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The Gulf crisis and China's Middle East dilemmaLillian Craig Harris aa Teaches at the American University , CairoPublished online: 03 Apr 2007.

To cite this article: Lillian Craig Harris (1991) The Gulf crisis and China's Middle East dilemma, The Pacific Review,4:2, 116-125, DOI: 10.1080/09512749108718908

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The Gulf Crisis and China'sMiddle East DilemmaLillian Craig Harris

Dangerous anomalies inChinese policy

The time for policyreassessment

116

The Gulf crisis has seriously damaged China's position in the Middle East. Chineseaspirations to a major leadership role in the developing world, important Sino-Arabeconomic ties and even China's claim to an 'independent' foreign policy have allbeen undermined. In trying to please everyone, the Chinese have displeased many.Ominously, the crisis has highlighted dangerous anomalies in Chinese policy, tacticswhich are themselves destructive to China's long-term interests.

The Gulf war enormously increased the involvement of outsiders in the MiddleEast and deflected attention from the Palestine issue which China recognizes as theregion's central dilemma. Such developments threatened China's hopes for atranquil Middle East where China could continue to expand its economicrelationships and strengthen its authority. Immediate damage to China's regionaleconomic interests was officially placed at $2 billion. Suspicion of Americanobjectives and the possibility that Gulf events would stimulate ethnic and religiousunrest in China itself set off yet other alarms in Beijing.

Worse was to come. The Gulf crisis caused China, for the first time, to side openlywith the West against an Arab friend. Though Beijing then worked hard to retainIraqi friendship, Iraqi—and Palestinian—resentment has been inevitable. More-over, by compliance with international sanctions against Iraq, China lost a degree ofits vaunted foreign policy 'independence' and found itself at risk of looking like justone more developing country capable of control through economic and technicaldependence on the West. China's demonstration of independence by refusing to votefor United Nations Security Council resolution 678 backfired badly.

Egypt and the Gulf Arabs are not pleased at China's failure to support the use offorce against Iraq. China, they say, was not decisive and let us down badly. Thepenalty the Arabs have imposed on China is both economic and political: China hasbeen shut out of consultations on the post-crisis Gulf security arrangements andvirtually excluded from involvement in lucrative Kuwaiti reconstruction projects.From the standpoint of China's economic needs and developing world leadershipaspirations, the situation would hardly be worse.

The Chinese know that the time for policy reassessment is upon them. If they wantto protect and promote China's interests in the Middle East, a more creative Chineserole will be necessary. But the obstacles to change are enormous. Near paralysis inthe Chinese leadership as the country awaits the passing of its geriatric old guardmilitates against rapid identification of a new policy. Moreover, despite 40 years'experience with the modern Middle East, major gaps remain in China'sunderstanding of the region and in the management of its political and economicrelations there. Nor is it evident that the embattled Chinese government listens tothe advice of its more astute political and economics experts and Islamic specialists.1

Even if none of these obstacles existed, it would still not be easy to define whatChina should or could do to promote its policy objectives. If China decides to adopta more active diplomatic posture in the Middle East, it risks becoming a player in'the Eastern Question', a continuing drama staged since at least the end of theeighteenth century. In this drama, as the Chinese are certain to have observed, onlyregional players have equity: outsiders all eventually receive a hook from the wings.2

China's 'Passive' PolicyChina's Middle East policy has been remarkably successful over the past 40 years.True, Beijing's long-range goals for the Middle East—Arab unity, regional stability,

Lillian Craig Harris teaches at the American University in Cairo and is writing a book on China'srelations with the Middle East.

© Oxford University Press, 1991, The Pacific Review Vol. 4. No. 2 0951-2748/91 $3.00

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Lillian Craig Harris 117

China's potential as acounterweight

Passive policy

Image as a dependableopponent of westerndomination

and freedom from outside manipulation—have not been met. But until the Gulfcrisis, no other major country, with the possible exception of Japan, retained thedegree of respect the Chinese commanded in the Middle East, a position uniquelyaugmented by strong ties to all Middle East states, including Iran and, unofficially,Israel.

The Middle East is important to China as an extension of the Central Asiansecurity buffer and as a stage upon which China acts out its myths of culturalsuperiority and regional leadership. In the 1950s and 1960s the Middle East servedmodern China as an arena in which to combat colonialism through theencouragement of revolutionary struggle. In the 1960s and 1970s, China describedthe Middle East as one of the world's 'hot spots' of 'colluding and contending' bysuperpowers—against whom Chinese advice could be repaid by Arab and Iranianfriendship. In the 1980s, the region emerged as a valued source of hard currency forChina's modernization priorities.

