the good, the bad, and the ugly

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

LUCY JOHNSTON' VANCE LOCKE University of Cunterbiq University of Western Australia

Christchurch. New Zealand Nedlands, Australia

LOUISE GILES AND KATE RATTRAY University of Cunterbunl

Christchurch, New Zealand

The impact of the activation of positive and negative components of an ethnic stereotype on judgments of responsibility for both positive and negative stereotypic behaviors was considered. Overall. stereotype activation biased judgments in a stereotype-consistent manner, across both positive and negative scenarios. Generalization of these judgments to more global trait perceptions of the target was limited to the negative scenario. Results are discussed in terms of both the use of stereotypes as inferential shortcuts and in-group favoritism mechanisms.

Social psychological research on stereotyping has focused on the negative aspects of social stereotyping. Given the practical importance of such discriminatory effects in, for example, court cases (e.g., Gerbasi, Zuckerman, & Reis, 1977; McGillis, 1979; Nickerson, Mayo, & Smith, 1986) and job applications (e.g., Heilman, 1984), this bias toward studying the negative impact of stereotyping can be understood. Cataloguing the harmful aspects of stereotyping should not, however, preclude consideration of potential positive aspects of stereotyping. Allport ( 1954) emphasized the functional utility of stereotypes as organizing principles, giving meaning and order to social encounters, and attention has recently returned to considering the usefulness of stereotypes in complex information processing (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1990b; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994).

Once activated, stereotypes have been shown to affect social information processing, including the interpretation of information and, consequently, in- ferences and judgments made from that information (Bodenhausen, 1988; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Darley & Gross, 1983; Duncan, 1976; Kunda & Sherman-Williams, in press; Sagar & Schofield, 1980). Stereotype activation results in stereotype-consistent information re- ceiving more attention than stereotype-inconsistent information, and hence

'Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Lucy Johnston, Department of Psychology, University of Canterbury. Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand. e-mail: I.johnston@,psyc.canterbury.ac.nz.

725

Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 1997, 27, 8 , pp. 725-741. Copyright 0 1997 by V. H. Winston & Son, Inc. All rights reserved.

726 JOHNSTON ET AL.

judgments are biased in a stereotype-consistent manner. This bias is especially strong when the behavioral information is ambiguous (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1988). The selective processing of information illustrates the usefulness of stereotypes in data reduction, directing perceivers' attention to expectancy- relevant information (Cantor & Mischel, 1977; Hastie, 1981; Stangor & McMillan, 1992) and especially to the encoding and representation of expectancy- congruent information (Bodenhausen, 1988; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffths, 1993; Srull & Wyer, 1989; Stangor & Duan, 1991). The integration of congruent information in long term memory is relatively straightforward and effort- less but the representation of incongruent information is more effortful and resource consuming (Macrae et al., 1993; Srull& Wyer, 1989; Stangor & Duan, 199 I ) . In other words, once activated, stereotypes ease the burden of iiiforma- tion processing by direction, processing resources to congruent information. These findings underline the importance of stereotypes as functional devices, or heuristics, in information processing (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) and illustrate the positive consequences of stereotype use for the per- ceiver in terms of increasing the available resources for other activities (e.g., Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994).

The trade-off for this cognitive expedience is, however, stereotypical evaluations of target group members. I t has been demonstrated, across a wide variety of paradigms, that the activation of stereotypic information can lead to negative evaluations of stereotyped group members (Bodenhausen, 1990a; Devine. 1989). Guided by salient social issues, these studies have focused on negative sccnarios. such as judgment of guilt (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1988). As such, positive scenarios have received little empirical attention. Given appropriate situations, we argue, stereotype activation will result in higher judgments of responsibility for both positive and negative behaviors. Darley and Gross ( 1983) demonstrated that activation of a positive stereotype of a child from a high socioeconomic background resulted in an overinflation of her academic abilities. Similarly, Snyder, Tanke, and Berscheid (1977) demonstrated that perceivers behave in a more positive manner when a positive stereotype (of physical attractil eness) was activated. Stereotype activation may then result in positive evaluations of target group members, depending on the salient processing conditions.

