r q u a l i t i e s o f character common t o man 'qua man'

and the 'essence' o f man. The essence o f man may comprise a1 1 the former

a t t r i bu tes , and the a t t r i b u t e s o f character may f o l l ow from the 'essence'

o f man.' The rami f i ca t ions o f Fromm's d i s t i n c t i o n between essent ia l

a t t r i b u t e s and the essence o f human nature r e f e r back t o Fromm's aim of

penetrat ing below the i 1 lusions t o the deeper meanings o f human r e a l i t y .

But the d i s t i n c t i o n between a t t r i bu tes and essence res ts p a r t l y on h i s

c r i t i q u e o f antecedent phi losophies o f man. Fromm suggests t ha t attempts

t o def ine human nature i n terms o f "reason, the capaci ty for production,

the c rea t ion o f soc ia l organization, the capacity f o r symbol making" are

a t t r i bu tes , bu t do not cons t i tu te the " t o t a l i t y o f human nature." Such

a t t r i b u t e s do however in f luence human character. Fromm asserts t h a t

from the time o f the ancient Greeks, through medieval philosophy and t o

the nineteenth century, such a t t r i bu tes have been mistakenly used t o de-

f i ne the essence o f human nature.'' Fromm therefore turns t o the

nineteenth century phenomenologists and e x i s t e n t i a l phi losophers I

(~ ierkegaard, W i 11 iam James and Bergson), f o r the essence o f man as pro-

cess. In other words Fromm se t t l es fo r a d e f i n i t i o n of human essence i n

terms o f existence. Here the essence o f human nature i s both h i s t o r i c a l

and temporal. I n these terms i t i s the "questions," no t the "answers"

which defines man's nature.

Now, human nature i s no t only a p r i nc i p l e , bu t i s a lso a capacity. l 1

Fromm concludes t h a t the 'essence' o f human nature res ts i n the 'capaci tyl

f o r reasoning, love and 'awareness. ' Essence a lso impl ies the 'possi-

b i l i t y ' f o r freedom; t h a t i s the " reve la t ion o f human d ign i t y . " The

p o s s i b i l i t y o f freedom i n t h i s sense i s here dependent on the development

o f awareness. But the au then t i c i t y of awareness and the p o s s i b i l i t y o f

freedom has t o be d i rec ted t o "human interrelatedness . " nature i s a being f o r others. '11 2

The d i s t i n c t i o n between essent ia l a t t r i bu tes and

Man i n h i s very

human nature i s

a consistent theme i n Fromm's w r i t i ngs and requires greater e luc idat ion.

The consistency of the formulation, o f the essence o f human nature,

previously ou t l i ned can be traced backwards i n Fromm's work t o as ea r l y

as 1957. A t t h a t t ime Fromm asserted t h a t knowledge o f human nature, o f

'essence' was outs ide the scope of psychology. He suggested:

Psychology can show us what man i s not, [ I t a l i c s Fromm's] i t cannot t e l l us what man, each one o f us i s 3

I n "Man I s Not A Thing ," F r o m engages i n a c r i t i c a l polemic against psy-

chology which focuses mainly on studies d i rec ted t o manipulat ing the

43

i n d i v i d u a l t o the d i c t a t e s o f i n d u s t r i a l p roduct ion and consumption and I

i n d i v i d u a l psychoanalysis as a method "by which one can a t t a i n happiness

and m a t u r i t y and y e t avo id the jump, the ac t , t he p a i n o f separat ion."

Th is type o f psycho1 ogy and psychoanalysis a ids t h e "universal process

o f a l ienat ion . "14 This c r i t i q u e i s based on F r o m ' s asse r t i on t h a t "man

i s n o t a th ing . " According t o Fromm psychologists and psychoanalysts

cannot ga in f u l l and complete knowledge o f the essence of man except i n

the ' a c t of love, ' an a c t which transcends thought and words. Th is i s a

cont inua l process from b i r t h of the "separat ion o f t he pr imary t i e s o f

s o i l and blood."

On t h i s p o i n t o f t he essence o f man and knowledge o f it, Fromm

assigns t o psychology and psychoanalysis negat ive ro les , t h a t i s the re -

moval o f ' d i s t o r t i o n s ' and ' i l l u s i o n s , ' "no t the p o s i t i v e , f u l l , and

complete knowledge o f a human being.'' On t h i s p o i n t Fromm concludes:

J u s t as myst ic ism i s a l o g i c a l consequence o f negat ive theology, l o v e i s the l o g i c a l consequence o f negat ive psychology . I5

It i s worth n o t i n g however t h a t there i s no mention o f a commitment t o a

Marxian concept o f human nature i n "Man I s Not A Thing." Though Fromm's

use o f t he concept o f love seems t o have been taken from Marx's s ta te -

ments on the nature o f love.16 ~ r h m ' s d iscussion o f Marx's concept of

' l ove ' tends t o focus on Marx's asse r t i on o f t he d i s t i n c t and q u a l i t a t i v e

d i f f e rences between human ac t ions which emphasize r e c e p t i v i t y as a condi- .

t i o n o f a l i e n a t i o n and p r o d u c t i v i t y which stresses the r e l a t i o n of human

being t o human being. According t o From, Marx viewed the essence of

man, i n h i s e a r l y w r i t i n g s , t o be based on the " p r i n c i p l e of movement ,"

no t a mechanical one, bu t one t h a t s t r i v e s f o r c r e a t i v i t y and s e l f -

r e a l i z a t i o n through p r a c t i c a l means, ones t h a t resolve the antinomies

between sub ject iv ism and object ivism, s p i r i t u a l ism and material ism, and

so on." [ I t a l i c s mine]

Er i ch Fromm's work i s committed t o the pos i t i on t h a t there i s no

con t rad ic t ion between a concept o f human essence, a soc ia l s c i e n t i f i c

theory o f human a l i ena t i on and a v e r i f i a b l e soc ia l science. This comni t-

ment i s f o r c e f u l l y argued i n Marx's Concept -- O f Man. This commitment a lso

means t h a t Fromm i s one o f the cent ra l f i gu res i n the debate i n recent

discussions o f the 'philosophy o f soc ia l science' about whether i t i s

possib le t o postu la te 'essences ' and l eg i t ima te l y j u s t i f y the conclusions

derived from such analyses as soc ia l science. The discussion which

fo l lows w i l l deal w i t h the foregoing problem i n r e l a t i o n t o Fromm's d is -

cussion o f Marx's concept of human nature and the s t r a teg i c s ign i f icance

o f t h i s p a r t i c u l a r Marxian posture t o Er ich Fromm's own work. A subse-

quent sect ion o f the chapter w i l l present the more generalized forms o f

the debate, w i t h i n the context o f methodology.

Fromm ou t l i nes the debate as t h a t between w r i t e r s who support

Daniel B e l l ' s 'end o f ideology' thes is i n the West and 'Communist

w r i t e r s ' such as Lenin and Bucharin i n the Soviet bloc, on the one hand;

and those who s t ress the con t inu i t y o f thought i n Marx such as Georg

LukGcs, Ernst Bloc, Kar l Lowi t h and Paul ~ i l l i c h .I8 The former group

suggests . . t h a t Marx's " i d e a l i s t i c humanism" and h i s claims f o r the

essence o f man ou t l i ned i n the Economic - And Phi losophical Manuscr ipts 'of -

1844, were abandoned by the mature Marx who became more h i s t o r i c a l and -

45

adopted a more economic ana lys is , The l a t t e r group argue genera l ly t h a t

a c o n t i n u i t y e x i s t s between Marx's humanism and h i s s c i e n t i f i c s o c i a l ism

and t h a t no c o n t r a d i c t i o n e x i s t s . The two sides o f t he debate can be

summarized i n t h e f o l l o w i n g statements. Daniel B e l l c laims t h a t

Marx had repudiated the idea o f a l i e n a t i o n , d ivorced from t h e econ- omic system, and, by so doing, c losed o f f a road which would have g iven us a broader, more useful ana lys is o f soc ie ty and pe rsona l i t y than the Marxi an dogmatics which have prevai l e d . I9

Fromm exp la ins the para1 l e l ism of ideas between Be1 1 and t h e Communist

w r i t e r s on the domination o f posi t i v i s t i c - m e c h a n i s t i c ideas i n s o c i a l

science thought from the 1880's t o the 1 9 2 0 ' s . ~ ~ F r o m makes th ree f u r -

t h e r arguments which subs tan t ia te h i s thes i s . The f i r s t i s t h a t Marx

d i d n o t abandon h i s views on the essence o f man i n h i s l a t e r w r i t i n g s

such as Cap i ta l . Rather Fromm suggests t h a t a l l Marx d i d i n h i s l a t e r

w r i t i n g s was t o change h i s use o f terms, r a t h e r than the ideas which

these terms expressed. Fromm takes se lec t i ons from - The German Ideology

and Cap i ta l t o demonstrate t h a t Marx never abandoned the n o t i o n o f an

essence i n human nature, he develops h i s ana lys is o f a l i e n a t i o n t o i l l u s -

t r a t e t h e h i s t o r i c a l consequences f o r t h a t essence, as s o c i e t i e s develop

and change. Fromm's r e p l y t o Danie l B e l l and others deserves quot ing i n

f u l l :

Marx does n o t say, as B e l l quotes, t h a t ' t he re i s no human nature i nhe ren t i n each separate i n d i v i d u a l , ' b u t something q u i t e d i f f e r e n t , namely, t h a t " the essence o f man i s no abs t rac t i on i nhe ren t i n each i n d i v i d u a l ." It i s the essen t ia l p o i n t o f Marx's 'mater i a l i sm' aga ins t Hegel 's ideal ism. Marx never gave up h i s concept of man's nature . . . b u t t h i s nature . . .; i s one which can be understood o n l y h i s t o r i c a l l y , because i t unfo lds i n h is tory .21

The second point i s tha t Marx shares a humanistic t radi t ion which i s non-

the i s t i c , b u t goes back t o prophetic messianism, Spinoza, Goethe and

Hegel. That the narrow interpretation of Marx which attempted t o negate

Marx's re lat ion t o tha t t radi t ion and can be par t ia l ly explained by the

re la t ive success of mechanistic material ism; was negated by the fai lure

o f the dominant industrial systems to eliminate dehumanization and poli-

t i ca l barbarism i n the East and West. This l a t t e r fa i lure led to a re-

interpretation of Marx, "based on the whole Marx and his humanist

phi losophy . '12* The third point, directed to Bell, i s tha t the l a t t e r

m i s-unders tands the concept of a1 ienati on. 23

Elsewhere, Fromm has suggested tha t just Marx's concept of human

nature or essence i s inextricably bound up with the l a t t e r ' s view of

alienation i n general and a1 ienated man in par t icu lar . Second that Marx

never p u t his psychological views i n any systematic form, but these

psychological views are "distributed a l l over his work. Thirdly and

i ronical ly Marx's unique contribution t o psychology though developed

e a r l i e r than tha t of Freud, had t o await Freud's own discoveries before

the former's was given any attention.24 Fromm's ideas as outlined in

"Marx's Contribution To The Knowledge Of Man" have a d i rec t bearing on

his polemi c against the narrow interpretation of a1 i enati on provided by

writers such as Bell and on Fromm's assertions on the necessity of the

concept of 'essence' t o a viable psychology and sociology. Marx's depth

psychology preempts l a t e r views of human nature and i s a cr i t ique of

mechanistically oriented experimental psychology. I t i s also a cr i t ique

of the 'model ' of man as an ' i solated ' homme machine although Marx's work

a n t i c i p a t e s ~ r e u d ' s .25 Fromm suggests the fo rce o f

I essence,' runs throughout a1 1 h i s works, and i s o f

temological value. Fromm s ta tes :

47

Marx's concept o f

emp i r i ca l and ep is -

. . . Modern academic and experimental psychology i s t o a l a rge ex- t e n t a science dea l ing w i t h a l i ena ted man, s tud ied by a l ienated inves t iga to rs , w i t h a l i e n a t e d and a l i e n a t i n g methods. Marx's psy- chology, being based on the f u l l awareness o f the f a c t o f a l i ena t ion , was ab le t o transcend t h i s type o f psychological approach because i t d i d n o t take a l i ena ted man f o r n a t u r a l man, f o r man as such .26

Here Marx's c r i t i q u e has two elements, one i s a c r i t i q u e aga ins t Hegel Is

absolute mind and the process o f the d i a l e c t i c , t he o ther i s Marx's d i s -

t i n c t i o n between animal and human nature. I n terms o f t h e l a t t e r po in t ,

a1 though Marx speaks o f man as having 'constant ' d r ives , these constant

d r i ves o f ea t ing , d r i n k i n g and p roc rea t ing are n o t o f t h e same q u a l i t y as

animal i n s t i n c t s , because the former cannot be considered i n abs t rac t ion

from " the environment o f o the r human a c t i v i t i e s ." That i s t o say the

human environment does n o t become, f o r Marx, an o b j e c t f o r the i n d i v i d u a l 's

s a t i s f a c t i o n o f these d r i ves . 27

Fromm's asse r t i on then i s t h a t Marx's statement i s t h a t concrete

i n d i v i d u a l s have a human nature, and t h a t na ture i s i n i t s core o r

essence, s o c i a l . Th is s o c i a l i t y i s f o r Marx the un ive rsa l and e terna l

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f both constant and r e l a t i v e dr ives . La te r we w i l l ex-

amine i n g rea te r d e t a i l Fromm's asse r t i on of man's need f o r i n t e r r e l a t e d -

ness as an e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r i n the essence o f man, we w i l l a l so examine

t h i s statement as a s y n t h e t i c one main ly der ived from Fromm's i n t e r p r e -

t a t i o n o f Marx. Here I want t o examine another dimension of the s ta te -

ment t h a t f o r Marx one o f t he essences o f human nature i s i t s soc ia l

48

qua1 i ty . According t o Fromm Marx, demonstrates t h i s asse r t i on by 1 i n k i n g

the asse r t i on t o the idea t h a t man i s a c reature who makes h imse l f i n a

process o f s e l f - c r e a t i o n , from the beginning of h i s t o r y . This process o f

s e l f - c r e a t i o n , o f a c t i v i t y , i s one of man, from h i s e a r l y h i s t o r y , b u t

i t i s a c t i v i t y d i r e c t e d t o man; producing h i s means of subsistence. I n

t h i s process o f t he s e l f - c r e a t i o n o f h i s means o f subsistence man t rans-

forms h imse l f and h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o nature. Th is i s the core o f Marx's

h i s t o r i c a l mater ia l i sm. But i n t h i s contex t h i s t o r i c a l mater ia l i sm i s

n o t a psychological theory. Fromm suggests t h a t the o n l y "quasi-

psychological premise i n t h i s theory l i e s i n the assumption t h a t man

needs food, s h e l t e r , e t c . ; . . . "28 These are the constant d r ives "which

e x i s t under a1 1 circumstances and which can be changed by s o c i a l condi - t i o n s on ly as f a r as form and d i r e c t i o n are concerned .'12'

What Marx appears t o be saying here i s t h a t f o r a l l i n d i v i d u a l

men the d r i v e f o r food, sex and s h e l t e r are constant b u t the very gener-

a t i o n and establ ishment of these d r i ves b r i n g men i n t o processes which,

even a t t he e a r l y stages o f human p re -h i s to ry , a re nascent soc ia l r e l a -

t ionsh ips . These dr ives a re constant t o the ex ten t t h a t they can be

modi f ied on ly i n form and d i r e c t i o n , b u t n o t i n content. Re la t i ve dr ives

are d i f f e r e n t i n t h a t they are h i s t o r i c a l l y and s o c i a l l y var iab le . These

ideas r e q u i r e c l a r i f i c a t i o n . 30

The d i s t i n c t i o n between constant and v a r i a b l e d r i ves does no t imply

a separat ion. Since the v a r i a b l e d r i ves which are t o t a l l y soc ia l i n

o r i g i n i s , presented by Marx, dependent on the p a r t i c u l a r soc ia l express-

i o n and forms o f t he constant d r ives . A c e n t r a l pos tu la te i n Marx's

analysis o f the development o f copstant and f i x e d dr ives, and the p a r t i -

cu la r constel l a t i on o f these dr ives i n the consequent human character,

i s the element o f labour.

Labour i s the f a c t o r which mediates between man and nature; labour i s man's e f f o r t t o regulate h i s metabolism w i t h nature. Labour i s the expression o f human l i f e and through labour man's r e l a t i onsh ip t o nature i s changed, hence through labour man changes himself.31

The use of the term ' labour ' i n the foregoing context i s c r i t i c a l

i n Marx's expos i t ion o f h i s t o r i c a l materi a1 ism. Emerging from Marx's

analysis i n the Economic - And Philosophical Manuscripts -- o f 1844 i s a

qua1 i t a t i ve d i s t i n c t i o n between 'a1 ienated' and 'non-a1 ienated' labour. 3 2

Al ienated labour i s ' l i f e a c t i v i t y ' which appear t o man "only as a means

f o r the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f a need, the need t o maintain h i s physical ex is -

tence." Non-alienated labour " i s l i f e c reat ing l i f e . . . L i f e i t s e l f

appears only as a means o f 1 i f e . "33 [ I t a l i c s author's]. I n Marx's view

conscious a c t i v i t y d ist inguishes man from the a c t i v i t y o f animals. Marx

suggests t h a t man i s only a conscious being, t h a t i s h i s own l i f e i s an

ob ject f o r him, because he i s a species being.

Only f o r t h i s reason i s h i s a c t i v i t y f r ee a c t i v i t y . Al ienated labour reverses the re la t ionsh ip , i n t h a t man because he i s a self-conscious being makes h i s l i f e a c t i v i t y , h i s being, on ly a means f o r h i s ex is- tence ,34

One o f the object ives o f Marx's analysis o f the phylogenetic evo-

l u t i o n o f man i s the i n t e n t t o i l l u s t r a t e t h a t man produces--i .e., non-

a1 ienated product i on--only when f reed from the d i r e c t physical need which

characterizes animal production. A1 i e n a t i on which Marx viewed as being

t o some ex ten t an i n e v i t a b l e consequence o f product ion under condi t ions I

o f phys ica l need i n man's e a r l y h i s t o r y can be e l im inated l a t e r i n man's

h i s t o r y i f on ly because o f increas ing technological progress. This i s a

v iewpoint which i s developed l a t e r by E r i c h Fromm. But Marx's analys is

i n the Manuscripts focuses on an explanat ion o f a l i e n a t i o n i n causal

terms which i s p laced i n human ' w i l l ' and 'cho ice t as w e l l f o r he s ta tes :

Human a l i e n a t i o n , and above a l l the r e l a t i o n o f man t o h imsel f , i s f i r s t r e a l i z e d and expressed i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between each man and o ther men. Thus i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f a l i ena ted labour every man regards o ther men according t o the standards and re la t i onsh ips i n which he f i n d s h imse l f placed as a worker.

I n the same t e x t Marx argues:

Every s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n o f man, from h imse l f and from nature, appears i n the r e l a t i o n which he postu lates between o ther men and h imse l f and nature .35

I n t h i s p a r t o f the t e x t Marx's ana lys is focuses on p r i v a t e proper ty n o t

as a t h i n g 'ex terna l t o mankind' b u t as the "sensuous expression o f the fac t

t h a t man ( i s a unique and p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l ) i s a t the same t ime an

o b j e c t i v e f a c t f o r h imsel f ; j u s t as h i s mani fes ta t ion o f l i f e i s a l so

h i s a l i e n a t i o n o f l i f e . . . ." I n sho r t f o r Marx p r i v a t e proper ty i s a

consequence o f a1 ienated 1 abour, i t spr ings from the re1 a t i on between

man and o the r men and i n which the labour, desires, etc., o f the s e l f

appear t o be o the r than s e l f ' s a c t i v i t y , they belong t o another power.

The development o f p r i v a t e proper ty i s the ma te r ia l necessary i n

the beginning o f soc ie ty , f o r c u l t u r a l development and w i t h i t the a n t i -

nomies of a c t i v i t y and p a s s i v i t y , essence and existence , sub jec t iv ism

51

and ob jec t iv ism; and so on. The r e s o l u t i o n o f these antinomies comes

w i t h the p o s i t i v e abol i ti on of p r i v a t e proper ty , i .e. , w i t h communism,

" the r e t u r n o f man as a s o c i a l being." Communism i s , f o r Marx, the:

. . . t r u e s o l u t i o n o f t he c o n f l i c t between exis tence and essence, between o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n and s e l f - a f f i rmat i on, between freedom and necessi ty , between i n d i v i d u a l and species. I f i s the s o l u t i o n o f t he r i d d l e o f h i s t o r y and knows i t s e l f t o be t h i s s o l u t i o n .36

I n an at tempt t o e labora te on Marx's ana lys is o f the essence o f man, and

h i s t o r i c a l mater ia l i sm, Fromm argues communism i s n o t t he aim o f human

development. Social ism, argues Fromm i s the aim. Fromm imp l i es t h a t

communism and s o c i a l ism are d i f f e r e n t phases o f s o c i e t a l o rgan iza t i on t o

the ex ten t t h a t t h e l a t t e r focuses on man, whereas under communism a

realm o f necess i ty under which man produces cont inue t o e x i s t . O f

soc i a1 ism Fromm argues :

Beyond i t (communism) begins t h a t development o f human power, which i s i t s own end, t he t r u e realm o f freedom, . . . 37

Further , Fromm suggests t h a t one can understand Marx's concept o f s o c i a l -

i sm i f the d i s t i n c t i o n between man's ' t r u e needs ' and the s y n t h e t i c

' a r t i f i c i a1 l y produced needs ' i s maintained. The former are roo ted i n

man's nature. "Man's t r u e needs are those whose f u l f i l m e n t i s necessary

f o r t he r e a l i z a t i o n o f h i s essence as a human being.''38 But i n t h i s

statement o f Fromm's 'essence' has become on to log i ca l , s ince i n an

e a r l i e r p a r t o f h i s ana lys is Fromm discusses the concept o f essence as

though i t were i nhe ren t i n man. Essence i s e x i s t e n t i n man b u t essence

i s a l s o i n t he process o f becoming. Yet paradox ica l l y Fromm does n o t

discuss the concept o f essence d i a l e c t i c a l l y and h i s t o r i c a l l y .

52

The Concept of Essence i n Human Nature

I n the foregoing sect ion analysis has been focused on those areas

o f Marx's thought which provide one o f the boundaries o f Fromm's concept

o f human nature. We saw t h a t f o r Marx the essence o f human nature was

man as "becoming," t h a t inherent i n t h i s not ion o f becoming was the idea

o f i nd i v i dua l freedom. I n Fromm's terms i t i s a 'freedom to, ' develop

and r e a l i z e himsel f . This freedom was a capacity f o r Marx, the possi-

b i l i t y of which i s r ea l i zed i n h i s t o r i c a l material ism. The problem o f

the essence of human nature was therefore i n Marx's terms no t so much

ex i s t en t i n man's b io logy, bu t ra ther i n h i s soc ia l being. The contra-

d i c t i o n between man's essence and h f s existence, between h i s capacity

f o r freedom and h i s temporal a l i ena t ion was one t h a t i s resolved w i t h

the passing o f time; one t h a t man becomes conscious o f w i t h r e f l ec t i on

on praxis.

Discussions o f the concept o f human nature are confronted by a

va r i e t y o f problems a t d i f f e r i n g leve ls o f the h i s t o r y o f philosophy and

a t d i f f e r i n g l eve l s o f epi stem01 ogy , These problems d i r e c t l y in f luence

the p o s s i b i l i t y s f a human sciences. One o f the problems germane t o such

human sciences i s ex i s t en t i n the concept o f essence.39 For F r o m the

concern w i t h essence expresses i t s e l f i n h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l focus on human

nature and on the problems o f i 1 lusions and the r e a l i t y o f soc ia l r e a l i t y .

The l a t t e r i s a transformation o f the phi losophical and s c i e n t i f i c con-

cerns w l t h the former. On the problem of the concept o f essence Marcuse

has remarked:

I t s mani fo ld forms have as t h e i r common content t h e abs t rac t i on and i s o l a t i o n o f the one t r u e ~ e i n g from the constant ly changing m u l t i - p l i c i ty o f appearances. Under the name o f "essence" t h i s Being i s made i n t o t h e o b j e c t o f "au thent ic " c e r t a i n and secure knowledge .40

Marcuse ' s essay i s concerned main ly w i t h the ep is temol ogi ca1 problems o f

t he concept o f essence. But much o f what he has t o say i s re levan t f o r

Fromm's concerns as w e l l . The problem o f essence i n general seem t o

a r i s e i n the human sciences o u t o f th ree d i s junc t i ons . F i r s t , the d i s -

j u n c t i o n between s o c i e t y and t h e i n d i v i d u a l . Second, the d i s j u n c t i o n be-

tween nature and human nature, and f i n a l l y the d i s j u n c t i o n between the

r e l a t i v i t y o f knowledge and t h e absolut ism o f being.

Marcuse comments on the attempt t o e l im ina te the concept o f

essence from science as fo l lows:

A theory t h a t wants t o erad ica te from science the concept o f essence succumbs t o he lp less r e l a t i v i s m , thus promoting the very powers whose reac t iona ry thought i t wants t o combat. P o s i t i v i s m cannot provide an e f f e c t i v e c r i t i q u e o f t he i d e a l i s t doc t r i ne o f essence. Doing so devolves upon the mater i a1 i s t d i a l e c t i c .41

Instead, Marcuse suggests t h a t ever s ince A r i s t o t l e 's time, the concept

o f essence has had a h i s t o r i c a l and dynamic character . But i n l a t e r

phi losophy ( p a r t i c u l a r l y i n l a t e a n t i q u i t y and the Middle Ages when logos

was t r a n s l a t e d i n t o man as r a t i o n a l ) man's being was t rans la ted i n t o

Chr is ti an the01 ogy 's wor ld view . Thus Marcuse argues :

A r i s t o t l e ' s d o c t r i n e o f t he essence o f man i s n o t comprehensible s imply through h i s general ' d e f i n i t i o n ' o f man as . . . (zoon logan echon; zoon p o l i t i kon) f o r i t presupposes h i s metaphysics as we1 1 as h i s e th i cs , p o l i t i c s , r h e t o r i c , and psychology, from which come the not ions logos, p o l i t i k o n , zoon. It presupposes no less h i s p o s t u l a t i o n o f domination and se rv i tude as modes o f Being and h i s view o f t he r o l e o f ma te r ia l labour i n t h e t o t a l i t y o f the areas of 1 i f e .42

I n t h i s essay Marcuse asserts t h a t h i s pr imary concern i s w i t h the

"s ign i f i cance o f t he problem o f essence f o r m a t e r i a l i s t theory c h i e f l y

i n terms o f t he concept o f t h e essence o f man." H is concern i s t o show

t h a t transformations i n the meani,ng o f essence f o r Descartes, Kant and

Hegel, ensue from the forms o f human s o c i a l o rgan iza t ion which the l a t e r

concepts o f essence re f l ec t .43 Whole dimensions o f man's ex is tence be-

come i n e s s e n t i a l o r cont ingent . The h i s t o r i c a l and concrete contents o f

t he experience o f p a r t i c u l a r groups are l o s t as bourgeois soc ie ty evolves.

I t i s on ly w i t h the development o f a Marx i s t m a t e r i a l i s t theory t h a t the

o r i g i n a l focus and sharpness o f t he concept o f essence i s rev ived and

transcended, t h a t t he c r i t i c a l m o t i f o f t he theory o f essence, the

" tens ion between p o t e n t i a l i t y and a c t u a l i t y , between what men and th ings

cou ld be and what they are i n f a c t " i s stressed.44 I n t h i s ana lys is

Marcuse l i k e Fromm stresses Marx's fucus on the connect ion between essence

and existence and p o t e n t i a1 i ty and ac tua l i ty ; b u t un l i ke Fromm Marcuse

st resses the c r i t i c a l c lass perspect ive o f t h i s concept o f essence.

M a t e r i a l i s t theory moves beyond h i s t o r i c a l re1 a t i v i sm i n l i n k i n g it- s e l f w i t h those s o c i a l forces which the h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n reveals t o be progressive and t r u l y 'un i versa1 . '45

I n d iscuss ing essence Marcuse def ines "materi a1 i s t theory" i n very broad

terms, r a t h e r than i n i t s s t r i c t l y Marxian fo rmula t ion . Th is a l lows

Marcuse t o t race t h e c o n t i n u i t y from P l a t o t o Marx. I n the case o f the

former, t he concern i s w i t h the movement o f s o c i a l forms, s o c i a l organiza-

t i o n . Thus P l a t o viewed s o c i a l movement as one of unres t and c o n t i n u a l l y

transformed tensions between existence (which we might term s o c i a l forms I

I

5 5

o f 1 i m i t e d temporal i t y ) and essence, b u t w i t h the t rans format i on o f the

former preserved i n l a t e r forms,

Wi th the emergence of C h r i s t i a n p h i 1 osophy , essence and ex is tence

a re kep t o n t o l o g i c a l l y separate. Essence i s viewed as ex terna l t o and

y e t necessary t o ex is tence.

The essence conceived i n t h i s way can become r e a l on ly through a p r i n c i p l e t h a t i s ' e x t e r i o r ' t o i t . . . Human beings are thus exon- e ra ted f rom concern w i t h the ' o n t i c ' d i f f e r e n c e between essence and ex is tence i n t he realm o f f i n i t e being.46

Here, o f course, the reference i s t o the phi losophy o f Thomas Acquinas . Here t o o Thomist ic phi losophy impeded the reduct ion o f the problem o f

essence t o one o f l o g i c and epistemology. Such a reduct ion Marcuse views

as c e n t r a l t o t he p o s s i b i l i t y o f a concept o f essence which would have

i t s p r i o r r e f e r e n t i n concrete i n d i v i d u a l human beings . The phi losophy o f Rene Descartes (1596-1650) i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n

t h i s development o f an essence whose r e f e r e n t i s the autonomous i n d i v i d -

u a l . Here essence became the ob jec t of the ego cog i to , of t h e o r e t i c a l

and p r a c t i c a l reason. But according t o Marcuse t h i s change a l s o echoes

the beginnings o f modern i d e a l i s t i c phi losophies o f essence. The r a t -

i o n a l autonomy and sover ign reason o f t he i n d i v i d u a l subject , as the

essence of human nature, an autonomy and r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t Descartes

fashioned a long the l i n e s o f mathematical science; paradox ica l l y , i s con-

f ron ted by an ex te rna l wo r ld over which the i n d i v i d u a l has no power.

For Descartes, the i n d i v i d u a l had power over on l y h i s thoughts and de-

s i r e s . Yet Descartes i s concerned w i t h human freedom.

. . . 'That t h i s freedom i s freedom "only" o f thought, t h a t on ly the ' abs t rac t i n d i v i d u a l i s free', t h a t concern w i t h human freedom becomes concern w i t h the absolute c e r t a i n t y o f thought, demonstrate the h i s - t o r i c a l v e r a c i t y o f Cartesian ph i losophy.47

Descartes formulat ions provided the basis f o r theory of transcendental

s u b j e c t i v i t y as i t was developed by Kant and l a t e r by Edmund Husserl .

Husserl f o r example def ines essence i n oppos i t ion t o any g iven spat io -

temporal f a c t i c i ty, t h a t i s t o say i n t h i s type o f phenomenology, the

tens ion between essence and existence i s 1 os t . Hegel Is re formula t ion of

essence as the absolute u n i t y o f "being-i n - i t s e l f " and "being- for- i t s e l f"

s u b s t i t u t e s a r e c i p r o c i t y between essence and existence f o r the e a r l i e r

l o s s o f tension. Hegel's fo rmula t ion i s a dynamic h i s t o r i c a l one b u t one

i n which essence i s "always p r i o r t o a l l s ta tes o f fact." Marcuse com-

ments tha t :

Hegel I s theory o f essence remains transcendental. 48

The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the above fo rmula t ion f o r Fromm's usage of the

Marxian fo rmu la t i on i s t h a t i n the case o f the phenomenological

(Husser l i an) fo rmu la t i on the essence o f t he i n d i v i d u a l i s l oca ted i n pure

s u b j e c t i v i t y , i t has no u t i l i t y i n Fromm's scheme s ince such a method

cou ld n o t f o r example demonstrate the e f f e c t on s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and

values i n shaping essent i a1 a t t r i b u t e s . A1 t e r n a t i v e l y Fromm cou ld n o t

e x p l a i n by t h i s method the h i s t o r i c a l movement o f e v i l , o f the patholog-

i c a l fo rces which are responses t o s t r u c t u r a l and mate r ia l d i s t o r t i o n s

of mani s p o s s i b i l i t i e s . By the same token the Hegel ian n o t i o n of essence

through i t s locus i n an absolute Being denies the elements o f i n d i v i d u a l

w i l l and choice i n the formation of human charac ter and the v a r i a b i l i t y I

o f charac ter as l oca ted i n spat is- temporal r e a l i t y . I n the f i n a l analysis

such spa t i o - tempora l i t y i s cont ingent f o r Hegel.

I t i s o n l y i n t h e m a t e r i a l i s t d i a l e c t i c as s o c i o l theory t h a t the

oppos i t i on o f essence and appearance i s , g iven a c r i t i c a l m o t i f . F i r s t ,

because the dynamic f o c a l p o i n t i n t h i s theory o f essence i s on the h i s -

t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p which cons tan t l y transforms the tension i n t h i s l i f e

by r e a l men and i n the l i v e s o f r e a l men. Secondly because the incon-

g r u i ty between p o t e n t i a l i ty as essence and a c t u a l i t y as existence

" i n c i tes knowledge t o become p a r t o f t he p r a c t i ce o f t ransformati on ." T h i r d l y , essence i s t he " t o t a l i t y o f the s o c i a l process as i t i s organ-

i z e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l epoch." But t h i s t o t a l i t y i s m u l t i -

dimensional, and i n methodological terms n o t data o f the process i s r e l -

evant a t any g i ven t ime. I t i s the r e l a t i o n o f an i n d i v i d u a l f a c t o r t o

the whole process which determines the whole o f l i f e . I n t h i s h i s t o r i c a l

epoch the economy has become the fundamental l e v e l , o ther l e v e l s o f

r e a l i t y have become i t s "mani festat ions . ll4' Four th ly , the cen t ra l phen-

omena, t h e essence do n o t appear as such t o i n d i v i d u a l s and groups. The

l a t t e r base t h e i r ac t i ons consequently on "appearances. I' The emergence

o f essence takes p lace o n l y l a t e r i n the h i s t o r i c a l process. I n t h i s

theory o f essence, the d i f f e r e n c e between essence and appearance i s a

h i s t o r i c a l cons te l l a t i o n o f s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , b u t both are par ts of

a h i s t o r i c a l process. 50

But we f i n d much o f Marcuse's ana lys is o f essence focused on i t s

present bas is where the essence o f the s o c i a l l i f e process i s grounded

one hand and the r e a l i z a t i o n o f cap i t a l on the other hand. From here the

antagonism i s seen as penetrat ing on areas o f l i f e . 5 1 The questions

I n the foregoing discourse the concept o f essence has been d is -

cussed as both method and value. Method, i n the sense t h a t w i t h i n the

. soc ia l sciences i nqu i r y seeks t o penetrate beneath the realm o f apparent

meanings. For instance i n analysis o f the problem o f what soc ia l fac tors

shape human character and personal i ty , Fromm's task has been t o go beyond

the general asser t ion t h a t ind iv idua l w i l l and soc ia l fac tors operate t o

determine character. Such a question impl ies a method o f i nqu i r y which

i s no t t o t a l l y dependent on assembly of empir ical data since the question

does no t presuppose knowledge o f a l l l eve ls o f soc ia l i n t e rac t i on i n a l l

known soc ie t ies . I n shor t the question i s formulated a t a general theo-

r e t i c a l l eve l , the problem o f human nature i s not postulated f o r purposes

o f ph i losophica l discourse, bu t because the problems o f various human

character types requi r e what Northrop terms normati ve theories. 5 2

Northrop suggests t h a t soc ia l s c i e n t i s t s cannot confuse the log ics o f

both sets o f theor ies, i .e., fac tua l and normative theories and t h a t the

.method inherent i n any theory should be d ic ta ted by the questions posed

and no t the o ther way around.

Normative soc ia l theories, which are the only re levant answers t o problems o f value i n the soc ia l sciences and the humanities, d i f f e r r ad i ca l l y from t h i s (i .e., fac tua l theor ies) . No normative theory . . ., could ever hope, nor does i t pretend, t o be completely i n accord w i t h what i s i n f a c t the case i n any spec i f i c s 0 c i e t y . ~ 3

59

The Northrop distinction between theories of f ac t and normative theories,

asser t tha t i n contrast to the natural sciences--where these are only

problems of fact--in the social sciences the problems which give r i se to

inquiry can be e i the r problems of f ac t or problems of value. Normative

theories are an inherent aspect of the social sciences, due t o the f ac t

tha t social ins t i tu t ions and the i r study--the very s tuf f of the social

sciences--are man made and ra ise questions of an "ought" character; a

type of question inherent in the social sciences. 54

Northrop ' s distinction and his explanation of the existence of

"ought" problems i n the social sciences are crude b u t provide one explan-

ation of "value" as constituted in the concept of essence. A t the same

time i t provides a basis fo r an analysis of essence as method and as

value. Problems of value and method though d i s t inc t are not separate a t

leas t in sociology. This position was jus t recognized by Max Weber.

The conception of science based on an Aristotelian natural philos-

ophy which in turn seeks t o understand things in terms of qual i t ies , of

essences which are determined would approximate Northrop's conception of

science and would i so la te existence from essence as well. B u t such a

conception of science has long been discarded, I f Northrop does not hold

any such view then the categorization of sciences of ' f a c t ' and sciences

of value due to some metaphysical relations of the d i s t inc t subject

matter of natural and social phenomena remain crude and less than useful.

A t any ra te Northrop ' s rationale for his categorizations--the f ac t tha t

inst i tut ions are man made, i .e . , the relation of 'subject ' and 'object '

i s one tha t s t i l l enjoys wide currency. Such a view misconstrues the

essence of sc i en t i f i c ac t iv i ty as we1 1.

60

It i s no longer debated i n ,phi losophic discussions o f natural

sciences t h a t there i s a close and ever changing re la t ionsh ip between

mathematics and a1 1 f i e l d s o f natura l science. Whether mathematics i s

the language o f nature, t h a t i s simply re f lec ts metaphysical qua1 i t i e s

and re l a t i ons between orders o f nature o r whether mathematics i s only an

i n t e l l e c t u a l t o o l i s another problem, inves t iga t ion o f which i s beyond

the scope o f t h i s d isser ta t ion . Mathematic science and i t s own l i m i ta-

t i ons provide a key t o the understanding of 1 im i ta t ions o f i nqu i ry and

explanat ion i n o ther realms o f science, 5 5

Ideas o f numbers are abstract ions from experience, t ha t i s t o say,

ideas o f number and form transcend the world of nature. This i s exempli-

f i e d i n the P la ton ic t r a d i t i o n . Ideas of numbers can also be treated as

d isc re te and separable. A t any ra te the assert ion about abstractions as

one element o f s c i e n t i f i c i nqu i r y ra ises the problem o f propositions i n

science as a whole. Summarizing h i s ideas on the signif icance o f math-

ematical proposi t ions fo r the development of science i n general and tha t

o f physics, one o f the most r ap id l y changing o f the sciences i n par t i c le ,

Hawki ns comments as f o l 1 ows :

But science i s no t a school o f metaphysics, committed once and f o r a l l t o any s e t o f pre-suppositions t h a t the phi losophical c r i t i c s may l abe l i t w i th . What science i s committed t o i s the t r u t h o f p a r t i a l t r u ths and the d i s c i p l i n e o f extending them.56

The context o f the foregoing statement i s seen i n the author's summary

discussion o f the concept o f essence as a metaphysic i n r e l a t i on t o 1 1

I s c i e n t i f i c explanations o f re la t ions i n modern physics. Hawkins begins I i by no t ing A r i s t o t e l i a n natura l philosophy sought t o understand things i n

Verms o f qua1 i t i e s , o f essences, which i n turn, determined character i s-

t i c forms of the i n t e r r e l a t i o n o f th ings ." The mechanist ic natura l p h i l -

osophy conceived th ings as s t r uc tu ra l , bu t the s t ruc tures were i n e v i t a b l y

p l a s t i c and responsive, on a continuous scale of t r ans i t i ons , " t o the

envi ronment i n which they existed. " Quantam physics, provides f o r the

" p o s s i b i l i t y o f wholeness and organizat ion, b u t does 'not exp la in the

a c t u a l i t y o f phenomena. It conceives phenomena i n terms o f :

The i n t e rac t i ons among th ings are condi t ioned by t h e i r character as th ings, by t h e i r q u a l i t i e s . The th ings have t h e i r q u a l i t i e s , . . . n o t i n i s o l a t i o n , bu t i n a m i l i e u of r e l a t i ons w i t h o ther th ings. The p a r t i c l e - f i e l d d u a l i t y i s the expression of t h i s l o g i c a l i n s ta - b i l i ty as i t appears i n modern physics .57

I n o ther words explanations o f r e l a t i ons o f parts--which are f l u i d and

changing take place w i t h i n a nexus o f essent ia l more s tab le re la t ions ,

these re l a t i ons are antecedent t o those of p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i ons o f pa r ts .

Hawkins, moreover appl ies a s i m i l a r idea t o h i s analysis o f s c i e n t i f i c

ep i s temol ogy . 58

It can be summarized from the foregoing t h a t concepts such as

essence are no t a n t i t h e t i c a l t o s c i e n t i f i c i n q u i r y s ince concepts are an

inherent p a r t o f science. Moreover t h a t there i s a s p e c i f i c sense i n

which such concepts imply a value. The misunderstanding i n the soc ia l

sciences which has l e d t o attempts t o d ivorce a l l concepts o f values.

Such attempts p e r s i s t i n t h e i r h o s t i l i t y t o concepts such as essence bu t

may w e l l be based on a p a r t i c u l a r and questionable view o f what types of

i n q u i r y and quest ioning cons ti t u t e the soci a1 sciences . For t h i s reason

assert ions such as those o f Fromm and Marcuse o f the necessi ty of

essence, o f a concept of human nature are by no means popular and requ i re

j u s t l f i c a t i o n i n the form o f a discourse on the philosophy o f science i n

, general and the p a r t i c u l a r relevance o f such a discourse f o r the soc ia l

science . 59

Human Nature i n the Philosophy o f Social Science

Most o f the sciences which are o f p rac t i ca l importance are, l o g i c a l l y speaking, a mixture o f natura l h i s t o r y and physics. The nearer one i s t o natura l h i s t o r y , . , . the b e t t e r the t r a d i t i o n a l logic-book account f i t s : the nearer one i s t o physics, the more unsat is fac tory i t becomes, 60

A ple thora o f l i t e r a t u r e purpor t ing t o deal w i t h the philosophy

and methodology of the soc ia l sciences has developed over the past few

decades. The approaches and subject matter vary i n t h i s l i t e r a t u r e , b u t

there i s general agreement t h a t the most fundamental problem i n the

philosophy of soc ia l science i s : how i s a science o f man possib le and

what i s the shape o f a science o f man? As has already been suggested

Er i ch Fromm's r e p l y t o such a question i s t o develop a science d i rec ted

toward the formulat ion o f a theory o f human nature. Fromm reformulates

the question i n the fo l low ing forms: what i s the nature of e v i l and does

a systematic conception o f human nature and c l i n i c a l e v i 1 negate a

c r i t i c a l Marxism, i .e., a soc ia l theory which focuses on the process of

soc ia l s t r u c t u r a l diachrony and synchrony i n t h e i r in f luence on human be-

haviour? The ph i losophi cal and methodological imp1 i ca t ions o f these

questions f o r a un i f i ed science of man i s summarized by Hosel i t z as

f o l 1 ows :

But the f i n a l b a r r i e r o f f u l l co-operation i n the soc ia l sciences w i l l be removed on ly when a1 1 spec ia l i s ts are able t o see and ap- pra ise t h e i r special f i e l d s o f research i n i t s context w i t h i n the whole f i e l d o f the study o f man and soeiety.61

Discussions i n the philosophy o f soc ia l science have a lso i n the

l a s t few decades avoided use o f the terms human nature and essence but

the expressed ideas are nevertheless s im i la r , as are the problems which

a r i se from use o f the concepts o f human nature and essence. 62

It i s now a t ru ism t o assert t h a t science does not attempt t o

exp la in fac ts , t h a t any not ion o f science involves the occurrence o f a

problem. S c i e n t i f i c explanation only makes sense when the not ion o f

order ex is ts . A not ion o f order i s i m p l i c i t i n any paradigmatic frame-

work. With in t h i s not ion o f order analysis o f p a r t i c u l a r events and t h e i r

i n t e r r e l a t i o n s are given regu la r i t y . Here too a r i se the notions o f laws

and so on. The not ion o f order i n science i s best represented by what

Toulmin terms "p r i nc i p l e " i n h i s a r t i c u l a t i o n o f the nature o f explana-

t i o n i n physical sciences. We now tu rn t o t h i s problem t o throw l i g h t

on the nature o f modern soc ia l sciences.

In sociology a dichotomy i n epistemology, methodology and the

philosophy o f science ex i s t s between those soc ia l s c i en t i s t s whose ques-

t i on i ng and problems begin w i t h an e x p l i c i t not ion o f soc ie ty as a system

and those theor i s ts who begin w i t h an e x p l i c i t concern f o r man. I n the

former approach, the view o f man and o f human nature i s i m p l i c i t i n the

paradigm; i n the l a t t e r approach the presupposit ion about human nature

tends t o be more e x p l i c i t . 63 *

The d i s t i n c t i o n being made here between soci 01 ogi s t s commi t t e d t o

the system paradigm i n contrast t o sociologists committed t o an exp l i c i t

concern w i t h man; i s a lso an attempt t o evade the narrow labelling of

some types of theories as being more conservate o r radical than other

types i n terms of the pol i t ica l implications of the substantive ideas.

The systemlman dis t inct ion cuts across pol i t ica l value l ines . In other

words no sociological theory i s 'value-free, ' b u t i n systems theory

whether of the geometrical types such as von Bertanlanffy's or the

action-cybernetic systems of Talcott Parsons the view of man and human

nature i s implici t and hidden within the axioms of the theory. Pre-

suppositions about man and human nature of the Parsonian system paradigm

are located i n Parsons' use of the term boundary maintenance, as a func-

t ional pre-requisite of the system. That is t o say fo r Parsons the major

problem of the individual in society is successful internalization of the

majoe value-orientations of the society and learning the role s e t or one

of the role-sets defined by the society. Parsons s t a t e s th i s view of

human nature as follows:

There is reason t o believe, tha t among the learned elements of personality i n certain respects the s t ab le s t and most enduring are the major value-orientation patterns and there i s much evidence tha t these a re " laid down" in childhood and are not on a large scale sub- j ec t t o dras t ic a1 terat ion during adult l i fe .64

Parsons has defined human nature in terms of existence, a spatio-temporal

process which is universalized and eternalized i n his scheme. In contrast

t o the pragmatism of C. W . Mi 11s ' crit icisms , the problem w i t h Parsonian

"grand theory" i s not so much i t s lack of ground in empirical rea l i ty . I Mi 11s i s opposed t o - a pr ior i presuppositions i n sociological theory which

65

at tempt t o de l i nea te a concept o f human nature, because he h imse l f i s

caught i n the dilemma o f a d ichotomizat ion o f essence and existence. 6 5

M i l l s misses the essen t ia l p o i n t i n h i s c r i t i q u e o f Parsons by imp ly ing

t h a t 'grand theory ' cou ld prov ide an isomorphic research model f o r t he

i n v e s t i g a t i o n of problems o f o rder and change f o r any g iven soc ie ty .

To t h e ex ten t t h a t 'grand theory ' cannot f u n c t i o n thus M i l l s dismisses

grand theory and deprecates presupposi t ions o f human nature i n such

theory. But paradigms i n the s o c i a l sciences a re h e u r i s t i c and cannot

be used as isomorphic models. A t bes t M i l 1s i s g u i l t y o f a misconception

o f presupposi t ions i n s c i e n t i f i c paradigms . 6 6 What i s t r u e o f Parsons' grand theory i s a l s o t r u e t o some ex ten t

o f s t r u c t u r a l - f unc t i ona l ana lys is which p r ides i t s e l f i n i t s , grounding

i n emp i r i ca l i n q u i r y . I n both cases the under ly ing assumption about

human nature i s t h a t man i s a tabu la rasa o r a l t e r n a t i v e l y t h a t human

needs are who l ly r e l a t i v i s t i c . C r i t i c i s m s o f t h i s brand o f s o c i a l science

i s w e l l documented.

The o ther approach i n the s o c i a l sciences, what C. W . M i l 1s c a l l s

abs t rac ted empi r i c i sm i s

o f t he Parsonian v a r i e t y

concern w i t h methodology

l i m i t i n g o f t he soc io log

p a r t l y a r e a c t i o n aga ins t grand theory schemes

. The appeals t o "value-freedom" and the narrow

abstracted from the n a t u r a l sciences l e d t o a

i s t s a t t e n t i o n t o the "minut iae w i t h i n man's

l a r g e r c u l t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l experience t h a t could be grasped through

q u a n t i f i c a t i o n . " Here too the focus was on a d ivorce between existence

and essence. Existence i t s e l f came t o be def ined as what i s .67 Here

the substance o f human nature i s no more e x p l i c i t i n the empi r ica l model,

66

what i s e x p l i c i t l y denied however ds the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f r e a l i z a t i o n o f

essence o r o f any p o s t u l a t i o n o f q u a l i t i e s o f human nature which t rans-

cend t h e immediate s p a t i o-temporal r e a l i t y . I n t h i s sense system grand

theory of t he Parsonian v a r i e t y i s n o t e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e ren t from

abst rac ted empir ic ism. Two important statements serve t o i l l u s t r a t e my

p o i n t about the r e l a t i v e t r i v i a l i t y o f 'abs t rac ted ' empir ic ism. Jacques

Bargun w r i t i n g i n t h e 1930's warned aga ins t the s u b s t i t u t i o n o f mechan-

i s t i c methodology f o r c r i t i c a l judgment i n e s t a b l i s h i n g postu lates f o r a

v i a b l e paradigm as fo l l ows :

What we want t o know cannot be equeezed o u t o f a machine by throwing i n the raw mate r ia l s a t one end and g r i n d i n g o u t r e s u l t s a t the other . Any i n v e s t i g a t i o n , be i t door-to-door canvass, a quest ion- na i re , an h i s t o r i c a l essay, o r a s t a t i s t i c a l study, s t a r t s w i t h def - i n i t i o n s and assumptions, expressed o r imp1 ied , and the worth o f these--other th ings being equal- - is the worth o f the study.68

The second statement was made by Robert Red f ie ld whose main argument i s

t h a t w h i l e the methods o f physical science have a p lace i n s o c i a l science

work, s o c i a l science i s a l so a r t s ince i t cons is ts (should) i n p a r t o f

"percept ive understanding o f some aspect o f human nature. " Red f ie ld

suggests t h a t t h ree works considered t o be c lass i cs i n the contemporary

soc i a1 science c i r c l e s (and inves t iga ted by a committee supposedly w i t h

the approval o f one o f t he p ro fess i onal soci a1 science associat ions) , had t h e f o l l o w i n g s i m i l a r , advantageous c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . F i r s t , a com-

b ined use o f both i n d u c t i v e and deduct ive methods. Secondly, these

methods were used t o i l l u m i n a t e the r e l a t i o n s of human nature t o the

nature o f soc ie ty . T h i r d l y , they "throw l i g h t upon man i n soc ie ty

through the more o r l e s s o b j e c t i v e presenta t ion o f general ized conclusions

6 7

from the study of par t icular sociefies ."69 Finally, each is an expression

of some perception of human nature; but a l so of man transcending the par-

t i cu la r i t i e s of given experiences. Redfield summarizes his position as

fol 1 ows :

In reading these books, we catch a glimpse of the eternal in the l igh t of the ephemeral . We see ourselves as exemplifications of pat- terns i n nature. Soci a1 science is concerned w i t h uniformities. The uniformities are exaggerated; they transcend the part icular i ty of real experience and h is tor ic event; they claim more than each f a c t by i t s e l f would allow; . , . 70

The foregoing discussion su,ggests tha t much of the debate in the

soci a1 sciences about methodol ogi cal procedures and the place of general

principles or major premises (Toulmi n) , or - a p r i ori statements (Morris

Cohen) appear t o be based on a misconception of science. Consequently a

major portion of methodol ogi cal discussions within the social sciences

i s a misplacement of a fundamental problem. Thus writings such as those

of Erich Fromm with i t s open assertions of the necessity of the major

premise of human nature and essence tend t o be neglected in the main

stream of social science discourse with the over simplified charge tha t

his work belongs among the ethical philosophers. Clearly the formulation

of social science methodological dilemma's in terms of grand theory

schemes w i t h implici t and one sided views of human nature, on the one

hand, and abstracted empiricism on the other; a distinction which emerges

from the sc i en t i f i ca l ly unfounded separation of 'object ivi ty ' and 'subjec-

t i v i t y ' or induction and deduction has not much advanced our understanding

of the problems of social science.

. . . , though the v i s i o n i n t o ,the Absolute i s e i t h e r i n t o a fathom- less depth i n which no d i s t i nc t i ons are v i s i b l e o r i n t o a fu l l ness o f being t h a t exceeds our human comprehension, we need the idea o f i t t o character ize our actual knowledge a t any time as incomplete and fragmentary. The wel ls o f r a t i ona l knowledge o f f e r no magic po t ion t o those who t h i r s t f o r the absolute ce r t a i n t y which w i 11 solve a l l u l t ima te questions. But they do o f f e r us l i v i n g waters which strengthen us i n our arduous journey.71

The foregoing statement concludes Cohen's discussion o f the nature

and func t ion o f the - a p r i o r i i n science. Cohen's analysis begins by

examining the problems o f epistemology i n s c i e n t i f i c discourse and

asserts t h a t t o the extent t h a t we are creatures i n time and space our

s c i e n t i f i c knowledge w i l l always be r e l a t i v e . Moreover some forms o f

knowledge though essent ia l t o us w i l l always be beyond our " ra t iona l

forms o r systems" o f empir ical science.'* Secondly, i n terms o f r a t i ona l

o r s c i e n t i f i c proof the v a l i d i t y o f ex i s t en t fac ts i s always i n terms o f

some fu tu re s ta te o f a f f a i r s and once the contingency o f ex is ten t f ac t s

on f u tu re s ta tes i s understood no t so much l o g i c a l l y bu t subs tan t ia l l y ,

the presence o f - a p r i o r i proposi t ions i n science, no t derived from exper-

ience becomes a fundamental problem i n philosophy and science. Cohen

then makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between psychological and l o g i c a l - a p r i o r i

proposi t ions. The former which i s a "question o f temporal p r i o r i t y i n

an i nd i v i dua l mind." A1 though Cohen does no t make t h i s po in t f o r ce fu l l y ,

there i s a connection between psychological - a p r i o r i s and the exclusive

use o f the induc t i ve method. Rather Cohen suggests t h a t the former

derives from a one-sided use o f the i n t u i t i v e method.73 Rather than

analyse the problem i n the way t h a t Toulmin does--by su.ggesting t h a t the

l o g i c a l s ta tus o f psychological - a p r i o r i s i s contingent upon our view of

6 9

language and the p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e ~ t i n which language i s used, as af fect-

i n g the meaning o f statements which are pos tu la ted as - a pr ior is- -Cohen

focused on the problem o f how we perceive phases o f nature and general-

i z e upon p a r t i c u l a r percept ions. I n o ther words Cohen t r e a t e d the

problem o f "psycho1 og i c a l p ropos i t ions" i n terms o f a un i versa1 i s t i c

psychological and metaphysics, whereas Toulmin d e a l t w i t h i t i n terms o f

epistemol og i c a l ana lys is as d i s t i n c t from epistemological theory. 7 4

The core o f Mor r i s Cohen's r e s o l u t i o n o f the problem o f - a p r i o r i s

as methodologi c pos tu la tes i n science r e s t on h i s d i s t i n c t i o n s between

percept ion and knowledge i n everyday experience and the procedural r u l e s

o f t he s c i e n t i s t . I n the former case un iversa l ideas; which are r e a l l y

a given s o c i e t y ' s general ideas "which emphasize c e r t a i n aspects o f

existence"; and p a r t i c u l a r f a c t "develop i n t o clearness together, the

p a r t i c u l a r instance he lp ing t o g ive body and prehensib i l i t y t o the idea,

and the idea making the instance c l e a r e r and more de f in i t e . " I n science

however the re are "ord inary hypothesesu--which can be disproved by t h e i r

consequences, i .e. , w i t h subsequent discovery o f phenomena--and the - a

p r i o r i assumptions, t he essence o f which i s then i r r e f u t a b i l i t y . Taking

PoincarG1s asse r t i on - a p r i o r i p ropos i t ions are i r r e f u t a b l e because they

are " r e a l l y f i r m reso lu t i ons t o ca r ry on the s c i e n t i f i c game according

t o c e r t a i n r u l e s o r s t i p u l a t i o n s ,I' Cohen concludes t h a t - a p r i o r i p r i n -

ciples--whose substance usua l l y asser t u n i f o r m i t i e s (essent ia l ) i n nature

which can be discovered -- over time--are methodologic, a s s i s t i n g us i n the

organ iza t ion o f f a c t u a l knowledge. He s ta tes :

Ref lec t i on , . . , , shows t h a t i , t i s poss ib le t o view a r i o r i p r i n - c i p l e s as bo th expressive o f the fundamental nature 07 %- t ings and as enab l ing us t o organize them according t o c e r t a i n orders o r pa t te rns suggested by these p r i n c i p l e s .75 [I t a l i cs mine]

I n t h e f i n a l ana lys i s however Cohen h imse l f was n o t s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h i s

d e f i n i t i o n o f t he scope of the - a p r i o r i , s ince he recognized t h a t advance-

ment i n science can chal lenge the s ta tus of the - a p r i o r i . Thus Cohen

suggests t h a t t he subs tant ive contex t o f the - a p r i o r i should be as such

as n o t t o forec lose a l l issues making f o r growth o f science. 76

he ambivalence o f Mor r i s Cohen's p o s i t i o n on - a p r i o r i pos tu la tes

becomes c l e a r when h i s ideas are viewed i n the context o f h i s concept ion

o f soci.al science. Cohen views the s o c i a l sciences as empi r ic - - tha t i s

based on m a t e r i a l observat ions. A1 though Cohen def ines the u n i t y o f

s o c i a l science i n terms o f some conception o f "u l t imate soc ia l ends, a

f a c t i s e q u a l l y v a l i d f o r o the r sciences," he proposes procedural method-

o logy i n terms o f empi r ic type ( i d e a l ) models. oh& favours e x p l i c i t

statement o f moral values as ends o r p o s s i b i l i t i e s , b u t h i s d iscussion

o f t h i s problem i s i n terms o f s o c i a l science as app l ied science ( A l v i n

Gouldner) r a t h e r than i n terms o f the t h e o r e t i c a l problems posed a t a

paradigmat ic l e v e l . Th i s weakness i s seen i n Cohen's choice o f t he deduc-

t i v e empirical method f o r s o c i a l science.77 Cohenls s o l u t i o n t o the

problem appears t o t h i s w r i t e r t o be a confusion a t a number o f l e v e l s .

F i r s t , o f a l l Cohen does n o t make a c l e a r enough d i d i s t i n c t i o n between

n a t u r a l and phys i ca l sciences. Secondly Cohen discusses s o c i a l science

as an e s s e n t i a l l y empi r i c science, i .e., one based on the discovery of

new phenomena, and thereby tends t o b l u r the d i s t i n c t i o n s between

7 1

paradigmatic pos tu la tes and those ,which can be d i r e c t l y tes ted i n the

research problem area. T h i r d l y desp i te h i s d iscussion o f l o g i c a l and

methodological issues Cohen r e s t r i c t s h i s discussion of - a p r i o r i s i n the

soci a1 sciences t o s t r i c t l y normative ones.

We have the re fo re t o r e t u r n t o the problem o r i g i n a l l y posed i n

t h i s sect ion. Whereas Cohen does n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s t i n g u i s h between

na tu ra l and physical sciences, Toulmin makes t h i s the bas is o f h i s d i s -

cussion o f t he phi losophy o f science. Fundamental t o Toulmin's ph i l os -

ophy o f t he sciences are two p r i n c i p l e s . The f i r s t i s h i s d i s t i n c t i o n

between the na tu ra l and the physical sciences. The second, i s h i s view

t h a t the physical sciences i s "organized common sense," and the unique-

ness o f s c i e n t i f i c analys is l i e s i n inferences which are g iven t o fam i l -

i a r data r a t h e r than the discovery o f new data. The purpose o f t h i s

d iscussion o f Toulmin i s my asser t ion t h a t h i s work on the phys ica l

sciences can be used t o some ex ten t t o charac ter ize the s o c i a l sciences,

t h a t i s t o say, by i m p l i c a t i o n p a r a l l e l s can be drawn between phys ica l

sciences and the soc ia l sciences.

To r e t u r n t o the f i r s t po in t - - the d i s t i n c t i o n between na tu ra l and

phys ica l sciences, Toulmin viewed na tu ra l sciences such as b io logy as

fundamentally "desc r ip t i ve " i n approach.78 The physical sciences are

however explanatory. Toulmi n suggests :

The p o i n t can be pu t concisely by saying: p h y s i c i s t s do n o t hunt ou t r e g u l a r i t i e s whose existence i s a1 ready recognized. 79

According t o Toulmi n Is analys is then "natura l h i s t o r i a n s " o r na tu ra l

s c i e n t i s t s l a c k f o r r e g u l a r i t i e s o f g iven forms, t h a t i s t o say they are

V i e d i n i t s e s s e n t i a l s ," t o the everyday c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f phenomena.

Physical sciences "seek the form o f g iven r e g u l a r i t i e s . "*' Th is asser-

t i o n has impor tan t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r an understanding o f the methods and

l o g i c s o f the s o c i a l sciences, f o r whereas Toulmin was n o t a s s e r t i n g

t h a t i n t he phys i ca l sc iences/natura l sciences d i s t i n c t i o n we have a

complete separa t ion o f issues he was asse r t i ng t h a t i n t h e phys ica l

sciences mere accumulat ion o f data was i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r t he drawing o f

t h e o r e t i c a l conclus ions. Rather Toulmin suggests t h a t i n t he phys ica l

sciences "it i s no use even beginning t o l ook a t th ings u n t i l you know

e x a c t l y what you a re l ook ing f o r : observat ion has t o be s t r i c t l y c o n t r o l -

l e d by reference t o - - some p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r e t i c a l problem"81 [ I t a l i c s

mine] . But what does Toulmin mean by theory i n t he phys i ca l sciences and

i n what sense does the cons t ruc t o f ex is tence and essence prov ide tech-

niques f o r " i n fe rence drawing," equat ion o f a " p i c t u r e " o f the motions

o f a s o c i a l system? Toulmin saw imaginat ion, n o t metaphysics as funda-

mental t o science. What Toulmin means by t h i s i s t h a t d iscovery i n the

phys i ca l sciences c o n s i s t o f new modes o f representa t ion . Representat ion

i s n o t a type o f -- ad hoc a c t i v i t y , representa t ion and the re fo re imagina-

t i o n i s most ly dependent on t r a i n i n g . Toulmin's ideas come c lose t o t h a t

o f Thomas Kuhn i n t h i s respect . Toulmin summarizes h i s views on theory

i n phys i ca l sciences i n t he f o l l o w i n g terms:

I t i s n a t u r a l f o r a l o g i c i a n t o suppose t h a t , i n o rder t o j u s t i f y a t h e o r e t i c a l conclus ion, one must c o l l e c t s u f f i c i e n t experimental m a t e r i a l t o e n t a i l it; and t h a t i f one does anyth ing less , the theor- e t i c a l conclus ion w i 11 a s s e r t something more than the experimental

data warrant. . . . But t h i s i s a mistake. For i t i s no t t h a t our theore t i ca l statements ought i o be en ta i led by the data, bu t f a i l t o be, and so asser t things the data do no t warrant: they ne i the r could nor need t o be en ta i l ed by them, being ne i the r general izat ions from them nor o ther l o g i c a l constructs out o f them, bu t ra ther r i n c i l es i n accordance ----- w i t h which we can make inferences about phenomena 'Iftal i cs m i ne j

+ I n Toulmin's terms then the " t r u th " o f a theore t i ca l statement does not

der ive from formal deductive l o g i c o r extrapolat ions from given tested

phenomena. Rather the t r u t h o f a theore t i ca l statement i s re la ted t o

the degree o f s p e c i f i c i t y o f the question posed and i s re la ted t o the

p a r t i c u l a r context o f the problem. S ta r t i ng w i t h the d e f i n i t i o n t h a t i n -

ferences i n science represent the spec i f i c se t o f re la t ionsh ips t h a t new

techniques open up f o r observation, .Toulmin concludes h i s analysis o f

physical science i n terms o f procedure by su,ggesting t h a t the f a c t tha t :

. . ., a t any p a r t i c u l a r stage, many o f the proposi t ions are taken wi thout question does no t make the exact sciences any less empir ical : i t merely r e f 1 ects t he i r 1 ogi cal s t r a t i f i c a t i on. Cer ta in ly every statement i n a science should conceivably be capable of being ca l led i n question, and o f being shown emp i r i ca l l y t o be un jus t i f i ed ; f o r only so can the science be saved from dogmation. But i t i s equal ly important t h a t i n any p a r t i c u l a r inves t iga t ion , many o f these prop- os i t i ons should no t ac tua l l y be ca l l ed i n question, f o r by question- i n a some wer ive others o f t h e i r verrmeaninq. It i s i n t h i s s e k e t h a t the' proposi t ions o f an exact- science-form a hierarchy, and are bui 1 t one upon another; . . .83 [ I t a l i c s mine]

Toulmin i s suggesting then t h a t some proposi t ions-- the most fundamental

f o r es tab l i sh ing the "boundaries" o f a s c i e n t i f i c paradigm are not d i r -

e c t l y empi r i c a l l y tes tab le though models and hypotheses derived from such

statements can lend s p e c i f i c i t y t o aspects o f empir ical work.

The over r id ing sugnif icance o f Toulmin's work res ts on the conclu-

sions which he draws from h i s analysis o f the necessity o f understanding

has come t o be called "laws of Nature," he suggests tha t i t i s not Nature

which i s uniform, b u t s c i en t i f i c procedure; and " i t i s uniform only i n

t h i s , tha t i t i s methodical and self-correcting. " Self-correction is

possible i f the four classes of statements in science are no t confused.

The classes are as follows:

F i rs t ly , abstract , formal statements of a law o r principle.

Secondly, his tor ical reports about the discovered scope of a law or

principle.

Thirdly, applications of a law or principle t o particular cases,

i .e., a model.

Fourthly, conclusions of inferences drawn in accordance with a law

o r principle . 84

Toulmin suggests in using the term laws of nature a distinction be made

between expressions which are t o be labelled "laws of nature" and those

expressions which are applications of laws to special ranges of circum-

stances. The former are "instructions for the formation of propositions,

rules of conduct, maxims and directions for the investigator. "85 Words

such as "true" and "false" are not therefore applicable to laws of

nature, b u t rather t o the statements which constitute applications of

laws. The laws themselves allow the investigator t o "find his way about

i n rea l i ty ." B u t no particular direction i s suggested i n the law i t s e l f .

This notion of laws of nature i s compatible with Toulmin's f i r s t class

of statements .

7 5

Summary ;arid 'DiscuSSion

Much of what Toulmin has t o say about the nature of statements i n

the physical sciences i s applicable t o the social sciences. The question

whether statements about human nature are necessarily t rue or fa lse i s

ruled out since they are in a very general sense heuristic. Moreover

as Toulmin has shown statements of th i s class rests neither on induction

or deduction. Whereas from the perspective of social science as based

on logical empiricist methods ; the concepts of human nature as essence

and existence would be viewed as - a pr ior i s and not capable of d i rec t

test ing, Toulmin's assertion i s tha t such statements function i n a spec-

i f i c sense in science. Moreover that to constitute the social sciences

as capable of ar t iculat ion i n the same terms as the natural sciences i s

t o misunderstand description as the sole method of sc i en t i f i c analysis.

To the extent tha t much of the raw data of social l i f e i s capable of for-

mulation in terms of what Toulmin ca l l s "common sense," then there i s a

role for concepts of human nature in the social sciences since sc ien t i f i c

investigation would then consist of drawing new inferences from existing

data, and these new inferences become the "gr is t le" for theory construc-

I t ion i n the social sciences. So tha t fo r example empirical data pertain-

I ing t o character analysis in Fromm's terms would have the i r genesis i n

I models based on an adequate conceptualization of human nature. B u t the I I adequacy of the data and the inferences drawn from models of human be-

haviour would depend on a viable formulation of the relationship between

essence and existence as elements of human nature. Such a conception of

:I human nature would be i n Toulmin 's terms a "representation statement . I'

7 6

Toulmin makes much the same po in t , i n another work, where he suggested

s c i e n t i f i c analysis begins w i t h " p r i o r theore t i ca l considerations , tha t

i s t o say pre-formed conceptsn and t h a t t h i s i s i nev i t ab le i f the concepts

are sub ject t o reshaping i n the l i g h t o f experience. These pre-formed

concepts take the form o f idea ls o f natura l order and other leve ls o f

i n q u i r y are concerned w i t h f i n d i n g deviat ions from t h a t idea l order. 86

The concept o f essence i n human nature provides i n formal terms j u s t

such an i dea l o f nature and i s f l e x i b l e enough t o al low f o r the formation

and i nves t i ga t i on o f concepts a t other leve ls of a r t i c u l a t i o n . It allows

f o r the more empi r ica l analysis o f concepts and models o f character i n

Er i ch Fromm's terms as we1 1 as f o r models o f soc ia l s t ruc ture . I n

Fromm's terms i t al lows f o r the explanation o f the rea l i n terms o f the

patho log ica l a p o i n t which Toulmin a lso makes. I n t h i s sense essence i s

both method and value. To the extent t h a t contemporary soc io log ica l

theory lacks a paradigm w i t h a suggestive conception o f man t h i s task

appears urgent, f o r a u n i f i e d theory o f man and society.

From the Propos i t ion o f Human Nature t o the Theory o f Human Character

I n Chapter One I suggested t h a t a broad d i s t i n c t i o n can be made

i n a l l o f E r i ch Fromm's work between what I have termed h i s theoret ica l

cont r ibut ions which can be f u r t h e r subdivided bu t i n which the fundamen-

t a l question posed was: what was the nature o f e v i l i n society? Fromm

bel ieves t h a t t h i s question i s o f urgent s ign i f icance t o a science o f

man. Social science paradigms must be based on t h i s problem. Fromm

does no t conceive of t h i s question i n a pure ly r e l a t i v i s t i c and normative

manner, f o r him i t i s an e x i s t e n t i a l and h i s t o r i c a l l y re levan t problem,

i n the same way t h a t modern physics i n r e l a t i o n t o machine computation,

using modern e l ec t r on i c ca lcu la to rs i s v i t a l t o a dynamic physics i n the

twent ie th century. For E r i ch Fromm the s c i e n t i f i c r a t i o n a l e under ly ing

the attempted r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between Marx and Freud, may be a f i r s t step

i n the attempt t o provide a re levant s e t o f questions and propos i t ions

f o r i nves t iga t ions o f the connection between c l i n i c a l e v i l and the

dynamics o f s t r u c t u r a l phylogenesis. The success o f t h i s venture p a r t l y

r es t s on o ther matters. The o ther sec t ion o f F r o m ' s work, the empi r i -

cal--perhaps Fromm's most important con t r i bu t i on t o soc ia l science--can

on ly be f u l l y appreciated w i t h i n the context o f the f i r s t d i s t i n c t i o n .

Here we f i n d Fromm t e s t i n g some o f h i s fundamental not ions by examination

o f the developmental processes a t both the s t r u c t u r a l and the character

l e ve l . This f o r example i s the s ign i f i cance o f one o f Fromm's most con-

s i s t e n t themes i n h i s analysis o f modal persona l i ty : the contradi c t i ons

i n some character types between freedom from t r a d i t i o n a l sources o f i

depr i va t ion and p o l i t i c a l au tho r i t y and man's general i n a b i l i t y t o

develop p o s i t i v e freedoms t o r e a l i z e himself .

When Fromm's work i s examined i n l i g h t o f the foregoing there i s

a d i r e c t connection i n h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l biography between h i s cont inu ing

concern w i t h human nature on the one hand and c l i n i c a l sources o f path-

\ ology on the other. This f o r F r o m appears t o be one o f the keys t o B

developing a theory o f human character. It i s t o the ou t l i nes -- o f t h i s

problem t h a t we must now t u r n our a t t en t i on .

Man suf fers from a fundamental, dualism, however one may formulate it, and n o t from a c o n f l i c t created by forces i n the environment t h a t may be avoided by a "cor rec t b r ing ing up" o r removed by l a t e r de-education (psychoanalysis). ( " L i f e Fear and Death Fear" i n The Myth o f the B i r t h o f the Hero and Other Wri t ings, p. 267, O t to K k ) --------

Rea l i t y i n s p i t e o f a l l d i f f i c u l t i e s and pain, i s n o t j u s t the enemy o f the i nd i v i dua l , as i t might seem from the neuro t i c viewpoint, b u t a lso a great he lp t o the ego. While the average human being has t o lea rn t o use r e a l i t y therapeut ica l ly , something which the neuro t i c can a t t a i n on ly i n the therapeut ic re la t ionsh ip , t h i s could never happen unless the p o s s i b i l i t y had been given i n r e a l i t y i t s e l f . I t i s n o t unsa t i s f y ing r e a l i t y , bu t a w i l f u l t u rn i ng away from t h i s na tu ra l therauv as qiven , t h a t characterizes the neurosis. ("The I nd i v i dua l and" the Soc ia l " i n W i l l Therapy and Truth and Rea l i t y , p. 195, O t to Rank)

One o f the i r on i es o f E r i ch Fromm's work on a science o f charac-

ter--a study which both Rank and Fromm view as having i t s genesis i n the

work o f S. Freud--is t h a t Fromm's work f i nds a number o f p a r a l l e l s i n

the work o f O t to Rank and y e t Fromm makes no reference t o Rank's theor ies

i n h i s own w r i t i ngs . The w r i t i ngs o f both por t ray an ambivalence and a

h o s t i l i t y t o the ideas of Freudian psychology, and both men attempt t o

transcend orthodox Freudianism. Again both Rank and Fromm attempt t o

develop a theory o f character and cu l t u re i n phylogenetic and ontogenetic

terms based on a fundamental dualism i n human nature. F r o m appears t o

have a debt t o Rank's ideas, b u t i t i s no t one so f a r acknowledged.

I n both opening statements o f Rank, quoted above, there are i n -

d ica t ions o f what Rank regards as e x i s t e n t i a l dichotomies and there i s

l i t t l e con t ras t between these dichotomies and those o f E r i ch F rom. Both

I men are concerned w i t h fear as a problem inherent i n human nature. With

h i s analysis i n the Trauma o f B i r t h (1929) Rank disc loses the unconscious I

-- I s t r i v i n g o f the c h i l d t o r e tu rn t o reunion i n the uterus--the source of

I

79

l i f e and death, the primal trauma- but the "intrauterine s t a t e" also

causes anxiety and fear since i t i s a rem

Paradise" (Trauma of Birth , p. 75) . From

environment, chiefly society was for Otto

i n individual and extra-individual terms,

nder of "expulsion from

th i s standpoint the external

Rank an open stage on which

man with the single variable,

will re-enacts and attempts to resolve th i s dilemma. Human character

types were then viewed as formed in th i s process. Otto Rank concludes

his analysis of the foregoing i n the following terms, which can be

viewed as the basis ( in terms of i ts logical conclusions) of Frommls

anthropology.

In cultural adjustment, with a l l i t s d i f f i c u l t normal and super- normal achievements, we witness various largely successful attempts t o overcome the birth trauma, . . . For we see in the chi ld ' s bio- logical adjustment t o the extrauterine s i tuat ion, i n the normal adjustment of the civilized man, as well as i n his compensatory super productions of a r t ( in the widest sense) , the same str iving t o overcome the birth trauma enacted in similar forms, the only essential difference being tha t the civi l ized human being and s t i l l more the " a r t i s t " can reproduce th i s objecti v e m man1 fold, s t r i c t l y determined forms, fixed by the primal trauma, whi 1s t the neurotic i s compelled again and again t o produce i t i n a similar -is own body. B u t the essence of most pathological processes seems t o r e s t on th is compulsive "return of the same" product on one's own body. The neurotic i s thrown back again and again t o the real bir th trauma, whilst the normal and supernormal throw i t , so t o say, forwards and project i t outwards, and are thus enabled t o objectify i t .87

We can conclude from the foregoing statement tha t for Rank's theory of

character formation, s t r e s s i s placed on the role of the individual 's

conscious will i n a deliberate attempt to form an "effective and inte-

grated personality fo r himself," tha t i n most men there is a creative

impulse t o harmonize the dualism of a l l l i f e . The creative personality

80

successful ly overcomes the dualism,, while the neurotic personality has ' 88 fai led to do so.

I t is worth noting tha t much of Fromm's general theory of character

formation and personality s t resses the role of conscious will and produc-

t i v i t y as well as the over-arching themes of l i f e and death. I t is also

worth noting that as Frommts opus develops his concept of character s h i f t s

increasingly toward the ideas of productivity and of "soci a1 character

as an inf luent ial factor in the formation and development of individual

character types and personality . '89

For the purposes of outlining what appears t o Fromm t o be the most

advanced elements of his thought on the problem of the genesis and forma-

tion of character, and in keeping w i t h the format outlined in Chapter One

of th i s discussion, I propose to look a t Fromm's l a t e r works and then

trace where possible continuities and discontinuities i n his writings on

the theory of character.

One of the most s ignif icant factors i n Erich Fromm's work on the

problems of exi s ten t i a1 and historical contradictions and the theory of

human character i s the analogy which he draws between the chi ld ' s expul-

sion from i t s mother's uterus, from organic nature as i t were and the

his tor ical separation of man from nature, the slow process of individ-

uation i n phylogenetic terms. In his e a r l i e r works Fromm tends t o view

these as the sources of fear ( in Rankian terms).

The social history of man star ted w i t h his emerging from a s t a t e of oneness with the natural world w i t h an awareness of himself as an ent i ty separate from surrounding nature and men. . . . In the l i f e history -- of an individual we ---- find the same process. A c h T l i l i s 5 n ----

when i t is no longer one w i t h i ts mother and becomes a biological ---- - - en t i ty separate -- from G.r'-

Later i n the same chapter Fromm suggests tha t the

emergence of individuation inevitably brings w i t h

m r t a l i ty of finitude i n individual terms and the

paradox of b i r t h , the

i t the awareness of

awareness of death as

a human problem, what m i g h t be termed "primal consciousness":

He becomes aware of death as his ultimate f a t e even i f he t r i e s t o deny i t i n manifold phantasies.91

Other metaphors i n Fromm's discussions betrays a parallelism to the work

of Otto Rank, particularly the usage of terms such as "man's expulsion

from paradise" and his allusion to some of man's ancient myths such as

the Garden of den." However From never undertakes a systematic anal-

y s i s of mythology as Rank does. Such an analysis of mythology is

important for Rank's final theory of human character. T h i s is so fo r

the following reasons, which will be noted, rather than discussed.

