the growth of understanding in information science: towards a developmental model

The Growth of Understanding in Information Science:Towards a Developmental Model

Nigel FordDepartment of Information Studies, University of Sheffield, Western Bank, Sheffield S10 2TN,United Kingdom. E-mail: [email protected]

Similarities are explored between research approachescharacterizing different paradigms in information sci-ence on the one hand, and different information pro-cessing styles of individual researchers on the other.Based on these similarities, a model of the way in whichnew knowledge is generated is proposed. The modelfocuses in particular on what the author describes as“research pathologies,” and ways in which the researchoutput of information science may arguably be en-hanced.

Introduction

Olaisen (1991, p. 259) has drawn attention to the ofteninsidious influence of research instruments in determiningwhat is discovered—indeed what is looked for andwhere—in information science research:

Common sense can be helped by appropriate conceptual andtheoretical apparatus that, as lenses or spectacles, extend therange of perception and improve its acuity and actuality; itcan also be hindered by distorting lenses. The apparatus i.e.our instruments will to a large extent dictate what results weget.

This article seeks to explore the effects of the mostinfluential and inescapable of all research instruments—thehuman brain. In particular, it attempts to examine the fol-lowing questions:

● To what extent might the tensions and limitations appar-ent in information science research reflect tensions andlimitations apparent in the cognitive functioning of theindividuals building the discipline?

● If such a mapping exists, what might be its implications?

Tensions between different research paradigms in infor-mation science have been well documented. However, itmay, nevertheless, be useful to give some examples of such

tensions, then briefly to summarize the essential character-istics of the broader paradigms of which they are arguablymanifestations.

Tensions in the form of differences of focus, approach,and viewpoint exist between researchers working in differ-ent component areas of information science, sometimesresulting in a degree of fragmentation and lack of integra-tion. Echoing Saracevic (1996), Spink and Greisdorf (1997,p. 272) note that:

A major problem for user-oriented researchers has been thelack of impact of their research on actual IR system designas the systems and user-oriented research has been operat-ing largely on separate and unconnected tracks.

Olaisen (1991, p. 236) also states that:

. . . information science research today seems to have twoindependent feedback loops. One product oriented (i.e. in-formation system-oriented) and one user oriented (i.e. or-ganizational oriented)—and the contact with the users indesigning the information services seems often to be amissing link.

However, tensions are apparent not only between com-ponent disciplines but also within them. As Allan and Ellis(1997, p. 737) note in relation to information systems re-search:

Currently the consensus seems to be that researchers in thefield of information systems typically adhere to one oranother broad school of thought. There is debate as to theextent to which there can be communication or commensu-rability between the work of those in the different schools.

Burell and Morgan (1979) make similar observations inrelation to different research paradigms in the study oforganizations:

With regard to the study of organisations, for example, eachparadigm generates theories and perspectives which are in© 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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fundamental opposition to those generated in other para-digms.

Such tensions are particularly rife in areas of investiga-tion to which both systems and users are central. If we takethe field of information retrieval, for example—even of acentral component of it, namely the notion of “rele-vance”—we can find in one (albeit thematic) issue ofJASIS,evidence of extensive differences of view characteristic ofdifferent paradigm “camps.” These differences are catego-rized, with illustrative quotations, below.

Objectivity/Subjectivity

Views differ as to the usefulness of permitting subjec-tivity—as opposed to seeking to maximize objectivity—indata collection and analysis (Tague-Sutcliffe, 1996, p. 1):

To evaluate how effective the [information retrieval] systemis, some writers believe that the original user must beinvolved in the relevance judgements. Others believe that atleast some aspects of a system can be evaluated withoutrelevance judgements from the users. Relevance judge-ments, in this view, represent judgements of whether or notthe document is about the query, and so can be made by anyknowledgeable person.

Universality/Contextuality

The search for generalizations that hold universally mayalso be contrasted with acceptance of phenomena as essen-tially context-based (Harter, 1996, p. 39):

These psychological and situational theories . . .imply thatthe relevance relationship between a user and a document(or a citation) is not fixed and unchanging but may varyaccording to current situational and psychological condi-tions . . . therelevance of an individual citation is time-,order-, and situation-dependent.

Quantifiability/Nonquantifiability

There is also tension between the desirability of quanti-fying data as opposed to adopting more qualitative analyses.Ellis (1996, p. 33), for example, draws attention to thedilemma but is overly pessimistic that:

. . . while it is feasible to describe or analyze changes inknowledge in response to new information qualitatively, toattempt to do the same quantitatively seems to have notenable theoretical or practical foundation and represents asimilar unsustainable research goal.

Simplify/Preserve Complexity

The desirability of simplifying measurement as opposedto maintaining the complexity of phenomena being studiedis also a source of considerable tension (Ellis, 1996, p. 34):

The dilemma of measurement is not resolvable within theconceptual and methodological framework derived from theCranfield tests which oversimplified the inherent complex-ity of the retrieval interaction in the pursuit of quantificationbut at the expense of validity both inside and outside theexperimental environment.

Laboratory Control/“Real Life”

Linked to the previous category, tensions are also appar-ent in relation to research design between exercising con-trol, often in laboratory experiments, versus preserving theinherent complexity of “real life” (Harter, 1996, p. 37):

despite known wide variations in relevance assess-ments . . .their effects on the measurement of retrieval per-formance are almost completely unstudied. . . . Weneed todevelop approaches to evaluation that are sensitive to thesevariations and to human factors and individual differencesmore generally. Our approaches to evaluation must reflectthe world of real users.