Many negative stereotypes contain some positive information (Gilbert, I95 1 ; Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969; Katz & Braly, 1933). The stereotype ot'Black Americans, for example, is predominantly negative (e.g.. lazy, dirty, stupid) but still contains some positive characteristics (e.g.. musical, athletic). Recent research has also shown that even when the stereotype is predominantly negative and the stereotyped group is the target of fairly extreme prejudice (Austra- lian aborigines), both positive and negative components of the stereotype may be activated when subjects make judgments concerning the stereotyped group

THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 727

(Locke, MacLeod, & Walker, 1994). Little research has been directed toward these positive components of stereotypes and the possibility that stereotypes bias people’s judgments in a positive as well as a negative manner. The present research sought to investigate whether the evaluative biases previously demonstrated with the negative components of stereotypes could also be seen with their positive components.

To this end, we aimed to replicate Bodenhausen’s (1988) findings with a different ethnic group, New Zealand Maori, and to extend his findings to examine the impact of stereotype activation on the evaluations of stereotyped group members in a positive scenario.

Bodenhausen (1988) found that the activation of a relevant ethnic stereotype (Hispanic) for a specific crime (a negative behavior) resulted in greater judgments of guilt for the stereotyped target than for an ethnically nondescript target, given ambiguous probative information. This difference in judgments of guilt was the result of selective information processing. Stereotype-consistent information (i.e., indicative of guilt) received more attention and processing for the stereotyped target than did inconsistent information (indicative of innocence), consequently leading to higher estimates of guilt than for the ethnically nondescript target, where all of the information received equal processing. The reported research investigated the impact of activation of an ethnic stereotype with both positive and negative components on judgments of responsibility for both a stereotypic negative and a stereotypic positive behavior.

New Zealand is a nation proud of its multicultural society and the way the indigenous population (Maoris) has been treated, especially in contrast to its Australian neighbors’ treatment of the aborigines. Immense legal and social strides have been made in recent years. The Treaty of Waitangi, signed between the Maori and the Crown in 1840, was given legal status in the 1970s. This has opened the way for the return of land possessed by the Crown and for the payment of large compensation claims to Maori. The treatment of Maori as an oppressed minority group has therefore diminished considerably over recent years.

Nonetheless, a distinct stereotype of the Maori can still be identified within the majority Pakeha (Anglo) community (Oliver & Vaughan, 1988). Although predominantly negative (e.g., aggressive, lazy), the Maori stereotype also has positive components (e.g., caring, proud). Two Maori stereotype-relevant scenarios were used in the reported research: a negative behavioral scenario (an assault) and a positive behavioral scenario (a clifftop rescue of a child in danger). Consistent with the stereotypes-as-heuristics notion outlined above, the activated stereotype should bias information processing in a stereotype- consistent manner. For the negative behavior, this should result in a stereotyped (Maori) target being seen more negatively (as more guilty of assault), than an ethnically nondescript target. For the positive scenario, however, this stereotypic

728 JOHNSTON ET AL

bias should result in the stereotyped (Maori) target being seen more positively (more responsible for the rescue), than the nondescript target.

Notwithstanding the functional utility of stereotypes as a whole, the dominant negativity effect in the literature led us to predict greater effects of stereotype activation on judgments of the negative than the positive behavior. Negative information is processed more elaborately and has a stronger memory trace than positive information (Pratto & John, 1991). As a consequence negative information can have a disproportionate effect on judgments, such as impression formation (Petty & Cacioppo, 1990; Yzerbyt & Leyens. 1991) and decision making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Negative information is perceived to be highly diagnostic (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). Negative information may simply be more informative than positive information, owing to its infrequency (Fiske, 1980) or the normative expectation of socially desirable, positive behavior (Reeder & Brewer, 1979). The implications of negative events are greater than those of positive events (Peeters, 1971) and, hence, perceivers may be especially sensitive to negative information (Peeters. 1991 ; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990); a single negative item can totally ruin an e\,ent or object (Kanouse & Hanson, 1971). The impact of negative stereotypes on judgments of responsibility will likely, then, exceed that of positive stereotypes. That is, we predict an interaction effect between scenario and actor, with the difference between the judgments of responsibility for the stereotypic and nondescript actor being greater in the negative than in the positive scenario.