Most Middle Easterners have long since forgiven the Chinese for quarrelling withNasser, supporting the Shah, aiding rebels against the Omani government andencouraging Palestinian armed conflict with Jordan and the use of Lebanon tolaunch attacks against Israel. The Arabs have valued China's potential as acounterweight to United States and Soviet pressures and been pleased to find a thirdworld friend as a permanent member of the Security Council. Despite setbacks,policy errors and limited leverage, China has also been deeply appreciated byMiddle Easterners for the seemingly disinterested nature of its aid programmes andits persistent support for 'the Arab cause'.

During the 1980s, China engaged in an essentially passive Middle East politicalrole, one long on righteous rhetoric and short on active involvement. Claiming 'novested interests' in the region, China pursued a policy driven by the twin motives ofinternal economic need and a desire for moral leadership in a hoped for 'new worldorder'. The one obvious forum through which China could have played a moreactive diplomatic and even mediatory role, the United Nations, was largely unused.Though China condemned Israeli intransigence, it retained western and Israeligoodwill by refusing to be drawn into the fray through using its veto on the Arabs'behalf.

A 'Five Step Peace Proposal' for the Middle East, offered by China in October1989 during Yassir Arafat's seventh visit to China, raised Palestinian hopes thatChina might be signalling its intention to play a more active part in the search for asolution to the Arab-Israel impasse. But, though the proposal emphasized China'swillingness to participate in an, international peace conference, in reality itconstituted an expression of agreement with Palestine Liberation Organization(PLO) positions. Having spotlighted its support for peace, China did not pursue theinitiative.3

The one major exception to this passive policy has been China's concertedeconomic push into the Middle East. During the 1980s, Sino-Middle Easterneconomic ties expanded enormously, causing some to question how long Chinacould continue to claim 'no vested interests'. The volume of trade between Chinaand the Middle East rose significantly,4 with a balance strongly in China's favour.Arms sales, remittances from Chinese workers, joint ventures (with Tunisia andKuwait) and the receipt of development loans from Kuwait all strengthened China'seconomic benefit from the Middle East.

As the decade of the 1980s ended, China's Middle Eastern policy seemed in goodshape. The achievement in 1990 of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and theestablishment of an unofficial liaison relationship with Israel gave China access toevery Middle Eastern capital. Despite some Arab carping over Beijing's opportunis-tic arms transfer policies and uneasiness about China's evolving friendship withIsrael, China maintained its image as a dependable opponent of westerndomination. The Middle East even appeared to assume a new importance for Chinawhen, in the aftermath of Tiananmen massacre in June 1989, Beijing polished itsthird world relationships by sending the president, Yang Shangkun, on a tour of theregion. In contrast to western outrage over the Tiananmen massacre, MiddleEastern governments, themselves under pressure from restless youth, the unem-ployed and those aspiring to greater political pluralism, provided sympatheticsupport to the Chinese government.

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118 The Gulf Crisis and China's Middle East Dilemma

The Gulf crisis called this cosy arrangement into question. But even before it did,the reshuffling of international power in a post-communist world and risinginstability in both the Middle East and Central Asia raised the need for policyreassessment. No longer did China have the flexibility of manoeuvre it had onceenjoyed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Distortion of the SovietUnion-China-United States 'triangle' had isolated China and invalidated the imageof two superpowers 'colluding and contending'. Moreover, the chickens werebeginning to come home to roost on certain of China's policies, in particular, armstransfers, efforts to harness Islam as a political force, and evolving ties with Israel.Policy needed to catch up with rapidly changing reality.

The importance of theMiddle East to China as asecurity buffer

China's chances in the 'newinternational order'

The Chinese Dilemma

Because its relations with several western countries were already strained by theTiananmen tragedy, China was not willing to fly in the face of world opinion inAugust 1990. China, moreover, was genuinely appalled by the Iraqi invasion ofKuwait and its condemnation of Iraq was quick and forceful. Calling on Iraq towithdraw and restore Kuwait's sovereignty and territorial integrity, China votedpositively on ten successive United Nations Security Council resolutions intendedto force Iraq into compliance. In late November, however, China abstained fromvoting on Security Council resolution 678 which set a 15 January deadline for Iraqiwithdrawal and specifically provided for the use of military force in case of non-compliance. Chinese opposition to western military action against Iraq wasconsistent with China's alarm over the deepening Gulf crisis and its ambivalenceover western intentions.