F i rs t ly , Rank believed that the ultimate source of imagination i n the

individual i s i n the active, unchecked and exuberant imaginative faculty

of the child.93 Secondly, the what i s normally termed the fancies of

psychoanalysis i s viewed by Rank as an instrument fo r observing these

fancies .94 Thirdly, the substance or content of myth and i t s formation

and the i r

"the most

ment both

is t o say

connection w i t h childhood imagi nings provide i n Rank ' s view,

sublime survival of what i s perhaps the most primitive adjust-

i n the phylogenetic and also i n the ontogenetic sense"; t ha t

the adjustment of every individual child to the intra-extra-

uterine s i tuat ion, on the one hand, and the adjustment of " rea l i ty t o

82

the Unconscious, what might be termed ' b i r t h trauma' a t t he cosmic l e v e l , I

between Nature and c i v i 1 i z a t i on. 'lg5

The essen t ia l d i f f e r e n c e between Ot to Rank and E r i c h Fromm w i t h i n

the contex t o f the fo rego ing i s t h a t whereas the former 's task was t o

prov ide i n h i s work - a systemat ic - analys is o f t h e dilemma o f l i f e and

death a t the ontogenet ic and phylogenet ic l eve ls , Fromm may have s imply

absorbed t h i s problem as the basis o f h i s l i f e ' s work, simply by posing

an analogy between chi ldhood s o c i a l i z a t i o n and the charac ter development

o f man as a whole, as located i n t h i s ambivalence t o l i f e and death.

According t o both Rank and Fromm man had t o emerge from Nature i n order

t o become human and y e t Nature promises immor ta l i ty, by keeping man f rom

t h e tragedy o f human consciousness. Being human provides l i f e , b u t a l so

b r ings w i t h i t consciousness o f death, o f m o r t a l i t y . Whereas from the

perspect ive o f humanness i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and oneness w i t h Nature promises

a r e t u r n t o the "pr imal s tate," an e te rna l sleep, which i s non-

i n d i v i d u a l i z e d . I t i s by posing t h i s problem t h a t Rank provides h i s own

bas is f o r a theory o f human character, and the process o f t he w i l l i n

i t s formation.96 Rank's i n t e r e s t i n the nature o f e v i l develops from

h i s quest ion o f t he nature o f t he death i n s t i n c t as i t mani fests i t s e l f

i n human consciousness--the on ly terms i n which - we can speak o f i t - - w i t h

psychoanalyt ic knowledge t h a t t he c h i l d j u s t experiences the f e e l i n g o f

fear i n the a c t o f b i r t h , which Rank viewed empi r i c a l l y as mani fes t ing

i t s e l f , now as fear of l i f e and a t another t ime as f e a r o f death. What

Rank was p o s t u l a t i n g here i s the ac tua l ambivalence o f l i f e and death as

processes, q u i t e d i s t i n c t from man's consciousness o f t h i s process as

dichotomous e x p e r i e n t i a l categor ies.

When Rank formulated the human dilemma i n the foregoing terms, he

was opposing the Freudian conception of man--since Rank was opposing the

Freudian conceptions of l i f e and death ins t inc ts as metaphysical things,

quite apart from part icular human consciousness of them. I t was fo r

th is reason tha t Rank reintroduced the problem of will i n the formation

of human character. Summarizing his c r i t ique of Freud in th i s regard

Rank has s ta ted:

However anti -moralistic psychoanalysis may seem, a t bottom fo r Freud, will--or whatever he understands by that term--is exactly as "bad" as fo r the Old Testament man or the Buddhist or the Christian, ex- act ly as reprehensible as i t s t i l l i s fo r Schopenhauer or other phi losophers who played reason against i t .97

Rank asks the question why must will be denied i f i t plays "so great a

role i n rea l i ty ," i .e . , i n the c rea t iv i ty of the s e l f and the environ-

ment. 98

An Outline of Erich Fromm's Theory of Human Character

In his attempt a t developing a theory of human character, Fromm's

task i s a t once more general and more specif ic than tha t of Otto Rank

and other predecessors. The task is more general in the sense tha t a t

the theoretical level of formulation Fromm begins with a conception of

human nature as essent ial ly paradoxical , without specifying in terms as

precise as those of Rank the nature of tha t paradox--Fromm at t r ibutes

the paradox neither t o specif ic l i f e and death ins t inc ts rooted in human

biology as does Freud, neither does he specify the paradox in psychic-

biological terms of the human experience of fear i n the "primal

84

s i t u a t i o n , " as does Rank. Fromm ra i ses the quest ion i s man e s s e n t i a l l y I

good o r e v i 1 , o r i s the essence o f good o r e v i 1 roo ted i n man ' s charac ter

as he makes a choice? Genera l i t y and s p e c i f i c i t y o f Fromm's task i s

r e l a t e d when he asks g iven t h i s choice o r these choices, what i s twen-

t i e t h century man's charac ter i s he tending toward g rea te r freedom o r

unfreedom and what are the consequences o f e a r l i e r choices f o r contempor-

a r y character? I n o the r words, what i s the connect ion i n human h i s t o r y

between e a r l i e r character con f igu ra t i ons and present day charac ter and

i t s possi b i 1 i t i e s ? The ph i 1 osophical and t h e o r e t i c a l force o f these

quest ions 1 ends urgency t o Fromm's emp i r i ca l f i n d i n g s . 99 A t the same

t ime Fromm's emp i r i ca l f i nd ings cont inua l l y focus and s p e c i f y h i s theo-

r e t i c a l formulat ions through m o d i f i c a t i o n o f h i s t h e o r e t i c a l pos tu la tes

and - a p r i o r i s . I n t h i s sense Fromm's emp i r i ca l f i n d i n g s are t e n t a t i v e .

I n t h i s s e c t i o n I propose t o o u t l i n e the major charac ter types i n

Fromm's scheme and then connect these t o the major h i s t o r i c a l stages

o u t l i n e d by Fromm. I n keeping w i t h the format suggested e a r l i e r i n t h i s

chapter, on the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between Fromm's c r i t i q u e

o f the s o c i a l sciences, i n c l u d i n g psychology and h i s value pos i t i on , i n

t h i s case h i s "psychology o f e t h i c s ," discuss ion o f knowledge o f good

and bad w i l l be postponed t o a l a t e r sec t i on o f t h e d i s s e r t a t i o n , and

Fromm's character types w i l l be t r e a t e d as emp i r i ca l models w i t h i n the

wider contex t o f Fromm's ana lys is o f human behavi our i n s c i e n t i f i c r a t h e r

than i n e t h i c a l terms. 100

Fromm develops h i s o u t l i n e s o f character s t ruc tu res from two pro-

pos i t i ons , the e x i s t e n t i a l dichotomy as i t gives use t o h i s t o r i c a l

85

lol His thesis is tha t man conscious of l i f e and death contradictions . (the exi s ten t i a1 di chotomy) has attempted t o create technical means fo r

material sat isfact ion. This was an h is tor ic choice, an attempt t o create

a world of his own, "in which he can feel a t home w i t h himself and his

fellow men." The new contradictions ar is ing from this choice, l ike the

choice i t s e l f is man-made and soluble, unlike the exis tent ial dichotomy.

Although the contradiction (h is tor ica l ) may not be soluble a t an e a r l i e r

temporal stage, i t i s certainly soluble a t a l a t e r stage. For example

the socio-economi c and pol i t i ca l contradi c t i ons ar is ing from the ins ti t u -

t ion of slavery i n ancient Greece may not have been soluble a t tha t time,

they were certainly soluble a t a l a t e r epoch in European history, when

the technical means were developed. B u t much of the history of European

societ ies have been attempts t o resolve e a r l i e r contradictions by creat-

ing rationalizations , for instance the creation of ideologies t o make i t

appear as though the materi a1 and soci o-pol i t i cal i nequal i t i e s rooted i n

the alienating social relations of production were natural inequal i t ies ,

tha t i s t o say by making i t appear tha t the his tor ical contradictions

were ex i s t en t i a l , and tha t the oppressed and exploited had t o resign

themselves t o these re1 a t i ons . Again men engaged i n ceaseless ac t iv i ty ,

i n business and pleasure t o escape inner restlessness. B u t much of the

solutions of th i s kind spring from "lack of courage and an unwillingness

t o face truth ." In quasi -Feurerbachian-terms Fromm su,ggests tha t even

the attempts t o create a l l inclusive "religious" views of the world w i t h -

out changing other spheres of human existence, are incomplete and com-

Pound the earl i e r contradictions . lo2 Fromm concludes t o understand

human motivation--as the f i r s t step toward understanding human behaviour 1

and character--we (soc ia l s c i en t i s t s ) must accept as a basic propos i t ion

t h a t a1 1 men have need o f a system o f o r i en ta t i on and devotion, bu t d i f -

ferences i n the content o f these systems r e f l e c t differences i n the

" ideal ism o f h i s s p i r i t , " some "idealisms," o r choices are conducive t o

the unfo ld ing o f man's powers, other choices warp t h i s growth and atrophy

h i s p o t e n t i a l i t i e s .

From the foregoing ou t l i ne Fromm makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between the

concepts o f character, personal i ty and temperament.

Character

Fromm defines character as "the ( r e l a t i v e l y permanent) form i n

which human energy i s canalized i n the process o f ass imi la t ionu-- the ways

i n which man re la tes himsel f t o the wor ld by acqui r ing and ass im i la t ing

things--"and soc ia l i za t ion" - - the ways i n which man re la tes h imsel f t o

the wor ld by r e l a t i n g himsel f t o people. lo3 The choices come out o f the

e x i s t e n t i a l con t rad ic t ion which i s the essence o f human nature. The

choices are two possib le attempted so lu t ions t o the cont rad ic t ion. Ex-

p l a i n i ng the devel opment o f the i nd i v i dua l character, Fromrn suggests

t h a t i t i s determined by " the impact o f i t s l i f e experiences, the i n d i -

v idual ones and those which f o l l ow from the cu l ture , on temperament and

physical const i tut ion."104 I n order t o develop an in tegrated view of the

connection between the i nd i v i dua l "physical cons t i t u t i on " and the soc ia l

environment, Fromm uses the concept o f "soc ia l character" as mediat ing

process, which provides a core of o r i en ta t i on f o r ind iv idua ls dur ing

processes o f soc i a l i za t i on . I n o ther words fac to rs such as c lass and

e thn i c groupings determine the nature of character s t r uc tu re b u t mani fest

themselves more d i r e c t l y i n the soc ia l character, which i n t u r n guides,

negat ive ly o r p o s i t i v e l y , the formation o f i nd i v i dua l character.

The f a c t t h a t most members o f a soc ia l c lass o r cu l t u re share s i g - n i f i c a n t elements o f character and t h a t one can speak o f a "soc ia l character" represent ing the core o f a character s t r uc tu re common t o most people o f a given cu l t u re shows the de ree t o which character 8 i s formed by soc ia l and c u l t u r a l pat terns .l 5

The d i f fe rences then between soc ia l and i nd i v i dua l character are due t o

fac to rs such as the s p e c i f i c pe rsona l i t y pat terns o f parents, the s p e c i f i c

i nd i v i dua l psychic endowment o f i nd i v i dua l s and the s p e c i f i c soc ia l en-

v i ronment i n which the c h i l d grows up.

Personal i t y

This i s def ined as "the t o t a l i t y o f i n h e r i t e d and acquired psychic

q u a l i t i e s which are cha rac te r i s t i c o f one i nd i v i dua l and which make the

i nd i v i dua l unique . Here Fromm proposes a concept o f persona1 i ty ,

accepted i n conventional i n t e r a c t i oni s t soci a1 psycho1 ogy . For Fromm

persona l i t y i s n o t d i r e c t l y observable, r a t he r i t i s a whole s e t o f

t r a i t s which are unique and predisposes the i nd i v i dua l organism t o a c t

o r s t r i v e i n p a r t i c u l a r d i rec t ions . Personal i ty a lso consists of i nne r

d i spos i t i ons which may no t eventuate i n over t behaviour. Shi butani de-

f i nes persona l i t y as:

. . . cons is t ing o f p o t e n t i a l i t i e s f o r ac t ion. I t i s no t so much what men a c t u a l l y do; i t i s the d i r e c t i o n i n which they would s t r i v e , were i t poss ib le f o r them t o do ~0 .106

88

Fromm regards p e r s o n a l i t y as an a l l i n c l u s i v e concept, t h a t i s t o say

when the i n d i v i d u a l organism has appropr iated one o r more charac ter

elements i n t o h imse l f , t h i s i s transformed i n terms o f t he unique psychic

c o n s t i t u t i o n w i t h which he i s endowed and through t h i s a core o f t he per-

s o n a l i t y , the "1" emerges, t h i s "1" o r core o f pe rsona l i t y , i s r e l a t i v e l y

unchangeable and p e r s i s t s throughout 1 i f e .Io7 For Fromm, then personal - i t y i s a t o t a l i t y .

Temperament

Temperament r e f e r s t o "mode - o f reac t ion " and i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

and n o t changeable. Temperament i s d i s t i n c t f rom charac ter and confusion

between the two a f f e c t s the p lace and substance o f e t h i c s i n d iscussion

o f human behavi our . Fromm u t i 1 i zes Hi ppocrates ' f o u r types o f tempera-

ments i n h i s own emp i r i ca l work, they are: " cho le r i c , sanguine, melan-

c h o l i c and phlegmatic. The sanguine and c h o l e r i c a re modes o f r e a c t i o n

which are charac ter ized by easy e x c i t a b i l i t y and qu ick a l t e r n a t i o n o f

i n t e r e s t , t he i n t e r e s t s being feeb le i n the former and in tense i n the

l a t t e r . The phlegmatic and melanchol ic temperaments, . . . , are charac-

t e r i z e d by p e r s i s t e n t b u t slow e x c i t a b i l i t y o f i n t e r e s t , t he i n t e r e s t i n

t h e phlegmatic be ing feeb le and i n the melanchol ic in tense. "lo* The d i r -

e c t i o n o f temperament depends on t h e type o f charac ter an i n d i v i d u a l

possesses. Fromm postu la tes temperament as a concept t h e substances of

which are e t h i c a l l y neu t ra l , s ince temperament wi 11 t e l l i n v e s t i g a t o r s

the "how o f reac t ion , " b u t n o t the consequences o f t h a t reac t i on . lo9

P a r t l y because Fromm be1 ieved confused t h i n k i n g t o e x i s t i n many

89

areas of social-psychology , p a r t i c u l a r l y , ) w i t h respect t o e th ics i n human

behaviour, he developed h i s character typologies. He be1 ieved character

t o mean not the s i ng le t r a i t , b u t a whole organized o r i en ta t i on from

which s ing le t r a i t s which can be acquired by ind iv idua ls , fo l low. I n

t h i s sense Fromm's character o r ien ta t ions are ' i dea l types' ( i n the

Weberian sense o f i t s methodological value). The character types are

i dea l types f o r two general reasons. F i r s t because Fromm's aim i s i n

the f i n a l analysis t o understand behaviour and t o develop a theory o f I

1 personal i t y from i t . Secondly because accord-i ng t o Fromm h imsel f char-

ac te r o r ien ta t ions whether o f soci a1 i zat ion o r assimi 1 a t i on are no t found t

i expressed as Fromm s e t them out i n h i s analysis; t o the extent then, t h a t

1 Fromm's concern i s i n p a r t modern man and the paradox o f h i gh l y evolved I i: techno1 ogi es and poor soci o-ethi ca l r e l a t i ons , then ind iv idua ls express

! t h i s contradi c t i on as we1 1 . 110

The fo l low ing i s an ou t l i ne o f Fromm's character types as ac t ion

o r ien ta t ions : 11 1

1 1 Ass imi la t ion Soc ia l i za t ion

i I I) Non-productive Or ienta t ion

1 a) Receiving . , . . . . . Masochist ic) i (Accep ti ng) (Loyal ty) 1 I ) Symbiosis

b) Exp lo i t i ng . . . . . Sad is t i c ) t (Taking ) (Au t h o r i t y ) ) I i c) Hoarding . . . . . . . . Destruct ive ) i (preserving) (Assertiveness)) With- 1 1

) draw- i d) Marketing . . . . . . . . I n d i f f e r e n t ) a1 i (~xchang i ng) (Fai rness) 1 1

11) Productive Or ienta t ion

90

Fromm's analysis i s par t ly aimed a t indicating the a f f in i t i e s between

socialization and assimilation and the ways in which orientations develop

i n r ea l i ty not exclusively on one or the other. Moreover From suggests

tha t , i n r ea l i ty from the perspective of an individual or social charac-

t e r type there can be blends of non-productive with productive orienta-

t ions. He s t a t e s :

. . . , i n r e a l i t y , we always deal with blends, fo r a character never represents one of the non- roducti ve orientations or the producti ve orientation exclusively. 11 5

Moreover any of the non-productive orientations has a positive and nega-

t ive aspect, "according t o the degree of productiveness in the total

character s t ructure. 8,113

In his attempt t o correlate development of ontogenetic character

orientations w i t h the phyl ogeneti c evolution of soci a1 structures. From

u t i l i zes a number of propositions which will be outlined. F i r s t , Fromm's

s t a r t ing point i s the historical contradiction of freedom from primary

t i e s and freedom to . Secondly particularly because part of the empirical

data fo r his orientations derives from his psychoanalytic experience,

Fromm locates the genesis of the contemporary meanings of freedom from

and freedom to in the breakdown of medieval social structures and the

evolution towards modern capital i sm. He s t a t e s :

We shall s t a r t our study of the meaning of freedom for modern man w i t h an analysis of the cultural scene in Europe during the Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern era .I 14

The phylogenetic stages which follow the chapter structures of Escape

From Freedom are as follows: -

1) a ) The Breakdown of Medieval society and the outlines of Renais-

sance social s t ructure: A The social s t ructure i s character-

ized by a general lack of individual freedom. Men were

conscious of themselves only as members of a race, family,

party or corporation. The Church fostered a sense of gui 1 t ,

and social and geographic mobility was low and discouraged.

b) The emergence of the Renaissance foreshadows the l a t e r

collapse of r igid feudal s t ructures and new c r i t e r i a of

social s t a tus , in place of b i r th and rank, wealth becomes

the measure of social s t r a t i f i ca t ion especially in and around

I t a ly . Pol i t ical struggles develop and resu l t i n the emer-

gence of new emperors and pol i t ica l uni ts . The emergence of

new forms of urban industry and the r i s e of a moneyed class

i n I t a ly .

The Renaissance i s a culture of wealthy burghers and nobles

on the one hand and exploited and manipulated masses on the

other.

Freedom and tyranny, individual i t y and disorder were i nextri cably interwoven. 115

Individuals become objects t o be manipulated or manipulating

subjects. B u t i n ideational terms the Renaissance i s a lso a

period of the revival of humanist ideas and forms of investi - gation which l a t e r resulted in the emergence of natural science.

2) S o c i a 1 ' S t ~ u c t ~ r e s ' f r o m ~ t t i ~ ' R ~ r i d i s s a n c e t o the Reformation:

Generally a period of growth of commerce t o larger national and

international proportions. The f i f teenth century sees th i s

growth accompanied values favouring economic and capital i s t i c

development. There were also changes i n the at t i tudes t o work,

fo r example the idea of efficiency becomes almost a moral value.

The Reformation witnesses an open s p l i t w i t h the Roman Catholic

noti on of authori ty and the asser t i on of the i ndi vi dual Is

"1 i berty of conscience. " B u t the pol i t i ca l structures s t r e s s new

forms of authoritarianism, as the ideas of the Reformation in-

creasingly become a weapon of the "princely" order in i t s f ight

fo r secular power.

1 3) From the Reformation t o Modern Industrial Capi talism:

The development of the factory system and the transformation of

the rural peasant in to an urban worker, is the main feature of

th i s period. B u t t h i s period marks a sharpening and synthesizing

of forces and inst i tut ional features, taking shape from an

e a r l i e r period, fo r example the development of the market, and

the principle tha t each individual acts t o maximize prof i t s , and

ye t th i s being t o the benefi t of a1 1. There i s also the rapid

introduction of machine technology and i n North America the rapid

dissolution of the large scale plantation system and the emergence

of corporate investment. 'I6 O u t of th i s process the se l f becomes

something t o be marketed, l ike any other product. The worker

becomes an insignificant thing, in the face of the expansion of

the mu1 ti -nat ional corporat i on and the large, bureaucratized

t rade union. "Power becomes anonymous. 1'1 17

Summary Remarks

Fromm's attempts t o invest igate the s t ruc tures o f mental hea l th as

we l l as pathology tend t o fol low along conceptual and h i s t o r i c a l l i nes .

The main content ion o f t h i s chapter has been t h a t such an inves t iga t ion

involves the development o f concepts o f character which are grounded i n

a no t ion o f human nature as paradox. Not only has the not ion o f essence

a l eg i t ima te place i n soc ia l science, bu t such a not ion does no t neces-

s a r i l y commit the inves t iga to r t o a se t o f e th i ca l presuppositions o r

normative prescr ip t ions. Fromm's work shows a systematic connection be-

tween h i s conception o f human nature and h i s c r i t i q u e o f theory i n the

soc ia l sciences. Moreover Fromm's empir ical constructs such as i nd i v i d -

ua l and soc ia l character i s based on the type o f questions which he pro-

poses and t h i s i s a v a l i d procedure i n the physical as we l l as the soc ia l

sciences. Fromm then i s not committed t o a view o f essence as substance

so much as essence as method. He has suggested t h a t the increasing ex-

pu1 s i on o f essence from contemporary soci 01 ogy can i t s e l f be understood

i n soc io log ica l terms. The rea l d i f fe rence between th inkers o f the

s ta tu re o f Parsons on the one hand and Fromm on the other, r e s t on the

f a c t o f essence as presupposit ion i n the case o f Parsons and propos i t ion

i n the case o f Fromm. But t h i s i s no t t o say t h a t Fromm's substantive

conclusions are necessar i ly va l i d .

The task o f the fo l lowing chapter w i l l be t o examine whether Fromm

9 4

has succeeded i n presenting a coherent view of human behaviour and an

explanation of evil as i t manifests i t se l f in individual behaviour pat-

terns in terms of the structural dynamics of social evolution.

5

FOOTNOTES

'Cf. R ichard Evans, D i a l o ue With E r i c h Fromm (New York: Harper +-- -. and Row, 1966), p. 18. See a so E. Fromm, Man For Himsel f : - An I n q u i r y i n t o the Psychology o f E th i cs (1970), p. 4 9 7 - -- -

'some o f the o the r we1 1 known works' i n t h i s area i nc lude those o f C . R. Rogers, G. W. A l l p o r t , A. H. Maslowe, S. Freud and a v a r i e t y o f Freudians i n c l u d i n g W. Reich and Geza Roheim. See Frank Issac, The Concept of Human Nature i n t he Wri ti ngs o f G . W . A1 1 p o r t , 5. E. Asch , E. Fr0mmTAH.M- a n d 7 R. Rogers,PF.DT Thesis, U n i v e r s i t y o f - - -- - Maryland, i96G. For analyses o f the concept o f human nature i n the pos t - Freudian t r a d i t i o n see Norman Brown, L i f e Against -- Death: The Psycho- a n a l y t i c a l Meaning of H is to ry , Vintage Books, 1959; Ernest Becker, The B i r t h and Death of w a n i n A Perspect ive i n Psych ia t r y and Anthropology ~ ( G l e n c K ~ r e e P ~ s d ) ,-especially c h G t e r s 5 and 7 F S e e a l so G. L indzey 's Handbook o f Soc ia l Psychology, Vol . 1, essay b y G. W. A l l p o r t , "The H is t o r i c a l BacKround o f Modern Soci a1 Psycho1 ogy ," pp . 3-54.

3 ~ h i s statement i s meant t o be t e n t a t i v e , no more. Since q u i t e apa r t f rom the hypothesis i t s e l f which f i n d s support i n t he numerous works o f Dr. Ernes t Becker and e a r l i e r on F. S. C. Northrop; what i s human nature i n t he contex t o f t h i s s e c t i o n has n o t y e t been defined.

4 ~ f . John Schaar, Escape from Author i t The Perspect ives of E r i c h Fromm (New York: Basic B o o ~ l d i 2 ~ -

-- --

' ~ f . E r i ch Fromm, Man For Himsel f : An I n u i r I n t o the Psychology of E th i cs (New York: F a w c a =Id L i b r a r y > ' ~ 1 9 7 0 ) , T 33. -

8 ~ f . E r i c h Fromm, The Nature o f Man: A Reader e d i t e d and w i t h an i n t r o d u c t i o n by E r i ch Fromm and RamonXirau T L z The Macmi 1 l a n Co. , 1968), p. 4.

101bid., pp. 5-6.

121bid., pp. 11-19.

13cf. E r i c h Fromm, "Man i s Not a Thing," - The Saturday Review, March 16, 1957, p. 10. ,

16see f o r example Marx's d iscuss ion o f l ove i n the Economic - and Ph i l oso h i c a l Manuscripts, c i t e d i n E r i c h Fromm, Marx's Concept -- o f Man

New York: F red r i ck Ungar Pub l ish ing Co., 1961), pp. 30-31. I n t h i s p a r t T--- o f t he Manuscripts, Marx saw the essence o f man as a na tu ra l species t o sensuous. Th is sensuousness i nd i ca tes f o r Marx and f o r Fromm the speci- f i c a l l y human nature. I n another t r a n s l a t i o n o f Marx's Manuscri t s , + t h e r e i s no menti on, i n t h e sect ions quoted by Fromrn, o f p r o u c t i v i t y and r e c e p t i v i t y ; r a t h e r Marx discusses ' r e a l va lue ' and 'use value ' de- f i n e d by money i n c a p i t a l i s t soc ie t y . Marx suggests of love: "As money i s n o t exchanged f o r any one s p e c i f i c qua1 i ty , . . . ? o r f o r any p a r t i cu- l a r human e s s e n t i a l ower, b u t f o r t he e n t i r e objective wor ld o f man and %- n a t u n r o m t h e s tan p o i n t o f i t s possessor i t the re fo re serves t o ex- change every p rope r t y f o r every other , even cont rad ic to ry , proper ty and ob jec t : i t i s t h e f r a t e r n i z a t i o n o f i m p o s s i b i l i t i e s . It makes contra- d i c t i o n s embrace. " See K a r l Marx, - The Economic - and Phi 1 osophi ca l - Manu- s c r i p t s o f 1844, tr. M a r t i n M i l l i g a n , e d i t e d w i t h an i n t r o d u c t i o n by David 3 .St= (New York: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Publ ishers, 1964), p. 169. [ I t a l i c s mine] I n M i l l i g a n ' s t r a n s l a t i o n i t i s n o t so much the antimony o f p r o d u c t i v i t y versus r e c e p t i v i t y which i s emphasized b u t the t rans- fo rming power of money i n c a p i t a l i s t soc ie t y . I n s h o r t i n c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y money becomes the t r u l y c r e a t i v e power. O f course both Fromm and Mi 11 i gan asse r t Marx's be1 i e f t h a t the r e s o l u t i o n o f t h i s con t rad i c t i on i s o n l y f i n a l l y poss ib le i n communist soc ie t y .

17~romm, OJ-. m., Marx's Concept o f Man, p. 35.

1 8 ~ h e o u t l i n e s o f the debate r e f e r r e d t o here and Fromm's p o s i t i o n on i t can be found i n "The Con t inu i t y o f Marx's Thought" i n Marx's - Con- cep t o f Man, pp. 69-79. --

l 9 c f . Danie l B e l l , "The Meaning o f A l i e n a t i o n " i n Thought, 1959, quoted i n Fromm, i b i d . , p. 77. Fromm notes t h a t B e l l ' s p o s i t i o n i s sim- i l a r t o t h a t taken by Russian Communists, though the motives are d i f f e r - en t . B e l l ' s motives are supposedly i n t e l l e c t u a l l y conservat ive, t h a t i s favouring i n d i v i dual r o l e adjustment and the equi 1 i b r i um o f the soci a1 sys tem .

20~romm, x. m., pp. 71 -72. For an a1 t e r n a t i v e approach t o the same problem e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h respect t o soc io logy see Robert F r i e d r i ch ' s A Soci 01 ogy of Sociology (1970) , pp . 24-25. F r i e d r i chs expla ins the - dominance o f T e c h a n i s t i c - p o s i t i v i s m i n American socio logy up t o the 1950's as be ing due t o the ' l a t e d iscovery of t he w r i t i n g s o f t he young Marx. '

2 1 Fromm, x. ' c i t . , - p. 78.

2 4 ~ f . E r i c h Fromm, "Marx's Con t r i bu t i on t o the Knowledge o f Man," i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Soc ia l Science Counci l , Soc ia l Science In format ion ,

- Par is , Vol. 7, NO-968, pp. 8-17.

3 0 ~ h i s argument o f Marx's ra i ses the problem o f ' fo rm' and 'content . ' Marx i s maki ng a henomenol ogi ca1 assumpti on (whi ch c o n t i nues t o f i n d support i n some areas ! t h a t form can change w i t h o u t changing the character of t h e r e l e v a n t content . Th is v iewpoin t i s bes t es tab l ished i n Georg Simmel ' s socio logy. Simmel suggests t h a t i d e n t i c a l content may take on d i f f e r e n t forms. He s ta tes : ". . . a con ten tua l l y i d e n t i c a l i n - t e r e s t may take on form i n very d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s ." Fur ther i n h i s work Simmel i s more e x p l i c i t : ". . . --everyth ing t h a t i s present i n them i n such a way as t o engender o r mediate e f f e c t s upon others o r t o rece ive such e f f e c t s , I designate as the content, as t h e ma te r ia l as i t were o f soc ia t i on . " These mate r ia l s are f a c t o r s i n s o c i a t i o n on ly when they " t rans form mere i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s i n t o s p e c i f i c forms o f being w i t h and f o r one another. . . . " See K u r t H. Wol ff , The Soc io l o of -+ Georg Simmel (New York: Free Press, 1950) , p . 22 and pp.

"~romrn, *. - c i t . , p. 16.

3 2 ~ s ana lys i s i n t h e Manuscripts progresses Marx tends t o r e s t r i c t use o f the term ' l abour ' t o a1 ienated 1 abour and work t o f r e e conscious non-a1 i enated 1 abour .

33~romm, . - c i t . , p. 101.

3 5 ~ b i d . , pp. 103-105.

3 9 ~ f . Herber t Marcuse, 'The - Essays - i n C r i t i c a l Theory (Boston:

4 0 ~ b id . , pp. 43-44.

4 1 ~ b i d -* 3 p. 45.

4 2 ~ b i d . , - p. 79.

4 3 ~ b i d . , p. 80.

4 4 ~ b i d . , p. 69.

4 5 ~ b i d . , - p. 78.

4 6 ~ b i d . , p. 47.

4 7 ~ b i d -* pp. 50-51.

4 8 ~ b i d . , p. 69.

4 9 ~ b i d -* 9 p. 70.

5 0 ~ b i d . , p. 71.

5 1 ~ b i d . , p. 84.

Concept o f Es•˜ence,"' ir i 'Necjations: - Beacon Press,-), pp. 43-87.

5 2 ~ f . F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic o f the Sciences and the Human- i t i e s (New York: World ~ u b l i s h i n g o . , 1 9 5 g . N o r t h r o p makes aiz- t i o n between f a c t u a l and normative s o c i a l theor ies . The l a t t e r i s in t roduced t o change the defacto s i t u a t i o n o r t o conform t o i t . "It def ines the i d e a l s o c i e t y a t which we are aiming. It does n o t pu rpo r t t o designate, a f t e r the manner o f a theory i n na tu ra l science, the de- f a c t o s t a t e o f a f f a i r s which we a c t u a l l y have" (p. 21). Factual theor ies i n s o c i a l science are answers t o problems o f f a c t and "must necessar i l y designate a form o f s o c i a l o rgan iza t ion which corresponds exac t l y t o what i s i n f a c t the case i n a s p e c i f i c soc ie ty o r c u l t u r e t o which the theory purpor ts t o r e f e r " (pp. 20-21 ) .

5 3 ~ b i d . , p. 21. Northrop has the fo l lowi ,ng t o say on the examin- a t i o n o f problems o f f a c t :

An examinat ion i n s o c i a l science o f problems o f value and problems of f a c t makes the d i f f e rence between them evident . Problems of f a c t i n soc ie ty i nvo lve the const ruc t ion o f h y p o t h e t i c a l l y designated, i n d i r e c t l y v e r i f i e d s c i e n t i f i c theor ies , a f t e r t he manner of those i n the n a t u r a l sciences. It i s the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the method

appropriate f o r verifying such theories tha t they designate any theory t o be f a l se i f one f a c t i s out of accord w i t h any deduced con- sequence of the theory. (p. 20)

5 4 ~ b i d - p, 255. Northrop's conception of natural science as con- cerned only w;;h problems of f ac t warrants a minor challenge. Northrop does not c l a r i fy whether what he means by f a c t i s elements of Nature w i t h ident i f iable metaphysical qua l i t ies which can be empirically known and validated in some a pr ior i fashion. Moreover even i f Northrop holds this Platonian view of-matter t ha t aspect of science no longer persis ts in the divorce between matter as essence and existence. The process of levels of indeterminacy between essence and existence, on the one hand and empiric science's explanations of fac ts as re la t ive t o specif ic types of explanation are no longer denied in 'normal science' (Kuhn). For further analysis of this problem, see David Hawkins, The - Language of Nature: An Essa in the Philosophy of Science (San Francisco: W . HTFree- man and E.-J&~E 760-186.

-

55~awkins, ib id . , pp. 11-39.

59~uch a s e t of generalizations i s not an attempt t o s e t u p a "straw man. " Nevertheless the di squi e t i n contemporary soci 01 ogy against the classical problems: ambiguous general theorizing and levels of empiricism which vary i n the degrees of t r i v i a l i t y which c l u t t e r the questions asked; are legion crit icisms . However some of the solutions to these problems spring from equally ambiguous and sometimes confused thinking about the senses in which sociology can be a science or i s a science. This i s very c lear as a general observation in a s e t of essays written by a group of eminent U. S. social s c i en t i s t s . See: Kewal Motwani , - A Critique - of Empiricism - i n Sociology (India: A1 l ied Publishers, 1967).

60~tephen E . Toulmin, The Philosophy - of Science: - . An Introduction (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 55-56. .-

6 1 ~ e r t Hoseli t z , Reader Is Guide t o the Social Sciences (I1 1 inois : Free Press, 1959), p . 16. ~ u o t e d ~ i ~ i a m P . ~ c ~ w a n , r o b l em of Soci a1 Sc ient i f ic Knowledge (New Jersey: The Bedmi nster =ss,'1963), P. 524.

6 2 ~ h i s statement requi res some cl a r i f i ca t i on. To the extent tha t $he general trend within the development of sociology has been away from . grand theory" and a minimi zing of the influence of t radi t ional

ph i losoph ica l problems terms such as human nature are n o t considered f i t i n s c i e n t i f i c discourse among many groups of soc io log i ca l t h inke rs . But some th inke rs such as C. W . M i l l s i n po lemic iz ing aga ins t abstracted empir ic ism cont inue t o suggest t h a t t he most important quest ions f o r modern s o c i o l o g i s t s have t o do w i th : ". . . what k inds o f 'human nature ' a re revealed i n the conduct and character we observe i n t h i s s o c i e t y i n t h i s per iod? And what i s the meaning f o r 'human na tu re ' o f each and every fea tu re o f the s o c i e t y we are examining?'' [Author 's i t a l i c s ] See C. Wright M i l l s , - The Soc io log ica l Imaginat ion (New York: Oxford Uni- v e r s i t y Press, 1959), p. 7.

6 3 ~ h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , between system t h e o r i s t s and those s o c i o l o g i s t s concerned w i t h man, i s n o t meant as exhaust ive o f the v a r i e t y and types o f s o c i o l o g i c a l theor ies . Such v a r i e t y i s n o t being denied i n the h i s t o r y o f socio logy. Rather I am more concerned, a t t h i s stage, w i t h s t r i k i n g a d i s t i n c t i o n which i l l u s t r a t e s the ways i n which th inke rs operate, t h i s tends t o mani fes t i t s e l f i n the forms and t v ~ e s of auest ions Posed. See f o r example Robert Merton, On Soc io lo i c a l Theory: f i v e ~ s s a ~ k , -- Old and New (New York: co l l ie r -Macmnlan, 1967 pp. 3-7. - +

6 4 ~ f . T a l c o t t Parsons, The Socia l System (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 208. A more sys temat ic ana lys is o f t he Parsonian paradigm w i l l be undertaken i n a subsequent chapter. A t t h i s stage I on ly want t o draw a t t e n t i o n t o the i m p l i c i t assumptions about human nature i n the work.

65~i 11s, o+. c i t., The Socio l o i c a l Imaginat ion, pp. 39-49. M i 11s ' s k i r t s ' the prob e m G a i s r b y & i s c r i t i q u e o f Parsons by suggest ing 'grand theo ry ' o r s o c i a l science paradigms should n o t at tempt t o s t ress c o n f l i c t o r i n t e g r a t i o n , conformi ty o r non-conformi ty i n a r i o r i . His s o l u t i o n i s a se r ies o f empi r ica l problemat ic models. BUT fi- t i s does n o t reso lve the problem o f inadequate pre-supposi t i o n s . M i 1 l s s ta tes : " . . . To emphasize such c o n f l i c t o f value i s n o t t o deny ' t he p r i c e o f r a t i o n a l consistencies . ' The discrepancy between word and deed i s o f t e n charac- t e r i s t i c , b u t so i s the s t r i v i n g f o r consistency. Which i s predominant i n any g iven s o c i e t cannot be decided a r i o r i on the basis o f 'human + theory" (p. 39). [ I t a l i c s mine]

e-b na tu re ' o r on t e p r i n c i p l e s o f s o c i o l g y ' o r y the f i a t o f grand

6 6 ~ o b e r t F r ied r i chs i n A Sociology o f Soc io lo (New York: Free + Press, 1970), h i n t s a t such a m i s c o n c e p t i o ~ ee pp. 146-147.

6 7 ~ b i d . , pp. 47-48. This pe r iod i n the development o f socio logy i s w e l l d E e n t e d and equa l l y we1 1 c r i t i c i z e d . Among t h e vocal c r i t i c s C . Wright M i l l s i s t he best known c r i t i c o f abstracted empir ic ism which he def ines as ". . . the simple c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f quest ions: who says what t o whom i n which media and w i t h what r e s u l t s ? " C. W. M i l l s , OJ. - c i t., p. 51. M i 11s views the p r i n c i p a l shortcoming o f 'abstracted empir ic ism as an abd ica t ion o f s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s from quest ions which touch on the

nature o f the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e o f ,a g iven soc ie ty . There i s a l so a "pronounced tendency t o confuse whatever i s t o be s tud ied w i t h t h e s e t o f methods suggested f o r i t s study."

68~ f . Jacques Bargun, O f Human Freedom (New York: J. B. L i p p i n c o t t Company, 1964) , p. 121 . For an m s i s o f Bargun's c r i t i q u e o f concepts o f human nature which dominated soc io logy and psychology i n the 1930's see pp. 122-124. I n s p i t e o f Mor r i s Cohen's ana lys is and observat ion o f t he methodological confusion i nvo l ved i n at tempt ing t o separate i n d u c t i v e from deduct ive methods, a b s t r a c t empir ic ism d i d u t i 1 i z e i n d u c t i v e methods, i .e., a t tempt t o pos tu la te general conclusions from p a r t i c u l a r research abs t rac t i ons . C f . Mor r is Cohen, Reason And Nature: - The Meaning of S c i e n t i f i c Method (New York: Free press^)>.^ -

6 9 ~ f . Robert Redf ie ld , "The A r t o f Soc ia l Science," i n Kewal Motwani , A C r i t i ue of Empir ic ism i n Soci 01 ogy (New York: Paragon Book Gal le ry , i 5 3 d n - 5 8 .

-

'"Ibid., p . 48. The th ree works c i t e d by Red f ie ld are: T. Veblon, The Theor- t he Le isure Class, G. Sumner's Fo1 kwa s and A. De Tocque- 4 _it m 1 e s Democracy i n A m e r i c a . 43). For an equa y cogent c r i t i q u e o f empi ri c i sm i n sociXog.y see Robert B i e r s t e d t Is , "A C r i ti que o f Empi r i cism i n ' Soci 01 ogy ,'I i n ~ e w k i Motwani , 9. - c i t . , pp. 149-1 74.

7 1 ~ o r r i s Cohen, x. a,, Reason - and Nature, p. 146.

7 2 ~ b i d . , - p. 136.

7 3 ~ b i d . , p. 137.

7 4 ~ b i d . , p. 138. Cohen's recogn i t i on o f the r o l e o f language i n t h e c o n t e z n d e r d iscuss ion i s as fo l l ows : "Each one o f us i s born i n t o a community and the general ideas o f t h a t community a re imposed upon us through language and through soc i a1 modes which emphasize c e r t a i n aspects o f ex is tence t o the neg lec t o f o thers" (p. 138) . For an extensive t reatment o f Toulmin's view o f the problem see David James Harding, - The Ideology and Log ic o f Scient ism, unpubl ished Ph .D. D isse r ta t i on , Simon F rase r U n G r s i t v , m70, Chapter 16 "Logic as Argument: Toulmin," pp.

7 5 ~ o r r i s Cohen, a. m. , p. 143.

7 7 ~ b i d . , pp. 333-368. Cohen concludes h i s ana lys is as fo l l ows : "To the e x t e n t t h a t t he s o c i a l sciences aim a t the adjustment of human d i f f i c u l t i e s , they i n v o l v e more judgement and circumspect ion. To the e x t e n t t h a t they aim a t i n s i g h t . . . , they are a t one w i t h pure science and w i t h r e l i g i o n and poetry . " See a l so A l v i n Gouldner, "Ant i-Minotaur:

The Theore t ica l Requirements o f t he Appl i e d Soci a1 Sciences ,Ii American Soc io lo ' i c a l 'Review, 1957. Here Gouldner makes a p o i n t s i m i l a r t o Cohen, t a t socio logy should develop t h e o r e t i c a l concepts which are more i n & l i n e w i t h the layman and thus f a c i l i t a t e the r e s o l u t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l s o c i e t a l problems.

86~ f . Stephen Toulmi n , Fores ight and Understandi n : An enquiry ---- i n t o the aims o f science (London: Hutchinson - I ) . an 99-115.

8 7 ~ f . O t t o Rank, The Trauma o f B i r t h (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., l929) , pp. m 3 . 7 -

88~f . O t t o Rank, The M t h o f the B i r t h o f t he Hero: -- and Other Wri t ings, ed. P h i l i p F r e ~ . ( k ~ o r k : R a n d o m ~ u ~ - m ) , p. v i i i .

8 9 ~ e e especi a1 l y E r i c h Fromm's essay "The Appl i c a t i o n o f Humanist Psychoanalysis t o Marx's Theory'' i n S o c i a l i s t Humanism: An I n t e r n a t i o n a l

e d i t e d by E r i ch Fromm (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 228-245. Here Fromm asserts :

t

Because o f t he development i n both M a r x i s t and psychoanalyt ic t h i n k - ing , t he t ime seems t o have come f o r humanist Marx is ts t o recognize t h a t t he use of a dynamic, c r i t i c a l s o c i a l 1 o r ien ted psychology i s a+ o f c r u c i a1 importance f o r t he f u r t h e r eve op-Marxi s t theory and s o c i a l i s t p rac t i ce ; t h a t a theory centered around man can no longer remain a theory w i t h o u t sychology i f i t i s n o t t o l ose touch w i t h human r e a l i t y . (p . 231) F ~ t a l i c s mine]

Th is statement i s fol lowed by an expos i t i on o f Fromm's concept of ' s o c i a l character . ' The above s ta ted s h i f t i n Fromm's t h i n k i n g was e a r l i e r d i s - cussed i n Chapter One of the d i s s e r t a t i o n i n more general terms of Fromm's soc i a1 science.

' O C ~ . E r i c h Fromm, The Fear o f Freedom (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 19. T i s t e x t i s s h e d i n Nor th America as Esca e From Freedom (New York: Hol t, Rinehart and Winston (1941) and

39-40. No reasons f o r t he t i t l e change are given, b u t there d~ i s no doubt i n my mind t h a t the analogy suggested i n t h e t e x t i s funda- mental t o Fromm's fo rmula t ion o f t he problem o f e x i s t e n t i a l and h i s t o r i - c a l f ea r . For example i n the 1965 e d i t i o n Fromm s ta tes i n Foreword 11:

It becomes ever i n c r e a s i n g l y c l e a r t o many students o f man and o f t h e contemporary scene t h a t t he c r u c i a l d i f f i c u l t y w i t h which we are confronted l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t t he development o f man's i n t e l l e c - t u a l capac i t i es has f a r ou ts t r i pped the development -- o f h i s emotions. Man's b r a i n l i v e s i n the twen t ie th centurv: t he h e a r t o f most men l i v e s s t i l l i n t h e Stone Age. (p. x i v ) 1 1 t a l i c s mine]

C lea r l y the i m p l i c a t i o n here i s t h a t there i s a dichotomy o f s o r t s be- tween the i n t e l l e c t u a l and phys io log i c a t t r i b u t e s of man and t h a t t h i s i s p a r t i a l l y t he source o f human e v i 1,

~romm, op. c i t. , --- The Fear o f Freedom, p. 27.

9 2 ~ b i d . , pp. 27-28. See a l s o O t to Rank, 2. c i t. , The Myth - o f the ---- B i r t h o f t h e Hero: -- And Other Wr i t ings , Chapters T a n d T 1 , pp. 14-96,

9 5 ~ a n k , . - c i t., - The Trauma -- o f B i r t h , pp. 103-105.

9 6 ~ a n k , E. G. , W i l l Therapy --- and Tru th and R e a l i t y , pp. 209-220.

9 7 ~ b i d . , p. 223. See a l so Frommls c r i t i q u e aga ins t Freudian p s y c h o - a n z i s I aim t o cure the i r r a t i o n a l by appeals t o reason, 9. a., Man f o r Himsel f , p. 36. --

he consistency o f Fromm's emp i r i ca l task which i s w ide ly r e f e red t o can be t raced i n the f o l l o w i n g works: Escape from Freedom (1941) Man f o r Himsel f : An I n u i r i n t o the Psychology o f E th i cs (194 t ) ; The ~ a n e ~ ~ m ~ 9 5 ~ ; - i k - & a ~ f ~ a n : I t s ~ e n i u c f o r Good and E v i r ( 1 9 6 4 ) d r o m m and F T i F h m a E o b y , ~ o C i a m a c t e r % - a M e x i c a n V i l l a e: A Sociopsychoanalyt ic Study ( m o o d C l i f f s ,N.-J. : Prent ice R a n a T 9 7 m .

l o 0 ~ a i l u r e t o make t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n c l e a r l y i n Fromm's work i s the main weakness of some of Fromm's c r i t i c s such as Rubin Grotesky, Person- ~ l i t y : The Need fo r L i b e r t y and Rights (1967) as c i t e d e a r l i e r . --- -

lol~he 'not ions ' of e x i s t e n t i a l and h i s t o r i c a l dichotomies are a lso present i n the works of othe? w r i t e r s w i t h respect t o h i s t o r i c a l development and character and behaviour. Ot to Rank discusses the process o f e x i s t e n t i a l and h i s t o r i c a l dichotomies--wi thou t actual l y using those terms--in r e l a t i o n t o sexual love, happiness and redemption, i n the fo l lowing terms : "A1 1 man's 1 onging f o r happiness and redemption corres- ponds then t o a spontaneous therapeut ic attempt e i t h e r t o u n i t e harmon- i ous l y once more t h i s inso lub le opposi t ion o f w i l l and consciousness o f gui 1 t o r t o separate them e n t i r e l y . Both must miscarry." (p. 299) . But i n terms of the temporal problem, w i l l , g u i l t and consciousness maintain themselves d i f f e r e n t l y . For w i 11 , "however one comprehends o r i n t e rp re t s it, remains a constant ly operating force, whi l e consciousness above a1 1 i s a qua l i t y , a s ta te , and as such i s passive and temporary. . . . The f ee l i ng of pain, which maintains i t s e l f psych ica l l y as gui 1 t fee l ing , ar ises from the a t t e m ~ t s t o u n i t e these two incommensurable ~owers . " (p. 298). See Ot to ~ a n k , OJ-. -. c i t 9 - W i l l Therapy and Truth and Rea l i t y . ---- D r . Ernest Becker w r i t i n g three decades l a t e r from an equal ly a n t i - Freudian standpoint and us1 ng the notions o f con t rad ic t ion i n r e l a t i on t o contemporary psych ia t r i c problems s ta tes the problem i n the f o l lowing manner:

For the sake o f h i s equanimity and power man i s t r y i n g t o entwine c u l t u r a l -- rules w i t h objects, But by thus incarnat ing the f i c t i o n i t becomes rea l and inslaves him. . . . The paradox i s t h a t f o r convic- t i o n man needs t o merge ru les and objects'; whereas f o r manipulatory con t ro l over the ru les , f o r the power t o change h i s designs, man needs t o disentangle the ru les from the objects. . . . L i t t l e wonder t h a t g u i l t i s rampant i n human l i f e . Man i s h o i s t w i t h h i s own petard, w i t h h i s need f o r conv ic t ion. The c h i l d o r the adu l t who concretizes the ru l es does so under the impetus o f a primary es the t i c des i re t o merge the mental and the mater ia l . He i s hard ly t o be blamed when, f o r the sake o f ce r ta in ty , he f inds the concrete hardened around h i s own fee t .

See Ernest Becker, - The Revolut ion i n Ps c h i a t r . The New Understanding o f Man (Glencoe: Free Press, 19641, piT; w i n ~ t m o r e ~ o i n ~ s ta te -

- - ments we f i nd a conception o f the movement o f e x i s t e n t i a l and h i s t o r i c a l contradi t i ons i n d i a l e c t i c a l (method) terms. The former i s the "essence o f man," See a lso Er i ch From, The Heart -- o f Man: - I t s Genius For Good -- and Evi 1 (New York: Harper and R K 1968), p. 121. --

102~romm, OJ-. c i t., Man For Himse!f, pp. 50-57. I use the term "re1 ig ious" no t t o r e f e r t o x r i c t l y the1 s t i c sys tems . Fromm uses the terms "frames o f o r i en ta t i on and devotion" (p. 56).

lo51bid., p. 68. See a l so F . Fromm, Esca e From Freedom (New York: Ho1 t, Rinehart and Winston, 19651, pp. d O ~ l s o E. Fromm, - The Sane Society (New York: Hol t , Rinehart and Winston, 1955) , pp. 79-83. -

lo6cf. Tamotsu Shibutani , Society and personali ty: An I n t e r ac t i on i s t A roach t o Social Psychology (Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . : P r x t i c e Hal l ,

p p 7 3 m . The pa ra l l e l s between many of Fromm's concepts and * those o f i n t e r a c t i o n i s t socia l psychology, p a r t i a l l y derive from the l a t t e r being a synthesis of the pragmatism of Mead and Dewey and psychoanalysis.

107~romm, *. m., Man f o r Himself, p. 208.

'081bid., p. 59.

'091bid., p. 62. Fromm a t t r i b u t e s pa r t of the confusion about e th i c s i n human behaviour t o C . G . Jung (p. 61). See a l s o John Schaar , 3. ci t. , Esca e From Authority , p. 86. Schaar suggests t h a t Fromm views inher i ted - +- qua i t i e s as synonymous w i t h temperament, and acquired qua1 i t i e s w i t h character .

l l O ~ b i d . , ppe 162-163. We wi l l return t o this problem i n a subse- quent chapter.

l l l~romm, 2. - c i t . , -- Man For Himself, p. 117. The def in i t ions and discussions of these or ienta t ions wi l l be developed i n Chapter 111.

114~romm? w. m., Esca e from Freedom, p. 53. One of the r a t - +- ionales underlying my focus on t ese propositions i s t h a t whereas i n Escape - from -- Freedom, Fromm's analysis focuses on the socio-s t ructural out l ines of the s tages of development, i n -- Man f o r Himself, the analysis is ontogenetic.

115~romm, 9. m., Escape from Freedom, p. 63. For an analysis of r i q id rank and s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n t m dress i n (Goth) th i r t een th centuFy Europe see J . Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of Life Thought and-t i n France and the Netherlacds & - - - - Fourteenth - and Fifteenth ~ e n t u r i e f l ~ o n d o n : Edward Arnold, 1924), p . 43.

ca l ly more comprehensive than From's i n -- The Sane Society, x. m., pp. 85-1 03.

l7~romrn, x. - c i t . , Escape from Freedom, pp. 148-152.

CHAPTER I11

A DISCUSSION OF ERICH FROMM'S THEORY OF HUMAN

CHARACTER, AND THE INDIVIDUAL

There i s no more a s p e c i f i c , independent p r i n c i p l e o f e v i 1 then there i s a s p e c i f i c p r i n c i p l e o f darkness, f o r both s p r i n g from an absence o f t he p o s i t i v e , which revea ls i t s e l f and i t s contrary.1 [Kar l Lowi t h ]

In Fromm's i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n t o the nature o f e v i l , he i s s p e c i f i -

c a l l y concerned w i t h c l i n i c a l e v i 1, t h a t i s t o say pa tho log ica l and

s o c i a l e v i 1. He i s n o t so much unconcerned w i t h e v i 1 as a ph i l osoph ica l

and moral e t h i c a l problem, r a t h e r he i s focused upon an anthropo-

s o c i o l o g i c a l problem. Such an i n v e s t i g a t i o n does n o t negate p h i losoph i -

c a l i n q u i r y , so much as i t would be an e r r o r t o t r a n s l a t e Fromm's

propos i t ions t o s t r i c t l y e t h i c a l and ph i l osoph ica l discourse, by t h e

same token i t w i 11 be an e r r o r t o evaluate h i s o v e r a l l task i n one

dimensional terms. Fromm recognizes the mu1 ti -dimensi onal na ture o f h i s

quest ions , he a1 so recognizes the 1 og i c a l and subs t a n t i a1 connections

between ph i losophi c a l proposi ti ons and psychoanalyt i c and s o c i o l o g i c a l

i n q u i r y . The preceding chapter i s concerned w i t h the s p e c i f i c na ture of

t he connections between ph i 1 osophi c a l proposi ti on and psycho-analyt i c

and s o c i o l o g i c a l i n q u i r y . Th is chapter i s concerned w i t h the h i s t o r i c a l

and empi r i c a l i nves ti g a t i ons o f Fromm.

Fromm's character typo1 ogy o f p roduct ive and non-producti ve and

h i s s o c i o l o g i c a l statements para1 l e l h i s a r t i c u l a t i o n o f good and e v i 1

i n ph i losophical terms. Such an ar t iculat ion have the Kantian formula-

t ion of evi l i n "anthropological" terms (of "radical evi 1" which refers

t o man's specif ical ly human nature, one able t o d i rec t i t s e l f with reason

and freedom) ; as we1 1 as Leibniz's paradoxical definition of evi l as

absence of the positive and ye t tha t the human i s an outcome of a trans-

cendent God, revealing himself in the human person. Fromm's pronounce-

ments a t the philosophical level s h i f t between Kant's "limitation" of

reason as "pure reason" and therefore evil as an ethical concept, in

this sense, on the one hand and Leibniz's imputation of evil t o f i n i t e

creatures, on the other hand, hence Fromm's assertions of the "burden of

reason" as defining the boundary between human and pre-human s t a t e s of

existence and his concretization of evil .* Precisely t o the extent tha t

Fromm's philosophical conception of good and evi l i s influenced by

Lei bniz he could asser t with Leibniz:

Adam and Eve's disobedience to God are not called s in ; nowhere i s there a hint tha t th is disobedience has corrupted - man. On the con- t rary, the disobedience i s the condition for man ' s sel f-awareness, f o r his capacity t o choose, and thus in t k - l f i n a l y s i s th i s ac t of disobedience i s man's f i r s t s tep toward freedom.3 [ I t a l i c s mine]

The foregoing statement re i te ra tes Leibniz's "optimism" when he says:

Thus the seeming deformations of our l i t t l e worlds combine t o form beauty i n the great world and in no wise confl ict w i t h the unity of an a1 1 embracing , i nf i ni te ly perfect principle: on the contrary, they enhance our admiration for i t s wisdom, which puts --- evil into the service -- of the greatest good.4 [ I t a l i c s m i n r '

Fromm's phi 1 osophical posi t i on then reveals a paradox of Lei bni zi an re-

l igiousi ty and Kantian r a t i ~ n a l i t ~ . ~ A t a different level From in

at tempt ing t o penet ra te t h i s problem fu r the r , t r a n s l a t e s t h i s paradox

i n t o a thoroughly s o c i o l o g i c a l one: t h e pr imary r e l a t i o n s o f fami ly ,

b lood and n a t i o n which we must separate ourselves from and the uncer ta in ty

o f poss ib le s t ruc tures- - the problem o f "freedom from" and "freedom to."

Fromm a l s o t r a n s l a t e s the problem i n t o a psycho-analyt i c one o f w i 11 and

g u i l t (Rank's terms) a t t he l e v e l o f depth psychology. The establ ishment

o f weaknesses i n Fromm's ideas a t what I here term h i s ph i l osoph ica l

l e v e l o f d iscourse does n o t p rov ide i n i t s e l f an e f f e c t i v e c r i t i q u e o f

h i s work as a whole. I f o n l y because Fromm s h i f t s cons tan t l y i n h i s

l o y a l t y t o antecedent ideas and use o f metaphor, which i s employed i n

h i s work. I t i s p a r t l y f o r t h i s reason t h a t t he d i s t i n c t i o n was e a r l i e r

made between Fromm's soc i 01 og ica l epistemology and h i s socio logy o f know-

ledge and Fromm's h i s t o r i c a l and emp i r i ca l w r i t i n g s . Fromm's emp i r i ca l work i n d i c a t e awareness o f t h i s problemat ic i n

h i s asse r t i on t h a t h i s charac ter types as pure types are meant t o be

d i d a c t i c and i n r e a l i t y ac tua l i n d i v i d u a l characters have t o be presented

as "blends" of d i f f e r e n t non-productive o r i e n t a t i o n s o r o f non-product ive

and the product ive o r i e n t a t i o n . He s ta tes t h i s as fol lows:

To understand the character system, i t i s necessary t o take account o f t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between modes o f assimi l a t i o n and r e l a t e d - ness, t h e qua1 i ty o f incestuous t i e s , and t h e degree o f p roduct i ve- ness .6

Th is statement a1 though repeated, w i t h v a r i a t i o n s , throughout Fromm's

has never been g iven extensive methodological o r t h e o r e t i c a l explanat ion,

what Fromm appears t o be saying here i s t h a t h i s character o r i e n t a t i o n s I

109

are " idea l types" almost i n the Weberian t r a d i t i o n . Such a para1 l e l i s I

however misleading. A few words on t h i s problem i s i n order, f o r j u s t

as pos tu la t ion o f Weber's " idea l type" and the subsequent controversy

marks the status o f t h a t th inkers t r a n s i t i o n between theory, method01 ogy

and empir ical analysis, so i n Fromm, h i s no t ion o f "blending o f or ienta-

t i ons" marks a c r i t i c a l p o i n t i n h i s work. 7

Because Fromm's concept o f character i s both an i n d i v i d u a l i z i n g

and a genera l iz ing concept ( i n von Schel t i n g ' s terms) i t betrays some

a f f i n i t y w i t h Max Weber's approach t o soc ia l phenomena. The l a t t e r

s t ra tegy i s employed i n Fromm's empir ical analysis i n Escape - From Freedom

and i n h i s most recent work Social Character -- i n a Mexican V i l lage: - A

Sociopsychoanalytic Fromm's concept o f character i s a general

i dea l type t o the extent t h a t i t i s app l i cab le - -a l l h i s types o f charac-

t e r - - t o an i n d e f i n i t e number o f concrete cases and any character type

w i t h a l l i t s elements may be appl icable t o given concrete s i tua t ions ,

f o r example t h i s i s evident i n Fromm's use o f the marketing o r i en ta t i on

as a type o f soc ia l character t yp i ca l o f advanced i n d u s t r i a l soc ie t ies .

But there are di f ferences between Weber's and Fromm's formulat ions o f

i dea l types. Weber 's asser t ion t h a t the considerat ions preceding the

se lec t ion o f the substantive content o f a given type, being "value-

free," t h a t i s having nothing t o do w i t h considerat ions o f what ought t o

ex i s t ; can be contrasted w i t h Fromm's view t h a t the r e l a t i o n between

product ive and non-producti ve modes o f soci a1 i z a t i on and assimi 1 a t i on

p o i n t t o an imperative. 9

There are two f u r t h e r s i g n i f i c a n t d i f ferences between Weber's and

Fromm's fo rmula t ion of i d e a l types. The f i r s t i s Weber's asse r t i on t h a t I

h i s types made no presupposi t ions a t t r i b u t a b l e t o psychology b u t r a t h e r

were se lec ted from classes o f phenomena cont ras ts sharp ly w i t h Fromm's

admission t h a t i n d i v i d u a l cases from psychoanalyt ic p r a c t i c e in f luence,

among o ther th ings , h i s se lec t i on . The second r e l a t e s t o t h e vary ing

a t t i t u d e s o f Weber and Fromm t o h i s t o r y . Weber asser ted t h a t h i s i d e a l

types were based on what i s l o g i c a l l y possib le, whereas the h i s t o r i c a l l y

r e a l was o f t e n q u i t e d i s t i n c t i n terms o f what causes e x p l a i n an event,

and the re fo re unre la ted t o the i n d i v i d u a l quest ion posed. Th is l i n e o f

reasoning lead Weber u l t i m a t e l y t o a k i n d o f type atomism. Fromm has a

l ess r i g i d a t t i t u d e t o h i s t o r y . Whereas Weber's concern i s w i t h an i d e a l

type cons t ruc t t h a t exp la ins h i s t o r i c a l p a r t i c u l a r s o r the unique occur-

rences o f phenomena, Fromm's concern i n h i s i d e a l type i s w i t h r e g u l a r i -

t i e s which transcend the p a r t i c u l a r . lo By transcendence o f t he p a r t i cu-

l a r i s meant a l e v e l o f ana lys is which s i g n i f i e s socio-economic develop-

ment and a development o f "1 i f e -cen te red values ." Nevertheless the

method employed by Fromrn i n t h i s approach t o h i s sub jec t mat ter i s n o t

I d i a l e c t i c a l i n S a r t r e ' s sense o f the d iachron ic and entogeneti c.

I n terms o f h i s empi r ica l and h i s t o r i c a l an thropo log ica l work

E r i ch Fromm's concern w i t h c l i n i c a l e v i 1 i s bes t understood w i t h i n the

context o f h i s general asse r t i on t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between normal

I and patho log ica l behaviour e x i s t s as a continuum. I n o the r words the

1 d i s t i n c t i o n s between normal and abnormal a re more q u a n t i t a t i v e than i

q u a l i t a t i v e i n mani fes ta t ion . From the t ime o f Freud t h i s idea has

tended t o i n f l uence s o c i a l science discourse. But how could Fromm asser t

i n h i s soc io log i ca l epistemology t h a t l i f e and death o r good and e v i 1

are opposed and asse r t i n h i s h i s t o r i c a l and emp i r i ca l work t h a t a con-

t inuum e x i s t s between mormalcy and pathology? I n h i s examination o f

Fromm's work, Schaar was t roub led by t h i s apparent cont rad i e t i on. 11

While Schaar holds t h a t Fromm's o,rgani z ing concepts o f p roduct ive and

unproduct ive o r i n pe rsona l i t y terms, good and bad, i s taken from Fromm's

m o r a l i s t i c p o s i t i o n and have l i t t l e t o do w i t h emp i r i ca l r e a l i t y .

Herber t Marcuse, i n an e a r l i e r , more scath ing a t tack h e l d t h a t such pro-

nouncements came from Fromm's support f o r t h e r e i g n i n g and repress ive

ideology and the re fo re i n d i c a t i v e o f a f a r more conservat ive p o s i t i o n

than Freud h imsel f :

There i s fur thermore the d i s t i n c t i o n between good and bad, construc- ti ve and des t ruc t i ve (according t o Fromrn: p roduct ive and unproduc- t i v e , p o s i t i v e and negat ive) , which i s n o t der ived from any t h e o r e t i - c a l p r i n c i p l e b u t simply taken f rom t h e preva lent ideology.12

I n o the r words Marcuse suggests t h a t behaviour which i s i n r e a l i t y pro-

duc t i ve i s almost impossible i n contemporary soc ie ty . I n f a c t any

observed d i v e r s i t i e s o f character i n contemporary society, are "secon-

dary phenomena. It Moreover Marcuse I s imp1 i c i t c r i ti c i sm i s t h a t Fromm

should focus h i s powers o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n n o t a t the l e v e l o f such

observed d i v e r s i t i e s o f psychological and soc i o-psycho1 ogi c a l pa t te rns ,

b u t on the "scope, form and e f fec t iveness o f repress ive con t ro l s preva-

l e n t a t t he g iven stage o f c i v i l i z a t i o n . 1 3 When examined more c lose ly ,

I Marcuse i s s t a t i n g t h a t the d iachron ic processes are p r i o r and determine : 1 the nature and scope of f ac to rs t h a t i n f l uence behaviour i n contemporary

112

soc ie ty , t h a t i s a t t he ontogenetic leve l - - thus Marcuse does n o t under- I

take a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n , on the Freudian model, between c i v i

and contemporary soc ie ty . But i f the nature and scope o f the

can be s imply deduced from phylogenet ic processes what i s the

Rank and Fromm's asse r t i on o f w i l l ? It i s t o t h i s concept o f

i z a t i on

ontogeneti c

p lace o f

w i l l t h a t

Marcuse does n o t address h imse l f i n h i s s p e c i f i c polemic aga ins t E r i c h

~ r 0 m m . l ~ It would appear t h a t Marcuse and Rank are a t cross purposes.

Fromm's use o f t h e concept o f w i l l i n h i s meta-psychology i s

meant t o break the deadlock, the c o n t r a d i c t i o n as i t were, between

Marx's focus on the s o c i a l order p a r t i a l l y d i c t a t i n g and p a r t i a l l y a de-

te rmi nant o f c lass p rax i s , on the one hand and Freudian i n d i v i d u a l ism,

on the o ther . By i g n o r i n g t h i s concept o f w i l l Marcuse tends t o i d e n t i f y

isomorphical ly , t he development o f the i n d i v i d u a l and the h i s t o r y o f

pas t soc ie ty . 15

Wi th in a w ider s o c i a l science discourse the r e l a t i o n s h i p between

no rma l i t y and abnormal i ty i s no less problemat ic . L i k e Freud, Marcuse

accepts as t r u e t h a t i n the e a r l y emergence o f c i v i l i z a t i o n a " c e r t a i n

bas ic repress ion and ascet ic ism was indeed necessary t o b u i 1 d c i v i 1 i za-

t i o n because o f t h e f a c t s o f economic s c a r c i t y and the work necessary t o

overcome s c a r c i t y . "I6 But s o c i a l s t r u c t u r a l development up t o now has

witnessed a bu i ld -up o f repress ive techniques o r surp lus repression. I n

One Dimensional Man, Marcuse extends h i s hypothesis t o suggest t h a t f a r - -

from an increase i n the development o f non-repressive sub l imat ion (a de-

velopment o f sexual impulses which w i thou t l o s i n g t h e i r e r o t i c energy,

' 'transcend t h e i r immediate o b j e c t and e r o t i c i ze normal l y non- and

113

ant i -erot ic relationships between, the individuals and between them and

the i r environment") ; there has been an extension of repressive de-

sublimation ("release of sexuality i n modes and forms which reduce - and

weaken e ro t i c energy"). The extension of the l a t t e r leads t o an exten-

sion of the Reality Principle over the instructual Eros. When trans-

lated fo r the purposes of analysis of a theory of social character in

contemporary industr ia l society, the Marcuse hypothesis a1 lows fo r a

s ingle character type. I t i s one in which the individual psyche

"becomes the more or less willing receptacle of social ly desirable and

social ly necessary aspirations, feelings, drives, and sat isfact ions."

In Frommian terms the productive character and in Marcuse's terms the

l iberated individual, one with a level of consciousness, a radical trans-

valuation of values, in short a non-repressive praxis i s i n most respects

a consequence of qua1 i t a t ive soci a1 and ins t i t u t i onal change. Marcuse

asser ts :

The individual, and with h i m the rights and l ibe r t i e s of the individ- ual, i s something t h a t has s t i l l t o be created, and that can be created only through the development of qual i ta t ively different soc- i e t a l relations and insti tutions.18

In terms of the foregoing social character i s one-dimensional , for

Marcuse then the problem of normality and abnormality i s in a sense i r -

relevant, since a l l individual praxis i s abnormal, b u t only from a pers-

pective (a c r i t i c a l theoretical and ideological one of "true Reason").

Marcuse implores us t o see that the Reality principle which once, in the

his tor ical past was Reason, has now become Un-Reason. For the contemporary

114

intel lectual psycho1 ogi cal categories must become pol i t ica l categories

since there are no "objective cultural values" (Marcuse's terms) contin-

gent of "material ground" which allows f o r the real izat ion of normality.

Marcuse charges Fromm with having divorced cultural values, the c r i t e r i a

f o r psychological performance, of the material base of which they are

made. Given the widespread influence of Marcuse's social theory i t is

no wonder tha t the belief in many social science c i rc les tha t normality

and abnormality is highly r e l a t i v i s t i c i s so pervasive, i t has become

another truism.

There are two fur ther se t s of arguments f o r the r e l a t iv i ty positions

which are variants of Marcuse's ideology cr i t ique (or of which Marcuse's

ideology cr i t ique i s a var iant) . These arguments are s ta ted br ie f ly i n

order t o show t h a t i n some ways Fromm's work on character i s an attempt

t o transcend such arguments. The just argument, put forward by the phil-

osophical r e l a t i v i s t s i s t ha t there i s no tenable philosophical basis f o r

the categories good and evi l as absolutes and therefore normalcy and

pathology. A1 though relativism in i t s most radical expression i s commonly

associated w i t h pragmatic and u t i l i t a r i a n philosophies, as a tendency i t

can be traced t o the sophists.19 The breakdown of feudal society and the

l a t e r corresponding emergence of u t i l i t a r i an ideas sealed the divorce be-

tween moral and factual questions . The emergence of uti 1 i t a r i an cul ture

also clashed with the "Christian conception of moral i ty as supernatural ly

sanctioned." Alvin Gouldner in his recent book, The - Coming Crisis - of

Western Soci 01 ogy , suggests an important 1 ink between % t i 1 i t a r i an cul-

ture," the emergence of bourgeois society ( in a Marxian sense) and the

t r ansva lua t ion o f values which led , t o the Durkheimian c r i t i q u e o f s o c i e t y

and the fo rmu la t i on o f t he concept o f anomie. Synthesiz ing these con-

nect ions Goul dner remarks :

. . . To evaluate men o r th ings i n terms o f t h e i r consequences i s t o evaluate them i n terms o f how they may be used t o persue an i n t e r e s t , r a t h e r than o f what they are i n themselves o r because they may be deemed good i n t h e i r own r i g h t . Things are good o r e v i 1 n o t i n them- selves, b u t i n whether they produce :agreeable outcomes .20

Gouldner makes a se r ies o f observat ions on the emergence and development

o f modern bourgeois c a p i t a l ism, some o f which have been recorded e l se -

where and which prov ide a p o i n t o f departure f o r t he r e l a t i v i t y p o s i t i o n

between no rma l i t y and abnormal i ty . The f i r s t p o i n t i s a q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f h i s e a r l i e r statement by

which Gouldner suggests t h a t the r i s i n g bourgeois ie a f t e r t h e e ighteenth

century s t ressed a l so a con junc t ion o f m o r a l i t y and u t i l i t y . For example

the "Dec lara t ion of t h e Rights o f Man" i n the French Revolut ion which

es tab l ished both a minimum o f i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s o f t he i n d i v i d u a l and

the r i g h t s o f p roper t y as a na tu ra l r i g h t .21 A c e n t r a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f

such a d e c l a r a t i o n was t h a t u t i l i t y becomes a m o r a l i t y i n i t s e l f where

what was normal behaviour a t an i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l depends on the conse-

quences o f t h e ac t ions o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l b u t a t t he same t ime men as

i n d i v i d u a l s were conceived as having i n t r i n s i c r i g h t s and thus the v a l i d -

i t y o f ac t ions d e r i v i n g from such r i g h t s would n o t depend upon conse-

quences. 22

Gouldner ' s second observat ion der ives p a r t l y from the f i r s t , t h a t

i s t h a t t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n marked a tendency f o r bourgeois m o r a l i t y t o

d r i f t toward an "anomic normlessness." I n one sense t h i s anomic normless-

ness i s a c lass phenomenon, a consequence o f the r e s o l u t i o n o f personal

worth i n t o exchange value. Thus Marx f o r example suggests t h a t h i s t o r i -

c a l l y the bourgeois ie p layed a rev01 u t i onary r o l e i n demys ti f y i ng feudal

and " i d y l 1 i c re1 a t i ons" and the "e terna l i s t i c " norms which re in fo rced

these r e l a t i o n s . E r i ch Fromm makes a s i m i l a r observat ion about the r o l e

o f t he small , weal t h y and powerful upper classes i n Renaissance Europe

which exp lo i t e d the o b j e c t i v e cont rad i c t i ons o f t he pe r iod and destroyed

t h e c u l t u r e o f t h e Middle Ages. But F r o m adds :

The masses who d i d n o t share the weal th and power o f t he r u l i n g group had l o s t t he s e c u r i t y o f t h e i r former s ta tus and had become a shapeless mass, t o be f l a t t e r e d o r t o be threatened--but always t o be manipulated and e x p l o i t e d by those i n power. A new despotism arose s ide by s i d e w i t h the new ind i v idua l i sm. Freedom and tyranny, i n d i v i dual i ty and d isorder , were i n e x t r i cably interwoven .23

It i s worth n o t i n g t h a t i n terms o f the impact o f t he emerging t r a d i n g

classes on the impetus f o r extension o f new ideas o f ph i losoph ica l i n d i -

v idua l ism and modern science, unanimi ty by no means e x i s t s among Marx i s t

t h inke rs . M. N. Roy i n Reason, Romanticism - and Revolut ion, Vol . I, has

suggested t h a t the connect ion between the r i s e o f i ndi v i dual ism, modern

science and the r i s e o f t he bourgeois ie i s n o t main ly causal b u t acci - denta l . 24

Whatever the mer i t s o f t he foregoing observat ions, Gouldner makes

a t h i r d observat ion which supports the r e l a t i v i s t tendency as an h i s t o r i -

c a l process and t h i s observat ion supports the Durkheimian n o t i o n o f

anomie i n the modern era as p a r t l y the outcome o f increased competit iveness

between individual and individual, as a basic commitment of emerging

bourgeois society. This competitiveness se t s the stage f o r the "normalcy

2 5 of pathology" outlook on the level of ideas.

Gouldner develops an analysis of the re1 ation between u t i 1 i t a r -

ianism, as e a r l i e r defined, and modern social theory, and one which pro-

vides a point of departure fo r discussion of the second level of arguments

i n psychology and psychiatry about the re1 a t i vi sm of normalcy and abnor-

mality. Gouldner suggests . . tha t since objects are no longer experienced

o r regarded as having an i n t r i n s i c value, what i s real i s also no longer

fixed.

. . ., one e f fec t of a u t i l i t a r i a n culture is tha t the established cultural mapping of objects, as a social ly shared order of r ea l i ty and value, tends t o be attenuated, with the r e su l t being tha t t radi- t ional definit ions or locations of objects have less power t o impose themselves on persons. There i s diminished certainty about e i the r t h e i r r ea l i ty or value. On the one hand th i s means a greater possi- b i l i t y of individual disorientation and anxiety; on the other hand, i t also means a greater freedom t o perceive and conceptualize objects in new, unconventional, and non-commonsensical ways. And the two are l ike ly to be connected: the increased disorientation prompts new e f fo r t s a t conceptual mapping .26

For Goul dner "ut i 1 i t a r i an cul ture" generates the development of s oci a1

theory because, f i r s t , soci a1 ideas have t o cope wi t h "grotesqueness, or

reducing the dissonance between the dimensions of power and, goodness i n

the object world." Secondly, i t has to redefine the relationships be-

tween objects i n the social world. 2 7

Gouldner's statement i s only s igni f icant as a ref lect ive one,

there i s l i t t l e tha t i s very s t r ik ing about the observation tha t with

the advent of bourgeois industrial u t i 1 i tarianism, front rank thinkers

a l l over Europe begin t o cast doubts on the belief in a fixed and separ-

ated relation between normal men and the mental ly i l l . By the same

token, Gouldner's use of the concept of u t i l i t a r i an culture i s too broad

and a l l inclusive to recognize the dis t inct ion between general and c r i -

t i ca l statements which question the psycho1 ogi cal premises of assertions

about normalcy and abnormality as though they were separate objects--a

cr i t ique which precedes the emqrgence of u t i 1 i t a r i ani sm and assert i ons

about behavi oural re1 a t i vi sm which develop from a systematic cr i t ique of

conventional, professional psychiatry.28 Fromm's work i s important for

i t s contributions t o the l a t t e r t radi t ion. For the conventional profes-

s i onal psychiatry , i t s 1 abel 1 i ng and a1 1 ied practices have underlying

them a systematic social theory, many aspects s f which come o u t of the

u t i l i t a r i an t radi t ion i t se l f , which Goul dner views as havi ng given

impetus t o a 1 i beral r e l a t i v i s t i c behaviourism. 29

The second level of arguments i n psychology and psychiatry for-

warded by Thomas Szasz (1 961 ), Ernest Becker (1964) , Ronald Lai ng (1 965)

and Michel Foncaul t (1965) among others ; contend tha t an ambigui ty in

the interpretation of psychological data, the aetiology of mental i 11 nesses

as presently characterized and the norms of professional psychiatry and

psychoanalysis i t se l f , renders questionable the categories of neurosis

and psychosis. Explanations for th i s f inal opinion tend t o vary as does

the weight of argument on any one of these factors , nevertheless the

viewpoint i s generally held.

R . D. Laing commenting on the paradox of "normalcy and abnormality"

i n everyday behaviour as well as the internal contradiction in

professional psychiatry between i t s 1 i berating and repressive tendencies

summarized the problem succinctly:

The statesmen of the world who boast and threaten tha t they have doomsday weapons are f a r more dangerous, and f a r more estranged from ' r e a l i t y ' than many of the people on whom the label 'psychotic' i s affixed.

Psychiatry could be, and some psychiatrists are , on the s ide of transcendence, of genuine freedom, and of t rue human growth. B u t psychiatry can so eas i ly be a technique of brainwashing, of inducing behaviour tha t i s adjusted by (preferably) non-i n jurious tor ture .30

Although a c r i t ique such as

and abnormal from di f ferent

than Fromrn there are many s i

Laing's asser t s the r e l a t iv i ty of the normal

professional and epistemol ogi cal positions

mi 1 a r i t i e s between these two positions .31 I

will mention br ie f ly two s imi lar i t ies because of t h e i r spec i f ic s igni f i - cance fo r Erich Fromm's statement of the normal i ty-abnormal i ty contro-

were no

i za t i on

ia t ion ,

concept

versy . The f i r s t point is a highly c r i t i c a l posture against contemporary

psychoanalysis and some forms of psychiatry adopted by professionals such

as Lai ng and Fromm. Both psychoanalysts argue tha t psychoanalysis has

w i t h i ts increasing professional i zation become more conformist in pers-

pective. The consequences of th i s posture i s t ha t c l i nci a1 observation

of individual patients take place w i t h i n a context of unconscious "collu-

sion" between analyst and pat ient , i n which: ' I . . . All too many patients

challenge t o the analyst nor the analyst t o them. u32 The central-

and bureaucratization of the Internati onal Psychoanalyti c Assoc-

on the one hand, which zealously protected a narrow Freudian

ion of psychoanalytic theory (and of course excluded radi cal

psychoanalytic theoris ts such as Fqrenczi , Rank and others) ; and an in-

creasingly large supply of high fee paying pat ients , on the other hand,

tended to obstruct fundamental self-inquiry on the patients ' part and

produce 1 azi ness on the part of many analysts . 3 3

The second point of simi l a r i ty between Fromm and Laing i s the

recognition of a conf l ic t i n contemporary society between health i n

social terms and health in human terms. We recognize this in Laing 's

s t r e s s on the term rea l i ty in the f i r s t paragraph and transcendence in

t h e second paragraph of the quoted statement.