Rather than isolated parameters of difference betweenviewpoints, such differences cluster into coherent groupingscharacterizing distinct research paradigms, discussed in thenext section.

Research Paradigms

These tensions apparent in theJASISissue on relevanceresearch are summarized in Table 1. They reflect classicdistinctions between research paradigms, as described be-low. The term “paradigms” is used here to signify styles ofcollecting and analyzing data. “Paradigms” may also bethought of in terms of research approaches in a more generalsense. It is important to note that such approaches maydiffer across dimensions other than those proposed here—for example, differences in research focus (e.g., general usermodeling or specific system evaluation), or more broadly,views of human nature.

Despite more complex classifications of such para-digms—for example, Burrell and Morgan’s (1979)func-tionalist, radical humanist, radical structuralist,and inter-pretativeparadigms in the field of information systems, andOlaisen’s (1991)empirical, materialistic, action,andclar-ified subjectivityparadigms in information science moregenerally—it is still possible to discern two major clustersof characteristics that form poles towards which particularparadigms may be located.

TABLE 1. Tensions in relevance research.

Data Objective SubjectiveMeasurement/analysis Quantifiable NonquantifiableFindings Universal Context-boundControl Laboratory/experimental “Real life”Viewpoint Simplify Preserve complexity

1142 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE—October 1999

Indeed, Olaisen does precisely this when he classifies hisfour approaches in terms of two corresponding dimensions,the poles of one being low and high complexity, the poles ofthe other being low and high subjectivity (Fig. 1). He giveseach of the four paradigms a single location on these di-mensions. Thus, theempirical paradigm’s location at theleft indicates that it represents the lowest levels of subjec-tivity and complexity, and that of theclarified subjectivityparadigm the highest levels. These map well onto the classicdivision, identified in the literature over many years, be-tween what may be loosely termed “scientific” and “illumi-native” paradigms. The essential characteristics of theseparadigms are summarized below.

“Scientific” Approaches

As shown in Table 2, traditionally research in the phys-ical sciences (Elton, 1977; Elton & Laurillard, 1979; En-twistle, 1973; Olaisen, 1991; Stenhouse, 1980) has concen-trated on:

● analyzing complex situations into component parts,● studying them, then● reassembling the parts into the original whole with in-

creased understanding.

A number of assumptions underlie the adoption of thisapproach, namely that:

● we can increase our understanding of complex wholes inan essentially atomistic way by analyzing them into com-ponent parts, better understanding the parts, then reassem-bling them to form the whole;

● we can discover universal laws of behavior: that is, wecan identify variables, that when subjected to the same

conditions, behave in exactly the same way in similarsamples.

These basic assumptions themselves involve other as-sumptions, namely that:

● we can measure individual variables in isolation from oneanother (as opposed to defining and knowing themthrough their relations with each other);

● having done so, we can profitably relink them usingstatistical relationships;

● we should control variables and avoid the intrusion ofuncontrollable elements.

These assumptions require a strong emphasis on

● quantitative data;● statistical significance testing in order to predict to other

samples in the search for universal laws;● reducing subjectivity to promote the most widespread

consensus (as opposed to individual idiosyncrasy) possi-ble, which will increase levels of statistical significance;

● searching for discrete relationships, particularly cause-and-effect relationships, involving “diachronistic” timescales (discrete event A, for example, being antecedent ofdiscrete event B) as opposed to a “synchronistic” timescale (in which events are interlinked more closely).

According to Olaisen (1991), this pole of the researchparadigms dimension is also characterized by relativelylow-complexity problems, an emphasis on logico-mathe-matical as opposed to social-intuitive analysis, and rela-tively clearly defined “definitive” as opposed to more spec-ulative, loosely defined “sensitising” concepts. Olaisen alsoconsiders that paradigms located towards this end of thedimension tend to be geared to addressing problems in the“what we know that we don’t know” as opposed to the“what we don’t know that we don’t know” category. Theformer category represents what may be described as “tak-ing the next logical step” in a research area, as opposed toapproaches in which the bounds of the problem are sur-rounded by more uncertainty, and the results are less sus-ceptible to precise anticipation. Such a focus arguably en-

FIG. 1. Olaisen’s four research paradigms.

TABLE 2. Characteristics of “scientific” and “illuminative” research paradigms.

“Scientific” paradigms “Illuminative” paradigms

Quantitative, statistical Qualitative, interpretativeAtomistic (focusing on component parts) Holistic (focusing on the whole)Seek universal laws Accept context-bound understandingIsolate and control variables Preserve complexity of “real-life” situationsHigh objectivity High subjectivityStudy discrete relationships Study complex interacting relationshipsLow complexity High complexityDefinitive concepts Sensitising conceptsLogico-mathematical Intuitive-socialWhat we know that we don’t know What we don’t know that we don’t know

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE—October 1999 1143

tails relatively convergent thinking in comparison with so-called “illuminative” approaches.

“Illuminative” Approaches

Illuminative approaches (Cronbach, 1975; Elton & Lau-rillard, 1979; Marton, 1978; McKeachie, 1974; Olaisen,1991) rest on certain basic assumptions, as shown in Table2, namely that:

● the “whole” is more than simply the sum of the parts, andcannot be fully understood by means of isolating, analyz-ing, testing, then reassembling the parts. Complex situa-tions must also be studied in their entirety, in a relativelyholistic way;

● human behavior is too complex necessarily to allow us toreduce it to universal laws. It is also necessary to studycomplex interacting phenomena that may interact differ-ently in different contexts;

● instead of separating and defining variables in isolationfrom one another, phenomena must be studied within thecontext of their interactions;

● relationships cannot solely be conceived of as discretecauses and effects within a “diachronistic” time scale.Rather, relationships must also be seen as complex pat-terns of mutual interaction;

● findings that relate to restricted contexts, as opposed tothose having universal applications, are valid. This meansthat models are developed that are not “simplified de-scriptions ofall of relevant reality,” but rather are used to“unify limited aspects of a particular reality” (Elton &Laurillard, 1979, p. 90). Several different models may beapplicable and valid to the same reality. Models may beuseful within the context of “frames, and different situa-tions may be viewed from a variety of such frames, orvantage points.