One need only remember the sustained official hysteria with which the Chinesegreeted the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a 'southward thrust to thePersian Gulf to realize the importance of the Middle East to China as a securitybuffer. The Gulf war resurrected such fears for Chinese security. In January, a leakedrecord of discussions between representatives of China's State Council and theGeneral Office of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee described theUnited States objective as 'first to teach Saddam Hussein a lesson and then todominate the world'.5 The need to avoid antagonizing the Americans kept thisassessment from being made public. But grave suspicion that the United Stateswould take advantage of a power vacuum created by the deflection of Sovietattention from the Middle East caused the premier, Li Peng, to warn that the Gulfconflict reflected 'the imbalanced global pattern of relations between statesfollowing the relaxation of relations between the United States and the SovietUnion'.6

Nor was this just the party line. Even many Chinese who question communistideology have ingrained fears about the United States' desire to achieve 'hegemony'and believe in an American propensity to act in an 'unrestrained' manner. Unable tofreely admit to internal security worries, Chinese Middle East experts are inclined,when talking to outsiders, to attribute their own fears to the Soviets. Thus, theSoviet Union is said to be concerned that a heightened United States presence in theGulf will allow the Americans to infiltrate 'spies' into Central Asia where they willwork to destabilize the government. Moscow, it is claimed (though not Beijing, ofcourse), sees Middle East and Central Asian security as 'one'.7 The prospect of along-term enhanced western military presence in the Gulf is deeply worrying tomany Chinese.

Still another Chinese dilemma centres on China's chances for a prominent voicein the much anticipated 'new international order'. The reduction of Chinese politicalleverage by Soviet-Western detente affected China's ability to manoeuvre in thedeveloping world and its failure to find a significant role during the Gulf crisisreduced China's influence yet more. China, according to a Southeast Asiandiplomat in Cairo, continues to live in the 'old' bi-polar world of confrontation notonly between superpowers but between the third world and the developed world.And although China today encourages a multipolar world, it continues to regardthis new world as a confrontation along North-South lines. The diplomat questions

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Lillian Craig Harris 119

Japan's involvement in theGulf crisis

The Middle East as a 'superbazaar'

Support for a peaceful Arabsolution

whether China can, without a willingness to get its hands dirty politically, have anysignificant role to play.

Similarly, Harry Harding of the Brookings Institution points out that, thoughChina hails the emergence of a more multipolar world, its relations with several ofthe 'emerging poles', including Vietnam, India, Japan, and South Korea, arestrained.8 How the Gulf war will influence China's Middle Eastern relationships inthe long term remains to be seen, but the possibilities for economic rivalry anddiscord with Asian as well as Arab states has been enhanced. The Chinese mediadraws critical parallels between a Japanese 'quest for political power' in Cambodiaand Japan's involvement in the Gulf crisis.9 China, which for historical reasons fearsany hint of Japanese 'militarism', strongly opposed the idea, promoted by someJapanese as well as westerners, that Japanese troops be sent to the Gulf. Anannouncement by the Japanese Foreign Ministry that it plans to study Japan's post-Gulf crisis Middle Eastern role augments Chinese concern that enhanced Japaneseinvolvement in the Middle East will disadvantage China.

The Gulf crisis was not without immediate benefit to China. Iraq replaced Chinaas the international pariah the West loved to hate. By November, western andJapanese economic sanctions imposed against China following the crushing of theTiananmen democracy movement were being dismantled in appreciation forChina's cooperation against Iraq. But the downside was significant. In addition toan immediate economic loss of $2 billion,10 there was also the loss of workers fromChina, the earnings and assets of some 60 Chinese companies in Iraq and Kuwait,and a $300m Kuwaiti development loan, only half of which had been delivered, withthe result that several major Chinese projects were halted. Iraq, moreover, owesChina a considerable debt on which payment has been frozen and which canprobably not now be expected.11 The Chinese are inclined to point out that, unlikecertain Middle Eastern states, they have not received international assistance ascompensation.

Conversations with Chinese economists establish their belief in the Middle Eastas a sort of'super bazaar', a vast potential market for Chinese goods from textiles toarmaments.12 The Middle East also serves as a lucrative market for Chinese labour.Some 20,000 Chinese worked in Iraq and Iran during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980sand thousands of others elsewhere in the Gulf sent home hard currency. Thesuccessful evacuation of 5,000 Chinese from Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion of2 August was not duplicated in Iraq where approximately 4,000 Chinese were heldto the terms of their contracts with the explanation, 'If ever we needed you, it is now'.

Though China refused to admit that these workers were in any sense held'hostage', there was great concern over their plight. The foreign minister, QianQichen, on a mid-November visit to the Middle East, placed them high on hisagenda. Subsequently, Chinese officials provided conflicting answers when askedhow many Chinese workers remained in Iraq, some officials even claiming all hadleft in August. Nonetheless, the risks involved in sending Chinese citizens to volatileregions will have to be reconsidered. The fate of the hundreds, at least, of Chinesecitizens who were in Iraq during the allied bombardment and invasion has not yetbeen made public but it is logical to assume that some may have been killed.