Fromm provides the clearest conception of normal i ty and abnormal - i t y i n the foregoing sense by suggesting tha t Freud had two conceptions

of mental heal t h whi ch could equal l y be operational i zed cl i ni cal ly . Health i n human terms "refers t o the functioning of the psychic system

i n i t s own terms." The raison d 'g t re f o r this, goal is maki,ng the uncon-

sc i ous conscious . The second conception of mental heal th--not a pri n-

cipal goal of Freud's--involves c l in ica l ly ego-development and getting

the individual pat ient t o adjust t o the existing society. B u t the c l in-

ical methods and therapy suggested by "health i n social terms" i s more

specif ical ly applicable t o the "sick" i n the conventional sense. In his

cr i t ique of psycho-analysis Fromm asser t s Freud's conception of health I

i n human terms was developed mainly from the l a t t e r ' s empirical observa-

tions rather than metaphysical speculations and tha t i t s raison d '6 t re

was Freud's theory of the i r rat ional which was both a cr i t ique of a sick

society and therefore res t r ic t ing of the label of mental i l l ness to the

! more extreme psychotic problems. B u t such an unrestricted use of the i E

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concept of abnormality does not reduce the c r i t e r i a of mental health to I

purely individual arbi t rar iness . 3 4

The unique contribution of Fromm's empirical work fo r an under-

standing of the problem of normalcy and pathology as c l in ica l and empir-

ical postulates derive from his attack on the influence of ego-

psychological revisionism on social science thought.

The egopsychological revision did not only s t a r t by studying the psychology of adaptation, i t i s i n i t s e l f a psychology of the adapt- a t ion , i t is i n i t s e l f a psychology of the ada ta t ion of psycho-

- analysis t o twentieth century social science.3 !

In response to th i s new positivism in psychology which reinforces an un-

c r i t i c a l soci a1 science praxis and effect ively denies soci a1 path01 ogy ,

Fromm has asserted a double-edged s trategy. The f i r s t and e a r l i e r

s ta ted response i s a re-assertion that on the cl inical level the most re-

warding aspects of psychoanalytic theory i s i t s concern with the uncon-

scious processes of the "id." The second s trategy i s Fromm's assertion

tha t Freud's dis t inct ion between heal t h in soci a1 and human terms can

only be empirically resolved i n terms of a dynamics of social character.

That i s to say t h a t c lear c l inical focus of minor or extreme forms of

pathology requi re as a pr ior context of interpretat ive analysis a concept

of social character. I t i s an ar t iculat ion of social character which

provides a clue fo r the analyst as to what i s being repressed a t the

group and individual level .36 Fromm suggests tha t repression i n the

dynamic psychoanalytic sense i s repression as unconscious.

Fromm's position i s tha t Freud's concern with the unconscious was

the basis fo r a "science of the i r rat ional ," a science which although

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not developed into a revolutionary cr i t ique by Freud himself--as witnessed

by Freud's s h i f t of emphasis from the l i f e ins t inc t t o the death ins t inc t

as the motive force behind human behavi our--neverthe1 ess was an incipient

radical cr i t ique of society by virtue of tha t very concern w i t h the un-

conscious, b u t always w i t h the environment as a modifying factor . Such

a concern with social factors excludes the possibi l i ty of an inconcilable

confl ic t between Freudian social psychology and a dynamic sociology. In

f a c t Fromm views one of his major tasks to be to integrate both disci-

plSnes and he finds a tool for such integration in the concept of social

character. Fromm believes that an integration a t the conceptual and

theoretical level i s therefore possible between a his tor ical mater ial is t

sociology and psychoanalytic inquiry. Fromm stated th is in one of his

e a r l i e r essays as follows:

Let me jus t point out that every society has i t s own d is t inc t ive l ibidinal s t ructure, even as i t has i t s own economic, soc ia l , poli t- 3cal and cultural structure. This l ibidinal s t ructure i s the product of the i nf 1 uence of soci o-economi c conditions on human drives; i n turn i t i s an important factor conditioning emotional de- velopments within the various levels of society, and the contents of the 'ideological superstructure. ' The 1 i bidi nal s t ructure of a society i s the medium through which the economy exerts i t s influence on man's i ntel lectual and mental manifestations .37

The major premises of discussion of character, therefore, pre-

suppose diachronic processes throughout historical development (of

Europe) from the Middle Ages in a continuous manner on the one hand, and

his tor ical -ontogeneti c changes para1 1 el i ng the former processes, on the

other hand. The historical -ontogenetic changes culminate i n the system

which Fromm terms social character, and can be distinguished from

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ontogeneti c processes (which are ~onceptual i zed as character i n the i ndi - vidual sense) in the following terms : whi 1e the l a t t e r refers t o individ-

ual processes, t ha t i s to say processes which are distinguished for

ar t iculat ing personality and character development; within a given epoch

or social s t ructure; the former refers to processes of change which are

cumulative, i .e. , 1 ong term and transcend the immedi aci es of a given

social s t ructure. Fromm applies the term social character to the long

term factors of change. Moreover Fromm's thesis on character develop-

ment is tha t ontogenetic processes have the i r terms s e t for them by the

condi ti ons of his tor i cal -ontogeneti c processes. I t i s worth n o t i n g tha t

there are ideas in the foregoing statement suggestive of a methodology

which recognizes the c i rcular i ty of an exclusive focus on e i ther psycho-

logical factors or d i s t inc t social structural ( i .e. , h is tor ica l ) factors .

In th i s statement of Fromm's we are provided with crude outlines of an

interchangeable analysis, or rather a specif ic connection between the

cl inical and the soci o-s tructural dimensions of human behavi our. Contem-

porary methodological discussion has s tated the problem i n terms of

holism versus individualism. B u t what is equally important here i s tha t

Fromm i s attempting to show how such a connection i s possible w i t h an

analysis tha t can discuss mental health and i l l health without fa l l ing

i n t o the trap of an extreme relativism. Suggesting tha t the fundamentals

of th is possi bi 1 i ty existed since Freud, Fromm s ta tes that Freud never

assumed an isolated man devoid of a l l social t i e s (and therefore mental

i l lness to be other than social i 11 ness) , t o be the object of

I i

psycho1 ogy .

On t h e o the r hand, Freud basi ,ca l ly r u l e d o u t the i l l u s i o n o f s o c i a l psychology whose o b j e c t i s a group as such, "society," o r a s o c i a l complex w i t h a "mass sou l " o r " s o c i e t a l sou l . " Rather, he always

I proceeds from the f a c t t h a t every group i s composed on ly o f i n d i v i d - u a l s and t h a t on l y the i n d i v i d u a l as such i s the sub jec t o f psychic p roper t i es . Freud l i k e w i s e refused t o accept the n o t i o n o f a " soc ia l i n s t i n c t . "38

The p r i o r i ty o f Fromm's var iab les o f soc i a1 i z a t i on and assimi 1 a-

t i o n de r i ve p a r t i a l l y from Fromm's b e l i e f t h a t h i s method develops l o g i c -

a l l y o u t o f t he Freudian p o s i t i o n . According t o Fromm psychoanalysis '

i n a b i l i t y t o systematize a s o c i a l psychology came o u t o f two weaknesses:

f i r s t l y t h e absol u t i z a t i o n o f bourgeois c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y and secondly

t h e emp i r i ca l understanding o f s i c k and heal t h y members was r e s t r i c t e d

t o middle c lass p a t i e n t s . Both weaknesses i n t u r n de r i ve from an i n -

a b i l i t y t o r i gou rous ly analyse the f a m i l y as determined by w ider socio-

economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s as w e l l as being the psychological agency o f

s o c i e t y a t t he i d e a t i o n a l l e v e l .39 To the ex ten t t h a t s o c i a l i z a t i o n and

a s s i m i l a t i o n are mutua l ly opera t ive i n shaping s o c i a l character they

a l s o de f ine the boundaries o f c u l t u r e o f a g iven soc ie ty , and again

appear as forces shaping i n d i v i d u a l character . But i n t h i s socio-

economic classes are the dependent va r iab les .

The Dilemma o f Modern Man as Located i n h i s Character S t ruc tu re

As i n d i v i d u a l s express t h e i r l i f e , so they are. What they are, therefore, coinc ides w i t h t h e i r product ion, both w i t h what they pro- duce and w i t h how they produce. The nature o f i n d i v i d u a l s thus de-

F ends on the mater i a1 cond i t ions determining t h e i r product i on .40 Marx and Engels]

Marx views the i n d i v i d u a t i o n o f man as gra'dual and h i s t o r i c a l and

125

i n the p e r i o d i s a t i o n o f h i s t o r y undertaken by Marx and Engels, t he

Middle Ages marks an impor tan t j unc tu re i n t h i s i n d i v i d u a t i o n i n the

sense t h a t i n t h i s p e r i o d the re developed the t h i r d form o f p r i v a t e prop-

e r t y ownership, t h a t i s feudal o r e ~ t a t e - ~ r o ~ e r t ~ . ~ ' But the Midd le

Ages a l s o s i g n i f i e s i n t he s t r u c t u r a l tens ion between town and count ry

and the l a t e r oppos i t i on t o t r a d i t i o n a l sources o f p o l i t i c a l and i n t e l -

l e c t u a l au tho r i ty the 1 a t e r dominat ion o f the bourgeois soc i a1 charac ter

i n t he form o f the medieval burgher. Th is Marxian ana lys i s prov ides the

s t a r t i n g p o i n t o f E r i ch Fromm's emp i r i ca l ana lys i s o f modern man and

e v i l and no rma l i t y .

I t i s i n the Middle Ages p a r t i c u l a r l y t he l a t e r phases t h a t Fromm

sees the essence o f modern man emerging, h i s ana lys i s o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e

o f changes f rom t h i s p e r i o d onwards i s impor tan t f o r a l l h i s work f o r i t

i s here t h a t t he concept o f essence der ives i t s s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l ground-

ing.42 I n M a r x i s t terms the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f t he o b j e c t i v e s o c i a l

s t r u c t u r a l fo rces such as the displacement o f the c l a s s i c a l feudal n o b i l -

i ty and the i nc reas ing chal lenge t o medieval forms o f re1 i g i o u s and

p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , the r i s i n g explos ions o f t he more a r t i c u l a t e

peasant groups a11 over Europe were symptomatic o f changes i n t he produc-

t i v e and techno1 og i c a l spheres o f soc i a1 1 i f e . Whatever t he debate

around the causal exp lanat ion f o r these changes, the pressures on feudal

au tho r i ty which r e i nforced medieval forms o f s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n the

countrys ide, on the one hand and the growing d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and mono-

p o l i z a t i o n o f t he g u i l d system i n the towns, on the o the r hand, f o rced

psychological changes a t a1 1 l e v e l s and s o c i a l c lasses o f European

126

soc ie ty . Such changes culminated, i n the paradoxical cond i t ion , which i s

the essence o f modern man. Man f reed from o l d sources o f c o n s t r a i n t and

y e t i s o l a t e d and i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n the face o f new o rgan iza t i on and move-

ments which th reaten t o a n n i h i l a t e the very Snd iv iduat ion which appeared

so w e l l es tab l ished by the t ime o f t h e Enlightenment. I t i s t h i s h i s t o r -

i c a l dilemma o f "freedom from and freedom t o " i n which Fromm's conception

o f essence and ex is tence are merged i n dynamic ana lys is . But the search

f o r the unique forms o f psychological adapta t ion are attempts t o i n q u i r e

i n t o the cond i t ions o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l 's ex is tence. Examination o f t he

diachrony from the Middle Ages then i s a Frommian s t ra tegy t o focus on

t h e Reformati on and p rov id ing para1 1 e l s t o t h e psycho1 ogi c a l ex is tence

o f man i n the present day, a t ime o f ambiguity.

. . . i n s p i t e o f a1 1 the obvious d i f f e rences between the two per iods , there i s probably no pe r iod s ince the s i x t e e n t h century which r e - sembles ours as c l o s e l y i n regard t o the ambiguous meaning o f f ree - dom. 43

When Fromm's empi r ica l and l a t e r c l i n i c a l ana lys is are brought t o -

gether w i t h h i s concepts o f essence, e v i l and human nature, t he socio-

h i s t o r i c a l fea tures o f h i s ana lys is g i ve these concepts prec ise meanings

and the s o c i a l phenomena which they i d e n t i f y , a focus which places Fromm

i n the f o r e f r o n t among s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s .

I n t h i s sec t i on o f the d iscuss ion th ree po in ts are discussed which

are antecedent t o Fromm's conclusions from h i s c l i n i c a l and empi r ica l

works. The v a l i d i t y o f Fromm's conclusions w i l l be r a i s e d a t the end of

these discussions . The f i r s t p o i n t i s Fromm's p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t he modern dilemma o f

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"freedom from and freedom to" i s the contemporary expression or the con- I

temporary form of human essence. I t s par t icular h i s to r i c i ty can be

traced to the diachronic change from Medieval society to the Reformation

and the psycho1 ogi cal adaptation to these s t ructural changes.

The second point i s tha t the contemporary expression of evi l i s

man's willingness t o submit to external forms of authority, t o the blind

dictates of mass movements and t o to ta l i tar ian poli t i cal ideologies and

bel iefs in attempts to escape feelings of isolat ion and aloneness.

Although Fromm is primarily motivated t o th i s question by the events of

World War XI, he asser t s t ha t the f l i ght from a1 oneness is genera1 t o

modern man, i n par t icular members of highly industrialized soc ie t ies .

The th i rd point i s Fromm's hypothesis tha t what must be rejected

is the sociologis t ic viewpoint tha t the problems raised i n po in t s one

and two can be understood as simply passive responses t o the social

structures as they evolved. Fromm subs t i tutes an analysis which t r ea t s

the objective economic and pol i t ical forces not as causal, b u t rather as

condi t i onal f o r personal i ty development.

Fromm's conclusions from the foregoing are as follows: The m~dern

individual has an ambiguous personal i ty , 1 ived i n a socio-economi c-

pol i t ica l context characterized by "good wi 11 and knowledge about the

fac ts and consequences of nuclear war," on the one hand, and an increasingly

mechanized industrialism on the other. The contemporary character s t ruc-

tures (soci a1 ) , faci 1 i t a t e the continuation of t h i s ambi gui ty of freedom,

which w i t h m i nor modifications in some of the objective condi ti ons of the

twentieth century; continue to channel behavi our and a t t i tudes . Fromm in

128

drawing these conclusions suggested t h a t the Reformation i s s imi l a r t o I

contemporary soc i a1 condi ti ons . 44

Freedom from: Freedom t o and the Soci 01 ogi c a l D i achrony

The c o n t r i b u t i o n o f h i s t o r y t o concrete knowledge o f human r e a l i t y

t h a t i s t o say t o an h i s t o r i c a l socio logy impl ies the study o f h i s t o r y

n o t p r i m a r i l y f o r means, b u t f o r values and ends. E r i c h Fromm intends

t h e study o f h i s t o r y as such a p r o j e c t w i t h the fo rmula t ion o f freedom

from and freedom t o as a synthes iz ing value a t the l e v e l o f processes of

i n d i v i d u a t i o n i n Europe. We have a1 ready summarized the nature o f t he

s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e o f Medieval soc ie ty which i n the c l a s s i c a l pe r iod i s

charac ter ized by a r i g i d system o f s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n and exp lo i t a -

t i o n by a small and powerful feudal nobi 1 i ty . As Marx has s a i d the

Midd le Ages s t a r t s w i t h the "countrys ide as the l o c a t i o n o f h i s t o r y . "

Medieval s o c i e t y was then a s o c i a l order conceived as a na tu ra l order i n

which economic ends such as product ion f o r p r o f i t were subordinated t o

I human ends. I n s t r e s s i n g t h i s l a t t e r p o i n t Fromm i s r e i n t e r p r e t i n g the

i

I h i s t o r y o f t he Middle Ages t o a t tach s p e c i f i c meaning t o e x p l o i t a t i o n

1 then as d i s t i n c t and sharp ly contrasted w i t h the forms and mechanisms of

i n d i v i d u a l expl o i t a t i on under modern bourgeois soci a1 re1 a t i ons of pro-

1 d u c t i on, r a t h e r than t o romant ic ize soc i a1 r e l a t i o n s i n the Middle Ages. I I

i Whereas Marx and Engels st ressed the change from medievalism t o modern

1 i n d u s t r i a1 ism as charac ter ized by the t ransformat i on from instruments of

1 i l abour as i n d i v i d u a l instruments o f labour and product ion i t s e l f ( i n

129

forces as social forces workable by a co l lec t iv i ty of men; Fromm places I

the s t r e s s elsewhere. The very concreteness of face to face relations

partly faci 1 i tated by the r i gi di ty of s ta tus and cl ass s t r a t i f i c a t i o n ,

began to collapse once medieval systems of authority were challenged. 45

The chall enge t o feudal authority which ended the economic exploitation

of the nobili ty also challenged the supranational posture of the Roman

Catholic Church in i t s assurance of forgiveness and unconditional 1 ove.

In the f i r s t instance the challenge to the doctrines of unconditional

love by dissident forces within the Roman Catholic heirarchy on the one

hand and the increasing different iat ion of c r a f t guilds system--the

growing influence of capital and monopoly as a qual i f icat ion f o r guild

membership--in the c i t i e s on the other hand, produced fear and doubt in

the middle classes, as well as among the weal thy nobles and burghers

during the Renaissance. The Renaissance which i s d i s t inc t from the

1 a t e r Reformation then i s characterized by a widespread psycho1 ogi cal

s t a t e of anxiety and fear among urban classes. The material and socio-

s t ructural di s t i ncti ons between the Renaissance and the Reformati on are

conditional in the sense tha t the important question fo r Fromm in both

instances i s , "What are the subjective motivations which make a person

aware of cer tain problems and make him seek f o r an answer in cer tain

directions? '46 Fromm accepts Burkhardt's view of the problem in so f a r

as the Renaissance i s concerned. The small and wealthy upper classes

confronted by a new sense of individualism b u t a t the same time having

los t the belonging to medieval society, attempted psychological adjust-

ment i n a "craving fo r fame." Fame elevates "ones individual l i f e from

1 30

i ts 1 imi t a t i ons and ins tabi 1 i ty t o the plane of i ndes t ruc t i bi 1 i ty . 1147 B u t only the small wealthy groups possessed the means to fame and so a l l

other groups became the object of exploi ta t ion. Fame i s viewed as pro-

viding the genesis of a new character t r a i t exis tent in contemporary

society: the exploitative orientation. Elsewhere Fromm defines the ex-

p lo i ta t ive orientation as having i t s basic premise in the feeling tha t

the source of a l l good i s outside, b u t tha t these things have t o be taken

from others, a1 though Fromm never expl ic i t ly s t a t e s tha t the conditions

which res t r ic ted the cravings fo r fame i n the Renaissance to a small

group changed with the passing of time and changed material conditions

to become part of the psyche of other social classes as well. 48

In one sense t h i s analysis of Fromm's constitutes a weakness fo r

i t i s one by which the proto-bourgeois classes of Renaissance society

are given a function which needs to be re-examined. What we have in

Fromm's a r t icu la t ion and analysis of the psychic adaptations in the

Renaissance (as i n the Reformation) i s an outline of the "evolution of

consciousness" an explanation of social pathology in modern society (and

i n terms of genesis) which i s one-dimensional and over simplified. If

From's view of fame in the Renaissance i s valid then the interpretation

of interpersonal relations in the Renaissance can only be summarized as

alienating t o an extreme degree. B u t i s Fromm accurate in at t r ibut ing

the role t o the small wealthy groups which he does? What other forces

can be ident i f ied as s ignif icant i n t h i s period and was the small wealthy

class the founder of the notion of fame and therefore the sole determin-

131

i n v a l i d a t e the l a b e l o f Reason attached t o i t by o the r phi losophers o f

h i s t o r y ?

Whi 1 e a1 1 the quest ions ra i sed cannot be tack led systematical l y

here the ana lys i s which fo l l ows w i l l show t h a t Fromm's analys is o f the

character adaptat ions i n the Renaissance needs t o be re-exami ned. 49

Fromm's ana lys is i s one-dimensional i n the sense t h a t he views

the socio-economic changes i n the Middle Ages as destroyiri:i feudal po l -

i t i c a l au t h o r i ty and re1 i g i ous author i ty , as r e s u l t i n g i n cont rad i c-

ti on o f increased s t reng th and i ncreased i s o l a t i on o f the i n d i v i d u a l . Th is c o n t r a d i c t i o n Fromrn sees expressed i n Renaissance humanis t i c

w r i t i n g s .50 And a f t e r t h i s statement, nowhere i n F r o m ' s Escape From

Freedom does he show how the increased s t reng th r e s u l t s i n more p o s i t i v e

charac ter adaptat ions. The un ive rsa l e x p l o i t a t i o n o f a1 1 classes i n the

Renaissance produces a vulnerable middle c lass which l a t e r i n the

Reformation encourages a se l f l ess a t t i t u d e t o a u t h o r i t a r i a n elements i n

the Reformati on re1 i g i ons . From t h i s pe r iod onwards anx ie ty increases

the f e e l i n g s o f i n d i v i d u a l helplessness and the basis f o r the "other-

d i rec ted" charac ter s t r u c t u r e o f modern mass capi t a l i

i t a r i an communism o f which Fromm 's character01 ogy i s

The f i r s t problem i s t h a t Fromm does n o t show

"fame" appropr iated by the upper classes i n the Renai

s t soc ie ty o r t o t a l -

a v a r i a t i o n .

where the n o t i o n of

ssance came from.

When ana lys i s o f t he s t r u c t u r a l changes on the ma te r ia l l e v e l i s kept

d i s t i n c t from ana lys is o f change i n the realm o f thought and ideas and

from the i d e o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s at tached t o the two former l e v e l s

of change by contending socio-economic, groups, the n o t i o n o f fame i s

132

seen as a s p e c i f i c response of the upper classes t o t h e i r s i t u a t i o n i n I

t he Renaissance r a t h e r than as a w ider s o c i e t a l ideology.

The p r i n c i p a l fea tures o f the Renaissance were the r i s e o f t he

t r a d i n g classes and the atmosphere favour ing new s c i e n t i f i c knowledge

focused i n the p r i n c i p l e s o f i n d i v i d u a l ism and humanism. "Fame" can be

seen as an upper c lass psychological o r i e n t a t i o n d e r i v i n g from the par-

t i c u l a r i d e o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f pessimism given by t h a t c lass t o

the per iod . Where expedient these w e a l t h i e r classes sought a l l i a n c e s

w i t h the r e v o l u t i o n a r y i d e a t i o n a l forces, w i t h the men o f t a l e n t , t he

poets and scholars such as Dante, so t o o d i d the emerging p o l i t i c a l des-

pots and s o l d i e r s o f fo r tune. Bu t the " ideology" o f fame was n o t the

so le i n t e l l e c t u a l product o f t he epoch, no r i s fame synonymous w i t h

i n d i v i d u a l i s m and humanism which was the p o t e n t i a1 consc io~~sness

(Go1 dmann I s term) expressed i n the Renaissance . The concept o f i ndi v i d-

ua l ism and humanism i n the l a t t e r sense i s n o t a mere supers t ruc ture ,

nor a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t he e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t he w e a l t h i e r classes. The

n o t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l i s m and humanism i n the Renaissance--which has i t s

genesis i n changes preceding the speci f i c soc i o-economi c upheavals be-

tween t h e fou r teen th and s i x teen th centuries--expressed i d e a l s o f u n i -

versa l man, " the archetype o f a f u t u r e o f f r e e humanity.1150 A number of

w r i t e r s have l a b e l l e d the Renaissance the Age o f Reason and i n t h i s r e f e r

i t o a process o f change i n the emancipation o f man from nature and con-

1 Sciousness from the "unconscious" ( i n E r i c h Neumann's sense o f t he term)

n o t u l t i m a t e l y exp l i cab le i n terms o f t he s o c i a l s t r u c t u r a l changes of

t he epoch o r the dominant i n t e r e s t groups, The very emergence of

133

Pro tes tant ism i n the Reformati on--,on which Fromm's work focuses heavi l y

--does n o t s imply represent a break i n the theo log ica l , o r s p i r i t u a l

realm w i t h medieval theology. When the arguments o f Fromm's theo log ica l

c r i t i c s are extended backwards i n t ime towards the Renaissance, i t i s

revealed t h a t Fromm's perspect ive on r e l i g i o n i s a p a r t i a l s i m p l i f i c a t i o n

o f Weber's and Marxls, i .e., Pro tes tant ism as the r e l i g i o u s c o r r e l a t e o f

capi t a l i s m V 5 l Sheldon Wolin i n h i s ana lys is o f C h r i s t i a n i t y through t o

the Reformation suggests t h a t the very expansion o f C h r i s t i a n i t y i n the

West and i t s f u n c t i o n as " res iduary legatee o f the Roman Empire" tended

t o r e s u l t i n a " p o l i t i c i z a t i o n o f r e l i g i o u s thought. Dur ing the Renais-

sance the r e 1 i g i ous and po l i t i c a l spheres were n o t dual b u t were i n t e r -

wined a u t h o r i t i e s . A t t he same t ime they were un ive rsa l . Lu ther and the

P ro tes tan t Reformati on served t o de- theologi ze p o l i t i c s b u t a t t he same

t ime served the cause o f n a t i o n a l pa r t i cu la r i sm. " From t h i s perspect ive

the Reformati on was profoundly reac t ionary .52 Fromm has on ly noted

b r i e f l y i n h i s major ana lys is p o s i t i v e i n d i v i d u a l i s m as p a r t o f t h e pro-

cess from t h e medieval t o the age o f Reformation what he st resses i s

a1 ienated i n d i v i d u a l i sm.53 I n shor t , desp i te the f a c t t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l

elements i n t h e Reformation served the i n t e r e s t s o f dominant socio-

economic groups s t a r t i n g i n the Reformation, both the n o t i o n o f i n d i v i d -

ual ism which i n i t s p o s i t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n transcends the p a r t i c u l a r

emergence o f these groups and i n the secul a r i zed imp1 i cat ions o f Refor-

mation processes f o r i n d i v i d u a l ism transcend the Reformation i t s e l f .

Thus Fromm may have app l ied a p a r t i c u l a r o r i e n t a t i o n t o a l l groups i n

the s o c i e t y i n the Renaissance, which on ly app l ies t o the middle c lass

groups.

134

For example O t to Rank's ana lys is suggests t h a t t he narrow n o t i o n

o f fame may have sprung from the no t ion o f genius, an ideology which was

used p a r t l y as a weapon du r ing the Renaissance, by " a r t " and aga ins t

" the c o l l e c t i v e s p i r i t o f C h r i s t i a n i t y ." Rank's ana lys is o f t he crea-

t i v e f u n c t i o n o f a r t i n the Renaissance suggests t h a t the ideo logy o f

genius became an a e s t h e t i c o f f e e l i n g dependent on consciousness o f per-

sonal i ty . To t h e ex ten t t h a t the a r t i s t i c m o t i f s o f t he Renaissance

dominates over t h e r e l i g i o u s ones the n o t i o n o f "fame" can be seen as a

p a r t i c u l a r d i s t o r t i on o f t he i ndi v i dual i sm developed by t h e a r t i s t and

sumrnari zed i n Rank I s concept of "genius. I1 54

What t e n t a t i v e conclusions can we draw from the fo rego ing d iscus-

s ion. F i r s t o f a l l Fromm n o t on l y s ta tes t h a t the ideo logy of fame was

un ive rsa l t o s o c i e t y i n the s i x teen th century b u t t h a t t he middle classes

and poorer groups were s imply unable t o achieve t h e wherewithal t o r e a l -

i z e the substance o f t h i s ideology. Fromm then suggests t h a t i t was

under the condi ti ons o f mater i a1 i n s e c u r i t y b u t w i t h the fa1 se conscious-

ness, as i t were, o f an upper c lass ideology t h a t the cond i t ions , w i t h i n

which Pro tes tant ism could t h r i v e , were u l t i m a t e l y es tab l ished. Where

i t i s n o t one's aim t o quest ion the view t h a t m a t e r i a l d e p r i v a t i o n

e x i s t e d among c lasses which were subordinate t o the weal t h y e l i t e , i t i s

c e r t a i n l y one's aim t o quest ion Frommls conclus ion t h a t t he ideology of

genius was viewed as the so le i deo log ica l response t o these condi t i o n s . D id o the r depr ived groups such as the urban p r o l e t a r i a t and groups i n

the countrys ide b u t i n t r a n s i t i o n , evolve o the r i d e o l o g i c a l i nte rp re ta -

t i ons? The d isp laced middle c lass groups w i t h a f a l s e ideo logy a t t he

135

end of the Renaissance, increasingly iden t i f i ed themselves w i t h Lutheran- ,

ism and l a t e r with Calvinism as means of resolving t h e i r contradictions

w i t h freedom, but what of other classes? How is formation of t h e i r

social character to be explained? Fromm does not deal w i t h these prob-

lems exhaustively. I f then he is implying t h a t there were some conver-

gences toward soci a1 character s t ructures as capi ta l ism evolved, from

what points did they converge. Are they converging? These a r e important

questions f o r Fromm's analysis of social character and the development of

socia l pathology. Whereas the task of identifying the source of l a t e r

character t r a i t s is beyond the scope of this d i s se r t a t i on , the connec-

t ion which Fromm establ ishes between the posit ion of the middle c lass a t

the end of the Renaissance, the adoption by t h a t c lass of Reformation

ideology and i t s function i n creating character o r ien ta t ions ; can be

questioned as being too one-dimensional . In other words h i s explanation

i n s t ruc tura l diachronic terms of evi l as socia l pathology, as the

dilemma of freedom transla ted in to terms of spec i f i c behaviour a t the

c l i n i ca l level has a semblance of va l id i ty and is faced w i t h a host of

d i f f i c u l t i e s . Fromm exp l i c i t l y argues i n r e in te rpre t ing t h i s h i s t o r i cal

epoch from the Renaissance onwards t ha t men i n middle c l a s s groups and

below lacked the material means t o rea l ize t h e i r individualism i n more

posi t ive terms and therefore turned t o Protestantism. Furthermore t h a t

this is where the abandonment of freedom began.

Whatever the merits of the foregoing argument i n terms of Protes-

t an t theology today, Fromm's bold asser t ion about the adoption of

Lutheranism and Calvinism by the middle and lower c lasses immediately

136

prompts r e p l i e s . It i s n o t t he task o f t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n t o t r a c e the

m e r i t s o f Fromm's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f P ro tes tan t gospel . Three o f F r o m ' s

c r i t i c s (John Schaar (1961); Guyton Hammond (1965) ; and Stanley Glen

(1966)) have attempted theo log ica l and ph i l osoph ica l c r i t i q u e s , leav ing

the Frommian thes i s more o r l ess i n t a c t . . P a r t o f t h e reason f o r t he

inconclusiveness o f t h i s debate i s t h a t Fromm's t h e s i s i s by no means

c l e a r having a t l e a s t two d i r e c t i o n s f o r argumentation and ana lys is .

The f i r s t i s t h a t Fromm may mean i n h i s ana lys is t h a t there i s a substan-

t i v e psychological connect ion between the middle c lass adopt ion o f

Pro tes tant ism du r ing the Reformation and the l a t e r submission by the

same German and European lower middle c lass t o Nazism. I n o the r words

ced sub- t h a t t he cond i t ions f o r the a u t h o r i t a r i a n charac ter can be t r a

s t a n t i v e l y t o t h e Reformation.

The focus o f ana lys is f o r t h i s thes i s centres on the r o

middle classes dur ing the Reformation as mediat ing between the

l e o f t he

powerful ,

new a r i s t o c r a c y o f capi t a l ism and the rebe l 1 i ous work i ng c l asses and the

p a r a l l e l r o l e o f the middle classes i n the twen t ie th century. I n the

same v e i n Fromm focuses a t the i d e a t i o n a l l e v e l i n order t o draw a con-

t i n u i t y between the a r t i c u l a t i o n o f doubt a t t he ph i losoph ica l l e v e l i n

doc t r ines and the 1 a t e r more expl i c i t a r t i c u l a t i o n

l u t i o n i n Nazi doc t r ines .

i s synthesized by the suggest ion t h a t doubt i n the

Lu the r ' s and Ca lv in ' s

o f doubt and i t s reso

Fromm's thes i s

Reformation and i n t h e 1930's i n Europe was i d e o l o g i c a l l y reso

t h e p r i n c i p l e s of man's u l t i m a t e worthlessness as an i n d i v i d u a

c a l l t o submission, as fo l l ows :

l v e d i n

1 and the

Once man was ready to become nothing b u t the means for the glory of a God who represented nei the? just ice nor love, he was suff ic ient ly - prepared to accept the role of a servant to the economic machine-- and eventually a " ~ u h r e r . "55 [I t a l ics mine]

The second direction for argumentation of the Fromm thesis wi t h respect

t o modern man will be f o r his c r i t i c s to t r e a t Fromm's thesis as argu-

ment by analogy. Here the weight of discussion would centre on Fromm's

treatment of human behaviour, t ha t i s on the dynamics of class relations

i n both epochs. Whereas in the f i r s t case the wider framework for argu-

mentation wi 11 be on the function of ideological systems, i n t h i s case

i t wi 11 be on the dynamics of c lass and psychological processes within

social s t ructures which resemble in the i r in tens i t ies of structural

change. Discussion i n t h i s part of the disser tat ion will interpret

Fromm's meaning in the second sense i n an attempt to deal with the con-

temporary problem of evi 1 as man's wi 11 i ngness to submit.

A fur ther comment on the significance of the d i s t inc t interpreta-

t i ons i s in order. The apparent "God everythi ng-man nothing" formula

which i s exis tent in Fromm's " ident i f icat ion" of the inner-core authori-

t a r i ani sm of Reformati on Protestantism and Nazism 1 ed Fromm to a cri t i que

of Protestant asceticism, in a s imilar fashion to the Weberian and

Nietzschean cr i t iques. Where the response t o Fromm's thesis i s a t the

level of his substantive treatment of the early Protestant theology, the

discussion i s bogged down in the problem of the nature of Protestantism

and Fromm's implicit ideas on middle class consciousness as fa l se con-

sciousness i s obscured. 56

The Contemporary Problem o f E v i l : The Author i t a r i a,n Ch.aracter

There a re n o t two k inds o f man, b u t two poles o f humanity. No man i s pure person and no man pure i n d i v i d u a l i ty . None i s whol l y r e a l , and none whol l y unrea l . Everyman l i v e s f n the two fo ld I. But there are men so def ined by person t h a t they may be c a l l e d persons, and men so def ined by i n d i v i d u a l i t y t h a t they may be c a l l e d i n d i v i d u a l s . True h i s t o r y i s decided i n the f i e 1 d between these two poles . [Mar t i n Buber, --- I and Thou, p. 651

There a re i n the w r i t i n g s o f Buber and o f Fromm a p a t t e r n o f sim-

i l a r i t y t o t he e x t e n t t h a t bo th men des i re a q u a l i t y o f freedom which i s

non-utopi an. Fromm's concept ion o f symbiosis as an exc lus i ve o r i e n t a t i o n

i s s i m i l a r i n some senses t o Buber's concept ion o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y as de-

f i n e d i n t he --- I and Thou. S i m i l a r l y , t he re i s some resemblance between

Buber's use o f t h e concept 'person' and Fromm's concept o f the syndrome

of growth.57 I t i s wor th emphasizing t h e non-utopian n o t i o n o f freedom

i n E r i c h Fromm's s o c i o l o g i c a l ana lys is i n o rder t o j u s t i f y a d iscussion

of Fromm's t h e s i s i n i t s concern w i t h b l i n d obedience i n the Reformation

and i n the t w e n t i e t h century. I n s h o r t the thes i s does n o t r e s t exc lus-

i v e l y on an ideo logy c r i t i q u e . I f Reformati on re1 i gious p r i n c i p l e s were

the oppos i te t o Fromm's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f them, the v a l i d i t y o f Fromm's

t h e s i s would s t i l l n o t be re fu ted . For Fromm def ines freedom as e x i s t i n g

i n man's p o s s i b i l i t y t o choose between the e x i s t i n g r e a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s .

Therefore one o f t he p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r freedom, a c e n t r a l one, i s a t t a i n -

ment o f a l e v e l o f consciousness which a l lows one t o recognize r e a l

p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 58

Frommls soci o-his tor ical analysis i n Escape From Freedom i s the para1 l e l

function of the middle c lass as a mediating group between the two major

antagonis t ic forces which emerged w i t h the development of modern capi ta l - ism. The psychological adaptation i s s ign i f ican t fbr demonstrating

From's centra l hypothesis i n his empirical and c l i n i ca l work t ha t the

basic problem of modern man i s the dilemma between "freedom from and

reedom to." I wi l l therefore take as my point of departure f o r discus-

sion Chapter IV of Escape - From Freedom, "The Two Aspects of Freedom f o r

Modern Man. 115' One aspect o f the Frommian discussion of the thes i s i s

t h a t the inclusion of h i s to r ica l epochs preceding the present day i s

meant t o demonstrate:

a ) That the emergence of individualism and forms of consciousness I

a re gradual socia l processes.

b) That spec i f i c forms of psychological adaptation w i t h i n a socie ty

a r e re la ted t o the manner i n which crucial groups such as the

middle c l a s s a re conscious of the real nature of processes of

change which a re central t o t h e i r h i s to r ica l r e a l i t y ; as we1 1 as

t h e i r own c l a s s o r social , group reaction t o those changes.

c ) That the "quest f o r freedom" i s a necessary r e s u l t of the soc ie ta l

o r diachronic process of individuation and become par t of the sub-

sequent cu l tu re of a l a t e r society. This quest f o r freedom dic-

t a t e s the conditions which would make the middle classes in contem-

porary socie ty f e r t i l e ground fo r a po l i t i ca l ideology and

prac t ice which threatens the en t i r e socie ty .

The foregoing a re three ba,si c sociological postulates which are

operational i zed throughout Fromm's empirical analysis and d i r e c t i t s

author t o three general conclusions w i t h respect t o modern man. The

f i r s t i s t h a t although i t is generally t rue t o s t a t e t ha t from the

Renaissance t o the present day the lower c lasses ( the peasantry and pro-

l e t a r i a t ) and the middle c lasses experienced a l ienat ion ( i .e . , powerless-

ness, feel ings of ins ignif icance and a1 oneness) deriving primarily from

the spec i f i c economic and pol i ti cal exploi t a t i on at tendant w i t h the r i s e

of capital ism; the psychological reaction and consequent adaptation was

d i f f e r en t i n both groups throughout the Reformation and i n to the ear ly

twentieth century--largely because the nature of f a l s e consciousness o r

i l l u s ion i n both c lasses varied. The second conclusion i s t ha t the

genesis of authori tarianism i n modern socie ty has i t s antecedent basis

i n the f a l s e consciousness and psychological adaptation of the middle

c l a s s as a whole, during the Reformation. The par t i cu la r experience of

a1 ienation of t h i s group became f e r t i l e ground f o r au thor i t a r ian , des-

t r uc t i ve and f o r automation conformity as cul tura l escape mechanisms.

Thirdly the pa r t i cu l a r economic changes toward monopoly capi t a l ism and

large s ca l e bureaucratic organizations a f t e r World War I as well as

the change toward 01 i garchi c trade unions and 1 abour organi za t i ons and

the perfection of mass media, created conditions which favoured the

spread and dissemination of middle c l a s s "cul tura l mechanisms of escape"

t o other socio-economic groups. This explains the r e l a t i ve popularity

and success of Nazi ideology i n the 1930's. B u t more importantly the

canal i zing of these mechanisms of escape i n t o soci a1 character

141

orientations which pervade the ent i re social s t ructure irrespective of

c lass , indicate tha t today the i l lusions of individuality have become

even more complex i n inverse proportion to the decline of real individ-

ual i ty ,

One of the most crucial analytical l inks here i s the connection

between "cultural mechanisms of escape" and the formation of social

character orientations i n a subsequent social s t ructure. The basic

datum f o r Fromm's analysis of the three major mechanisms which he ident i -

f i e s are the unconscious forces which are part of the individual psycho-

logical complex. Fromm asser t s tha t the findings from psychoanalytic

observations of neurotic persons can be applied t o the group as a whole

( the middle c lass ) .

Articulated i n t h i s manner then, Fromm's explanation of the evolu-

t ion of character orientations from the Reformation to the i r present

forms, i s straightforward. From the perspective of Fromm's l a t e r

writ ings, the middle classes during the Reformation had one of two

courses open to them a f t e r they had supported the forces favouring a

breakdown of feudal t i e s and the principle of economic progress ( in

brief the freedom from); they could have related "spontaneously t o the

world in love and work and thus contributed to a new synthesis with man

and nature!' The second course would be to give u p the struggle fo r

positive freedom by surrendering individuality . Imp1 i ci t in Fromm's

analysis tha t on the whole the members of the middle-class who experien-

cing most acutely, re lat ive to the two other classes, alienation, chose

the second course as i s seen by the i r receptiveness t o early

rotes st ant ism.^^ Fromm substant ia tes t h i s p a r t o f h i s d iscussion by

t u r n i n g t o psychoanalyt ic experience. Here the imp1 i c a t i on i s t h a t the

middle-class a t t r a c t i o n t o and development o f e a r l y Protestant ism i n -

d ica tes one s ide o f t he masochist ic s o l u t i o n : submergence o f doubt and

powerless i n t h e n o t i o n o f God. Th is takes the contemporary form o f

t he submission t o a leader ideology, so prominent among the lower middle-

c lass dur ing the r i s e o f H i t l e r . Fromm s ta tes

The i n d i v i d u a l f a c i n g God's might alone could n o t he1 f e e l i n g crushed and seeking s a l v a t i o n i n complete submission. 11

However the masochist ic psychological s t r i v i n g i s one o f many aspects o f

t he a u t h o r i t a r i a n mechanism o f escape. Fromm's thes i s holds t h a t t h i s

e a r l y escape mechanism i s c r u c i a l f o r t h e format ion o f t he f o u r main

types o f s o c i a l charac ter under modern capi tal ism.62 Fromm a t t r i b u t e s

t h i s psychological posture as a main f e a t u r e o f the process o f r e i f i c a -

t i o n symbolized i n money, ma te r ia l gains and so on. I n one o f t he v i t a l

sec t ions o f -- Man f o r Himself , Fromm renews h i s concern w i t h a u t h o r i t a r i a n -

ism, t h i s t ime a t t he ontogenet ic l e v e l and as a major fea tu re o f t he

unconscious psychic fo rces o f modern man. Here Fromm's ana lys is i s t h a t

t he contemporary i n d i v i d u a l has tended t o " i n t e r n a l i z e the voice o f an

ex te rna l au tho r i ty. I' Whereas i n t h i s connect ion Fromm may have taken an

extreme i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by suggest ing t h a t the confusion between s e l f i s h -

ness and s e l f - l o v e f i n d s i t s c l a s s i c expression i n Calv in, Fromm's aim

i s nevertheless t o demonstrate t h a t i t was the o r i g i n a l psychological

o r i e n t a t i o n which forged e a r l y P ro tes tan t theology i n t o an ideo log ica l

Automaton Conformity

This i s a character t r a i t which expresses modern man's a t t i t u d e

toward au thor i t y . Fromm argues t ha t duri,ng the eighteenth and nineteenth

centur ies Western soc ie ty was character i zed by ra t i ona l and i r r a t i o n a l

au thor i t y bu t both were over t and v i s i b l e . But w i t h the s t r uc tu ra l changes

w i t h i n cap i ta l ism "Author i ty i n the middle o f the twent ieth century has

changed i t s character; i t i s no t over t author i ty , bu t anonymous, i n v i s i b l e ,

a1 ienated au thor i t y ."64 Fromm's pos i t i on i s t h a t from the development of

Protestantism t o the present day has witnessed a subs t i t u t i on o f " i n t e r -

na l i zed au tho r i t y f o r an external one," b u t t h i s i s an idea l since i n

"recent decades" external au tho r i t y has become i nv i s i b l e , the n o t i on o f

conscience has 1 i t t l e v a l i d i t y s ince conformity i s stressed. Fromm's

pos i t i on i s t h a t although the i nd i v i dua l i s removed from t r a d i t i o n a l and

over t sources o f cont ro l , new sources o f cont ro l which are external t o

the i nd i v i dua l threatens t o "change pos i ti ve freedom i n t o i t s opposi te . 1165

With the d i s i n teg ra t i on o f over t forms o f au thor i t y then, more

covert forms o f au tho r i t y have been in te rna l i zed . Fromm i s hard pu t t o

suggest t h a t automaton conformity i s a mechanism which was adopted by

the ea r l y Protestant and Pur i tan middle c lass since the i deo1 ogy o f

i nd i v i dua l ism o r ' 1 i ber ty o f conscience ' which developed from the Refor-

mation and through the Enlightenment was a basic ideology which i s i n

conf 1 i c t w i t h Fromrn's i 1 l u s t r a t i on o f automaton conformi t y . But Fromm

I I

suggests elsewhere t h a t the contemporary lower middle class, from the I I t ime o f Nazism i n Europe and i n present day North American society, have I

I adopted t h i s mechanism. Nevertheless the n o t i on o f ind iv idua l ism remains

i t

rooted i n modern socie ty , i t is an i l l u s ion . Automaton conformity i s I

conceived as a var ian t of authori tarianism. Summarizing this idea Fromm

argues t h a t as d i s t i n c t from the working c l a s s , the nobi 1 i ty and the

upper middle c lasses , the lower middle c lasses i n Europe has a love of

the strong and hatred of the weak as well as a narrow asceticism, sus-

picion of the s t ranger and ra t iona l iza t ion of t h e i r envy as moral indig-

nation. W i t h respect t o German fascism Fromm suggests t h a t s t r uc tu r a l

changes such as growing worki,ng c lass mili tancy, p r i o r t o 1930 and the

f inancia l slump which tended t o decrease the material welfare of the

lower middle c lass in tens i f i ed the psycho1 ogi cal t r a i t s and gave Nazism

strong appeal . Thus whereas both working and 1 ower middle c lasses were 8

p o l i t i c a l l y defeated by 1930 the reaction of both, groups t o Nazism

varied. The former r e s i s t ed mildly then col 1 apsed, the lower middle

c l a s s especi a1 l y the younger generati on embraced Nazism. Fromm suggests

To say t h a t the socia l character of the lower middle c lass di f fered from t h a t of the working c lass does not imply t h a t this character s t r uc tu r e was not present i n the working c lass a lso . B u t i t was typical f o r the lower middle c l a s s , while only a minority of the working c lass exhibited the same character s t r uc tu r e i n a s imi la r ly c l ea r cu t fashion; the one o r the other t r a i t , however, i n a l e s s in tense form, l i k e enhanced respect of author i ty o r t h r i f t , was t o be found i n most members of the working c lass too.66

The foregoing statement a l so summarizes another of Fromm's mportant con-

clusions and t h a t is his a t t r i bu t i on of destructiveness, his t h i rd

mechanism of escape t o the lower middle c l a s s , t h i s r e f e r s again t o the

genesis of t h i s mechanism. Destructiveness i s d i f fe ren t ia ted from the

e a r l i e r outl ined sado-masochistic s t r i v ings , i n so f a r as i n the former

the aim i s "elimination of i t s object ,'I r a ther than act ive o r passive

145

symbiosis. I t i s a "constantly lingering tendency within a person which

. . . waits only fo r an opportunity to be expressed." Like the s t r ivings

toward authoritarianism and automaton conformity, destructiveness i s

"caused" by al ienat ion, and the anxiety created by the threat to material

and emotional in te res t s . "Destructiveness i s the outcome of an unl i ved

l i f e . " In th i s respect too, Fromm views the lower middle class as having

a higher content of destructiveness as compared w i t h the working c lass . 6 7

Summary

What conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing observations?

The f i r s t is tha t Fromm views the modern sources of social pathology,

tha t i s to say, the psychological reactions and negative character

t r a i t s w i t h i n the social character orientations of modern man, in the

patterns of lower middle class adaptations. In terms of the non-

productive character orientations out1 ined in -- Man for Himself, elements

of the three escape mechanisms previously outl i ned, figure prominently

i n Fromm's four character orientations. Fromm asser ts that what he means

by th i s proposition i s tha t the s t r ivings which underlie his escape

mechanisms are typical , different iat ing lower middle class behaviour pat-

terns from those of the rich bourgeoisie and the working classes. He i s

not asserting tha t these escape mechanisms are not found in the behaviour

of these other two classes. The constant proposition which underlies

Fromm's adumbration of the receptive, exploi ta t ive , hoarding and market-

ing orientation i s the psychological s t a t e in which the individual views

the source of a l l good as lying outside of himself. This a t t i tude then

146

i s typical of lower middle class behaviour from the Reformation t o the I

present day, i t epitomizes a1 ienation and powerlessness, i n Fromm's

terms. Anxiety and fear of the se l f are by products of th i s phenomena.

Whether the individual or group orientation i s receptive or exploi ta t ive,

hoarding or marketing alienation is the cause.68 For example the only

differences between the experience of a l ienat ion, as an his tor ical par t ic-

ular experience, of the i ndi vidual , rest in the responses of i ndi vidual s . So tha t i n terms of the exploitative orientation the individual believes

tha t the source of good which l i e s outside of himself has to be taken by

force or coercion whereas the marketing orientation character believes

tha t what i s good can be won by "sel l ing himself" on the local market.

In -- The Sane Society, acknowledged as a continuation of the socio-

logical themes outlined in Escape from Freedom, From elaborates his

'pathology of normalcy' theme of Western culture. The f i r s t i s tha t

there is a di a1 ec t i cal process i n Western cul ture from the Reformati on

whereby the disintegration of external and covert sources of authority

corresponds to the increasing awareness of individuals of th i s loss of

social control, with one resolution manifesting i t s e l f i n individual

control taking the form internalization of i r ra t iona l ideologies . T h i s

is the significance of the Reformation theology since i t thwarts the

evolution of real forms of consciousness. I t i s worth noting here tha t

Fromm i n asserting the significance of i r rat ional ideologies and the i r

function in symbiotic adaptation, i s not using the term symbiotic to

suggest a return to e a r l i e r identical forms of control. Since belief

Systems operate covertly as sources of authority. There i s another level

147

of resolution of the dilemma and t ha t i s the individual Is increasing

r ~ o t e d n e s s t o external symbols of power, pres t ige and author i ty . This

theme i s an extension of the Marxian notion of r e i f i c a t i on . Here too

the elaboration of complex i l lus ions about the s e l f i s furthered.

The second conclusion t o be drawn from Fromm's analysis of char-

a c t e r i s t ha t socia l pathology indicates both the complexes of configura-

t ions of soc ia l i za t ion and assimilat ion which have in ternal ized as

"normal " e i the r the "good" o r "gui 1 ty" author i tar ian conscience, on the

one hand, and the elements of s t ruc ture which perpetuate and reinforce

these psychologically.69 An essen t ia l element i n the notion of ev i l a t

this point becomes gui 1 t. In the cases of the hoarding and marketing

soci a1 characters , both reinforced by the "good author i tar ian conscience ,"

the level of g u i l t i s low. The author i tar ian gu i l ty conscience "which

reinforces the hoarding and exploi ta t ive characters imply grea te r feel - ings of gui 1 t by the individual . "70

Fromm implies t ha t i t i s the strength of external mechanisms of

control which prevent the gu i l ty author i tar ian conscience from being

transformed in to a more humanistic conscience and a productive or ienta-

t ion. Fromm's long discussion of se l f ishness and sel f - love i n both - Man

fo r Himself and i n The Art of Loving, a r e attempts t o a r t i c u l a t e the - --- conditions f o r the transformation of gui 1 ty authori t a r i an i n to humanistic

conscience.

Among other things, one of the d i f f i c u l t i e s of Fromm's work in

t h i s area of the development of psycho1 ogi cal and soci 01 ogi cal factors

i n r e la t ion t o individual character i s t h a t Fromm's work is constantly

movi ng from i n te rac t i oni s t t o a di a1 e c t i cal framework . For example i n

148

terms of the question what i s i t tha t determines the character orienta-

t ion and predispositions of the individual as a specif ic member of a

c lass or social group, Fromm's reply comes close to tha t of Parsons fo r

i t s funct ional is t implications. Where the question i s w i t h respect t o

the social group within the framework of the development of the wider

society, Fromm's theoretical out1 i nes are dialect ical .71 The problem of

Fromm's concept of character goes beyond th i s observation also, fo r his

character orientations are deeply rooted in the experiences of Europe

and fascism. His recent work i n Mexican vil lages i s an attempt to make

his character types in to non-determi ni s t i c tools of analysis . Fromm

develops variants of the main types in terms of productive and non-

productive hoarding and so on, and analyzes behaviour i n terms of the

material conditions of peasant l i f e in a changing vi l lage. The study

ut i 1 i zes a se r i e s of method01 ogical and technical measurement devi ces in

an attempt t o produce an answer to the main question in the second part

of the study: what new type of character s t ructure will eme,rge with

changing . . materi a1 conditions . Fromm suggests that the expl oi t a t i ve

character, a deviant type between the Revolution and 1950ts, i s emerging

because i t proves i t s e l f as successful adaptation in a society i n which

a l l the dynamic features of modern capital ism, have not ye t emerged.

Thus the producti ve-expl oi ta t ive seemed t o emerge as the dominant type. 72

This kind of study and conclusion, whatever Fromrn's s c i e n t i s t i c posture,

is subject t o the same kinds of crit icisms about type atomism and non-

c r i t i c a l approaches, the framework of Mexican society as a whole i s

accepted as the s ta tus quo ( in Marcuse's terms). Nevertheless Fromm's

work par t ly develops out o f a c r i t i que agains t the view t h a t soc ia l I

s t ruc tu res a r e ' e t e rna l . ' We turn t o this contr ibut ion.

FOOTNOTES

' ~ e f . Ka r l Lowith, "The Ph i losoph ica l Concepts o f Good and E v i l : The Best of a l l Poss ib le Worlds (Le ibn iz ) and The Radical E v i l (Kant) ," pp. 203-226, i n Ralph Manheim and H i ldegard Nagel , Evi 1 (Evanston: Nor th Western U n i v e r s i t y Press, l967), p. 214.

rich Fromm, The Heart o f Man: I t s Genius f o r Good and Evi 1 (New York: Harper and R o w , ~ 6 ~ p 3 f i n d ~ 8 . On p 7 2 8 o i i i i i i - r e f e r s t o ~ e i b n i z ' s ' formul a t i o n o f freedom i n terms o f v a r i bus degrees o f i n c l i na- t i o n , w i t h o u t a1 l u d i n g t o L e i b n i z ' s s t rong C h r i s t i a n b ias . Fromm a lso s ta tes on the same page: "Our moral c o n f l i c t on the quest ion o f choice a r i ses when we have ' t o make a concrete dec is ion r a t h e r than when we choose, good o r e v i 1 i n general " (p. 128) .

3 ~ b i d . , pp. 19-20. I t i s f o r t h i s reason a l s o t h a t Fromm at tacks the " p e s 3 Z s m " o f S a r t r e ' s e x i s t e n t i a l i s m i n h i s foreword (p. 13).

4 ~ e e G o t t f r i e d W i 1 helm L e i b n i z, Essai s de ~ h 6 o d i c6e su r 1 a bontE de Dieu, l a l i b e r t g de l'homme, e t l ' o r i g i n e au Ma1 ( l 7 l O ) , p. 147. Quoted i n Kar l Lowi t h , w. e. , p. 21 7.

'see espec ia l l y , E r i c h Fromm Ps choanal s i s and R e l i g i o n (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1950): w-

7~romm has used the n o t i on o f b lend ing i n a number o f works. See f o r example, Fromm, -- Man For Himsel f (New York: Fawcett World L i b r a r y , 1947), p. 85; a l s o Escape From Freedom (New York: Hol t, Rinehar t and Winston, 1941), p. 305. I n h i s l a t e r work on a t t i t ud ina l syndromes i n p e r s o n a l i t y fo rmat ion Fromm makes a s i m i l a r p o i n t . See --- The Heart of Man, 9. c i t . , p. 23. The p o i n t I wish t o s t r e s s here i s t h a t Fromm i s - c o n s c i o u s o f t h e conceptual s ta tus o f "character . " Th is d i scuss i on i s i n no way intended t o repeat the arguments of t he preceding chapter, t he l e v e l of ana lys is here i s d i s t i n c t , s ince i n t h i s sec t i on the focus i s on the t r a n s i t i o n from concept t o emp i r i ca l ana lys is , whereas the re i t was main ly on the approach t o theory and concept format ion.

%n i t s s imples t terms Weber's i d e a l type i s a "mental cons t ruc t formed by the synthesis o f many d i f f u s e , . . . , concrete i n d i v i d u a l phenomena, which are arranged, according t o c e r t a i n one-sidedly accen- tua ted p o i n t s o f view, i n t o a u n i f i e d a n a l y t i c a l const ruc t , which i n i t s conceptual p u r i t y cannot be found i n r e a l i t y ; i t i s a u top ia , a l i m i t i n g

concept w i t h which concrete phenomena can only be compared f o r the pur- pose of expl icat ing some of theik s i gn i f i c an t components . I 1 See Carl Hem~el . nTvooloaical Methods i n the Social Sciences" i n Maurice Matanson.

A Reader (New York: Random House, S F h m defines the individuali zi ns . - . .

ideal type as being ' a ) the' "concrete h i s to r ica l individuals which consti - t u t e the objects of causal analysis ." In this case abst ract ion is essen- t i a l l y a consequence of the "selectiveness of s c i e n t i f i c i n t e r e s t . " The application of this kind of idea1 type t o the concrete r e a l i t y explains nothing, but points out what is t o be explained. Another type of indi- vidualizing concept contains ideas, which a r e not so much the actual con- t en t s of the minds of a l l individuals, but a re exaggerated but consis tent forms of wider bel ief systems, f o r example, the ideal construct of Calvinism. In con t ras t t o the above, a "general ideal type i s a construc- t ion of a h.ypothetica1 course of events w i t h two other charac te r i s t i cs : 1) a b s t r a c t general i ty and 2) the ideal typical exaggeration of empi ri cal r e a l i t y ." See Ta lco t t Parsons, The Structure - of Social Action

' ~ f . Max Weber, "Objecti v i ty" In Soci a1 Science and Soci a1 Pol i cy , I i

i n Maurice Matanson, 2. c i t . , ~ h i i o s o ~ h ~ -- of the Social Sciences : - A Reader, pp. 354-418, pp. 404-405. .

'O~his point i s succinctly made by Parsons, x. G., The Structure of Social Action, p. 516. -

" ~ o h n Schaar, Escape Perspectives -- of Erich Fromm (New York: Basic Books,

' l ~ e r b e r t Marcuse, OJ-. c i t . , Eros and Civi l iza t ion: A Philoso hical In u i ~ i n to Freud, 1962, p. 2x S-ibDissent, 9. &.'& + T h ~ l m w n oolemic between Fromm a m u s e (see Dissent. Vol. 2, No. 3, 1955, pp. 221-240 and Vol . 2, No. 3, F a l l , 1955, pp. 343-349; and Vol . 3, No. 1 , Winter 1956, pp. 79-83) is largely a debate a t cross purposes. Marcuse's or iginal charge against Fromm was t h a t the l a t t e r defines personali ty by negating the individual pre-formation of personali ty a t the "deepest ins t inc tua l s t ruc ture . I t A pre-formati on which Freud saw as the work of "accumulated c i v i 1 i za t i on ,'I 9. - c i t . , Marcuse, -- Eros and C i v i 1 i zat ion, p. 230. Contemporary socie ty shares w i t h preceding h i s to r - i c a l forms, types of repressive controls which render both epochs repres- s i ve ( c f . Marcuse, Dissent, Ninter, 1956), p. 80) . In these terms, Marcuse suggests t ha t the radical element of Freudian psycho1 ogy would focus on the depth of repressive controls and the content and dynamic of the unconscious. Moreover, Marcuse su gests t ha t Freud refused t o t r e a t the a l ienated individual i n al ienated 9 present) socie ty as a t o t a l per- sonali t y , but viewed the f a t e and eventual freedom of the individual as t i ed up w i t h the general f a t e . On the other s ide of the polemic Fromm suggests t h a t Freud i n assuming love i n i t s essence t o be "sexual des i re" assumed a1 so a contradiction (an his t o r i cal contradiction) between love

and socia l cohesion. Fromm, of course views Freud as trapped i n the nineteenth century ideology (maniQes ted i n pol i ti cal economy and Darwin- ian biology) of human nature. This view i s f o r Fromm a mistaken one and so he subs t i t u t e s the concept of socia l character--which Marcuse opposes --to demonstrate both the var ia t ions of individual character i n contem- porary socie ty and thei r h i s to r ica l rootedness o r genesis. Fromm a1 so believes t h a t a use of the concept of socia l character would demonstrate the potential behaviour patterns which would transcend contemporary a1 ienation ( i . e . , c rea te rev01 utionary s t ruc tura l change) and provide the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r individual l i be r a t i on , a goal which both Marcuse and Fromm des i re . I t appears t h a t Marcuse's view of repression i s one- dimensional and therefore h i s d i s t inc t ion between ci v i 1 i za t i on and con- temporary socie ty is n o t only defined negatively, b u t a l so "blunt." He could not therefore i f even he were p o l i t i c a l l y disposed t o do so make out a case f o r Fromrn's concepts of mental health and psycho-pathology as h i s t o r i ca l pa r t i cu la r s which do not negate but i ncorporate the fundamen- t a l contradiction of man and socie ty .

" ~ e r b e r t Marcuse, w. -.' ci t -- Eros and Civ i l i za t ion , p. 230. Though Marcuse makes a d i s t inc t ion between " basi c" and "surplus repres- sion."

1 4 ~ h i s problem is in t r iguing a l so because Marcuse implies admi r- a t ion f o r Rank's findings on the ex i s t en t i a l dilemma.

5 ~ f . Alasdai r MacIntyre, Marcuse (London: Fontana, Wm. Col 1 ins and Co. Ltd.) , p. 51. Marcuse's i n t e l l e c t u a l biographer MacIntyre, con- cludes from t h i s and other points t h a t Marcuse i s e s sen t i a l l y a pre- Marxist thinker.

8 ~ a r c u s e , w. - c i t . , Preface t o 1962 ed i t ion , pp. v i i i -i x.

' '~he Sophists (especi a1 l y Antiphon) were r e l a t i v i s t s i n the sense t h a t they specif ied and emphasized the dis junct ion between "nature" and "convention ." Impl ic i t i n Sophist doctrine was the notion of the re la - tivi t y ( temporali ty) of values of the legal and moral order of a given socie ty , hence P l a to ' s a t tack on Sophist doctrine.

*Osee Alvin Gouldner, - The Coming Cr i s i s of Western Sociolo York: Basic Books, 1970), p . 66. Gouldner's book is cerned with the paradox7 which resides i n modern academi c soci ology . A paradox i t s "1 i berat ive potential " and i ts conservative s t ruc tu r e , and the problem becomes ex t r ica t ing the former from the l a t t e r which involves, ". . . the penetration of an h i s t o r i ca l l y informed c r i t i que of sociology as a theory and as a socia l i n s t i t u t i on" (p . 12). This i s a v i t a l task

f o r Gouldner pa r t l y because of thq i r on i c posture of the "young radical who i n s t r i d e n t l y c r i t i c i z i n g ex i s t ing soci a1 ins t i tuti ons , including establishment sociology, tend t o despise theorizing and so f a l l i n t o a re1 i ti z a t i on of values tinged w i t h personal sentiment and t o t a l i t a r i an rea l pol i ti k .

2 1 ~ o r extensive analysis of this issue see Georg Je l l inek , The Declaration -- of the Rights ---- of Man and of Cit izens: A Contribution t r Modern Cons ti tu t ional His tory , trans1 a ted , Max ~ e r r a n d (New York: K n r y m n d Co., 1901).

22 Gouldner, 9. - c i t . , p . 70.

r o l e of weal t h y manufacturers i n destroying patr iarchal re la t ionships i n t h e towns (p. 135).

2 4 ~ f . M . N . Roy, Reason, Romanticism - and Revolution, Vol. I (Calcutta: Renaissance Pub7ishers, l952), p . 58.

25~ouldner , 9. - ci t., pp. 67-68.

2 8 ~ o r instance Char1 es Fourier whose wri t i ngs i ndi cate French soc i e ty s t i 11 "caught" i n the contradictions of agr icul tura l feudal ism and e a r l y crude bourgeois capital ism wrote i n the l a t e eighteenth century of t h e hidden manias clothed i n r espec tab i l i ty . Moreover he saw manias as d i r e c t consequences of repression. Thus he wrote: "Nature driven through the door comes back through the window . ' I See Frank Manuel , Pro he t s of Paris: Turgot, Condorcet, Sai nt-Simon, Fourier, and Comte 7&krHW and Row, I-. 2 3 0 - 2 3 5 .

--

2 9 ~ o c i a l thinkers i n addit ion t o Gouldner, such as Marcuse i n Reason - and Revolution, have suggested the paradoxical tendencies of l i b e r a l and p o s i t i v i s t i c socia l thought which emerge i n the ea r ly stages of t h e i ndustri a1 rev01 u t i on.

3 0 ~ f . R . D. Laing, The Divided Self : An Exis tent ia l Study i n Sani ty and Madness, P r e f a c n o the Pelican e m o n (London: Penguz Books, 1965)-

3 1 ~ h e s i m i l a r i t i e s referred t o pa r t i a l ly derive from substantive arguments which s t r e s s the imp1 i ci t c r i ti que of contemporary socie ty as S t ruc tu r a l l y pathological (Freud) and fu r the r t h a t the only di f ference

between the so ca l led mental ly ill and the so ca l l ed normal members o f modern society, i s t h a t the former have been successful ly labe l led, t o the extent t h a t being abnormal means from the perspective o f the psychia- t r i s t being "i 11 ." This i s no t the place t o engage i n deta i l e d exami na- t i o n o f the issues involved. It i s worth no t ing however, t h a t Becker (1964) asserts a t the end o f a thorough examination o f the issues, t h a t the normal i s an idea l , the normal i nd i v i dua l being one who i s "not s tup id" which means being not coerced, i t means being creat ive and ex- e r c i s i ng cont ro l over "choice o f means and ends." Ref. E. Becker , =. c i t . , The Revolut ion i n Psychiatry, p. 209. 7 - -

3 2 ~ e f . E r i ch Fromm, The C r i s i s o f Psychoanalysis: Essays on Freud, -- Marx and Soci a1 ~ s ~ c h o l o ~ w ~ o r k : Hol t , Rinehart and Wins ton, m, p. 3 .

3 3 ~ b i d. , pp. 1-4. Whi l e Fromm does suggest t ha t some psychoanal - ys s made-nifi cant cont r ibut ions t o f u r t h e r c l i n i c a l knowledge about mental i l l n e s s , he impl ies t ha t the long overdue connection between the insane ( i n a conventional sense) people " su f f e r i ng from aggravating symptoms 1 i ke phobias, compulsions and hyster ia," and the pat ients w i t h complaints about t h e i r " i n a b i l i t y t o enjoy l i f e " (bu t who presumably could s t i l l " funct ion" a t l eas t minimal ly i n the soc ie ty ) ; was no t fos- tered a t the c l i n i c a l and empir ical l eve l . There i s a lso a para1 l e l o f so r ts between Frornm's hea l th i n soc ia l terms and hea l th i n human terms

' and La i ng Is d i s t i n c t i o n s between "sane sch izo id way o f being-in-the- world" and "psychotic way o f bei ng-i n-the-world ,I' though La i ng u t i 1 i zes the 1 a t t e r d i s t i n c t i o n phenomenological l y and e x i s t e n t i a1 l y .

3 4 ~ b i d -- 9 pp. 23-29. Fromm c r i t i c i z e s Hartmann and the ego- psycho1 ogi s t s f o r i d e n t i f y i n g "human and soci a1 hea l th" and thereby deny- i n g soci a1 path01 ogy .

3 6 ~ b i d . , p. 17. F r o m c r i t i c i z e s Marcuse f o r using the term re - pression m s c r i m i na te ly . He argues as f o l lows :

Not less serious i s the d i s t o r t i o n o f Freud's theory i n Marcuse's use o f the concept o f repression. . . . But the cen t ra l category o f Freud's system i s "repression" i n the dynamic sense o f the repressed being unconscious. By using "repression" f o r both conscious and un- conscious data the whole s i gni f i cance o f Freud Is concept o f repres- s ion and unconscious i s l o s t . Indeed the word "repression" has two meanings: f i r s t , the conventional one, namely t o repress i n the sense o f oppress, o r suppress; second the psychological one used by Freud . . ., namely t o remove something from awareness. The two meanings by themselves have nothing t o do w i t h each other. By using the con- cept o f repression ind isc r im ina te ly Marcuse confuses the cent ra l issue o f psychoanalysis. (p. 17)

Fromm's observations a re 1 ) pa r t of his ongoing polemic w i t h Marcuse witnessed i n the a r t i c l e s i n Dissent and is s ign i f i c an t f o r Fromm's asse r t ion t h a t Freud's theory of character is based on his c l i n i ca l ob- servations--hence what is removed from awareness, cannot be decided theoret ical l n 2)- part Fromm's attempt t o a s s e r t t h a t Freud viewed character as var iable t o the extent t h a t he did not perceive sexual re- pression t o be ident ical w i t h the r e a l i t y pr inciple .

"~romm, E. ci t . , The Cr i s i s of Psychoanalysis, pp. 132-133. The auoted s t a t e m e n t x k e n f r o m FrommF famous 1932 essay, "The Method and function of Analytical Soci a1 Psycho1 ogy: Notes on ~ s ~ c h o a n a l ~ s i s and His tor ical Materi a1 ism" reprinted i n Cr i s i s of Psychoanalysis, sup- ports my contention i n opposition t o Schaar 's t h a t Fromm's task i s a Marxian-Freudian synthesis . Also Fromm means socia l character by the use of the term l i b id ina l s t ruc ture .

38~b id . , p. 115. While extensive discussion of the methodological impl icat ionswi 11 take us too f a r away from our or iginal in tent ions , i t is worth noting t h a t Fromm i s drawing a t t en t ion t o Freud's l a t e r awareness of wha't methodologists such 'as Ernest Gel l ne r term the "hen and egg" cha rac t e r i s t i c of debates about "holism and individual ism" (see f o r e x a m ~ l e Ernest Gel l n e r ' s "Holism Versus Individual ism," i n May rodb beck; Readings i n the Philosophy -- of the Social Sciences (London: Col lier-Ma- 1968), pp. 254-268. Fromm's statement a l so indicates awareness of some var ie ty of method01 ogi cal i ndi v i dual ism, though he may be extending t o Freud a commitment t o soci a1 psychology which was by no means consis t e n t (see p. 116 of Fromm, OJ. - ci t . , Cr i s i s of Psycho- ana lys i s ) . To the extent t h a t Fromm i s more committed t r c l i n i c a l psychoanalysis and empi ri cal soci a1 psycho1 ogy than was Freud, Schaar ' s Chapter 2 , "Character and Goodness," i s a l so i n need of extensive revision.

39~romm, 9. - c i t . , pp. 116-119. To the two reasons c i t ed by Fromm, one could add a t h i r d , namely t h a t a11 psychiatry from i t s incep- t ion was confronted w i t h the problem t h a t i n order t o analyse and ex- [

plain behaviour i t had t o c l a s s i fy t h a t behaviour, but once psychiat r ic ' l abe l s ' had been at tached, the ' l a b e l s ' became bar r ie r s between pa t ien t

! and doctor, i n the sense t h a t the doctor had now become the soc ie ty ' s j a i l o r . Freud's i n t e l lec tual develo ment reveals an awareness of this,

, though minimal ( i n h i s socia l theory ! b u t the dilemma between examina- i.

t ion of his own "conceptual categories" and possible loss of control over the behavioural phenomena which concerned Freud, on the one hand and more r ig id acceptance of his "categories" and control of behavioural phenomena, on the other hand, i s a dilemma which he never resolved s a t i s f a c t o r i l y .

4 0 ~ a r l Maw, Preca i t a l i s t Economic Formations , t r . Jack Cohen, I ed i ted E . J . Hobsbawm New Yor International Publishers, 1965), p.

121. *

4 1 ~ h e f i r s t form o f ownership i s t r i b a l ownership. The second form i s ancient communal and State ownership. I b i d . , pp. 122-125. See a l so F r i ed r i ch Engels, Herr Eugen D ih r ing 's R e v m i o n i n Science: Ant i D ih r ing (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1935), esp. pp. 104-110, f o r Engels' analysis o f the evo lu t ion o f the bourgeois and p ro l e ta r i an de- mands f o r equal i t y i n t h i s per iod . Contemporary Marx is t method01 ogi s t s are more i n s i s t e n t than Er i ch Fromrn was ( a t the time t h a t Escape from Freedom and -- Man f o r Himself was being w r i t t e n ) t h a t economic f a c t F occupy a unique pos i t i on o f importance i n analysis due t o i t s s ign i f i cance i n the unfo ld ins o f h i s to ry , more than to ' anything else. C f . Lucien Goldmann, The ~ h a n sciences tr. H. V . White and R. Anchor (London-athan

42~romm i s no t alone i n conceptual iz ing the Middle Ages as a s i g - n i f i c a n t p o i n t i n the evo lu t ion o f the psycho1 ogi ca l devel opment toward modern man. Michel Foucault views the per iod between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance as a s i g n i f i c a n t t r a n s i t i o n i n the meaning o f madness, i n the former the mot i f s emphasized madness as s in , bu t no t unreason. By the end o f the Middle Ages, madness was f o l l y , i n Foucault 's words, mad- ness had l o s t i t s voice, i t had become unreason, reminding "each man o f h i s t ru th . " Madness i s a lso confined, a forerunner t o the l a t e r u t i l i - t a r i a n no t ion o f the mad as useless' and the obl i g a t i on t o work (Ref. M. Foucault, Madness - and C i v i l i z a t i o n : - A H i s to r y o f - Insan i t y -- i n the Age - o f Reason, .oJ-: c i t. , Chapters 1 and 2) . ~ e i nhol dT iebuke discusses 5 contradi c t i o f i e t w e e n the Reformati on and Renaissance as destroying the - - "medieval synthesis" i n which the Cathol ic Church was the h i s t o r i c " locus where the con t rad ic t ion between the h i s t o r i c a l and the d i v i ne was overcome i n f a c t " (p. 139). The development o f Reformati on phi losophical theology marks the f i n a l dest ruc t ion o f t h i s synthesis, f a i t h and o r i g - i n a l s i n became the d r i v i n g forces o f Chr i s t ian theology, i t s consequen- ces f o r the i nd i v i dua l s e l f are we l l documented elsewhere (Ref. R. Niebuke, The Nature and Destiny o f Man: A Chr is t ian I n te rp re ta t i on , Vol. I1 (New Y x : ~ h a r l e s c r i bne r ' sTndon , 1964).. Hui z i nga, analyses the end o f the Middle Ages as a per iod o f intense fo rma l i za t ion o f behav- i o u r pat terns and the s t y l i z a t i o n o f norms as one o f the determining pat terns on eighteenth t o twent ieth century manners and morals (Ref. J . Hui zinga , - The Waning -- o f the Middle Ages, 9. - c i t. , pp. 40-41 ) .

43~romm, Escape - from Freedom, 9. - c i t. , p. 54.

4 4 ~ b i d . , p. 54 These conclusions were drawn i n i ti a1 l y i n 1941 , b u t F r o m m 5 o r k i n t i e 1960's and 1970's r e i t e r a t e them.

4 5 ~ b i d . , pp. 57-58. See a lso Engels, OJ-. G., Ant i ~ i i h r i n g , pp. 278-279.

4 6 ~ r ~ m m , x. - c i t. , Escape from Freedom, p. 82.

4 7 ~ b i d . , pp. 63-66.

4 8 ~ e e Fromm, -- Man f o r Himsel f , 9. c i t pp. 71-73. - -. ' 4 9 ~ w o recen t c r i t i q u e s of Fromm r a i s e quest ions about the na ture

o f h i s s o c i a l psychology and h i s ana lys i s of a l i e n a t i o n o r estrangement, though n e i t h e r o f these r a i s e quest ions about h i s ana lys i s o f t he Ren- aissance i n r e l a t i o n t o these problems. See Guyton B. Hammond, Man i n Estrangement: A Com a r i s o n o f t he Thought o f Paul T i l l i c h and E r m - Fromm (Nashv i l i e : -9-1 Vanderbi T U f i e r s i t y P r E s T 6 5 ) ; T S m y

E r i c h Fromm: A P ro tes tan t C r i t i q u e (Phi l ade lph ia : The Westminster Press, i%CJ-.- -

5 0 ~ e e M. N. Roy, 9. - c i t., Reason, Romanticism - and Revolut ion, v01. I (1952), pp. 64-87.

5 1 ~ . Stanley Glen, OJ-. - c i t . , -- E r i c h Fromm: - A Pro tes tan t C r i t i q u e , p. 27.

5 2 ~ f . Sheldon Wolin, OJ-. - c i t . , P o l i t i c s and V is ion : C o n t i n u i t y and I n n o v a t i on i n Western P o l i t i c a l Thought, pp. 97-143. - -

5 3 ~ f . Fromm, 9. a., Escape f rom Freedom, pp. 119-120. E r i c h Neumann sees the n o t i o n o f t he s a n c t i t y o f t he i n d i v i d u a l sou l as ante- da t i ng the Renaissance i n re1 i g i on, however t h i s n o t i on was secul a r i zed i n t he Renaissance and i n t h i s sense the Reformation was a reac t i on . Though Neumann does n o t extend h i s ana lys i s t o t he Reformation he imp l i es t h a t t he Reformati on and p a r t i c u l a r l y t he evangel i z a t i on tended t o i n h i b i t the growth o f i n d i v i d u a l consciousness.

The s a n c t i t y o f t he i n d i v i d u a l sou l which asser ted i t s e l f throughout t h e Midd le Ages i n s p i t e o f a l l orthodoxy and a l l burn ings o f h e r e t i c s , has become secu la r i zed s ince the Renaissance, though i t was i n ex is tence l ong before tha.

Neumann suggests t h a t the Chr is t i a n i z a t i o n o f the masses ( t h e backward peoples o f Europe) l e d t o a " reco l l e c t i z a t i o n t h a t cont ras ted very s t r o n g l y w i t h the h igh standard o f i n d i v i d u a l consciousness a t t a i n e d by the c u l t u r e d man o f a n t i q u i t y " (Ref. E r i c h Neumann, The O r i i n s and -+- H i s t o r y o f Consciousness, Vol . 11, Psycho1 o g i c a l Stages i n t e Develop- ment o f Pe rsona l i t y , t r a n s l a t e d R. F. C. H u l l (New York: Harper Torch- books, 1954) , pp. 382-383.

5 4 ~ e e O t t o Rank, 9. -a c i t - The Myth o f t he B i r t h o f t he Hero and ------- Other Wr i t i ngs , pp. 122-1 24. __I

5 5 Fromm, 9. - c i t., Escape f rom Freedom, p. 131 . 5 6 ~ h i s d e f l e c t i o n of the core o f Fromm's t h e s i s and subsequent

obscurantism i s p resent i n the sometimes pene t ra t i ng b u t n o t q u i t e con- v inc ing polemics i n t he work o f S tan ley Glen who s imply b r i n g s toge the r

a host of s c r i p tu r a l arguments t o give the obverse in te rpre ta t ion t o Fromm's t he s i s , t h a t i s where Frbm is interpreted as saying t h a t the re la t ionship of God t o man is au thor i t a r ian , Glen argues t h a t the separ- a t ion of God and man i s the very condition of freedom, and not of man's submission as sado-masochism. See f o r example Glen's claim t o provide conf l i c t ing Biblical reference i n Chapter 5 of h i s book (Ref. S. Glen, . ci t . , rich Fromm: A Protes tant ~ r i ti,que , esp. pp. 99-101). p - .--- nother 1 i ne of c r i t i c i % can be di rected against John Schaar 's asse r t ion

t h a t when Fromm " ta lks about re l ig ion he i s -no t r ea l l y ta lking about re l ig ion a t a l l but about ethics"' (p . 126) x. ci t . , John Schaar. In the cas'es of Glen and Schaar theological and philosophical discussions of Fromm's t he s i s is subs t i tu ted . ' for Fromm's sociological posture.