Because of the relevance of partial models, and becauseof the complexity and interrelatedness of variables:

● it is both possible and desirable to place more emphasison qualitative data and analysis, even if (as is usually thecase) this means reduced quantity;

● subjective “experiential” data” is permissible and desir-able, i.e., data gleaned from the participants’ experienceof the situation being investigated. In scientific para-digms, this type of data is not desirable, insofar as it risksa reduction in the quantity of strictly comparable data dueto subjective idiosyncrasies.

Olaisen (1991) considers that this pole of the researchparadigms dimension is also characterized by high-com-plexity problems, an emphasis on social-intuitive as op-posed to more logico-mathematical analysis, and “sensitiz-ing” as opposed to “definitive concepts. Sensitizing con-cepts Olaisen (1991, p. 254) are somewhat tentative andspeculative concepts that:

. . . offer a general sense of what is relevant and will allowus to approach flexibility in a shifting, empirical world to

“feel out” and pick one’s way in an unknown terrain. . . . Insum, the on-going refinement, formulation, and communi-cation of sensitizing concepts must inevitably be the build-ing block of our exploratory theory.

Approaches located towards this pole are better able toaddress problems in the “what we don’t know that we don’tknow” as opposed to the “what we know that we don’tknow” category. This arguably entails relatively divergentthought in comparison with so-called “scientific” ap-proaches.

Pluralistic Approaches

There has been increasing interest recently in recogniz-ing the merits of combining the advantages of differentparadigms. This methodological pluralism may take a num-ber of forms:

● acceptance that any one paradigm is as good as any other(methodological relativism);

● a desire to preserve and utilize the differences positively;e.g., to (a) map different paradigms onto different types ofproblem; (b) encourage critical constructive dialogue oncommon phenomena from the different perspectives af-forded by different paradigms; and (c) blend differentparadigms within a single study.

Advocates of methodological relativism often base theirviews on Feyerabend (1975), who noted how scienceprogresses via irrational as well as rational decision makingin relation to theories and paradigms. Arguably, becausethere are no rational criteria for choosing between differentpositions, any one is as good as any other.

Writers, including Olaisen (1991, p. 260) on the otherhand, argue that different paradigms are appropriate todifferent types of problem:

The difficult question is of course: if one paradigm is chosenwill it be possible to move on from a low degree of com-plexity to a higher degree of complexity (i.e. that we cangeneralize from a very small part of the reality to a largerpart of the reality) . . . It is notpossible, for instance, to onlyadd up opinions of single employees to say anything mean-ingful about a group of employees . . . On thecontrary, it isvery difficult to move on from a high degree of complexityto a lower degree of complexity . . . In other words, we needto use different research paradigms owing to the degree ofcomplexity of the study.

Others stress the desirability of combining (as opposedsimply to encouraging dialogue between) different ap-proaches. Wildemuth (1993, p. 466, quoted in Allen & Ellis,1997), for example, notes that:

interpretative research can be combined effectively withpositivist research, in spite of the fact that the two ap-proaches take very different views of the nature of realityand how one comes to know about or understand reality.


This point of view echoes that of Entwistle & Hounsell(1979, p. 361):

The two paradigms (“scientific” and “illuminative”) containthe tension of opposites—a thesis and antithesis out ofwhich a fruitful synthesis might be anticipated, but is stillfar from being achieved . . . Yet themethodologies of com-peting paradigms could be used alongside one another, eachproviding distinctive yet equally valid types of evidence.

Weaver and Gioia (1994, p. 145) argue for critical dia-logue in that perspectives can be found that provide:

. . . a basis for seeing how organisational scholars can in-voke different assumptions, pursue different goals, ask dif-ferent research questions, use different approaches, but nev-ertheless be engaged in enquiry with commonalities despitesuch diversities.

Conflict between the Two Paradigms

The arguments for pluralism seem to make sense—yetwhat is striking is the degree of historical conflict and lackof integration between research paradigms in informationscience. Examples of these conflicts were presented earlier.However, more generally, Entwistle and Hounsell (1979, p.363) note that:

As each paradigm marks out boundaries and establishes itsown rules of discourse, there is a danger that territorialadvantage will be sought through confrontation rather thanmutual understanding—and the outcome of a pitched battleis more likely to be schism than synthesis.

Some writers—for example, Bradley and Sutton (1993,p. 407—quoted in Allen & Ellis, 1997)—are of the opinionthat the conflicts are artificial:

The paradigm debate has, in some senses, created an arti-ficial polarisation based on abstractions that can easilyharden into misunderstanding, caricature, and an attitude ofsuperiority on both sides.

Others, however, consider integration not to be possiblebecause of fundamental, mutually exclusive positions. Ellis(1996, p. 33), for example, rules certain areas are “out ofbounds” to particular approaches:

. . . while it is feasible to describe or analyze changes inknowledge in response to new information qualitatively, toattempt to do the same quantitatively seems to have notenable theoretical or practical foundation and represents asimilar unsustainable research goal.