China's dilemma was deepened by its belief that, whatever the outcome of theGulf crisis, Iraq must remain strong to avoid further regional destabilization.Suspicion that the United States, acting under Israeli influence, intended todismember Iraq provided an urgency to Chinese support for a peaceful Arabsolution to the crisis. Qian Qichen's November trip illustrated the Chinese dilemma.Beijing officially described the trip as a fact-finding mission, not a specific peaceinitiative. Nonetheless, Chinese aspirations to promote a regional solution wereapparent in an officially sanctioned post-visit report that Qian Qichen had'mediated among Egyptian, Kuwaiti, Jordanian, Saudi Arabian and Iraqi leaders' inan effort to 'drum up peace in the Gulf'.13

China cast about for means to stay on good terms with Iraq. Among the earliestChinese responses to the crisis was an invitation for the Iraqi first deputy primeminister, Taha Yassin Ramadan, to visit China in September, the first official non-Arab contact with Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait. Nor was China above taking thepublic line that its workers in Iraq were held there against their country's will, while

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120 The Gulf Crisis and China's Middle East Dilemma

finding at least some private satisfaction in this mode of reassuring Iraq of China'scontinuing friendship. Throughout the Gulf crisis, China maintained close contactwith Iraq, receiving a final envoy from Saddam Hussein in mid-February after thebeginning of the ground war. Chinese calls for western, as well as Iraqi 'restraint',after the ground battle began were intended to demonstrate that China supportedIraq, if not the actions of Saddam Hussein.

Evolutionary nature ofChinese policy

China's major arms market

Questionable TacticsChina's interaction with the Middle East over recent years, including expandingeconomic relationships, demonstrates the evolutionary nature of Chinese policyand China's need to take a closer look at what it actually intends its policy toaccomplish. All three policies examined below have been carried out in violation of amajor Chinese goal, the elimination of outsider interference from the Middle East.All three, moreover, are related to ongoing tensions between China's domesticmodernization needs and its foreign policy goals.

Opportunistic Arms Transfers

By western and Soviet standards, China's transfer of arms to the Middle East hasnot been massive. But the fact that China sold some $12 billion worth of arms,including sophisticated missiles, to Iran and Iraq during their extremely bloodyconflict made China an active participant in that dispute.14 The financial benefitswhich China derived from these sales was augmented by subsequent sales to SaudiArabia, in particular 25 medium-range East Wind missiles which Riyadh purchasedin 1988 in response to a perceived threat from the Chinese Silkworm missiles soldtwo years earlier to Iran.

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, the Middle East has remained China'smajor arms market. Cooperation now extends to co-production of certain itemswith states such as Egypt and Iran. Even before Iraq invaded Kuwait, both the ArabLeague and various Gulf states had joined the western nations in seeking limits byChina to its opportunistic arms sales policy. China's ability to do so may have beencompromised by freelance sales to the Middle East, as the then premier, ZhaoZiyang, claimed to the United States secretary of state, George Shultz, in July 1988when he accused unspecified military units of selling arms outside centralauthorization.

That China remains extremely sensitive about arms transfers is demonstrated bycontinued denial in Beijing that any Chinese weapons were officially transferred toeither Iran or Iraq during their eight-year war in the 1980s. According to a seniorChinese political analyst, China abides by three principles in arms export: arms aretransferred only for purposes of self-defence, the transfer must benefit regionalstability, and China does not use weapons export to interfere in any country'sinternal affairs.15 When pressed, Chinese analysts suggest third party transfers ofChinese weapons or revert to the 'transfer without central authorization' argument.

The Gulf war greatly, albeit temporarily, reduced Chinese arms sales to theMiddle East. All sales to Iraq, a major Chinese customer before the war, wereofficially halted in August in accordance with United Nations sanctions. Reportsthat China continued to transfer arms to Iraq have not been substantiated.Nonetheless, the extent to which the Chinese government has failed to controlweapons export and whether such failure continues is not known.16 What is evidentis China's unflagging interest in the Middle East as an arms market, including ofsophisticated weaponry. In the past two years, Chinese delegations have discussedmissile sales to Syria and Libya17 and, according to one well-placed officialEgyptian, an impending Sino-Saudi arms deal was a crucial factor in persuadingChina to abstain from, rather than veto, the late-November United Nationsresolution setting a deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.18

The arms trade is what has given China a favourable balance of trade with theMiddle East. Because Middle Eastern swords are not likely to be beaten into ploughshares in the immediate future, the potential for marketing Chinese arms remainsstrong. However, should China eventually need to import oil,19 a distinct possibilityas China continues to industrialize, the favourable balance of trade will tilt. Here,

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Lillian Craig Harris 121

Chinese officials expressedconfidence, but suchconfidence is cracking

Intense concern at thehighest levels of government

A force for separatism insideChina

China's state-controlled economy serves as a hindrance to cooperation. Plans by thestate-owned Saudi Arabian Oil Company to build a string of petroleum refineries inAsia, where demand now far exceeds that of western industrialized nations, do notinclude China.