5 7 ~ e e E. F r o m ' s , The Heart of Man, 9. c i t . , p. 114 and Martin Buber's I and Thou, t r . b-onald Gregor Sml t h (second ed i t i on , Edinburgh: Charles Sc'i%%er1s Sons, l958), pp. 61 -65.

58~romm, OJ-. *. , The Heart of Man, p. 143.

5 9 ~ f . Fromm, 3. c i t . , Escape from Freedom, pp . 123-1 56. -

6 2 ~ b i d . , p. 133. For an expl icat ion of the various forms of authori tarianism as a psycho1 ogi cal escape mechanism, see Ib id . , pp. 163- 202. I t i s not the aim i n this d i s s e r t a t i on t o deal exhaustively w i t h the problem of authori tarianism. Apart from the c l a s s i c study bv T . W . ~ d o r n o , Frenkel -Brunswi k , e t . a1 , he Authoritarian personal i iy l ~ e w York: Harper, 1950) ; t h e r e i s a g o o d d i scussi on i n Roger Brown, Soci a1 Psychology (New York: Free Press, l!J65), p p . 477-546. There a r e essen- t i a l d i f ferences i n the meaning of authori tarianism i n Fromm's terms i n con t ras t t o Adorno e t . a1. he l a t t e r i s based almost who1 ly on con- sciously held a t t i t z e s w h e r e a s both the genesis and the use of uncon- scious data predominates i n Fromm's concept.

6 3 ~ f . Fromm, OJ-. m., Man f o r Himself, pp. 148-162 and esp. p. 124.

6 4 ~ f , From, The Sane Society, OJ-. ci t., p. 152. Fromm's d i s t inc - t ion of ra t ional a n d i r r a t i o n a l author i ty K t s on the asse r t ion t h a t although both a re characterized by in fe r io r / super io r re la t ions and " i m ~ e r a t i v e co-ordinati on" (Weber's term), the di rect ion of i n t e r e s t s l i e ' on the same path i n ra t ional author i t ; . See a l so Escape -- from Free- dam, pp. 188-189. 2_

65~romm, . - c i t . , Escape from Freedom, p . 156.

6 6 ~ b i d . , p. 236. When d iscuss ion o f conformi ty s h i f t s t o contem- porary Nor th America, Fromm does ) n o t conceptual i ze au tho r i ty as s u p e r i o r and tang ib le , b u t as the commonly h e l d b e l i e f s i n t he neighbourhood of e i t h e r t he necess i t y o f "keeping up w i t h the Joneses o r t he obsession w i t h "adjustment" t o the-norms o f t he neighbourhood. Here too i t i s i n Fromm's view a d i s t i n c t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t he lower middle c lass . The a u t h o r i t y here i s f e a r o f t he sanct ions o f one's peers, w i t h o u t reasoned t h i n k i n g accompanying the behavi our p a t t e r n i n quest ion, See Fromm's d iscuss ion o f t h i s i n t a n g i b l e and a l l pervading phenomena i n Sane Society , 9. - c i t . , pp. 152-166.

67 Fromm, w. - c i t . , pp. 206-208.

6 8 ~ h e debate between Paul T i l l i c h and E r i c h Fromm on the concepts o f a1 i e n a t i on ( p a r t i a1 a1 oneness and separateness o f t he i n d i v i d u a l , which operate d i a l e c t i c a l l y and i s sub la ted a t a more 'advanced' s t r u c - t u r a l l e v e l ) and estrangement ( T i 11 i ch 's term which describes the t o t a l e x i s t e n t i a l d ichotomiza t ion o f man f rom nature) ; i s n o t o f c e n t r a l con- cern here. One o f t he few Fromm c r i t i c s t o acknowledge the c e n t r a l i t y o f a l i e n a t i o n t o Fromm's framework i s Guyton Hammond. For a d iscuss ion o f Fromm's concept o f a l i e n a t i o n as we1 1 as Fromm's d i f f e rences w i t h T i l l i c h see Hammond's, -- Man i n Estrangement, a. - c i t., pp. 120-125.

69~romm, -- Man f o r Himsel f , w. - c i t . , pp. 149-150.

7 1 ~ h i s p o i n t w i l l be more f u l l y discussed i n a subsequent chapter .

1 L E m p i r i c a l l y , Soci a1 Character -- i n a Mexi can V i 11 age, i s Fromm's most c o m ~ l e x work. P a r t l y because Fromm i s t i e d t o h i s m a t e r i a l i s t i c b ias i n t he d e f i n i t i o n o fVwhat i s p roduct ive , a t t imes the work i s un- c r i t i c a l o f assumptions i n bourgeois economi c theory . Fromm views the new economic oppor tun i t i es , corpora t ives , c a p i t a l i z a t i o n o f a g r i c u l - tu re , e tc . , as opening up p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r t he p roduc t i ve e x p l o i t a t i v e types. Fromm makes no at tempt t o eva lua te t h i s change. See, F r o m and Maccoby , w. - c i t., pp. 230-231 .

CHAPTER IV

POWER AND MORALITY: LACUNAE IN PARSONS' SOCIOLOGY

Introduction .

Structural ly , then, Academic Sociology i s characterized by the importance i t a t t r ibutes to values and by i t s f a i lu re t o develop - in i t s charac ter i s t ic manner which transforms almost everything into a specialization - a d i s t inc t ive sociology of morals. [Alvin Gouldner, p. 1411

Broad, generalized statements of cr i t ic ism against the nature

o f contemporary sociological theory a r e ra re ly sat isfactory explanations

for the present s t a t e of sociology as a theoretical science. One of

the hallmarks of the increasing maturity o f t h i s theoretical science

i s the recent emergence of three d i s t i n c t l ines of cr i t ic ism. There

is c r i t ic i sm from the standpoint of the logic and philosqhy of science;

from the standpoint of theoretical content; and from the standpoint

of ref lexive sociology. In the f i r s t case the c r i t i c a l concern i s with

theory as a formally logical system and the strategy adopted by a theor is t

in order t o construct given empirical models, and the c r i t e r i a of veri-

f i a b i l i t y for the theoretical system as a whole. In the second case

theoretical cr i t ic ism tends t o concern i t s e l f w i t h concrete substantive

elements of a theory and the particular assumptions of a given theoretical

strategy. In the third instance cr i t ic ism i s aimed a t the infrastructural

assumptions of a sociological paradigm as a whole and the wider societal

influences bearing on the development of tha t paradigm. This third type

161

of c r i t i c i s m i s the most r e c e n t and the one which p o i n t s t o t h e con- ,

t i n u i t y i n t h e development of l a t e twen t ie th century sociology, as w e l l

as some o f t he fundamental dilemmas o f t h i s socio logy. This type p f

c r i t i c i s m concerns i t s e l f w i t h explanat ions f o r t he l a c k o f a systemati-

c a l l y c r i t i c a l s o c i a l theory; w i t h t h e almost "un ive rsa l " adopt ion i n

cu r ren t theory o f a view o f human nature which sees man as a passive

o b j e c t "responding" t o s t r u c t u r a l forces, and o r o f t h e "necessi ty" f o r

i n s t r u c t i o n a l norms and c o n t r o l s over t h e i n d i v i d u a l . This tends t o

be a c r i t i c i s m o f modern s o c i a l theory f o r i t s ambigui ty i n a r t i c u l a t i n g

the r e l a t i o n between power and m o r a l i t y . 1

Our task i n t h i s chapter i s t o c r i t i c i z e the i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l

system o f assumptions of modern s o c i a l theory, as epitomized i n t h e

thought o f T a l c o t t Parsons, b u t from t h e perspect ive of Fromrn's thought.

Our s e l e c t i o n o f t h e Parsonian system i s n o t ad hoc o r a r b i t r a r y . The

emergence and d i f f u s i o n of Parsonian s t r u c t u r a l f unc t i ona l i sm took p lace

i n the 1930s and 1940s i n t h e Uni ted States. I n terms o f content Parsonian

soc ia l theory was a synthesis o f t h e basic elements o f t h e German Romantic

and French f u n c t i o n a l i s t t r a d i t i o n s . Parsons' aim i s t o develop a con-

ceptual t h e o r e t i c a l framework which st resses t h e inward o r i e n t a t i o n of

the a c t i n g sub jec t i n teg ra ted i n t o a framework o f s o c i e t a l i n s t i t u t i o n s

and r e l a t i o n s h i p s which had a s o c i a l u t i l i t y . A s o c i a l u t i l i t y which

Parsons conceptual ized i n h i s e a r l y pe r iod as resonat ing the moral o r

normative values o f t he soc ie ty as a s o c i a l system, f o r t h e o r i e n t a t i o n

of t he a c t i n g subject . I n the words o f A l v i n Gouldner, Parsons ' pre-war

theo re t i ca l conceptua l iz ing can be viewed as an e f f o r t t o l o c a t e t h e

162

v i t a l i t y of t he socia l system i n toe "inward moral convictions of t he

individual" ra ther than the "imputed usefulness fo r o r function i n the

larger group or soc ie ty . " In this sense Parsons' ea r ly theoret ical

posture was an Americanized Romanticism and an t i -u t i l i t a r i an i sm, where

the l a t t e r i s understood i n a ch i e f l y economistic and organizational

sense . 2

A fundamental cha rac t e r i s t i c of t he Parsonian opus is the cemen-

t ing function of morality f o r the socia l system, i t i s an opus i n which

Parsons has s t ressed the individual Is in te rna l iza t ion of the moral code,

for voluntary socia l ac t ion. Gouldner has characterized Parsons' ear ly

conceptual e f f o r t s as containing a tension between u t i l i t y and morality.

This tension can be traced t o the very genesis of a socia l science attemp-

t ing t o accommodate i t s e l f t o the consolidation of middle-class power

a t the very core of bourgeois soc ie ty i n Europe, and North America.

Parsons ' combination of functional ism and voluntarism was a r e f l ec t i on , w i t h i n the idiom of technical socia l theory, of the continuing c o n f l i c t i n bourgeois cu l t u r e between u t i 1 i t y and morality or "natural r i g h t s , " and i t was an e f f o r t t o con- f r o n t and resolve this cu l tu ra l c o n f l i c t on the theoret ical level . 3

Two addit ional cha rac t e r i s t i c s of Parsons' work merit a t t en t i on

before engaging i n a f u l l e r discussion of the problem of morality i n

Parsons' thought. The f i r s t is t h a t Parsons views his theoret ical

Conceptual i za t ion a s a s c i e n t i f i c synthesis of the anti-Marxian polemic

of t h e c l a s s i ca l European period of soc ia l thought. This c l a s s i ca l

Period i s characterized by the anti-Marxian sociology of Durkheim, Weber,

Pareto and Sombart. T h u s the Parsonian opus s t a r t s w i t h the conclusions

163

of th i s anti-Marxian cr i t ique , by jgnoring the original works of Marx

and Engels. In shor t i t i s an attempt t o "expel Marxism from "true,

s c i en t i f i c sociology."4 The second point i s t ha t Parsons aimed a t a

world view, a t a method of understanding society as a to ta l system i n

terms of the interconnection of i t s ins t i tu t ions , b u t i t i s a world

view w i t h a d i s t inc t ive "ideological ident i ty ." I t i s an ideological

ident i ty which takes the posture of a synonymity between abstract tech-

n ica l i ty , detachment from the deep conf 1 i c t s of American society in the

l93Os, and s c i e n t i f i c object ivi ty . Gouldner sumnarizes Parsons ' i n t e l -

lectual stance and i t s significance and points to the c r i t i c a l infra-

s t ructural assumptions in the following terms.

Despite Parsons ' great significance for technical theory-work, there remains the paradox tha t his work seems to be detached from the world around i t . . . . Cast on i t s high level of abstraction, i t does not manifestly center on American society as such or even on industrial society more broadly. . . . I t employs a terminology tha t obviously does not coincide with tha t of everyday usage. If ever a social t heory seemed to grow only from purely technical considerations internal t o social theory, as i f born of an immaculate conception, i t i s the work of Talcott Parsons. . . . The r e a l i t y of the s i tu - a t ion , while by no means simple, i s quite d i f fe rent . What i s usually forgotten, or a t l eas t never remarked upon, i s t ha t t h i s theory actual ly emerged in the United States during the Great Depression of the l a t e 1930s. The his tor ical juxtaposition of Parsons' detached, technically engrossed theory and th i s time of turbulent t ravai l seems so sharply incongruous as t o lend almost prima fac ie p laus ib i l i ty to the assumption tha t the theory emerged independently of societal pressures. Such an appearance of social irrelevance, however, i s t o t a l ly deceptive. We must not mistake detachnient for irrelevance.5

The above statement i s a c l a s s i c assessment of the pol i t ical

and ideological subt lety of Parsonianism, the cent ra l i ty of Parsons'

Posture of science to most of American academic sociology. I t i s a l so

164

an imp1 ici t attack on most of Pars,onsJ cr i t ics , with the exception of

perhaps C. Wright Mills. This statement i s the basic justification for

~ouldner 's reflexive sociology, as well as for the task of this chapter

which i s the centrality of the problem of power and morality for any

social science.

Walter Buckley in an introductory chapter of his work Sociology

And Modern Systems Theory has suggested that the modern systems theory - concepts in physical and social science i s the culmination of "a broad

shif t in scientific perspective striving for dominance over the las t

few c e n t u r i e s . ~ ~ Buckley also traces through specific American social

scientists the contemporary sublation of the mechanical and organismic

analogies of society by the notion of society as a socio-cultural system,

which i s a complex adaptive system, which create, elaborate or change

structure as a prerequisite t o remaining viable, as ongoing systems,

rather than minimize organization (equi 1 ibrium maintenance) or preserve

a given s t r u c t ~ r e . ~ In this shift Talcott Parsons' early work The Structure

of Social Action i s viewed by b o t h Buckley and Ludwig von Bertalanffy - as a major contribution, not withstanding their criticisms of Parsons. 8

While i t i s no t my intention t o discourse on the specifics of systems

theory as expounded by Parsons over the past four decades, i t i s my inten-

tion t o argue that there is a connection between Parsons' empirical

analyses of the particular social problems which he has tackled from

time t o time, and the ultimate problems of power and morality; and in

this sense, the basis for points of comparison exist between Fromm and

Parsons. The connection within a single methodology of a systematic

approach to power and morality a t a theoret ical , analytical level , on

the one hand, and analyses of empirical problems such as fascism, on

the other hand, cannot ent i rely evade some mention of the technical the-

oret ical issues raised by Talcott Parsons. B u t these will be kept t o

a minimum.

In the f i r s t chapter of t h i s discussion the point was raised

tha t in contemporary sociology there was an increasing real izat ion tha t

rules of ver if icat ion and val idi ty with respect e i ther to particular - substantive theories or the ver if icat ion of particular elements of a given

meta-theoretical system, were subordinate t o the problems of the paradig-

matic assumptions or commitments of e i ther the Marxian conf l ic t or the

system orientations. Furthermore, t o tha t extent, the problem of 'v is ion '

or 'hope' could not be simply dismissed by sociologists as an ethical

problem. Rather i t i s a part of the area of work which comes under the

rubric of 'philosophy of the social sciences' and i s central t o meth-

o d o l ~ ~ ~ . ~ This discussion i s resumed in t h i s chapter.

The body of work termed 'philosophy of the social sciences'

include problems of methodology as well as problems of infrastructural

assumpti ons--and thereby a ref1 exive sociology. The term method01 ogy

i s used in the general sense to re fer t o questions of the nature, 'how

can the social s c i e n t i s t approach social phenomena to gain valid and

I ' t e s tab le ' comprehension of i t s elements and interrelat ions? ' Questions

t E about technique in theory building, as well as questions about the infra-

1 structural elements of a sociological paradigm, have the i r ultimate

166

of both Fromm and Parsons a r e subject t o considerations in a comparative

sense, from these perspectives, however diverse the levels of analysis

of both men may a t f i r s t appear.

The thought of Erich Fromm and Talcott Parsons reveal some

signif icant para1 1 el s . Both men developed in the t radi t ions of European

and United States sociology. They were highly influenced by the events

of the 1930s and by the Second World War, for example both attempted

analyses of fascism. Fromm and Parsons undertake an interconnection

of sociology and psychology. B u t there a r e equally important contrasts

in Fromm and Parsons. Where Fromm's work has a popular appeal t o the

lay public in American society, appearing on public newstands, nationally

and internationally, and where Fromm uses a language which appeals t o the

non-specialist, Parsons' work has no such appeal. The l a t t e r ' s work i s

scarcely read outside of academic social s c i en t i f i c c i r c l e s . The obscurity

of Parsons' s t y l e betrays a singular lack of in t e res t in communicating

his sociological meaning to the widest possible comuni ty of scholars,

th i s renders Parsons' international reputation something of a paradox.

Parsons' task has been n o t so much to develop substantive theories but

tha t of a general theory of human action, by developing "logically in te r -

related s e t s of categories and concepts which will presumably enable

theories t o be developed. " lo Consequently Parsons ' empirical writings

may appear to be somewhat peripheral t o his main task. In Parsons '

eyes these two orders of his work have not ye t fu l ly converged.

The volume and intensi ty of c r i t iques and commentaries on Parsons '

thought t e s t i f y t o the host of problems which face many of Parsons' con-

ceptual asser t ions, b u t more importantly to the general malaise in recent

167

sociological theory. Part of the,malaise has t o do with a t once wide-

spread influence of structural-functionalism in twentieth century socio-

logy and the fundamental weaknesses of t h i s orientation.' ' Vastly ela-

borated versions of some of these cr i t ic isms a r e applied to Parsons'

work also. B u t there i s a difference. F i r s t , there i s a recognition

on the part of some recent c r i t i c s tha t the Parsonian system partly

due to i t s recognition of the gap between i t s abstract and i t s empirical

statements, cannot be so easi ly dea l t w i t h . Secondly because of Parsons

early cr i t ic isms of pos i t iv i s t methodology, tha t i s his exp l i c i t re-

jection tha t the sc i en t i f i c orientation which exclusively d i rec ts i t s

attentions on the purely physical aspects of human behaviour; i t is

recognized tha t Parsons ' theoretical statements cannot be evaluated in

terms of the canons of natural science. In other words Parsons' early

assertion of the primacy of the subjective factor , of voluntarism in

human action, raised questions about c r i t i c a l c r i t e r i a which s t r e s s the

empirical referent as a basis for evaluating the Parsonian scheme. 12

The implications of th i s expl ic i t assertion for a t l eas t par t ia l evalu-

ation of the Parsonian opus continues to the present day i n sociological

theorizing. For example i n a recent commentary on Parsons scheme the

author recognizes tha t because the theory i s not intended as a complete

deductive system, "we cannot judge i t solely or even primarily in terms

of i t s production of predictive and explanatory propositions. " B u t once

we abandon these s t r i c t c r i t e r i a , we a r e faced with two c r i t i c a l per-

spectives: a ) "we can take Parsons' overall strategy, tha t of prefacing

fully theoretical work in sociology with the construction of a categorical

1 68

system, as g iven and examine the adequacy o f h i s scheme as a body o f

ca tegor i ca l knowledge'' o r b ) , "we can argue t h a t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l s t r a t e g y

i s i t s e l f misguided and u n l i k e l y t o f a c i l i t a t e the development, by which

alone i t can f i n a l l y be j u s t i f i e d , o f a f u l l t h e o r e t i c a l system. Ill 3

The problem w i t h e i t h e r o f these c r i t i c a l s t r a t e g i e s i s t h a t they have

both been observed by Parsons. F i r s t because Parsons asser ts t h a t h i s

theory i s n o t a body o f ca tegor i ca l knowledge, p r e c i s e l y t o t h e ex ten t

t h a t he i n s i s t s t h a t h i s concepts a r e i n t e n t i o n a l l y abs t rac t . A t po in ts

i n Toward General Theory - o f Ac t ion Parsons comes c l o s e t o a s s e r t i n g

t h a t h i s concepts and ca tegor ies a r e " f r e e c rea t ions o f t h e human i n -

t e l l e c t . " They a r e i n i t i a l l y more l o g i c a l models than models f o r events

o f phys ica l existence.14 Secondly because as e a r l i e r s ta ted Parsons

c o n t i n u a l l y asser ts t h a t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l system i s un in tegra ted and

incomplete. It i s worth n o t i n g t h a t bo th asser t ions a r e no t f u l l y e x p l i -

cated as t o meaning, by Parsons. What i s s i g n i f i c a n t about Mulkay's

ana lys is i s h i s t a c i t r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o come up w i t h

a body o f c r i t e r i a w i t h which t o evaluate Parsons ' a n a l y t i c a l work w i t h o u t

having t h e author say as he d i d t o Black and others t h a t they have missed

the p o i n t o f h i s work.

It i s my con ten t ion i n t h i s chapter then, t h a t due t o t h e mani fo ld

d i f f i c u l t i e s o f developing a body o f t h e o r e t i c a l c r i t e r i a which can

j u s t i f i a b l y be u t i l i z e d i n an examination o f Parsonian thought meaningful

d iscussion must be focussed on Parsons' "emp i r i ca l " w r i t i n g s , r a t h e r

than a t t he l e v e l o f h i s a n a l y t i c schemes. We can o u t l i n e the reasons

for t he adopt ion o f t h i s s t ra tegy as fol lows:

1 69

Fi r s t , a cursory examination of the volumes of c r i t i c a l material on

Parsons suggest t ha t the main d i f f i c u l t i e s stem from Parsons ' substan-

t i v e preconceptions a t the paradigmatic level , rather than from his

general orientations on the nature of theory or theoretical construction. 15

In other words to elucidate why a theor is t of Parsons' ca l ibre does not

consistently define 'order ' a t the system level of ar t iculat ion or why

his paradigmatic metaphor s h i f t s from voluntary act ion, t o s t ructural

functional ism ( i e . organicism), t o exchange and cybernetics, attention

has t o be focussed on what substantive factors in society he i s attempting

to unify or t rans la te into exchangeable terms a t the paradigmatic level

of discourse. More often than not these factors a r e in contradiction

a t the level of social experience of everyday rea l i ty . In the case of

Parsons the irreconcilables a r e power and morality.

Secondly Parsons has staunchly held tha t many of his c r i t i c s discuss

his "general theory" as though i t were complete. Parsons holds tha t

the out1 ines of his "general theory" i s continually being developed.

Parsons suggests tha t the program to develop "grand theory" cannot be

abandoned before the more empirically based "middle range theory" i s

integrated with "grand theory." In a very recent comment on the problem

Parsons asser ts :

. . . , the controversy over the virtues and vices of "grand theory" shows no sign of subsiding.16

Implicit in the context from which the preceding statement was taken,

i s Parsons ' suggestion tha t the empirical work i s also incomplete.

Moreover, Parsons i s s ta t ing more spec i f ica l ly tha t his analytical grand

add t o social science knowledge.

Finally, implicit in the foregoing argument i s the assertion

tha t Parsons' work cannot be f ina l ly and decisively shif ted, by d i n t of

theoretical c r i t iques alone, t o the forefront of sociological develop-

ment, or a1 te rna t i vely removed a1 together from th i s development--aspects

of Parsons ' work will continue to const i tute an important part of socio-

logical knowledge. As was the case with both Durkheim and Weber, an

important s t rategy of retrospective c r i t iques was the lacunae i n t he i r

I i

respective works between the i r theoretical and conceptual writings and i f t he i r "descriptive" and empirical writings. This c r i t i c a l strategy

can be applied t o Parsons b u t the attempts a t t h i s stage must focus on

I his empirical and interpret ive essays. This consideration i s given

added weight in the l igh t of the following observation by Talcott Parsons

which i s quoted in fu l l :

A t any r a t e , the whole collection [of empirical essays pub1 ished in the volume being introduced] i s meant to be presented as an example of the virtues of theoretical 'holism' in attempting t o t i e together the immense variety of phenomena which, . . . , a r e touched upon in the volume. The essential theoretical back- ground throughout i s the theory of the social system, t reat ing the concrete system not as an empirically integrated whole, b u t as a system the problems of which must be analyzed in terms of an integrated conceptual scheme. Only by following th i s path, whatever - the specif ic conceptual content of the scheme, can the various problems associated with the common categories of ' s t ruc ture ' , of ' function' , of 'process', of ' conf l i c t ' , and of 'change' be related t o each other in such a way tha t we can speak of an empirically viable 'sociological theory' and not merely of a catalogue of discrete ' theories ' each relevant only t o i t s particular subject-matter. The underlying question is, i s sociology coming t o be a science, or must i t remain a congries of d iscre te protosciences? [ I ta l ics mine117

171

The point here i s t ha t Parsons ' t a c i t l y accepts the cr i t ic isms tha t his

'conceptual scheme' i s not in f ac t integrated prior to empirical analyses

and tes t ing and tha t the content of much of the categories which comprise

th i s 'conceptual scheme' may be problematic. This i s a self-cr i t ic ism

i n s p i t e of the charges of his c r i t i c s and not necessarily because of

them.l8 Rather than claim tha t his categories a re specif ic or his con-

ceptual scheme i s theoret ical ly successful Parsons i s suggesting tha t

relevant empirical problems can only be ident i f ied specifical ly and

relevantly researched within the context of his categories. The more

intriguing question following from the imp1 ications of th i s l a t t e r asser-

t ion becomes then, not - i s Parsons ' structural -functional strategy or

his work as a whole valid, b u t why Parsons has adopted th i s strategy?

I t i s pursuing th i s l ine of inquiry tha t power and morality become focal

issues, and a demonstration of the meaning of Parsons ' work highlighted

in his empirical and interpret ive essays.

The Parsonian Definitions of Power and Morality

The intel lectual community's r e t r e a t from responsibi l i ty may have part of i t s source, paradoxically, in the way in which 'democracy' has become a subs t i tu te for rel igion in the formal accumulation process. [Robert Friedrichs, 19701

We have to subs t i tu te with the help of the Inst i tut ions the force and inf lexible just ice of the laws for personal influence. The Revolution will thus be strengthened; there will be no jealousies; there will be no pretentious claims and no calumny . . . we have . . . t o subs t i tu te the ascendancy of vir tue for the ascendancy of men. . . . Make pol i t ics powerless by reducing a l l to the cold ru le of jus t ice . [Saint-Just]

172

What took the form of a pjea and an ideal with Saint-Just takes

the form of observed r ea l i ty for Parsons. The former wanted to reduce

pol i t ics t o questions of morality, and consequently education; the l a t t e r

completed the sociological frame of reference a s a specialized frame of

reference, made the 'organization' into a type of sub-system of the

societal system and therefore a f i l t e r of the societal morality and the

morality as a generator and regulator of power. In these terms power

as a phenomenon of coercion, as an exercise of control over others,

in short , the zero-sum concept of power has become for Parsons a special

case of power, a t l eas t in "modern soc ie t ies . "19 Parsons did not easily

produce an equation of power and morality a t the conceptual level t ha t

could be consistent with his 'grand theory ambitions.' The f inal equation

of power and morality--that i s t o say his conception tha t power i s a

generalized, symbolic medium of exchange analogous to money in terms

of having as part of i t s cons t i tuent cer tain binding obligations tha t

a re exchanged in, transactions--necessi tated a gradual b u t consistent

abandonment of Parsons ' ear l ie r recognition of the hierarchical elements

of power and the zero-sum concept of power. By 1960--when Structure

And Process In Modern Societies was pub1 ished--the 'pol icy ' had become - -

a clear ly ar t iculated sub-system of the social system, pol i t ical science

a "dis t inct ive conceptual scheme" l ike economics, and the ea r l i e r am-

biguity of the ro l e of pol i t ical science in his general scheme had a l l

b u t disappeared. The following are excerpts from Parsons ' changing

definit ions of power from the 1930s to the present.

In his 1953 essay "A revised analytical approach to the theory

of social s t r a t i f i ca t ion" Parsons conceptualized power holding in teres t

173

groups within the society as a "sy~tem-unit" and suggested tha t such a

system-unit's hierarchical position cannot be only a function of i t s

''place in a scale of valuation r e l a t ive to an integrated common value

system," i n other words the power groups cannot be conceptualized as

possessing such r e l a t ive power by vir tue of i t s commitment to values

on a scale which emphasize integration of a wider value system. This

was so because in concrete terms a discrepancy exis t s between the "norma-

t ively defined ' i dea l ' ranking order and the actual s t a t e of a f f a i r s ,

in terms of the re la t ion between ranking in value terms and 'power. "'

Following th i s statement Parsons defines power as:

The r e a l i s t i c capacity of a system-unit t o actualize i t s ' in te res t s ' ( a t t a in goals, prevent undesired interference, command respect, control possessions, e tc . ) within the con- tex t of system-interaction and in th i s sense t o exert in- fluence on processes in the system.20

Although much of the discussion of the concept of power, in th i s essay,

leaves t o one s ide the transference of the exercise of power between

systems, and power not as the resu l tan t , b u t the condition for claims

to high standards of valuation, the condition for social control over

others ( a l t e r ) and f ina l ly , the control of possessions; i t attempts to

recognize authority and legitimizing as factors which are comprehendible

i n terms of the exercise of power.21 A t any r a t e t h i s Parsonian con-

I ception recognizes power as a concrete phenomenon of action orientation. !

A further complication inherent in Parsons' conception of power

1s recognized as part of h is e a r l i e s t conception, Parsons ' discussion

of authority and legitimation as d i s t i n c t from a formal definit ion of

174

power but in tegral t o empirical generalization of i t . In order t o t r a c e

the sources of t h i s concern we need t o go back t o Parsons' ea r ly work

i n The St ruc ture Of Social Action. One of t he cen t ra l sub-themes of

this analysis i s Parsons ' concern w i t h a s t a b l e system of act ion i n a

complex socie ty and the normative regulation of power fo r the regulation

o f in te rac t ion between individuals. Hobbes' zero-sum concept of power

as a means by which one individual achieved his wants, was fo r Parsons

a c l e a r sighted view. A t the same time Parsons' concern w i t h ' o rder '

and the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the "unlimited s t ruggle fo r power" led h i m t o

view the solut ion i n in tegrat ion of individual act ion or ien ta t ion i n a

common value system. This f a c t rendered i n s t i t u t i ona l norms legi t imate . 2 2

A t this s tage of ear ly formulation Parsons limited his notion

of power t o 'coercive r a t i o n a l i t y . ' Power i s a r e l a t i v e concept and

not a property of the t o t a l action system. Par t of Parsons ' c r i t i q u e

o f Hobbes here, was t h a t t h e - l a t t e r ignored a common value system which

transcends the acquis i t ion of power goals. The lack of character izat ion

o f a normative order as well as the conception of power a s means i n the

achievement of a given end a r e key weaknesses i n Hobbes which Parsons

notes. In t he second case Parsons suggested t h a t t o the extent t h a t

i t was inherent i n human act ion t h a t the act ions of some men would be a

means t o other men's ends then i t was ' r a t i o n a l ' t h a t a l l men should

des i re and seek power over one another. B u t i n this case power becomes

an end i n i t s e l f and the very e a r l i e r ends which Hobbes a r t i cu l a t ed a r e

los t .

A t t h i s point in the discussion, Parsons' focus changes from a

r i t i q u e of the substant ive issues ra ised by Hobbes t o a sociology of

175

knowledge c r i t i que of u t i l i t a r i an thought in the eighteenth and nine-

teenth centuries. Parsons suggests tha t the animus of Hobbesian philo-

sophy was for a normative order and a secular defense of individual

r ights . B u t within the dominant stream of u t i l i t a r i a n philosophy Hobbes '

work tended t o be viewed a s a l i t e r a l description of existing society.

Thus began, s t a t e s Parsons, the s h i f t from a normative to a factual

order or theory of society.23 Marx's conception of power as c lass power,

a bargaining weapon of the dominant c lass and i t s control of the i n s t i -

tutional framework i s recognized by Parsons a s a major advance on Hobbes,

but Parsons implies tha t Marx's discussion of c lass power a s a means

within the dominant inst i tut ional framework i s invalidated because the

economic process, a key factor in such control, i s invalidated by more

contemporary economic theory.

In a l a t e r work Parsons modifies the Hobbesian view of power,

"a man's present means to any future good," by suggesting tha t such

means cons t i tu te his power; "so f a r as these means a r e dependent on his

relat ions t o other actors; the correlat ive i s the obligation of a l t e r

to respect ego's r ights . "24 Here the concept of power a s an individualized

f a c i l i t y of control over others, whether t o obtain influence on another 's

action--the positive, or to guarantee the non-interference of others,

the negative--is the important consti tuent of power. A1 though we find

Parsons suggesting, expl ic i t ly as well a s implicit ly, t ha t his work on

[ the concept of power i s continuous, involving c la r i f ica t ions and allowances

for issues not specified in the Hobbesian concept of power, his changed

defini t ions a r e in f a c t discontinuous. All roads do not lead to the

176

Parsonian conceptual framework. F i r s t l y , Parsons i s saying t h a t Hobbes

intended phys ica l f o rce t o be one form o f power. Secondly, Parsons i s

saying t h a t any f a c i l i t y which ob l i ges a l t e r t o respec t ego's r i g h t s

and which ' c o n s t i t u t e ' ego's means i s possession o f ego's power. The

a n a l y t i c a l r a t i o n a l e fo r t h i s a s s e r t i o n i s Parsons' v iew t h a t p o l i t i c a l

power i s i n h e r e n t l y d i f f u s e , i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e s p e c i f i c i t y o f economic

power. He s ta tes :

This means t h a t a theory o f p o l i t i c a l power must i n t he na ture o f t he case take i n t o accou as va r iab les , most o f the v a r i - ab les o f t he s o c i a l system. hk

The meaning and s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r Parsons' concept ion o f empi r ica l p o l i t i c a l

problems i s by no means apparent f o r he i s s t a t i n g a number o f complex

and sometimes c o n t r a d i c t o r y th ings, which u l t i m a t e l y and i n terms o f

Parsons ' scheme does n o t p rov ide a systemat ic concept o f power.

One major d i f f i c u l t y i s Parsons ' ana lys i s o f t he problems o f

i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n and i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n . We w i l l examine these b r i e f l y .

On the problem o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n Parsons has two aspects t o sys-

tematize: the f i r s t i s t h a t i n complex s o c i e t i e s t h e governmental p o l i t i c a l

system c o n t r o l s and regu la tes o ther sub-systems and i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n

t h e soc ie t y . A t t he same t ime the p o l i t i c a l system de f i nes and l i m i t s

t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f means w i t h i n which p a r t i c u l a r ac to rs and groups r e a l i z e

t h e i r goal o r i e n t a t i o n s . I n o ther words through power the r i g h t s o f

i n d i v i d u a l s a r e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d . Parsons summarizes bo th the face ts

o f power as fo l lows:

The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f power t o t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f any goal- o r i e n t a t i o n o f one o r more ac to rs w i t h i n t h e s o c i a l system

i s a function of the extensity of the system of actual or potential exchange relationships through which i t ramifies .26

Before dealing with the problems of the ambiguity of the foregoing formu-

lation either as analytical or empirical referent, two further aspects

are worthy of note. One i s the universalization or generalization of

norms which transcend the particularity of specific relationships.

Breakdown of particularistic t i e s i s the f i r s t condition of extension of the power sys tem .27

The other i s the system's definition of what i s regarded as a legitimate

choice of means, that i s t o say, the 1 imits on individuals over the use

of force, fraud and 'control of organization. ' In other words the legi-

timate authority to arbitrate the conflicts between parties i s a function

of the institutionalization of power.

Parsons summarizes his concept of power, a t this point in his

intel lectual career, by suggesting that economic power i s '1 ineal ly

quantitative, ' while political power i s hierarchical.

Uhile the structure of economic power i s , . . . lineally quantitative, simply a matter of --- more and less, that of political power i s hierarchical; that i s , of higher - and lower levels. The greatest power i s power over the lesser, not merely more power than the lesser. . . . This i s perhaps another way of stating the diffuseness of political power, in that i t i s a mobilization of the total relational context as ~ a - fac i l i ty relative to t h e < o i i - i ~ s ~ ~ t a l ics mine]

We can now resume discussion of the ambiguity of meanings of

Parsons' concepts of power in the above formulation. The main weakness

of the formulation i s not Parsons' assertion of the generalizing quality

178

of pol i t ica l power, in contrast to, the spec i f ic i ty of economic power;

b u t non-human tendency of th i s generalization. Parsons views the nature

of economic power in the social sub-system as a d i s t i n c t 'product' of

pol i t ical power which i s in turn a mobilization of the to ta l re lat ional

context. This i s simply an analytical formulation of the notion t h a t

"power comes from the people." From th i s simple assertion Parsons specif ies

two processes which changes the picture: the inst i tut ional izat ion and

universalization of norms and the integration in organizational and

regulative terms of a l l the component sub-systems of the society. In

a l l th i s Parsons recognizes the crucial focus on the modern nation s t a t e

but says v i r tua l ly nothing def in i t ive about who controls the s t a t e , how

the s t a t e comes to have t h i s cent ra l i ty , or how the regulative i n s t i -

tutional processes which guarantees the s t a t e from "particularism" and

defines the conditions of economic exchange are arrived a t , much less

maintained. On the nature of the mobilization toward the modern s t a t e

Parsons s tates:

Since a b i l i t y to use force in i t s re la t ion to t e r r i t o r i a l i t y i s one ultimate focus of power in t h i s sense, [in the sense of force being a form of power along a continuum which includes 'fraud ' , purchasing power ' , the abuse of control of organi za- t i o n ' , and even 'expressive symbolism') the control of the use and organization of force r e l a t ive to t e r r i to ry i s always a crucial focus of the pol i t ica l power system, in one sense the crucial focus. I t i s t h i s which gives the s t a t e i t s central position in the power system of a complex society. I t i s in turn the functional need t o organize the power system re l a t ive to force and t e r r i to ry which gives control of the machinery of governmental organization i t s s t ra teg ic position as a proximate goal of emulation for power.29

I t i s through the modern s t a t e then, t ha t inter-sub-system

integration i s achieved, but t h i s i s done by pol i t ic ians, t h i s Parsons

179

f a i l s t o make expl ici t , rather he ygges ts t h a t the generalization of

t h i s function i s dependent on the "level of universalism." In t h i s

very paragraph Parsons suggests further tha t the ins t i tu t iona l iza t ion

of economic power i s focussed on the maintenance of the conditions of

reciprocal exchange transactions and of the generalization of

transactions. Equal ly however insti tutional ization of economi

includes insulation of large concentrations of economic power

'undue influence' as f ac i l i t i e s for the exercise of pol i t ica l

Once again the question here i s n o t so much tha t such insulat i

these

c power

from "having

power. 1130

on i s

h is tor ica l ly impossible within the context of modern pol i t ica l democracies,

rather i t i s tha t Parsons apart from asserting tha t economic power cannot

be diffused and that economic exchange conditions take place under r ig id ly

defined conditions; does n o t analytically specify how these regulative

mechanisms exis t . Such an analytical c la r i f ica t ion i s crucial t o Parsons '

concluding theme which i s the notion tha t pol i t ical power integrates

into a coherent system of 'legitimized authority ' and 'col lect ive res-

ponsibi 1 i ty . ' His ear l ier assertion therefore tha t economic or purchasing

power has a cer tain scope b u t one that r e s t r i c t s the 'purchasing' of

fraud, force and abuse as a means to gaining pol i t ical power advantages

i s not demonstrated in The Social System. We can regard i t as Parsons '

preferred mode of analytical art iculation and no more. This preferred

mode of analogizing and expression has a personal referent in Parsons'

ideological commi tment "traditional 1 iberal ism" of the eighteenth and

nineteenth century variety. A t a d i s t inc t level i t i s a preference which

hinges on Parsons ' conception of man. While i t i s not necessary t o

probe deeply ei ther of these levels a t t h i s stage to bring out more

c lear ly the relat ion between power and morality which Parsons ' draws,

i t i s worth noting tha t there i s a c ~ n n e c t i o n . ~ ' Approaches to th i s

connection from both these perspectives would take us f a r a f ie ld from

our original ' s t ra tegy ' in th is chapter. B u t there i s another problem.

However much the essays of Hacker and Winter provide general guides

to an understanding of the significance of the underlying problems of

Parsons' conception of power, they a re s t i l l simplifications in one

sense tha t becomes clearer from the foregoing analysis. Parsons does

not fu l ly disparge the zero-sum concept of power, for in the concept

presented above Parsons defini t ion of power i s not fu l ly committed t o a

functional i s t conception of power, whatever his orientational aims.

This i s one lacuna in Parsons.

A Critique of: "On The Concept of Pol i t ical Power"

"On The Concept Of Pol i t ical Power" i s generally regarded as

Parsons' main attempt a t a c lear conception of power. As was remarked

e a r l i e r , Parsons was from the outset concerned with power and morality,

but there i s a difference between his ea r l i e r statements and the one

presently under consideration. In his ea r l i e r work Parsons looked a t

power and morality as aspects shaping s t r a t i f i c a t i o n categories of

contemporary soc ie t ies . B u t in these early e f for t s Parsons adopted a

less ambitious conceptual strategy and therefore did not asser t the

para1 l e l ism of economic and pol i t ical theory character is t ic of "On The

Concept Of Pol i t i ca l Power. " In terms of the earl i er e f f o r t power was a

181

"residual category" of d i f fe rent ia l valuation. Specifically a variety

of value systems was viewed as providing jus t i f ica t ions of why discrimi-

nation and d i f fe rent ia l access of individuals to the s tatuses , ro les ,

incomes and so on, was legitimate. Parsons suggested s i x bases of

d i f fe rent ia l valuation of which power was one.32 This was clear ly a

structural-functional i s t conception of social s t r a t i f i c a t i o n b u t power

was s t i l l a phenomena a t the f a c i l i t y of individuals, a means in the

conventional sense, rather than a 'generalized medium. ' More importantly

however the equivalence of power and morality character is t ic of his

l a t e r conception i s lacking. Parsons did not view a l l normative orien-

ta t ions and normative patterns of action as relevant to the moral sen t i -

ments governing d i f fe rent ia l ranking in general terms. Though moral

evaluation was the central c r i te r ion of d i f fe rent ia l ranking, i t was

imp1 i c i t in Parsons tha t moral evaluation was t o some extent defined

by the competing individuals, a retrospective process, a rat ional izat ion

i n Weber's terms, rather than something which 'defined the s i tua t ion of

action. ' The discontinuity between the implications of the ea r l i e r and

l a t e r conceptions of power give significance to th i s view and to the

shaping of Parsons' thoughts on power. In the early essay Parsons held

tha t moral superiority was the object of an "empirically specif ic a t t i t ude , "

and tha t the place of moral evaluation in a s t r a t i f i ca t ion system was

determined by the place of moral evaluation in the "theory of action."

Then Parsons suggests tha t moral evaluation i s a main aspect of the

broader phenomenon of "normative orientation": ". . . , since not a l l

normative patterns which are relevant t o action are the objects of moral

182

sentiments. "33 While i t i s accurpte then to say tha t for Parsons the

"social world i s primarily a moral world and social r e a l i t y i s a moral

r ea l i ty , " and equally that "social ex i t " i s dysfunctional and unreal,

i t i s cer tainly not accurate to hold tha t non moral norms a r e ei ther

neglected or "only marginal " t o Parsons. More importantly the Parsonian

morality was in his ea r l i e r formulation subsumed under the more equivocal

normative^.^^ The wider encompassing of the world as a moral en t i ty

had t o await the 1963 generalization of power and i t s equation with

economics.

There i s a fundamental s h i f t in Parsons' thought with reference

t o power. I t i s a s h i f t in focus from individual goal orientations t o

the ' co l lec t iv i ty . A h i l e th i s s h i f t commits Parsons to a peculiar

holism with basic imp1 ications for a r ig id i f ica t ion for the conceptions

of social evil and morality which closely approximates Gouldner ' s s t a t e -

ment on Parsons (quoted above), i t a l so entrenches these concepts within

Parsons' analytical-theoretical framework. In i s in t h i s sense of in-

creasingly entrenched concepts which fur thers the r ig id i ty of the overall

framework tha t Parsons' particular notions of evil as focussed on power

and morality a r e interwoven into the corpus of his work as a whole.

These concepts cannot therefore be fu l ly extricated from th i s framework,

without seriously d is tor t ing Parsons ' meaning of ' ev i l , ' power and morality.

An a1 ternative approach will be adopted, t ha t i s t o discuss "On The

Concept of Pol i t ical Power" as a basis for presenting the problems of his

1 major interpret ive essays.

Parsons does not subscribe to the view tha t power in the "individual

183

views the 'po l i ty ' as a system o f ,d i r ec t empirical reference for the

analysis of power in modern society. I t i s a sub-system which parallel

in terms of i t s character is t ics as the economy.35 Parsons sees the

polity as composed "of the ways in which the relevant components of the

to ta l system a re organized with reference to one of i t s fundamental

functions, namely effect ive col lect ive action in the attainment of the

goals of c ~ l l e c t i v i t i e s . ' ' ~ ~ Parsons a s se r t s a t the s t a r t of the essay

tha t he i s only prepared to regard as power the exchange relat ions between

two or more systematically related co l l ec t iv i t i e s which have suf f ic ien t ly

mobilized organizational resources in arriving a t the i r goals.

The analogy of the polity and the economy a re important in the

following ways:

F i r s t , because i t i s the point of departure for a polemical c r i t ique

against C. Wright Mil ls ' work on power re la t ion in contemporary America.

I t i s an argument against the zero-sum concept, a concept of which Parsons

is not a t a l l c lear i n his early discussions of power. After ca l l ing

Mills a 'utopian individual is t ," Parsons s tates:

. . . . The dominant tendency in the l i t e ra tu re , for example in Lasswell and C. Wright Mills, i s to maintain expl ic i t ly or implici t ly tha t power i s a zero-sum phenomenon, which i s to say tha t there i s a fixed 'quantity' of power in any relat ional system. . . . There a re of course res t r ic ted contexts in which t h i s condition holds, but I shal l argue tha t i t does not hold for to t a l systems of a suff ic ient level of complexity.37

Second, because Parsons aims t o r e l a t e the coercive and consensual aspects

of power without subordinating one to the other.

Thirdly, because the policy has three "operative contexts" which gives

i t the resemblance of the economy, these are:

184

a ) the polity can adjust t o the 'demands ' of the groups in the

society over whom power i s exercised. Moreover tha t these 'demands1

emerge outside of the polity i t s e l f ,

b) the 'resources' for the exercise of power must be mobilized

within the polity,

c ) there a re processes whereby the ' factors of production' within

the polity can be combined creatively in the l i g h t of the u t i l i t y of out-

puts of the pol i t ica l s ~ b - s ~ s t e m . ~ ~ Parsons suggests tha t j u s t as 'value

reference' in economics i s u t i l i t y , a factor which applies equally t o

producers and consumers, the factor of effectiveness i s the value reference

in pol i t i ca l sub-systems. Further Parsons asser t s tha t the "goal -demandsu

of in t e res t groups, tha t i s t o say the pol i t ica l demands of groups in

the society, i s another factor , l i ke effectiveness, which has para1 l e l

s ta tus t o consumers wants in economic analysis.

Fourth, 1 i ke economic analysis, pol i t i ca l analysis has a central place

for a generalized medium. In economic analysis i t i s money, in pol i t ica l

analysis i t i s power, which i s the generalized medium. For the foregoing

reasons then, Parsons s t a t e s tha t power i s the generalized medium of the

polity, in a sense d i rec t ly parallel in i t s logical s t ructure to money

in the economic process. I t i s a means of acquiring the ' factors of

effectiveness, ' but power i s not the same as one of the ' factors of

effectiveness. ' Power then in the Parsonian sense, c i rculates within

the policy, b u t into other sub-systems of society as well, such as the

judiciary, the police and other areas of the integrative sub-system;

the cu l tu ra l , educational and social izat ion agencies of the pattern-

maintenance sub-system; and the economic or adaptive sub-system. 3 9

185

Apart from the v i ta l assumptions of ' f r ee competition' and a I

presumed level of knowledge and rational choice which led the 'c lassical

economists' t o accept ' u t i l i t y ' and 'consumers wants ' as 'givens' for

economic analysis, Parsons i s equally wrong in postulating 'effectiveness '

and 'goal demands ' as given for his pol i t ical analysis. He begs the

question, and in so doing presumes as 'given' the very things which he

se t s out t o analyse, t h a t i s the relationship between power as a c i r -

culating medium and a level of morality or normative orientations, in

complex soc ie t ies . I t i s ironic tha t he should s t a t e , soon a f t e r adum-

brating the factors of the 'operative context' of power; t ha t we should

not mistake power with the ' factors of effect iveness , ' one of which i s

morality, when he has jus t finished doing precisely that . Whereas in

classical economics the major ro le of advertising as a form of psycho-

logical coercion could not have been anticipated in the postulation of

consumers ' wants and u t i l i t y , Parsons cannot be said to be ignorant of

the unspecified underlying forces which determine, and sometimes produce

'consti tuent demands ' in the modern polity. We must assume then, t ha t

Parsons del iberately constructed a c i rcu lar model being in ten t on asser t ing

coercion whether physical or otherwise as an analytically d i s t i n c t form

of power.

The remainder of th i s analysis will focus on Parsons general

treatment of coercion and consensus, of which the zero-sum concept of

power i s treated as a particular variant. Parsons asser ts tha t power

has both coercion and consensus as aspects, when conceptualized as a

c irculat ing medium. This i s another way of saying that the particular

186

groups, inst i tut ions and agencies, including the mili tary and pol ice

which apparently have power--the generalized capacity "to secure the

performance of binding obligations by units in a system of col lect ive

organization when the obligations a r e legi timized with reference t o the i r

bearing on col lect ive goals" and where there i s recalcitrance negative

sanctions can be imposed--are dealing in a medium which has 'exchange,'

but no 'use' value. Further, Parsons s t a t e s tha t power i s an exchange

value in so f a r as i t s proper functioning i s dependent in the f inal

analysis, neither on ascr ipt ive obligations nor on barter re la t ions .

Exchange i s ra ther dependent on a s tab le " inst i tut ional ized confidence

i n the power system. ,140

Parsons ' strategy i s t o p u t the focus of power on the capacity

to secure compliance as a generalized feature of power relat ions and

the function of 'sanctioning a c t s ' as a generalized aspect of th i s

re lat ion. Force, then,is not the single functioning sanction. Force

i s an agency of enforcement, for binding obligations . Para1 l e l ing th i s

generalized feature of compliance, Parsons suggests tha t the power holder,

so called, has nothing b u t a s e t of 'expectations' tha t he can invoke

cer tain obl i gations, b u t 1 egi timation of these expectations i s part of

power. Legitimation then functions in the same manner as confidence

in mutual acceptabili ty and s t a b i l i t y of the monetary unit in economic

systems. In these terms, force and legitimacy ex i s t in inverse relat ion-

ship to each other. Force i s a means of gaining compliance, b u t the

in t r ins ica l ly most effect ive means of coercion. Parsons summarizes th i s

point as follows:

. . . power cannot be only aq in t r ins ica l ly effect ive deterrent; i f i t i s t o be the generalized medium of mobilizing resources for effect ive col lect ive action, and for the fulf i l lment of comrni tments made by co l l ec t iv i t i e s . . . ; i t too mus t be both symbolically generalized, and leg i timized.41

Parsons extends his analysis within the context of two general paradigms:

the i n p u t of "factors of production" from di f ferent parts or sub-systems

of the social system and inputs to the social system;

of strategy. The point here i s t ha t Parsons t r i e s to

point, namely tha t within integrated systems most pol

a r e based not on force, b u t on an inst i tut ional ized n

Whereas the relat ions between national col l ect ivi t i e s

more general s t ra teg ies of "situational i nducements , "

and four types

demonstrate a s imp1 e

i t i c a l re lat ions

ormati ve order.

only r e s t s on the

and "intentional

persuasion" where both countries enjoy friendly relat ions. However

where the general re lat ions a re ambiguous or a t issue, the power systems

are more vulnerable to expl ic i t resor t t o threats of coercive sanctions

and ' i n t r in s i ca l ly ' effect ive measures, tha t i s force.

The c r i t i c a l point, a t which the inst i tut ional integration of power systems i s most vulnerable t o s t r a in , and t o degeneration in to reciprocating threats of the use force, i s between t e r r i - t o r i a l l y organized pol i t ical systems. . . .

In t h i s connection i t should be recognized tha t the possession, the mutual threa t , and possible use of force only in a most proximate sense the principal 'cause' of war. i e

This i s in e f fec t a sc i en t i f i c rationale for the modern nation s t a t e

for Parsons s t a t e s tha t the "effective" management of the power system

l ike tha t of the monetary system must be integrated into the ins t i t u -

tional ization of pol i t ical power and the monopol ization of physical

force. Not only does Parsons go beyond Max Weber in not d i f fe rent ia t ing

188

between power, domination and legj timacy, he also derives h is def ini t ion

of democratic systems from the nature and functioning of the existing

ins t i tu t ions . Secondly, a1 though Parsons maintains throughout the

cent ra l i ty of infrastructural moral systems and consequently the function

of inst i tut ional ized norms, neither the moral system nor the norms sense

any end in themselves. They faci 1 i t a t e orderly exchange between units

in the system. Yet Parsons recognizes, a t l eas t implicit ly, t ha t d i f fe rent

units in the social system may give differ ing interpretat ions to the

moral codes of the social system, hence his recognition tha t differentials

in commitments t o col lect ive goals may ex i s t . This i s not only the case

w i t h those on whose behalf goals a re ,a r t icu la ted b u t a lso those in the

higher echelons of power and authority. Parsons recognizes th i s b u t

suggests tha t compliance appl i es to both subordinates and superordinates . He is not correct when he suggests, however, t ha t the norm i s tha t binding

obligations "can clear ly be 'invoked' by lower-order against higher-order

agencies. "43

Despite t h i s ins ti t u t i onal i zed domination, Parsons ho1 ds tha t

there i s no evidence from examination of empirical problems to conclude

as C. Wright Mills does tha t there i s a trend toward hierarchization

in the to t a l social system because there are two d i f fe rent principles

a r i s ing from the generalization of the medium of power, though not from

the hierarchy of authority. The f i r s t i s the 'equality of the franchisei

which i s a control on d i f fe rent ia l power 'from above.' The second i s

equality of opportunity which i s a control from below. 44

Parsons summarizes his essay by asserting tha t the interchange

between the polity and the integrative sub-system, tha t i s the system

189

which functions to organize and 1,egi timize authority, can be conceived

as a c i rcu lar flow system, in terms of the analogue of modern banking

systems. This 'c i rcular flow system' i s a way of characterizing democratic

electoral systems. Here the elected leadership i s in a position analogous

to that of the banker. In a p lu ra l i s t i c society the freedom of the

leadership to make binding decisions i s confined t o the c i rcu lar flow

system. Here a balance would tend t o e x i s t between the people's input

of power through the channels of pol i t ical support, and the 'output '

through pol icy decisions t o in t e res t groups which have specif ical ly

demanded these decisions. This freedom gives the leadership the f a c i l i t y

t o create 'power c red i t s . ' They do t h i s through use of influence which

derives from the 'prestige of of f ice . ' This element of c red i t creation

i s on a dimension of ' inflation-deflation. ' Parsons characterizes the

McCarthy era in the United States as the equivalent of a deflationary

trend, with McCarthy demanding a l iquidation of a l l other pol i t ica l

commitments in favour of the national pr ior i ty . This l i ne of analysis

indicates Parsons ' movement to an increasing moral r e l a t iv i ty--he suggests I

t ha t there i s a f ine l i n e between so l id , responsible leadership and poli-

t i ca l recklessness . 45 The fundamental significance of Parsons ' conceptual i s a t i on of

the ins t i tu t iona l iza t ion of action orientations had to await his a r t icu-

la t ion of power.46 Consequently we find Parsons asser t ing tha t the

"problem of evil " in society has to do with undeserved suffering in

terms of the current value system, and to the "actual existence of un-

punished behavior in contravention of the moral norms of the society,"

190

. . . And y e t Parsons views mortality in terms of public and private

or informal spheres, with the increasing differentiation of society

producing informal c r i t e r i a for definitions of morality. For instance

i n discussing morality in complex societies, Parsons s tates:

There i s a moral issue only when the alternatives involve a presumption of relevance to the ' integri ty ' or the ' so l idar i ty ' of an interaction system when the pres rvation of that integri ty or sol idar i ty i s i t s e l f a value. 47

One of the significant lacunae in Parsons' thought i s imp

be1 ief tha t morality i s coextensive with rea l i ty . If we define m

1 i c i t

oral i ty

as being rooted in the "scarcity and contingency of desired objects and

performances. "48 According to Alvin Gouldner, moral claims a r e rhetorical

and made by Ego t o mobilize Alter 's motives for complying with his wants,

"without express reference to the manner in which the situation will be

changed by improved benefits or by avoided costs." Morality i s a t a c i t

promise of mutuality of grat i f icat ion and therefore obligations and

r ights for the parties subject to i t . Consequently there a re ambiguities

and vulnerabi l i t ies inherent in a l l moral systems. Gouldner in a relent-

l e s s a t tack on Parsons suggests that the l a t t e r wants to have his "moral

norms without paying the Posi t ivis t price of a deterministic universe."

What is wrong with Parsons ' conceptions of power and morality i s tha t

he n o t only refuses non-morally sanctioned power, and yet power and

morality a r e only sociologically recognized where they a re inst i tut ional ized.

This renders superflous both his concepts of consensus and legitimation

as processes. How can Parsons examine sociologically socially in s t i t u -

tional ized patterns of deviance such as Nazism and McCarthyism, with

191

such conceptions? In b o t h cases ppwer and legitimacy were existent.

Parsons makes explicit that forms of coercion are n o t power i f they

are not legitimized or justified. A1 though Parsons recognizes those w h o

possess power sometimes f a i l to discharge the rights of others, he i s

not prepared to see this as patterned, and ,therefore that default on

moral obligations may be due to the very possession of power. Ignoring

this facet leads Parsons to the implicit view that possession of power

i s right and sanctified. 49

Parsons ' Empirical and Interpretive Essays

We come now t o the final section of th is chapter: an evaluation

of Parsons' empirical and interpretive essays, in terms of his earl ier

discussed pronouncements on power and morality. The main contention in

this section i s that in his more empirical essays Parsons has not demon-

strated t h a t he has gained any unique insights from the complex and often

convoluted discussion of basic concepts such as power and political inter-

action. Parsons' empirical essays are scattered throughout his career

b u t I will select for focus his two essays on Nazism because they best

highlight the differences between Parsons and Erich Fromm, also because

both essays were published about the same time as Fromm's major work,

Escape From Freedom. The la t ter work was of course, prompted partly

by the emergence of fascism in Europe.

In the essays of Parsons and Erich Fromm the fundamental problem

i s focussed on explanations for the emergence of fascism and Nazism.

I n the case of fascism an implicit analytical distinction i s drawn from

Nazism. B u t the similarity in attempts end here, for whereas Fromm accepts

192

t h e general t h e s i s t h a t fascism, ,as ' r a d i c a l i s m o f t he r i g h t ' i s deeply

roo ted i n t h e s t r u c t u r e of Western s o c i e t y as a whole, and l oca tes t h i s

rootedness i n t h e charac ter s t r u c t u r e o f modern man: Fromm does n o t

b e l i e v e t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t a r i a n s o c i a l charac ter i s due t o anomie, o r t h e

l a c k o f i n t e g r a t i o n o f man w i t h s t a b l e i n s t i t u t i o n a l pa t te rns , as does

Parsons. On t h e cont rary , Fromm's t h e s i s argues t h a t t h e so-ca l led

anomie was an h i s t o r i c a l problem which Western man reso lved s ince t h e

Reformation by abandoning choice, t o a l a r g e e x t e n t by conformi ty .

This leads Fromm then t o p lace l e s s emphasis on t h e apparent d i f f e r e n c e s

between s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s i n Europe and North America and more emphasis

on the c o n t i n u i t i e s between s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e and personal i t y and charac ter

i n any g iven i n d u s t r i a l soc ie t y . I n o ther words, Fromm conceptual izes

fasc ism as t h e t w e n t i e t h century man i fes ta t ion , w i t h Nazism as an i n s t i -

t u t i o n a l i z e d , s t a t e i ns t ru rnen ta l i za t i on o f these forces. This manifes-

t a t i o n o f t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m i s j u s t as l i k e l y t o emerge i n t he Uni ted

States, i n a d i s t i n c t form, as i n any o f t h e o ther h i g h l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d

European s o c i e t i e s . More impor tan t l y Fromm does n o t regard as h i s t o r i c a l l y

s i g n i f i c a n t t he f a c t t h a t o v e r t t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m has no emerged i n t h e

Uni ted States. Parsons does, though he recognizes some s t r u c t u r a l s i m i -

l a r i t i e s between Nazi Germany and the U. S. o f t h e 1940s, and he s t a t e s

t h a t t h e psychological response t o endemic anomie i s "submission t o

some s t rong a u t h o r i t y and r i g i d system o f b e l i e f , " i n which the i n d i v i d u a l

f i n d s a measure o f escape.'' I f Parsons takes s e r i o u s l y h i s asse r t i ons

t h a t t he re a r e s t r u c t u r a l and psychological s i m i l a r i t i e s i n Western

s o c i e t y t o the degree t h a t he i d e n t i f i e s them how does he e x p l a i n the

193

" i n t r i n s i c uniqueness" o f Nazism as a un ique ly German phenomenon? For I

he suggests t h a t Nazism o r t o t a l i t a r i a n processes l i k e i t cou ld n o t

emerge i n the Uni ted States and c r i t i c i z e s 'Marx is t w r i t e r s ' f o r sugges-

t i n g t h a t it could. When we pursue t h i s l i n e o f ana lys i s i t becomes

poss ib le t o recognize t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e stance o f Parsons essays over

t ime- - fo r example the connect ion between t h e conclusions of t he essays

present ly ,d iscussed and h i s work on McCarthyism and pat te rns o f v o t i n g

behaviour i n the Uni ted States, and so on. 5 1

The p o i n t o f departure f o r Parsons t h e s i s w i t h respec t t o t h e

s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e o f Pre-Nazi Germany i s an a n t i - r a d i c a l c r i t i q u e . I t

i s one i n which Parsons i s saying t h a t t he re a r e g rea t resemblances i n

t h e economy and i n s t i t u t i o n a l apparatuses o f Germany and t h e Uni ted

States, b u t t h a t t he causes o f Nazism i n Germany l i e a t t h e s u b t l e r

i n s t i t u t i o n a l l e v e l s . Parsons s ta tes :

I t w i l l , by c o n t r a s t ( t o M a r x i s t w r i t e r s who view the emergence o f some form o f Nazism i n t h e Un i ted States as q u i t e poss ib le ) w i t h t h a t view, be the thes i s of t h e present ana lys is t h a t a divergence o f p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n so fundamental as t h a t a t present developing between the f a s c i s t and 1 i b e r a l -democratic s o c i e t i e s must go back t o deeper s t r u c t u r a l sources than t h i s view would indicate.52

An eva lua t ion o f Parsons1 essay on f a s c i s t movements w i l l be

undertaken f i r s t and h i s conclusions on Nazism placed w i t h i n t h a t con tex t

because l i k e most other w r i t e r s on the subject , Parsons recognizes fascism

i n Europe as t h e more general socio1ogica1 phenomena. F i r s t o f a l l ,

as was e a r l i e r s ta ted Parsons takes the view t h a t fascism i s deeply

roo ted i n t h e i n t e r n a l s t r a i n s and c o n f l i c t s o f Western soc ie ty . Parsons

attempts an ana lys i s o f t h e cause o f fasc ism a t a number o f l eve ls ,

the key ones being the historica

psycho1 ogi cal . He suggests tha t

discontinuous with the conservat

runs as follows:

194

1 , the modern social s t ructural and the

fascism i s a radical response which i s

ism of pre-1914. Parsons explanation

Fascism i s a particular response led by 'privileged e l i t e groups '

with 'vested interests ' in the i r position. I t i s the i r response t o

anomie.53 In th i s sense Parsons conceives a constant re1 ation between

fascism and 'vested interests ' but the vested in teres ts identified are

the t radi t ional feudal and semi-feudal remnants from an ea r l i e r agricul-

tural society, and the lower middle classes from contemporary capitalism.

B u t Parsons i s not fu l ly committed to th is explanation and leaves the

matter open by asserting tha t what specif ic groups a r e involved i s a

matter of the particular s t ructural s i tua t ion in the society in question. 54

The imp1 ication however i s tha t they are economical ly deprived.

Parsons suggests tha t the his tor ical factors "causing" fascism

go back in the f i r s t place t o the Industrial Revolution and the conse-

quences of the change from predominantly agricul tural t o industrial and

commercial soc ie t ies , with the attendant growth of migration t o and

rapid expansion of c i t i e s . The growth of migration has meant d i f f i c u l t

processes of assimilation to d i f fe rent cul tural se t t ings .

Another his tor ical factor i s frequent economic instabi 1 i ty ,

characterized by cyclical fluctuations and unemployment. Another source

of constant change i s changes in fashion, dress and t a s t e , as well as

ideas, po l i t ica l and cul tura l . A major change here i s the debunking of

t radi t ional ideas, va1 ues and re1 i gi ous patterns. 55

The s t ruc tura l factors aye characterized by the following con-

dit ions: a ) the processes of ra t iona l iza t ion which can be found i n the

changing patterns of science and technology. These forces r ad i a t e t o

change rapidly the occupational ro les of men's l i ve s as well as t h e i r

private 1 ives, patterns of consumption and. recreat ion. Such changes

necessi tate an abandonment of t rad i t iona l o r ien ta t ion pat terns .

b) Another source of s t ruc tura l change is t h a t of 'contractural r e l a t i on -

ships. ' Parsons summarizes t h i s aspect as fol lows:

Contracturalism overlaps widely w i t h the use of money and the wide extension of market re la t ionships .56

Parsons i so la tes the segregation of occupational ro les from kinship

and local t i e s , par t icular ly i n large-scale socia l organization as a

crucial process i n t h i s contractualism.

The th i rd factor , the psychological and ideological imp1 icat ions

of these processes of change, is t he f i na l one i n Parsons' analys is .

One form of ideological change i s manifested i n 'movements of the l e f t . '

Parsons characterizes t h i s a s par t of the i n t e l l e c tua l movement which

debunked ignorance and supers t i t ion on the one hand as well as the tyranny

of monopoly capital ism on the other.57 In other words, t he range of

the psychological reaction has tended t o be both an a t t ack on t he t r ad i -

tional order and a "naive ra t ional i s t i c topianism. " Another psycho-

logical reaction i s the "fundamentalist" type where aggression has turned

toward the symbols of ' r a t iona l iza t ion ' which a r e seen t o be subversive

of t radi t ional values. I n other words fascism i s par t ly an outgrowth

of t h i s fundamentalist react ion, but one which finds a great bo l s te r

196

in nationalism. In Parsons ' wordq nationalism i s the "lowest common

denominator o f t r ad i t iona l i s t i c sentiments. ,158

Parsons suggests, in conclusion, tha t vested in teres t groups

feeling insecure by the increasing attacks on privileged positions ,

by which he means r igid s t r a t i f i ca t ion , from organized labour reacted by

supporting an older t radi t ional society. He suggests that fascism did

not a r i se in the United States because i t would have t o combat the power

of the symbols of l iber ty , democracy and the r ights of the individual

which stem from the En1 ightenment of the eighteenth century.

Parsons' analysis i s general t o such an extent that i t i s t rue

of almost a l l modern societ ies . For example his explanation of why

fascism did not emerge in the United States does not withstand rigorous

scrutiny. For i t i s just as t rue to suggest tha t the slogans of the

En1 ightenment of the eighteenth century were to some extent ins t i t u -

t ionalized in the socio-polit ical s t ructure of France. In terms of

ideology the very nationalism which provided the basis for the support

of fascism do not in many cases ant idate the general spread of Enlighten-

ment. So tha t i n t h i s respect the United States, a t l eas t in theory,

has no special a t t r ibu te .

B u t Parsons ' analysis i s weak on another important ground, tha t

is his asser t ion tha t fascism i s an ideology which does not antidate

1914. More rigorous studies have shown tha t on parts of the European

continent such as Germany and France f a sc i s t ideological elements a re

I present since the 1870s. J. L . Carsten in a recent work, for a l l i t s

I other shortcomings dispels through rigorous his tor ical research the

notion tha t fascism was the raisop d e t r e of the threatened lower middle

classes and suggests tha t most of

movements were respectable academ

tural conditions for fascism were

and the social changes a f t e r 1918

chapter dealing w i t h the pre-1914

the founders of f a s c i s t and pre-fascist

ics and professionals but tha t the s t ruc-

the increasing concentration of capitalism

were a ca ta lys t . He s t a t e s i n one

s i tuat ion:

The extreme r igh t wing movements from the l a t e r nineteenth century onwards affected a l l major countries on the European continent. These groups and part ies had much in common. They were not only nat ional is t and expansionist, but a t the same time ant i - l ibera l , anti-parliamentarian, anti-democratic and anti-freemason, as well as outside l taly--anti-~emetic.59

The same author goes on to show that ' in almost every case examined fascism

was in i t i a t ed and supported in the large urban areas and by groups which

had economically and s tatus wise the most t o gain from rat ional izat ion

and industr ia l izat ion. Parsons however does not want t o indict growing

capitalism, for th i s would r a i s e questions about the "moral i n s t i tu -

t ional izat ion of norms" of U. S. society, a society which Parsons repeats

time and again i s democratic in a unique manner. Moreover another factor

which i s dominant i n fascism, racialism and which has serious implications

for the nature of the social s t ructure would have t o be re-examined

by Parsons. There i s a further lack of spec i f ic i ty which weakens Parsons

analysis. The s t r e s s on the mass nature of f a s c i s t movements and the

ro le of residual t radi t ional groups tend t o ignore two v i t a l features

of f a s c i s t 'seizure of power' in I ta ly and Germany. The f i r s t i s tha t

i n a l l cases the majority of the followers of the movement were manipulated

in to support of sk i l l fu l leaders and therefore the real ba t t les for

198

power took place not in the s t r ee t s b u t in ministries and government

buildings. In th i s sense f a sc i s t movements were much less romantic

from the vantage point of the leadership and more so challenges for

s t a t e power. The second i s tha t in many cases the old ruling c lass ,

as for example in Germany, and in England were under attack from f a s c i s t

par t ies . The explanation of anomie which Parsons views as stemming

from threatened vested in teres ts i s therefore tenuous. Again Cars ten

s t a t e s :

Once in power, they (the f a s c i s t leaderships) naturally had to use many of the old experts, c i v i l servants and generals, b u t these were no longer in command. They received the i r 'marching orders ' from the new leaders who often came from ent i rely d i f - ferent social groups, f a r below the level of the old ruling- c lass .go

I t i s c lear from the accounts of both Parsons and Carstens tha t

fascism found substantial support among a l l classes in Europe and there-

fore the explanation of threatened vested in teres ts may be applicable

in particular his tor ical s i tuat ions, b u t such explanation i s not general

enough for understanding fascism as sociological phenomena in i t s wider

sense. Although Fromm too gives some credence t o these threatened vested

in teres ts , his own explanations tends t o probe t o a level of problems

which underlie specif ic c lass in te res ts , and therefore i s a basis for a

more f ru i t fu l l ine of inquiry.

Parsons' analysis of the social s t ruc ture of pre-Nazi Germany

i s an attempt a t a more general perspective on fascism with his explanation

of specif ic forces peculiar t o Germany which he ident i f ies as underlying

inst i tut ional forces which came into association with the more general

tendencies in Europe previously ar t iculated.

199

Here again his thesis i s q n attempt to explain Nazism as the

product of residual pre-modern capi tal i s t i c tendencies which survived.

Briefly Parsons ident i f ies the Junker mili tary elements w i t h i t s t rad i t ions

of Prussian a r i s toc ra t i c values and the middle-class bureaucracy and

the so l idar i ty of both with royalty. Combined with these forces were

two other d i s t i n c t forces, the strength of Lutheran ideology and sense

of the ultimate legitimation of authority generated by the two groups

which 1 imi ted and undermined the workings of the more universal is t ic

par1 iamentary forces in the Weimar Republ i c . Parsons ' explanation then,

focusses on the s t ructure of the German s t a t e and the prominence in t h i s

s t a t e of the feudal -mil i t a r i s t i c elements. He suggests tha t the deposition

of the monarchy a f t e r 1918 went fa r toward diminishing these elements,

but not f a r enough. 61

A t the same time tha t the above forces came into conf l i c t with

the democratizing processes a f t e r 1918, the removal of royalty from

power and the s t ructure of parliamentary change, "deep-seated romantic

tendencies such as the heroic idealization of men and the formality of

t radi t ional s ta tus hierarchies . ' These things contradicted the tendencies

toward working c lass dominance and socialism. Parsons suggests that:

" 'Le f t i s t radical ism' appealed t o organized industrial labour and to some

in te l lec tua ls , b u t i t had too narrow a base i n the social s t ructure to

be s table . "62 B u t what does Parsons mean by th is? Earlier in the essay

Parsons suggests tha t the romantic elements were a l so in conf l ic t with

the bourgeois a t t i tudes and values, precisely secular values of achieve-

ment which were opposed by Lutheran protestantism. B u t Parsons discusses

these elements as though they emerged from below, whereas i n e f f e c t I

they were prop3ganda elements disseminated downwards from t h e 1 eadershi p

o f t h e Nat iona l S o c i a l i s t Par ty i n order t o widen i t s base o f support.

Whereas i t would genera l l y be c o r r e c t t o suggest t h a t Weimar p o l i t i c a l

i n s t i t u t i o n s were worn down and demoral ized from both Communists and

f a s c i s t s a l i k e between 1918 and 1933, i t i s a very d i f f e r e n t mat te r t o

suggest t h a t t h e rank and f i l e o f t he Nazi movement cou ld a r t i c u l a t e

p r e - i n d u s t r i a l romant ic ism t o support t h e Nazi a t tacks r a t h e r than t h e

Communists . Parsons ' exp lanat ion then may he1 p t o exp la in the e l ements

which went i n t o a c o n s t i t u t i n g o f Nazi ideo logy b u t t h i s i s a very d i f -

f e r e n t mat te r from suggestions t h a t t he mass membership cons t ruc ted t h a t

ideology. Moreover i t i s t he success and power o f the Nazi movement

t h a t was i t s g rea tes t a t t r a c t i o n r a t h e r than i t s polemic stance as Parsons

suggests. Parsons f a i l s i n h i s ana lys i s t o show t h a t i t was Nazi m o b i l i -

z a t i on o f science, techno1 ogy and complex o rgan iza t i ona l pa t te rns from

i t s e a r l y h i s t o r y , under the guise o f a romant ic ideology, which gave

Nazism i t s p e c u l i a r s i g n i f i c a n c e . We see Parsons repea t i ng i n many

ways t h e weaknesses o f h i s study o f Nazism, i n h i s s tudy o f McCarthyism.

I n bo th cases the re i s a s i n g u l a r f a i l u r e t o express e x p l i c i t l y t h e

process i n power r e l a t i o n s lead ing t o i nc reas ing l eg i t imacy . So t h a t

t he re i s an i m p l i c i t n o t i o n i n Parsons t h a t t he l e g i t i m a c y adopted by

the Nazis came f rom the t r u t h o f t h e s o c i a l s t r a i n s which grounded t h e

movement .

~ o n c l us i ons

In conclusion, both Parsons and Fromm are concerned w i t h the

psychological complexes which partly derive from the contradictions of

change in complex modern soc ie t ies , b u t by locating Power as a generalized

medium, Parsons weakens his perspective. To what extent a re both Nazism

and McCarthyism not causes b u t in f a c t symptoms, whose removal t e l l us

l i t t l e about the removal of the causes. Parsons t a c i t l y admits t h i s

possibi l i ty , b u t does not tackle the problem beyond discussion in terms

of s t ructural tendencies and fundamental i s t r o m a n t i ~ i s m . ~ ~ This i s the

v i t a l question for a sociology of modern society, and i t i s one which

an incorporation of Fromm's work into the mainstream may help to penetrate

more f ru i t fu l ly . In addition to th i s advantage i t could throw l igh t on

a position held by a number of contemporary sociologists, including

Lipset and Kornhauser and centralized pol i t ica l power i s non-specific

i n c lass terms.64 The adoption of th i s position i s a theoretical strategy

adopted by Parsons and others i n an attempt to develop explanations of

pol i t i c a l re lat ions which would incorporate explanations about the con-

nection between personality and specif ic s t ructural conditions, b u t

apart from the concept of working c lass authoritarianism, th i s strategy

has had only limited success.

I

FOOTNOTES

' ~ x a m ~ l e s of the three forms of cr i t ic ism in relat ion to Parsons' thought are as follows: a ) In terms of the formal c r i t e r i a of science see M . J . Mulkay "An Assessment of Parsons' Scheme" in Functionalism, Exchan e And Theoretical Strategy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, d p 6 6 - 9 3 . b) One of the best known cr i t ic isms of the second t.ype i s Max Black's he Social Theories of Talcott Parsons: A Crit ical Examination, edited - Max Black (New ~ e r s e F Prentice Hal 1, 1 9 c 1 7 c ) An example of cr i t ic ism of the third type will be found in two recent works a r e Robert Friedrichs A Sociology Of Sociology, 2. e., esp. pp. 25-30; and Alvin Gouldner - The ~ o m i n g T r i s i s Of Western Sociology, OJ. m., esp. chapter 7, "The Moralistics of TaEot t Parsons: Religion, Piety and the Quest for Order in Functionalism," pp. 246-282.

*see Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis - of Western Sociology, a. si t . , p. 139.

Jersey: 'see Walter Buckley, Sociology - and Modern Systems Theory (New Prentice-Hall , 1967), p. 36.

8 ~ h e cr i t ic isms of L. von Bertalanffv and W . Bucklev will be taken together a t a l a t e r stage in the discussion; b u t on ly as they r e l a t e t o the problem of power and morality.

'LOC. -- c i t . , chapter I , p. 14, footnote 35.

'O~ i l l i am C. Mitchell, Sociolo ical Analysis and Polit ics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons New Jersey: ~ r e n t i c e x l ' m , p. 4. - T-9- For a short out l ine of the history of Parsons' commitments to "grand theory," see his introduction to the paperback edition of The Structure of Social Action, Vol. I , (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. v i i i - ix . - See a lso , Talcott Parsons, "The Point of View of the Author," in Max Black (edi tor) The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons (New Jersey: Pren- t i c e Hall, 1961),pp. 311-363. ~ e r c Parsons' expresses his purpose i n the form of an analogy which i t i s worth noting:

Perhaps, with due caution, i t i s permissible to introduce an analogy between the process 'of theory-bui lding in a developing sc i en t i f i c f i e ld and the process of development of a legal system. There i s a sense i n which more general theory i s t o a f i e ld of science what the more general legal principles a r e to a legal system. . . . Here the function of the theor is t i n science may be likened to tha t of the appellate judge whose primary function for the system i s not the disposal of cases, but rather the interpretat ion of rules a t the higher levels of generality, the i r codification in re la t ion t o general prin- c ip les , tes t ing for consistency and the l ike . (p. 321)

The above statment i s Parsons' way of asserting the following. a ) The general theory of action i s about the actor qua actor and groups of actors (both actor and action a re abstracted concepts) and the regu- l a r i t i e s and inconsistencies which they exhibit over a period of time. The crucial problem for the social sciences i s t o develop the principles of action into a theoretical s t ructure or s t ruciures . b) Such a task involves two levels of problems, one which I term here operational, the other the elucidation and codification of substantive axiomatic principles which would render the system a logico-deductive system, f a c i l i t a t i n g the selection of empirical problems for research and providing hypotheses for investigation of these problems. Such systematically derived hypotheses and the resul t ing prepositions would contribute to the validation and revision of theory. B u t the approach " i s not ye t a logico-deductive system. I' The f i r s t , or operational level of problems has been a major focus of Parsons ' task ( j u s t as much as the second has been--in f ac t they are as projects interwoven b u t d i s t i n c t ) . This involves a disciplinary integration of elements of general theory of sociology with social anthropology, psychology of personality, economic theory and pol i t ica l theory. A t the system level t h i s involves the adumbra t ion of sub-sys tems of action. This includes the cul tural system, the personality system and the behavioral organism, and so on. c ) Parsons contribution has been of two orders, f i r s t an abstract theoretical and conceptual s t ructure which i s "more than an ec lec t ic collection of unrelated theoretical ideas, " a t the macroscopic 1 eve1 . Parsons' assertion here seems t o be tha t his theoretical contributions cannot be in te l l igent ly examined by c r i t i c s in terms of logico-deductive c r i t e r i a (pp. 316-317). Parsons implicit ly recognizes only time, and ". . . the outcome of the process of natural selection through professional cr i t ic ism by which sc i en t i f i c reputations ultimately come to be sabi t ized" (p. 321), as the deciding factor on the question of the merit of his ideas [ I t a l i c s mine]. What "natural select ion" means in terms of the establishment of a d i s t i n c t s e t of principles for the evaluation of the Parsonian scheme, remains an open f i e ld among 'Parsonian' and other comrnenta tors . The second order of contributions i s Parsons ' writings a t the level of summary and interpret ive essays, his empirical work. He implies tha t he has selected problem areas deriving from the more general scheme of the conceptual interrelat ion of ins t i tutions and se1 f - in te res t .