In addition to judgments of the specific behavior described in the test scenario, subjects were also asked to rate the target on a number of stereotypic dimensions. We were interested in whether the judgments made for the specific behaviors described in our scenarios would generalize to global perceptions ofthe targets. The generalization of biases arising from stereotype activation have been notably inconsistent (Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1994). Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein ( I 987) showed stereotyped targets to be judged as more aggressive in general as well as more guilty of the specific (aggressive) crime described. However, Bodenhausen ( 1990a). argued that these effects are mediated by specific stereotypic beliefs rather than a generalized dislike of a particular group. Consistent with this reasoning, the activation of a particular component of the stereotype should bias probative judgments on only stereotypic positive or negative traits, depending on the aspect of the stereotype activated. However, the negativity effect outlined above again led us to make differing predictions for the positive and negative scenarios. It is predicted that there will be greater generalization from the judgments of responsibility to general trait ratings in the negative scenario conditions. For the negative scenario, we predicted that higher judgments of responsibility would be reflected in more negative trait ratings in general, but for the positive scenario there would be less generalization.

THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY

Method

729

Subjects and Design

Seventy-seven psychology undergraduates at the University of Canterbury volunteered to participate in the study. Data from 10 subjects were discarded, as they identified their ethnic origin as other than New Zealand Pakeha (mostly Asian students). Thus, 67 subjects remained in the final analysis. A 2 x 2 (Scenario: AssaultIRescue x Stereotype: Stereotype ActivatedINo Stereo- type) factorial design was used.

Materials

Four versions of the task were used in the experiment; two scenarios (assault/rescue) and two targets (stereotypichonstereotypic). Subjects read about an event, and afterward answered some questions about the person taking part. All subjects read that the target person was 24 years old and single, that he had been born in Auckland and lived there most of his life but now worked as an engineer on a Christchurch building site. For half of the subjects, the target was identified as Tama Heremala (a Maori name) and for half as John Watson (ethnically nondescript name for New Zealand Pakeha subjects).* Both of the experimental scenarios described a behavior stereotypic of Maoris. For these subjects when the target person was Tama, a relevant stereotype was activated prior to the judgment task. For the other half of the subjects, no such stereotype was activated. Subjects then read about either the assault or the rescue.

For the assault scenario, an abridged version of Bodenhausen's (1988) assault scenario was used, with the target name and venue changed to reflect a New Zealand context. Subjects were provided with a description of the accusa- tion (an assault in a pub parking lot) and eight items of evidence, some implying innocence and some guilt. The items of evidence had previously been rated for probative valence, -5 (extremely unfavorable) to +5 (extremelyfavor- able). Two neutral items (mean probative ratings = -0.50), three favorable items suggesting target innocence (mean probative ratings = 3.13), and three unfavorable items suggesting target guilt (mean probative ratings = -2.89) were used in the experiment proper. The overall probative value of this abridged scenario was, therefore, close to zero (-0.04), indicating true ambiguity. Examples of

'1 Like Bodenhausen (1988; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein. 1987; Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985) and Devine (1989), we argue that ethnic stereotypes will be activated in response to the target's name, depicting his ethnic identity. Whether this stereotypic activation is automatic, spontaneous, or intended is not central to our argument.

730 JOHNSTON ET AL.

items are: “No bruises or cuts were found on the defendant” (favorable. rating = 3.30) and “The defendant could not provide any proof of his whereabouts at the time of the assault” (unfavorable, rating = -3.44). After reading this information, subjects indicated the extent to which they thought the target was responsible for the assault, 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (extremelj, likely).