Islam as a Political Tool

Islam has been used by China as a political tool since the mid-1950s when theChinese Islamic Association was established. Scores of delegations of ChineseMuslims have helped strengthen religious and economic ties with the Arab states,Iran and Turkey. During the past decade in particular, China has sought to identifyitself as a quasi-Islamic power on the basis of its own, perhaps, 30 million Muslimcitizens.20

Cultural ties between Chinese and Arab Muslims have been encouraged,cooperative economic ventures established between Chinese Muslim regions suchas Ningxia and various Arab states, and financial aid for theological education hasbeen accepted from Saudi Arabia. Muslim organizations including the Organiza-tion of Islamic Conferences have been praised as rallying points against efforts byoutsiders (read 'unbelievers') to interfere in and control Arab affairs, and Chinesesupport for both the Afghan resistance and the Palestine 'revolution' has sometimesbeen expressed in terms which came close to support for a 'holy war'.21 Asked aboutthe risks of using Islam as a political instrument, Chinese officials have through theyears expressed confidence that they know what they are doing. But such confidenceis cracking.

The overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the assassination of the president ofEgypt, Anwar Sadat, in 1981, both at the hands of religious activists, were two of themost severe jolts China has experienced in its 40-year relationship with the modernMiddle East. These two events marked the beginning of an internal debate over theextent to which Islam can be manipulated. But during the 1980s, the optimistsremained in the ascendancy, assisted by an official desire to establish diplomatic tieswith Saudi Arabia and to enlist the Middle East in China's economic moderniza-tion. Meanwhile, Islamic revivalism has continued to spread both in the MiddleEast and in China's Islamic regions.

The visible discomfort of Chinese analysts when asked about Islamic politicalactivism inside China, and their near total refusal to discuss the topic, suggestintense concern at the highest levels of government. There seems to exist, moreover,a naive Chinese belief that, while Shia Islam is dangerous (Chinese are not allowedto study in Iran), Sunni Islam is 'safe'. Nor is it obvious that Chinese historians arebeing consulted about Islam's record of opposition to oppressive central Chineseauthority. Some Chinese Middle East specialists even profess ignorance aboutmassive uprisings by Chinese Muslims during the last century.

Renewed Islamic unrest in Xinjiang beginning in the late 1980s, accompanied inearly 1990 by official Chinese warnings against separatists 'in religious outergarments',22 indicate that the policy of using Islam as a political and economic toolhas serious drawbacks. In the event, a specific Chinese policy of 'openness' to theIslamic world may have contributed to the stimulation of Islamic separatistaspirations, thus providing the central Chinese leadership with yet another reasonfor policy change.

The resurgence of Islam as a force for separatism inside China could turn the 'buffer'zone into an actual threat to Chinese security. This realization has already broughtcertain internal policy changes. Since 1990, contacts between Muslims in Xinjiang andthe Middle East have been more carefully restricted, as has mosque construction andreligious education, and it was announced last year that the official policy of one childper family now applies in Islamic areas—though it is not yet enforced. The eventualcost to China's Middle Eastern ties could be high, particularly if China continues toresort to force in suppression of the political aspirations of Chinese Muslims.23

The Sino-Israeli Relationship

One additional Chinese policy also raises embarrassing questions: China'sstrengthening ties with Israel. Surprisingly, the Arabs remain, for the most part,publicly uncritical of this change in Chinese policy. The PLO, though deeply

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122 The Gulf Crisis and China's Middle East Dilemma

regretting this moderation in China's position, is forced by weakness to acceptChinese explanations of a need to improve ties with Israel.24 To appease the otherArabs, China can point to the use of Israeli-acquired technology in missiles suppliedby China to Saudi Arabia and to its own continuing condemnation of Israel's failureto accept the necessary 'land for peace' formula. Some Arabs may also believe, asChina implies, that contacts with Israel will provide a means to moderate Israelipolicy. Finally, China points to the fact that Egypt—with the Egypt-Israel treatyintact—has been able to return to Arab good graces, including the transfer of ArabLeague headquarters back to Cairo in late 1990.

China, meanwhile, has its cake and eats it—the mark of diplomatic success.Military technology acquired from Israel has made a considerable contribution toChina's military modernization as well as to the Chinese arms-for-export industry.Through the Liaison Office of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities,which opened in Beijing in early 1990, China receives assistance in irrigation andwater management technology—and a good deal of Israeli goodwill. Scores ofbusiness contracts signed by Israeli companies are being implemented by severalhundred Israelis working in China. A Center of Israel Studies has begun functioningin Shanghai under the umbrella of the Chinese Institute for Peace and DevelopmentStudies and the Xinhua News Agency is expected soon to open an office in Israel.Chinese hope for increased political and economic support from American Jews isprobably at an all time high.