Moreover, Parsons argues t h a t suqh empi r ica l concerns were always pursued i n terms o f t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e (p. 318). For f u r t h e r r e f e r - ences t o Parsons' view o f h i s t ask a long the foregoing l i n e s , see T a l c o t t Parsons, - The Socia l System (New York: Free Press, 1964 e d i t i o n ) , esp. pp. 536-555, where Parsons suggests the theory o f s o c i a l systems i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t he conceptual framework o f a general theory o f ac t ion ; T. Parsons, Edward A. Sh i ls , e t a1 . Toward A General Theory o f A c t i o n (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, .1962),pp. 3-29: For an o u t l i n e o f Parsons' view o f the f u n c t i o n o f theory i n s o c i a l science, as w e l l as Parsons' meaning i n t h e statement t h a t t h e a c t o r i s an abs t rac- t i o n , t h i s essay i s v i t a l . See a l s o T a l c o t t Parsons, "An Ou t l i ne o f t h e Soc ia l System," i n Parsons, Edward A. Sh i ls , e t a l . , Theories o f Soc ie t : Foundations o f Modern Soc io log ica l Theory (New York: F reeTress , d p p . 30-79, e s p r p . 33; and T. Parsons "The P o s i t i o n and Prospects o f Systematic Theory i n Sociology," i n Essa s I n Soc io log ica l Theory ( rev ised e d i t i o n ) (New York: Free Press, -5 1964 T p p . 212-237. I n t h i s 1945 essay Parsons suggests the m a t u r i t y o f t h e o r e t i c a l development i n socio logy, w i l l r e s t i n i t s subs tant ive theory. Here Parsons asse r t s t h a t such a theory w i l l be a " s t r u c t u r a l f unc t i ona l system," i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e present ' a n a l y t i c a l system' (p. 218).

"A good recen t summary o f some conceptual and method01 o g i c a l weaknesses i n f u n c t i o n a l analyses can be found i n Georqe A. Theodorson, "The Uses o f Causation i n ~ o ~ o l o ~ y , ' ' i n L. Gross (ed i ted ) Soc io lo i c a l Theory: I n q u i r i e s - and Paradigms (New York: Harper and Row, & 131-152. See a l s o M. J. Demrath and Richard Peterson, System Change and C o n f l i c t , Free Press, 1967. - I n b r i e f some o f the c r i t i c i s m s are: a ) S t ruc tu ra l - f unc t i ona l i sm i s an a t tempt t o avo id causation, by s u b s t i t u t i n g such concepts as func t i on , dys func t ion , system equi l ibr ium, e t c . b ) S t ruc tu ra l - f unc t i ona l i sm commonly confuses f u n c t i o n and cause p a r t l y as a consequence o f the foregoing s u b s t i t u t i o n . c ) S t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i onal ism hinges on the f a l s e assumption o f system i n t e g r a t i o n . d) Func t i ona l i s t s speak as though t h e goal o f a dynamical ly moving system were i nhe ren t i n t h e system i t s e l f . I n r e a l i t y these a r e the values o f t h e f u n c t i o n a l i s t , wrongly imputed t o the system. Pat terns o f behaviour a re then viewed as func t i ona l o r dys func t iona l according t o whether they c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e achievement o f t h i s goal. 3) Due t o these weaknesses s t r u c t u r a l - f unc t i ona l ism cannot p rov ide an a1 1 -embracing model. Ref. pp. 135-1 38, Theodorson.

12see f o r examole T. Parsons. "The Place o f U l t ima te Values i n Soc io log i ca l Theory," i n t e r n a t i o n a l Journal - o f Eth ics, Vol. 45, No. 3, A p r i l 1935, pp. 282-316.

13 OJ. m., Mulkay, p. 67.

14&. - i t . , Parsons, Toward - A General Theory - o f Act ion, p. 37.

1 5 ~ w o c r i t i q u e s of Parsons' thought se lec ted a t random t o i l l u s - t r a t e my case are: 1) Walter Buckley, w. - c i t., esp. pp. 23-24, where Buckley makes the fo l l ow ing observat ions, f i r s t t h a t some o f t h e Parsonian c r i t i q u e s a r e t h e "crudest o f ca r i ca tu res " because Parsons' framework i s n o t a "c lose k n i t p o s t u l a t i o n system o f w e l l de f ined concepts" and because statements can be found i n Parsons' work as a whole which seemingly r e f u t e almost any c r i t i c i s m s made aga ins t it; 2) M. J. Mulkay, x. c i t . , who notes Parsons' s h i f t a t t he l e v e l o f ca tego r i ca l conceptual f o r m c l a t i o n , from a c t i o n t o s t r u c t u r a l func t iona l ism t o exchange ( r e f . p. 89) [Mul kay def ines ca tego r i ca l systems, as a l e v e l o f c o n s t r u c t i v e formu- l a t i o n s which i n v o l v e "sets o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s " which r e f l e c t more accura te ly and more c o n s i s t e n t l y t he r e l a t i o n s e x i s t i n g i n t h e " r e a l world. " Categor ica l systems d i f f e r from -- ad hoc systems i n be ing i n t e r - n a l l y more cons i s ten t and i n being r e l a t e d t o t h e i r sub jec t ma t te r i n a more s p e c i f i c and d e t a i l e d manner." (Ref. p . 36)]. Where Buckley 's focus o f a t tack i s on Parsons' problem s e l e c t i o n o f "order" and the l ack o f s p e c i f i c i t y i n Parsons conceptual d e f i n i t i o n o f "orderN (p. 24); Mu1 kay 's focus i s on the s t r a t e g i c a l i ncons i s tenc ies i n t h e i r imp l i ca t i ons f o r empi r ica l reference, i n terms o f Parsons' concept ion o f f o r example s t r a t i f i c a t i o n (pp. 91-93), I n t h e case o f bo th Buckley and Mulkay, q u i t e a p a r t from t h e confus ion they generate by the p ro fus ion o f d e f i n i t i o n s , they focus on t h e symptoms~ o f Parsons ' weak- nesses as a t h e o r i s t .

'%ee T a l c o t t Parsons, " i n t r o d u c t i o n t o the paperback ed i t i on , " S t ruc tu re - o f Soc ia l Act ion, x. - c i t . , p. i x .

17see T a l c o t t Parsons, S t ruc tu re and - Process - i n Modern Soc ie t i es (New York: Free Press, 1960), p. 13.

181t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t Mu1 kay recognizes t h a t Parsons ' statement on t h e s o c i a l system and i t s elements i s n o t a theory i n t he p rec i se sense def ined by Parsons and i s n o t in tended t o be a theory by Parsons, b u t r a t h e r a conceptual scheme w i t h d i f f e r e n t i a t e d l e v e l s o f ca tegor ies . See f o r example Mulkay, x. - c i t . , p. 65, p. 67. On page 120 o f h i s book Mulkay accuses George Homans o f misunderstanding Parsons conceptual scheme f o r a theory. Whatever Parsons' avowed statements--and they vary cons ide rab l y - - i t i s c l e a r t h a t Parsons regards as h i s s p e c i f i c c o n t r i - b u t i o n t o sociology, i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e sub-systems o f s o c i e t y as a s p e c i f i c s o c i a l system, and t h e economy as a d e f i n a b l e sub-system (hence the concent ra t ion on Marshal 1 i n The St ruc tu re o f Soc ia l Ac t i on ) and the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f modern i n d u s t r i a l society, Parsons wanted each theory, o f an aspect o f t he system, as an a n a l y t i c a l scheme t o be p a r t o f a "more general i zed t h e o r e t i c a l organon. " On t h e 1 eve1 o f conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n Parsons wants t o conceive t h e economy as a sub-system p a r a l l e l t o the p o l i t y as a sub-system, j u s t as a t t he l e v e l o f h i s ' t h e o r e t i c a l organon'-- the general theory o f ac t ion- -he wants t o con- ceptual i z e power and norms as general i zed medium o f exchanges.

''see Robert W . Friedrichs, A Sociology of Sociolo . E. c i t 90; J . L. Talmon, The Origins 'of Totalitarian -* Democrac New York: - W. Norton & Co., 1970), p. 144, for statement by Saint-Just; and c o t t Parsons, Structure - and Process Modern Societies, z. - c i t . ,

180-187.

2 0 ~ e e T. Parsons, Essays - In Sociological Theory, z. - c i t . , p. 391.

"Ibid., p. 391.

2 2 ~ e f . T. Parsons, x. - ci t., Structure - of Social Action, Vol. 2, p. 768.

2 3 ~ b i d . , Vol. 1, p. 94. This s h i f t in analysis i s a l so the point of departure for Parsons' comparison of Hobbes and Marx and a cr i t ic ism of the l a t t e r s conception of power. Ref. pp. 107-110 and Vol. 2, pp. 488-495. The 'normative' and the factual r e fe r , roughly, t o what 'ought to be ' , and as a ' sc ient i f ic theory of human action as i t was ' , respectively .

2 4 ~ e f . T. Parsons, - The Social System, x. m. , p. 121.

31~ndrew Hacker suggests the personal ideological preference, tha t i s the traditional ' l i be ra l ' commitment of Parsons contains a mixture of ideas resembling those of Edmund Burke and John Locke. I t i s reflected i n the cent ra l i ty of 'equilibrium' on the one hand and the 'assumption of pub1 i c responsibi l i t ies for the general welfare ' , on the other. Hacker provides one of the best cr i t iques of some of the d i f f i cu l t i e s of Parsons' substantive conclusions deriving from his interpretive essays. Gibson Winter suggests tha t ultimately the contrasting theories of power and social change, highlighted in the debate between Parsons and C . W . Mills a re "inseparable from the conceptions of man implicit in the con- t ras t ing models of social process." (p. 39). Winter does not go on to suggest expl ic i t l y what the nature of these contrasting conceptions of man are, and th is i s a weakness of his work. He does s t a t e however in terms of the problem of power ' i n t e res t theor is t s ' such as C. W . Mills a re conceived with 'who has power. ' They are interested in what changes in power relationships are doing 'for man' and ' t o -- man', while Parsons

and the functional i s t s a re concerned with 'what' changes i n technology, etc. come from power increases in the to ta l system (pp. 194-195). Cf. Andrew Hacker, 'Sociology and Ideology,' in M . Black, 1961, w. c i t . , pp. 289-310; and Gibson Winter, Elements For A Social Ethic: S c i e n t i f i c and Ethical Perspectives - on Social ~rocesflNgw York: m l l a n Co., 1966), esp. pp. 182-195.

3 2 ~ h e others were: 1) membership in a kinship uni t , 2) personal qua l i t i e s , 3) achievements, 4 ) possessions and 5) authority. Ref. T. Parsons, "An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social S t r a t i f i ca t ion" (1940), i n Essays - in Sociological Theory, x. m., pp. 75-76.

3 4 ~ e e Alvin Gouldner, - The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, OJ. - c i t . , p. 246 and pp. 417-418. This aspect o F t h e gradual evolution of Parsons ' posi t ion tends to be ignored by Gouldner .

3 5 ~ e e T. Parsons, "The Distribution of Power in American Society, " in Structure - and Process in Modern Societies (1960), OJ. m., p. 222; a l so "On the Concept of pol i t ical Power," Proceedin s of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Spr~ng - - 7 ? p ~ 2 ~ 1963

36~arsons defines goal-attainment as the "satisfactory" re1 ation between a co l lec t iv i ty and other co l l ec t iv i t i e s , some of which may be parts of other societ ies . Cf. T. Parsons, "On the Concept of Pol i t ical Power," x. - c i t . , p. 233.

3 7 ~ b i d -* 5 p. 233.

381bid. , p. 233. This summary of the 'operative contexts ' of the polity i s a re-phrasing of Parsons ' language, b u t re tains the meaning.

4 0 ~ b i d -. 9 p. 237. Parsons suggests tha t exchange gives the ' recipient ' four degrees of freedom in his participation in the to ta l exchange system: 1 ) He i s f ree to spend his money/power for any item or combination of items, on the market which he can afford. 2) He i s f ree t o shop around among a1 ternat ive sources of supply for desired items. 3) He can choose his own time to purchase. 4) He i s f ree to consider terms which, because of freedom of time and source he can accept or r e j ec t . To corroborate his argument that force i s an increasingly specif ic means along a continuum (within which two extreme types of s t rategies apply) constituted of four s t ra teg ies in two dichotomous categories (the posit ive and negative). The former s t rategies are those determined by the s i t u - ation 1 ) positive: inducement; 2) negative: coercion; 3) intentional :

persuasion; 4) negative act ivat iqn of commi tments. ( Ib id . , p. 238). Force i s then a negative sanction.

4 3 ~ b i d . , p. 243. For another spec i f i c statement on au thor i ty and compliance, see p. 250, where Parsons notes t h a t the j u s t i f i c a t i on fo r invoking compliance by superordinate agents r e s t s on an " ins t i tu t iona l ized code within which the 'language of power' i s meaningful and, therefore i t s use will be accepted i n t he r equ i s i t e community, which i s i n the f i r s t instance the community of col l e c t i ve organization i n our sense. "

4 5 ~ b i d . , - pp. 256-257.

46~a r sons defines three types of ins t i tu t iona l ized action orien- t a t i on i n complex social systems as being a ) the instrumental i n which the goal i s given, i e . i s unquestioned, where evaluative se lec t ion gives primacy t o cognit ive considerations. b ) the expressive o r ien ta t ion , where the or ienta t ion i s not t o the attainment of a goal , but the or- ganization of the "flow of g r a t i f i c a t i ons . " Grat i f ica t ion i n t e r e s t s have primacy. c ) the moral aspects of ordering, here evaluative i n t e r e s t s have primacy. The cu l tu ra l values which have primacy a r e moral values. The focus i s on the in tegra t ive problems. The ac tor w i t h t h i s i n t e r e s t is " r e s ~ o n s i b l e " for the impingement of his act ion on others and fo r . - col 1 ect;vely defined i n t e r e s t s . See T. Parsons, - The Soci a1 System, w. - c i t . , pp. 48-51.

4 8 ~ l v i n Gouldner, - The Coming Cris is - of Western Sociology, w. c i t . p. 267.

4 9 ~ b i d . , pp. 290-297.

5 0 ~ . Parsons, "Some Sociological Aspects of Fascis t Movements, " i n Essays i n Sociological Theory, OJ. m., pp. 128-129. The second essay which forms par t of t h i s discussion i s "Democracy and Social St ructure i n Pre-Nazi Germany." Both a r e published in the above volume and reprinted in Po l i t i cs and Social St ructure (New York: Free Press, 1969). Because these essays remain unrevised i t i s assumed by t h i s wr i t e r t h a t Parsons s t i l l adheres t o the conclusions arrived a t in 1942, when they were f i r s t wri t ten .

5 1 ~ e e fo r example T. Parsons, "Social St ra ins i n America, " and '?Social St ra ins in America: A Postscr ipt (1962) ," i n Daniel Be l l , e d i t o r , The Radical Right (New York: Anchor Books, 1964), pp. 209-238. -

5 2 ~ e e T. Parsons, "Democra~y and Socia l S t ruc tu re i n Pre-Nazi Germany," x. c i t . , pp. 105-106.

53~arsons r e l y i n g heav i l y on the Durkheimian theory o f s o c i a l s t ruc tu re , which r e 1 i es h e a v i l y on the normative i n t e g r a t i o n o f s o c i e t y no t ion , de f ines anomie as being " the s t a t e where l a r g e numbers o f i n - d i v i d u a l s a r e t o a ser ious degree l a c k i n g i n t h e k ind o f i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h s t a b l e i n s t i t u t i o n a l pa t te rns which i s essent ia l t o t h e i r own personal s t a b i l i t y and t o t h e smooth f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e soc ia l system" ( r e f . T. Parsons, "Soc io log ica l Aspects o f Fasc i s t Movements," E. m., p. 125.

5 5 ~ o r an o u t l i n e o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r s discussed see ib id . , pp. 127-128. Parsons argues t h a t from these h i s t o r i c a l fo rces alone, the inc idence o f la rge-sca le anomie i n Western soc ie ty can ha rd l y be s a i d t o be i n doubt, b u t t h i s f a c t demonstrates o n l y t h e s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o f a s c i s t movements. Thus the h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r s a lone does n o t con- s t i t u t e a s o c i o l o g i c a l explanat ion.

5 7 ~ b i d . , pp. 132-134.

5 9 ~ e f . J. L. Carsten, --- The Rise o f Fascism (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1967), pp. 43-44.

6 1 ~ e e "Democracy and Socia l S t ruc tu re i n Pre-Nazi Germany," OJ-. - c i t . , p. 107.

63~ndrew Hacker, i n "Ideology and Sociology," E. m., makes a s i m i l a r p o i n t . See Hacker, p. 293.

6 4 ~ e e espec ia l l y Parsons' rev iew o f P o l i t i c s o f Mass Soc ie ty and P o l i t i c a l Man i n 'Socia l S t ruc tu re and P o l i t i c a l Or ien ta t ion , " i n World P o l i t i c s , Oct. 1960, pp. 112-118, esp. p. 117.

CHAPTER V

FROMM'S "THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS WRITINGS" AS THE

SOURCE OF HIS ANTHROPOLOGICAL PREMISS

It does n o t f o l l o w t h a t goodness, j u s t i c e , wisdom are chimeras because t h e ex is tence o f god i s a chimera, n o r t r u t h s because t h i s i s a t r u t h . The i dea o f God i s dependent on the i dea o f j u s t i c e , o f benevolence; a God who i s n o t benevolent, n o t j u s t , n o t wise, i s no God; b u t t he converse does n o t ho1d.l

E r i c h F r o m has n o t abandoned h i s p r o j e c t , i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f

t he psychological complexes and the ways i n which these are now causes,

now consequences o f the h i s t o r i c a l d i lemna of t he "freedom from-freedom

t o " quest ion, which i s the legacy o f modern man. The p r o j e c t was n o t

abandoned w i t h the p u b l i c a t i o n of Escape From Freedom and Man For Himsel f .

For Frornm any ana lys is o f power whether t h e o r e t i c a l concep tua l i za t i on

o r empi ri c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s a t the soc i 01 ogi c a l l e v e l , an equat ion

which demonstrates the urgency o f t he dilemma o f modern s o c i e t y by

l ead ing back t o the paradox o f "freedom from-freedom to." From a

F r o m i a n perspect ive then, Parsons ' work on power and m o r a l i t y i s a

f a i l u r e , because i t i s n o t an equat ion t h a t i s t raced back t o the na ture

o f the h i s t o r i c a l paradox. For h i s p a r t Frornm does n o t adopt a socio-

l o g i c a l ana lys i s o f the diachrony o f h i s t o r i c a l stages, r a t h e r i t i s a

search f o r common features, psychologi ca l and s o c i e t a l - i n s t i t u t i o n a l

which nou r i sh power-seekers and thwar t human c r e a t i v i t y .

21 1

Perhaps the most f r u i t f u l , d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t can be made, i n an

e f f o r t t o understand the s i g n i f i c a n c e t o Fromm of knowledge about t he

s u b j e c t i v e f e e l i n g s o f those who obey and thus the na ture o f good and

e v i 1 as a p e r s i s t e n t theme, i s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between concentrat ions

o f a u t h o r i t y and concentrat ions o f power. When we come t o examine

Fromm's concepts o f God and i t s an thropo log ica l i m p l i c a t i o n s such a

d i s t i n c t i o n would be i n s t r u c t i v e . I n t h i s contex t a u t h o r i t y i s a value,

t h a t i s a r i g h t t o make decis ions, a l l o c a t e r o l e s and a r i g h t t o expect

compliance o r obedience among o t h e r th ings . Power however i s an i n s t r u -

mental va lue o f which fo rce and coerc ion are aspects. Fromm's concern

w i t h the e s s e n t i a l na ture o f t he r i g h t s o f a u t h o r i t y and power leads

him t o an examinat ion o f the theo log i ca l and the re1 i g i o u s .2 No r e v

then, o f Fromm concepts o f good and e v i l and the essence o f man, i s

complete w i t h o u t an ana lys is o f Fromm's theo log i ca l and r e l i g i o u s w r

A s imple a r t i c u l a t i o n o f Fromm's thought f r e q u e n t l y leads t o

i t i n g s .

the conclus ion t h a t h i s r e l i g i o u s w r i t i n g s s t r a t e g i c a l l y serve t o render

more f o r c e f u l Fromm's impera t ive claims, t h a t i s claims about what

ought t o be. This view i s an o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . Despi te t h i s obser-

vat ion, there are i n f a c t , many polemical responses t o Fromm's w r i t i n g s

on r e l i g i o n , a l e v e l of response w i t h few p a r a l l e l s i n o t h e r areas o f

F r o m ' s w r i t i n g s . There are a h o s t o f grounds on which these c r i t i q u e s

are based. The f i r s t and most bas i c reason i s a general quest ioning,

by m i l d supporters and c r i t i c s a1 i ke, o f t he s c i e n t i f i c s ta tus , o f t he

r a m i f i e d asser t ions which revea l an i n te rconnec t i on i n h i s work between

e th i cs , a humanist ic s o c i a l science concept and hard emp i r i ca l data.

212

His c r i t i c s aim t o question any presumed interconnection between the

f i r s t two (e thics and a humanist socia l science concept) through ques-

t ioning the va l id i ty of h i s theological and re l ig ious wri t ings . For

example, John Schaar, F rom's most systematic c r i t i c , reveals h i s concern

i n the following statement:

I f Freud was the Moses who showed the people the way out of the Egypt of t h e i r passions, Fromm aspires t o be the Jousha who would lead them i n t o the promised land of the sane socie ty .3

Format

The discussion of From's "theology as anthropology" i n this

chapter i s proposed in three sect ions . In the f i r s t sect ion which i s

divided i n to three subsections the f o l l owing themes are discussed.

a ) An analyt ical de f in i t ion of theology as anthropology.

b) This anthropology i s shown as const i tu ted of two d i s t i n c t t r ad i t i ons .

The f i r s t , the philosophical anthropology which has a continuity in the

psychoanalytic anthropology of Rank, Jung and Frornm w i 11 be b r i e f l y

sketched i n the formulations of Hegel, Feuerbach and Freud, par t ly

synthesized i n the modern humanist t r a d i t i o n n 4 This t r ad i t i on i s of

course one of Fromm's primary sources. The second aspect of the t r ad i t i on

is seen in the evo lu t ion i s t focus of nineteenth century anthropology.

In t h i s t r ad i t i on the search i s f o r n a t u r a l i s t i c laws of socie ty which

could t r ace some presumed para1 l e l isms between the evolution of re1 i gious

be l i e f s from primitive t o c iv i l i z ed socie ty in re la t ion t o the material

development of these soc i e t i e s . Here too the analysis wi l l be b r i e f .

21 3

Section two of the chapter is a lso sub-divided i n to two par ts . In the

f i r s t pa r t I wi l l examine the ideational content of Fromm theological

analyses, focussing mainly on the changing conceptions of God, man and

his tory as examined i n You Shall Be As Gods (1969). In the second

par t I sha l l argue t h a t i n Fromm's analysis of "Jesus" there is a blending

of the philosophical and evo lu t ion i s t t r ad i t i on i n anthropology. I

sha l l a l so review Fromm's analysis of the i n s t i t u t i ona l i za t i on of modern

Western European Chris t iani ty from the Roman Empire. The source f o r

this analysis wi l l be the "Dogma of Christ ," f i r s t published i n 1930.

In sect ion three I sha l l discuss Fromm's misplaced c r i t i c s suggesting

t h a t Fromm i s not concerned t o prove the existence o r non-existence

of God as such, b u t t ha t he uses theological sources as anthropological

data.

The Meaning of the Theological as Anthropology

The movement which has been loosely termed "theology as anthro-

pology" i s i t s e l f pa r t of the wider movements of nineteenth century

philosophy and the socia l sciences, and many of the philosophical issues

which found expression in the overthrow of the t h e i s t i c system can

only be adequately in terpreted within the "language of the En1 ighten-

ment." Though t h i s i s n i t t o be in terpreted as meaning t h a t the over-

throw of theism i s an Enlightenment phenomena. The concern with an

inclus ive character izat ion of theology as anthropology however i s impor-

t an t f o r c l a r i f i c a t i on of how Biblical t ex t s and the concept of God came

t o be in terpreted in a more secular and s c i e n t i f i c l i gh t . Viewed i n t h i s

21 4

l i gh t , the Lutheran Reformation an# Protestantism is not the end of a

process, but mid-point, culminating i n the logical overthrow of t h a t

very Protestantism. There had from the ear ly stages been c r i t i c i sm of

Biblical t ex t s b u t the s t a r t of theology as anthropology came w i t h

Hegel ' s phi losophi cal chall enge of Chris t i ani ty . For i t was w i t h Hegel

t h a t the claim, t h a t the essent ia l truth of the s p i r i t o r of the exis-

tence of God can only be revealed t o man was decisively refuted. Up t o

the time of Hegel, Christian doctrine had held t h a t i t was through

revelat ion and not through experience t h a t man becomes aware of the

t r u t h of Chr i s t i an i ty , but t h i s was not the point a t which the debate

o r i gi nated. The discussion of the01 ogy as anthropology re fe rs t o those

thinkers who, using Biblical texts c r i t i c i z e the statements of the t e x t

on h i s t o r i ca l , grounds, suggesting t h a t the t ru ths of the Bible a re

not l i t e r a l so much as they are symbolic of the anthropological t ru ths

about the re la t ions of man and man and man and nature. The ontology Y

of these re la t ions may be d i f fe ren t ly expressed by d i f f e r en t wri ters

b u t they tend t o have i n common the view t h a t a l l phenomena have a

materi a1 basis and t ha t minds as separate from body, o r God as separate

from the world of nature are non-existent. Any discussion of theology

as anthropology however implies a d i s t inc t ion between theology, re1 igious

fee l ing and expression and the ins t i tu t iona l iza t ion of re1 igious r i t u a l

and pract ice . Theology as anthropology i s n o t so much concerned w i t h

the ontological nature of a given pract ice or re1 igious b e l i e f , r a ther

i t s e x p l i c i t concern i s f o r a level of meaning, of these phenomena as

outl ined in Biblical t ex t s , o ther than the s t a t ed t h e i s t i c meanings

21 5

themselves. I t makes impl ic i t inference t o the existence of God and

the super-mundane sphere but does not begin from philosophical specu-

1 a t i ons about the existence o r real i ty of God as such. The01 ogy as

anthropology i s characterized as h i s t o r i ca l c r i t i c i sm of t he Bible w i t h

the method of s c i e n t i f i c thought. I t emerged under the impetus of the

Darwinian theory of evolution without being par t of the i n t e l l e c tua l

t r ad i t ion which views science and re l ig ion as being i n open h o s t i l i t y .

I t i s a re ject ion of t rad i t iona l in te rpre ta t ions of the doctrines of the

Christ ian churches without an a t tack on the r e a l i t y of re1 i gious be l ie f s

as such. Theology as anthropology does not , i n i t s ear ly forms attempt

t o undermine re l ig ious f a i t h i n the essen t ia l truth of Chris t iani ty .

The forces which generated demands f o r a new conception of the

nature of the b ib le and re ject ion of the prevail ing view tha t i t con-

tained t imeless, uni versa1 and f ina l teachings, had ramifications f a r

beyond the scholar ly re interpreta t ions of nineteenth century theologians

such as Schlei ermacher who in s i s t ed on separating theology from re1 i gion

and others such as Carlyle, Matthew Arnold, Huxley and ~ l i f f o r d . ~ This

is due t o the nature of these forces. These forces can be b r i e f l y

adumbrated as being, the progress and sophis t ica t ion of s c i e n t i f i c

methodology of which Freudian psychology, cul tura l anthropology and

Marxian socia l analysis are descendants. These are metaphysical ideal ism,

positivism, and the doctrine of materialism.6 There i s a l so the philo-

sophical debates generated by the philosophical systems of Kant and

Hegel which par t i a1 ly fed the sophis t i cation of s c i e n t i f i c methodology.

The t h i r d force i s humanism which i s more ambiguous and i s par t ly a

der ivat ive of the former two forces. 7

21 6

Not only did the foregoing forces remove the old dis t inct ion

between sacred and profane writings, i t also stimulated a "higher c r i -

ticism" toward a reinterpretation of the view of history t rad i t iona l ly

established in the Old Testament. The l a t t e r ceased t o be regarded as

a uniform s e t of writ ings, and more as discordant sources, ref lect ing

the aspi rations of people a t temporally different periods, and monotheism 8

increasingly came to be seen by scholars as an evolving system. Most

of the early cr i t ic ism of 01 d Testament texts propounded the view tha t

such texts were more products of a re1 i gi ous cul ture, than they were

products of divine inspi ration. These early cr i t i cs--of whom there

was a strong t radi t ion in nineteenth century Germany, which must have

influenced the work of the psychoanalysts--aimed to understand the

nature and history of tha t culture. Hegel's philosophy of history and

Darwin's concept of evolution, provided the methodological basis fo r

Old Testament research. In th i s type of research, the problem of the

ultimate meaning of the Scriptures was approached through patient

examination of the internal evidence of the Old Testament. Such c r i -

ticism suggested the possibi l i ty of reconstructing the religious history

of Israel . This documentary scholarship i s d i s t inc t from the more

orthodox anthropological research into re1 i gion , of Ado1 f Bas t i an,

Edward Tyl o r , Robertson Smith and James Frazer, to the extent tha t while

the l a t t e r ' s aim was elucidation of a general scheme of cultural develop-

ment of a l l mankind; the former research concentrated on reinterpretation

of the minute de ta i l s of the his tor ical chronology contained in the

Bible. Some of these findings had imp1 i cations fo r an anthropological

21 7

theory of the evol u t i on of re1 i gious be1 i e f , but the research i t s e l f

did not inquire i n t o the phenomenon of God.

Theology as Anthropoloqy: Two Aspects of the Tradit ion

The c r i t i c a l approaches t o the doctrines of the 01 d Testament

e a r l i e r outl ined par t ly st imulated and was par t ly "fed" by two fu r the r ,

d i s t i n c t t r ad i t i ons w i t h i n t h i s area as a whole, the philosophical

anthropology and the cul tura l anthropology. Both t r ad i t i ons as well as

Old Testament research cons t i tu te the antecedents of Erich Fromm's

work, and a re here presented i n order t o sketch the background against

which Fromm's work i s be s t understood; but by i t s e l f the Old Testament

research could not cons t i tu te i t s e l f as an anthropology, not because

the concept of evolutionary change did not e x i s t within the Bible--

especia l ly i n the Old Testament--but because f i r s t the idea of evolution

toward monotheism as an ultimate form and secondly the very concept,

the metaphysic of God would have t o be challenged from elsewhere. Old

Testament research therefore could increase anthropological knowledge,

but not anthropol ogi cal understanding.

The s ignif icance of t he notion of understanding, takes us t o

the hear t of the problem, the meaning of anthropology, and the place

of philosophical anthropology, i n i t . Within the context of a general

de f in i t ion of anthropology as being the "sum to t a l of knowledge about

man," as the science of human nature, "as i t appears in socie ty and

h i s to ry , " b u t one dedicated to the character izat ion of the "moral purpose

of human freedom;" philosophical anthropology i s a "sub-discipl ine"

218

concerned with the elucidation of the essence of man, i t i s the fundamental

philosophical science.' B u t as Martin Buber suggests however, philo-

sophi cal systems, by recognizing "stages i n 1 i f e , " types and characters

i n human l i f e , "and from the constantly new proof of the one i n the many,

can . . . come t o see the wholeness of man. "I0 Although Ernest Becker

does not a l loca te spec i f i c portions of h i s c r i t i que t o philosophical

anthropology as a unique aspect of orthodox anthropology he recognizes

the v i t a l nature of the questions o r ig ina l ly posed by Kant, and suggests

tha t the increasing excl usion of these ques t i ons from 1 a t e r anthropology

led t o entropy. These questions have t o do w i t h the real pa r t i c ipa t ion

of the anthropologist i n the process of knowing man, and t h a t anthro-

pology implies t ha t the observing subject comes t o know the e th ica l

and moral norms which can guide his act ion, The pecu l ia r i ty of the

approach a f t e r the En1 ightenment t o this wide ranging prospectus, which

began with the Greeks, was the d i s t i nc t i ve secu la r outlook w i t h which

the question was posed. B u t as Becker suggests the task of moral and

e th ica l elucidation has as i t s aim personal freedom and socia l community

and t h i s demanded a fundamental ontology, one t h a t implies a theory of

a l ienat ion as a synthesizing point f o r the host of problems impl ic i t

i n the task of personal freedom and socia l communi t y . l l From the philo-

sophi cal anthropological standpoint ne i ther the metaphysi c of God as

superordinate phenomena o r the a p r io r i detachment of the inves t iga tor

were adequate. Man i s a whole being and the inves t iga tor ' s experience

of h i s humanity are cruci a1 perspectives. The phi 1 osophi cal and onto-

logical debate about the existence of God a f t e r Kant i s central t o

anthropology because nothing less than the realization of the

o f anthropology defined by Kant depends on th i s problem.

The role of Ludwig Feuerbach in th i s debate i s centra

bach's work i s a product of post-Kantian and post-Hegelian ph

He has been described as the philosophical anthropologist par

21 9

early aims

1. Feuer-

i losophy.

excel 1 ence

not only fo r his demolition of the concept of God and his cr i t ique of

Hegel b u t fo r his exclusion of theology from religion.

The concrete, individual and sensuous man is the subject of

Feuerbach's philosophical anthropology, t h i s implies rejection of the

reduction of man to exclusive reason, This also means tha t Feuerbach

formulated his view of rea l i ty i n terms of the dualism of subject and

object, and rejected any attempted resolution of i t in a monistic system

based on pure thought. For him pure thought i s only taken -into the

real world through the senses, such as imagination, b u t since thought

as objects of the imagination are dependent, they are private and sub-

ject ive, in contrast t o things of the objective world of rea l i ty .

B u t in the same way that Feuerbach used his notion of the senses to

c r i t i c i z e a l l universals--including Hegel's Absolute Mind--he used i t

t o c r i t i c i z e religion. This cr i t ique has two aspects, in the f i r s t

Feuerbach suggests that re1 igion i s an obstacle to man's material improve-

ment by directing man's attention to a transcendental Heaven for the

fulfi l lment of happiness. Thus he suggests that a precondition for

emancipation of the underprivileged i s the rejection of God. His second

l ine of attack i s on the speculative-ontologic level. F i rs t he argues

that there i s no d i rec t experience of a supernatural God. Secondly

220

Feuerbach asse r t s t ha t the qual i t i les a t t r i bu t ed t o God are r ea l l y human

q u a l i t i e s and aspira t ions projected outside of man, and i t i s possible

t o r e j e c t the concept of God without re jec t ing the qua l i t i e s . The power

of Feuerbach's c r i t i que was in h i s 'explanation' of the psychology of

projection and ob jec t i f i ca t ion .

Through h i s analysis of the processes of projection and objec-

ti f i cat ion then, Feuerbach provided an important phi 1 osophi cal foundation

f o r the ontologic bas is of modern anthropology. We can thus view Darwin

as providing the s c i e n t i f i c basis and Marx, t he his tor iographic one.

The th ree together would cons ti tute the, more o r l e s s , complete method-

ologi cal foundation of modern anthropology. The s ignif icance of Feuer-

bach's asser t ion t ha t there i s no experience indicat ing the existence

of God, imp1 ied acceptance o f , o r consideration of another proposit ion,

namely t h a t re1 i gi ous phenomena and " the i s t i c 1 anguage," cannot be taken

a t face value; t h a t i s t o say, t h a t they must be in terpreted as re fe r r ing

to man. However, i f we accept t h i s l a t t e r proposi tion--which became

the onto1 ogi c bas is f o r an anthropological analys is , of t h e i s t i c phenomena,

w i t h a long t rad i t ion of which Fromm is a part--i t does not imply an

acceptance (with the proposit ion), w i t h the proposition t h a t there is

no human experience indicat ing the existence of God. And so , what

Feuerbach had hoped f o r , a complete phi losophi c-materi a1 i s t anthropology,

f ind dissenters among a l a t e r group of philosophic anthropologists ,

whose t r ad i t i on i s a polemic against Feuerbach. From a c r i t i c a l

Marxi an perspecti ve then the term phi 1 osophi cal anthropol ogy i s an apt

description not because of the point from which Feuerbach began h i s

cr i t ique of theology and of Hegel but because of abstractness of tha t

anthropology, tha t Feuerbach deals with man i n his abstract species

nature. From a Marxi an perspective the onto1 ogy which Feuerbach proposes

is incomplete, man's concreteness i s material and ye t abstract. A peri-

pheral concern i n an analysis of Fromm's anthropology will be t o examine

his work in th i s l i gh t , t o view the extent to which he does stand, in

h i s empirical examination of Old Testament doctrine, on the shoulders

of Karl Marx.

Feuerbach turns to a psychology of projection and object i f icat ion

in order t o explain the workings of the imagination of sensuous man

as the ultimate source of the genesis of the belief in the supernatural

concept of God and the "metaphysical correlate of fa i th . "I3 The hub

of Feuerbach's project then rests on his explanation of God as the end

product of human imagination which i

t ion , an a t t r ibu te of concrete man.

which f o r Feuerbach, has no l imits .

his inabi l i ty t o sa t i s fy a l l his mat

s in turn contingent on sense percep-

B u t imagination as a creative role

Mainly due to man's f ini tude and

e r i a1 wants, creat ivi ty i s di rected

t o the realm of the fanciful . In early 1 i f e the i 11 usion of God ful-

f i l l e d man's need of realizing his f u l l po tent ia l i t ies . "God i s the

p o r t r a i t t ha t man paints of himself as fu l ly realized. 111 4

Feuerbach i n explaining how man can rea l ize his fu l l poten-

t i a l i t i e s by re-translating divine a t t r ibutes into human a t t r ibutes

came upon another di f f i cul ty however, fo r the concept of God i s charac-

t e r i zed by materi a1 and non-materi a1 a t t r ibutes . Materi a1 a t t r ibutes

of God could be assigned t o concrete individual man b u t the non-materi a1

ones such a .s i n f i ni tude, omniscient

222

and omnipotence are not. These

Feuerbach a t t r i b u t e s t o the human species as a whole. For his c r i t i que

t o be consis tent therefore Feuerbach would have t o say t h a t the species

as a whole can r ea l i z e t he non-material a t t r i bu t e s . T h i s apparent

dual i ty i n Feuerbach is the s t rength and weakness of h i s philosophical

anthropology, the point of at tack f o r Engels and Marx as well as f o r

supporters of theism. This dual i s t i c we1 tanschauung i n Feuerbach i s

attacked by Engels and Marx as being a philosophical anthropology which

Feuerbach fa i 1s t o transform in to a h i s t o r i ca l -materi a1 i s t anthropology.

We wi 11 examine this c r i t i que i n order t o demonstrate the paradoxical

continuity and discont inui ty between. phi losophi ca1 anthropology and

h i s to r i ca l -materi a1 i s t anthropology, thereby placing the Fromm's expo-

si t i on of the01 ogy i nto i t s i n te l 1 ectual context.

Feuerbach's dualism of sensuous, concrete man as passive agent

of Nature and generic abs t rac t man, i s complemented by a double explanation

of a1 ienation. For Feuerbach , a1 ienation is f i r s t l y a condition "caused

by the f a c t t h a t man, whose t r ue nature i s divine, f a l l s sho r t of the

divine i n h i s actual existence. " I5 To the extent t ha t man has not real ized

his divine o r human q u a l i t i e s , he i s a l ienated from his t rue s e l f . B u t ,

secondly, a l ienat ion a lso comes from man's projection of pa r t of h i s

being i n t o an imaginary being, God. Alienation therefore is caused by

man's fantasy of a God. Thus f o r Feuerbach, the primary solut ion t o

a l ienat ion is removal from human language and thought a1 1 t races of

transcendence and the supernatural and the placing of man in complete

space and time dimensions. The resolution of man's problem is t o change

human consciousness. Feuerbach the re fo re r e j e c t s the Hegel i an monism

and the r e s o l u t i o n o f a l i e n a t i o n as the u n i t y o f thought and being.

But w h i l e Marx and Engels concur i n Feuerbach's c r i t i q u e of Hegel, they

r e j e c t Feuerbach's s o l u t i o n o f a1 i ena t i on , and h i s "causal exp lanat ion

o f it."

The not ions o f theology and anthropology as charac ter ized and

a r t i c u l a t e d by Ludwig Feuerbach i s o f more than j u s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s i g n i -

f icance. The Feuerbachian d e f i n i t i o n s o f them p o r t r a y them t o be two

a1 1 comprehending and i n c l u s i v e we1 tanschauungen t h a t are fundamental ly

juxtaposed. This j u x t a p o s i t i o n s i g n i f i e s Feuerbach's c r i t i q u e o f Hegel 's

specu la t i ve phi losophy . The anthropo log ica l we1 tanschauung "takes ma t te r

as a r e a l and independent be ing and t h e r e f o r e bases i t s e l f on sensat ion

as the pr imary means o f the au then t i c c o g n i t i o n o f r e a l i t y . "16 This

anthropol og i c a l view bases thought on sensat i on. The anthropologi ca l

view t h e r e f o r e opposes the n o t i o n o f pure o r a b s t r a c t thought. The theo-

1 ogi c a l we1 tans chauung, i n cont ras t , views absol u t e mind determines

r e a l i t y , i t i s the means t o grasp r e a l i t y . Feuerbach's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o

t h i s cha rac te r i z a t i o n was t o demonstrate through h i s c r i t i q u e o f Hegel

t h a t absolute mind o r pure thought i s the essence o f t h e God o f theology.

Feuerbach asser ts t h a t Hegel i an phi losophy i s thus the h ighes t expression

of specu la t i ve theo l ogy , i n the f o l l o w i n g statement:

But i n Hegel the essence o f God i s a c t u a l l y no th ing o t h e r than the essence o f thought, o r thought abs t rac ted from ego, t h a t i s from the one who th inks . Hegel ian phi losophy made thought--namely the sub jec t i ve be ing conceived, however, w i t h o u t sub jec t , t h a t i s conceived as a be ing d i s t i n c t from the s u b j e c t - - i n t o a d i v i n e and absolute being.

The s e c r e t o f 'abso lu te ' phi losophy i s thus the s e c r e t o f t heo l ogy . I 7

224

Feuerbach saw h i s own philosophy as the "new philosophy," as the dis-

solut ion of the "old philosophy," the former makes man, the "unique,

un i versa1 and h,ighes t object of phi losophy. " According t o Feuerbach,

i t thus makes anthropology, with the inclusion of physiology, "the

universal science." There is however, an added aspect to Feuerbach's

anthropology, and one t h a t becomes the focus of l a t e r theological anthro-

pologis ts , though to some extent i n contradiction w i t h Feuerbach's

physiological man, and t ha t i s t ha t the t r ue d i a l e c t i c and the highest

pr inciple of philosophy was a l so asser ted as the "dialogue between I

and thou," as the "unity of man and man. ,118

The ambiguity of Feuerbach's posi t ion, h i s asser t ion of the

concrete physiology as the locus of the senses, on the one hand, and

generic man on the other hand, led t o the observation t ha t Feuerbach

reduced theology t o anthropology and a t the same time e levates h i s

anthropology i n to a theology. Marx and Engels ' most s t r i k i n g c r i t i cism

of Feuerbach is t ha t he displaces God from rel ig ion but maintains the

divine. A s imi la r observation i s made by John Schaar about Fromm's

formulations. Schaar suggests t ha t Fromm too displ aces the ri gi d super-

natural monotheism but re ta ins the mystical element of God and re l ig ion ,

t ha t i s t o say Fromm anthropologizes the concept of ~ 0 d . l ' Manfred

Vogel i n h i s introduction t o Feuerbach's Principles Of The P h i 1 osophy

Of The Future, suggests t ha t Feuerbach's c r i t i que though val id i n i t s -- assessment of Hegel stopped shor t of a f u l l concretization of man,

s ince such a posit ion imp1 i e s an analysis of the "social conditions which

gave r i s e t o the God of re1 i gi on in the f i r s t place. 20 Moreover Vogel

225

adds t ha t Feuerbach's demand f o r a, concrete man stopped midway; Vogel

s t a t e s :

. . . Feuerbach again did not go a1 1 the way. He stopped midway with what i s s t i l l the bourgeois conception of man, namely the pr ivate individual . T h i s is f o r Marx, s ti 11 an abst ract ion from the f u l l y concretized man. The t ru ly concretized man must be placed i n a socia l context. His essence must not be severed from his socia l a t r i x o r , f o r t h a t matter , from h is po l i t i c a l powers. 2'7

The implications of the socia l matrix and the h i s t o r i ca l context i n which

Marx and Engels place man make them diametrically opposed t o Feuerbach.

This i s so par t ly because the l a t t e r r e l i e s on the notion of the cen t r a l i t y

of sense perception but because Feuerbach held t h a t the truth and r e a l i t y

of the being are in nature, and independent of human ac t i v i t y . For

Feuerbach the human subject , in nature, i s a passive ego, whereas f o r

Marx man is an ac t ive agent. 22

The weaknesses of Feuerbach ' s subs t an t i ve formulations and

par t i cu la r ly the Engels-Marx c r i t i que of those weaknesses has been too

well documented t o j u s t i f y r e i t e r a t i on here. What i s f a r more s,igni-

f i c a n t apar t from the i n t e l l e c tua l connection between Feuerbach and

From i s the i nc ip i en t and undeveloped modern humanism i n Feuerbach.

He c r i t i c i z e s a supernatural i s t i c conception and poses as the elemental

nature of man the re1 at ion between I and thou as a subs t i t u t e , f o r

the re la t ion between God and man, as the fundamental problem. Where

I and thou i s the basic anthropological formulation of the question,

what i s man, however, we are led t o the paradoxical conclusion t h a t

i n one very important sense, Feuerbach posed the anthropological question

fo r theism wi thout providing an answer t o t h a t ques ti0.n. 2 3

Eri ch Fromm's Anthroool o w and the Social i s t Humanist Tradition

As has been shoun in the foregoing sect ion Feuerbach's uork,

h i s philosophical anthropology i s a form of humanism. Similarly, an

understanding of Erich Fromm's anthropology is grasped only when h i s

pivotal r o l e i n the 'resurgence' of the humanist t r ad i t ion i n i t s attempt

t o i n j e c t a new direct ion i n to an atrophic socia l science, is grasped. 2 4

T h i s a t rophic socia l science i s an ideological ' r e f l e c t i on ' of the

materi a1 re la t ion of economic and po l i t i c a l power forces ex i s t ing within

contemporary c a p i t a l i s t soc i e t i e s , i n the Western world. The question

t o be decided then is not whether Fromm's work i s pa r t of the i n t e l l e c tua l

landscape traversed by Feuerbach and c r i t i c i z e d by Marx--so t ha t the sub-

s t an t i ve Marxi an c r i t i que is not central here--but whether Fromm's an thro-

pology i s a departure from the ' ab s t r ac t humanism' cha rac t e r i s t i c of

the English l i be r a l philosophies and consis tent with h i s Marxism, which

as Louis A1 thusser has shown car r ies within i t s e l f the dual , ambiguous

themes of "soci a1 i s t-humanism, " A1 thusser i n s t r e s s ing Marx's rupture

w i t h Feuerbach , asser t s t h a t Marx was s truggl i ng against i deol ogi cal

in te rpre ta t ions of ideal i s t and humanist va r i e t i e s which threatened

"Marxist theory. "25 By a "Marxist theory," A1 thusser means a theory which

defines i t s e l f di a l ec t i cal ly--one w h i ch is simul taneously a science of

h is tory (h i s t o r i ca l materialism) , and a philosophy which can account

f o r the nature and his tory of i t s theoret ical formations. 26

I t i s on the basis of the foregoing c r i t e r i a t h a t the d i s t inc t ion

between theory and ideology can be applied t o Fromm's wri t ings , but

a l so because as was s t ressed i n the f i r s t chapter, Fromm i s in agree-

ment w i t h many Marxist scholars t ha t Marxism i s not simply a po l i t i c a l

doctrine but i s indispensable t o the theoret ical development of the

'human sciences , ' and t o p h i From sygges t s t ha t socia l i s t

humanism which i s experiencing a renaissance j u s t now i s a branch of

huma.nism, which has a long t rad i t ion s t r e t ch ing backwards to the Hebrew

prophets and Greek philosophers. The former is defined simply as:

The be l i e f i n the unity of the human race and man's poten- t i a l t o perfect himself by his own e f f o r t s , . .

Fromm fu r the r imp1 i e s a philosophical and theore t ica l ly problematic

continuity between Marx and Feuerbach, through h i s crude d i s t inc t ion

of re1 igious and non-re1 igious humanists ; suggesting tha t the 1 a t t e r

hold t ha t "man makes h i s own his tory and is h i s own creator" (thus

Fromm s t r e s se s the conti nui ty between G i anba t t i s t a V i co and Marx) ,

Fromm holds however t h a t the main dis t inguishing feature of Marx's

socia l i s t humanism i s the declaration t ha t theory cannot be separated

from prac t ice , knowledge from action o r s p i r i t u a l aims from the socia l

sys temaZ8 Further, Fromm suggests t ha t the theoret ical and i deol ogi cal

aspects of soci a1 i s t humanism are primary problems f o r modern soci a1 i s t

humanism.

A complex of questions w i t h d i r e c t bearing on Frornm's anthro-

pology emerge from the foregoing discussion, The v i t a l questions are

what are the imp1 i c a t i ons f o r h i s anthropological conclusions , and t o

what extent i s Fromm able t o maintain c r i t i c a l theoret ical control of

h i s Marxist posture without transforming real humanism in to ideal ism,

228

i n A1 thusser ' s terms without transforming Marxist theory i n t o ' ideology ' ?

While this theme cannot be exhausted i n this par t of the work, a few

words of caution are i n order. These words are i n order because i f

Fromm's analysis of theology as anthropology involves a blending of the

phi losophi cal anthropological and the ma te r i a l i s t and evol u t ionis t

t rad i t ions of anthropology then a cruci a1 question f o r any eval uati on

and c r i t i que of Fromm's theory wi l l be the extent t o which Fromm maintains

the d i a l ec t i c a l ma te r i a l i s t logic and t o what ex ten t h i s theory 'descends

i n to a simple ana ly t ic logic . 12' Althusser a s se r t s t h a t Feuerbachls

humanism had i t s theoret ical moment i n the Germany of the 1840s, serving

t o ' re lease ' t he young Hegel i ans from t h e i r theoret ical impasse created

by Hegel's philosophy of h i s to ry , on the one hand, and the repressive

po l i t i c a l regime of William IV, on the o ther hand, and the contradiction

between them. Now, Marx's theoret ical problematic as well as his i d e a l i s t

humanism, p r io r t o 1845 are Feuerbachian, i .e , they derive from Feuer-

bach's p h i losophi c prolemati c. Marx, then simply borrowed t h i s probl emati c

and applied i t t o an understanding of human h i s to ry . B u t Marx develops

a new problematic and breaks with Feuerbach, t h i s break i s largely

theoret i cal ra ther than phi losophi cal however, f o r once the theoret i cal

break was made i t was a break from the conceptual s e t of Feuerbach and i

I not j u s t from a simple concept in i so la t ion from i t s context. A1 thusser

I I

makes this point because Marx's 1841-1845 writ ings do not contain an

e x p l i c i t Marxist philosophy, Althusser makes t h i s point i n order t o

r e j e c t what passes fo r Marxist humanism, the elemental decomposition of

Marx i n to a young and mature Marx by c r i t i c s , who hold t o the reciproci ty

of materialism and idealism as thoygh they were dual problematics i n

Marx, in which Capital becomes e i t h e r a betrayal o r an expression of

the "Young Marx. li30 A1 thusser summari zes his argument as fol 1 ows :

. . , Understanding an ideological argument implies, a t the level of the ideology i t s e l f , simultaneous, conjoint knowledge of the ideological f i e l d i n which a thought emerges and grows; and the exposure of the in ternal unity of t h i s thought: i t s problematic. Knowledge of the ideo- logical f i e1 d i t s e l f presupposes know1 edge of the probl emati cs compounded o r opposed i n i t . 3 I

As we sha l l show i n the following sect ions of t h i s chapter,

Althusser 's remarks provide a programmatic framework f o r analysis of the

ideational s t r uc tu r e and concrete formulations of From's work on theo-

logy and re l ig ion. Fromm then is not simply borrowing i so la ted concepts

from the works of Feuerbach and e a r l i e r th inkers , r a ther a "balanced

c r i t ique" of Fromm' s anthropology necess i ta tes an a r t i cul a t i on of the

ideologies of science and humanism i n the contemporary world and an

impl ic i t reference t o the socio-ecanomi c r e a l i t i e s of the present day

of which those ideologies are par t ly re f lec t ions .

The Second Aspect of the Tradition: "Academi c Anthropology I'

Anthropology has been t r ad i t i ona l l y defined as the science of

man which dist inguishes a ) various physical types of human beings and

b ) s tud ies the manners and customs of these types of human beings as

"expressions of psychological pecul i a r i t i e s " associated with physical

ones. Wi th the d i f fe ren t ia t ion of anthropology i n to sub disc ipl ines ,

from the second ha l f of the nineteenth century, the focus on man as a

biological organism and the physical aspects of t h i s became the province

of physical anthropology, here re1 igion was excluded from central focus.

B u t t o most o ther anthropologists , the nature of cul ture--and thus re l ig ion

and the in te r re la t ionsh ips of i t s concrete elements, t he growth, change

and e f f e c t s on man has continued t o be defined as anthropology. What

dist inguished "academic anthropology" from one of i t s branches, philo-

sophical anthropology, however was the appl i cation of ' s c i en t i f i c methods '

t o t h i s study. 32

As Marvin Harris has suggested in the f i rs t Qo chapters of h i s

work no s ing le individual from the l a t e seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth

centur ies , is responsible f o r the r i s e of cul tura l anthropological

theory, though throughout t h i s period i n t e l l e c tua l h i s tory has recorded

the many concepts and idea threads which provide the concern wi t h ex-

plaining cul ture from a 'ma t e r i a l i s t ' and socio-s t ructural standpoint .

Moreover the probl emati c of contemporary anthropology theory i s syn-

thesized a t the point in the mid-nineteenth century where ' r a c i a l i s t

sci entism' characterizes the i deol ogi cal and theoret ical s t rugg le between

' r ac i a1 egal i tar ianism' and ' raci a1 determinism. ' B u t this problematic

is par t ly the ref lect ion and act ivat ion of the rapid expansion of indus-

t r i a l capital ism and colonialism on the one hand and the i n t e l l e c tua l

compromise w i t h the theological reaction of the ea r ly nineteenth century

I against the En1 i gh tenment 1 i beral ism. 3 3

The development of an evo lu t ion i s t focus i n contemporary cul tu ra l

anthropology corresponds to the materi a1 development of 'Western socie ty '

and par t ly manifests i t s e l f i n the ' m a t e r i a l i s t behaviourism' which has

characterized much of the sc ience 's development from the nineteenth

century. Two points should be noted i n relation to this development

in contrast to philosophical anthropology. The f i r s t i s that the anthro-

pologis t i s commi t ted , whatever the substantive variations, to a science

tha t i s determinis t i c and material i s t--"the doctrine that the nature of

that which i s s e l f-exis tent i s material in .characteru--be1 ieving that a

complete description of some s t a t e of nature, would enable him to calculate

any event of the past o r future. There i s fur ther the view tha t " l ike

causes " produce "1 i ke effects . " Moreover there was the behaviouris t

view which compared to other disciplines exercised sway in cultural

anthropology. 34 Within this context the dual i ty of national ism and

empiricism and between necessity and .contingency, has had serious epis-

temologi cal and s c i e n t i f i c impl i ~ a t i o n s . ~ ~ These dual i t ies pervaded

sub-disci pli nes within anthropology , such as soci a1 anthropology, psycho-

logical anthropology, and so on, as well as theoretical systems, through-

out the period from the 1890s to the present day. The epistemological

problems raise questions such as how do w e know tha t other minds ex is t?

The s c i e n t i f i c problem has to do with the re1 ation between necessary

and contingent fac ts , The second point i s an extension from the f i r s t

and br ie f ly i s that with the search fo r general laws, then s t ructural

patterns with cornparati ve uti 1 i ty in cultural anthropology, the theoretical

concl usions of anthropological theory though not focussing on the meta-

physical real i ty of the i deati onal content of non Western theis t i c sys tems ,

nevertheless arrived a t conclusions wi t h impl i ci t inferences for that

content. The i d e a l i s t elements of Feuerbach's anthropology was impl i c i t

in the inferred conclusions of the studies of religion and theology

adopted w i t h i n cul tura l anthropology. In t h i s sense there was a mis-

placed idealism i n cul tura l anthropology which remains to t h i s day.

Thus, while p h i losophi cal and socio-cul tura l anthropology remain

separate, they have common threads running through their approaches to

the study of re l ig ion and theism. I t wi l l be shown i n t h i s chapter

t h a t Erich Fromm's work par t ly 'br idges ' the distance between both f i e l d s ,

just as Teilhard de Chardin's work has attempted t o do.

An Analysis of the Ideational Aspects of Theology and the Early Christi an Tradition in Fromm's Works

All of the passionate speeches of accusation against the S p i r i t , in which modern philosophical l i t e r a t u r e i s so r i ch , cannot make us forget , therefore , t ha t here i n truth i t is not Life s t r i v ing against the S p i r i t , but the l a t t e r s t r i v - ing against i t s e l f . And t h i s in ternal conf l i c t i s real lyg6 i t s appointed f a t e , i t s ever las t ing , inescapable pathos.

I be1 ieve t h a t the concept of God was a h i s t o r i ca l l y con- di tioned expression of an inner experience.37

I t i s remarkable t ha t Erich Fromm should "turn to re l ig ion and

theology" f o r deeper ins ights i n to the concepts of cul ture and psychology

thereby following two e a r l i e r psychoanalysts, often suggested t o be

Fromm's 'masters, ' Freud and Otto Rank. Fromm uses the Bible as an

ethnological source, b u t t h i s is d i s t i n c t from the asser t ion t ha t Fromm

i s 'following' Freud and Rank--as was i l l u s t r a t e d i n the foregoing

sect ion the secu la r philosophical and anthropological c r i t i que of Bib1 ica l

sources has a long t rad i t ion . In t h i s sect ion discussion wi l l centre

on the proposition t ha t the Frommian analyses of theological sources i s

ne i ther psychoanalytic and symbolic, nor the derivation from some a p r io r i

e thi cal posture.

2 33

The anthropological project which Fromm undertakes i n h i s writ ings

on Biblical t ex t s i s a blending and cross f e r t i l i z a t i o n of two d i s t i n c t

t r ad i t ions i n anthropology, the philosophical and the empirical ethno-

graphic. The ra t iona le fo r terming Fromm's study as anthropology derives

from the def in i t ion of anthropology as a d i sc ip l ine which began as a

science of h is tory f o r the study of the nature of man [Ernest Becker,

1971 and Marvin Harris, 19681. From t h i s broad def in i t ion then, the

s ignif icance of the in terpenetra t ion of ethnography by phi losophi cal

anthropology i s the in ternal es tab1 ishment w i t h i n the in f ras t ructural

framework of a conceptual basis f o r the concern w i t h the s e l f i n develop-

mental terms. In Fromm's terms, t h i s would take the form o f the anthro-

pological concern w i t h the "freedom to" aspect of human essence, w i t h

man as becoming. In t h i s sense, therefore , the forced separat ion, o r

spl i t t i n g of f of phi losophi cal anthropology from the ethnographic s i de

of the d i sc ip l ine has major implications f o r ethnography's epistemo-

logical foundation. In the f i r s t book examined i n t h i s sect ion i t wil l

be shown t h a t impl ic i t ly Fromm attempts t o reconcile t h i s s p l i t , thus

h i s Biblical wri t ings do not stem from ec

epistemological postulate. In t h i s sense

par t ly cons t i tu ted by a speci f i c epis temo

from-freedom t o proposition i s a concrete

l ec t i c i sm but from a v i t a l

his ' radical humanism' i s

logy--of which the freedom

mani fes tation--though par t ly

cons t i t u t i ve of t ha t epis temol ogy . The epistemological o r ien ta t ion

i s d i s t i n c t from the question, why Fromm chose the Old Testament?;

t o which the simple answer i s , because i t appeared f r u i t f u l in documen-

t a t i on f o r his ' radical humanism. '38 The non-normative and s c i e n t i f i c

aspect of Fromm's anthropological qr ienta t ion o r project i s c l ea r i n

the following two statements:

The Old Testament i s the document depicting the evolution of a small, primitive nation, whose s p i r i t u a l leaders i n s i s t ed on the existence of one God and t he non-existence of i do l s , t o a re l ig ion w i t h f a i t h i n a nameless God, i n the f i na l unif icat ion of a l l men, i n the complete freedom of each individual .

Then again Fromm s t a t e s :

Interpreta t ion of an evol uti onary process means showing the development of cer ta in tendencies t ha t have unfolded i n the process of evolution. . . . A his tory t ha t ascribes the same importance t o a l l f a c t s i s nothing but an enumera- t ion of events; i t f a i 1s t o make sense of the events. Writing his tory always means in te rpre t ing history.39

The evolution which i s the subject of From's work i s the study

of the diachronic change of the Jewish people from a "small nomadic

t r i ba l socie ty t o the encul tura t ion of Hel len i s t i c cul ture and the

in te rna l development of sharp s t r a t i f i c a t i o n character is t i c s . " T h i s

process of change contains in ternal contradictions , explicable in terms

of the speci f i c soci o-economi c condi t i ons of the geo-pol i t i cal envi ron-

ment. B u t the in ternal contradictions of ancient Judaic socie ty a re

par t ly mani fes ted i n the opposing i deol ogi cal tensions between "national ism

and u n i versa1 ism, conservatism and radical ism, fanaticism and tolerance. I t 40

Fromm views the Old Testament writ ings as depicting the nature and

transformation of these contradictions. Fromm a lso views these contra-

d ic t ions , though changed i n form and content as factors in contemporary

Jewish soc i e t i e s . Fromm views these soc i e t i e s as characterized by the

contradictions between clannishness, arrogance and internat ional ism,

peace, jus t i ce, and humanism. 41 Foremost in Fromm' s conceptions then i s

the notion t ha t the Old Testament i s not a substantively uniform tex t .

Before exploring Fromm's anthropological or ienta t ion i n - You

Shall Be As Gods and the Dogma of Chris t , i t wi l l be necessary to i n - ---- dicate the two main axes on which the p l aus ib i l i t y and socia l s c i e n t i f i c

' pos s ib i l i t y ' of any such project turns. The f i r s t axis is the i n t e r -

connection and interpenetrat ion of p h i losophi cal anthropology and con-

temporary academic anthropology. These two di sc i pl i nes have been kept

qu i te separate and sometimes h o s t i l e , i n the recent past . The Engels

c r i t i que of Feuerbach a t t e s t s t o t h i s f ac t . The almost complete juxta-

posit ion of philosophical anthropology from the dominant cu l tu ra l -

materi a1 i s t s t ra tegy i s r e i t e r a t ed i n otherwise br i 11 i an t work of

Marvin Harris. Harris at tacks the "ideal i s t " and mental i s t i c anthro-

pology of a host of wri ters from Comte t o Levi-Strauss and l a t e r i n the

same work disassocia tes Levi-Strauss from the 1 a t t e r ' s self-proclaimed

Marxism. Later i n the same work, however, he takes t h i s c r i t i que t o a

more extreme position w i t h the following statement:

Let those who know how t o explain what the cu l tu ra l - ma te r i a l i s t s t ra tegy has thus f a r f a i l ed t o explain s t e p forward w i t h thei r monotheti c a1 t e rna t i ves. We do not demean a theory by i t s f a i 1 ures t o explain every- thing, but by i t s f a i l u r e t o explain as much as i t s neares t r i va l s . In t h i s frame of reference, the a1 te r - natives t o cul tural-material ism have f a i l ed and have as of ten obscured as en l i htened our understanding of soci o-cul tu ra l evolution. 82

While the re can be l i t t l e quarrel w i t h the Harris c r i t i que of pa r t i cu l a r

i d e a l i s t i c anthropology, i t i s s i gn i f i c an t t h a t there i s l i t t l e o r no

2 36

mention i n h i s work of a possible rapproachment between the i d e a l i s t i c

element of the philosophical anthropological t r ad i t ion and the Marxist

cu l tu ra l -mate r ia l i s t one; i n view of the absence i n physical anthro-

pology of ' pos i t i ve ' o r de f in i t i ve conclusions about the s p e c i f i c or igins

of homo-sapiens, based on 'concrete ' empirical data. Wi th a conceptual

formulati on from physical anthropology it' i s possible t o in tegra te both

disc ipl ines . Such a posit ion has i n f a c t already been adopted by Ashley

Montague t o c i t e one anthropologist who i n s i s t s on the pr inciples of

co-operati on and ' love ' as the ontology of contemporary cul tu ra l anthro-

pology. The second axis derives from the f i r s t and has t o do w i t h the

dichotomization of humanism and Marxi.sm. To the extent t ha t Marxism i s

viewed as h i s t o r i cal -material ism, humanism i s regarded as another form

o f idealism. One aspect of Fromm's work has been t o re- integrate these

two "strands of thought," by giving them an ethnological focus, Eventual

success here have radi cal imp1 i ca t i ons f o r the cl ass i cal expulsion of

Marxi sm from an thropol ogy ,

Eri ch Fromm's anthropological focus i s oriented t o a discussion

of the concepts i f God, man and his tory i n his in te rpre ta t ion of the

Old Testament and the concept of Chris t in ear ly Chris t iani ty . These

analyses a re focussed a t the ideational level . The question, however

is whether From's materi a1 i s t explanation f o r the emergence of Chris-

t i a n i t y during the Roman Empire i s residual t o the theoret ical con-

clusions arrived a t from analysis a t the ideational level? In order

t o discuss the question whether Fromm's materi a1 i s t explanation of the

changing dogma of Chris t i s residual in h i s overall perspective on

re l ig ion o r theology--and i f t h a t i s the case c r i t i c s such as John

Schaar wi 11 be e s sen t i a l l y correct i n ca l l ing From a moral phi losopher--

and therefore whether h i s "anthropology" f a i 1 s to convince; we propose

t o t r e a t h i s l a t e r You Shall Be As Gods as an attempted theoret ical

undergirding of the "Dogma of Christ" as we1 1 as intended t o decrease

the Freudian symbolic overtones behind the conclusion of much of the

l a t t e r . 43 This proposition i s evidenced by two things; the f i r s t i s the

f a c t t ha t "The Concept of History" i s the axis on which a l l the other

substant ive discussion of You Shall Be As Gods r e s t s , i t i s i t s axis

as i t were. The second thing i s Fromm's asser t ion t h a t the fu ture of

modern c iv i l i z a t i on as a study and proxis should (will ) be concerned

w i t h demonstrating the essen t ia l r ightness of the ' X ' experience as

"experiential human phenomena, regardless of conceptual iza t ions . . . , on the basis of a highly developed anthropology." Fromm puts t h i s

epistemology , onto1 ogi cal project and imperative i n the following terms :

In sho r t , we are i n need of an empirical psychological anthro- pology which s tudies X and non-X experience as exper ient ia l human phenomena, regardless of conceptual i za t i ons. Such a study might lead t o es tab l i sh ing ra t iona l ly the super io r i ty of the X way t o a1 1 others , as methodologically the Buddha already did. I t may occur t h a t while the Middle Ages were concerned wi t h the proof of God's existence w i t h phi lo- sophical and logical arguments, the fu ture wi l l be concerned w i t h out l in ing the essen t ia l r ightness of the X way on the basis of a highly developed anthropology - 44

What then i s the substance of the X and non-X experience which

character izes the subject matter ( the ontology) of Fromm's anthropology?

Fromm terms t h i s experienti a1 substratum the X experience because,

he a s s e r t s , the re i s no word in the Western languages, o ther than those

w i t h a t h e i s t i c reference, to re fer t o the experience. Secondly, the

X experience, tho,ugh re1 i gi ous i s "not necessari ly" connected wi t h a

t h e i s t i c thought concept. Thirdly, Fromm distinguishes between theism,

ethics and religion, the l a t t e r is also humanistically e th ica l , but

need not be theis t i c . Fromm suggests the fo l l owing characteris t i c s

of the X experience: the f i r s t (experience) character is t ic i s the

experience of the individual 's separation from man and nature as a deep

problem and the wish to find "at-onement. " I t i s dissat isfact ion w i t h

mundane 1 i f e , experience of the exis tent i a1 dichotomies as requi ring

an answer. Secondly, there i s the experience of the optimal development

of one's own powers of love, reason and so on as the highest in a hier-

archy of values . The X experience i s one in whi ch the worldly 1 i f e

" is permeated by sp i r i tua l aims. " Fromm suggests tha t his hierarchy of

values does not imply asceticism, b u t t ha t worldly achievements are

subordinated t o the highest human values. The apparent s imilar i ty

between Fromm's posi t i on in this regard and Max Scheler's subordination

of "pleasure" to "v i ta l" values has no basis , however, in the i r respec-

t i ve works .45 The cultural anthropological basis for Fromm's hierarchy

of values as fo r the X experience as a whole wi 11 be extensively dis-

cussed l a t e r in the chapter. Fourthly, in contradistinction to material-

i s t i c culture, the X experience l ives l i f e as a constant process of

inner transformation and "becoming par t of the world in the ac t of

l iving." "Man alone i s an end and never a means." Fif thly, th i s in-

volves abandonment of the ego, which implies openness, not passi vi ty ,

as a pre-condi tion to love and becoming part of the world. I t involves

"transcedence of the ego. " I t i s this X experience with which Fromm i s

concerned in The Art of Loving, where he su,gges t s that modern man has the

capacity fo r i t , not because of b u t insp i te of the contradictions of

modern capi ta l ism, techno1 ogy and the power of pol i t i cal i ns t i t u t i ons ,

but as he also s,uggests this capacity does not mean that man necessarily

has the ab i l i t y as a species fo r the experience.46 This capacity i s

the culmination of the process of phylogeneti c evol uti on of homo sapiens . Fromm s ta tes :

The realm of 1 ove, reason and just ice ex is t s as a real i ty only because, and in as much as , man has been able to develop these powers in himself throughout the process of his evo- lution.47

A t the ideational level of his anthropology then, Fromm traces

the cultural development of the "category" of X experience in relation

to i t s symbolic referent 'God' and the cultural referent the concept of

Man, both in early Judaism, precisely because of i t s "positive univer-

salism. 1148

Fromm predicates his anthropology on what i s for him the concrete

pol i t i ca l problem of twentieth century soc ie t ies , whether capi t a l i s t or

s o c i a l i s t , the dual problems of the threat of nuclear extinction and the

trans formati on of men i nto "appendi ces of machi nes . " Both phenomena

threaten to exterminate the human species, b u t they also thwart man's

capacity for the X experience which i s the central reflection of con-

temporary alienation. Thus the central anthrpo1,ogical and his tor ical

issue i s for man to recognize this alienation and i t s expression as

240

idolatry. One expression of idolakry i s the present soci o-economi c s truc-

ture of "industrialized society." The formulation of th i s idea i s by

no means speci f i c in Fromm b u t gives the impression that contemporary

capi talism, the bourgeois s t a t e power and class exploitations and an-

tagonisms are al 1 expressions of a socio-historical praxis, idolatry. 49

Fromm's definit ion of his task i s not a discussion of the concepts of

God and man from early Jewish society b u t the experience in which these

concepts refer .

Fromm explains the contemporary idolatry as due to a "negative"

r e l a t i on to the matricentri c and patr icentr i c principles, both of which

have played a par t in the evolution of man's psychic s t ructure. The

constellation of forces which make up th i s psychic s t ructure are as

follows : a ) Patri centrism ; characterized by authori t a r i an re1 a t i ons ,

a s t r i c t superego, internalized gui 1 t and acceptance of punishment

for one's gui 1 t; the Protestant work ethos with i t s emphasis on extreme

rat ional i ty; and work and labour as a means to earning rewards such as

love and affection; an ident i f icat ion of duty and personal happiness

a t the level of familial relations between father and son.

b ) Matricentrism; attachment to blood and soi 1 ; regression to infan-

t i lism, passivety-recepti vi ty; mere negation of patriarchal ism without

a progressi on t o higher forms. 50

Armed with this array of concepts Fromm's anthropology has two

aspects. The f i r s t i s t o use his physical anthropological synthesis

to demonstrate the emergence of human self-awareness as a unique pheno-

menon not determined by inst inct ive determination in the individual

2 41

physiological being b u t by the soci,o-his t o r i cal f a c t s which shaped the

human configuration. The second aspect i s t o t race thrqugh the Old

Testament t ex t s the human response t o the ex i s t en t i a l di lemma as the

response changed, thereby showing man's capaci ty f o r the most archaic

and the most creat ive and l ibe ra t ing experience as manifested in h i s

( re l ig ious) s p i r i t u a l h i s tory. However, the force of the second aspect

of Fromm's analysis i s par t ly dependent on h i s success i n e s tab l i sh ing

the f i r s t argument. 5 1

Fromm suggests t ha t culmi na t i on of phyl ogeneti c evoluti on toward

homo sapiens resul ted in man w i t h a high level of cor t i ca l development

and a diminished level of i n s t i nc t i ve functioning, an emergence from

in s t i nc t i ve adaptation. This means t h a t the capaci ty f o r self-awareness ,

s p a t i a l l y and temporally i s inherent in man. Fromm suggests fu r ther ,

t h a t long a f t e r the biological capacity of the brain has ceased t o evolve

i n homo sapiens, man's reason, t ha t i s h i s capacity fo r grasping the world

by thought, continues t o evolve, b u t t h i s evolution does not occur auto-

mati cal ly.52 By dist inguishing reason from in te l l igence , the 1 a t t e r

being man's a b i l i t y t o manipulate the world, Fromm i s able t o demon-

s t r a t e the spec i f i c function of thought and ob jec t iv i ty i n the develop-

ment of human cu1 t u r e . Fromm asser t s a correspondence between man's pol i t i c a l -economi c

s t ruc tu r a l adaptations and the in ternal ideational content of man's

t h e i s t i c and re l ig ious forms. In t h i s sense Fromm's u t i l i z a t i on of

anthropological material i s cul tura l ma te r i a l i s t as was t h a t of many

nineteenth and ear ly twentieth century thinkers . For instance Fromrn

s t a t e s i n The Sane Society: --

He (man) develops animal husbandry, learns t o c u l ti vate the land, achieves an every- increas ing s k i 11 i n a r t and craftmanship, . . . .

His gods change accord ing ly . As l o n g as he f e e l s l a r g e l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h nature, h is , gods are p a r t o f n a t ~ r e . ~ 3

The f o l low ing i s a subs tan t i ve summary o f Fromm's anthropo1,ogy

o f r e l i g i o n . 1 ) Since the concept ion o f a god as another human be ing

imp l i es a r e l a t i v e l y evolved soc i o-economic s t r u c t u r e ; and t h i s combined

w i t h the t r u t h t h a t the Old Testament conceptions o f God e x p l i c i t l y

r e j e c t e d ma t r i a rcha l no t ions o f t i e s t o b lood and s o i 1 (a form o f

i d o l a t r y ) , then the mergence o f God as a p a t r i a r c h a l f i g u r e imp l i es h i g h l y

evolved s t r u c t u r e s i n terms o f d i achrony . Thus Fromm summarizes these

p o i n t s as fo l l ows : "A t f i r s t - - a n d t h i s seems t o correspond t o an a g r i -

c u l t u r a l stage--God appears t o him i n the form o f the a l l - p r o t e c t i n g

and a l l - n o u r i s h i n g 'Great Mother. ' Eventua l ly he begins t o worship

f a t h e r l y gods, represent ing reason, p r i n c i p l e s , laws. ',54

2) A1 though man's e a r l y h i s t o r y i s o f soc i a1 s t r u c t u r e s i d e o l o g i c a l l y

dominated by m a t r i a r c h a l b e l i e f s , h i s e a r l i e s t i d e a t i o n a l content i n

r e 1 i g i on i s n e i t h e r speci f i ca l l y m a t r i a rcha l o r p a t r i a r c h a l , b u t by

animism o r f e t i sh i sm, as understood i n the Comtean sense.

3) The Old ,Testament concept ion o f man and God be fo re the " fa1 1 " supports

God announce the p r i n c i p l e t h a t man s h a l l r u l e over woman

e n t i r e C ld Testament i s an e labo ra t i on o f the p a t r i a r c h a l

var ious ways w i t h the p r o h i b i t i o n aga ins t f i x a t i o n t o s o i

ponding sense the Chr is ti an re1 i g i on tends throughout i t s

the hypothesis t h a t mat r ia rchy preceded p a t r i a r c h y s ince woman i s the

more "ac t i ve and d a r i n g o f the two," and on ly a f t e r the " f a l l " "does

. " Thus the

p r i n c i p l e i n

1. I n a cor res-

devel opmen t t o

243

s t r e s s the pa t r i archal princi p le , culmi nating in contemporary Protes-

tantism. Roman Catholicism represents p r i o r t o the Renaissance the only

contradi c t i on t o t h i s conclusion, here elements of the matri archal

pr inciple had a posi t ive focus i n the notion of an a l l - loving, a l l -

forgiving God.

4) The flowering of science and ra t ional thought i n pa r t i cu l a r and the

emphasis on reason i n general , s ince the s ixteenth century i s re la ted

t o the increasing r i s e of Protestantism w i t h i t s characterization of

posi t ive and negative aspects of the patr iarchal s p i r i t . The contra-

d ic t ion however i s t h a t w h i l e science and technology here created the

conditions f o r human universalism, the Western world has fa1 len back

on new forms of ido la t ry and the negative forms of matriarchalism.

5) The paradox i s t ha t these forms of negative matriarchalism are the

very forms which the prophets of the Old Testament t r i e d t o overthrow. 5 5

A Presentation of Fromm's Substantive Anthropology

The three major themes of You Shall Be As Gods, the concept of

God, the concept of man and the concept of h i s to ry i s rea l ly a presen-

t a t ion of a s ing le phenomenon from d i f f e r e n t perspectives. The pheno-

menon being d e a l t w i t h i s the ' X I experience and the d i f f e r i ng conceptions

of i t , as i t is transformed from the Creation. When the process i s

viewed in overall terms the following out l ines appear.