Others, such as Burrell and Morgan (1979, pp. 397–398) gofurther and propose that, in the interests of self-preservationand to avoid emasculation:

Contrary to the widely held belief that synthesis and medi-ation between paradigms is what is required, we argue thatthe real need is for paradigmatic closure.

Human Cognition

There is a considerable body of psychological researchthat provides insights into the processes whereby individu-als build complex understanding. It would appear thatwithin the great complexity of processes, it is possible todiscern two fundamental modes of thinking that map wellonto the research paradigms discussed in the previous sec-tion.

Perhaps the most extensive series of studies of the pro-cesses involved in developing understanding of complexacademic subject matter are those conducted over more than25 years by Gordon Pask and his associates (Pask, 1976a,1976b, 1979, 1988; Pask & Scott, 1972, 1973). Pask wasinterested in observing, in as neutral a fashion as possible,how people build up understanding of complex subjectmatter. In his early experiments, he asked volunteers tolearn by requesting information on a series of cards. Thecards could be accessed in any order, and volunteers had toexplain why they wanted to see each particular card. Laterexperiments used computer monitoring of routes taken bylearners through complex academic subject matter thatranged from biological taxonomies, the menstrual cycle, theoperon, spy networks, reaction kinetics and Henry VIII’sreign.

Pask discovered that people used one of two basic ap-proaches. What he termed “holists” tended to adopt aglobalapproach to learning, concentrating first on building a broadconceptual overview into which detail could subsequentlybe fitted. Holists formed complex and relatively speculativehypotheses about how individual topics are interrelated.They typically addressed several aspects of the learningmatter at the same time, relating them using complex links,and making rich use of enrichment material such as analo-gies, illustration and anecdote, and relating what was beinglearned to personal experience. The subject matter wasapproached essentially in a holistic way with a global focusspanning the subject area widely and having several sub-topics “on the go” at the same time.

“Serialists,” on the other hand, tended to use a predom-inantly local learning approach, concentrating on one thingat a time. They explored the subject matter by means ofrelatively narrow, simple hypotheses, testing them out thor-oughly. They related new concepts to previously learnedones using simple logical links, building up their under-standing on a relatively narrow front, step by step, logicallyand sequentially. They proceeded on the basis of thoroughlymastering one component part of the subject matter beforeproceeding to the next. Relative to the holist approach, thebroad conceptual overview of the subject matter emergedlate in the learning process. Starting relatively low in thesubject matter hierarchy, serialists adopted essentially anatomistic approach. These differences are shown in Table 3.


In further studies, Pask discovered that these approacheswere linked to more fundamental components of under-standing (Table 3). They represented different but equallyvalid routes to achieving high levels of understanding, theholist approach being particularly linked with what hetermed “description building,” the serialist approach beinglinked to “procedure building.” Both description buildingand procedure building are necessary to achieve full under-standing.

Description building entails the construction of an over-all conceptual map—a description of what may be known ina subject area. Operation learning relates to mastering pro-cedural details—evidence and logical arguments supportingfor the larger picture. Entwistle (1981, pp. 93–94) describesthese differences:

Pask . . . haslikened these two aspects of thinking to theway an architect designs a building. He has to build theoverall plan (description building) and also to work out thedetailed processes, and the logistics of those processes,(operation and procedure building) whereby the plan can beconverted into an actual building. Any weakness either inthe plan, or in the . . .operations and procedures which willsatisfy the implicit demands of that plan, will prevent thebuilding being satisfactorily completed (understanding be-ing reached).

“Versatile learners” are able to combine both descriptionbuilding and procedure building to achieve full understand-

ing. However, there is also strong evidence that manypeople may tend generally to prefer, and be better at, one orthe other. Such consistent tendencies may be termed “cog-nitive styles.” People displaying a “comprehension learn-ing” style emphasize description building, and tend to be-have like holists. Those displaying an “operation learning”style emphasize procedure building, and tend to behave likeserialists. To some extent different levels of uncertainty areinherent in these different approaches. The individual usinga holist approach must sustain greater uncertainty in thesense that he or she is dealing with complex and relativelyuntested hypotheses at the same time, in comparison withthe relatively “secure” logical steps of the serialist approach.

Further studies have revealed correlations between thesestyles and differences in individuals’ information seekingactivity in both hypertext and keyword-based databases, asshown in Table 4. Ellis, Ford, and Wood (1992, 1993), forexample, studied strategic differences in the use of naviga-tional tools in a large hypermedia-based database relating tothe European Single Market. Forty postgraduate studentswere given the task of using the system to answer a numberof questions. All interactions were automatically logged.

Significant differences were found relating to the use ofdifferent navigation tools. Holists made significantly greateruse of the spatial concept map; serialists made significantlygreater use of the keyword index. The map was particularlysuited to global orientation—keeping track of where onewas in relation to the overall structure of the subject matter.

TABLE 3. Defining characteristics of holist and serialist cognitive styles.

Serialist Holist

Atomistic HolisticLogic AnalogyKernel data only valued Enrichment (e.g., anecdote) valuedSequential ParallelLocal (focus on component parts) Global (focus on overview)Relatively reproductive and memory intensive Transformation into personal meaningHigh certainty in concept development (definitive) Low certainty in concept development (sensitizing)Simple chains of logical argument Patterns of interrelationshipsSmall steps Large stepsSimple hypotheses Complex hypothesesProcedure building Description buildingImprovidence pathology (“failing to see the wood for the trees”) Globetrotting pathology (unjustified overgeneralization)

TABLE 4. Information-seeking and research behavior found to correlate with holist and serialist cognitive styles.