Ties with Israel risk an Not only do ties with Israel risk an eventual Arab backlash, they could pose aneventual Arab backlash additional threat to China's 'independent' policy. According to an authoritative

Israeli source, the Chinese were informed some time ago that if they hope eventuallyto take part in a Middle East peace conference, they can avoid an Israeli veto onChina's participation only by the establishment of ties with Israel. 'We have toldthem,' the Israeli official said, 'If you are our friends, you will establish ties and wewill then let you play the game'. For years, China has maintained that it will notestablish diplomatic relations with Israel prior to a just settlement of the Palestineissue. But in a significant policy switch during 1990, the Chinese let it be known thatBeijing 'cannot rule out' the establishment of official relations between China andIsrael before the settlement of the Palestine dilemma.25

To Play or not to Play?China's ties with the Middle East have earned economic benefits and politicalfriendships which, in turn, require support. Changing international alignments,pressures on international boundaries, Islamic revivalism, ethnic unrest, economicinterdependence and aspirations for modernization all influence China's view of theMiddle East. So, too, does China's continuing wish to solidify its position as asignificant leader of the developing world and a force to be reckoned with ininternational politics. Though China professes 'no change' in its Middle East policy,several significant alterations have taken place over the past decade and others seempending as a result of the Gulf crisis.

• Tensions between Chinese policy objectives (economic gain and the avoidanceof outside interference) and China's desire to adhere to internationalcommitments and avoid becoming the 'odd man out' have never been moreintense. The Gulf crisis has brought China into alignment with internationalopinion spearheaded by the United States. Forced to choose between Arabfriends as a result of the Gulf crisis, China faces the most acute politicaldilemma in its 40-year relationship with the modern Middle East. Can Chinaunder present circumstances plausibly continue its claim to have an'independent' foreign policy? What might Chinese cooperation with the UnitedStates in the Gulf mean for China's South-South leadership aspirations?

• The breakdown of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union hascombined with the ending of the Cold War to reduce China's leverage in theMiddle East. Finally successful in establishing diplomatic ties with SaudiArabia, China sees the Saudis pulled ever closer into the American orbit by theGulf crisis. What impact will Soviet-American detente have on China's

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Lillian Craig Harris 123

aspirations and its ability to present itself to the Middle East as an alternatesupporter?

• A decade of concentration on economic ties with the Middle East providesChina with a significant range of vested interests. The Middle East remainsChina's major arms market. But loss of access to Kuwaiti development fundsand revenues from business and labour impede China's modernizationpriorities. Can we expect greater Chinese activism through diplomaticchannels or international organizations to protect its interests and access?How will continued Chinese arms transfers influence Sino-Western relations aswell as regional stability? Will the detention of Chinese citizens in Iraq duringthe Gulf crisis influence the future export of Chinese labour to the Middle East?

• China's policy of maintaining good ties with the Arabs while continuing tostrengthen ties with Israel was singularly successful up until the Gulf crisis.Now, as a direct result of the failure to wholeheartedly back either Iraq or theallied coalition, China has cool relations with several Arab states. For theArabs, China's prestige as a third world leader has diminished considerably.When will China follow Egypt's lead and establish diplomatic ties with Israel?How would this influence Sino-Arab relations?

• Though the vast majority of Arabs criticize Saddam Hussein's invasion ofKuwait, many also regard his action as, at least in part, a response to anAmerican failure to restrain Israel. Though China agreed with the Americanposition that the confusion of the Gulf crisis and the Palestine issue could wellhave ended with the resolution of neither, China has little quarrel with the Arabassessment. Can China win back some of its lost prestige in the Middle East byplaying a more active role as a mediator? What might China's role be at aninternational peace conference?

• A Chinese policy of identifying Islam as a legitimate force for nationalism and atool for economic cooperation appears to have backfired and there are signs ofChina back-pedalling amidst evidence of growing links between Muslims inChina, the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and perhaps Turkey. Chinese Muslimcontact with and links to the Islamic world, including the Arab states, areunder closer surveillance and restriction. How might the Arabs—Saudi Arabiaand Egypt in particular—respond to the Chinese suppression of the politicalaspirations of Chinese Muslims and what would be the impact on Sino-Arabeconomic and political ties? What is the likelihood that Islamic unrest willembroil China in Arab and Central Asian disputes?