1 ) Fromm begins w i t h the Creation w h i ch the Old Testament texts reveal

as a s i t ua t i on in which the concept of God i s as an absolute ru l e r , a

pat r iarchal f igure . Yet man i s God's r i v a l , he has the potent ia l t o

become God, a1 though the 1 a t t e r mas made man and nature. God fee l s

244

threatened when man 'eats ' of the , t ree of knowledge, and moves to protect

his supremacy, "by expel l ing Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden and

thus preventing them from taking the second s tep toward becoming God--

eating from the t r ee of l i fe" [ I t a l i cs mine] .56 According t o Fromm God

was an arbi t rary and a l l powerful ru ler precisely because human history

had not y e t begun, once Man i s expelled however the process of indepen-

dence begins and s o human history also begins. B u t the concept of

God as man's owner also begins to be diminished. A t the level of or-

dinary l i f e , every individual has to break t i e s to his parents to begin

the "evolution" toward freedom and individuation.

2) In the second phase of the concept of God and the Biblical conception

of the relation between God and man, He and Man have become "partners in

a t reaty" or covenant. Fromm suggests tha t this covenant has three

aspects. The f i rs t i s between God and Noah, in which the former agrees

not to destroy a1 1 l i f e . However Fromm does not t e l l us why God makes

such an agreement. Fromm does asser t however that:

The i dea of the covenant cons t i tutes , indeed, one of the 57 most decisive steps in the religious development of Judaism.

In the second par t of the covenant phase, God makes a covenant with the

Hebrews in which the l a t t e r are requested t o leave the i r land and go to

some unspecified land (God i s t o show the Hebrews the new land). For

Fromm th is i s an expression of universalism. Here again Fromm has no

explanation for th i s covenant, except tha t man should obey--as d i s t inc t

from being fixated to--God.

3) In the thi rd phase, we see the most radical expression of man's

245

covenant w i t h God, f o r the l a t t e r i~ completely persuaded by Abraham n o t

t o des t roy a c i t y where man's o r some men's p o t e n t i a l for , good e x i s t s . Here man has the r i g h t t o demand w i t h p r i d e , r a t h e r than beg. For

Fromm t h i s i s expressed i n Abraham's m i x t u r e o f def iance and f o r m a l i t y

i n the face o f God's power. The former b inds God t o the norms o f j u s t i c e

and love mu tua l l y agreed t o e a r l i e r . Fromm s ta tes i t thus:

P rec i se l y because God i s bound by the norms o f j u s t i c e and love, man i s no longer h i s s lave . Man can chal lenge God-- as God can chal lenge man--because above both are p r i n c i p l e s and norms. Adam and Eve chal lenged God, too, by disobedience; Abraham chal lenges God n o t by disobedience b u t by accusing h im o f v i o l a t i n g h i s own promises and p r i n c i p l e s . Abraham i s . . . a f r e e man who has the r i g h t t o demand, and God has no r i g h t t o refuse.58

Fromm formulates the t h i r d and most s i g n i f i c a n t phase as God's

r e v e l a t i on t o Moses--speci f i c a l l y around the i ssue o f t he l i b e r a t i o n

o f the Hebrews from the Egypt ian empire--of h i m s e l f as the God o f h i s t o r y

r a t h e r than the God o f nature, and thereby separates h i m s e l f from the

n o t i o n o f God as an i d o l . Here Fromm attempts t o show the Jewish t r a d i t i o n

as r e j e c t i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t God's essence can be known. Ins tead

we f i n d the n o t i o n o f God as be ing " t o be" ( t he name Eheyeh which Fromm

t rans la tes t o mean "becoming"). The s i g n i fi cance here i s t h a t i d o l s

a re th ings , completed processes, t o t a l i t i e s , i n the Hegel ian sense.

This Fromm asser ts t o be one o f the antecedents f o r the t r a d i t i o n o f

"negat ive theo logy" developed by Maimonides, who asser ted t h a t God had

no posi ti ve a t t r i b u t e s . The concept o f negat ive theology i s charac-

t e r i z e d by a) the a t t r i b u t i o n o f a c t i o n t o God and b ) the i dea t h a t

man can on l y know God by what he i s no t , 59

246

The u l t i m a t e consequences o f Judaic fo rmula t ions i n t he fore-

going sense i s t h a t t he re can be no j u s t i f i a b l e theo log i ca l speculat ions

about who o r what God i s . The Talmudic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a re about t h e

law and p r i n c i p l e s governing conduct i n l i f e . Fromm asser ts t h a t Judaism

d i d n o t develop an e f f e c t i v e theology p r e c i s e l y because o f i t s negat ion

of ido logy . Thus the l o g i c a l consequence o f Ylewish monotheism" i s the

absu rd i t y o f theology. I n so f a r as the prophets c o n t i n u a l l y cha rac te r i ze

i d o l a t r y as s e l f - c a s t i g a t i o n and s e l f -humi l i a t i o n and the worship o f God

as s e l f - l i b e r a t i o n and l i b e r a t i c n from others, a f e a r o f submission t o

God tended t o (develop) i nc reas ing l y d imin ish. This i s cont ras ted

w i t h the n o t i o n o f a r b i t r a r y acts o f God w i t h respect t o man's fa te - -

as f o r ins tance i n Calvinism. To t h i s ex ten t the Judaic t r a d i t i o n i s an

e a r l y humanism.60 The former i s pervaded then by a humanist ic conscience.

I n h i s analyses o f the concept o f man and o f h i s t o r y , Fromm

u t i 1 i zes the an thropo log ica l fo rmula t ion o f the evol u t i onary process

w i t h the aim o f keeping the development as problemat ic f o r man r a t h e r

than predetermined. Fromm achieves t h i s e f f e c t by s t r e s s i n g two se ts

o f ' f a c t s ' from B i b l i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . The f i r s t i s t h a t t he most

fundamental an thropo log ica l asse r t i on i s t h a t man i s made i n t h e image

o f God. Nevertheless t h i s l ikeness i s l a t e n t ( E r i t i s S i c u t Dei) .

But man i s n o t God, he can i m i t a t e God, however, h i s m o r t a l i t y d i s t i n -

gui shes h im from the 1 a t t e r and so man has t o s t r i v e f o r t h e 1 i keness . The second s e t o f factors are, f i r s t t h a t man has t o c u t incestuous

t i e s t o "b lood and s o i l ," t h i s has an i n i t i a l consciousness awakening

consequence; secondly t h a t he has t o c u t t i e s t o h i s " f a t h e r ' s house"

247

and cut soci a1 t i e s ; thi rdly man bas to arr ive a t a s t a t e of "complete

i nneracti vi ty and producti vi ty" ; f i na1 1y there must be conscious i n -

culcation of the bel ief that every man carr ies a l l of humanity w i t h i n

himsel f . 6 1

The exis tent ia l dilemma which Fromm poses a t the level of the

i ndi vi dual human bei ng i s para1 1 el ed by the his tor i cal di 1 emrna between

Paradise and the Messianic time. Where Paradise i s viewed as the "original

pre-individualist harmony between man and nature and man and woman";

the messianic time i s viewed as the his tor ical answer t o the existence

of man, on a higher level , precisely because man creates himself through

an his to r i cal process of suffering and awareness .62 Fromm presents

an analysis of th i s his tor ical development through an analysis of the

story of Moses, Pharaoh and the Hebrews in Egypt. The author's central

thesis i s tha t the possibi l i ty of l iberat ion exis t s only because people

suf fer and because ( in biblical 1 anguage) God understands the suffering

and hence t r i e s t o relieve i t . This formulation is beset w i t h ambiguities

however, f i rs t l y because the very bi bl i cal formul a t i on s t i 11 contai ns

an anthropomorphic God concept, which Fromrn tends to gloss over, and

secondly because the substance of the proposition implies an inverse

relation between degree of suffering and level of self-awareness. We

will return t o these problems l a t e r , but i t should be noted tha t Fromm

views the experience of suffering as uni versa1 , connected with a second

observation, i . e. that the Hebrews developed new powers in thei r ori ginal

desertion of the i r homeland and in the process of l iberation from Egypt.

B u t Fromm does not specify what these powers are.

Fromm presents three 'ac ts t ' i n t h e drama of Hebrew his tory:

the dialogue of doubt and f ea r between Moses and God and the f e a r of

freedom of t h e Hebrews; the encounter between Moses and t he Pharaoh

and t h e i r mutual use of force, but Moses ' t a c t i c a l use of force i s

s t ressed . Here Fromm implies an analogy between modern man and the

Egyptians; and the wanderings of t he Hebrews i n the wilderness, and

thei r tendencies t o regress t o values more compatible wi t h the we1 l -

regulated conditions of slavery. God issues two commands f o r l i f e i n

the wilderness; t he f i r s t is t h a t l i f e is t o be l ived not hoarded ( i .e.

the Hebrews a r e not t o co l l ec t more food than could be consumed i n a

day); the second i s the i n s t i t u t i o n of the Sabbath day. This i n s t i t u t i o n

is a symbolic representation of the harmony between man and nature and

man and man. The Talmudic concept of 'work' i s any a c t i v i t y o r i n t e r -

ference by man of nature and t h i s in terference i s eliminated by represen-

t i ng the pos s ib i l i t y of man's victory over time. 6 3

Fromm attempts an a r t i cu l a t i on of the di a1 e c t i cal re1 a t i on between

t he Hebrews and Pharaoh which has a te leological qua l i ty i n two senses.

The f i r s t is t h a t God predicts to Moses the intransigence of the Egyptian

ru le r s who succumb t o Moses ' request f o r freedom of the Hebrews, only

w i t h a demonstration of force. In t h i s sense t he Pharaoh's reaction i s

both predicted and "caused" by God. Fromm's in te rpre ta t ion of the

d i a l ec t i c here, betrays a somewhat mechanical conception. Fromm s t a t e s

f o r example:

Any a c t t h a t wi 11 necessari ly happen i s God's wi 11. Hence, when God says t ha t he wi 11 harden Pharaoh's hear t , he i s announcing t ha t Pharaoh ' s hear t wi 11 unavoidably harden. (P* 80).

I n a s i m i l a r ve in God a l so knows t h a t t he Hebrews are unprepared f o r

freedom. For example i n t h a t p a r t o f t h e d ia logue which deals w i t h

Moses' doubt t h a t t he people w i l l b e l i e v e God t o be t h e God o f h i s t o r y ,

Fromm s ta tes :

God's answer i s the f i r s t o f var ious concessions he makes t o the unpreparedness o f t he people. (p. 76)

With the above Fromm mainta ins t h a t f o r c e never convinces e i t h e r t he

Pharaoh o r the Hebrews, who "regress t o f e a r o f freedom and t o i d o l

worship whenever they encounter d i f f i c u l t i e s o r when t h e cha r i sma t i c

f i g u r e o f t h e 1 eader i s n o t present . " (p. 79). The c o n t r a d i c t i o n here

i s t h a t Fromm holds t o the n o t i o n t h a t God does n o t i n t e r f e r e i n t h e

h i s t o r i c a l process, t h a t man i s l e f t t o h i m s e l f "and makes h i s own h i s -

t o ry ; God he1 ps , b u t never by changing man ' s nature, by doing what o n l y

man can do f o r h imse l f . To p u t i t i n ny own n o n - t h e i s t i c language:

man i s l e f t t o h imse l f , and nobody can do f o r h im what he i s unable t o

do f o r and by h imse l f . " (p. 74). Thus i t was n o t t he Hebrews who f r e e d

themselves w i t h God's assistance, i t was e n t i r e l y God's w i l l , f o r Fromm

i s unable t o demonstrate adequately t h e process between man's i n i ti a1

c r y f o r he1 p and i t s r e l a t i o n t o any conscious a c t i o n fo l l ow ing on t h a t

cry. I n o t h e r words Fromm's ana lys i s here s u f f e r s from t h e same d e f e c t

o f Hegel 's and some Marx i s t t h inke rs : t he connect ion between an apparent

l e v e l o f consciousness as a man i fes ta t i on o f ac t ion . F r o m has n o t

demonstrated t h a t the observed consciousness i s o b j e c t i v e poss ib i 1 i ty . 64

"Understand" i s ambiguous. A second ambigui ty i s t h a t f o l l ow ing from

the f i r s t , t he re i s no necessary connect ion between t h e i nc reas ing use

2 50

of force and the hardening of the hear t , a t best t h i s i s equivocal

without an appeal to an anthropomorphic view of God. Fromm suggests

tha t what both Hebrews and Egyptians had in common was the i l lus ion

tha t force guarantees freedom, whereas in e f fec t increasing force only

hardens "men's hearts." Then Fromm draws a parallel between the bib1 ical

story and the contemporary arms race in the following words :

They ( the Western and Soviet blocs) be1 ieve tha t the threa t of force will guarantee 'freedom' or 'communism1--as the case may be. They do not see tha t t h i s course only hardens man's heart more and more, until he arrives a t the point where he ceases to care; a t this point he will ac t as did Pharaoh, and perhaps did the ~gyptians.65

In other words, fo r Fromm, force is ultimately counterproductive. B u t

th i s i s a proposition which few will deny. What Fromm does not do

sa t i s f ac to r i ly i s t o a r t i cu la t e the spec i f ic positive value of force

i n the his tor ical process. In order to get a t the root of Fromm's

ambiguity, we have to return to the dialect ical relationship between

Paradise and the Messianic time as fundamental t o Fromm's concept of

God and history. Where the former impl ies self-awareness of estrange-

ment between man and man, and so on, not original s in ; t h e l a t t e r

impl ies man as a whole as "ful ly born," man a t home again in the world,

i n the future. Fromm asser t s t ha t the prophetic teachings since the

time of Moses sought to remind man of the possibi l i ty of obtaining peace

i n the future, without the use of secular power and force. Fromm's

own ambivalence toward force and power in the rev01 utionary process i s

indicated in the analysis, for i t i s one thing to suggest tha t force

i s ultimately counterproductive, i t i s qui te another t o suggest there

251

i s no moral foundation for the use, of force b u t only a tac t ica l basis

for such usage. Fromrn alludes t o the l a t t e r position in a number of

sections in attempting to integrate his "messianic time" with the pro-

phetic concept of peace among the Judaic prophets. In one statement

Fromm stresses the tac t ica l or s t r a t eg ic aspects of the use of force;

i n the other t8wo he s t resses as a consistent prophetic a t t i t ude the

task of separating power from morality. In the f i r s t statement Fromm

argues as follows:

An essential aspect of the prophets' messianic teaching i s t h e i r a t t i t ude toward power and force. Indeed, we must admit t ha t a l l human history so f a r (perhaps with the excep- t ion of certain primitive soc ie t ies ) has been based on force; the force and power of a propsperous minority over a majority who work hard and enjoy l i t t l e . . . . The prophets a re rev01 utionaries who rob force and power of t h e i r moral and religious d i ~ ~ u i s e s . 6 6

In the second statement, Fromm emphasizes as one of God's roles in

history his "sending of prophets" t o perform four functions, one of

which i s :

. . . the establishment of a society governed by love, jus t ice , and truth; they i n s i s t t h a t pol i t ics must be judged by moral values, and tha t the function of pol i t ica l l i f e i s the realization of these values.67

In the th i rd statement Fromrn's analysis s h i f t s t o the tac t ica l element

i n force. In order to demonstrate the re la t ive ambivalence of Fromm's

own thought here we refer to the f ac t t ha t Fromm quotes two positions

held by Jewish prophets about the preconditions fo r the messianic time

in Talmudic l i t e ra tu re . The f i r s t position i s t ha t some sources argued

tha t the messiah will come only when suffering and evi l has reached

252

i cal such a degree " that men will repent and thus be ready." In sociolog

terms, revol utionary change will take place when the consciousness

of a l l lead them to abandon force. In the second interpretat ion, the

messianic time will come when the oppressed class becomes a revolutionary

class. From quotes one source as s t a t ing th i s as follows:

The messiah will not come until there are no more conceited men in I s rae l , o r until a l l judges and of f icers are gone from Is rae l , o r that Jerusalem wi 11 be redeemed only by righteousness.

In Fromm's view there i s a parallel between Marx's thesis tha t the working

class precisely because i t i s the most alienated and suffering i s also

the most revol utionary.68 B u t Fromm's parallel i s misleading to the

extent tha t there i s ( in t h i s author's view) a more s t r ik ing s imi lar i ty

between the second Talmudic precondi t i on fo r revol uti onary change and

Marx's own conception. If we take the notion of "until a l l judges and

off icers a re gone from Israel" to mean the wi 11 ingness of the oppressed

to expel exploiters from among t h e i r midst, then th i s accords with

Marx's concept of the exploited serfs becoming transformed into a non-

feudal group only partly through the i r own e f fo r t s . Inter-group struggl es

a s s i s t in b u t does not transform the conditions of society, t h i s i s

more dependent on socio-economic forces having attained a level of

contradi c t i on and tension whereby the sectors of urban society most

affected by these changes begin to transform the society. Marx saw the

degree of dependency between se r f and landlord to real ize tha t the former

did not i n i t i a t e change in the sense Fromm implies for feudal type

societ ies . What Fromm does not do i s what Marx did and t h a t i s t o

From t r i e s to condemn force in to ta l while and the same time recognizing

i t s tac t ica l usefulness and only resolves the sociological contradiction

between both a1 ternatives by implying tha t they are d ia lec t ica l ly resolved

in the concept of hope.69 In other words Fromm attempts to subs t i tu te

hope for force, in order t o r e s t r i c t the ro le of the l a t t e r .

In the concluding sections of the most important discussion of

the concept of God as history, Fromm launches an attack (undifferentiated)

against the proponents of force as having moral value in history:

Robespierre, Diderot, S ta l in and Lenin. He draws an analogy between

the establishment of a "workers s t a t e " in the U.S.S.R. and the i n s t i -

tutional ization of Christianity as i t s e l f indicative of a fundamental

s h i f t , an attempt to delude the majority tha t the 'hoped f o r ' or the

messianic time has arrived. Fromm implies tha t both s i tuat ions represent

a corruption of the revol ution, and l ike the s i tuat ion in antiquity

where Moses could lead the Hebrews only "to freedom," b u t not "in freedom."

What a l l these s i tuat ions reveal, according to Fromm, i s t ha t revol ution

takes place in steps. Implicit i s the notion tha t to attempt to force

evolution by use of power and coercion leads to reaction and "fear of

freedom. " What i s lacking in these assertions i s c lear structural

referents.. We see in th i s aspect of Fromm's work a conservative bias

which having rejected force leads t o an i d e a l i s t i c attachment to hope

or to skepticism. A1 though Fromm suggests tha t the third revolution

the "freedom in ," had fa i led , he makes a dis t inct ion between the Hebrew

followers and the Hebrew prophets. The revolution had not fai led fo r

the l a t t e r because history indicated the t r u t h of t h e i r teachings.

Fromm employs two se t s of factors to explain the specif ic fa i 1 ure of

the f i r s t generation of freed Hebrews, to establish a new l i f e without

idolatory: the fac t that t h e i r past as slaves s e t l imits on what they

could achieve, they were slaves who s ta r ted the revolution they could not

f inish i t ; secondly they were idol worshippers and could easi ly f a l l

back into idolatry, since only those not born into slavery could suceed

in achieving the promised land; and thirdly the Hebrews use force r u t h -

less ly in t h e i r conquest of Canaan to root out idolators and in th i s

inhumanity destroyed the very things they hoped t o save. Thus the

Hebrews f e l l back into idolatry.

The problem with Fromrn's explanation i s not his conclusions which

are possibly valid, but his explanations which do not go f a r enough into

the ins t i tu t iona l frameworks established by the freed Hebrews as corro-

borati ve data a1 lowing fur ther insight into why th is behaviour pattern

developed. This i s important i f Fromm takes seriously his aim which

i s t o demonstrate tha t the sp i r i tua l leader i s a re1 igious leader and

t h a t an understanding of the laws which he enunciates i a a t one and the

same time an understanding of the laws of history and of God's laws.

I t i s the interpretat ion of events against which these laws are a1 t e r -

native modes tha t questions can be raised.7o The epistemological imp1 i -

cations of such a l ine of inquiry take us t o the third section of th i s

chapter, t o which we now turn.

Fromm's 'Analysis of Christ and the Blending of the Phi losophi cal and Evolutionist Traditions

Fromm's strongest c r i t ique of inst i tut ional ized Christianity

from i t s integration into the

di s i ntegrati on of the prophet

to monotheism. This ' s e l lou t

ancient Roman Empire i s the dis tor t ion and

i c messianism which i s Chris t ' s t rad i t ion

' ' as i t were a1 so constitutes the point of

departure, for Fromm between inst i tut ional ized Christianity and the

essent ials of Judaism. In the "Dogma of Christ ," Fromm traces the his-

tor ica l development leading to the collapse of the most dynamic and

revolutionary concept within early Christianity the concept of Christ

as a his tor ical symbol of the a b i l i t y of man t o transcend himself, t o

become God, as represented in the relat ion of God to Christ. From

traces the socio-economi c conditions and the soci o-psychological conse-

quences of the trans formati on i deol ogi cal ly from Chri s t becoming God t o

God becoming man. In other words there i s a t l eas t one continuity of

ideational theme between the two works under investigation here, tha t i s

the messianic qua1 i ty in both t radi t ions , despite the differ ing levels

of analysis of the two. The passion of From's analysis i s shown in the

f s l l owing concl uding statement:

The change in the economic s i tuat ion and in the social com- posi t i on of the Chris t i an communi ty (from 1 AD-4 AD) a1 tered the psychic a t t i tude of the be1 ievers . Dogma devel oped; the idea of a man becoming a god changes into the idea of a god becoming a man. No longer should the father be over- thrown; i t i s not the rulers who are guilty b u t the suffering masses. Aggression i s no longer directed against the authori- t i e s b u t against the persons of the suffers themselves.71

We wi 11 examine in greater detai 1 , a t e r on, the c r i t i ca l posture adopted

by Fromm and his position tha t the loss of hope meant the abandonment of

the original aggressive posture of the early Chris t i ans , and the f a c t tha t

t h i s had implications for the use of force. T h i s i s the paradox of

Fromm's position who appeared ear ly to reco.gni ze the significance of

force and l a t e r t o abandon th i s position. I t i s worth noting tha t the

significance of force and violence i n the forging of both Christianity

and Judaism i s noted in another famous work, Karl Kautsky's Foundations

Of Christianity who s t a t e s on the messianic component as follows: - The belief in the Messiah arr ives a t the same time as mono- theism and i s closely connected . w i t h i t . Precisely for th i s reason the Messiah i s not thought of as God, b u t as a man sent by God. He was to establish an earthly kingdom, not a heavenly kingdom ( f o r Jewish thought was n o t as abs t rac t as a l l t h a t ) , a Jewish kingdom. In f ac t , Cyrus, who released the Jews from Babylonia and sent them back to Jerusalem, i s a1 ready desi gnated as the Lord's annoi ted, Messiah, ~ h r i s t . 7 ~

Whatever the difference between Fromm and Kau t s ky , the 1 a t t e r gave an

anthropological interpretation of ear ly Chris t iani ty 's conception of God

and Christ , what Kantsky did in his sociological analysis of the sources

of Western monotheism. A1 ready, Kautsky shows both Judaism and Chris-

t i an i ty as we know i t as a compromise with imperial power.

B u t in what sense i s Fromm's essay "The Dogma of Christ" anthro-

pological? The following are the main senses:

f i r s t , Fromm uses a fundamental notion of matriarchal and patriarchal

principles, throughout his analysis;

secondly, Fromm i s searching fo r a modal soci a1 psychological s t ructure

2 57

i r e ; as i t changes under the impact of his tor ical change i n the Roman Emp

th i rd ly , Fromm uses a concept of social s t r a t i f i c a t i o n in order to examine

the par t icu lar i t ies of th i s change in thei r social psychological impact.

The analysis of "The Dogma of Christ" will be presented in i t s

en t i re ty before elucidating the foregoing principles of discussion.

Fromm's concern with the concept of God i s extended t o the relationship

between God and Christ, but now his spec i f ic task i s examination of the

motives which conditioned the evolution of concepts from the beginning

of Christianity in the f i r s t century A.D. t o the Nicene Creed in the

fourth century A.D. These changing concepts are termed Dogma which Frorran

defines as 1 argely condi t i oned by the real i s t i c soci o-pol i t i ca l motives

of three principal groups within the Roman Empire, who were of Pales-

t inian origin: the Pharisees, Sadducees, and the Am Ha-aretz. Fromm

suggests tha t t h i s dogma served to express the changed a t t i t ude toward

God and society during the crucial three hundred year period, with the

content of the dogma of early in s t i tutional ized Christianity suppressing

the ori gi nal eschatel ogical and spi r i tual conceptions of Christ and God.

The general forces underlying the evolution of t h i s dogma follows the

same laws tha t govern "compulsive-neurotic processes" (Fromm, p. 92) .

Dogma functions according to Fromm as a banner to diss ipate the pol i t ica l

and revolutionary aspirations of the Am Ha-aretz ( the Roman lumpen

p ro le t a r i a t ) , i .e. the ski 1 led, uns ki 1 led and poverty s t r i ken rural

c lass , thereby deflecting the b r u n t of opposition of the Palestinians

against the Romans, on the one hand and on the other hand helped to

reconcile the Pharisees (or middle classes) and Sadducees (or rich upper

classes). A1 1 three groups are not or iginal ly classes within Palestine

so much as they were groups which were religious and pol i t ica l responses

of d i s t i n c t groups within the Empire, in the i r genesis. The dogma which

i s a consequence of the soci o-psychologi cal development of the dialect ical

re lat ion between these groups, served as a "recognition of the banner

. . . the avowal of membership in a par t icular group" (p. 92). Dogma

i n t h i s sense i s an ideological synthesis, the parallel a t the socio-

logical level comparable to a powerful suggestion.73 In terms of the

substantive content of Christian dogma as a culmination of the his tor ical

process which Fromm examines the "new dogma" ( in the sense of a subst i -

tution of a contempl a t i ve fa i th 'for an active rev01 utionary re1 i gi ous

ideology) i s developed around the "idea of a god becoming a man ," the

converse s ide of the adoptionist theory ( i . e . t ha t God made Jesus, Lord

and Christ) . Wi t h dogmati c Christi ani ty man no 1 onger even 1 ooks forward

in the future for salvation, ". . . salvation was a1 ready prepared fo r

man and man for salvation. 1174

Fromm out1 ines the method01 ogical and epistemological basis of

his culture and personal i ty anthropology as fo l l ows .

I t ( the analysis) will attempt to understand the ideas in terms of men and the i r l i f e patterns, and t o show tha t the evolution of dogma can be understood only through knowledge of the unconscious, upon which external real i t works and which determines the content of consciousness. $5

Fromm opens his account by suggesting tha t in the f i r s t century (A.D.)

Palestine, of which Jerusalem was a c i ty with the largest pro le ta r ia t

within the Roman Empire, was a colony of the empire. The social

259

s t r a t i f i ca t ion in Jerusalem had become restructured under the impact

of expanding commercial trade on an international scale and the termination

of feudal oligarchic domination by the Augustan rulers (Karl Kautsky

suggests tha t trade and migrations are par t of the classical history

of Arabia in general and Palestine in par t icular) . A1 though there had

always been forms of social s t r a t i f i ca t ion among the Jews of Palestine,

both Kautsky (pp. 238-259) and E. Fromm s t r e s s the polarization of social

groupings on the basis of economic power and deprivation and the r i s ing

resentment characterized by the poor urban groups within Jerusalem from

the f i r s t century B . C. There were essent ial ly three broad s t r a t a within

Pales t ine, the small feudal, moneyed and powerful upper stratum, many

of whom were administrators in Roman provinces, such as tax collectors.

What th i s privileged group had as a common feature with the r e s t of the

Jewish population was a certain re1 i gious and national patriotism, stimu-

lated by t h e i r varying relationships, over time, t o the Roman pol i t ica l

power centre. They developed the pol i t ica l and religious grouping called

the Sadducees. The Sadducees representi ng a power holding re1 i gious

nobi 1 i ty. 76 This group increasingly l o s t power and inf l uence t o another

sec t , the Pharisees, a middle economi c ' cl ass ' grouping, cons t i tuted

of members from a variety of economic and occupational backgrounds, whose

distinguishing feature was a mixture of re1 i gious t radi t ional ism and an

expectation of arr ival of the Messiah, Jewish patriotism and contemp-

tuousness of the Romans and Sadducees. I t was from among th i s group

tha t the oppressed, disenfranchised, urban lumpen pro le ta r ia t , found

i t s anti-Roman rebel leaders in the early days. Fromm suggests tha t

the l a t t e r group, the lowest s t r a t a of the society, were poverty s t r iken

260

composed of ski1 led and unski l led as we1 1 as rural socio-economic groups--

the Am Ha-aretz. Fromm writes of the Am Ha-aretz in the following terms:

They stood economically and social outside the Jewish 77 society integrated into the whole of the Roman Empire.

What Fromm i s referring t o i s the fac t that Roman society, which was an

e s t a t e society and therefore governed by forms of s t r a t i f i ca t ion which

were economi cal ly based, b u t defined in terms of l egal i s t i c c r i t e r i a ,

defined most of the lower orders as non-citizens. However, with the

increase in trade and urbanization, these groups were more exploited

and became increasingly conscious of t h e i r vul nerabi 1 i ty . Consequently

they had no stake in supporting the s ta tus quo. Paradoxically, tension

and polarization, in contrast to the e a r l i e r period (before Christ)

increased within Jewish society, manifested i t s e l f in the mutual contempt

between Pharisees, Sadducees and the ' l umpen pro1 e t a r i a t . '

The two forms of mass movements, as responses to changing social

conditions, t ha t i s pol i t ical rev01 t on the one hand and various forms

of religious-messianism, on the other hand; had as one aspect a s p l i t t i n g

apart of the Pharisaic group along clear class and ideological l ines .

As the opposition became increasingly revolutionary and violent in

content, not only was Jerusalem and i t s re1 i gi ous-economi c ins t i tu t ions

threatened and f inal ly destroyed, b u t increasingly during the th i rd

century more members from the non-Roman colonized provinces were co-opted

and integrated into the governing power s t ructure. This had the e f fec t

of making i t non-profi table for scholarly and middle-class Pharisees

to disassociate themselves from the rebellious masses. This had the

effect of uniti

Fromm attempts

and his tor i cal

ideol ogi cal pol

261

ng sections of the urban lower groups under the Zealots.

t o trace th is process of development in dialect ical

materi a1 i s t terms, showing the increasing class and

arization within a Jewish society in which formerly

a l l sectors reconciled the i r differences in the common hatred of Roman

rule and Judaic religious ident i f icat ion. B u t the more radical the

tenor of popular revol t, the more pri vi 1 eged Jews withdrew and recon-

ci 1 ed themselves to Roman authori ty . This fur ther weakened the power

of the masses who were repeatedly crushed by imperial mili tary force.

One serious outcome was the emergence of c iv i l war within Palestine

and a war between Rome and Palestine. The f u t i l i t y of the anti-Roman

struggle i s partly symbolized in the charismatic, pseudo-messianic

character of much of the rebel leadership. 78

The content of opposition t o Roman rule indicates tha t no sharp

separation can be made between re1 igiously and pol i t i ca l ly expressed

opposition. There i s a long t radi t ion of messianic expectations and

eschatology i n Judai c i deati onal forms preceding the 'arr ival ' of Jesus.

Fromm stresses the function of apocalyptic l i t e r a t u r e , on the one hand,

and the consistency of opposition and the appeal of such l i t e ra tu re

t o the poorer c lasses , on the other hand, i n the following terms:

The bleaker the hope for real improvement became, the more th i s hope had to find expression in fantasies. The Zeal ots ' desperate f inal struggle agai ns t the Romans and John the Baptists ' movement were the two extremes, (of re1 igious and pol i t ical expression) and were rooted in the same so i l : the despair of the lowest classes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

From th i s stratum of the poor, uneducated, revol utionary masses, Christianity arose as a s i n i f icant his tor ical messi a n i c-rev01 uti onary movement. 7 8

I

"Primitive Christianity" and the Early Christian Community

With the abortive rebellion against Rome, and the disintegration

of Judaism in Jerusalem and i t s environs, expressions of discontent

take on increasingly class character is t ics . The analysis of t ransi t ion

from the spec i f ic Jewish rebel lion against Rome t o the formation of

early Christian communities and i t s incorporation of non-Jewish oppressed

sectors of society i s given s l igh t ly d i f fe rent focus in the work of

Fromm and Kautsky. Where the former s t resses a dis t inct ion between the

Zealots and Sicar i i resting on the sense of "hopelessness of realization"

of the eschatological goals in earthly l i f e , and the formulation of

fantasies expressing a sp i r i tua l re1 i e f from oppression, Kau t s ky c i tes

the Essenes (emerging as early as 150 B.C. ) as a proletarian movement

characterized by a " th is worldly" communisti c praxis, whose t radi t ions

were oral 1y transmitted, and who were a community of consumption rather

than production, sharing food, clothing and rejecting single family

l i f e s ty les . In other words, where Kautsky s t resses tha t the ideological

superstructure of primitive Christianity emerged from practical consid-

erat ions, ra ther than eschatological reformulation, Fromm s t resses

the soci a1 -psycho1 ogical adaptation t o secular power (Roman imperial

power), i n the form of democratic orientations and brotherly love. 80

What both thinkers s t r e s s however i s the psychological a t t i tudes of

hatred against the rich and privileged and hope as common a t t r ibutes of

these communities. Primitive Christianity then had clear ant i - inst i tut ional

features and ideological character is t ics . Fromm has remarked of these

early Christian communi t i es :

I f Jewish socie ty of the time was characterized by the extreme cas te s p i r i t pervading a1 1 socia l re la t ionships , t he ea r ly Christ ian community was a f r e e brotherhood ofgl the poor, unconcerned w i t h ins t i t u t i ons and formul as .

Man: The Messiah Attains Divine Grace

One of the doctr ines , which is a pre-condition f o r the Church

i n s t i t u t i ona l i zat ion of Chris t iani ty i n the form of Roman Catholicism

i s the de i f i ca t ion of Christ t o the s t a t u s of God. Although Chris t iani ty

began t o evolve as an in ternal ly s t ruc tured and hierarchical organization

long before the f i na l , of f i c i a1 acceptance of the "Homoonsi an dogma ,"

acceptance of the l a t t e r marks a crucia l s t age in t he transformation

from primitive Chris t iani ty t o i n s t i t u t i ona l i zed Chris t iani ty . The

Homoonsian dogma i s the be1 i ef i n t h e i den t i t y o r unity of substance

of God and Chris t , Father and Son. B u t what is the anthropological

and soci a1 psychologi cal s ignif icance of this dogmatic t r ans i t i on?

Fromm suggests t h a t corresponding t o primitive Christ ian communes

which emphasized an egal i tar ianism and hope, was the emergence of the

idea t h a t Jesus was a man, chosen t o introduce the "new Kingdom," which

would contain the suffer ing and oppressed, and messiah whom God would

'adopt' and e x a l t as h i s son. Fromm views t he s ignif icance of Jesus '

suffer ing and death, preceding adoption, as a powerful psychic force ,

which reconciled the oppressed individual w i t h suffer ing as an ind ica tor

of h is eventual triumph. In keeping w i t h his most ambiguous anthro-

pological formulation t o da te , i .e . the posi t ing of the "patr iarchal

pr inciple" a t an abs t rac t level of t he ideational content of thought

sys tems , Fromm s t a t e s : ,

The belief in the elevation of a man t o god was thus the expression of n unconscious wish fo r the removal of the divine father. 82

From's explanation i s tha t the oppressed having been physically de-

feated by the mili tary and pol i t ica l power of a patriarchal imperial

system, which appeared t o have absolute secular authority, i t would

have been easy fo r the early Christians t o extend tha t resentment to a

patriarchal God and wish his removal, b u t the doctrine of the elevation

of Jesus to the God, cancelled the mono1 i th i c "appearance of power."

I t was in Nietzsche's term a transformation, simply a t the mental level

what was defeat into "posit ive victory." Fromm suggests tha t the figure

of a suffering Christ served a three fold function: a) provided a

figure with whom the masses could ident i fy; b) shif ted some of the

death-wishes against the father to the son; c) through ident i f icat ion,

they themselves suffered and atoned for these very death wishes. Al-

though Fromm refuses to term th i s ident i f icat ion as masochistic s t r iv ings ,

one could add a fourth function, t ha t is tha t i n universalizing suffering,

the "adoptionist theory" a1 lowed an individual internal contemplation

of redemption (because such acceptance would imply a grounding in f a i t h )

to become a competitive "a1 ternate r ea l i ty , " t o the real 1 ived rea l i ty .

The theory provided a systemati c a1 ternate paradigm fo r analysis of

a l l experience.83 In th i s way religion became tha t of the "oppressed

pagan masses ," since the epi stem01 ogi cal framework no 1 onger required a

his tor ical awareness. One of the weaknesses of the Frommian analysis

265

in t h i s connection i s t ha t he views , t he change to Catholicism and a

matriarchal principle c r i t i c a l l y , what he has not done i s t o develop

adequately a c r i t ique of even the adoptionist theory and the concept of

the messiah as an inherently conservative ideational principle. Nor

does he question the s ta tus of the juxtaposition of matriarchy and

patriarchy as a 1 imi t ing dichotomization.

In s p i t e of the ontological conservatism of the adoptionist

principle, Fromm regards i t as a revol uti onary one. Fromm' s di a1 ec t i cal

analysis i s weak on th i s point t o the extent tha t he does not recognize

the inherent contradiction in any total i zation. Such a recognition

implies the acceptance tha t new syntheses can formulate a t the ideo-

logical level . Rather From t r e a t s the decline of adoptionist theory

as the termination of c lear 'revolutionary' elements in the diachronic

process. He i s of course encouraged in th i s conviction by the a t t r ibut ion

of matriarchal principles t o Roman Catholicism. Thus he s t a t e s :

The early Christian adoptionist belief was born of the masses; i t was an expression of the i r revol utionary tendenck~s, and offered a sa t i s fac t ion for t h e i r strongest longing.

This position leads Fromm t o an implici t c r i t ique of a l l religion

i n Christianity as conservative. B u t unless he i s t o be involved in

an obvious contradiction, he can be seen t o be referring t o ins t i tu-

t ionalized Chris t iani ty , since the formed cr i t ique i s a "vulgar Marxist"

c r i t ique , stemming from a misconception tha t Marxist method01 ogy i s

essenti a1 ly reciprocal , and therefore re1 i gi on i s a "slrper-structure"

i n some metaphysical sense. A view which orthodox Marxism has rejected. 8 5

Fromm suggests tha t inst i tut ional i zed re1 i gion preserves the " in teres ts

of the governing classes. " Fromin's conception of adopti oni s t theory

/as fantasy for the 'working classes ' i s ambiguous, the difference between

i t and the pneumatic viewpoint being tha t in the l a t t e r God becomes

man, rather than any elevation of man. 86

So primitive Christianity i s rejecting centralized secular

pol i t ica l authority in the s t a t e , evolves various forms of "love com-

munism," a re1 i gion of the most oppressed groups. The corresponding

ideational system was the "adoptionist theory." B u t here too both

the oppressed groups and the religious orientation were outside of

the control and influence of the Roman and Jewish ruling classes. The

bi t t e r c lass hos t i 1 i ty and hope are consti t u t i ve of the organizational

and ideational character is t ics of early Christianity; b u t they a re

also const i tut ive of a si lence between classes and between early Chris-

t i ani ty and other ideological interpretat ions , within the Roman empi re.

This si lence renders early Christianity revolutionary, in a sense analo-

gous tha t t ha t ar t iculated by Foucault as character is t ic of the juxta-

position of reason and mental i l l ness in Europe, up to the end of the

eighteenth century. For Foucault also th i s renders mental i l l ness a

viable a1 ternative to sani ty, since insanity takes the posture of an

'autonomous other , ' one whose legi timacy i s not dependent as l a t e r on

dialogue through the intermediary ( the psychiatr is t ) psychiatry. Early

Christianity too i s not dependent as i t comes to be l a t e r on on "pro-

fessi onal the01 ogy " fo r i t s di a1 ogue wi t h secul a r society . 8 7

Where Foucaul t l s aim i s the archaeology of the silence pr ior :r

t o the end of the eighteenth century European experience, Fromm's task

is an anthropology of the silence and i t s break. Fromm's analysis

throughout the remainder of his essay i s not so much: why did this

silence gradually recede into the background, disappearing completely

by the th i rd century, but ra ther - how did th i s si lence recede? To the

l a t t e r question, Fromm provides a simple answer, i t i s the change in

psychic a t t i tude among the oppressed classes which lends meaning to

the economic and materi a1 forces which he "is01 ates ," on the one hand

and t h i s very changed psychic outlook manifests i t s e l f in the ideational

content of l a t e r Christian religious dogma. Both se t s of forces, Fromm

argues, became increasingly synthesized in the inst i tut ional izat ion of

Christianity, the Church and i t s t a c i t ident i f icat ion with the State .

Fromm makes two fur ther points worthy of note, f i r s t tha t t h i s synthesis

i s not an en t i re ly smooth process and c i t e s the inst i tut ional expulsion

of and suppression of Gnosticism and Montanism before the period of

the Micene Council as a necessary part of the consolidation of re1 igious-

pol i t ica l power i n the hands of the intel lectual and pr ies t ly represen-

t a t i ves of the pol i t ical ruling 'classes. ' Both Montanism, an attempt

to separate Christianity from State power and to highlight the "Return

of Christ ," and the Gnostics who rejected eschatology, stressed "acute

secularization ," a rejection of "collective redemption and an assertion

of the class s t r a t i f i ca t ion of society, . . . "; were suppressed by

the ear ly Church. The f i r s t was suppressed because i t was in d i rec t

contradiction with the ideological orientation of the Church, the second

because the doctrine pre-empted l a t e r Catholicism, b u t was out of s tep

with the then consciousness of the masses. This i s a paradox. However

according to Fromm both processes can be best understood di a1 ec t i cal ly. 88

We turn now to an analysis of the e a r l i e r mentioned psychic

change and the material forces f ac i l i t a t ing dogma change. Of the second

century of Christianity, Fromm stresses the nature of the psychic change

in the following statement:

The real , histor ical world no longer needed to change; outwardly everything could remain as i t was--state, society, law, economy--for salvation had become an inward, sp i r i tua l , unhistorical , individual matter guaranteed by f a i th in Jesus. The hope. fo r real , hi s to r i cal del i verance was re- pl aced by f a i th in the al ready complete spi r i tua l deli verance. The his tor ical i n t e re s t was supplanted by the cosmological 89 i n t e re s t . Hand in hand with i t ethical demands faded away.

Fromm asser t s t ha t the psychological response of the masses was an

adaptation of the changed rea l i ty and the new response of the rulers

toward Christianity indicates another level of psycho1 ogi cal change

to the e a r l i e r changed a t t i tude of the masses. In other words a f t e r

the destruction of Jerusalem, the masses increasingly and consciously

turned to belief in the Messiah as a r ea l i ty of deliverance. T h i s i s

fantasy, b u t progressively the hatred fo r Roman authori t ies was no longer

conscious and the rev01 uti onary expectation was abandoned, so tha t by

the fourth century, they were mentally prepared for the Homoousian

dogma. From puts th i s as follows:

I f i t was hopeless t o overthrow the fa ther , then the be t te r psychic escape was to submit to him, t o love him, and to receive love from him. This change of psychic a t t i tude was the in vi table resu l t of the final defeat of the oppressed cl ass. 50

Fromrn fur ther suggests tha t because the real oppression and exploitation

was not removed, the e a r l i e r aggression did not vanish, b u t was turned

toward the - s e l f , and away from t h e j r e a r l i e r objects, the authori t ies

and the symbolic father. Fromm summarizes th i s as follows:

For them no longer were the rulers to blame fo r wretchedness and suffering; rather the sufferers themselves were g u i 1 ty. They must reproach themselves i f they are unhappy. Only through constant expiation, only through personal suffering could they atone fo r t h e i r gui 1 t and win the love and pardon of God and of his ear thly representatives. By suffering and castrating oneself, one finds an escape from the oppressivegl g u i l t feeling and has a chance to receive pardon and love.

Here Fromm can be seen as extending an analytical perspective, f i r s t

developed in Escape - From Freedom, in both the e a r l i e r Roman empire and

in the Reformation, the escape takes the form of theological fantasy.

Here however i t i s n o t the economically more prosperous b u t the more

deprived groups who attempt to "escape. " We suggest t ha t anthropological

significance of Fromm's proposition i s t ha t he attempts t o show the

genesis of the symbolic figure of the fa ther , fo r contemporary culture.

The ' ru l e r s ' derived a twofold advantage from th i s change, par t ly

f ac i l i t a t ed by the Catholic Church's development of g u i l t and s in.

First, i t diverted the aggression of the masses and assured the rulers

of the grati tude, love and dependency of exploited groups. Secondly,

i t relieved the rulers of the gu i l t feelings "they experienced because

of the d is t ress and suffering of the masses whom they oppressed and

exploited." According t o Fromm they came t o believe tha t since the

Son of God had suffered voluntarily, "suffering fo r the masses, was a

grace of God, and therefore they had no reason to reproach themselves

for causing such suffering. I1 92

270

A t the level of the material changes taking place within the

Roman Empire Fromm stresses tha t these were a l l changes toward a feudal

c lass s t a t e . This i s a strange use of terminology since more recent

writings have stressed that the Roman Empi re was an agrarian system,

which i s the consequence of small advances in technology, resulting in

an en1 arged economi c surpl us, and advances in mi 1 i tary techno1 ogy , and

the 'conquest s t a t e . ' B u t as Lenski has suggested these conquest s t a t e s

and especially Rome, until i t s decline, was not a feudal society in

the classical sense, power was used to enhance the wealth of the governing

class and the ruler; To the extent tha t public off ice was used t o

increase wealth there was substantial rnobi 1 i ty within the system, fo r

the governing class . 93

Under the impact of expanding "commerce" and more intense forms

of war, not only did Christian ideas spread beyond Palestine. Fromm

suggests from the middle of the second century Christianity, a ) began

to win followers among Greeks, Romans, Syrians, with an increasing

in terna t ional i s t ideology from the pol i t ica l centre.

b ) Christianity began t o become prominent among sections of the ruling

classes.

c) Christianity began to adopt ideational features from Egypt and

Greece, t o mention two areas which were transformed in to the l a t e r

Homoonsi an doctrine (Kautsky , pp . 139-142).

B u t these were manifestations of the breakdown of local and national

di fferences ard the gradual ' feudal i zation, ' i .e. the creation of compul-

sory work groups. Slaves and s e r f s , into hereditary groups and ar t isan

27 1

guilds in the towns. Forms of taxation increased corresponding to these

groups. Another important change was the t radi t ion s e t

other rulers whereby central Roman authority became the

r ights of the poor and slaves, b u t the l a t t e r were used

force in disputes between the rulers and the entrenched

by Nero fo r

guarantor of some

as a counter-

hierarchy (Kau tsky ,

p. 129) and (Lenski , p. 241 ) . Of course when Christianity became a

s t a t e re1 i gion under Constantine, a1 1 of these developments spread with

rapi di ty . Christianity as of f i cia1 re1 igi on became internal ly hierarchical ,

corresponding to the wider society, fo r example the spread of ecclesias-

t ica l unions with authoritative leaderships displaced the egalitarianism

of brotherly love. Love and grace were no longer dispensed by God,

but now by the Church, the locus of morality within the empire. Fromm

summarizes t h i s change as fol lows :

Economi c regression had supervened; the Middle Ages began t o develop. The economic s i tuat ion led to a system of social t i e s and dependencies tha t came t o t h e i r peak pol i t ica l ly i n the Roman-Byzantine absolutism. The new Christianity came under the leadership of the ruling class.94

The dogma i s thus in content an (ideological) ideational expression of

change.

Synops i s

Both Fromm and Kautsky suggest t ha t the new Christianity provided

a universali ty and additional moral control fo r the Roman Empire in a

way tha t neither the Mithras cu l t o r any of many sects introduced e a r l i e r

succeeded in achieving. Christiani,ty integrated the masses in to the

S ta te , the Paulinian doctrine of acceptance and love and obedience t o

the master revived within Christianity. Thus the s h i f t from man be-

coming God t o God becoming man signal led an anthropological role t o

the Church as bastions of s t a t e power. As. Fromm suggests (p. 69),

the transformed Chri st01 ogi cal dogma and the re1 i gi ous organization

as a whole, merely corresponded t o the sociological function of re1 i gion

in general , i n the West. The Church does t h i s by having the madiating

power of salvation and by the Middle Ages, Roman Catholicism i s charac-

ter ized by the matriarchal orientation (the masses as her children)

as represented in the 'elevation' of. the Virgin Mary to mother of God,

a transformation from recipient to dispenser of grace. B u t the fa ther ,

patriarchal principle i s represented by the notion of God as the f inal

authority and the Pope as his representative and the notion of submission.

This mixing i s a high1 ighting of a process corresponding t o the social

s t ructure of the empi re.

Section 3 - Fromm's "Misplaced Cri t ics"

There are a t l eas t two published works dealing almost en t i r e ly

with Fromm's re1 i gious perspective. Both works s t r e s s however Fromm's

concern with Protestantism, rather than Fromm's cr i t ique of inst i tut ional ized

re1 i gion in modern hi story which as had been suggested above i s i t s e l f

part of the implicit diachronic viewpoint which I have termed Fromm's

anthropology, since his aim ideally seems t o be to identify specif ic

inst i tut ional and psycho1 ogi cal , cultural forces, operating to produce

contemporary cultural symbols such as the father figure. I have fur ther

273

suggested tha t Fromm's c r i t ique along the 'freedom from, freedom t o '

dimension i s completed in a conceptual manner when his anthropol ogi cal

writings a re integrated into his sociological ones. The incipient

concepts of contradiction a t one level and of alienation and regression

used h is tor ica l ly a t another 1 eve1 derive perspective from th i s approach.

Both Glen and Hamrnond take Fromm's concepts of alienation and

humanism out of perspective and discuss them abstract ly , tha t i s without

the d i s t inc t ly h is tor ica l and mater ia l i s t character given them by Fromm.

We will examine the formulation of both thinkers individually and then

look a t them c r i t i c a l l y . We will take Stanley J . Glen's c r i t ique i n

Eri ch Fromm: A Protestant Cri t ique, f i r s t because i t attempts to be -- - the most systematic.

Glen's work begins with the assertion tha t Fromm's c r i t ique of

Christianity i s essent ia l ly a Marxian one which s t a r t s from his conception

of alienation as a product of the loss of self-esteem and ends as a

thorough-going cr i t ique of evangelical Chris t i ani ty in "every period

of history." What Fromm t r i e s to do, suggests Glen, i s to draw a f f i n i t i e s

between his analysis of contemporary man's alienation and aspects of

Biblical theology. The author then draws a s imilar i ty between Fromm's

"humani s t i c s e l f - real izat ionH and tha t tradi t i on of which John Dewey

i s a par t . Hence the popularity of Fromm's work in America, comes

from th i s t rad i t ion with a more radical soci a1 cr i t ic ism, thrown in. 9 5

After suggesting Fromm's closeness to Dewey, Glen moves to what

he terms a level of conservatism which i s expressed in the religious

context of Fromm's psychology. Fromm's " w s t i ca l atheism'' indicates

274

a "lingering fascination for his earl i e r re1 i gious f a i th as indicated

by the frequency w i t h which he turns to the Old Testament and the Talmud

fo r i 11 ustrat ive material. " This fascination betrays a re1 i gi ous w s t i ci sm

and a theological atheism, the former posit ive, the 1 a t t e r negative.

This a1 ternativism i s for Glen vacuous, because i t i s devoid of any

exp l i c i t doctrines of theology and intel lectual izat ion of f a i th . 96

Fromm i s seen as supplanting the "notion of feelings of oneness w i t h

God for the principle of "believing in God," without being suf f ic ien t ly

sel f-cri t i cal of i ts assertion tha t God i s a symbol of man's powers,

not one of God's power over man. 9 7

Glen's major cr i t ic ism i s th.at because Fromm's c r i t ique of the

Protestant gospel i gnores the evangel i cal cl aims of Protestantism ( tha t

i s t ha t man i s who1 ly in need of Christ) i t holds to the popular mis-

conception tha t the "depravity of man" means his reduction t o the lowest

possible degradation ( t h a t i s , "God everything-man nothing"). Further

Glen argues : "He ( Fromm) then trans1 ates the formul a into psycho1 ogi cal

terms, with the conclusion tha t such a God i s s ad i s t i c and the submissive

believer i s ma so chis ti^."^^ Glen suggests tha t Fromm's c r i t ique of the

'God everythi ng-man nothing formula ' tha t sees the formula as inversely

proportional to the development of the economic pattern typical of

capitalism. In other words tha t the par t icular formulation of "God

and man" i s a d i r ec t "ideological" manifestation of the s t ructure of

capitalism in i t s his tor ical development. Moreover, Glen suggests t h a t

Fromm's thesis i s tha t th i s also expresses the typical economic and

pol i t ica l pattern of the German Nazi s t a t e , with the a1 1-powerful God

IF- ?

275

representing the t o t a l i t a r i a n d i c t a t o r , while the completely surrendered

God represents the subjugated c i t i z en . Fromm i s viewed as deriving

his causal (not j u s t coincidental ) analysis from Weber--the idea t h a t

Protes t an t i sm i s the re1 i gi ous correl a t e of capi ta l i sm. Glen suggests

t ha t Fromm however extends the conclusion t o s t a t e t h a t Protestantism

i s the cor re la te of Nazism. Glen concl udes t h a t what we see i n Fromm's

work i s a psychoanalytical version of the Marxi an c r i t i que of re l ig ion ,

whi ch i n t u r n deri ved i t from ~euerbach ." The remai nder of Glen's work

is devoted t o re jec t ing this supposed formulation.

The main propositions on which Stanley Glen's a1 t e rna t i ve i n t e r -

pre ta t ion of the Reformation sc r ip tu res is based, a r e as follows. F i r s t

t h a t the word of God-(theology) i s a body of object ive truth t h a t i n t e rp re t s

revela t ion, and t h a t can be studied of i t s e l f and independently of 1 i f e .

This i s h i s i n t e rp re t i ve norm. Secondly Glen r e j ec t s the posit ion t h a t

the i n t e rp re t i ve norm i s "the subject ive l i f e o f man," o r t h a t theology

is determined by man's character s t r uc tu r e , o r the economi c s i t ua t i on.

Glen summarizes h i s theological outlook i n t he following statement:

Obviously there i s no recognition (by Eri ch Fromm) given t o the pos s ib i l i t y t h a t the gospel i n i t s essen t ia l meaning i s a message object ive t o his tory and t o economic, socia l and psycho- logi cal condi t i oni ng and therefore uncondi t i oned.100

From t h i s l o f t y posit ion Glen concludes, i n the posi t ive aspect of h i s

c r i t i que t h a t i t cannot be established--as Fromm attempts in "The Dogma of

Christ1'--that there were two gospels, a revolutionary and a conservative

one, both corresponding respectively t o a rev01 ut i onary and conservati ve

o r reactionary re1 i gion; during the transformation of Chris t iani ty .

Glen argues tha t the New Testament sources do not support the Frommian I

contention tha t there was an original Jesus who was a pol i t ica l messiah,

who died as a suffering hero and was exal ted to the s ta tus of God.

Moreover, Glen argues, t ha t the conception of two d i f fe rent gospels

tend to r e f l ec t the outlook of the more extreme German l iberal New

Testament c r i t i c s of the nineteenth century. Glen argues tha t the New

Testament sources i ndi cate tha t Jesus rejected apocalypti ci sm. Rather,

the emphasis i s on the inner-directed sp i r i tua l source of man's in-

humanity to man, rather than upon the soci a1 and economic environment.

In shor t , Glen's aim i s to prove tha t Jesus i s incompatible w i t h revolu-

tionary ac t iv i ty , and tended to be a pac i f i s t . The New Testament then

argues tha t there i s more to l i f e than what i s of economic or materi a1

importance, and i t i n s i s t s tha t man needs the assurance of the ultimately

good purpose of the whole order of existence more than anything e lse .

What Glen does then i s to develop a radical theology as a reaction

t o the very exis tent ia l polarization of man of which he accuses Fromm,

Marx and Feuerbach of es tab1 i shi ng, t ha t i s the "God-everythi ng-man-

nothing" thesis . Where Fromm and others responded wi t h the assertion

of a thoroughly soci a1 man, Glen responds with a throughly spi r i tual man.

This shows also the significance of the Nietzschian formulation t h a t

God i s dead. lol In other words to the supposed challenge of "God every-

thing" of which Glen accuses Fromm, the former repl ies with the notion

of Christ as the answer. Glen in order to do th i s simply provides

a1 te rna t i ve Bi bl i cal interpretations of grace in terms of the doctri ne

of predestination and depravity; of the meaning of s in as total depravity;

277

and of the re la t ionship between God and man. In terms of grace, Glen

suggests t h a t i t re fe rs t o the "gratuitous goodness of God" i n h i s

power t o c rea te , sus ta in and so on, t h i s involves undoing what i s wrong

as we11 as res tor ing what i s r i gh t . Finally Glen argues, t he doctrine

of grace suggests through the i n i t i a t i v e of divine love t h a t God knows

man, before man knows God. Secondly, Glen argues t h a t s i n as t o t a l

depravity i n Lutheran the01 ogy real l y means gui 1 t as object ive gui 1 t ,

w i t h no reference t o feelings of g u i l t as such. The re la t ionship between

God and man i s one i n which gui 1 t and grace a re interpersonal re la t ion-

ships of two d i f f e r en t kinds, not substances as such. Thus the theology

of the Protes tant Reformati on i s re1 a t ional , n o t subs t an t i ve, and therefore

capable of conceiving of the believer as a s inner and a s a i n t a t the

same time, and of man as made i n the image of God and y e t depraved.

I t i s Glen argues, t he whole man i n his re la t ion t o God, n o t h i s substance,

which defines the t o t a l i t y . This i s the paradox of God, ra ther than

the simple logical meaning.lo3 Glen's most s i gn i f i c an t statement i n the

body of h i s c r i t i que i s h is asse r t ion t h a t Fromm views the re la t ion

between God and man as an in terplay of faces i n which ' t he force of God'

i s inversely proportional t o the force of man, and therefore fa i 1s t o

a t r i bute any s ign i f i c an t place t o s i n and forgiveness ( i n --- You Shall Be

As Gods, Fromm devotes an e n t i r e chapter t o s i n and repentance). 104 7-

According t o Glen, From is pushed t o t h i s extreme in te rpre ta t ion because,

l i k e Weber before him, he was troubled by the existence of two conceptions

of God; the kindly New Testament f igure on the one hand, and the hidden

God, the deus abscondis of Luther, i . e . the transcendent God, on the other.

278

J u s t as Calvin too had two notions + o f predestination, one Christologi cal ,

the o ther phi 1 osophi cal , nei t he r Luther nor Cal vin reconciled these

binary compositions. Glen's point then i s t h a t Fromm's analysis becomes

a gross general i z a t i on in h i s c r i t i que of Chris t i ani ty . While there i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t F rom ' s conception of re l ig ion

i n 1950 (Psychoanalysis - and Re1 i gi on) reveals 1 ess concern with the01 ogy

i n t he more in tegrated sense of You Shall Be As Gods, i t is c l ea r t h a t ----- Fromm's concern has always been of a fundamental ly anthropological nature,

r a ther than as a subs t i t u t e fo r theology. Though From does tend t o

give the impression t h a t he i s more concerned with an a1 te rna t ive re l ig ion

(see Psychoanalysis - and Religion, pp.. 1-5) t h i s a r i s e s from From's

concern wi t h contemporary expressions of a1 i enat i on. This takes us t o

Guyton Hammonds view of Fromm ( i n -- Man In Estrangement) on the problem

of a l i ena t ion , on which Hammond r e l a t e s the views of Paul Ti1 l i ch and

Erich Fromm. The l a t t e r ' s view of a l ienat ion i s termed n a t u r a l i s t i c ,

the former's theol ogical . 105

I t i s t h i s al leged naturalism i n Fromm which requires examination,

though i n i t s essen t ia l or ienta t ion Hammond's view of Fromm i s more

"balanced" than Glen's. Hamond's c r i t i que l i k e t h a t of Schaar's begins

from the asse r t ion t h a t there a r e two somewhat contradictory tendencies

i n Fromm, the n a t u r a l i s t i c and the humanistic. Fromm's attempt t o view

man as biological and psychic, leads Fromm not only on a quest f o r a

"model of human nature," b u t a lso leads t o a re1 igious aspect i n a

natural i s t i c form. He sees Fromm's view of re1 i gion as ex i s ten t i a1 i s t

i n the Feuerbachian sense. lo6 In t h a t sense the concept of a l ienat ion

i s central . Moving to From's anthropol ogy, Hammond suggests tha t

Fromm views death as anti thet ical t o 1 i fe and cannot be incorporated

in to a philosophy of l i f e , and the concept of God i s understood by

Fromm as a source of love fo r man. This conception of God i s of course

taken from Fromm's e a r l i e s t work on religion. The author suggests tha t

Fromm views man as becoming a1 ienated, as a necessary consequence of

the development of society and the development of consciousness. Hammond

also provides as second concept of God as universali ty and in contrast

to a1 i enati on. lo7 Therefore religion i s man's answer to his problem

of existence. Fromm i s then seen as di s tinguishi ng between humanis t i c

and idol atious re1 igion which i s one form of regressive answer.

Here too we see the tendency t o discuss Fromm's work in the

binary terms which Fromm himself partly develops. What i s missing in

the cr i t iques of both Glen and Hammond i s tha t for Fromm human evolution

and therefore the concept of God are his tor i cal problems, not ones which

work according t o "pre-historic values." In contrast t o both Glen and

to a l e s se r extent Hammond, i t can be asserted tha t for From alienation

i s not the primary concern in Fromm's anthropology, rather i t i s the

concern wi t h contradi c t i ons in the di achroni c movement of s t ructural

categories. Fromm i s asserting a metaphorical association between

l a t e r Christianity and the patriarchal orientation which i s not r igidly

determined. This i s d i s t inc t as a problematic from Fromrn's his tor ical

and sociological analysis of a correlation between Protestant Reformati on

and authori t a r i ani sm. Where Fromm i s concerned wi t h metaphor, matri archy

and patriarchy are not substances, b u t qua l i t ies of relations as such.

theology fo r the existence o r proof of the essence of God or man, rather

in both cases the qua1 i t i e s associated with both are viewed in a dynamic

context from the standpoint of the appearance of contradictions in the

relationships between man and man and the impact of these relations fo r

generating psychol ogi cal characteri s t i cs . Both Glen and Hammond are mistaken in t h e i r views tha t Fromm's

the01 ogi cal and re1 i gi ous c r i t i que stem from his moral pres uppos i t i ons ,

i n the f i r s t instance--though i t should be noted tha t Fromm partly

gives th i s impression in his two e a r l i e s t known works, to an English

audience. Fromm's synoptic view of theology as a system, and the place

of alienation i n such an analysis cannot be simply deduced from Fromm's

statements about re1 i gion as an inst i tut ional ized system. The 1 a t t e r

i s anthropologically and his tor i cal ly determined, the emergence of a

patriarchal concept of God i s his tor i cal ly specif ic . Glen and Hammond

suggest t ha t Fromm explains religious alienation as a product of loss

of self-esteem. B u t Fromm does not uti 1 i ze psychology to explain psycho-

logy. Rather Fromm i s asserting tha t c lear s t ructural changes in the

hi story of man, induce psychol ogi cal responses whi ch eventual ly penetrate

t o the level of the unconscious, f o r example there are two outstanding

periods in the hi story of Chris t i ani ty where the psychol ogi cal responses

are s imilar , the f i r s t i s the defeat of the Am Ha-aretz in Palestine and

the second i s the displacement of the lower middle classes a f t e r the

Renaissance ; the f i r s t i s mi 1 i tary and pol i t i cal , the second, economi c

and soc ia l , b u t in both cases there i s loss of self-esteem and in both

28 1

there are major advances fo r i n s t i t u t i ona l ized re1 i gion and subsequent

ideological syntheses. Between the i n s t i t u t i ona l i za t i on and the ideo-

logical syntheses however there is a broadening of the membership base

as oppressed groups t u r n away from a secular toward a more spi r i tual

in te rpre ta t ion of theology, on the one hand, and an in te rna l iza t ion of

and suppression of h o s t i l i t y , on the psychological plane, on the other.

The point here i s t h a t where Glen and Hammond both suggest t h a t F rom ' s

c r i t i que begins with psychological and ex i s t en t i a l precepts, t h i s analysis

s t r e s se s t h a t Fromm's work on re l ig ion and theology began w i t h anthro-

pol ogi cal analyses and work toward psycho1 ogi cal concl usi ons .

Analyses of Fromm's anthropology have radical imp1 i cations f o r

his e n t i r e opus. The tensions revealed i n his analysis of theology

and re l ig ion stem from Fromm's i n a b i l i t y t o adequately in tegra te the

posit ions of a Marxism w i t h i t s focus on a ma te r i a l i s t h i s to r ica l d ia lec-

t i c and the symbolic and psychoanalytic focus of Freud. The tension

is par t i cul a r l y c l ea r i n Fromm's attempted conti n u i ty between the p h i 1 o-

sophi cal and empi ri cal ethnographi c anthropology . One of the concl usi ons

of t h i s analysis i s t h a t beginning w i t h t h e notion of man as ac t ive

( i n con t ras t t o Feuerbach) Fromm t r i e s t o demonstrate t h a t f o r contem-

porary socie ty the in tegrat ion of church and s t a t e implies the "defeat"

of the oppressed groups a t s t r a t e g i c epochs. The bourgeois s t a t e ,

c lass exp lo i ta t ions and antagonisms are par t ly expressions of a "socio-

h i s to r ica l praxis ," a t the level of s t r uc tu r a l analys is . These a r e

282

spec i f i c forms of ido la t ry . Idology a l so expresses i t s e l f as ido la t ry

a t the ideational l eve l . In t h i s sense Fromm's analysis d i s c r ed i t s

Glen's c r i t i que of Fromm. Glen i s mistaken i n h i s view t h a t Fromm

conceptualizes Chr i s t i an i ty ' s ideological element from a 1 imi t sd c r i t i que

of capi t a l i sm and Protestantism which i s essent i a1 l y Weberi an and Marxi an.

Nevertheless there are two s i gni f i cant areas of Fromm' s ideal ism

which requi re mention, and elaboration i n the subsequent chapter. The

f i r s t i s t h a t Fromm l i k e Feuerbach wants t o transform the world by

changing man's consciousness, although From ar r ives a t this from a

posit ion s l i g h t l y d i f f e r en t from Feuerbach. This conclusion cons t i tu tes

a ser ious defect in From's overall scheme, and i s p a r t i a l l y ind ica t ive

of Fromm's bourgeois conception of man which comes up against h i s materi - a1 i s t in te rpre ta t ion of h is tory . log Not only does Fromm not t e l l us

why the oppressed c lasses should r e j e c t force w i t h a more mi 1 i t a n t

eschatology, but he i s unable t o demonstrate t h a t where "God uses force"

i t i s simply t a c t i c a l . This re ject ion of force i s pa r t ly ind ica t ive

of the contradictions between Marxism and humanism, t o which A1 thusser

a1 1 udes. I t cons t i tu tes an "ideological b ias" i n F rom's work. There

tends to be a subs t i tu t ion of hope f o r fo rce , and a concept of gradualism

which emerges as the important lessons f o r h is tory from the Old Testament

Hebrews. For Fromm revolution proceeds i n s t ages , s ince force i s counter

productive. Franz Fanon i n his work on the psychology and organization

of violence from the perspective of the oppressed gives a more adequate

explanation f o r the fa i 1 ure of violence i n c l a s s i c col oni a1 s i t ua t i ons

which throws l i g h t on Fromm's problematic. Fanon suggests rev01 utionary

violence tends t o coll apse where the pol i t i cal l y most conscious elements

i n the socie ty a r e approached in the f i r s t place ( instance) f o r a1 1 i ance

o r compromi se . Fanon i nsi s t s t h a t i n col oni a1 s i t ua t i ons , the pol i t i cal ly

most conscious groups have more t o 1 ose through use of force. In sho r t

Fanon looks a t the psychic d i f f e r en t i a t i on of urban and rural groups.

He a1 so suggests a v i t a l organizational t i e between pol i t i cal continuity

and the points a t which force emerge. ' lo In other words force and

violence have t o be subjected t o s t ruc tu r a l and soci 01 ogi cal analyses

l i k e other factors such as c lass . Thus a1 te rna t ive explanations f o r the

f i r s t ' fa i 1 ure ' of the Hebrew rev01 ution out of Egypt and the oppressed

Christ ian groups may be t h a t , a ) violence was not i n i t i a t e d by the

Hebrew s laves , but by Moses who used i t as a point of bargaining w i t h

the Pharaoh, ra ther than as an organizational and consolidating mechanism;

b ) the leaders of the Am Ha-aretz turned f o r a l l i ances t o the Pharisees

and so a l ienated the oppressed groups, respectively. We turn now t o the

second weakness of Fromm's analysis .

Fromm's thinking takes the form of ten of binary oppositions.

This i s the case w i t h h i s anthropological use of the concepts of matri - archal and pa t r i a rcha l . Man's h i s to ry p r io r t o the " f a l l " i s matricen-

t ic ism, t h i s i s a l l a non-productive aspect of man's h i s to ry , f o r there

i s non-indivi duation and lack of i n s t i t u t i ona l i za t i on . I f t h i s i n t e r -

p r e t a t i on of the Old Testament t ex t s i s val i d then Fromm would have

d i f f i c u l t y explaining t rad i t iona l matriarchal s t ruc tures as anything b u t

archai c and regressive, in anthropol i gi cal di achrony . Thus, f o r Fromm,

the en t i r e Old Testament i s an elaboration of the patr iarchal p r inc ip le

with the prohibition against symbiotic t i e s ; o r matriarchy i s used in

a pa r t i cu la r i s t i c sense. Here we see a bias which i s par t ly charac ter i s t ic

of Freud also. Fromrn view the maturing of science (and by implication

technology) as outgrowths of rational thought since the sixteenth century

and posit ive expression of the patriarchal . principle. Later Protestantism

i s a negative character is t ic of the same principle. This s t r i c t adherence

t o Bachofen and classical anthropology diminishes the v i t a l i t y of Fromm's

anthropology. The explanation of technology and science also par t ia l ly

expl ai ns why Fromrn conceptual i zes techno1 ogy as an "independent factor"

i n his sociology. This l a t t e r point consti tutes a serious defect in his

work. Nevertheless Fromm's concl usions whi ch are sound a t the s t ructural

level and ambiguous a t the ideational level i s t h a t the messianic time -- another expression of self-hood--which i s revol utionary, i s the his tor ical

answer to man's exis tent i a1 dichotow. I t i s to th i s "revolutionary

concept" of sel f-hood tha t the discussion turns.

"The Lord: No, they will conceive of a sac r i f i ce so perfect t ha t i t

could cancel off a1 1 t h e i r gui 1 t , however mi ghtly tha t gui 1 t

might be.

Satan : B u t only a god would be perfect enough for that!

The Lord: Qui t e r i ght.

Satan: I tremble! You mean , . . The Lord: Yes. And f ina l ly a c u l t will a r i se which holds tha t I ,

in q y i n f in i t e mercy will send my only begotten Son as the

perfect sacri f i ce for the Earth-Peopl e ' s redemption.

Stan : Send your Son, to redeem such vermin! What pride they have!

What haughtiness ! How perfectly revol t i ng.

The Lord: Easy, w l ad . Th is i ssue c a n ' t be so lved by a hot-head.

You must r e a l i z e t h a t t h i s i ssue i nvo l ves n o t on l y a p r i n c i p l e

o f t heo log i ca l p e r f e c t i o n , b u t a l so a p r i n c i p l e o f logo-

l o g i c a l p e r f e c t i o n . I t o l d you t h a t we should be hear ing

much about " p e r f e c t i o n " be fore we were through. "

[Kenneth Burke, "Epilogue: Prologue I n Heaven," The Rhetor ic

of Re l ig ion : Studies I n Logology J ' I

I

FOOTNOTES

German

and r e

1 Cf. Ludwig Feuerbach, - The Essence of Chr i s t i an i t from the by George E l io t (New York: Harper T o ~ h d , p. 21.

' ~ 0 t h this question and the empirical material ( i .e . theology l i g ion ) which Fromm examines i n h is attempt, highlight the prob 1 em

which emerges with any attempt t o make connected asser t ions about human behaviour; and t h a t i s the unavoidability of the socia l s c i e n t i s t , taking an impl ic i t or e x p l i c i t posit ion on two questions. The f i r s t i s what r e l a t i v e weight should be given t o empirical fact-gathering and t o "formal deductive logic , the elaboration of analyt ical categories and t h e i r re la t ionsh ip t o one another." The second question concerns the "moral posit ion of the s c i e n t i s t i n r e l a t i on t o h i s subject matter , . . . " Assertions about both questions underlie this d i s s e r t a t i on ; See Chapter 3; "The New Schol as t i ci sm and the Study of Pol i t i c s ," i n Po l i t i c a l Power And Social Theory: Six Studies , by Barrington Moore, (Cambridge-varvard University ~re=1958),esp. p. 89.

3 ~ f . John Schaar, Escape From Authority , q. c i t . , p. 5. What Schaar could not have fu l l y r e a l i z e d i n 1961 was thatTomm l i k e Freud went "back" t o re l ig ious and theological writ ings in order t o lead. Whatever the contras ts in the substant ive aspects of the work of Freud and Fromm, t h e i r reversion t o theological sources a re s imi la r . This appears t o be t r ue of other psychoanalysts such as Otto Rank, Carl Jung and so on.

4 ~ t has been noted t h a t the humanist t r ad i t i on as well as the sources of a phi losophi cal anthropology antedate the wr i te r s mentioned, i n f a c t i t precedes the Protes tant Reformation i f aspects of the writ ings of S t . Augustine and S t . Thomas Acquinas and Dante a re included. What i s s t r i k i n g of these i s the te leological qua l i ty of the debate, repeated t o a large extent in the work of Hegel.

5 ~ f . Maurice Mandel baum, His tory , Man And Reason: A Stud In Nineteenth Century Thought (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press 1 . 28-29.

' ~ r i e f l ~ , metaphysical idealism may be defined as : the view t h a t those t r a i t s which define man as a s p i r i t u a l being can reveal through natural human experience, the understanding of the ult imate nature of r e a l i t y . This i s taken t o be a spec i f i c re jec t ion of revela t ion and an opposition t o materialism. See M. Mandel baum, E. - ci t . , p. 6. Positivism as defined above, r e j ec t s a l l forms of metaphysics, a search fo r repeated corre la t ions of phenomena through d i r e c t observation and an explanation of phenomena in terms of such uniformities. Also t h a t

such knowledge ( sc i en t i f i c ) consti tutes the ideal form of knowl edge. These characteris t i cs consti tu te the core of Comte's teachings. Mandelbaum touches on the conception of materialism as a s c i e n t i f i c epistemology of the nineteenth century when he s t a t e s tha t mater ial is ts believed: tha t "there i s an independently exis t ing world; t ha t human beings, l i ke a l l other objects, are material en t i t i e s ; t ha t the human mind does not ex i s t as an en t i ty d i s t inc t from the human body; and tha t there i s no God (nor any other non-human being) whose mode of existence i s not tha t of material en t i t i e s . " Cf. Mandelbaum, ibid. , p. 22.

7 ~ h e significance of humanism and of Kant and Hegel will be discussed more fu l ly when the problems of "philosophical idealism" i s taken up.

8 ~ e r b e r t F. Hahn, in The - Old Testament In Modern Research, with a survey of Recent ite era turn hi lade1 phi= Fortress Press, l966), p. 7. Hahn c i t e s the example of the conclusion of Wilhelm Vatke who i n 1890 suggested, from a cr i tique of 01 d Testament texts tha t the Hebrew religion underwent three changes. The f i r s t was the "age of primi t i ve worship;" the second, "the age of ethical consciousness"; the th i rd , the "age of the more external, ceremonial religion represented by the Levitical legis lat ion." Vatke's work i s suggested to be one of a host of re1 i gi ous reinterpretation of Chri s t i ani ty i nfl uenced by Hegel ian implications for historicism.

'see Ernest Becker's instruct ive essay, "Sketch For A Crit ical History of Anthropology," pp . 71-157 in -- The Lost Science -- of Man (New York: George Brazi l ler , 1971). Becker supports the notion of the cen- t r a l i ty of a philosophical anthropology, in any scheme of a unified science of man, by his discussion of the significance of Kant. Philo- sophi c-anthropology i s however in terms of i t s contribution one of the foundations of modern anthropology .

1•‹cf. Martin Buber, Between --- Man And Man (New York: Macmillan Co., l965), pp. 122-123. The assertion of phi losophical anthropology as a "sub-discipline" as used in th i s context i s not intended in an overall taxonomic sense b u t as a specification of one of the means by which anthropological knowl edge can be obtained.

''see E . Becker, x. - ci t., pp. 153-154.

121 re fe r here t o the works of Karl Bath's Church Dogmatics, Vol. I , and Reinhold Niebuhr's, The Nature And Destiny -- of Man, Vols. I and I1 (New York: Charles ~cribner , )~n terms of writers of the above genre, the c r i t i cal anthropol ogi cal school emergi ng out of Engel ' s c r i t ique has a different ontologic relat ion to Feuerbach.

13cf. Manfred H . Vogel , in introduction to Ludwig Feuerbach's Principles Of The P h i 1 osophy Of The Future (Indi anapol i s : Bobbs-Meri 11 Co. Inc. , 1966),pp. xxi i - x x i i i . T o g e l defines projection as "the

mechanism t h a t attempts t o s a t i s f y man's needs and wants by overcoming h i s f i n i t u d e . Through p r o j e c t i o n and subsequent o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n , man creates h i s i d e a l image. He creates God. I t i s the human imag ina t ion t h a t p r o j e c t s and i s thus c r e a t i v e " (p. x x i i i ) . O b j e c t i f i c a t i o n f o r Feuerbach , however, i s the a t t r i b u t i o n o f independent ex is tence t o p r o j e c t e d human qua1 i ti es . Feuerbach s t a t e d h i s p r i n c i p l e o f ob j e c t i - f i c a t i o n and f a i t h as fo l lows:

Where the ex is tence of God i s a l i v i n g t r u t h , an o b j e c t on which the imag ina t ion exerc ise i t s e l f, the re a l so appearances o f God a re be1 i eved i n . Where on t h e cont rary , t he f i r e o f t he re1 i g i ous i magi n a t i o n i s e x t i n c t , where the sensat ional e f f e c t s o r appearances, necessa r i l y connected w i t h an essen- t i a l l y sensat ional ex is tence cease, t he re t h e ex is tence becomes a dead, s e l f -cont rad i c t o r y ex is tence whi ch fa1 1s i r r e v o c a b l y i n t o t h e neqat ion o f atheism.

See Ludwi g ~euer6ach, - The Essence o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , x. - c i t. , p. 203. The p o i n t has a l s o been made by a number of w r i t e r s i n c l u d i n g Engels and Vogel t h a t Feuerbach was n o t t h e f i r s t phi losopher t o deny the ex is tence o f God as a supernatura l ex is tence, from t h e Sophists t o Rosseau, t he re i s a cons i s ten t t r a d i t i o n . Feuerbach's uniqueness i s h i s exp lanat ion o f the genesis o f t h e n o t i o n o f god i n sensuous man, and the throughness and sys temat i za t i on o f t h i s explanat ion.

1 4 ~ e f . Manfred Vogel , z. - c i t . , p. xxv.

151bid., p. x l v .

181bid., - pp. 68-72.

2 0 ~ b i - d. , p. l x i v. See a l so John Schaar, Escape From A u t h o r i t y , OJ-. - c i t . , pp. 125-126.

bid., p. l x v i .