Serialist Holist

Information-seeking behavior (Wood, Ford, & Walsh, 1992; Wood, Ford, Miller, Sobczyk, & Duffin, 1996)

Narrow search strategies Broad search strategiesFew different keywords used Many different keywords usedFew new keywords introduced Many new keywords introducedFew irrelevant references retrieved Many irrelevant references retrieved

Hypertext navigation behaviour (Ellis, Ford & Wood, 1993)

Verbal index Spatial concept map


The index was particularly suited to finding specific infor-mation.

Wood, Ford, Miller, Sobczyk, and Duffin (1996) inves-tigated 105 students’ on-line searches of CD-ROM data-bases for information on topics relating to their coursework.Search strategies were recorded. Comprehension (holist-like) learners, relative to operation (serialist-like) learnersused a broader range of new terms per search, and used agreater range of different terms per search. They retrievedmore relevant references, but were less satisfied with theirsearch results. They were also more aware of broadeningand narrowing techniques.

In a further experiment (Wood, Ford, & Walsh, 1992),67 postgraduate students were set the task of searching alarge CD-ROM database of bibliographic references, againto find information relevant to their coursework. The pur-pose of the experiment was to investigate the effects ofpostings. Each search was, therefore, conducted in twoexperimental conditions, both with and without postings.Similar results were reported to the previous study in thatcomprehension (holist-like) learners displayed overallbroader search strategies than operation (serialist-like)learners counterparts. However, the presence of postingshad an interesting effect. When postings were absent, com-prehension learners displayed a broader approach than op-eration learners in that they made significantly greater use ofOR and truncation, and less use ofAND and date/languagequalifiers. Conversely, operation learners were narrowerthan were comprehension learners on these measures ofstrategy. When postings were present, comprehension learn-ers and operation learners both introduced an element ofversatility in relation to the use ofAND and truncation.Comprehension learners increased their use relative to op-eration learners, thus narrowing what was previously abroader strategy on all significant measures. Conversely,operation learners decreased their use (thus broadening theirapproach). This finding suggests that these styles may tosome extent be susceptible to change and manipulation—atheme taken up in more detail in the section after next.

As shown in Table 5, correlations have also been foundbetween holist and serialist differences and a variety ofother psychological characteristics. Pask (1976b), for exam-ple, found correlations between these constructs and scoreson tests of divergent thinking. Indeed, the “divergentthinker” (Hudson, 1968) has been described as excelling intasks requiring him or her to think tangentially, making the

sort of connections between concepts more characteristic ofthe holist than the serialist (Kennet & Cropley, 1975, p.176).

The highly divergent thinker tends to be relatively uncon-cerned about strict observation of rules, somewhat uncon-ventional, impulsive and willing to take risks.

The convergent thinker excels at tasks requiring aheavier emphasis on logical processes. This type of thinkingis characterized by features reflecting more the serialistapproach, entailing relatively less uncertainty in relation toconcept formation and the building up understanding in alogical step-by-step way.

It may be that such distinctions reflect not just differ-ences between individuals—but also fundamental biologi-cal distinctions within each individual. Research in the fieldof neurological science (Gregory, 1987) has characterizedthe left hemisphere of the brain as (Raina, 1979, p. 10):

. . . arational-linear mind specializing in sequential process-ing logical analytical thinking and verbalization. . . . This isthe mind that requires structure and order, which processesperception and sensory input in logical and linear modes.

The right hemisphere, by contrast (Samples, 1977, p.688):

. . . houses spatial perception, holistic understanding, per-ceptual insight . . . visualization and intuitive ability. Itsmode is metaphoric, analogic and holistic. . . . This side ofthe brain thrives on multiple relationships processed simul-taneously.

Lack of Integration

Although so-called “versatile” individuals can integratethese approaches, or switch as appropriate in different cir-cumstances (as discussed in the following section), there isalso substantial evidence that many individuals tend consis-tently to adopt one or other type of thinking across differentsituations and in different contexts. Pask noted that thedifferences he found seemed to reflect fundamental styles ofinformation processing. Individuals tended consistently toadopt either a holist or a serialist strategy across differentlearning tasks. Moreover, when material to be learned waspresented in a way mismatched to individuals’ preferredstyles (material presented in a holist way to serialist indi-viduals, and in a serialist way to holists), learning wasseriously disrupted. Learning in matched conditions wasmore durable, enjoyable, and quicker (Pask, 1976b; Pask &Scott, 1972). Ford (1985, p. 1995) also found significanteffects of matching and mismatching information presenta-tion with holist/serialist styles.

Consistent differences were also found not only in rela-tion to the holist/serialist distinction, but also to the under-lying components of learning to which each style is partic-ularly geared. That is, although it is possible to engage in

TABLE 5. Other psychological factors correlating with holist and seri-alist cognitive styles.

Serialist Holist

Low cognitive complexity(Pask, 1996a)

High cognitive complexity

Low scores on divergentthinking (Pask, 1996a)

High scores on divergent thinking

Field-independent cognitive style(Ford, 1995)

Field-dependent cognitive style


both description and procedure building and achieve fullunderstanding via a holist or serialist route, certain individ-uals “stop short” of achieving full understanding. The un-derdeveloped procedure building of the extreme holist re-sults in unjustified overgeneralization; the underdevelopeddescription building of the extreme holist results in disinte-grated partial learning in which he or she “fails to see thewood for the trees.”

Entwistle (1981) tested 2208 British undergraduates forPask’s learning styles, and published mean scores for thislarge sample. These give some indication that these learningpathologies are not uncommon. Mean score for the presenceof one or other pathology was 24.57 (out of a possible 48),compared to a mean of 29.63 (out of 48) for “versatility”(i.e., the absence of both pathologies). There is an approx-imate balance between comprehension learning (compe-tence at description building) with a mean score of 13.12(out of a possible 24) and operation learning (competence atprocedure building with a mean score 13.25. The meanscore for comprehension learning is higher for Arts students(13.04 compared to 12.45 for operation learning): that foroperation learning higher for Science students (13.48, com-pared to 12.64 for comprehension learning).