How to Burn your Fingers

China's aspirations to influence in the developing world are tied to its ability tochampion third world causes. Such a policy becomes very difficult when China'sown security and economic concerns are involved. A belief that instability andconflict in the Gulf could influence China's internal affairs increased Beijing'sanxiety and placed China's leaders under internal pressure to demonstrate theirwillingness to help resolve the Gulf crisis along lines reflecting a freedom to operate

China, badly misplayed its outside western domination. But China, by dithering between the traditionalhand preference for safe 'passive' policy and the need for a more forceful partnership with

the Middle East, badly misplayed its hand.Qian Qichen's visit to the Middle East in November failed to persuade the Arabs

to resolve their differences without western involvement. Instead, it raisedexpectations of Chinese support which Beijing could not fulfil. Chinese policy wasreactive and at no point did China appear to have a clear plan of what it ought to do.Qian himself claimed he was only fact finding. Calls for 'restraint' on the part of allparties appeared ludicrous to those who were under threat. Eventually, Chinesesupport for the allied coalition came to be seen by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwaitas half-hearted and the economic benefits China received as a result of cooperationwere deemed opportunistic.

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124 The Gulf Crisis and China's Middle East Dilemma

China has little to offer theMiddle East, beyond arms

China inspires, it does notinitiate

Despite strong ties with all regional states and aspirations to developing worldleadership, China has little to offer the Middle East, beyond arms, cheap labour andsupport for elusive third world goals. China and various Arab states could evenbecome competitors for economic favour from donor countries and organizations.A need to import oil would further reduce China's ability to manoeuvre in theMiddle East. China seems to have little chance of playing a more forceful MiddleEast role unless it becomes politically active on the Arabs' behalf in internationalfora. But to do so would damage increasingly its valuable ties with Israel.

Recent Chinese expressions of exasperation over domination of the UnitedNations by 'western values and priorities' argue against greater Chinese activism inthat organization. The present stalemate between party and people and thepossibility of a succession crisis probably preclude any sudden change in Beijing'sforeign policy. Political and social turmoil during and after the succession couldeven incline China towards a retreat into isolation. And, on balance, unrest inCentral Asia probably promotes prospects of China 'circling the wagons' ratherthan attempting to coordinate policy with neighbours who face similar internalsecurity problems.

China is discouraged by endemic Arab disunity and impotence. The BeijingReview laments that 'Since the eruption of the war, the Arab League has beensilent'.26 Embarrassment and disappointment over difficulties with the Arabs as aresult of the Gulf crisis will probably incline China to lie low for a while. Theemergence during the crisis of a unique Egypt-Syria-Saudi coalition which couldmove the region towards the resolution of its endemic problems has yet to gain apublic vote of confidence from China. Those Chinese leaders who advocated a moreactive'Chinese future in the Middle East must wrestle with the past: by historicalprecedent, China inspires, it does not initiate.

But are economic incentives, a growing security dilemma and a decline ininternational status and manoeuvrability enough to induce China to abandon thepolitically passive policy which until recently has been successful? Those who resistthe prospect are certain to point out the basic rule of'the Eastern Question Game':outsiders who involve themselves in Middle Eastern events, even by internalinvitation, are certain, sooner or later, to burn their fingers. The Gulf crisis will beremembered by China as a painful blister.

1. I am indebted to the British Academy and to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences under whosejoint auspices I went to China in November 1990 and was able to discuss the Middle East with Chinesehistorians, economists, political analysts and Islamic specialists at 12 research institutes. I am alsograteful to Dr Peter Ferdinand of the Royal Institute of International Affairs who arranged for me topresent an earlier version of this paper to the British International Studies Association and at ChathamHouse in December 1990.

2. See L. Carl Brown's fascinating study of the Middle East's 'stubborn penchant for kaleidoscopicequilibrium' (p. 190) as continuation of a discernable pattern of relations between the Middle East andEurope from the late eighteenth century. L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East: OldRules, Dangerous Game (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

3. 'China's Five Steps to Peace in the Middle East', Beijing Review, 16-22 October 1989, p. 6.4. The 1989 IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook lists Iran and 14 Arab states as trading

partners with China between 1982 and 1988 for a total of $2,089m in exports and $577m in imports in1988. Obviously, such figures, while indicative, are neither up to date nor comprehensive. They can alsobe misleading: a high volume of Chinese exports to Jordan, for example, actually represented arms beingtrans-shipped to Iraq.

5. 'Fiendish Plot', Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 January 1991, p. 6.6. 'Li: Gulf Crisis Should be Resolved by Peaceful Means', Beijing Review, 10-16 September 1990, p. 4.7. Such views reflect, in particular, conversations at the Institute of World Economics and Politics and

the Institute of West Asian and African Studies in early November 1990. Though analysts in these twoinstitutes, as elsewhere, are inclined to distrust American intentions in the Gulf, they are by no meansunited in their assessment of Soviet perceptions of the American threat or of the possible impact of Gulfturmoil on China itself.

8. Nicholas D. Kristof, 'China Gains in Mideast Crisis, but Loses Cold War Benefits', New YorkTimes, 11 November 1990.

9. 'Japan's Quest for Political Power', Beijing Review, 28 January-3 February 1991, p. 9.10. 'US $2 Billion Loss', Beijing Review, 12-18 November 1990, p. 8.11. Neither China nor Iraq have stated publicly how much Iraq owes China, but unofficially the

Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates the sum as at least $3 billion. Even before the Gulf crisisIraq had acquired a reputation for default or slow payment to a number of creditors and it is perhapssignificant that when asked their impressions of Arabs as business partners, Chinese economists are fondof the word 'unreliable'.