2 2 ~ n t h i s con tex t Marx and Engels a re more i n agreement w i t h Hegel than w i t h Feuerbach, f i r s t because t h e former h o l d t h a t sense c e r t a i n t y i s n o t t h e f i n a l c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h , secondly because Feuerbach ignores the d i a l e c t i c method. For Feuerbach the t r u e d i a l e c t i c i s a humanist ic p r i n c i p l e , the d ia logue between I and thou ( i b i d . , - p. 72). Thi r d l y because Feuerbach i gnores t h e process o f 1 abour. Feuerbach ' s concl u s i on, therefore, t h a t the r e a l i z a t i on of t r u t h requ i res a change i n man's consciousness i s i n r a d i c a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o Marx's pos tu la tes . I t i s n o t w i t h i n the scope o f t h i s d iscuss ion t o engage i n a systemat ic Marxi an c r i ti que of Feuerbach , t h i s i s adequately done by F red r i ck Engel s i n Ludwig Feuerbach And The Outcome o f C lass ica l German Phi losophy (New York: 1 n t e r n a t i K l X b l i shers ,79'-

23~euerbach made one mention of the I and thou which lacks sys- tematic discussion. Cf. L. ~eue+bach, Princi l e s O f The Philoso h bf - --- E. - c i t . , p. 147-

+--+, The Future, w. c i t . , p. 72. See a l so Mar t~n Bu e r , Between an ndTan,

2 4 ~ h e r e Goul dner holds t h a t entropy i s devel oped in soci 01 ogy, via the c r i s i s of functionalism, this wr i t e r a s se r t s t h a t entrophy i s taking place a f t e r a long process of theoret ical and ideological confusion. C f . A1 vin Gouldner, - The Coming Cris is - In Western Sociology, 2. - ci t. , pp. 373-376.

2 5 ~ f . Louis A1 thusser, -- For Marx., T. - ci t . , p. 11. Georg Lukaa , wri t ing some quar te r century p r io r t o A1 thusser s t a t ed the same dilemma of Marxism as fol lows:

"When the problem of connecting i so la ted phenomena has become a problem of categor ies , by the same d i a l ec t i c a l process every problem of categories becomes transformed in to a his t o r i cal problem. " Though i t becomes a problem of universal h is tory which appears simultaneously as a problem of method as we1 1 as our knowledge of the present. And from this standpoint alone does his tory become a his tory of mankind, f o r i t con- t a in s everything t h a t leads back ult imately t o men and the re la t ions between men. Then again: " I t i s because Feuerbach gave t h i s new direct ion t o philosophy t h a t he was able t o exercise such a decisive influence on the or igins of h i s t o r i ca l materi a1 ism. However, by t rans forming phi 1 osophy in to ' anthro- pology' he caused man t o become frozen i n a fixed ob j ec t i v i t y and thus pushed both d i a l ec t i c s and his tory to one s ide . And precise ly t h i s i s the g rea t danger i n every humanism o r anthropological point of view. For i f man i s made the measure of a l l th ings , and i f with the aid of t h a t assumption a l l transcendence i s t o be eliminated without man himself being measured against t h i s c r i t e r i on, without applying the same 's tandard' t o himself . . . , then man himself i s made i n to an absolute and he simply puts himself i n the place of those transcendental forces he was supposed t o explain, dissolve and systematically replace. A t bes t , then a dogmatic meta- physics i s superseded by an equally dogmatic relat ivism. " Thus , s t a t e s Lukac's, the fa i 1 ure t o make man d i a l ec t i c a l i s complemented by the f a i 1 ure t o make real i t y di a1 e c t i cal . [I t a l i cs m i ne) .

Ref. Georg Lukacs , His tory -- And Class Consciousness : Studies - In Marxi s t Dialect ics , a. - c i t . , pp. 186-187.

2 6 ~ . Althusser, OJ-. - c i t . , p. 39. Al thusser ' s statement implies t h a t Marxism i s capable of posing the epistemological question. A1 thusser defines (humani sm) soci a1 i s t humanism concretely as the consummati on of bourgeois humanism' s noblest aspi ra t ions . "Humani ty ' s mi 11 enari an dreams, prefigured in the d r a f t s of pas t humanism, Christian and bour- geois," which a t l a s t f ind rea l iza t ion i n i t , in man and between men.

I t i s the eventual rei gn of Man. , I t i s the ideological problematic from which Marx emerged. B u t f o r Marx humanism was the " theoret ical p r inc ip le of h i s world outlook and of h i s pract ical a t t i t ude . " I t was the basis f o r a "rigourous theory of h is tory" and a "consis tent po l i t i c a l pract ice ." Further, A1 thusser defines ideology as " the 1 ived re la t ion between men and t h e i r world, o r a re f lec ted form of t h i s unconscious r e l a t i on, f o r instance a philosophy . . . , e t c . " Ideology i s d i s t i n c t from science by the f a c t t h a t the pract i co-soci a1 predominates i n i t over the theoret ical . H i s t o r i ca1 l y , i deo1 ogy precedes the science produced wi t h an epi s temo- logical break, but i t survives alongside science as an essen t ia l element of -every soci a1 formati on. Ref. L . - ~ l thusser , z. - ci t. , pp . 222-223 and pp. 251 -252.

2 7 ~ f . Eri ch Fromm's introduction t o the vol ume e n t i t l e d Soci a1 i s t -~ - .

Humanism: An International Symposi um, ed. E . Fromm (New York: Doubleday, 1 9 6 5 ) , p . V i i - x i i i .

2 8 ~ b i d . , - pp. v i i - v i i i .

2 9 ~ o r an extensive discussion of the d i s t inc t ion between analyt ic- posi t ive reason and d i a l ec t i c a l reason, see R. D. Laing and D. G. Cooper Reason and Violence, op. - c i t . , pp. 10-13. See a l so L . Althusser, -- For Marx, pp. 90-% where s t r e s s i s placed on the epistemological aspects of the d i a l ec t i c. Final l y , George Lukacs i n His tory -- And Class Consciousness , x. ci t . , discusses the problem of d i a l ec t i c a l and analyt ical reasoii- f r omthe standpoint of the unity of theory and praxis and from the object i v i s t character of the c r i t e r i a of academi c s c i ence. Thus Lukacs s t r e s se s i n h i s discussion the h i s t o r i ca l conditioning of a1 1 f a c t s unearthed with a d i a l e c t i c method. See pp. 5-15 of "What I s Orthodox Marxism." The s impl i s t character izat ion of the d i a l e c t i c as a method i n the human realm--a f a c t on which both S a r t r e and Lukacs concur-- i s as a re la t ion between the knower (analyst ) and known, and the nature of the known. The d i a l e c t i c recognizes the h i s t o r i ca l moments of percept and concept, and aims not as ' t o t a l i t i e s , ' but as t o t a l iza t ions-detota l i - z a t i o n s - r e t o t a l i z a t i o n s . Cf. p. 10, Laing and Cooper.

3 0 ~ . A1 thusser , For Marx, 2. - ci t., "On The Young Marx," pp. 52-71.

3 Z ~ e r d e r i s suggested as the founder of modern anthropology, and the general focus on customs and cu l tu re as t he dis t inguishing features i s emphasized by Marvin Harris , --- The Rise Of Anthropological Theory, . ci t. , pp. 1-2 and Max Gl uckman and Fred Eggan in ' Int ro- ducti on, - T h e e l evance O f Models For Soci a1 Anthropol ogy , ed. M. Banton, A.S.A. Monographs, No. 1 7 ~ o n d o n : G i s t o c k Publications, 1965), pp. ix-xi . For a discussion of Herder's anthropology, see R. G . Collingwood, The --- Idea Of Hi s to ry (Oxford: Cl arendon Press, 1946), pp. 88-93.

as one his ins is tance on the u n i Herder i s asser ted of the ,founders of anthropology because of

t y of the human species. I t should be noted t h a t Harris t races anthropology t o Locke's concept of cul ture i n h i s An - Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1 960) ; and En1 i ghtenment thought.

3 3 ~ f . Marvin Harris , --- The Rise Of Anthropological Theory, s. - c i t . pp. 8-79.

3 4 ~ f . M. Mandelbaum, History, -- Man And Reason, z. m., Pp. 20-28.

3 5 ~ o r extensive discussion of these dua l i t i e s see S. Tvler "A Formal Science," pp. 65-78, i n S. Tyler (ed.) Concepts and Assum t ions i n Contemporary Anthropol oqy (Georgia: Uni versi t y of Georg5P&.

3 6 ~ f . Ernst Cassi r e r , " ' S p i r i t ' And 'L i f e ' in Contemporary Philo- sophy," pp. 857-880, i n Paul - A . ~ c h i l p p , The Philosophy ---- of ~ r n s t ~ a s s i r e r (New York: Tudor Publishing, l958) , p. 8 7 r

3 7 ~ f . Erich Fromm,You Shall Be As Gods: A Radical In te rpre ta t ion Of The Old Testament And 1 t s ~ m i o n v e w r k i Holt Rinehart and Kn%n,969)-, p. 1 8 7 -

3 8 ~ b i d . , pp. 10-1 1. Fromm uses the terms radi cal humanism and socia l i s t humanism i nterchangably.

3 9 ~ b i d . , pp. 10 and 13. Early i n the introduction Fromm declares the i n t e l l e c tua l nature of h i s value biases t o be radical humanism, influenced by three Jewish scholars of humanist ideology, but w i t h varying or ienta t ions of t radi t i onal i s t mystic and Hasidic backgrounds. Ib id . , p . 14.

4 0 ~ b i d . , - pp. 12-13

4 2 ~ a r v i n Harris , The --- Rise Of Anthropological Theory, E. - ci t. , P. 662. For Harr is ' c r i t i que of the mentalism in 'French Structural ism, ' see ch. 18, pp. 464-513.

4 3 ~ n t h i s sense, I do not regard the following Fromm's works as central t o his anthropological perspective: Ps choanal s i s And Reli ion (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1950) ; Zen-Bud ~ s m - And-yc -f+- o- analysis (New York: Harper and Row, 1960).

4 4 ~ f . Erich Fromm,You ----- Shall Be As Gods, E. - ci t . , p. 50.

4 5 ~ f . - i bi d. , p. 48. This wr i t e r has seen a t 1 e a s t two bri ef references t o the s imi l a r i t y between Fromm and Scheler, but t h i s i s not borne out i n a reading of the l i t e r a t u r e . For the l a t t e r the higher values are an e th ica l a p r io r i which i s re l ig ious o r sacred. These

values correspond to a hierarchy pf men characterized by the " re l ig ious ly super ior" a t one extreme and the " a r t i s t s of consumption," a t the other. I t i s bourgeois morality which eroded Christ ian morality, from the th i r t een th century onwards, which a r e the roots of ressentiment, i n Scheler ' s phi losophi cal anthropology. Cf. Max Scheler Ressentiment, tr. W . Holdheim (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 10-22.

4 6 ~ f . --- The Art Of Loving, OJ. c i t . , pp. 109-112. - 4 7 ~ b i d . , p. 60.

48~romm s e l e c t s Judaism and the Hebrew t ex t s because they reveal a concern with a l l nations, a radical humanism, a f a c t pa r t ly conditioned by t h e i r h i s t o r i ca l powerlessness ( i b id . , p. 15). See a l so Ramon Xirau, "Erich Fromm: What I s Man's Struggle," in Bernard Landis and Edward S. Tauber ( e d i t e d ) , In The Name Of Life; Essa s In Honor of Erich Fromm ---- (New York: Hol t Ri n e ~ r t a n m n ~ t o n 9 7 d . 150-1 60.

4 9 ~ r i c h Fromm, 9. - c i t . , pp. 177-180.

''~hese ideas a re impl ic i t ly and e x p l i c i t l y s t a t ed i n Frorrm's two essays on Bachofen, see "The Significance O f The Theory Of Mother Right For Today" ( p p . 79-83) and "The Theory Of Mother Right and I t s Relevance For Soci a1 Psychology" (pp. 84-109) i n The Cris is - Of Psycho- analysis , 9. - c i t . , 1970. There a r e a l so posi t i v G s p e c t s . Ref. - The Sane Society, op. ci t., p. 57. The concept of ido la t ry a l so requires - def in i t ion . Fromm's notion of ido la t ry i s s im i l a r t o Marx's concept of r e i f i c a t i on and i s used in an equally wide-ranging sense. "Man t rans fe rs h i s own passions and qua l i t i e s " t o a thing or essence outs ide o f himself and worships i t . "The more he impoverishes himself, the g rea te r and s t ronger becomes the i do1 . The idol i s the a1 i enated form of man ' s experience of himself. In worshipping the i d o l , man worships himself. B u t t h i s s e l f i s a p a r t i a l , l imited aspect of man; h i s in te l l igence , his physical s t reng th , power, fame, and so on. By ident i fying himself w i t h a pa r t i a l aspect of himself, man l im i t s himself t o t h i s aspect; he loses h i s t o t a l i t y as a human being and ceases t o grow. He i s depen- dent on the i d o l , s ince only in submission t o the idol does he f ind the shadow, a1 though not the substance of himself." See E. Fromm, ----- You Shall Be As Gods, OJ-. cJ., p. 37. Also pp. 36-41.

''see introductory essay by S. Tauber and B. Landis i n -- In The Name Of Life: Essays In Honor of Erich Fromm, E. c i t . , pp. 1-2. ---

5 2 ~ f . Erich From, The Sane Society, OJ-. e., p. 64. For summary statements of Fromm's view of phylogenetic evolution see --- The Art Of Loving, pp. 6-7; -- The Sane Society, pp. 23, 27-28.

5 3 ~ . Fromm, The Sane Society , OJ. ci t . , p. 50. This cul tura l evolutionism i s t a k e n t x h t from the workof J . J . Bachofen. For example Marvin Harris s t a t e s of the l a t t e r : "Bachofen's scheme, . . . ,

included not only the evolution of soci a1 organization, b u t a l so a para1 l e l and functionally re la ted evolution of re1 i gious ideas. Indeed f o r Bachofen i t was a s e r i e s of re l ig ious reforms t h a t s e t the di rect ion of h i s tory" (see Marvin Harris --- The Rise Of Anthropological Theory, OJ-. - ci t., p. 200) .

5 4 ~ e f . E . Fromm, The Sane Society, z. - c i t . , p. 50.

5 5 ~ . Fromm, -- The Sane Society, 9. - ci t. p. 58.

E. From, ----- You Shall Be As Gods, 9. ci t. , pp. 21 -22. - 5 7 ~ b i d . , p. 23. Fromm does imply t h a t the idea of a God who

resembles man was an ' a rcha ic ' one, and thus the Biblical i n t e rp re t e r s imputed human psychological responses t o God. He suggests i n t he same paragraph t h a t t h i s apparent archaism o r regression i s a s t e p preparing the way f o r complete human freedom.

5 9 ~ bi d. , pp. 28-33. - 6 0 ~ b i d . , pp. 40-50.

"Ibid. of man survives nationalism w h i

, pp. 52-69. Fromm suggests t h a t the humanist concept i n the Jewish t r ad i t i on i n sp i t e of the elements of

ch he explains i n terms of the epochs of persecution and ghettoization of Jews in Europe. B u t the n a t i o n a l i s t i c a t t i t u d e i n the Bible i s balanced by the pr inciple of universalism. This univer- sa l ism f lour ishes under socio-poli t i c a l conditions ( fo r example the nine- teenth century) where bar r ie r s are broken down (see pp. 66-69).

6 2 ~ e e - i bi d . , pp. 96-98, f o r an extensive discussion of the messianic time in t he b ib l ica l sense. Fromm conceives of the messianic time i n the Hegel i an sense of the 'mas t e r - s l ave' d i a l ec t i c a l re la t ion- ship. Both Paradise and the messi anic time a re s t a t e s of harmony, b u t the l a t t e r i s a consequence of man having been born, a fu tu re s t a t e ; where a pre-condition of the former i s t h a t man is n o t y e t born.

6 3 ~ b i d . , pp, 151-157. See a l so pp. 79-87.

6 4 ~ f . G. Lukacs , History - And Class Consciousness : Studies In Marxist Dialecti c s , esp. chapter three "Class Consciousness ," pp. z - 7 9 , x. - ci t . , fo r an analysis of t h e problem of the object ively possible.

6 5 ~ . From, ----- You Shall Be As Gods, 2. - ci t., p. 86.

6 6 ~ b i d . , pp. 102-103.

6 7 ~ b i d . , pp. 93-94.

%ee pp. 110-1 11, especial l y footnote on p. 11 1 where From

draws the para1 l e l . Fromm i s a l so wrong f o r another simple reason, i .e. t h a t Marx did not i n h i s conkept of h is tory iden t i fy s e r f s w i t h exploited cas tes , with the working c lasses . The l a t t e r i s a h i s t o r i ca l ly unique phenomena. Working c lass imp1 i e s polarized groups i n a spec i f i c s t r uc tu r a l sense. Serfs and landlords a re opposed groups i n another sense. The non-mono1 i th i c nature of Marx's "theory of h is tory" cannot be overstressed. See Henri Lefebvre The Sociology of Marx, esp. "Socio- logy And Social Classes," pp. 87-1 22 ( N e w York: Vi n t a g e o l s , 1969).

6 9 ~ e e E. From, You Shall Be As Gods, x. - c i t . , p. 113 and pp. 121-124.

7 0 ~ t is worth notino t h a t a1 thouqh Fromm was acquainted with the a1 t e rna t i ve analysis o f " ~ a r 1 ~ a u t s k y w ( ~ h e - ~ounda t i ons Of Chri s - t i an i ty , t r . Henry F. Minns, New York: S. A. Russell, 1 9 5 3 x when he wrote h i s e a r l i e r essay "The Dogma Of Christ" which i s an a1 te rna t ive analysis on the monotheistic sources of Judaism with strong oppositions t o the h i s to r ica l and ideological au then t ic i ty of the 01 d Testament, Fromm chooses t o ignore these sources i n t h i s second essay --- You Shall Be As Gods. --

" ~ f . Erich Fromm, "The Dogma Of Christ," i n - The Dogma Of Christ : and o ther essa s on r e l i ion, psychology and cul ture . New ~ o r k r ~ n c h o r ----+- 9- - Books, 1966 pp. 3-95 p. 93.

7 2 ~ e f . Karl Kautsky, Foundations (If Chr is t i an i ty , w. - ci t., p. 200.

7 3 ~ o r extended def in i t ion and analyses of the concept of dogma see t h e writ ings of A. Harnack (1957), Martin Werner (1957) and Karl Kautsky ( l953) , a l so R. Niebuhr (1964), Vol. 11. While wr i te r s such as Harnack and Niebuhr define t he problem of Chris t i an dogma from the inception of this debate about God and Christ as though i t were simply a problem of the d iv in i t y of Chris t , a kind of theological-philosophical and epistemological i ssue about whether Chris t is a l so God, in sho r t about the continuity between Primitive and He1 l e n i s t i c Chris t iani ty (Niebuhr, pp. 60-61), wri ters such as Martin Werner a re c loser t o Fromm's conception of dogma. Werner defines dogma as the condi t i ons ( c i rcum- s tances) i n which a t l e a s t two decades a f t e r the Cruci f i xion, two r iva l in te rpre ta t ions about the nature and mission of Jesus emerged. In t h i s sense the synoptic formulations in theology are only surface mani- fes ta t ions of the his tory of dogma and t he forces shaping t h a t h is tory . The ideological point of departure i s the re la t ionship of the death of Jesus t o the Judaic messianic concept of Law. A t another level i t i s the sociological causes of the transformation of the primitive Christ ian f a i t h and i t s imminent eschatology about the transformation of the world order, the appearance of the Kingdom in to the doctrines of ea r ly Catholicism. The ideational content of theology becomes t h a t of order and hierarchy. (See Martin Werner, The Formation O f Christ ian Dogma: An Historical Study Of I t s Problem-(iondon: ~ d a m y n d Char1 es Black, 1957, pp. 3-27. ) ---

Whereas Werner looks a t the problqm of dogma as a whole, From's analysis is only concerned with the spec i f i c period from the f i r s t t o fourth cen- t u r i e s . Fromm a lso deals with the problem anthropologically in the sense t h a t he examines i t from a 'personali ty-social s t r uc tu r e ' per- spect i ve.

7 4 ~ e e E . Fromm, Dogma - Of Chris t , x. - ci t., p. 60.

7 5 ~ b i d . , p. 10. I t i s worth noting t h a t From dis t inguishes I between Freud s and h i s own study. He suggests t h a t Freud aimed t o

study people ( t h a t i s t h e i r psychic re l ig ious o r ien ta t ion and the inner power of re1 igious doctr ines) v i s a v i s a study of those doctrines. Fromm on the other hand aims to understand dogma on the basis of people. Ref. i b id . , pp. 17-21. See a l so George Wilbur and Warner Mennsterberger (edit* Psychoanalysis And Culture: Essays In Honor Of Geza Roheim, Par t I essay by H . H a r t m a ? T S 7 - . ~ a n R . o K e n s t e i n , ' S o m e Psycho- ana ly t ic Comments on 'Culture And Personali ty," pp. 3-31, p . 4 (New York: International Universi t ies Press, 1951) ; f o r mention of From's anthro- pologi cal posture as d i s t i n c t from Freud's.

76~au t sky , wri t ing of the re l ig ious ideology of t h i s group, suggests t h a t i t denied human immortal i t y , punishment a f t e r death and God as a causal f ac to r in human l i f e . Cf. - The Foundations -- of Chris- t i ani t y , 9. e., p. 229. See a l so E . Fromm, - The Dogma - Of Chris t , 9. - c i t . , p. 29.

7 7 ~ . Fromm, x. - c i t ; , p. 25.

781bid., - pp. 27-34. Both Fromm and Kautsky provide adequate concrete examples of confl i c t , co-optation and repression w i t h i n t h e empi re . Kauts ky , of course draws para1 l e l s a t points wi t h the French Rev01 ution and par t i cu la r ly w i t h the Par is communal rev01 t of 1871. Kautsky a l so suggests t h a t sect ions of the opposition had designs not simply on overthrowing t he Rome hierarchy, but of taking control on behalf of the oppressed Jews and spreading Judaism. These points a re ignored by Fromm. See K. Kautsky, x. ci t . , Kautsky's in te rpre ta t ion of sect ions of the "book of Daniel, " pp.35-236. For an analysis of the nature of soci a1 mobility and the possible conditions f o r f l ex i - b i l i t y and therefore co-optation within t h e rul ing e l i t e see , R. Hopkins, "E l i t e Mobility In The Roman Empire," -- Past and Present, No. 32, 1965.

7 9 ~ f . E . Fromm, a. - c i t . , p. 36.

8 0 ~ f . K. Kautsky, x. - ci t . , pp. 258-271 and E . Fromm, pp. 40-48. The Essenes were o r ig ina l ly Jewish prole tar ian groups which s t ressed puritanism, celibacy and asceticism and unfreedom of the will and f a t e , group excl usi veness and peasant agri cul ture . They exis ted around Pales t i n e from the second century B . C. t o the second century A. D.

8 1 ~ f . E . Fromm, 9. - ci t . , p. 42. Like most eschatologies, ea r ly Chris t i an ones s t ressed a1 so the ultimate reversal whereby the r ich would s u f f e r punishment and the poor exalted t o happiness.

8 2 ~ f . E. Fromm, 9. c. ,, p. 49.

83~r-omm does recognize a defusing of revolutionary content a t t h i s point. See E. From E. - ci t . , p. '52.

8 6 ~ h e pneumatic viewpoint evolves toward eventual and complete i den t i t y i n the following manner: 1 ) Jesus, son of God begotten of the Father, before a l l time and of one nature w i t h t he Father; 2) The Arian. s im i l a r i t y of natures b u t not ident ical natures i s re jected i n favour of the view t h a t two natures a re only one nature, i .e. the dua l i ty and simultaneity view. Ibid . , p. 64.

8 7 ~ f . Michel Foucault, Madne5s - And Civi 1 i za t ion : A History O f Insani ty In The A_qe of Reason, x. a. , pp. x-xi . I-oucaa t s t a t e s t h i s concept o f s i l ence i n t h e fol 1 owing manner.

In the serene world of mental i l l n e s s , modern man no longer communicates w i t h the madman: on the one hand the man of reason delegates the physi c i an t o madness, thereby authori - zing a re la t ion only through the abs t r ac t universal i ty of d isease; on the other , the man of madness communicates w i t h socie ty only by the intermediary of an equally abs t rac t reason which i s order , . . . the requirements of conformity. There i s no common language, no dialogue between them, . . . The 1 anguage of psychiatry, which i s a monologue of reason about madness, has been es tabl ished only on the basis of such a s i l ence .

Fromm a1 so commenti ng on the characteri s t i cs of the ea r ly s i 1 ence fol 1 owing the f a i l u r e of the Pharisees t o lead the revolutionary process suggests:

Li ke John t he Bapt i s t , ear ly Chris ti an doctrine addressed i t s e l f not t o the educated and the property owners, but t o the poor, the oppressed and the suf fe r ing (p. 36). B u t an essent i a1 element s t ruc tura l ly as we1 1 as ideational ly was the s t ruggle against paternal author i ty (p. 38).

8 8 ~ f . E. Fromm, w. - ci t . , pp. 74-84. See a l so , Martin Werner, The Formati on of Chri s t i an Dogma, 9. ci t. , pp . 40-52. - - -

89&. . , Fromm, p. 61.

I bi d. , p. 68. For an a r t i cu l a t i on of t h e concept symbol see E. Fromm, TheForgot ten - Language, An Introduction t o the Understandin of Dreams, Fairy Tales and Myths (New York: Grove Press, 1951 - -- - - m y - 2 3 , esp. pp. 15-18 where From examines universal symbols.

"E. Fromm, x. - c i t . , "The Dogma o f C h r i s t , " p. 69. n .. "see G. Lenski , Power And P r i vi l e e: A Theory of Soci a1 S t r a t i -

f i c a t i o n (New York: ~ c ~ r a w - H i l l 3 9 6 6 T+ pp. 18g-242, e s r pp. 197-201. - . . I t i s worth n o t i n g t h e di f f e r e n c e s between Max Weber's a s s e r t i o n t h a t imperi a1 Rome was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a system o f r a t i o n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e bureaucracy where t h e r e was a s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e i nd iv idua l and t h e s t a t u s o f o f f i c e . This does n o t appear t o be v a l i d f o r t h e most powerful o f f i c e s . Both Kautsky and Lenski stress a s a prime mot iva t ion the use o f p o l i t i c a l power t o i n c r e a s e economic wealth. Cf. Max Weber, The Theory o f Economic And Socia l Or a n i z a t i o n , tr. A. M. Henderson Ki T. P a r s o n s ' ( N e w r k : F r e e P re s s , 9--r 1964 , p. 67.

9 4 ~ . Fromm, x. m., p. 65.

9 5 ~ f . S t an l ey J . Glen, -- Erich Fromm: - A P r o t e s t a n t C r i t i q u e , 2. - c i t., pp. 20-21. Some o f t h e imp l i ca t i ons o f Glen ' s concept ion o f Fromm's simi 1 a r i t y wi th Dewey w i 11 be taken up i n t h e next chap te r .

9 6 ~ b i d . , - p. 24.

9 7 ~ b i d . , p. 25.

9 8 ~ b i d . , - p. 27.

" ~ b i d . , p. 27.

loO1bid . , p. 31.

l o l l b i d . , pp. 47-49.

lo31bid. , - pp. 52-54. In a subsequent s e c t i o n Glen d e a l s with t h e "negat ivism" i n Fromm, again i n terms o f g r a c e , s i n and God ( r e f . pp. 54- 74) . The main conc lus ion a r r i v e d a t i s t h a t f o r Calvin and Luther, man was ex i s t e n t i a1 l y gui 1 t y , bu t n o t e s s e n t i a1 l y ev i 1 .

'041bid. , pp. 72-85.

lo5see Guyton Hammond, Man I n Es t r an ement: A corn a r i s o n o f t h e

P re s s , 1965, p. 5. .+ *-- thought o f Paul T i l l i c h and ~ r i c h ~ x m m ennessee: van e r I t n l v e r s l t y

l o 6 ~ u y t o n Hammond, x. - c i t. , p. 42.

lo71bid. , pp. 60-63.

lo81 r e f e r t o Psychoanalysis - And Re1 i gi on (1950) , x. G. and E. Fromm and D. T. Suzuki and D. T. Martino, - Zen Buddhism - And Psychoanalysis

(New York: Harper and Bros , 1960). ' Both of these works have been h i ghly c r i t i c i z e d elsewhere. For a c r i t i que of the l a t t e r work, see f o r example Paul Wienphal, "Book Review," i n Philosophy --- East And West, Vol. 15, 1965, pp. 81-82.

l o 9 ~ h i s point i s elaborated and discussed i n chapter s i x where Fromm's concept of s e l f i s c r i t i c a l l y examined.

llOcf. Franz Fanon, The Wretched Of The Earth, tr. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press,-, pp. 107-147. For the non- Marxist imp1 i cations of Fanon's posi t i on on rev01 utionary vi 01 ence see David Cante Fanon (London : Fontana/Coll i n s , 19701, pp. 68-90, esp. pp. 70 and 82. This weakness a l so explains Fromrn's i den t i f i c a t i on of the messianic time with the prophetic concept of peace i n h i s socio- logical connections.

l1 ~ f . Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies - In Logo1 ogy (Boston : Beacon ~ress ,9p.2=.

C H A P T E R VI

T H E INDIVIDUAL A N D THE S E L F

Why t h e n become a g i t a t e d ? We have , on t h e one hand, v a r i o u s t e c h n i q u e s , each o f which e x e r t s o n l y p a r t i a l a c t i o n and can t h e r e f o r e be of no damage t o man's t o t a l b e i n g . O n t h e o t h e r hand, we have a myth, 'Man' , which more o r l e s s d e f i e s h i m and i n any c a s e s t r o n g l y a f f i r m s t h a t t e c h n i q u e i s s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e human b e i n g . What more cou ld we want? ( J a c q u e s ~ 1 l u l ) l

, Whi l e Eri ch Fromm's a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l s t r a t e g y r e s t s on

h is d e m o n s t r a t i o n of t h e i n c r e a s i n g " p o t e n t i a l " o f t h e human

s p e c i e s f o r a c r e a t i v e s e l f w i t h t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of

s y m b i o t i c t i e s - t h a t i s t i e s t o m a t r i a r c h a l o r i e n t a t i o n s ,

t i e s t o b l o o d , s o i l and a p r o t e c t i v e a u t h o r i t a r i a n d e i t y ;

t h e s o c i o 1 o g i c a l c o r o l l a r y f o c u s e s on what happens t o - t h a t

p o t e n t i a l and t h e d i a c h r o n i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e advance of

t e c h n o l o g y and i n d u s t r i a l i s m . As was s u g g e s t e d i n t h e

p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r t o f u l l y comprehend t h e s s c i o l o g i c a l

s t r a t e g y i m p l i e s an a n a l y s i s of t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l one ,

e q u a l l y however, a comprehension of t h e n o t i o n of

p o t e n t i a l i t y i m p l i e s some i n q u i r y i n t o t h e u n d e r l y i n g

c o n n e c t i o n between Fromm's view o f t e c h n o l o g y , h i s a n a l y s i s

of power and t h e o p t i o n of c o n s c i o u s n e s s th rough e d u c a t i o n

( i n i t s b r o a d e r s e n s e s ) f o r t h e n o t i o n of s e l f a s becoming

a s a b i l i t y , r a t h e r t h a n s imply c a p a c i t y . The a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l

and t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l s t r a t e g i e s t a k e n t o g e t h e r c o n s t i t u t e

299

300

t h e main framework o f t h e Fromrnian opus.

B u t i t i s on t h e l a t t e r t h a t any s y n o p t i c e v a l u a t i o n

o f Fromm's work must , i n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , be based .

T h i s c h a p t e r has a s i t s p r i n c i p a l t a s k such an e v a l u a t i o n ,

which t a k e s t h e form of t h e q u e s t i o n : "what a r e t h e

i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e freedom from - freedom t o p o s t u l a t e f o r

t h e s e l f h o o d of modern man?" I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e n o t i o n of

s e l f h o o d i s d i s t i n c t from t h e n o t i o n of " p r o d u c t i v e

c h a r a c t e r " , f o r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n r e s t s on t h e f a c t t h a t

where t h e fo rmer i s n o n - s p e c i f i c emphas iz ing e s s e n t i a l l y t h e

i n d i v i d u a l ' s c a p a c i t y t o t r a n s c e n d t h e g iven s o c i e t y ,

s t r e s s i n g c r e a t i v i t y and t h e s p e c i e s c a p a c i t y f o r i t , t h e

p r o d u c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s a s p e c i f i c c o n c e p t r e f e r r i n g t o t h e

means ( a c a t e g o r y n o t a t a l l f i n a l i z e d i n Fromrn's opus ) f o r

such c r e a t i v i t y . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n c a n n o t be o v e r s t r e s s e d

l a r g e l y becuase t h e a r e a o f s e l f h o o d i s p r o b a b l y the l e a s t

deve loped and s p e c i f i c of Fromm's works.

I t i s a l s o one o f t h e a r e a s i n which many c r i t i q u e s

of Fromm's opus t e n d t o become bogged down f o r h i s c r i t i c s

t e n d t o a rgue t h a t he i s e i t h e r a ) p a s s i n g o f f i d e o l o g y a s

c r i t i c a l human s c i e n c e and s o j u s t i f y i n g t h e s t a t u s

t h a t i s t o s a y n o t r e c o g n i z i n g an e s s e n t i a l t ruth i n F reud ,

t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n between t h e i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y quo ,

(Marcuse 1955, pp. 242 -243 ; Harry Wel ls ( 1 9 6 3 ) ; Y . Lowenfeld

( 1 9 6 0 ) . Or b ) t h a t Fromm mi s u n d e r s t a n d s t h e phenomenology

of l i b e r t y and a u t h o r i t y and s o e s s e n t i a l l y a d v o c a t e s

d e m o c r a t i c r u l e by whim o r d e s i r e ( 3 . S c h a a r ( 1 9 6 1 ) . p p .

288 and 295 and R . Grotesky ( 1 9 6 7 ) ) and o r exempts some o f

h i s own " o b j e c t i v e s " from t h e de te rmin i sm which he h i m s e l f

(Fromm) wants t o a v o i d (Henry K a r i e l (1957) . While i t i s

by no means o u r i n t e n t i o n t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e r e a r e no

a m b i g u i t i e s i n Fromm's work, we s u g a e s t t h a t t h o s e

ambi a u i t i e s a r e n o t s a t i s f a c t o r i l y e x p l a i n e d i n t e rms of

Frommfs work a s l i b e r a l i d e o l o g y on t h e one hand o r

s c i e n t i s t i c de te rmin i sm on t h e o t h e r , r a t h e r t h e y r e s t on

t h e d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s - i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n - between Fromm's

use o f , and a l l u s i o n t o t h e n o t i o n o f , t h e s e l f and t o t h e

c o n c e p t of t h e p r o d u c t i v e c h a r a c t e r a s s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r .

In l i n e w i t h t h e e a r l i e r d i s t i n c t i o n s t r u c k between c o n c e p t s

a t t h e i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l l e v e l and t h o s e a t t h e e m p i r i c a l

t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l i t i s s u g g e s t e d h e r e t h a t Frornm's c o n c e p t

of t h e s e l f i s a t t h e j u s t l e v e l of a r t i c u l a t i o n and h i s

c o n c e p t of t h e p r o d u c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s a t t h e second l e v e l .

The e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l problem whi ch u n d e r l i e s Fromm's

c o n c e p t i o n of t h e s e l f i s n o t unique t o h i s work a l o n e , b u t

u n d e r l i e s t h e e n t i r e a t t e m p t t o i n t e g r a t e and s y n t h e s i z e

s o c i a l psychology and s o c i o l o g y . The problem i s b e s t

e x p r e s s e d i n one of Fromm's r e c e n t works , where he s t a t e s :

. . . " t h e r e i s a t remendous d i f f e r e n c e t o be found between o u r most undeveloped a n c e s t o r s and c i v i l i z e d man a s he a p p e a r s i n t h e l a s t f o u r t o s i x thousand y e a r s of h i s t o r y . O n t h e o t h e r hand, i f one a c c e p t s an e v o l u t i o n a r y concep t and t h u s b e l i e v e s t h a t man i s

c o n s t a n t l y chang ing , what i s l e f t a s a c o n t e n t f o r an a l l e a e d " n a t u r e " o r " e s $ e n c e n o f m a n ? "

A l i t t l e l a t e r i n t h e same t e x t Fromm s u g g e s t s t h a t

s e l f h o o d i s t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n th rough a c t i v i t y i n t o

r e a l i z a t i o n of o u r e s s e n c e b u t such a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i m p l i e s

t h e " r e a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s " which a r e de te rmined by the " t o t a l

s i t u a t i o n " . S e l f h o o d a s freedom t h e n l i e s i n t h e

" p o s s i b i l i t y t o choose between t h e e x i s t i n g r e a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s

( a l t e r n a t i v e s ) . Freedom i n t h i s s e n s e can be d e f i n e d n o t

a s ' a c t i n 9 i n t h e awareness of n e c e s s i t y ' b u t a s a c t i n g on

t h e b a s i s of t h e awareness of a l t e r n a t i v e s and t h e i r

consequences . S o c i a l c h a r a c t e r i n t h e form of t h e

p r o d u c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s n o t an end i n i t s e l f - i n t h e l o n g

r u n - b u t a means a " r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y " , a t the l e v e l o f

Fromm's e m p i r i c a l psychology. Fromm i s l i k e l y t o be

m i s c o n s t r u e d because he has n o t made t h i s p o i n t e x p l i c i t l y .

C o n v e r s e l y , t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i on of t h e socio-economi c

sys t em o f modern s o c i e t y i s no t an end i t s e l f b u t a p r e -

c o n d i t i o n , a means t o t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of s e l f h o o d . 2 T h i s

l i n e of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s i n keep ing w i t h Fromm's r e p e a t e d

a s s e r t i o n i n h is r e c e n t works t h a t t h e s o c i a1 c h a r a c t e r i s

a c a n a l i z a t i o n and c h a n n e l l i n g of f o r c e s i n a g iven

d i r e c t i o n b u t n o t a t h i n g i n i t s e l f and f o r i t s e l f , I t

s e r v e s t o " e x p l a i n t h e l i n k between t h e m a t e r i a l b a s i s of

a s o c i e t y and t h e " i d e o l o g i c a l s u p e r s t r u c t u r e " , 3

The r e a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of Fromm's p o s i t i o n i n t e r m s

of h i s c o n c l u s i o n t h e n does n o t r e s t on h i s c o n c e p t s of I

t h e s e l f o r h i s c o n c e p t s o f s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r and s o on.

R a t h e r t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s s t em from h i s s o c i o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s

i t s e l f . P u t more s p e c i f i c a l l y i t s t ems from t h e

"empi r i c a l " a n a l y s i s of t h e p a r t i c u l a r p r o c e s s e s of

e l i m i n a t i o n which l e d from t o t h e t r e a t m e n t of t e c h n o l o g y ,

i n modern s o c i e t y , a s though i t were an i n d e p e n d e n t

v a r i a b l e , from t h e l a c k o f a s y s t e m a t i c c r i t i q u e o f t h e

c o n t e n t of such t e c h n o l o g y . Thus Fromm t e n d s t o a r g u e t h a t

p a r t o f t h e p r o c e s s o f chang ing t h e m a t e r i a l p r e c o n d i t i o n s

o f t h e s o c i e t y i n o r d e r t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e o p e r a t i o n a l i s m

o f t h e p r o d u c t i v e c h a r a c t e r must i n v o l v e a change i n t h e

d i r e c t i o n - of t e c h n o l o g y , b u t he s a y s l i t t l e t h a t i s

s u b s t a n t i v e a b o u t t h e r e a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d i n t h i s ,

b u t r a t h e r i m p l i e s t h a t t h i s can b e a c h i e v e d th rough a

p r o c e s s of ' e d u c a t i o n ' . P u t more g e n e r a l l y t h i s i m p l i e s

chang ing man's c o n s c i o u s n e s s . B u t what a r e t h e

p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r t h i s i n modern i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y ? What

c o n c e p t of power does such advocacy imply? And t o what

e x t e n t does such a c r i t i q u e o f Fromm's r e n d e r h i s

t r a n s l a t i o n from s o c i a l psycholo9y t o s o c i o l o g y a form of

s o c i o 1 o ~ i s m , jus t a s h is a n t h r o p o l o g y s u f f e r s from an

e v o l u t i o n a r y s i m p l i f i c a t i o n - t h e i n a b i l i t y t o r e c o g n i z e

e l e m e n t s of q u a l i t y i n t h e i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s o f ~ r i m i t i v e o r

t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i e t i e s . 4

304

The a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e r a m i f i c a t i o n s of meaning

i m p l i c i t i n Fromm's c o n c e p t ' o f t h e s e l f , canno t be t r e a t e d

l i g h t l y ; once i t becomes c l e a r t h a t t h e s e l f i s an

i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l component of t h e opus , Poi n t s of

r e i t e r a t i o n of i s s u e s d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r i n Chap te r Two a r e

u n a v o i d a b l e a t t h i s s t a q e o f t h e work, f o r what i s i n v o l v e d

h e r e i s a drawing t o g e t h e r of t h e t h r e a d s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

engaged i n s o f a r .

In t h e f i r s t Summary of Chap te r Two we s u g g e s t e d t h a t

where Fromm's concep t of human n a t u r e i s viewed i n t e r m s

o f e s s e n c e and e x i s t e n c e , e s s e n c e becomes method and v a l u e ,

i n t h e s e n s e t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s of s c i e n c e have a r t i c u l a t e d

c l e a r l y - and Fromm has t a c i t l y adopted t h e i r s t a n c e - t h a t i n o r d e r t o p e n e t r a t e below t h e i l l u s i o n s of s o c i e t y

a s w e l l a s t o pose q u e s t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r a human s c i e n c e s ,

n e c e s s i t a t e d a c o n c e p t of e s s e n c e which t r a n s c e n d s

b e h a v i o u r i s m . We a l s o s u g g e s t e d i n t h a t c h a p t e r t h a t t h e

c o n c e p t of c h a r a c t e r , i t s i n t e g r a t i o n of s o c i a l - p s y c h o l o g y

and s o c i o l o g y , were p r e d i c a t e d on such a c o n c e p t of

e s s e n c e , B u t a l l t h i s i s a t one l e v e l o f t h e o r e t i c a l

a n a l y s i s , t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l , A t a n o t h e r l e v e l of Fromm's

work, t h e empi r i c a l t h e o r e t i c a l and s y n o p t i c l e v e l , and

t h u s i n t e rms of some of his c o n c r e t e c o n c l u s i o n s , t h e

c o n c e ~ t of e s s e n c e re-emerges i n Fromm's n o t i o n of t h e

s e l f , We s e e f o r example i n Fromm's ' a n t h r o p o l o g y '

t h e a t t e m p t t o i n j e c t i n t o h i s n o t i o n of e s s e n c e a

305

h i s t o r i c a l p roof w h i ch c o u l d complement t h e a n a l y t i c a l and

m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a s s e r t i o n s , and i t i s i n t h i s s e n s e t h a t

h i s a n t h r o p o l o g y and s o c i o l o g y a r e i n t e r c o n n e c t e d . We can

view t h e t r a c i n g by Fromm o f changing r e l a t i o n s between

man and God l e a d i n g t o t h e n o t i o n of autonomy a s e v i d e n c e

of t h i s p r o j e c t , s o t h a t t h e s e l f which Fromm a d h e r e s t o ,

i s one which he b e l i e v e s t o be h i s t o r i c a l l y and

i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y , a s p e c i f i c one t o modern man. The problem

however i s t h a t a c l e a r c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e s e l f w h i l e c l e a r

enough as an i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l c o n c e p t i o n i n t h e form of t h e

n o t i o n o f human n a t u r e u n d e r l y i n g t h e Frommian devel opment

of t h e c o n c e p t of c h a r a c t e r i n h is o r i e n t a t i o n t o s o c i a l

s c i e n c e , i s by no means c l e a r i n a n o t h e r p a r t of Fromm's

work. In t h e a r e a of Fromm's c o n c r e t e e m p i r i c a l work t h e

c o n c e p t of s e l f i s a t t i m e s l a t e n t , a t o t h e r t i m e s g a r b l e d

and c o n f u s e d , w i t h a t endency t o become r h e t o r i c a l . Here

we s e e a t some p o i n t s a t endency i n Fromm t o c o n f u s e t h e

c o n c e p t o f p r o d u c t i v e c h a r a c t e r and t h e c o n c e p t of t h e

s e l f . I f t h e l i n e of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t p r o d u c t i v e

c h a r a c t e r , i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y a means t o s e l f h o o d , i s a

c o r r e c t one , t h e n such c o n f u s i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a major

weakness of Fromm's work and p u t s one i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n

t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e k e r n e l of v a l i d i t y i n many of h i s c r i t i c s '

a s s e r t i o n s abou t Fromm's works. I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o

r e c o g n i z e t w o poi n t s stemming from t h e f o r e g o i n g r emarks ,

however. The f i r s t i s t h a t many of Fromm's c r i t i c s

( d i s c u s s e d i n d e t a i l t h r o u g h o u t t h e work h e r e ) have o n l y a

k e r n e l of v a l i di t y , where t h e y r e c o g n i z e ambi gui t i e s and

u n c l a r i t i e s , b u t t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between 'means ' and

' e n d ' , between c h a r a c t e r and s e l f h o o d i s l a t e n t i n Fromm's

work. The second p o i n t i s t h a t t h e r e i s a s u b s t a n t i v e and

method01 o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n between t h e a m b i g u i t i e s w i t h

r e s p e c t t o c h a r a c t e r and s e l f h o o d and Fromm's t r e a t m e n t of

power and techno1 ogy, p a r t i c u l a r l y Fromm's t r e a t m e n t of

p h y s i c a l f o r c e a s an a a e n t of s o c i a l change. B r i e f l y

Fromm's humanism l e a d s him t o r e j e c t p h y s i c a l f o r c e a s a

v i a b l e a g e n t of s o c i a l change which cou ld y e t l e a d t o man's

s e l f h o o d . Although he wants t o view t h a t s e l f h o o d a s

becoming, c r e a t i v i t y and r e a l i z a t i o n of powers w i t h i n man,

w i t h o u t s p e c i f y i n g i n d e t a i l t h e s u b s t a n c e s o f s e l f h o o d ,

s i n c e t h i s would r e n d e r h i s work d e t e r m i n i s t i c and no l e s s

t o t a l i t a r i a n t h a n h i s opponents (who cou ld t h e n accuse

h i m of ex t reme s o c i a1 e n g i n e e r i n g ) ; Fromm c o n s i s t e n t l y

r e j e c t s t h e use o f p h y s i c a l f o r c e even a g a i n s t t h e

a u t h o r i t a r i a n s t a t e , and f a v o u r s i n s t e a d ' e d u c a t i o n ' ,

s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n and c o n s c i o u s n e s s a s a v e h i c l e of s o c i a l

change . When Fromm a s s e r t s t h e n e c e s s a r y p r e c o n d i t i o n of

t h e s o c i a l i z a t i o n of t h e means and f o r c e s of p r o d u c t i o n ,

a s ' e l e m e n t s ' o f m a t e r i a l soc io -economic change , he i s

j u s t i f i a b l y a t t a c k e d by Marcuse and Harry \ J e l l s o f b e i n g

r h e t o r i c a l . N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e Frommi an ambigu i ty has t o be

viewed as o r i g i n a t i n g i n t he concept of se l fhood which

Fromm holds . ,

Two t a sks a r e necessary before moving t o t h e more

' c o n c r e t e ' d i s cus s ions of the chap te r about t h e s e key

i s s u e s i n the conc lus ions of Fromm: t h e f i r s t i s t o quote

a few s e c t i o n s from Fromm's w r i t i n g s where he takes u p the

l i n k between psycholoay and soc io logy as psychoanalysis

and Marxism ( i n o r d e r t o demonstrate our a s s e r t i o n t h a t t he

d i s t i n c t i o n a l luded t o above i s l a t e n t , r a t h e r than

m a n i f e s t ) ; t he second i s t o engaqe i n a s h o r t d i s cus s ion

of the methodological value of t he concept of s e l fhood as

i t r e l a t e s t o t h i s chap te r . This involves examination of

t he b r i e f o u t l i n e s of the advantages i n pe r spec t ive of suck

a concept as i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l .

Fromm's concern on the f i r s t po in t i s seen in t h e

f o l lowing s t a t emen t s :

"What i s t h e primary importance of t h i s kind of s o c i a l psychology ( i e . cha rac t e ro logy) f o r soc io logy? I t s primary value l i e s i n t he f a c t t h a t i t enab les us t o understand the l i b i n a l fo rces t h a t f i n d express ion in c h a r a c t e r , i n t h e i r r o l e as f a c t o r s which work t o f u r t h e r ( o r i n h i b i t ) t he s o c i a l development of a s o c i e t y and i t s p roduc t ive f o r c e s . . . . . . The appl i c a t i on of psychoanalysis wi 11 not only provi de s o c i o l o g i s t s with usefu l viewpoints i n t h e i r s tudy of t hese ques t ions : i t w i l l a l s o prevent t he u n c r i t i c a l use of f a l s e psycholoai ca l ~ a t e g o r i e s " . ~

Fromm's meaning in t h i s s t a t emen t i s i n keening with

h i s o f t e n repea ted a s s e r t i o n t h a t convent ional soc i a1

psychology can a t b e s t have a nega t ive f u n c t i o n , i e . t e l l

308

u s w h a t man i s n o t , b u t t h a t i t c o u l d n o t e l u c i d a t e and

p r e s e n t p o s i t i v e v a l u e s forb s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t , B u t such a

s t a t e m e n t begs t h e q u e s t i o n f o r t h e use o f t e r m s such as

" p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s " i m p l y p o s i t i v e d i r e c t i o n . E l s e w h e r e

Fromm's s t a t e m e n t on t h e " n s y c h o l o a y - s o c i 01 ogy 1 i n k " i s

l e s s guarded ; f o r example i n h i s e s s a y "On The L i m i t a t i o n s

And Dangers O f P s y c h o l o g y " , he d i s c u s s e s t h e i n t e g r a t i o n

o f " m a r k e t p s y c h o l o g y " and "human r e l a t i o n s " and t h e n

i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h modern economics and m a r k e t r e s e a r c h

d i s c i p l i n e s w i t h " b e n e f i t s " f o r c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t and

c o n s u m p t i o n p a t t e r n s . L a t e r on he a r t i c u l a t e s t h i s

i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a s p e c t s o f p s y c h o a n a l y t i c

and p s y c h o t h e r a p e u t i c k n o w l e d a e ' s r e i n f o r c e m e n t o f p o p u l a r

b e l i e f s o n t h e s i m p l e a t t a i n m e n t o f h a p p i n e s s . B o t h

r e i n f o r c e t h e a l i e n a t i o n o f t h e r a p i s t and p a t i e n t . He

summar izes t h e s e p o i n t s as f o l l o w s :

P s y c h o l o g i c a l know ledge ( M e u s c h e n k e n n t n i s ) has assumed a p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n i n c a p i t a l i s t i c s o c i e t y . A f u n c t i o n and a mean ing q u i t e d i f e r e n t f r o m t h e mean ing i m p l i e d i n "Know t h y s e l f " . g

W h i l e t h e f o r e a o i n g s t a t e m e n t s a r e c l e a r as examples

o f Fromm's c r i t i q u e o f knowledge ( p s y c h o l o g i c a l ) and i t s

use i n modern s o c i e t y , and h i s p o s i t i o n on " n e g a t i v e

p s y c h o l o g y " , i t i s l e s s t h a n c l e a r on how s e l f h o o d i s

p o s s i b l e a t t h e l e v e l o f d y a d i c r e l a t i o n s . T h i s poses

d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r Fromm's w o r k on t h e p o s i t i v e p a t h t o

309

s e l f h o o d , and t h e r o l e of knowledge i n t h i s c o n t e x t .

The re i s l i t t l e i n h i s work beyond h i s a s s e r t i o n o f t h e

need f o r l o v e and commitment, Though he s u g g e s t s

d e s p e r a t i o n f o r c l o s e n e s s w i t h t h e o t h e r may l e a d t o a

s e a r c h f o r knowledge - a t y p e of p s y c h o l o a i c a l knowledge

which i s a form of c o e r c i o n , a f o r c e d ~ e n e t r a t i o n of t h e

o t h e r and hence t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e o t h e r - which i s i n

e f f e c t power o v e r t h e o t h e r . 7

I s such p r e v a r i c a t i o n s a t i s f a c t o r y ? To s a y t h a t

p s y c h o l o a i c a l knowledae can be 1 i b e r a t i n g o r o p p r e s s i v e

w h i l e s a t i s f a c t o r y i n o t h e r c o n t e x t s , r a i s e c r i t i c a l

i s s u e s i n r e l a t i o n t o s e l f h o o d a s p o s i t i v i t y . And t h e

c l o s e s t Fromm o e t s t o i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n

of such knowledge a s forms of power, which a r e a g a i n

t r a n s l a t e d t o t h e l e v e l of c h a r a c t e r s t r u c t u r e s , a

manageable l e v e l a t which one c o u l d t r e a t problems o f Power

a s s a d i s t i c , d e s t r u c t i v e and s o on , i n t e r m s of o n e ' s

b i n a r y s t r u c t u r e s ( s e t o u t i n - The H e a r t Of Man). Such a -- t r e a t m e n t c o n s t i t u t e s a major me thodo log ica l s h i f t from

t h e d i a l e c t i c l o g i c (where t h e c o n c e p t of c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s

c e n t r a l ) o f a "Marxian psychology" t o a n a l y t i c l o a i c . The

f a c t t h a t Fromm e x p l a i n s t h e 'power p r o c e s s ' i n dyads i n

t e rms of t h e unconsc ious m o t i v a t i o n t o dominate o t h e r s

does n o t d e t r a c t from t h i s c r i t i c i s m . I t i s n o t s o much

Fromm's c o n c l u s i a n t h a t t h e n a t t e r n of b e h a v i o u r i s

p a t h o l o a i c a l which comes under c r i t i c i s m - o t h e r

psychologis ts such as R . D. Laing, Thomas Szasz a n d

Eriving Goffman a r r i v e a t the same conclusion - i t i s

r a t h e r Fromm's f a i l u r e t o provide sys temat ic a n a l y s i s of

the s e l f as p rax i s , t h a t i s t o t e l l us - h o w the behaviour

i s pa thologica l . 8

The use of the terms "sadism" a n d "des t ruc t iveness" as

appl ied t o desc r ip t ions of the s e l f - o t h e r o r i e n t a t i o n s which

r e s u l t in knowledge a n d power as s u b s t i t u t e s f o r commitment.

and love" are unhelpful t o the e x t e n t t h a t does n o t provide

in-depth explanat ion of the ways in which those w h o cont ro l

the " d e f i n i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n " i n dyadic s t r u c t u r e s ,

hold soc ia l power.' Where Fromm's ana lys i s of power as

physical force i s v iable a t the s o c i o - s t r u c t u r a l l e v e l ,

tend t o become r e i f i c a t i o n s a t the in te rpe r sona l leve l of

ana lys i s . Can a praxis be explained i n terms of i t s e l f ? 10

As was suggested i n the previous chapter Fromm's "descent"

i n t o a n a l y t i c l o g i c can be t r aced 'back ' t o h i s anthropology

where f o r example he r e l i e s o n a metaphor t o force a n

explanat ion o f contemporary man's o r i e n t a t i o n t o s e l f a n d

o the r as chi l d - l i k e , or resembling t h a t of " a p r imi t ive

i d o l a t r i c t r i b e . " Such a l i n e a r evolu t ionary perspect ive

+ tantamount t o s t a t i n g t h a t w h a t i s "p r imi t ive or

t r a d i t i o n a l " i s necessar i ly lower o n the "di achronic

s c a l e . " I 1 In t h i s sense Fromm's work has a conservatism

a n d a radical ism. One aspect of the whole which allows us

t o s e e t h i s c o n s e r v a t i s m i s i n his view of t e c h n o l o g y and I

power, i n modern s o c i e t y , which c o n s t i t u t e s a t t h e

p s y c h i a t r i c l e v e l , t h e absence o f c r i t i q u e , e x c e p t f o r

Freud. Fromm pays l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e work of c r i t i c s

such a s F o u c a u l t and Laing and David Cooper, whose works

have been c r i t i c i z e d a s e x i s t e n t i a l by Fromm.

"Things a r e go ing t o be d i f f i c u l t i f you t e l l me t h a t I am ex e r i e n c i n a something which I am n o t e x p e r l e n c ~ no t h a t i s what I t h i n k you mean bv u n c o n s c i o u s - e x p e r i e n c e . As f a r a s I k n o w , t h e r e 3 s no comparable p r a c t i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l s e t of problems i n n a t u r a l s c i e n c e , , . . . Only some p s y c h o l o g i s t s seem t o be unaware o f t h i s . . . . . . . I t i s p rematu re t o speak o f an a l r e a d y e x i s t e n t s y s t e m a t i c method o f i n v e s t i ~ a t i n g t h e f i e l d o f i n t e r - e x p e r i e n c e , l e t a l o n e t h e he no me no logy o f such a method." ( R . D . L a i n g , S e l f and 0 t h e r s l 2 ) .

The m e t h o d o l o a i c a l problem o f t h e s e l f i n

metapsychology i s n o t w h e t h e r t h e f i r s t t h i n g g iven t o

each of us i s t h e s e l f , o r whe the r t h e f i r s t t h i n g we g r a s p

i s " a n o t h e r human b e i n g i n h i s body, movements, g e s t u r e s

and s o on. As Laing s u c c i n c t l y s t a t e d i t , metapsychology

has t o beg in w i t h somebody's e x p e r i e n c e , t h e problem i s

whose and o r - what e x p e r i e n c e ? The l a t t e r p a r t of t h e

q u e s t i o n has been answered by a v a r i e t y o f p s y c h o l o g i s t s ,

p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s and s o c i o l a g i s ts w i t h t h e

n o t i o n of t h e "!de". The works o f Laing and Cooper pose a

c h a l l enae f o r con temporary s o c i a1 s c i e n c e and p s y c h o a n a l y t i c

p r a x i s by a s k i n g t h e q u e s t i o n whose e x p e r i e n c e i s t h e 'We'

312

e x p e r i e n c e . l 3 S c h u t z makes i t ve ry c l e a r t h a t h i s c o n c e p t

of t h e l e b e n s w e l t , which i s c e n t r a l t o h i s s o c i o l o a i c a l

t a s k of i n t e r p r e t i n g s o c i a l a c t i o n f o r ' s e l v e s ' and ' s e l f ' :

t a k e s i t s s t a r t i n g p o i n t i n t h e p r e - g i v e n n e s s of t h e 'We'

t o t h e ' 0 ' and t h e ' S e l f ' . By modify ing t h e c o n c e p t of

t h e 'We' w i t h t h e a l t e r - e g o , S c h u t z p r o c l a i m s t h a t i t i s a

" s u f f i c i e n t frame of r e f e r e n c e f o r t h e f o u n d a t i o n of

empi r i c a l psycho1 ogy and t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s " . While t h i s

t y p e of t y p i f i c a t i o n t a k e s c o a n i z a n c e o f t h e c l a s s i c a l

d i s c o v e r i e s of G. H. Mead on a s p e c t s o f t h e s e l f p r o c e s s

i n e a r l y s o c i a1 i z a t i o n and J e a n P i a g e t heteronomous and

autonomous o r i e n t a t i o n s i n e a r l y c h i l d h o o d and so o n , i t

g e n e r a l i z e s t h e scheme. Laing and Cooper ' s work a s s e r t two

t h i n g s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e q u e s t i o n whose e x p e r i e n c e i s t h e

'1Je' e x p e r i e n c e and t h e r e b y throw l i g h t o n t h e s o c i o l o a i c a l

and s y n o p t i c v a l u e o f t h e s e l f c o n c e p t : t h e f i r s t i s t h a t

t h e e s s e n t i a l 'We' h i s t o r i c a l 1y i s t h e modern b o u r g e o i s

f a m i l y , t h e second i s t h a t t h e we i s p r i m a r i l y

c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a s e r i e s of c o l l u s i o n s , i l l u s i o n s , c o e r c i o n s

and r e p r e s s i o n s . David Cooper ' s r e j e c t i o n o f a b s o l u t e

m o r a l i t i e s a t t h e l e v e l of t h e dyad i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n i s

based on h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e f a m i l y ' s codes l i k e t h e

w i d e r s o c i e t y ' s have been f r o z e n and a b s t r a c t e d ' o u t o f

t i m e ' , p r o c e s s e s of s e l f ,. t h e n , i n v o l v e s e r i a l r e p e t i t i o n s ,

t h e r e i s a f a m i l y which i s o r i e n t e d s o l e l y t o s e c u r i t y

which i t a c h i e v e s by t e a c h i n g s u b m i s s i o n and t h e ' g l u e i n g '

o f human b e i n a s as h a l v e s t o each o t h e r . There i s a l s o by

e a r l y ado1 escence a n i n t e r o r a a n i z a t i o n of t he same fami l y

w i th in us and the wider wor'ld i s i t s e l f a r e p e t i t i o n a n d

the model of the same fami ly . 15

I n many ways Cooper's work i s a v i a b l e s y n t h e s i s

of t he formula t ions of R . D. Laing a n d h i s co l l eagues .

As w i l l be shown l a t e r i n t h e d i scuss ion whi le Fromm

s t r e s s e s the problem of i n d i v i d u a t i o n , t h e r e i s no

s y s t e m a t i c c r i t i q u e of the contemporary family i n c a p i t a l i s t

s o c i e t y , whatever t he weaknesses of Cooper's own c r i t i q u e ,

t o t h i s e x t e n t , Laing a n d Cooper's work a t t s m p t t o

a r t i c u l a t e t h e problem of se l fhood as a b i l i t y , whereas

Fromm's a n a l y s i s s t i l l tends toward a c r i t i q u e of the s e l f

as c a p a c i t y . The r e a l ques t ion i s , however, why i s Fromm's

concept of se l fhood equivocal i n p a r t s a n d what i s t h e

r e l a t i onship between e q u i v o c a l i t y and Fromm's concepts of

power, the s t a t e and technology? We turn t o t h i s ques t ion .

From ' S o c i a l i s t Humanism' t o American Functional Sociologism: War o r Peace

"The vo ices of reason must d e c l a r e themselves f i r s t i n p r i v a t e chambers a l l over t he world, even behind I ron Cur ta ins a n d Chinese ' r lal ls ; then r i s e i n t h e q u i e t exchanges of f r i e n d with f r i e n d , of work fe l low with work f e l l o w , u n t i l they swel l i n t o a con f iden t p u b l i c command: 'Men a n d b r o t h e r s , l e t us come t o o u r senses a n d behave l i k e men'. Fo r t h e r e i s no v a l i d human goa l , n e i t h e r freedom n o r s o l i d a r i t y , nei t h e r c a p i t a l i s m nor communism, t h a t w i l l n o t be o b l i t e r a t e d i n t he t o t a l madness t h a t w i l l be t he f r u i t of t o t a l war" -16 (Lewis Mumford, 1954).

314

Few s t a t e m e n t s u t t e r e d i n r e c e n t y e a r s b e t t e r

c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e u n d e r l y i n g ' appea l of t h e Frommian grand

opus . B u t such ' d reams ' t e n d t o evoke s k e p t i c i s m among

many s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s abou t t h e c o r e o f meaninas

u n d e r l y i n g t h e p o e t i c p r o s e . Without an e l u c i d a t i o n of such

c o r e o f meaninas Fromm's work w i l l be i g n o r e d , j u s t i f i a b l y

by ' t ough minded' s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s . The Frommian grand

opus r e f l e c t s a conce rn w i t h human development which has

t h r e e broad a s p e c t s . The f i r s t i s a r e f l e c t i o n of t h e

I n s t i t u t e o f S o c i a l Research and Z e i t s c h r i f t f u r - S o z i a l f o r s c h u n ~ - and t h e German r e f u a e e i n t e l l e c t u a l

t r a d i t i o n , t h a t i s t h e dua l c o n c e r n s w i t h a t h e o r e t i c a l

a r t i c u l a t i o n of f a s c i s m and communism on t h e one hand, and

an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e c o n s c i o u s and unconsc ious f o r c e s

a t a a roup l e v e l which a r e v e h i c l e s f o r t h e s e sys t ems .

Fromm's c o n c e p t of s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s l a r g e l y a p a r t i a l

r e s o l u t i o n o f t h i s p r o b l e m a t i c ,

The second a s p e c t of Fromm's conce rn - p a r t l y

r e f l e c t h i s i n f l u e n c e by t h e North American i n t e l l e c t u a l

t r a d i t i o n . T h i s i s t h e i n t r a and i n t e r s y s t e m i c r i v a l r y

of t h e two powerfu l b l o c s , t h e S o v i e t Union and China, on

t h e one hand and t h e Uni ted S t a t e s and c a n i t a l i s m on t h e

o t h e r . Here t h e concern i s wi th a t o t a l h o l o c a u s t , i n

t h e form of a t h i r d wor ld war and t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r

n u c l e a r disarmament . Th i s conce rn emerpes c l e a r l y i n

1955, 1961 and most c l e a r l y i n 1968. l 7 T h i r d l y , t h e

s h a r p e n i n g o f f o c u s on t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f a f i n a l

n u c l e a r h o l o c a u s t l e a d s ~ r o m m t o an i n t e r e s t i n g c o n c l u s i o n

a b o u t i n d i v i d u a l i t y i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , Communist C h i n a

a n d the U.S.A., namely t h a t i n a l l t h r e e human f r e e d o m and

t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s e l f h o o d a s f u t u r i t y i s t h w a r t e d , t h a t

t r u e i n d i v i d u a l i t y d o e s n o t e x i s t . I n a l l t h r e e s y s t e m s - s t a t e s Fromm t h e r e i s n e g l e c t o f t h e a f f e c t i v e s i d e o f man

a n d a w o r s h i p o f t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l s i d e . Fromm's p o s i t i o n

i s b a s e d on t h e view t h a t t h e e m p h a s i s on i n d u s t r i a l

p r o d u c t i o n and economi c a n d m i 1 i t a r y c o m p e t i t i on i n t h e

c a s e o f t h e U.S. and U.S.S.R. a n d the r a p i d d i s c o v e r y o f

new t e c h n i q u e s f o r the m o b i l i z a t i o n o f human r e s o u r c e s i n

C h i n a h a v e a s a c o n s e q u e n c e a n e g l e c t o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y .

I n o n e s e n s e t h e n t h e r e i s a f o r m o f c o n v e r g e n c e b e t w e e n

t h e U.S.A. and t h e U.S.S.R. i n many o f t h e i r s t r u c t u r a l

f e a t u r e s and o r i e n t a t i o n s , I n t e r m s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l

p o l i t i c s o n l y some c o u n t r i e s o f the T h i r d W o r l d , the

" i n d e p e n d e n t d e m o c r a t i c s o c i a l i s t " s t a t e s s u c h a s Y u g o s l a v i a

a n d I n d i a , r e v e a l a v a r y i n 9 p i c t u r e . T h i s t y p e o f

p e r s p e c t i v e l a r g e l y r e f l e c t s t he i n f l u e n c e o f t h e N o r t h

Amer ican i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a d i t i o n on Fromm's d e v e l o p m e n t .

F o r e x a m p l e t h e r o l e o f i n d u s t r i a l a n d m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y

a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a r e v i t a l f a c t o r s i n t h e n o t i o n o f

' c o n v e r g e n c e ' . S i m i l a r v i e w s a r e h e l d by w i d e l y s c a t t e r e d

( i d e o l o g i c a l l y ) s o c i a 1 s c i e n t i s t s f r o m D a n i e l B e l l and

David Riesman of more c o n s e r v a t i v e p e r s u a s i o n s t o Lewis I

Mumford, and C . Wright M i l l s , George Novack and o t h e r s on

t h e p o l i t i c a l ' l e f t ' . l 8 The d i f f e r e n c e however i s t h a t

bo th C . Wright Mil 1s and Novack r e a a r d t h e ' c o n v e r g e n c e ' a s

r e s t i n g on t h e e x i s t e n c e of a l i e n a t i o n i n t h e t h r e e t y p e s of

s o c i e t i e s , w i t h l e s s f o c u s on t h e problems of n u c l e a r war

p robab i l i t i e s .

The enlargement of Fromm's s o c i s l o g i c a l canvas has

r a d i c a l consequences f o r Fromm's view of t h e s e l f i n modern

s o c i e t y . Here t h e a n a l y s i s s e t o u t i n M a y M a n - P r e v a i l w i l l

be r e i t e r a t e d i n o u t l i n e and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r h i s view

of t e c h n o l o g y , power, the s t a t e and v i o l e n c e w i l l be

e s t a b l i s h e d . I t i s c l e a r from a r e c e n t i n t e r v i e w , t h a t f o r

Fromm t h e problems of n u c l e a r war and i n d i v i d u a l i t y a r e n o t

j u s t i d e o l o g i c a l o r d i s t a n t p o l i t i c a l p rob lems , b u t i n f a c t

v i t a l t o a l l o f h i s work. Fromm t a c i t l y a g r e e d w i t h t h e

view t h a t t e c h n o l o g i c a l development had f a r o u t s t r i p p e d

man's e m o t i o n a l development and i n f a c t was i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n

w i t h i t . Moreover i t i s c l e a r t h a t he b e l i e v e s an

i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l u t i o n t o t h e 'arms r a c e ' was somehow

r e l a t e d t o dehumani z a t i o n and a l i e n a t i o n . For example

Fromm s t a t e s :

" I f we can avo id war , t h e n I w i l l b e very o p t i m i s t i c . I would have f a i t h t h a t man would overcome even t h e p o t e n t i a1 l y dehurnanizi n a e f f e c t s of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . "

31 7

Fromrn goes on t o s u g ~ e s t t h a t p a r a n o i a i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l

r e l a t i o n s would have t o be ' e r a d i c a t e d t o g e t h e r w i t h a

change i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g , w i t h t h e

S o v i e t Union, as a s t a t e , managed b u r e a u c r a t i c s o c i e t y ,

w i t h a p o p u l a t i o n n a i v e l y o r i e n t e d t o m a t e r i a l w e l f a r e a s

t h e road t o s a l v a t i o n . He g i v e s t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t what

has t o change i s t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h i n k i n a and t e c h n o l o a y .

Thus f o r example, he s u p p o r t s t h e peace r e s e a r c h scheme. 19

Fromm t h e M a r x i s t seemed t o have r eceded t o t h e background.

B u t what does i t mean t o change t h e d i r e c t i o n of t e c h n o l o g y ?

And what i s F r o ~ m ' s view of propoganda , myth and i d e o l o g y

i n t h e complex sys tems of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , he

d e s c r i b e s , i s i t an a d e q u a t e view? These q u e s t i o n s a r e

c e n t r a l t o a comprehension of t h e s u b t l e change i n Fromm's

r e c e n t t h o u g h t . For a s was s u g g e s t e d e a r l i e r t h e r e i s a

c o n n e c t i o n between Fromm's view of v i o l e n c e and s o c i a l

chanae i n h i s a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s of 01 d Tes tamen t

t e x t s and h i s view o f t h e s o l u t i o n t o contemporary wor ld

problems. What i s under s c r u t i n y i s n o t t h e c h a l l e n g e of

wor ld peace and t h e r e t u r n t o a human s o c i e t y - t h i s has

been t h e theme of a h o s t of w r i t e r s o v e r t h e l a s t few

decades - b u t t h e s p e c i f i c a n a l y s i s which Fromrn o f f e r s ,

and h i s s o l u t i o n s . 20

While a t h e o r y of a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m remains a t a s k

f o r Fromm, he does n o t r e f e r t o i t a s t h e c e n t r a l problem

of t h e modern wor ld . I n c o n t r a s t t o t h e t h e m a t i c s t r u c t u r e

of Escape - From Freedom, i n -- N A Y MAN PREVAIL, t h e c e n t r a l I

problems a r e t h e t h r e a t of n u c l e a r war on a v a s t s c a l e o r

t h e u s e of m i s s i l e s aimed a t l i m i t e d t a r g e t s b u t

a c c i d e n t a l l y o r o t h e r w i s e i n i t i a t e d by one of t h e major

powers , on t h e one hand, and " t h e f u t u r e c o u r s e of t h e

underdeve loped n a t i o n s , whi ch compr ise a m a j o r i t y o f t h e

human r a c e " , on t h e o t h e r , 21 I n o t h e r words t h e r e a r e two

a s p e c t s of a * r e v o l u t i o n a r y " p r o c e s s i n p o l i t i c s and

t e c h n o l o g y w i t h due consequences f o r a1 1 mankind. While

t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l and p r o d u c t i v e ab i l i t y t o produce t h e

most ' e f f i c i e n t ' , compute r i zed and speedy weapons sys t ems i s

a r e a l i t y ; s i g n a l l e d by t h e s t o c k p i l i n g of armaments. The

l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of t h e p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y of t h e S o v i e t

Union and t h e U.S.A. i s devo ted t o a weapons i n d u s t r y and

t h e h i g h s t a t u s of m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y i n both s o c i e t i e s .

Viewed i n t h e l i g h t of t h e s e l f - c o n c e p t i o n each power has

o f i t s e l f and t h e o t h e r , t h e t h r e a t of war through a c c i d e n t

o r d e s i g n , i s a lways p r e s e n t . A t t h e same t ime a s o c i o -

p o l i t i c a l u p h e a v a l , s i n c e t h e 1 9 4 0 ' s has been o c c u r r i n g

among t h e c o l o n i z e d and l e s s i n d u s t r i a l i z e d n a t i o n s , f o r

i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , an end t o e x p l o i t a t i o n and s o on. 22

From t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e l a t t e r c o u n t r i e s Fromm a s s e r t s :

"They i n s i s t n o t on ly on o b t a i n i n g p o l i t i c a l i ndependence b u t a1 s o on r a p i d economi c development ." ( p . 2 4 9 ) .

Within t h e c o n t e x t of t h i s aim o f d e c o l o n i z a t i o n and

pol i t i c a l economic development , b u t from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of

t h e major powers - t h e Uni ted S t a t e s , t h e U.S.S.R. and

Communist China t h e r e i s c o m p e t i t i o n f o r t h e " h e a r t s and

minds" of t h e p e o p l e s of t h e developin! a r e a s . T h i s means

t h a t t h e r e i s an e x t e n s i o n o f t h e p o l a r i z a t i o n of t h e

Cold War and i t s r e s i d u a l e l ement s i n t o t h e "newly

d e v e l o p i n g areas".: Fromm e x p l a i n s t h e b a s i s of t h i s

s t r u g g l e i n t e rms of t h e f o l l o w i n g h i s t o r i c a l p r o c e s s e s :

1 ) The two World Wars c o i n c i d e d w i t h v i o l e n t r e v o l u t i o n a r y

p r o c e s s e s o f change - f i r s t i n R u s s i a , t h e n China which

has c u l m i n a t e d i n l a r g e s c a l e economic and p o l i t i c a l

advancement i n t h e s e c o u n t r i e s . Both t h e s e c o u n t r i e s

t h e r e f o r e p r o v i d e 'mode l s ' f o r t h e d e v e l o p i n g n a t i o n s . So

t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n i s n o t whe the r t h e s e c o l o n i a l n a t i o n s

w i l l j o i n t h e communist o r t h e c a p i t a l i s t s y s t e m s , b u t

whe the r t h e y w i 11 " a c c e p t t h e Chinese o r t h e Russ ian form

of communism,. . . ." (pp . 14 -15) . (Fromm c o n c e p t u a l i z e s

t h r e e models of n o n - c a p i t a l i s t development , ( a ) "Krus)l.chsvism,

a sys tem of comple te c e n t r a l i z e d p l a n n i n g and s t a t e owner-

s h i p of i n d u s t r y and a g r i c u l t u r e , " : ( b ) Chinese communism,

. . ., a sys tem of t o t a l m o b i l i z a t i o n of i t s most i m p o r t a n t It

c a p i t a l a s s e t " , p e o p l e , and complete m a n i p u l a t i o n of t h e i r

p h y s i c a l and emot iona l e n e r g y , w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o t h e i r

f n d i v i d u a l i t y . ( c ) h u m a n i s t i c s o c i a l i s m , which t i e s t o b lend

320

a minimum of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , s t a t e - i n t e r v e n t i o n and

b u r e a u c r a c y , w i t h a maximum of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , f reedom

and i n d i v i d u a l i s m ( p . 1 4 ) .

( 2 ) In c o n t r a s t t o t h e n i n e t e e n e t h c e n t u r y p i c t u r e , when

t h e soc io -economic gap between t h e c l a s s e s i n c a p i t a l i s t

s o c i e t i e s was wide , t h i s aap i s i n c r e a s i n g l y b e i n g narrowed

between t h e ' h a v e s ' and ' h a v e - n o t s ' w i t h i n Western

i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s , however t h e soc io -economic gap between

' r i c h ' and poor n a t i o n s has been w i d e n i n a , w h i l e t h e

m i l i t a n c y of t h e l a t t e r has been i n c r e a s i n g i n t h e t w e n t i e t h

c e n t u r y ( p . 1 1 ) . On t h i s p o i n t Fromm s t a t e s :

"Two t h i r d s of t h e human r a c e a r e u n w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t a s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e i r s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g i s o n l y from 10 t o l e s s t h a n 5 p e r c e n t o f t h a t o f peop le of t h e r i c h e s t c o u n t r y - t h e Un i t ed S t a t e s - which w i t h s i x p e r c e n t of t h e w o r l d ' s p o p u l a t i o n produces t o d a y 40 p e r c e n t of t h e w o r l d ' s goods" . * 3

Fromm a s s e r t s t h a t t h e c o l o n i a l r e v o l u t i o n and i t s i n c r e a s i n g

m i l i t a n c y was s p a r k e d by t h e weakening m i l i t a r y and

economic domi nance of t r a d i t i o n a l European c o l o n i a1 powers

a f t e r 1918, and t h e d i s s e m i n a t i o n o f i d e o l o g y and

t e c h n o l o g i c a l i deas w i t h r e v o l u t i ona ry p o t e n t i a1 . ( 3 ) The emergency of China a s a s u c c e s s f u l s o c i a l i s t s t a t e

has two major consequences , The f i r s t , i s an i n c r e a s i n g l y

t e n s i o n f i l l e d r e l a t i o n between i t s e l f and t h e U.S.S.R., a s

t h e l a t t e r has advanced i n d u s t r i a l l y and m a t e r i a l l y i t has

come t o be a "have" c o u n t r y , " t h r e a t e n e d " by t h e m i l i t a n c y

of t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . Second ly , China has I

become t h e moral l e a d e r of t h e developed c o u n t r i e s . Thus

t h e U.S.S.R. has come t o seek a d e t e n t e wi th t h e U,S.

w i t h o u t t u r n i n g t h i s i n t o an o v e r t a l l i a n c e a q a i n s t China.

( P . 1 2 1 . ~ ~

( 4 ) Western capi t a l i s m has undergone c o n s i d e r a b l e change

due t o a s e p a r a t i o n of ownership and management of i n v e s t e d

c a p i t a l ( R a l f Dahrendorf makes t h i s p o i n t i n C l a s s - A n d

C l a s s C o n f l i c t In I n d u s t r i a l S o c i e t y , 1959). I t i s t h e r e f o r e - - s u b j e c t t o t h e very c r i t i c i sms d i r e c t e d a ~ a i n s t Dahrendorf .