A second, comparable scenario was developed, describing a positive event. The nature of this event was chosen to be consistent with the cultural stereotype of Maoris (Oliver & Vaughan, 1988). Hence the event described a helpful, caring situation in which a child in potential danger on a clifftop was helped down by an anonymous passerby. The scenario was presented as coming from a “Heroes” program on the local television network (CTV). Subjects were asked to imagine they were watching the program with a number of wotkmates. They were told that the details of the rescuer given on the program suggested that the rescuer might in fact be one of their workmates. They were asked to indicate the extent to which they thought the target was responsible for the rescue, 1 (trot ut all likely) to 7 (extremely likely). Subjects were again presented with eight pieces of information, chosen from a pilot study in which 8 subjects rated the probative value of 25 items of information, -3 (extremely unfawruble) to +3 (e,~tremelj~,favoru~le). Two neutral items (mean probative value = 0.06), three favorable items (mean probative value = 1.21). and three unfavorable items (mean probative value = -1.25) were chosen for use in the experiment proper. The overall probative value of the scenario was exactly zero, indicating that the information was ambiguous. Examples of items are: “John (Tama) had some scratches on him the next day” (favorable, rating = 1.67) and “John (Tama) is afraid of heights” (unfavorable, rating = - 1.02).

The traits used in the subsequent trait rating task were taken from Oliver and Vaughan (1988). Oliver and Vaughan had New Zealand students generate words and phrases they thought best described Pakehas, Maoris, and Samoans. Data were content analyzed by developing a set of categories, each representing words of similar meaning. Based on this analysis sixteen positive and negative stereotypic traits were chosen for use in this experiment. These traits could be divided into four clusters: kind, caring, friendly, and proud (Maori positive traits); lazy. dirty, aggressive, and gets into trouble (Maori negative traits); clever, hardworking, confident, and rich (Pakeha positive traits); and snobbish, conceited, selfish, and appearance conscious (Pakeha negative traits). These traits were presented to all subjects in the same random order.

Procedure

Subjects were tested in a group situation but with sufficient spacing between work areas that any discussion or comparison between subjects was


minimized. Subjects were given a booklet containing the consent form, instruc- tions, and dependent variables pertaining to one of the experimental conditions. All subjects read that they were taking part in a study of impression formation and decision making. They were asked to read the description of an event which followed and then to answer the questions. At the end of the booklet, subjects were asked for some demographic information. The primary item of interest here was the subjects’ identified ethnic group. Only those identifying them- selves with the dominant ethnic group (New Zealand Pakeha) were included in the data analysis. Subjects’ booklets were collected as soon as they had com- pleted all of the questions. They were then debriefed, probed for suspicion as to the purpose of the study, and thanked for their participation. No subjects indicated any suspicion that the study was concerned with racial stereotyping.

Results

Jiidginents

Mean judgment ratings are shown in Figure 1. A 2 x 2 (Scenario: Assault/ Rescue x Stereotype: Stereotype ActivatedNo Stereotype) ANOVA revealed significant main effects of both scenario, F( I , 63) = 22.30, p < .OO 1, and stereotype, F( 1, 63) = 4.89, p < .05. Regardless of stereotype activation, the targets were judged more likely to be responsible for the rescue than for the assault (Ms = 4.40 and 3.08, respectively). Judgments of responsibility across the two scenarios were higher when the stereotype was activated than when no stereotype was present (Ms = 4.05 and 3.50, respectively). That is, the Maori target was judged to be more likely to have been responsible for both the assault and the rescue than the ethnically nondescript target. Contrary to predictions of a negativity effect, however, there was no significant scenario by stereotype interaction.

Tiwit Ratings

Mean ratings across the four relevant traits for each trait type (Pakeha positive, Pakeha negative, Maori positive, and Maori negative) were com- p ~ t e d . ~ Mean scores are shown in Table I .

)Correlation analyses indicated four distinct clusters of trait ratings corresponding to the four groups identified by Oliver and Vaughan (1988). That is, the four positive Maori traits, correlated highly with one another but not with the other types of traits and similarly for each of the four trait types. There were moderately high correlations between the Maori positive and Pakeha positive traits and between the Maori negative and the Pakeha negative traits, indicating a positivity dimension in the trait ratings. Analyzing the results separately for each of the traits added nothing to the overall findings.