The Integration of Approaches

As previously noted, integration of both descriptionbuilding and procedure building is necessary for full under-standing to be achieved. So-called “versatile learners” cando precisely this. They avoid both learning pathologies bysuccessfully engaging in both description building and pro-cedure building. A similar situation is observed in relationto divergent and convergent thinking. Certain of Hudson’s(1968) sample were classified as “all-rounders,” performingwell on tests of both types of thought. Laurillard (1984) alsoidentified individuals who varied their approach dependingon the problem-solving context. The results of the previ-ously described study into the effects of postings on onlinesearching (Wood et al., 1992) also provides support for thenotion of variability in that searchers displayed a moreversatile approach seemingly in response to different searchconditions.

Neurological research (Raina, 1979, p. 11) has also in-dicated the essentially integrated and complementary role ofthe left and right hemispheres of the brain.

Indeed cerebral organization as the basis for processinginformation and constructing expressive behavior must beunderstood as more than simple lateralization of cerebralfunctions. Cerebral organization must also be interpreted interms of inter-hemispheric integration . . . (both) are crucialto the successful and complete processing of information.

Although the left hemisphere is thought of as controlling,for example, linguistic functions such as reading, there isevidence that right hemisphere functions are also necessaryin verbal processing, including letter recognition. Other

writers such as Efron (1990) have been highly critical of anysimple view of hemispheric specialization.

Mapping Cognition onto Research Paradigms

If we view research paradigms as the products of humancognition, it is hardly surprising if the distinctions discussedseem to reflect distinctions identified in research into cog-nition itself. On the other hand, however, it is interesting tonote such consistent similarities in human thought pervad-ing such a wide range of intellectual activities, and emerg-ing from such different research areas from informationscience through the philosophy of thought to cognitive andinstructional psychology. Importantly, if the distinctionsidentified in preference for particular research paradigms doreflect more general cognitive preferences and styles thatextend over a range of disparate intellectual activity—whatmight be the implications? Research paradigms, cognitivestyles, and even biological hemispheric specialization maybe thought of as differing across a common dimension.Towards one pole of such a dimension, thought is charac-terized by logical, sequential analysis. A problem (learningor research) is typically broken up into manageable compo-nents, each of which is studied in depth. More complexunderstanding is built up on the basis of understanding ofthe component parts. The other pole is characterized by amore holistic approach, in which understanding of complexphenomena may be sought more directly, rather than as theprogressive step-by-step cumulation of understanding oftheir component parts. To some extent different levels ofuncertainty would seem to be inherent in these differentapproaches. The individual pursuing a relatively holisticapproach must sustain greater uncertainty in the sense thatas the research progresses, he or she is often dealing withcomplex and relatively untested understanding, in compar-ison with the relatively “secure” logical steps of moreanalytic approaches. These differences seem to reflect fun-damental differences in the way we process informationfrom the level of concept learning through strategies forlearning complex academic topics possibly to some extentalso to broad specialization in arts and science (Entwistle,1981).

This article suggests that differences in research para-digms are analogous to differences associated with cogni-tive styles. However, analogies entail both similarities anddifferences. The study of research paradigms and that ofcognitive styles are different in that the latter generallyentails known measurable outcomes, whereas the formerdoes not. Research by its very nature entails exploring theunknown. Research performance can, therefore, not be mea-sured against any agreed measure of what should have beendiscovered—for example, to assess levels of effectivenessof different research approaches. The notion of “completeunderstanding,” and of different levels of understanding,canbe assessed in relation to the learning of known bodiesof academic subject content, as used in the experiments ofPask and others.


However, it is the author’s contention that the similaritiesapparent between defining characteristics of research para-digms and cognitive styles are sufficiently striking to war-rant the speculative generalization of certain features fromthe latter to the former—in particular, findings relating tothe adoption of pluralistic approaches, presented below.Reasoning by analogy in this way is arguably the bestapproach we have, because (a) it is fortunate to find ananalogous relationship with such compelling face validity,and (b) no other more logical criteria exist for evaluating themerits of competing research approaches. Feyerabend(1975) noted that science progresses via irrational as well asrational means. As argued by a number of researchers, theimplication of this observation is that there exist no rationalcriteria by which to choose between different research ap-proaches.

The following model of the growth of understandingwithin information science is based on these premises, andis offered in the spirit of “right brain,” analogy-based think-ing. The relationships and implications proposed in themodel constitute somewhat tentative and speculative “sen-sitizing,” as opposed to more definitive, concepts.

The model complements and extends that of Tornebohm(1983) and others at the Institute of Science at GothenburgUniversity (Fig. 2), who according to Olaisen (1991, p. 236)conceive of science as:

. . . a sequence of partly cumulative and partly non-cumu-lative transformations of knowledge (K), problems (P) andinstruments (I).

“Knowledge” refers to the overall state of understandingin the particular aspect of reality being studied. “Instru-ments” include not only data collection instruments, statis-tical methods, etc., but extend to methods more generallyand overall approach and research design.

The model proposed in this article (Fig. 3) seeks toextend our knowledge of what in Tornebohm’s model isreferred to as theresearcher’s orientation and world view,which acts as a filter to the research process. This corre-sponds broadly tobeliefs in the proposed model. It alsoseeks to extend the concepts ofknowledge(K), common toboth models, andinstruments and methods(I), which cor-respond broadly toapproachesin the proposed model.