There i s a l s o mass ive s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e economics

of Western c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y wi th t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n

on t h e armament 's i n d u s t r y . Fromm's p o s i t i o n on t h e

r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e " t e c h n o s t r u c t u r e and s t a t e i n

modern c a p i t a l i s m i s p a r a d o x i c a l , f o r whereas he admi t s t h a t

t h e r e i s an " i n c r e a s i n g e l ement of s t a t e p l a n n i n g i n k les tern

c a p i t a l i s m " , through massive s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n - he even

r e c o g n i z e s t h e Atomic Energy Commission as t h e l a r g e s t

i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e i n the U.S., he n e v e r t h e l e s s h o l d s t h e

view t h a t t h i s does n o t imply o v e r a l l p l a n n i n g i n t h e U,S.;

and t h a t "some measure of c o m p e t i t i o n i n Western sys tems s t i l l

e x i s t s ! 25 T h i s p o s i t i o n i s very ambiguous, s i n c e , we can

f o r example , n o t e i n p a s s i n g t h e view h e l d by J . K. ~ a l b r a i t h

t h a t n o t on ly does t h e Federa l S t a t e accoun t f o r between

one f i f t h and one q u a r t e r of a l l economic a c t i v i t y and

322

r e g u l a t e t h e t o t a l ava i l a b l e income; b u t a l s o " t e c h n o l o a i c a l

compuls ions and n o t i d e o l o g y o r p o l i t i c a l w i l e w i l l r e q u i r e

t h e f i r m t o s e e k t h e h e l p and p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e s t a t e " ,

The problem o f i n d u s t r i a l p l a n n i n g goes beyond t h e r each o f

t h e i n d u s t r i a l f i r m . 2 6 The weakness of Fronm's a n a l y s i s i s

t h a t he i m p l i e s t h a t s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n i s a m a t t e r s imply

o f m i l i t a r y s t r a t e f l y and i d e o l o g y . Fromm then h o l d s t h e

view t h a t i t i s p a r t l y t h e n e c e s s i t y , b u t main ly an

i d e o l o a y o f p l a n n i n g a s a means which u n d e r s c o r e s both s t a t e

c a p i t a l i s m i n t h e West and s t a t e ownership i n t h e E a s t .

Thus Fromm a r r i v e s a t h i s f i r s t i m p o r t a n t s o l u t i o n t o

a l i e n a t i o n under Western c a p i t a l i s m i n t h e f o l l o w i n g t e rms :

"The S o v i e t sys t em i s n o t t h e o p p o s i t e o f t h e c a p i t a l i s t s y s t e m , b u t r a t h e r t h e image i n t o which c a p i t a l i s m w i l l develon u n l e s s we r e t u r n t o t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h e Western t r a d i t i o n of humanism and i n d i v i d u a l i s m , " 2 7

The v i e w p o i n t t h a t , on t h e c r i t e r i a of c o n c e n t r a t e d

ownership of c a p i t a l , b u r e a u c r a t i c management of p r o d u c t i o n

and m a n i p u l a t i o n of consumpt ion; t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y c a p i t a l i s m

i s d i f f e r e n t on ly i n d e g r e e , n o t q u a l i t y , from S o v i e t

communism i s e r r o n e o u s ( p . 81 Fromm), T h i s t a k e s us t o

t h e f i f t h p o i n t of Fromm t h e s i s .

( 5 ) Fromm exp l a i ns t h e "convergence" between t h e S o v i e t

Union and t h e Uni ted S t a t e s i n p a r t i c u l a r and Western

c a p i t a l i s m on t h e whole , i n t e rms of t h e r i g i d i f i c a t i o n of

forms of s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n w i t h i n t h e S o v i e t Union.

He u s e s two f a c t o r s t o a s s e v t t h i s s i m i l a r i t y : monetary

i n c e n t i v e s and p a r t l y d e r i v i n g from t h i s i s s t a t u s

r e i n f o r c e d by o c c u p a t i o n a l mobi l i t y and e d u c a t i o n a l

o p p o r t u n i t y . 2 8 T h i s p o s i t i o n wi 11 be c r i t i c i z e d more f u l l y

l a t e r i n t h e c h a p t e r , s u f f i c e i t t o s a y t h a t t h i s t y p e o f

a n a l y s i s s u f f e r s from some of t h e w o r s t m e t h o d o l o a i c a l

d e f e c t s of s o c i o l o a i c a l f u n c t i o n a l i s m . For Fromln conc ludes

h i s d i s c u s s i o n of s i m i l a r i t i e s between both sys t ems on t h e

f o l l o w i n g n o t e :

" R u s s i a i s s t i l l a r e a c t i o n a r y s t a t e ; we a r e s t i l l a l i b e r a l w e l f a r e s t a t e , . . , . , The S o v i e t sys t em w i l l s h i f t t o t h e same means t h a t a r e used i n t h e West: t h e methods of n s y c h o l o g i c a l s u g g e s t i o n and m a n i p u l a t i o n t h a t a i v e t h e i n d i v i d u a l t h e i l l u s i o n of h a v i n a and fol lowincr h i s own c o n v i c t i o n s , w h i l e ' h i s ' d e c i s i o n s a r e i n r e a l i t y made by t h e e l i t e of t h e ' d e c i s i o n makers ' " .29

While i n one s e n s e Fromm's i s o l a t i o n of t h e

p r o b l e m a t i c of i n t e r and i n t r a s y s t e m r i v a l r y and t h e t h r e a t

of n u c l e a r war shows t h e scope of h i s conce rn w i t h t h e

p o t e n t i a l f o r s e l f h o o d , h i s a r t i c u l a t i o n of t h i s

p r o b l e m a t i c i s g r o s s l y i n c o m p l e t e , f o r he h a s d e v i s e d an

a n a l y s i s which g i v e s p r i o r i t y t o i d e o l o g y and t e c h n o l o g y ,

However much means adap ted w i t h i n soc io -economic sys t ems

r e s e m b l e , s i m i l a r means do n o t imply s i m i l a r p o l i t i c a l o r

human e n d s . S t a l i n i s t propoganda a p a r t , t h e r e i s l i t t l e

doubt t h a t a l i e n a t i o n e x i s t s w i t h i n S o v i e t b l o c , b u t t h e

e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e between t h e S o v i e t b l o c and China on I

t h e one hand and Western c a p i t a l i s m on t he o t h e r , i s t h a t

t h e ownership of c a p i t a l and t h e r e s t i n g p l a c e o f p r o f i t s

i s i n p r i v a t e hands i n t h e l a t t e r sys t em. The r e l a t i v e

c l o s u r e of t h e ' g a p ' a t t h e i n t r a sys t em l e v e l i n t h e West

does n o t r e f l e c t a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h i s c a p i t a l , on t h e

c o n t r a r y , i n d i c a t i o n s are toward g r e a t e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of

c a p i t a l ( i n t h e c l a s s i c Marxian s e n s e ) i n t o f ewer p r i v a t e

hands , i n a l l t h e major c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s . The modern

n a t i o n s t a t e i n c a p i t a l i s t economics may s e r v e th rough i t s

v a r i o u s mechanisms t o r e d i s t r i b u t e s p e c i f i c s o u r c e s of t h e

n a t i o n a l income, b u t i t does no t s e r v e t o r e d i s t r i b u t e

c a p i t a l , t h a t i s p r i v a t e l y owned cap i t a l a While t h i s

d i s c u s s i o n i s n o t p r i m a r i l y a t r e a t i s e on economic t h e o r y ,

i t i s wor thwhi l e q u o t i n a a a a i n from Mandel ' s e x t e n s i v e

t r e a t m e n t o f t h e problem:

"The e v o l u t i o n of p r e s e n t - d a y c a p i t a l i s m i s s a i d t o b e n o t towards a c o n c e n t r a t i o n , b u t , on t h e c o n t r a r y , a d i s p e r s i o n , an e v e r - g r e a t e r l e v e l l i n g of incomes. So f a r a s w e a l t h and p r o p e r t y a r e c o n c e r n e d , e s p e c i a l l y t h e ownership of i n d u s t r y and p r o p e r t y i n c a p i t a l i s t s ' s a v i n g s , t h e s e a l l e g a t i o n s a r e a c r u d e u n t r u t h : a l l t h e f a c t s we have p o i n t t o an i n c r e a s i n a c o n c e n t r a t i o n of t h i s ownership ." ( p . 335 Vol .1) .

Mandel t h e n p r o v i d e s a s y s t e m a t i c breakdown o f t h e S t a t e s '

income i n t e rms o f d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t forms of t a x a t i o n

f o r t h e U.S.A., G r e a t B r i t a i n and F r a n c e , as w e l l a s

Denmark and Belaium f o r a p e r i o d v a r y i n g from 1937 - 1949

325 -

and c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e e f f e c t o f r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f income

i n f a v o u r o f t h e working c l a s s e s i s s l i g h t o r n o n - e x i s t e n t

( e x c e p t i n c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s d u r i n a s p e c i f i c economic

c r i s e s , o r a l o s t war , when t h e r e t e n d s t o be some r e -

d i s t r i b u t i o n i n f a v o u r of t h e p o o r e s t s t r a t a , t h e unemployed

and war v i c t i m s ) . Mandel t h e n c o n c l u d e s on t h i s sombre

n o t e :

" I n s o f a r a s t h e p r i c e of l a b o u r power i n c l u d e s a r e l a t i v e e l e m e n t , namely t h e a v e r a g e needs d e t e r m i n e d by t h e a v e r a g e l e v e l of c i v i l i z a t i o n i n a c o u n t r y a t a c e r t a i n epoch, t h e S t a t e by g u a r a n t e e i n g t o t h e wage- e a r n e r s c e r t a i n s e r v i c e s which t h e y do n o t have t o p u r c h a s e w i t h t h e i r money waae, mere ly g u a r a n t e e s , on b e h a l f o f t h e b o u r g e o i s i e a s a whole , t h e payment o f an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f wages. The S t a t e does n o t t r a n s f o r m s u r p l u s v a l u e i n t o wages: i t mere ly p l a y s t h e r o l e o f c e n t r a l c a s h i e r p e r t h e b o u r g e o i s i e , pay ing p a r t of wages i n a c o l l e c t i v e f a rm, s o a s t o s o c i a l i s e c e r t a i n e n d s e M 3 0

The f o r e g o i n g c r i t i q u e of Fromm's p o s i t i o n on

convergence i s p u t f o rward p a r t l y t o ' b l o c k t t h e s u a g e s t i o n

t h a t t h e i n t e r s y s t e m i c r i v a l r y o f t h e major i n d u s t r i a l

sys t ems i s p r i m a r i l y i d e o l o g i c a l , i n t h e s e n s e used by

Fromm, i , e m t h e p o p u l a r b e l i e f s h e l d by t h e masses t h a t

each wants t o expand i t s i m p e r i a l i s t i c a ims , and o r d e s t r o y

t h e o t h e r , and t h a t t h i s i s mere b e l i e f , s i n c e t h e y

r e semble ' m a t e r i a1 l y ' and s t r u c t u r a l l y e Fromm under-

e s t i m a t e s t h e i n t r a - s y s t e m i c c o n f l i c t of c a p i t a l i s t

s o c i e t i e s and t h e fundamenta l d i f f e r e n c e between t h e s e and

t h e i n t r a s y s t e m i c c o n f l i c t s w i t h i n conmunis t s o c i e t i e s , 3 1

3 26

Later we w i l l examine t h i s type of problem w i t h respec t

t o developing nat ions in the ' 'have-nots ' sphere. We turn

now t o Fromm's proposals f o r s o l u t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l

r i v a l r y , s ince these proposals are interconnected t o

Fromm's overa l l analysi s ,

Fromm's bas ic proposals are based on h is cons i s t en t

b e l i e f t h a t i n contemporary p o l i t i c a l terms w h a t i s r e a l l y

a t s t ake i s the t r a d i t i o n of humanism a n d individual ism

which i s inherent t o the Western t r a d i t i c n . S o he does n o t

g o t o the extreme t o suppest t h a t t he ' E a s t ' ( i n the above

terms, the Sovie t Union a n d China noses a t h r e a t o f

t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m ) poses t h a t t h r e a t , b u t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o

r e s i s t the impl ica t ion . Proposals have t w o a spec t s , He

makes the following observat ions: l . ( a ) . The U.S. can

compete with communism by demonstrating t h a t i t i s poss ib le

t o r a i s e the J i v i n g s tandard o f the underdeveloped count r ies

t o a degree comparable with t h a t which t o t a l i t a r i a n methods

achieve without usi n u methods of coercive reaimen t a t i o n .

This can be achieved through j u s t , " r e - d i r e c t i n g the

t h o u a h t o r i e n t a t i o n s " o f the pol icy makers in the U.S.

government a n d the West, toward Latin America, Asia a n d

Afr ica , i n a n e f f o r t t o end support f o r m i l i t a r y

d i c t a t o r s h i p s a n d the economic e x p l o i t a t i o n i n s i d e these

regi ons . Fromm implies t h a t the United S t a t e s a n d a l l i e d support

327

f o r d i c t a t o r s h i p s i n L a t i n America, S p a i n and Taiwan under

t h e s l o g a n t h a t t h e y a r e p a h t o f t h e " f r e e w o r l d N i s a

consequence o f a m i x t u r e of " p a r a n o i d M , " p r o j e c t i v e " and

" d o u b l e - t h i n k " t h o u g h t o r i e n t a t i o n s . Thus he s t a t e s :

"We i n t h e West c a l l d i c t a t o r s h i p s ' p a r t of t h e f r e e w o r l d ' i f t h e y a r e a n t i - R u s s i a n . Thus d i c t a t o r s l i k e Synaman Rhee, Chi ang Kai-Shek, F ranco , S a l a z a r , B a t i s t a , t o ment ion o n l y a few, were acc la imed a s f i a h t e r s f o r f reedom and democracy, and t h e t ru th a b o u t t h e i r regimes was s u p p r e s s e d o r d i s t o r t e d . . . . 11 3 2

Fromm s u g g e s t s t h a t accompanyi na t h i s change of t h o u a h t

o r i e n t a t i o n s h o u l d be mass ive food and c a p i t a l a i d from t h e

Western n a t i o n s t o t h e underdeve loped c o u n t r i e s . T h i s

cou ld be f a c i l i t a t e d by r e o r g a n i z a t i o n and s t r e n g t h e n i n g

o f t h e Uni t ed Na t ions s o t h a t i t has t h e c a p a c i t y t o

s u p e r v i s e i n t e r n a t i o n a l disarmament . A t t h e same t ime t h e

p u b l i c media , such as t e l e v i s i o n and r a d i o c o u l d be r e -

o r i e n t e d t o e d u c a t i o n of t h e masses , toward new forms o f

h u m a n i s t i c i d e a s ( i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o Fromm's n o t i o n

o f i d e o l o a i e s . 3 3

The second s e t of p r o p o s a l s r e f e r s p e c i f i c a l l y t o

an end t o t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l Cold War and t h e ' m i l i t a r y arms

r a c e ' . A p r e - c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of any

p r o p o s a l s , Fromm s u g g e s t s , i s ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s a r m a m e n t ' ,

t h a t i s t o s a y , " t h e end inq of t h e h y s t e r i c a l h a t e and

s u s p i c i o n among t h e main p r o t a g o n i s t s . . . . " 3 4 T h i s does

n o t imp ly t h e abandonment o f g e n u i n e p o l i t i c a l and

p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n v i c t i o n s , n o r t h e r i p h t t o c r i t i s i z e

o t h e r s y s t e m s . B u t such c r i t i c i s m w i l l n o t be t a i n t e d by

h a t e and a w a r l i k e s p i r i t . Fromm i m p l i e s t h a t ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l

d i s a r m a m e n t ' s p e c i f i c t o t h e o r i e n t a t i o n o f t h e masses t o

i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i s i n t r i c a t e l y i n t e r w o v e n w i t h

h i s l a t e r p r o p o s a l s f o r a h u m a n i z a t i o n o f t e c h n o l o y , whe re

he a d v o c a t e s t h e r e a s s e r t i o n o f w i l l f o r t h e r e v i t a l i z a t i o n

o f t h e American d e m o c r a t i c s y s t e m , f rom t h e p a s s i v e consumer

t o an " a c t i v e , p a r t i c i p a n t c u l t u r e " . He s t a t e s t h i s a s

f o l l o w s :

he f a c t i s t h a t t h e r e i s a s t r i k i n a c o r r e l a t i o n tween e d u c a t i o n -- and t h e ~ o l i t i c a l o p i n i o n o f v o t e r s . e l e a s t i n f o r m e d v o t e r s l e a n more t o w a r d i r r a t i o n a l n a m s o l u t i o n s , w h i l e t h e b e t t e r e d u c a t e d ones ow a t e n d e n c y t oward more r e a l i s t i c and r a t i o n a l

s o l u t i o n s . . . . . . . As p o l i t i c a l e d u c a t i o n 9rew t h e y would become i n c r e a s i n a l y a p a r t of t h e d e c i s i o n making on t h e n a t i o n a l and s t a t e l e v e l M . 3 5 ( I t a l i c s m i n e ) .

I t i s c l e a r f rom t h e f o r e a o i n g t h a t Fromm l i n k s r e -

e d u c a t i o n t o r a t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i t i c s on t h e n a t i o n a l

and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l , b u t t h i s i s l i n k e d t o h i s r e j e c t i o n

o f p h y s i c a l f o r c e a s an a a e n t o f s o c i a l change a t t h e i n t r a -

s y s t e m i c l e v e l . I n t h e v e r y i n t r a s y s t e m i c c o n t e x t Fromm

r e j e c t s f o r c e , f o r wha t he r e g a r d s a s s t r u c t u r a l l y

p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s , such a s t h e l a c k o f a mass b a s e f o r t h o s e

g roups p r e s e n t l y a d v o c a t i n g chanae i n America - b l a c k s and

329

r a d i c a l s t u d e n t s . These l a t t e r a r e a m i n o r i t y s u g g e s t s

Fromm. Fromm a l s o r u l e s o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of s u c c e s s f u l

urban g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e , t h e urban p o p u l a t i o n s i n t h e U.S.

a r e i f any thin^ h o s t i l e t o t h e s e g r o u p s , Fromm s u g g e s t s .

F i n a l l y a v i c t o r i o u s r e v o l u t i o n would l e a d t o a breakdown

o f t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l , manageri a1 and i n d u s t r i a l

i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . Here Fromm q u o t e s Veblen a p p r o v i n g l y . 36

Force as a means i s i n d i c a t i v e t h e n of s p i r i t u a l and

p o l i t i c a l d e s p a i r . A t t h e l e v e l of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s ,

Fromm s e e s one s e c t o r as ' c a p a b l e ' and j u s t i f i a b l y u s i n g

f o r c e , t h e c o l o n i z e d T h i r d World, b u t t h i s on ly i f t h e

r e v o l u t i o n i s t h w a r t e d by t h e major powers, b u t t h i s

' p r o b a b i l i t y ' c a r r i e s w i t h i t a t h r e a t t o t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l

s t a t u s quo, and n u c l e a r war. S i n c e t h i s i s u n a c c e p t a b l e

t o Fromm h i s s o l u t i o n s a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l a r e

s imply a m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h o s e f avoured f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l

peace i n t h e U.S. Fromm t h e r e f o r e d e v o t e s one of h i s

l o n g e s t c h a p t e r s i n rAay - Man P r e v a i l , t o n u c l e a r d isarmament .

The d i s c u s s i o n i s roughly s u b d i v i d e d i n t o two p a r t s : a

c r i t i q u e of t h e 'game' s t r a t e g i e s o f f e r e d by K i s s i n g e r ,

Kahn and t h e R . A . H . D . o f f i c i a l s . In t h e second s e c t i o n he

e l a b o r a t e s on h i s concen t of a ' m u l t i c e n t e r e d w o r l d ,

dependent on t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s quo

by a l l powers and e f f e c t i v e disarmament . 37 c o n c u r r e n c e

wi th Fromm's views on t h e f i r s t p a r t of h i s a n a l y s i s does

330

n o t imply a c c e p t a n c e of t h e second p o i n t . On t h e f i r s t

p o i n t Fromm r e j e c t s t h e a s s h m p t i o n s of t h i n k e r s such a s

Kahn who p ropose a n u c l e a r s t r a t e g y based on c o n t i n u e d

armaments and m i n i m i z a t i o n of l o s s i n t h e c a s e of an a t t a c k

or c o u n t e r a t t a c k . B u t Fromm a l s o r e j e c t s t h o s e who a r g u e

f o r ' a rms c o n t r o l ' a s a s u b s t i t u t d f o r d isarmament . Fromm

responds by s u a g e s t i n g t h a t 'arms c o n t r o l ' i s r e a l l y p a r t

o f a t h e o r y of armament. 38 I n t e rms of t h e second p o i n t

Fromm s u g g e s t s a g e s t u r e of disarmament t o g e n e r a t e t r u s t

between t h e U.S.S.R. and t h e U.S.A., a s one way of e n d i n g

t h e 'Cold War' d e a d l o c k , Fromm a l s o s u g a e s t s a Russ ian - American modus v i v e n d i o v e r West Germany and B e r l i n , which

i n c l u d e s n o n - a ~ n e a s e m e n t by t h e U.S. o f West Germany's

c l a i m s f o r r e u n i f i c a t i o n , and s o on, Most of Fromm's

p r o p o s a l s imply ' q o o d w i l l ' a s a p r e c o n d i t i o n , even h i s

a n a l y s i s o f a t r a n s f o r m e d r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e U.S. t o L a t i n

America. What becomes c l e a r i s t h a t w h i l e Fromm r e c o g n i z e s

economi c neo-co lon i a l i sm, f o r example i n Guatemala,

Venezuela and Columbia, a s a b a s i s f o r t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t ' s

s u p p o r t of m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p s i n t h e s e a r e a s ( 1 9 6 1 ) , he

does n o t g i v e t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p t h e h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t

a n a l y s i s i t d e s e r v e s . I n t h i s s e n s e Fromm's s o l u t i o n s on

t h e second p r o p o s a l i s i d e a l i s t i c and a b s t r a c t .

A C r i t i q u e o f Fromm's A n a l y s i s of Technology, Powelr and t h e S t a t e :

and t h e Ambi au i t y of S e l f h o o d

Unless E r i c h Fromm has abandoned his b a s i c p r e c e p t

of t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r t r a n s f o r m i n g t h e economic and m a t e r i a l

i n f r a s t r u c t u r e o f advanced c a p i t a l i s m a s a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r

t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of man, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o comprehend

h i s v a c i l l a t i o n from h i s e a r l i e r p r e c e p t s . I t i s c l e a r t o

even neo-Marx i s t s t h a t w h a t e v e r t h e i n h e r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n s

of S o v i e t economics of t h e Russ i an o r Chinese v a r i e t y ,

t h e s e c o n t r a d i c t i ons canno t be comprehended a s e x i s t i n g a t

t h e same s t a g e of development as t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s w i t h i n

c a p i t a l i s t economics. To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e fo rmer have

undergone r e v o l u t i o n a r y changes i n t h e p r o d u c t i v e s e c t o r s

which have a b o l i s h e d t h e c a t e g o r y of p r i v a t e ownership of

t h e means o f p r o d u c t i o n , which i s i t s e l f t h e fundamenta l

c a u s e of a l i e n a t i o n i n i t s e x t a n t form, t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s

i n t e r n a l t o S o v i e t and Chinese communism a r e a t a d i f f e r e n t

s t a a e from t h o s e i n t e r n a l c a p i t a l i s m . On t h e l e v e l of

economic p r o d u c t i v i t y t h i s d i f f e r e n c e can he c h a r a c t e r i z e d

q u i t e s imply a s b e i n g , t h a t i n t h e S o v i e t s t a t e s t h e ma jo r

c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ' s p r i n g ' from t h e an tagon i sms of a s o c i a l i s t

p l anned economy which a r e b u r e a u c r a t i c a l l y l i n k e d t o

b o u r g e o i s forms of work a1 l o c a t i o n and t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n

o f incomes , i n t h e c a s e of t h e l a t t e r t h e s e forms e x p r e s s

t h e m s e l v e s i n t h e money i n c e n t i v e s i n a g r i c u l t u r e and some

3 3 2

forms of i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n . I n c a p i t a l i s t economics

on t h e o t h e r hand t h e c o n t ' r a d i c t i o n s a r e between d i r e c t

s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n and f u n d a m e n t a l l y a n t a ~ o n i s t i c

c l a s s e s . 39

We w i l l beg in o u r c r i t i q u e of Fromm's p o s i t i o n by

r e -examin in9 t h e ve ry p remises of h i s b a s i c a n a l y s i s . His

argument t e n d s t o e x p l a i n t h e b a s i c p a t h o l o g i c a l forms o f

t h o u a h t i n t h e U.S.A., t h e " f r e e w o r l d " , on t h e one s i d e

and of t h e same p a t h o l o 9 i c a l forms i n t h e communist c o u n t r i e s

as somehow b e i n g t h e c a u s e o f t h e t e n s i o n s and the

consequen t use o f p o l i t i c a l power and t e c h n o l o g y i n t h e

d i r e c t i o n of h e a v i l y armaments , o r i e n t e d i n d u s t r y wi th i t s

consequen t ' t h r e a t ' t o t h e T h i r d Idorld. Mot on ly i s such a

p remise i n d i r e c t c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h Fromm's c o n s i s t e n t

a s s e r t i o n of t h e ' p o w e r l e s s n e s s ' o f t h e masses i n h i g h l y

i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s , b u t we may w e l l ask how ( i n t e r m s

of p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s ) such p a t h o l a g i c a l t h i n k i n g i n f l u e n c e

t h e h i g h e s t l e v e l s of d e c i s i o n making f o r t h e p r o d u c t i o n of

armaments , and t h e main tenance o f t h e 'Cold War'? We

propose a f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n , i s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e

' c o n t e n t ' of techno1 ogi c a l knowledge and o t h e r f e a t u r e s of

h i g h l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d s o c i e t y , r e l a t e d t o such a o p u l a r l y

h e l d b e l i e f s ; o r i s t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t e c h n o l o a i c a l

advancement di c t a t e d by o t h e r q u i t e u n r e l a t e d f o r c e s i n

t h e s e s o c i e t i e s ? In h i s a r t i c u l a t i o n of p a t h o l o a i c a l

t h i n k i n g Fromm f a i l s t o s t r i k e a d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e

p o p u l a r l y h e l d b e l i e f s by t h e members of t h e working I

c l a s s e s and t h e s t r u c t u r a l c a p a c i t y of t h e s e groups t o

e x e r c i s e i n f l u e n c e and c o n t r o l of t h e magni t u d e he s u g g e s t s ,

i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o t h e s i t u a t i o n s e x i s t i n g among t h e

upper s t r a t a w i t h i n t h e s e s o c i e t i e s . Without n e c e s s a r i l y

s t a r t i n g from t h e economic i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of c a p i t a l i s t o r

s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t i e s i n h i s a n a l y s i s , a n a l y s i s based on such

a d i s t i n c t i o n would o r i e n t Fromm's a n a l y s i s i n a d i r e c t i o n

f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f i c u l t from t h a t i n May - tnan P r e v a i l .

d i s t i n c t i o n between p o p u l a r be1 i e f s and i d e o l o g y i m p l i e s a

c l a s s a n a l y s i s of s o c i e t y . 40 For any a n a l y s i s which

c o n s t i t u t e s t h e major f o r c e s of c o n t r a d i c t i o n and c h a n ~ e

i n contemporary c i v i l i z a t i o n as h i s t o r i c a l l y and m a t e r i a l l y

d e t e r m i n e d i n a d i a l e c t i c a l nianner t h e p o p u l a r b e l i e f s of

Frornmts conce rn would be c o n c e p t u a l i z e d as de te rmined by

c l e a r i d e o l o a i c a l f o r c e s a t t h e l e v e l s of p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l .

I n s h o r t t h e b e l i e f s would be m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f more

complex i deo log i c a l and m a t e r i a l c o n t r a d i c t i a n s of Cold War

pol i t i c s , t h e outcome of i n t e r n a t i ona l m a t e r i a1 and

economic c o n f l i c t s a t t h e i n t r a and i n t e r s y s t e m i c l e v e l s .

For exarnale Roger Garaudy has remarked r e c e n t l y t h a t a t

t h i s s t a a e i n t h e develonment of t h e q r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s

" ( t h a t of t h e p r e s e n t s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n o l o a i c a l r e s o l u t i o n )

t h e f u l l development of man becomes t h e n e c e s s a r y p r e -

c o n d i t i o n f o r h i s t o r i c a l development i f t h i s i s n o t t o be

h e l d back" . N e v e r t h e l e s s Garaudy r e j e c t s a methodology

which would view s o c i o - p o l i ' t i c a l p r o c e s s e s i n t e rms o f

impending chaos and an Apocalypse , as s o c i o l o g i c a l l y

s u p e r f i c i a l . The p o i n t h e r e t h e n , i s t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e

t o ho ld t h e view of Fromm w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e pr imacy of

s e l f h o o d and y e t r e j e c t h i s p a r t i c u l a r a n a l y s i s a l m o s t

c o m p l e t e l y . 41

C e n t r a l t o a non-mechanistic, non-aooca lyp t i c view

of contemporary s o c i e t y a l s o i s a r e j e c t i o n of t h e view

t h a t t e c h n o l o g i c a l change i s an i ndenendent autonomous

f a c t o r . Some M a r x i s t s such a s E l l u l and M a r x i s t a g r e e on

t h i s p o i n t . Fromm does n o t e x p l i c i t l y a rgue t h a t t echno logy

i s a n i n d e p e n d e n t f a c t o r b u t h o l d s t h i s p o i n t by i m p l i c a t i o n ,

and i t i s one which has become more prominent i n r e c e n t

y e a r s . In - The Revo lu t ion - Of -9 Hope Fromm d i s c u s s e s t h e

t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f American s o c i e t y by s t u d i e s based on a

c h o i c e between " l i f e f u r t h e r i n g " and " l i f e - h i n d e r i n g n e e d s " ,

w i t h o u t comina t o te rms w i t h t h e e s s e n t i a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n

between c a p i t a l i s m and t e c h n i q u e ( i n El l u l ' s s e n s e o f t h e

t e r m ) 4 Z The f o l l o w i g g i s a s h o r t e x c e r p t from E l l u l ' s

c o u n t e r p o i n t on t h e s u b j e c t :

"The p u r s u i t of t e c h n i c a l au tomat ion would condemn c a p i t a l i s t e n t e r n r i s e s t o f a i l u r e . The r e a c t i o n o f c a p i t a l i s m i s w e l l known: t h e p a t e n t s of new machines a r e a c q u i r e d and t h e machines a r e n e v e r p u t i n t o o p e r a t i on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C a p i t a l i s m i s no l o n g e r i n a p o s i t i o n t o p e r s u e t e c h n i c a l au tomat ion on t h e economic o r s o c i a l p l a n e . I t i s i n c a p a b l e o f d e v e l o p i n g a s y s t e m of d i s t r i b u t i o n

t h a t would p e r m i t t h e a b s o r p t i o n of a l l t h e goods which t e c h n i q u e a l l o w s ) t o be produced. I t i s l e d i n e v i t a b l y t o c r i s e s of o v e r p r o d u c t i o n . And i n t h e same way i t i s unab le t o u t i l i z e t h e manpower f r e e d by e v e r y new t e c h n i c a l improvement. C r i s e s of unemployment would e n s u e . " 4 3

E l l u l i s e x p r e s s i n g t h e c l a s s i c Marxian c r i t i q u e of t h e

n a t u r e o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a t t h e i n t r a s y s t e m i c l e v e l of

c a p i t a l i s m ,

Fromm's a n a l y s i s o f p r e s e n t day d e v e l o n i n g s o c i e t i e s

and t h e 'way o u t ' of p o v e r t y , c l e a r l y d e r i v e s from h i s

u n d e r s t a n d i n a of t h e consequences of t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of

c a p i t a l i s m and i t s a p p a r e n t r e s o l u t i o n o f c l a s s

c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n t e rms of a more p r i m i t i v e form of Marxi a n

a n a l y s i s . I n c o n j u n c t i o n wi th t h i s s y n t h e s i s , Fromm's

f a i l u r e t o g r a s p t h e view t h a t t h e ex t r eme c e n t r a l i z a t i o n

of t h e S o v i e t economy d i d no t p r i m a r i l y t a k e p l a c e because

S t a l i n was a power hungry madman. The l a t t e r may w e l l be

t h e c a s e , b u t t h i s i s no t t h e c e n t r a l i s s u e . C e n t r a l i z a t i o n

can be e x p l a i n e d i n t e rms of t h e f o l l o w i n g : c u l t u r a l and

t e c h n o l o a i c a l backwardness , m a t e r i a1 p o v e r t y , and t h e

b lockade by cap i t a l i s t powers , i n c l u d i n a t h e Uni ted

Kingdom, and t h e war. I n c r e a s i n q l y w i t h t h e r e s u l t s and

s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h , p r e s s u r e f o r new ' m o d e l s ' of

development a r e emerg ina , f o r example i n Czechos lovak ia .

The i d e o l o g i c a l o b s t a c l e s t o such p r o c e s s e s a r e t h e n one

v a r i a b l e which canno t be i s o l a t e d .

336

We turn b r i e f l y t o Fromm's a n a l y s i s of t h e r e l a t i o n

between c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s and c o l o n i a l and n e o - c o l o n i a l

s o c i e t i e s o u t l i n e d by Fromm. While he r e c o g n i z e s some of

t h e U.S. i n v e s t m e n t i n L a t i n America f o r i n s t a n c e , Frornm

g i v e s t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e f o r m e r ' s s u p p o r t f o r

' d i c t a t o r s h i p s ' i n t h e s e a r e a s i s p r i m a r i l y due t o t h e

f a c t t h a t t h e s e d i c t a t o r s a r e a n t i - R u s s i a n and a n t i -

communist. The 01 i a a r c h i c a l c o n t r o l o f p o l i t i c s and t h e

m u l t i - n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n wi th r e s p e c t t o ' c a p i t a l ' i n v e s t e d both w i t h i n t h e U.S. and o u t s i d e has been t o o w e l l

documented t o r e q u i r e r e p e t i t i o n h e r e . 4 4 'Under

development ' i s t h e l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n of c a p i t a l i s t

e x p a n s i o n , from i t s e a r l y s p r e a d i n Western Europe. I t i s

t h e r e f o r e a euphemism f o r Fromm t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e s e

n a t i o n s w i l l n o t adopt c a p i t a l i s t modes of development f o r

p s y c h o l o a i c a l r e a s o n s , even t h e c o n c e p t i o n of a ' t h i r d

w o r l d ' i s a euphemism f o r Gunder F rank , t h e o v e r a l l economics

of c o l o n i a l s o c i e t i e s a r e i n t e a r a t e d i n t o t h e complex

socio-economi c s t r u c t u r e , o f t h e rnetropol i s , c h a r a c t e r i z e d

by t h e m u l t i - n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n . 45 In one s e n s e t h e n ,

t h e c o l o n i a l r e v o l u t i o n i s an outcome of o v e r t h r e e

c e n t u r i e s of r e s o u r c e , l a b o u r and consumer market

e x p l o i t a t i o n and o n l y ~ e r i p h e r a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e Second

World War. Moreover Fromm a l s o b e t r a y s a l a c k of i n t e n s i v e

a n a l y s i s of neo-coloni a1 p r o c e s s e s , by s u g a e s t i n g t h a t t h e

Uni ted Kingdom's 'abandonment ' o f i t s i m p e r i a l r o l e i n

I n d i a , among o t h e r a r e a s , c o n s t i t u t e s independence from

economic e x p l o i t a t i o n , which i s t h e key f a c t o r . 46 I f t h e

a n a l y s i s wi th r e s p e c t t o G r e a t B r i t a i n i n t h e 1 9 6 0 ' s a r e

p a r t i a l l y c o r r e c t f o r t h e Ilni t e d S t a t e s , France and !4est

Germany, t h e s o - c a l l e d 'Cold War' ' i s n o t a t h r e a t t o

peace i n t h e s e n s e Fromm i m p l i e s , s i n c e t h e s p r e a d of neo-

c o l o n i a1 e x p l o i t a t i o n i s f a c i l i t a t e d by such an i d e o l o a i c a l

'smoke s c r e e n ' .

Summary

There i s no doubt t h a t c a ~ i t a l i s m i s n o t i n f i n i t e l y

f l e x i b l e b u t most r e c e n t M a r x i s t a n a l y s e s have s t r e s s e d t h e

f l e x i b i l i t y w h i l e c o n t u i n i n g t o p o i n t t o chang inp i n t e r n a l

c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , n o t j u s t a s e r i e s o f r e p e t i t i o n s . While

Fromm a p p e a r s t o have widened h i s scone f o r a n a l y s i s ,

beyond a conce rn s i m p l y w i t h a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m and t h e r e -

emergence o f f a s c i s m , h i s e f f o r t s s o f a r a s unconv inc ing .

Fromm has i a n o r e d an e n t i r e g e n e r a t i o n o f M a r x i s t s c h o l a r s

who a r e non-mechan i s t i c and t e n d toward i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y

i n t e g r a t i o n . As a s u b s t i t u t e , he has t e n d e d t o adop t a

s t a t i c s t r u c t u r a l f u n c t i o n a l i s m . So t h a t he i s mis t aken

i n v iewing t h e Cold War a s an o b s t a c l e t o s e l f h o o d .

Chanpes t a k i n a p l a c e w i t h i n each t y p e o f sys t em a r e c l e a r l y

d e t e r m i n e d by o t h e r k i n d s of v a r i a b l e s . Cold war 'smoke

338

s c r e e n s ' may s e r v e t o r a t i o n a l i z e t h e m i l i t a r y i n d u s t r i a l I

i n t e g r a t i o n which i s p a r t o f e v e r y major c a p i t a l i s t

c o u n t r y , b u t t h i s i s j u s t a s much due t o what Mandel te rms

t h e c r i s i s of P o s t War (1945) c a p i t a l i s m a s due t o Cold

War p o l i t i c s . The s i m p l e f a c t i s t h a t today armaments a r e

a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x p o r t b u s i n e s s t o sma l l n a t i o n s . Many

r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e major t h r e a t o f t h e l a t t e r h a l f of t h i s

c e n t u r y i s n o t i n t e r n a t i o n a l war, b u t c i v i l and r e s t r i c t e d

w a r s , Within t h e c o n t e x t of t h i s p o l i t i c a l envi ronment

f o r c e i t s e l f i s p a r t of t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l d i a l e c t i c o f

s o c i a l change , While i t canno t be p r e d i c t e d w i t h

c e r t a i n t y what t h e consequences f o r s e l f h o o d would be

behind t h e ' i r o n c u r t a i n ' , i t i s a r o s s a e n e r a l i z a t i o n t o

s u g g e s t , as does Fromm t h a t t h e Chinese r e v o l u t i o n c r i p p l e s

s e l f h o o d , when t h e p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r such s e l f h o o d a s

s t i 11 be ing formed. W i t h r e s p e c t t o c o l o n i a l s o c i e t i e s

engaaed i n a n t i c o l o n i a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y p r o c e s s e s , t h e same

can be a s s e r t e d . T h i s i s t h e p o s i t i o n of an e a r l i e r Fromm,

who a s s e r t e d t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r soc io-economic change a s

a p r e c o n d i t i o n t o s e l f h o o d , Any p r i o r r e j e c t i o n of f o r c e ,

i n t e rms o f t h e r e a l i t i e s o f c l a s s s o c i e t y and i m p e r i a l i s m

i s an a b s o l u t i z a t i o n of a f a c t o r and abandonment of t h e

l o g i c of Fromm's p o s i t i o n . Fromm needs t o r e c o g n i z e t h e

r a d i c a l ' d i s c o n t i n u i t y ' of h i s t h o u g h t i f t h e l a t t e r i s

t h e c a s e .

, FOOTNOTES

'cf . , Jacques E l l u l , The T e c h n o l o p i c a l S o c i e t y , t r . John W i l k i n s o n , ?lew York, V i n t a g e i3ooks, 1967 , p p . 390-391.

% f a Eri ch Fromm Good and- ~ ; i 1 . on. c i t

The H e a r t Of Man: I t s Genius Fo r T . 1 1 6 - 1 7 and p.43. See a l s o Toward A Humanized T e c h n o l o p y , OD. -

3 ~ e e E . Fromrn, S o c i a l i s t Humanism: An I n t e r n a t i a n a l - Symoosium, op. c i t . , p. 233.

4 ~ h i s a n t h r o n o l o a i c a l o v e r s i r i i ~ l i f i c a t i o n i s s e e n i n e v e n Fromm's r e c e n t w r i t i n g s , s e e f o r examole - The R e v o l u t i on Of Hope: Toward A Humanized T e c h n o l o a y . - -

5 ~ . Fromm, T h e Crisis O f P s y c h o a n a l y s i s : E s s a y s On Freud Marx and ~ o c i a l m o E a y , op. c i t . , p. 158. -

-9 - - 6 C f , E . Fromm, "On The L i m i t a t i o n s And Dance r s Of

P s y c h o l o a y " i n Doqma - Of C h r i s t , op. c i t . , pp. 197-206 , p. 197 .

7 ~ b i d . , p p . 202-204. Fromm s t a t e s : " T h e r e i s one o t h e r way, . . . . . t o g e t t o know t h e s e c r e t : i t i s t h a t o f c o m p l e t e power o v e r a n o t h e r p e r s o n ; t h e power which makes h i m do what I w a n t , f e e l wha t I w a n t , t h i n k wha t I w a n t ; w h i c h t r a n s f o r m s h i m i n t o a t h i n g , my t h i n g , m y p o s s e s s i o n " ( p . 2 0 2 ) .

8 ~ r o m m t e l l s us e s s e n t i a l l y t h a t ' s o c i e t y " i s r e s p o n s i b l e and t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s r e s p o n s i b l e , b u t t h a t i s a l l . Fromm's c r i t i q u e becomes an e x p l a n a t i o n o f why p e o p l e ' ~ u n c o n s c i o u s l y " s e e k power i n t e r m s o f t h e i r a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e dominan t i d e o l o g y o f c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y . B e l i e f i n i d e o l o a y ( c u r r e n t ) t h u s l e a d s t o r e g r e s s i o n and i d o l a t r y , F o r t h i s p o s i t i o n s e e , E . Fromm, "Love And I t s Disi n t e a r a t i o n " , PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol . VII , No. 6 8 , 1956 , pp. 36-44.

'1 have i n mind h e r e , t h e a p p r o a c h t o t h e p r s e l f i n i t i a t e d by t h i n k e r s such a s R . D . L a i n a and T S z a s z and E r v i n 9 Goffman i n The D i v i d e d S e l f ( 1 9 6 5 ) c i t . and --- The S e l f And Others,ondon, Pe-n Books T. S z a s z ' s T h e Myth Of t l e n t a l I l l n e s s : F o u n d a t i o n s Theory ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ d u c t , em Del l P u b l i s h i

I n c . , 1961 and Ideo logy And I n s a n i t Essa s On The Ps c h i a t r i c Dehumanization - d f w * -9 E c F Books, h v - A s y l u m s , New York: Anchor Books, 1961.

l o s e e David Ing leby ' Ideo logy And The Human S c i e n c e s " : Some Comments on The Role o f R e i f i c a t i o n i n - - - . . . .

Psycholoay and P s y c h i a t r y , Human C o n t e x t , Vol. 2 , 1970, pp. 159-187.

l l ~ h i s a n a l y t i c - l i n e a l i t y a p p e a r s s c a t t e r e d i n h i s w r i t i n g s , b u t s e e "Love And I t s D i s i n t e g r a t i o n " , O D . c i t . , p . 44, among o t h e r r e f e r e n c e s . I

1 2 ~ e f . R . D . Laing, -- S e l f And O t h e r s , London, P e l i c a n Books, 1961, p . 37.

1 3 ~ h i s q u e s t i o n t a k e s p recedence i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , o v e r t h e s t r i c t l y phenomenological one of what i s t h e s e l f . My own o r i e n t a t i o n as "backaround" a rgumenta t ion of t h e phenomenological i s s u e o f t h e s e l f d e r i v e s l a r g e l y from A l f r e d S c h u t z ' s C o l l e c t e d Pavers ( t h r e e vo lumes) , e d i t e d and i n t r o d u c e d , Maurice Matanson, The Hague, Mar t inus N i j h o f f , 1971, 1964 and 1970 r e s p e c t i v e l y . Many volumes have been w r i t t e n on t h e ' s e l f ' one of t h e s i m p l e s t d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e s e l f i s Harry S tack S u l l i v a n ' s t h a t i t i s c o n s t i t u t e d o f t h e r e f l e c t e d a p p r a i s a l s o f o t h e r s . See a l s o Hans Girth and C . \ r i g h t Mi 11s C h a r a c t e r And S o c i a l S t r u c t u r e : The Psycholoa Of S o c i a l 1 n s t i t u t i o n r ~ m k , H a r c o u r t , ~ c d d ~ n ~ 5 3 , e s p e c i a l l y Chap te r I " , where t h e a u t h o r s s u g g e s t t h a t t h e s e l f i s a more o r l e s s c o n s c i o u s rea lm of e x p e r i e n c e o f o u r bod ies and t h o s e of o t h e r s , o u r a c t s and o t h e r s and o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f o t h e r s a p p r a i s a l s of o u r a p p r a i s a l s of them ( p . 5 1 ) . The s t r e s s i n Laing and Cooper ' s of t h e s e l f a s a t o t a l i z a t i o n which t h e y s u g g e s t i s i n most contemporary s o c i e t i e s f r o z e n , d i v o r c e d from i t s e l f th rouah a s e r i e s of i n t e r i o r i z e d s t r a t e g i e s . In Volume I of C o l l e c t e d Pa e r s : The Problem Of S o c i a l R e a l i t y S c h u l t z e x p l a i n s t h e s e f a s c o n s t i t u t i v e - -5- and c o n s t i t u t e d ( L a i n a ' s t e r m s ) . He s t a t e s : "Then my " S e l f " , which has been h idden ( b e f o r e r e f l e c t i o n ) a s y e t by t h e o b j e c t s o f my a c t s and t h o u g h t s , emerges , I t does n o t merely e n t e r t h e f i e l d of my c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n o r d e r t o a p p e a r on i t s h o r i z o n o r a t i t s c e n t e r ; r a t h e r i t a l o n e t h i s f i e 1 d of c o n s c i o u s n e s s e Consequen t ly , a1 1 t h e per formed a c t s , t h o u g h t s , f e e l i n g s r e v e a l themse lves a s o r i g i n a t i n g i n WJ- p r e v i o u s a c t i n g , my t h i n k i n g , my f e e l i n g . The whole s t r e a m of c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s through and through t h e s t r e a m of my p e r s o n a l l i f e , and my s e l f i s p r e s e n t i n any of my e x p e r i e n c e s " . (p . 1 6 9 ) .

See a l s o Michel F o u c a u l t , - The Order Of T h i n a s : An Archaeoloa Of The Human S c i e n c e s , ~ o n d o n , ' T a v i s t o c k m s ~ l m , p p . 312-318; and John T . Doby "Man The S p e c i e s And he I n d i vi dual : A Soc i 01 ogi c a l P e r s p e c t i v e , S o c i a l F o r c e s , Vol. 49, No. 1 , September , 1970, p p . 1-15; -0- ckM. Chisholm, "On The O b s e r v a b i l i t y Of The S e l f " , Phi losonh And Phenomenol oqi ca1 Resea rch , Vol . 30 , 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 & 2 ~

1 4 ~ . S c h u t z , O D . c i t . ? C o l l e c t e d P a o e r s , Vol. I , PP. 174-175. The a l t e r - e a o 1s " t h a t s u b j e c t i v e s t r e a m of . . t h o u ~ h t which can be e x p e r i e n c e d i n i t s v i v i d p r e s e n t " . p . 174.

1 5 c f . David Cooper, The Death - Df The Fami 1 , London, Penguin P r e s s , Al len Lane, m l , e s p . p p ~ - +

I 6 ~ e f , Lewis Mumford In The Name o f S a n i t y , New Y o r k , H a r c o u r t , Brace and Co., 1 9 5 T D . 6 - -

i s An - Mew

171n The Sane S o c i e t y ( 1 9 5 5 ) . op. c i t . , t h e conce t h e r e b u t r a t h e r m m m p a r e d wi th May Ifan P r e v a i l : I n u i r I n t o The F a c t s And F i c t i o n 0 f % r * n m , + h + D m e ~ ~ , ~ 6 ~ h ~ f t h i s c h a p t e r i

based o n - t h e i d e a s - s e t o u t h e r e and i n The Revo lu t ion - Of Hope: Toward - A Humanized Technoloay, 1 9 b B ( o p . c i t . ) .

1 8 ~ h e t h e s i s of converaence has had s o c i o l o g i c a l c u r r e n c y , s e e f o r e p , J . H . Go ld thorpe " S o c i a l S t r a t i f i c a t i o n In I n d u s t r i a l S o c i e t y " i n Bendix and L i p s e t C l a s s , S t a t u s -- And Power: A ~ k a d e r In S o c i a l S t r a t i f i c a t i o n , Glencoe , Free p r e s s , 1950;~. E. Noore and 1. Feldman. " I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and I n d u s t r i a l i s m " i n ~ i a n s a c t i o i s Of The F i f t h IJorld Conaress Of Soci o l o c y , 0 1 11 . 1950. m e t h e r - b y E . ~ u n n c q and E , S . Hopper , - . " ~ n d u s t & a l i s a t i o n And The Problem Of convergence : A C r i t i c a l t l o t e , S o c i o l o a i c a l Review, Vole 1 4 , 1966.

' ' ~ f , Richard Evans, Dialogue \ I i t h Er i ch Fromm, o p e c i t . , Ouote t aken from p . S e e p-173. T h i s i n t e r v i e w i s s i pni f i c a n t be~au:!~: t revea ! s t h a t i n r e t r o s p e c t Fromm r e a a r d s h i s a n a l y s i s i n M A Y M A N PREVAIL as c e n t r a l -- t o h i s opus.

here has been a p r o l i f e r a t i o n of l i t e r a t u r e on t h i s sub . j ec t i n t h e 1 9 6 0 1 s , and we w i l l r e f e r t o on ly a few of t h e more prominent works i n t h i s f i e l d arnona t h e n a r e Lewis Piurnford, The ?,Jane S a n i t y , o p . c i t . ,; - The M t h Of The Pach ine : T e c h n ~ c s A n d Human Development, New &-- , H a r c o u r t , Brace and W o r l d , I n c . , 1966 and Paul

Goodman, L ike A Con u e r e d P r o v i n c e : The Floral Ambiau i ty O f Ameri c m e 7 &dqm House , m 6 X e most - n o t a h T e u r c e s used i n t h i s c h a ~ t e r b u t a n t e d a t i n a 1 9 6 0 ' s a r e F ranz A l e x a n d e r O u r Aae Of Unreason : A S t u d Of The I r r a t i o n a l Faces I n E i r ~ i f e , New York: d ZT~FC 1 9 4 2 ; J a c q u e s ! ? a r X a i n , s c h o l a s t i c i s m And P o l i t i c s , t r . F lor t imer A d l e r , New York, Doubleday , 1 m and Man A n d T h S t a t e , I l l i n o i s , I J n i v e r s i t y Of C h i c a a o P r e s s , m l ; - G t e i n V e b l e n , The P l a c e Of S c i e n c e I n I todern C i v i l i z a t i o n : And m e m a r , New ~ o r k , -1 8 Russ

9 6 1 , and - The F u n b e a c e ,And The T e r n s Cf I t s - -- -- P e r p e t u a t i o n .

e l l ,

2 1 ~ ~ f . E. Fromm, -- Way Man P r e v a i l , on. c i t . , p. 249 .

2 2 ~ l t h o u a h Fromm docs n o t p r o v i d e s t a t i s t i c s on t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e t o t a l b u d g e t g i v e n t o d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e t h e f i g u r e s a r e a s f o l l o w s : IJ.S.S,R,: d e f e n s e b u d a e t f o r 1971 was 17.9 b i l l i o n r u b l e s of a t o t a l b u d g e t o f 160.6 b i l l i o n r u b l e s . T h e r e a r e 3,300,OaO men u n d e r arms o f a t o t a l ~ o p u l a t i on o f 241,784,OOO. The m i 1 i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e was 11.1% o f t h e t o t a l b u d a e t , a d e c r e a s e o f 1.3% ( a ~ n r o x . ) on 1970 f i o u r e s . ( S o u r c e -- he-1972 W O R L D A L M A N A C , Neh 'York; Newspapers E n t e r p r i s e Assoc. I n c . ' f h e r m o f U.S. s t a t i s t i c s i n t h e same s o u r c e i s more complex b u t i t i s $76 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s ( a n ~ r o x . ) f o r 1 9 7 1 , compared t o s l i a h t l y o v e r $50 , b i l l i o n i n 1965 ( e x c l u d i n g v e t e r a n s ' e x p e n d i t u r e ) . S o u r c e , D . 69. T h e r e a r e no r e l i a b l e t o t a l s f o r t h e o v e r a l l s t r e n g t h o f t h e armed f o r c e s , p e r t o t a l ~ o ~ u l a t i o n . Ny e s t i m a t e s a r e c l o s e t o 3 m i l l i o n . L i t t l e u n a n i m i t y e x i s t s amona e c o n o m i s t s on m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e f o r example G a l b r a i t h s u q a e s t s t h a t i n t h e f i r s t h a l f o f t h e 1 9 6 3 ' s d e f e n s e o u t l a y c o n s t i t u t e d be tween 55% and 60% o f t h e t o t a l b u d a e t o f t h e F e d e r a l Government , w h e r e a s E. Mandel r e p o r t s t h i s p e r c e n t a a e f o r t h e y e a r s 1957 - 1955. S e e 3 . K . G a l b r a i t h , ~ h b New ~ n d u s t r i a l ~ t . a t e , B o s t o n , Houghton M i f f i n , 1967,p728-239; E . !I-, M a r x i s t Economic T h e o r y , Vol. 1 1 , t r . B r i a n P e a r c e , ~on-rlin P r e s s , 1 9 6 8 , 533 . Both a u t h o r s a g r e e on t h e i n c r e a s i n g s i z e o f t h e F e d e r a l b u d g e t g i v e n t o m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e d u r i n g t h e l a s t 10 y e a r s however .

~ J E . Fromm, % Man P r e v a i 1 , op . c i t . , p. 11 . - 2 4 ~ r o m m u s e s t h e s t a t i s t i c s o n t h e g rowth r a t e o f

t h e U.S.S.R. economy be tween 1928 and 1940 8 . 3 % and 1950 and 1955 9 .0%: i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r . t ~ u o t e d f rom E . A . K a ~ l a n and R. Moors t een , " A n I n d e x Of S o v i e t I n d u s t r i a l O u t p u t " , American Economic Review, J u n e 1969 , pn. 295-318: W . S . N u t t e r , " T h e s t r u c t u r e Growth Of s o v i e t I n d u s t r y , A omp par is on w i t h The U n i t e d S t a t e s ,

C o n a r e s s i o n a l Comrni t t e e Paoers".

2 5 ~ . Fromm, Man P r e v a i l , op . c i t . , p . 78. - 2 6 ~ e f . J . K. G a l h r a i t h , op. c i t . , p . 20 . We can

compare Fromm's i m p l i c i t a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e two s y s t e m s i s i d e o l o a y w i t h t h o s e o f E . Nandel and R. Garaudy.

2 7 ~ . Fromm, op . c i t . , p. 82.

2 8 1 b i d . , pp. 82-84.

3 0 ~ f . E. Mandel , Vol. I , po. 335-337. S u r p l u s v a l u e i s o f c o u r s e d e f i n e d a s t h e c r e a t i o n o f " u s e - v a l u e " o v e r and above t h e l a b o u r needed t o n r o d u c e t h e e a u i v a l e n t o f t h e wage p a i d f o r t h a t l a b o u r . Ref . K a r l ~ l a r x , The P o v e r t v O f P h i l o s o o h y , i n t r . F . E n a e l s , New ~ o r k , m t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1 9 6 3 , D D . 90-108. See a l s o * , -

E . Mandel , M a r x i s t ~ c o n o i i c T h e o r y , Vol. I , ( o p . c i t . ) , pp. 132-181 , where t h e a u t h o r d i s c u s s e s v a r i o u s means o f c r e a t i n g s u r p l u s v a l u e u n d e r c o n t e m n o r a r y c a p i t a l i s m , such a s s p e e d i n g up t h e p a c e o f work ; s p e e d i n p u p t h e m a c h i n e r y , i n c r e a s i n a t h e number o f machines t o b e wa tched and s o on.

3 l ~ h i s p o i n t a l s o i m p l i e s t h a t ' a l i e n a t i o n ' i n b o t h t y n e s of s y s tems a l s o r e q u i r e a1 t e r n a t i ve e x p l a n a t i o n s t o t h a t o f f e r e d by Fromm. S e e f o r example - The M a r x i s t Theo rv Of A l i e n a t i o n , b y E r n e s t Handel and Georae Nbvack , m r k , P a t h f i n d e r P r e s s , 1970.

3 2 ~ f . E . Fromm, May Ifan P r e v a i l , o p e c i t . , p. 28. Fromm d e f i n e s t h e t h r e e - t v p r o f h t o r i e n t a t i o n s a s f o l l o w s : ( 1 ) P a r a n o i d t h i n k i n a ; i n v o l i e e n t i r e g roups b e l i e v i n g t h a t a n o t h e r c o u n t r y o r aove rnmen t (U.S.S. R e o r C h i n a ) i s ' a f t e r them' and w i l l i n v a d e them, ( 2 ) ' P r o j e c t i v e t h i n k i n g ' ; e x i s t s where e a c h s o c i e t y a c c u s e s t h e o t h e r o f i t s own i n t e r n a l , u s u a l l y a g a r e s s i v e d e s i a n s . The enemy a p p e a r s a s t h e embodiment o f e v i l , and e q o , t h e embodiment o f a l l t h a t i s aood , ( 3 ) 'Doub le t h i n k ' ( t a k e n f rom O r w e l l ) means " t h e power o f hold in^ two c o n t r a d i c t o r y b e l i e f s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , f o r example t o s u p p o r t t h e p r i n c i p l e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e f o r s m a l l n a t i o n s and y e t s u p p o r t t h e o v e r t h r o w o f o t h e r s m a l l n a t i o n s . Fromm a l s o i s o l a t e s ' f a n a t i c i s m ' and ' a u t o m a t o n ' t h i n k i n a a t t h e a r o u p l e v e l . The l a t t e r i n v o l v e s !vhole s o c i e t i e s b e l i e v i n a t h a t t h e i r t h o u a h t s a r e t h e i r own, when i n a c t u a l i t y , t h e s e b e l i e f s have been a d o p t e d b e c a u s e t h e y were p r e s e n t e d b y s o u r c e s

t h a t c a r r y some form o f a u t h o r i t y . Fromm makes two p o i n t s a b o u t t h e s e fo rms o f t h o u g h t s a ) t h e y a r e p a t h o l o a i c a l , o s y c h o l o ~ i c a l p r o c e s s e s a t t h e mass l e v e l and a r e a l l c a u a b l e o f m a n i ~ u l a t i o n t h r o u a h n ropoaanda b ) t h e y a r e b a s e d on l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s ( i . e . wha t t h e o t h e r m i a h t d o ) r a t h e r t h a n p r o b a b i l i t i e s ( i . e . t h o u a h t s based on r e a l i s t i c a s s e s s m e n t of t h e p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s . Ref. E . Fromm, I b i d , P O . ' 17-30. ( t h e t e r m ' p o s s i b i l i t i e s ' i s u sed i n a d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t t o t h a t a o p l i e d i n - The R e v o l u t i o n - Of Hope, op. c i t . , p . 147 .

3 3 ~ . Fromm, The R e v o l u t i o n Of Hope, p p . 155-156. - 3 4 ~ . Fromm, l&y- Van P r e v a i 1 , o a . c i t . , p . 16 . - 3 5 ~ . Fromm, The R e v o l u t i o n Of I lone, op. c i t . ,

p p * 117-118.

3 6 1 b i d . , pp. 148-150.

3 7 ~ e e C h a p t e r 7 , " S u g a e s t i o n s Fo r P e a c e " , i n !+& Man P r e v a i l , op. c i t . , p p . 177-250. -

3 8 I b i d . , pp. 194-200 and pp. 202-207.

3 9 ~ f . E . Mandel and G . Novack, - The M a r x i s t Theo ry Of A l i e n a t i o n , op . c i t . , p. 52. -

401f we d e f i n e i d e o l o a i e s a s b e i n 9 more t h a n j u s t s e c o n d a r y m a n i f e s t a t i o n s a t t h e l e v e l o f t h o u u h t which r e f l e c t u n d e r l y i n a r e a l f o r c e s o f c o n f l i c t and c h a n a e , and i n c l u d e w i t h i n t h i s c o n c e p t i o n t h e n o t i o n o f i d e o l o g i e s a s p a r t l y c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e s e f o r c e s , t h a t i s t o s a y a s s h a p i n a t h e s e f o r c e s . I d e o l o a i e s can t h e n be u n d e r s t o o d a s c l a s s d e r i v e d i n c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t i e s . S e e f o r e a . Maur ice C o r n f o r t h he Onen P h i l o s o p h And The 0 e n - s o c i e t y , Mew York I n t e r n a t i o n a l d ~ m - 8 u 7%-

4 1 ~ f . Roger Garaudy , The T u r n i n a P o i n t of S o c i a l i s m : t r . P e t e r and B e t t y Ross , ~ o ~ n , n ~ l i - i i s , 1970 ,

4 2 ~ . Fromm, - The R e v o l u t i o n nf Hone, O D . c i t . , pp. 125-126.

4 3 ~ f . J a c q u e s E l l u l , - The T e c h n o l o o i c a l S o c i e t , + op. c i t . , p p . 81-82. T h i s i s n o t t h e p l a c e t o dea w i t h a l a t e r c o n t r a d i c t i o n of E l l u l ' s p o s i t i o n w i t h r e a a r d t o c a p i t a l i s m and c o l o n i a l a r e a s and t h e s p r e a d of t e c h n i q u e . Here E l l u l c o n t r a d i c t s h i s e a r l i e r p o s i t i o n . See p p . 119- 120. See a l s o Garaudy , op. c i t . , p. 33 .

4 4 ~ e e e s p e c i a l l y G. W . Domhoff, Who Ru le s Amer i ca , New J e r s e y , P r e n t i c e H a l l , ) 1 9 6 7 ; ~ i c h a e l e a a a n , P o l i t i c s , Economi c s And The G e n e r a l ! J e l f a r e , ' S c o t t , l o r e s w a n , rhi c a a o . 1 R 7 5 : ~ Baron and Sweezv. Monopoly - ~ a p i t a i , - ~ n d r e ~ ~ u n d e r F r a n k , ati in- America: ~ n d c r d e v e m Or R e v o l u t i o n , New ~ o ~ o ~ e v i e w P r e s s , 1969 , E . l i z d e l , E l a r x i s t Economic T h e o r y , Yol. 2 , o p e c i t .

45See f o r e p . e u n d e r F r a n k , ' D i a l e c t i c , Hot Dual S o c i e t y " , p p . 221-230 , i n L a t i n Amer ica : Underdeve lopment Or R e v o l u t i o n , o n . c i t . ; a m . blandel , op. c i t . , pp. 441-484.

4 6 ~ e f . Robin B l a c k b u r n , "The Hea th Government : A New Course F o r Bri t i s h Imneri a l i s m " * - New-Left Review, No.70, November-December, 1971 , pp. 3-26. Not o m d o e s B l a c k b u r n r e v e a l t h e r a d i c a l r e n d e r i n g o f a l l i e d r e l a t i o n s v is a v is t h e U.S. , t r a d i t i o n a l l y t a k e n f o r a r a n t e d ( a p o i n t a l s o a s s e r t e d by E . ! l ande l on i n t r a s y s t e m c u r r e n c y and g o l d f l u c t u a t i o n s ) ; b u t B l a c k b u r n , l i k e Gunder Frank a l s o s u a g e s t s t h a t many o f t h e r eg imes i n t h e ' t h i r d w o r l d ' such a s E a y p t , Sudan and Zamhia , f a r f rom h e i n 9 ' i n d e p e n d e n t d e m o c r a t i c s o c i a l i s t s ' a c t i n g a a a i n s t neo- c o l o n i a l i s m , i n r e a l i t y f a c i l i t a t e c o n t i n u e d more c o v e r t f o rms o f s o c i o - e c o n o m i c e x p l o i t a t i o n . B l a c k b u r n s u a g e s t s t h a t i n t h e c a s e o f G r e a t B r i t a i n o v e r s e a s i m p e r i a l i n v e s t m e n t s i n c r e a s e d b y 2 ,003 m i 11 i o n ~ o u n d s be tween 1945-1964. He s t a t e s " t l o r e o v e r , p o l i t i c a l d e c o l o n i z a t i o n d i d n o t mean t h a t t h e r e a l e conomic s i n e w s o f Empire were i n any way abandoned: a o l d i n S o u t h A f r i c a , r u b b e r and t i n i n Malaya , o i l i n t h e Middle E a s t , \ r e r e a l l p r e s e r v e d i n t a c t " ( p . 5 ) .

"The quest of science i s re la t ive ly new ..., among those circumstances whose select ive action in the f a r past has given to the race the human nature which i t now has. The race reached the human plane with l i t t l e of th i s searching knowledge of f ac t s ...; b u t i t has never until now been put in the f i r s t place, as the dominant note of human cul ture . The normal man, such as his inheritance has made him, has therefore good cause to be res t ive under i t s dominion. " [THORSTEIN V E B L E N , 19061

The main task of t h i s study has been to extr icate a systematic

human

Fromm

i s t social s c i en t i f i c " infrastructure" in the writings of Erich

. Neither the task i t s e l f nor the broader aims for i t s persual

a re self-evident, b u t in the case of 'Erich Fromm's work any attempt of

t h e f i r s t task implies some establishment of the second. P u t d i f fe rent ly ,

Erich Fromm i s not simply a social c r i t i c - - in the loose sense of the

term--he i s a systematic social s c i en t i s t who has not taken the time to

t e l l us "academic social s c i en t i s t s " , what he i s about and why he i s

about what he i s about. This takes us to a second observation, Erich

Fromm's restiveness. Few statements, among which i s Veblen's, e a r l i e r

quoted, characterize the personality and the work of Erich Fromm, so

tha t t o examine t h i s work i s of necessity t o juxtapose the rest ive and

the "tough-minded" social s c i en t i s t s . Our f i r s t conclusion then i s tha t

Fromm's 'socialist-humanism' i s a considered response to restiveness.

I t i s a humanism not based on some vague ' ex is ten t ia l choice' b u t on a

his tor ical perspective, in i t s turn predicated on a specif ic ontological

and epistemological framework. The restiveness which Veblen traces in

"The Place of Science In Modern Civilization", and' in which he does not

347

exhort us t o choose the "tough minded'' or the humanist ( f o r Veblen a

mixture of "dramati sa t ion" and scholarship) ; gave b i r t h t o socia l

science. The roots of social science then a r e t heo re t i c a l l y and sub-

s t a n t i a l l y c r i t i c a l with respect t o modern c i v i l i z a t i o n . 1

The foregoing analysis cons t i tu tes a t one l eve l , t he centra l

case of chapter one of t h i s study. We have shown tha t the very concern

with the in tegrat ion of sociology and socia l psychology theory p a r t i a l l y

derives from the c r i t i c a l res t iveness of Fromm. Fromm's c r i t i c a l

res t iveness i s summarized in h i s constant use of the phrase " i l l u s ions

of r e a l i t y " which i s a t one and the same time a c r i t i q u e of social

p rac t ica l ly .

of contradic t

socie ty . The

i s a sociolog

t ion t o the

and h i s own

meets the f

t o selfhood

science and of o r ien ta t ions of people i n ordinary l i f e . B u t t h i s is a

complex proposition which Fromm attempts t o resolve theore t ica l ly and

The dual c r i t i que j u s t mentioned derives from Fromm's view

ions i n phylogenetic and diachronic development of man and

f i r s t i s primarily an anthropological postula te , the second

ical one. We have argued t h a t Fromm's attempt t o synthesize

t he ideas of Marx and Freud i s a unique attempt a t theore t ica l synthesis ,

emerging from the contradictions which he a s s e r t s e x i s t s between the

underlying (Fromm terms i t unconscious) 'needs ' of man ( t h e s i s ) and

academic socia l science (ant i t h e s i s ) . There is another attempted

synthesis , t h i s time a t the pract ical l eve l , and expressed in the

Frommian exhortat ions of ' love ' and hope, on the one hand and the

productive character on the other . This level of synthesis i s i n r e l a -

tension or contradiction between man's species nature (Marx)

h i s to r ica l and cul tura l response (as an t i t h e s i s ) . Fromm's

i r s t c r i t e r i a of a humanistic social science, one dedicated

, by choosing the concept of 'productive charac te r ' as the

vehicle f o r a r t i cu l a t i ng the 'pa ths ' t o t ha t selfhood.

B u t the humanist perspectivk in social science i s not simply

based on the asse r t ion of selfhood alone, nor i s i t derived a l t e rna t e ly

from c r i t i ques of positivism, which has again become very current in

sociology i n pa r t i cu la r . Fromm's work in Beyond the Chains of I l lus ion

i s very ins t ruc t ive here. When Fromm claims t h a t h is own in t e l l e c tua l

and theore t ica l o r ien ta t ion derive from Marx and Freud, he i s making two

impl ic i t assumptions which a r e centra l t o any conception of a humanistic

socia l science which aims to transcend the merely rhe tor ica l . The f i r s t

i s t h a t a c r i t i c a l social science i s nothing new--whatever the claims of

Robert Friedrichs and Alvin Gouldner, t h i s i s d i s t i n c t from the problem

of theoret ical entropy which they emphasize. Cr i t i ca l theory i s t r ad i - t ional t o socia l science a s Ernest Becker has asser ted cons i s ten t ly ,

where the term c r i t i c a l i s taken t o mean c r i t i c i sm of socia l and po l i t i c a l

pol icy. Fromm takes the problem a s t ep fu r ther by suggesting t h a t

humanistic social science fu r ther implies an i n t e l l e c tua l posture which

has the capacity t o c r i t i c i z e i t s in f ras t ruc tura l components, i t s own

conceptual ca tegor ies , where those categor ies form metatheory. This i s

t he reason why Fromm s t r e s se s t ha t the i n t e l l e c tua l t r ad i t i on of

DE OMNIBUS EST DOBITANDUM (of everything one must doubt) e x i s t s i n both

Marx and Freud. In j u s t t h i s sense the humanist t r ad i t i on as Fromm a l so

points out in THE NATURE OF MAN (1968) extends backwards in to philosophy

and other areas a s well. John Schaar 's c r i t i q u e of Fromm, then, i s

somewhat inadequate when he suggests t ha t the l a t t e r i s c r i t i c i z i n g

socia l s c i e n t i f i c empiricism, and t h a t Fromm wants t o subs t i t u t e an

a1 t e rna t e moral philosophical base. No, Fronm i s ca l l ing fo r r e f l e c t i v i t y

i n socia l science theor iz ing, an ingredient of humanism. As i s c l ea r from

a large part of his work, Fromm i s engaged in constant empirical

analysis of social l i fe . ' His b i n b y groupings of ' l i f e ' and 'dea th1 ,

good and e v i l , productive and non-productive, and so on, extend to

his en t i re intel lectual orientation i s not limited to being a technical

device. Rather i t s value as technical device in sociological s t ructural

analysis and in psychoanalytic c l in ica l practice derives from Fromm's

view of science. Fromm's ' integrat ion ' then i s a t the level of

sociology, anthropology and social psychology as well as these d isc i -

plines and philosophy. In a sense then Fromm's intel lectual development

i s essent ial ly from tha t of a sociological perspective, the concept of

selfhood i s predicated on a sociological epistemology. The concept of

'human nature' is derived from an anthropological standpoint. 3

In sp i t e of the theoretical4 c l a r i t y of Fromm's work as a basis

fo r his opus there a re many conceptual and empirical weaknesses. We

confront some of these d i f f i c u l t i e s in Fromm's analysis of character

which i s also the strength of his work, since he makes the v i ta l inte-

gration with the concept of character. Most of the sticking cr i t ic isms

have previously been stated in the two f ina l sections of chapter three,

so only those remarks which bear d i rec t ly on the overall framework

which has been developed in the d isser ta t ion , will be rei terated here.

In an ea r l i e r discussion in chapter three, of Fromm's a r t icu la t ion

of character adaptations, i t was suggested tha t a cer tain one dimen-

s ional i ty ex is t s in Fromm's strategy in explaining character adaptations.

For in the case of the Renaissance, he did not show how increased

strength of the individual, as one part of the paradox of 'freedom from'

old t i e s and alienation a t the same time. In short there was l i t t l e

mention of posit ive individual ism, what Fromm stressed was a1 ienated

350

individualism. Fromm does not t e l l us how differentiated class

response i s possible, under what ar'e by his own accounts internal ly

varying socio-economic conditions fo r d i f fe rent classes in the same

society. We suggested also tha t t h i s was because Fromrn's main focus

i s on abandonment of freedom. B u t i t was mentioned tha t Fromm may be

arguing by analogy. In other words Fromm i s searching fo r similar

responses by the same c lass , the lower middle c lass in d i f fe rent

his tor ical epochs. This analogy i s extended into Fromm's anthropology

in his "Dogma of Christ".

If we examine Fromm's analysis of the structural re lat ions among

the various socio-economic groups in Pal es t ine prior to the development

of Christian dogma, we find an analysis which closely resembles the one

s e t out of the Renaissance--the lower middl e c lasses , ( the Pharisees'

behaviour resembles tha t of the lower middle class during the

Renaissance), s e l l out the pro le ta r ia t and lumpen pro le ta r ia t every

time. What i s peculiar here i s that Fromm does not provide any adequate

analysis of why t h i s i s the case in every instance, rather than the

assertion i t s e l f . To the extent that both analyses were developed a t a

period when Fromm was highly influenced by Marxism i t i s possible to

understand th i s conclusion of Fromm's. I t i s possible to accept the

conclusion and question the reasoning behind i t , which i s the position

of th i s author. The dictum here appears to be: "the lower middle classes

are not to be trusted as a revolutionary force". B u t Fromm t e l l s us

l i t t l e more. This i s a problem in his work especially because Fromm also

wants to develop an analysis of 'Freedom t o ' , which i f we take Fromm's

analysis to i t s logical conclusion leads to Marxism with the emphasis

on the pro le ta r ia t as the revolutionary force, B u t Fromm does not make

t h a t commitment. Fromm there fore has t o f i n d o the r means t o 'shore up ' I

h i s system as a whole.

Th i s i s p r e c i s e l y what Fromm does. We w i l l 'draw a sketch ' o f

t h a t system as a whole:

a ) The bas is of t h e system i s t h e concept ion o f s o c i a l science

grounded i n on attempted synthes is o f Marx and Freud. As was suggested

Fromm extends h i s antecedents w i t h o u t r e s o l v i n g some fundamental cont ra-

d i c t i o n s . Rather he cons t ruc ts a hexagonal system on t h i s i n an a t tempt

t o i n t e g r a t e h i s bas ic themes a t t he cent re . 'Hope' emanates from t h i s

fo rmula t ion .

b) Fromm then moves t o do two th ings from t h i s base: t o develop

a concept o f essence on the one s ide w i t h p a r t o f i t s antecendents i n

Marx and the conceptual bas is f o r a n o t i o n o f freedom. On t h e o the r s ide

o f t he (Marx-Freud base), Fromm works on a concept and theory o f s o c i a l

character . Nevertheless p a r t o f t he antecedents here, p a r t i c u l a r l y those

which v a l i d a t e h i s subs tant ive fo rmu la t i ons a r e dependent on Freud. On

the s i d e o f essence Fromm produces he ' ques t i on posed' w i t h respect t o

human na tu re and essence as the c e n t r a l concern. On the s i d e o f t he

'hexagon' dea l i ng w i t h character , t he immanence o f t he problem o f choice

between ' 1 i f e and death ' i s the c e n t r a l quest ion.

c ) I f Fromm's opus had moved v e r t i c a l l y f rom t h e s i d e o f char-

a c t e r he would c o n f r o n t t he problem o f power i n a l l i t s dimensions, n o t

j u s t phys ica l f o rce . But t h i s i s by no means c l e a r i n h i s scheme,

p a r t l y because he had n o t reso lved the i n d i v i d u a l freedom versus s o c i a l

character , problem. Therefore, t h e r e i s an in terchange o f power and

humanism, It i s p a r t l y f o r t h i s reason, t he d i f f i c u l t y o f unearth ing

a systematic theory of power t h a t analys is in the d i s s e r t a t i on sh i f t ed I

t o Parsons.

d ) On the opposite or f i f t h s i de of the hexagon, Fromm engages

i n a deta i led and systematic anthropology. The background ideas here

though theological have two long range imp1 ica t ions , the f i r s t coincides

w i t h Fromm's view of social i n s t i t u t i o n s ; the second c l a r i f i e s a concept

of s e l f .

e) The f i n a l aspect of Fromm's work has t o do w i t h the notion

of freedom t o which i s pa r t ly a product of the cross f e r t i l i z a t i o n of an

analysis of essence and existence on the one hand and individual char-

a c t e r on the other . Here we f ind Fromm's concept of selfhood. A t t he

cen t re of the scheme i s revealed Fromm's view of modern c i v i l i z a t i o n .

Here a l so a l l the e a r l i e r contradictions come to r e s t , many unresolved.

Two s e t s of contradictions stand out in pa r t i cu l a r , the f i r s t has t o do

with Marx and Freud a t the base of the 'hexagon'. The second has to do

with Fromm's essen t ia l c losure of a c l a s s analysis of socie ty so t h a t

individual and social character a r e now synonymous, now in contradiction.

I t i s worthwhile s t a t i ng the centra l core of concepts e a r l i e r

alluded t o which tend t o res ide within the Frommian framework:

a ) hope; b ) l ) the concept of the 'quest ion ' a s the important point of

o r ien ta t ion f o r analysis of man and socie ty , b)2) the concept of l i f e

and death and the po t en t i a l i t y t o choose between them; c ) the dual

concepts of power and humanism. Here i s the weak l ink i n the system;

d ) the concept of s e l f as freedom from and freedom t o ; e ) the notion

of the modern world as qua1 i t a t i ve ly d i f f e r en t from e a r l i e r c i v i l i z a -

t ions . I t i s c l ea r from Fromm's r e f l ec t i ons on h i s work t h a t he regards

his system of notions and conepts as a more or l e s s neat scheme. B u t

t h i s i s hardly the case. A t the same time the outer shell which has

been constructed in th i s study, i s ' integrated in terms of the d isc i -

pl i nary program which Fromm adopts.

A hermeneutics such as adopted in th i s disser tat ion allows us

to examine a major contribution to humanistic orientations in the

social sciences. In sp i t e of the cr i t ic isms levelled against tha t

scheme, i t s tendency to be reduced to a form of sociologism, and t h i s

from a Freudian social psycho1 ogism of 'freedom from' - 'freedom to ' ;

we cannot fu l ly comprehend the l a t en t c r i t ique of academic social

science in th i s psychology a t a simple level of interpretation. A

fur ther point has to do with the significance of Fromm's concept of

'freedom t o ' or selfhood, whose ambivalence can be traced back to the

f i r s t chapter of t h i s study, b u t the c r i t i c a l value of which cannot be

dismissed.

'see Thors te in Veblen. "The Place o f Science I n Modern C i v i l i z a t i o n " , i n The Place of Science I n Modern C i v i l i z a t i o n : And Other Essays, New York, Russel 1 and Russel 1, 1961, pp. 1-31. See e s p e c i a l l y pp. 26-27.

2 ~ i s work w i t h Michael Maccoby, Soc ia l Character I n a Mexican V i l l a g e (1971), a t t e s t s t o a g r e a t deal o f empir ic ism.

3~ have suggested t h a t t h e i n t e g r a t i o n o f these d i s c i p l i n e s w i t h ph i losophy i s , a t the ep is temolog ica l l e v e l , w i t h Kant, and Hegel, w i t h t h e s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t Fromm's concept would be incompat- i b l e w i t h t h e t e l e o l o g i c a l imp1 i c a t i o n s of t he Absolute S p i r i t .

4 ~ h e n o t i o n o f theory i s used i n a wider sense, than i t s r e s t r i c t i o n t o emp i r i ca l theory. This w r i t e r takes t h e view t h a t i n works such as Fromm's the d i s t i n c t i o n between metatheory o r i n f r a - s t r u c t u r a l l e v e l s and emp i r i ca l t h e o r e t i c a l 1 eve1 s have t o be imposed t o f a c i l i t a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n b u t a r e n o t o r i g i n a l t o Fromm's work, i n c o n t r a s t t o a t h i n k e r such as Parsons who i s more d i s c i p l i n e d i n t h i s sense.

I

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