732 JOHNSTON ET AL

No stereotype

Stereotype activated

Assault Rescue

Scenario

Figure 1. Judgments of responsibility for the event as a function of scenario and stereotype activation.

These scores were then analyzed in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (Scenario: .4ssault/ Rescue x Stereotype: Stereotype ActivatedNo Stereotype x Trait Stereotypi- cality: Pakeha/Maori x Trait Valence: PositiveINegative) mixed model ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last two factors. There was a main effect of trait valence, F( 1 , 59) = 20.95, p < .0001, and a two-way scenario by valence interaction, F( I , 59) = 5.34, p < .05. However, both of these were qualified by a three-way scenario by trait stereotypicality by valence interaction, F( I , 59) = 5 . 5 5 , p < .05. To pursue our predictions concerning the effects of stereotype activation on positive and negative stereotypic behaviors, simple effects analyses using the error term from the overall analysis, were conducted for each scenario. In the assault scenario there was only a main effect of valence, F( 1, 30) = 4.07, p < .05. Ratings were higher on the positk e (both Maori and Pakeha) than the negative traits (Ms = 3.49 and 3.13). In the rescue scenario, there was a main effect of trait valence, F( 1, 31) = 1 1 5 . 3 3 , ~ < ,001, but this was qualified by a significant interaction between trait valence and trait stereotypicality, F( 1, 3 1) = 5.08, p < .05. Simple main effects analysis on this interaction revealed effects of trait valence for both Maori stereotypic traits, F(1, 31)= 1 8 . 9 0 , ~ < ,0001, and Pakeha stereotypic traits, F(1, 31)= 1 2 . 7 3 , ~ < ,001. For both trait types, ratings were higher for the positive than the negative


Table 1

Mean Trait Ratings as a Function of Scenario, Stereotype, Trait Stereotypicality, and Trait Valence

Trait type

Maori Pakeha

_______ ____ ____~ ~-

-______- _______

Scenario Stereotype Positive Negative Positive Negative

Assault Activated 3.53 3.10 3.55 3.19 No stereotype 3.25 3.23 3.58 3 .OO

Rescue Activated 4.38 3.27 3.79 3 2 0 No stereotype 3.95 2.40 3.76 2.65

~ _ _ ____ -

______ ____ ____________

traits. In addition, there was an effect of trait type for the positive traits, F( 1, 3 I ) = 5.63, p < .05. Ratings were higher on the Maori positive than the Pakeha positive traits (Ms = 4. I3 and 3.77, respectively).

Jiidgment- Trait Correlations4

In order to test our predictions regarding generalization of the judgments of responsibility to the overall evaluation of the target, an index of negativity on the trait ratings was calculated for each subject by subtracting the mean ratings for the positive traits from the mean ratings for the negative traits. Since there was no effect of trait stereotypicality in the trait analyses above, positive and negative traits were collapsed across trait stereotypicality to give a single negativity index. Any generalization effects were, therefore, the result of overall evaluative generalization rather than being specific to the components of the group stereotype. Pearson product-moment correlations were calculated between judgment ratings and the index of negativity.

Assault. For the assault scenario, there was a significant positive correlation between the index and judgments of responsibility when the stereotype was activated, r( 15) = ,430, p < .05. That is, the more guilty the Maori target was perceived to be, the more negative the trait ratings were. In contrast, when there

4Five subjects failed to complete the trait rating measure.

734 JOHNSTON ET AL

was no activated stereotype, there were no significant correlations between guilty judgments and the negativity index, r( 15) = -.099. In the stereotype- activated condition, higher judgments of responsibility were reflected in more negative trait ratings, as predicted. Contrary to predictions, however, there was no generalization from judgments of responsibility to the general trait ratings for the ethnically nondescript target.

Rescue. In the rescue scenario, the correlation between judgments of responsibility and the index of negativity was nonsignificant in both the stereotype activated, r( 14) = ,075, and nonactivated, i-( 18) = -. 168, conditions. For neither the Maori nor the Pakeha target did higher ratings of responsibility for the rescue result in a more positive overall perception of the target. For the Maori target, the generalization effects from the positive stereotype activation were weaker than from negative stereotype activation, as predicted.