12. Due to serious Chinese quality control problems, outsiders are less inclined to believe that Chinesemanufactured goods can make serious inroads into established Middle East markets. The proliferation of

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Chinese goods in the Middle East in recent years, one Egyptian economist points out, relates tounderpricing in an effort to 'soften' up the market—the implication being that when Chinese pricesbecome more realistic, the Arabs will shift back to preferred western and Japanese brands.

13. 'Qian Drums Up Peace in Gulf, Beijing Review, 19-25 November 1990, p. 4.14. Yitzhak Shichor, 'Unfolded Arms: Beijing's Recent Military Sales Offensive', The Pacific Review,

Vol. 1, No. 3, 1988, p. 320-1.15. Conversation with analysts at the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies, 9 November

1990.16. A late 1990 report that China planned to sell lithium hydride (a nuclear and chemical warfare

component) has been denied by China and is, in any event, unlikely as China has consistently opposed thetransfer of nuclear weapons technology. But there has been speculation that the report reflected thecontinued failure of central control over Chinese exports. Independent (London), 30 September 1990.

17. See, for example, 'China Helps Libya Develop Missile Program', National Front for the Salvationof Libya Newsreport, May/June 1990, p. 4.

18. Privileged statement by Egyptian MFA official, Cairo, November 1990.19. According to official Chinese figures, China's petroleum production in 1989 totalled nearly 138

million tonnes, making it the world's fifth largest oil producer. (Li Ping, 'Steady Growth for China's OilIndustry', Beijing Review, 5-11 November 1990, p. 16.) China continues to export limited quantities ofpetroleum and is not known to have imported oil other than reluctantly in certain cases of barterexchange or for resale. But despite the optimistic tone of Chinese petroleum production publicity, doubtremains that China's oil industry can continue to support an expanded industrial infrastructure. Thepresence of Chinese observers at OPEC meetings indicates a more than passing interest in the MiddleEast's major commodity. Moreover, many of China's oil fields are of limited potential or presentsignificant access problems. It could prove of enormous consequence that the most valuable recent oiland gas discoveries have been in an Islamic area, the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang Province.

20. The number of Chinese Muslims remains controversial—and a subject which Chinese Middle Eastspecialists seek to avoid. Given high birth rates in most Muslim families and a generally accepted figure ofsome 20 million Muslims in China before 1949, the present official figure of between 17-18 million iscertainly far too low. Outsider estimates range as high as 70 million but the actual figure is probablycloser to 30 million.

21. For example, in references to the Soviet Union as 'the mortal enemy of the Islamic Movement'(Daily Report: China, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 29 January 1981, I 1-2.) According to oneArab analyst, 'The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan . . . was tantamount to a turning point in Chinesepolicy toward Islam and Muslims. Immediately after this invasion Chinese policy became more active ina friendly way toward Muslims so as to show everyone that the Soviets were the aggressors against Islamand Muslims. The Chinese meanwhile were standing in the square that was aiding and supporting Islamand Muslims.' (Fahmi Hawidi, 'Islam in China', Kuwait Al-'Arabi, November/December 1980; January1981 in China Report, JPRS 77735, 2 April 1981, No. 177, p. 4.

22. 'Li Peng Addresses National Conference on Nationalities Affairs', Xinhua home service, 20February 1990, SWB/FE/0696, 23 February 1990, B2/1. See also Lillian Craig Harris, 'China's Muslims:Unrest is Growing', International Herald Tribune, 10-11 March 1990.

23. The Arabs remain intensely interested in the welfare of Chinese Muslims as recent articles in theEgyptian press reflect: "Chinese Police Shoot Moslem Demonstrators' (unrest in Yunnan reported in AlNoor of 28 November 1990) and '200 Mosques in China Sealed Off" (story of armed men taking overmosques in 'Geniang' (Zhejiang?) published in Al-Wafd, 2 December 1990.

24. The Palestine ambassador in Beijing professed an understanding of China's need to benefit fromties to Israel, emphasizing continuing strong Chinese support for the Palestinians. The Israel Academy ofScience and Humanities Liaison Office has, he said, 'nothing to do with polities'. (Conversation withYousef Rajab, Ambassador of the State of Palestine, Beijing, 12 November 1990.)

25. Conversations in Cairo, October 1990, with a senior Chinese diplomat, and in Beijing, November1990, at the Institute of Contemporary International Studies.

26. Shi Jian, 'War Alters Mideast Political Map', Beijing Review, 4-10 February 1991, p. 12.

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