According to the proposed model, the growth of under-standing in a research area progresses via the building of

descriptions and procedures. Description building entails“right brain”-type activities characterized by a relativelyglobal approach employing analogy recognition and rela-tively ambitious, tentative concept development. Procedurebuilding entails “left brain”-type activities characterized bylogical, sequential, and analytic progress establishing rela-tively well-defined concepts and building on them in arelatively sure, step-by-step way.

The model is intended to apply at different levels ofgranularity, i.e., from small component topics in a researchstudy to larger research questions. Arguably, it also can beapplied to the growth of a discipline as a whole. It distin-guishes between global and analyticapproaches(strate-gies),beliefs(about how new knowledge may best be gen-erated), andstates of knowledge(understanding achieved ofthe topic under investigation).

Global and analytic strategies may be largely mutuallyexclusive for an individual researcher at any particular pointin time. That is, choice of a global (holist-like) strategy toexplore a given part of a research problem will preclude useat the same timeof an analytic (serialist-like) strategy.These approaches make differential use of the same mentalresources, and entail choice of sequence in tackling a re-search problem. It is not possible, for example, for anindividual at the same time both to take an atomistic focusand work serially, in a localized fashion and at the sametime to approach the problem with a global focus usingrelatively parallel processing in a holistic fashion. The twoapproaches represent equally valid—but very different andto a large extent mutually exclusive—ways of tackling aresearch problem.

FIG. 3. Model of research processes in information science.

FIG. 2. Adaptation of Tornebohm’s model of the process of research(itself adapted from Olaisen, 1991).


This mutual exclusivity is not contradicted by the exis-tence of versatile individuals (described in the previoussection). As Ford (1985) discovered, even versatile individ-uals are susceptible to biases towards holist or serialiststyles of information processing. Although successfully en-gaging in both description building and procedure building,the style and sequencing of so doing may still vary accord-ing to the holist or serialist biases.

Beliefsandstates of knowledgeare not mutually exclu-sive in this way, and arguably should contain the integrationof global and analytic components. Beliefs and states ofknowledge are more general than—indeed employ in theirservice—the mutually exclusive strategic approaches justdescribed. But they are not themselves mutually exclusivein relation to the global/analytic differences discussed so farin this article. One can at the same point in timeknowof therelative merits and limitations of both global and analyticapproaches, andbelieve in the desirability of integratingthem in particular circumstances or in relation to particularproblems.

That research approaches tend to invite exclusive con-centration on a global or analytic focus at particular pointsin time would seem to pose little problem. Different ap-proaches can be adopted over time, enabling the integratedperception of global and analytic perspectives. However,there is arguably a tendency for the mutual exclusivityexperienced at one point of time to generalize in terms ofboth knowledge and beliefs. Indeed, Marton and Svensson’s(1979, p. 484) observations relate to research paradigms, asopposed to visual perception:

What we can see from one point of view we cannot see fromanother. . . . With one kind of observation certain aspectsbecome visible: with another kind of observation we seesomething else. We cannot arrive at a procedure of obser-vation which makes all the various aspects visible simulta-neously.

Entwistle (1979, p. 130) is also talking about researchparadigms (“scientific” and “illuminative”) when he adds

It is almost as if the one perception . . .necessarily destroysthe other.

Such a process could also explain relative closure inbelief systems, giving rise to a “paradigm warriors” men-tality in which individuals and groups see their preferredapproach as correct, or at least the only one really worthpursuing. Underpinning such positions are beliefs about thenature of phenomena being studied, and how new knowl-edge is best discovered.

Such generalized mutual exclusivity is frequently ob-served in the field of instructional psychology. However, theproblem is less severe here. As previously mentioned, muchresearch into cognitive styles relates to learning known andbounded bodies of subject content. Although more seriouspathologicalstates of knowledgeare also observed as indi-

viduals fail to engage in sufficient description or procedurebuilding, mutual exclusivity in terms of global (holist) andanalytic (serialist)approachesis not necessarily a problem.This is because the integrated building of both descriptionsand procedures may be achieved via a predominantly globalor a predominantly analytic approach. It is possible success-fully to build both descriptions and procedures viaeither aglobal approach, in which broad descriptive conceptualoverview is created prior to slotting in detailed proceduraldetail, or an analytic, step-by-step approach in which theoverall picture emerges after the procedural details havebeen well established. Indeed as previously noted, Ford(1985) found holist and serialist biases in highly successfulpostgraduate students classed as “versatile” (i.e., able toengage in both description and procedure building).

However, the “subject matter” of research is inherentlyless known and bounded than that forming the focus ofresearch into teaching and learning. It is by its nature openended and potentially vast. In this context, it is much lessfeasible to achieve a satisfactorily integrated state of knowl-edge (the nearest approximation to the “full understanding”of learning experiments) by using either a global or ananalytic approach in isolation. It would arguably be difficultfor two researchers investigating a wide-ranging and open-ended research area—one from a holistic, the other from anatomistic perspective—to achieve the same type and levelof understanding without some remaining gap.

Thus, arguably, failure by a researcher or research groupto integrate (i.e., to consider as an antithesis, or comple-ment, to their thesis) knowledge derived (not necessarily bythat researcher or group) from perspectives alternative totheir own, is potentially limiting.

It is important to distinguish between approach, beliefs,and resultant states of knowledge. “Paradigm closure” in thesense of consistent preferences for global or analytic re-searchapproachesmay arguably be regarded as valuedspecialization of expertise on the part of particular individ-uals or groups of researchers. However, considering that thebodies of knowledge so developed need not be criticallyinterpreted in terms of complementary perspectives is argu-ably problematic.