Discussion

Consistent with past research, our results demonstrated that activation of a relevant stereotype leads to differential judgments of responsibility. Targets belonging to an ethnic group (Maori) for which the behaviors were stereotypic were judged more likely to be responsible for those behaviors than were ethnically nondescript targets. Importantly, this effect was not confined to negative behaviors. Maori targets were judged as more likely to have per- formed both a stereotypic positive and a stereotypic negative beha\ ior. As such, i t does not appear that stereotypes are used solely in a discriminatory or prejudiced manner. Indeed. in certain situations, the use of stereotypes may be to the evaluative advantage of the stereotyped group members. Stereotypes may have important positive consequences not only in their ability to produce savings in terms of cognitive resources, but in their ability to guide judgments toward stereotypically positive evaluations. The activation of positive stereotypes may not always, however, be of benefit to the target. Consider, for example, the stereotypes of women as caring and nurturant, which are positive stereotypic beliefs. Activation of these positive beliefs may, in some situations, be harmful to a woman, for example in the application for a job which requires assertiveness or a g g r e ~ s i o n . ~ The positive impact of activation of positive stereotypic beliefs may also, then, be context specific.

Surprisingly, there was no evidence of a negativity effect in the ratings of responsibility. This may be due to leniency in our negative scenario. Social leniency effect is especially likely in a mock juror situation, as in our assault scenario, owing to the “reasonable doubt” concept which gives any benefit of

’We are grateful to an anonymous revieher for draiting our attention to these isZues


the doubt to the defendant (MacCoun & Kerr, 1988). This leniency effect may also explain the overall tendency to consider all targets as more responsible for the positive than the negative behavior.

Our results are consistent with the stereotypes-as-heuristics approach (Bodenhausen, 1990b; Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994). Social perceivers are reluctant to use stereotypes as a basis for judging others in the absence of information on which to base those judgments (Darley & Gross, 1983; Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, & Rocher, 1994). When information is available. however, perceivers use stereotypes to bias their interpretation of that information. Stereotype-consistent information receives more attention and processing than stereotype-inconsistent information (Bodenhausen, 1988; Olson & Zanna, 1979) and hence judgments are made in line with stereotypic beliefs. It is likely, then. that subjects in our experiment biased their information processing in line with stereotype activation. Importantly, the direction of this biased information processing is sensitive to situational constraints.

The trait ratings show little stereotyping. There was no evidence of Maori targets being rated higher on Maori than Pakeha characteristics or of the Pakeha target being rated higher on Pakeha than Maori traits. Use of target names rather than categories may have reduced the impact of stereotypic beliefs on these trait ratings (Locksley, Hepburn, & Ortiz, 1982). Stangor and Lange (1994) recently noted discrepancies in the traits assigned to stereotyped groups as a whole, compared to those assigned to individual members of that stereotyped group. Subjects are willing to assign fewer stereotypic traits when judging individual group members than when judging the group as a whole (Sigall, Stangor, & Ford, 1990). Similarly, Lynskey, Ward, and Fletcher (1 99 1 ) showed Pakeha teenagers to display no stereotypicality effect in trait ratings of aprototypical (i.e., individuated) Maori target. Beckett and Park (1995) argued that the use of stereotype-based judgments depended on the salience of the category member- ship. For example, they showed that increasing the salience of gender categories by identifying targets by both name and photograph resulted in them being judged more in stereotype-based terms than were targets identified by name only. Our failure to find stereotyping on the trait rating may, therefore, have been due to low salience of the racial categorization during this task.

Our failure to find stereotypicality effects on the trait ratings are, then, consistent with previous research (Lynskey et al., 1991; Sigall et al., 1990). In contrast to both Sigall et al. and Lynskey et al., however, we found no evidence of a negativity effect; Maori targets were rated no less positively than Pakeha targets. The lack of findings on the trait ratings indicates a lack of generalization of biases arising from stereotypic activation (Banaji et al., 1993; Bodenhausen, 1990a). Differentiation between our targets was specific to the judgment dimension for which they were provided with probative information.

736 JOHNSTON ET AL

Although there was no overall negativity effect on the trait ratings, our correlational findings are consistent with the negativity effect reported by both Sigall et al. (1990) and by Lynskey et al. (1991). Judgments of the stereotyped target (Maori) in the assault scenario (i.e., negative judgments) generalized to a relatively more negative evaluation of the target on the trait ratings. Judg- ments in the rescue scenario (i.e., positive judgments) did not, however. generalize to relatively positive evaluations of the target group member. Therefore, while the overall ratings showed that the activation of the stereotype for the Maori targets did not lead to them being judged more negatively, on average, than the Pakeha targets, it is the case that the more guilty a subject was willing to judge the Maori target in the assault scenario, the more likely they were to rate them higher on the negative traits relative to the positive traits. The impact of stereotype activation was, therefore, greater in the negative than the positive situation, which is consistent with the negativity effect reported in the literature (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1990; Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1991).

Such a relationship between judgments and trait ratings may be indicative of an internal attribution being made for that behavior. The attribution literature indicates a group-serving bias in judgments. For out-group members, negative behaviors are attributed to internal causes but positive behaviors are attributed to external sources. Conversely, for in-group members, positive behaviors are attributed to internal causes but negative behaviors are attributed to external sources (e.g.. Taylor B Jaggi. 1974).

In the stereotyping domain, stereotypic behaviors are attributed to internal causes and nonstereotypic behaviors to external causes (Bodenhausen & Wyer. 1985; Macrae & Shepherd, 1989). These studies have, however, been limited to considering only socially undesirable stereotypic and nonstereotypic behaviors, I t may indeed be the case that for stereotypic negative behaviors an internal attribution is made; hence, the relationship between judgments and trait ratings for the stereotyped target in our assault scenario. A different pattern of attribution may, however, be made for positive stereotyped behaviors. These behaviors may not be attributed to internal causes; hence, the lack of a relationship between judgments and trait ratings for the stereotyped target in our rescue scenario. Such a pattern of results would demonstrate in-group favoritism by the dominant ethnic group (our subjects). In essence, the results of our correlations. when linked to attributional styles, indicate that the dominant ethnic group (Pakeha) considered the minority group (Maori) to perform negative behaviors because they are nasty people but to perform positive behaviors because of external, situational factors. Of course, attributional measures need to be made in order to confirm such an attributional style.

An alternative explanation for the differential generalization effects from the positive and negative behaviors may lie in the global valence of the


stereotype rather than the specific valence of the activated components of the stereotype. In our experiment, we tested the effects of activating positive and negative components of a predominantly negative stereotype. The generalization from judgment to trait ratings may have been seen when the negative, and not the positive, component was activated because the Maori stereotype has a stronger negative component overall. If this explanation holds, activation of the negative component of a predominantly positive stereotype should result in less generalization than activation of the positive component. Such a prediction is, however, in contrast to the frequently reported negativity effect (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky. 1979; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990; Pratto & John, 1991; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989; Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1991)

The reported generalization effects may have important practical implications, for example in courtrooms. The correlational results suggest that judging a stereotyped target guilty of one crime generalizes to a relatively more negative impression of the target. It may then be the case that, where an individual is charged with multiple offenses, a judgment of guilt on one charge which is stereotypically associated with the target's ethnic group leads to an internal attribution, and negative behavior is seen as a disposition. Such an attribution may than be used to guide judgments of guilt for other crimes and sentencing. This would suggest that individuals charged with multiple crimes should, from a psychological point of view at least, be judged by separate juries for each crime.

In conclusion, this study demonstrates the various implications of activated stereotypes on information processing. Many stereotypes contain positive as well as negative components. The present study has illustrated that stereotype activation does not always lead to a dominance of the negative component of racial stereotypes. The good is that, in certain situations, stereotypes bias judgments in a favorable manner. The bud is that. in some situations, stereotypes also bias judgments in an unfavorable manner. The ugly is that the effect of positive stereotypes on information processing is situation specific; the effect of negative stereotypes generalizes to global perceptions of the stereotyped target.

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