For example, studying relevance in IR systems usingquantitative approaches has resulted in useful new knowl-edge. But the idea that this knowledge need not be criticallyinterpreted in terms of, and complemented by alternativeperspectives arguably constitutes a pathological state ofresearch—one not necessarily foreign to information sci-ence. Indeed, Olaisen (1991, p. 260) notes that:

. . . information science thought has been imprisoned by thedominant quantitative empirical metaphors which havedrawn the attention to some quantitative phenomena whileneglecting other more qualitative phenomena. The result isa cumulation of trivial findings.

This pathological state of overly analytic knowledgeidentified in the context of information science research


paradigms is directly paralleled by a similar pathologyidentified as resulting from overly analytic states of knowl-edge identified in cognitive style research. Overly analyticstates of knowledge are characterized by fragmentation—atworst, isolated facts lacking integration into any coherentwider conceptual picture (Pask, 1988).

As a result, much research in information science hasarguably provided highly reliable answers to highly mean-ingless questions. The takeup of qualitative research ap-proaches is now widespread in user-oriented research. Butwithout critical interaction with complementary perspec-tives the increasing use of subjective analysis of introspec-tions using small samples of information users threatens tosupply highly meaningful questions with highly unreliableanswers. Some balance and integration must be achievedbetween the two extremes.

Arguably, it is the informed critical interaction betweenwhat might loosely be termed “left brain” and “right brain”perspectives that may provide a solution to such a patho-logical state of knowledge. As Olaisen (1991, p. 260) goeson to note

Dialectical analysis begins with an observed thesis, exam-ines its opposite (antithesis) and postulates after an exami-nation of the available information the synthesis. Informa-tion science move[s] seldom beyond the negation—one ofthe reasons may be the researchers feel that it has to be a‘logical’ examination—a ‘subjective’ examination will notbe accepted.

Paradigm exclusivity and paradigm closure would makesense if the paradigm in question could be rationally eval-uated as likely to produce results that (a) can be guaranteedprogressively to home in on “the truth” in relation to thephenomenon under investigation; (b) are likely to be prac-tically useful in some applied context. Option (a) is impos-sible if Feyerabend’s (1975) observation that progress takesplace via irrational as well as rational behavior is acceptedas preventing any rational choice between approaches. If weare left with option (b), then theoretical assumptions aboutthe predictability of man and his susceptibility to scientificstudy, as well as the techniques used to investigate thisperspective, must themselves be evaluated in terms of theirrelative usefulness within particular contexts, rather thanremaining largely unquestioned yardsticks of some univer-sal truth.

The balance is between truth and pragmatism—thesearch for universal laws of behavior on the one hand, andknowledge that is “good enough” to improve some prag-matic situation on the other. In the words of Popper (1968,p. 111):

. . . if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because wehave reached firm ground. We simply stop when we aresatisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure,at least for the time being.

Yet, arguably, much of information science ploughs onwith option (a) as if seeking “the truth.” The result is

arguably a lack of attention to option (b), i.e., a lack ofexploration of alternative methods and methodological plu-ralism, and concentration on synthesizing knowledge gen-erated from differing perspectives. According to some, theresult is that information science has produced disappoint-ingly little pragmatically useful knowledge for the time,money, and effort expended. Also, little research attentionhas been paid to the exploration of factors influencing theusefulness and takeup of research findings in informationscience—for example, what types of findings and evidenceare likely to influence the practice of users and informationprofessionals in various contexts. If we are “discovering thetruth,” then this question is less relevant than if we aresearching for just pragmatically useful knowledge.

This article has concentrated on the generation of re-search. But the pervasive differences in cognitive style alsoapply to the consumers of research, including practitioners.It remains an open research question whether, for example,strongly globally oriented research findings are equally ac-cessible (intellectually), and of equal persuasive potency, toindividuals with strongly analytic preferences and capaci-ties—and vice versa.

There may be considerable forces of tradition, as well asincentives and controls that mould the way researchers goabout research, in particular institutions, funded by partic-ular bodies and/or supervised by particular individuals. Allof this may be coupled with individual researchers’ owndeep-rooted cognitive styles and beliefs about the nature ofinvestigation, reality, and truth. Indeed, it is not impossiblethat the lack of interaction between key groups in informa-tion science—system-focused and user-focused research-ers—noted in the introduction to this article may derive atleast in part from differences in cognitive style.

To the extent that different groups may be populatedstrongly by individuals steeped in either science or socialscience and humanities backgrounds and experience, theymay tend to be typed by particular approaches to research.Correlations have been found linking differences in cogni-tive style with individuals’ choice of, and success in, dif-ferent academic disciplines, professional careers, and evendifferent specialisms within them (Pask, 1979; Witkin,Moore, Goodenough, & Cox, 1977).

It may be that the integration of differing views of phenom-ena may best be promoted as a distinct entity pursued throughdistinct channels. While it may be easier for the researcher tochange his or her paradigms than for the proverbial leopard tochange its spots, nevertheless, the willingness of individuals tointegrate different approaches in their own work and in theirevaluation of the work of others may often be difficult toacquire. This may even result in the proverbial searching for alost coin not where it was dropped, but rather where the lightis considered to be better! It is conceivable that, to futuregenerations of information science practitioners if not alsoresearchers, our conceptions of what constitutes the best “ev-idence” may be just as interesting as—perhaps more so than—the cumulation of knowledge that we hand on to them basedupon such evidence.


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the growth of understanding in information science: towards a developmental model

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