the godfathers of truth weber and schmitt morgenthautheory

8/2/2019 The Godfathers of Truth Weber and Schmitt MorgenthauTheory

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The Godfathers of 'Truth': Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau's Theory of PowerPoliticsAuthor(s): Hans-Karl PichlerSource: Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Apr., 1998), pp. 185-200Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097517Accessed: 16/08/2010 12:06

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Review of International Studies (1998), 24, 185-200 Copyright ? British International Studies Association

The godfathers of 'truth5: Max Weber and

Carl Schmitt inMorgenthau's theory of

power politics*HANS-KARL PICHLER

Abstract. The article uncovers the intellectual link between Morgenthau's theory of power

politicsand the German thinkers Max Weber and Carl Schmitt.

Throughthis it sheds

lighton

the forceful claims to objectivity contained inMorgenthau's theory of power politics. Theauthor reveals how, by combining Schmitt's ideas of 'the Political' with Weber's ideas on the

objectivity of social science, Morgenthau finds an elegant way to overcome the value

determinacy of social science. This enables him to assert the objectivity of (international)political science. The same arguments allow Morgenthau also to formulate a moral defence of

the state.

A striking feature of Hans Morgenthau's books and articles is their extraordinarily

persuasive language. It seduces the reader to believe that the theories contained in

them are an 'objective' and 'true' reflection of the workings of international politics.Throughout the pages of his main work, Politics among Nations, Morgenthau inces

santly reminds the reader that his writing is about 'the theoretical concern with

human nature as it actually is, and with the historic processes as they actually take

place'.1 Yet Morgenthau's objectivity is more asserted than proven. He fails to

provide epistemological arguments for his claims to objectivity. The 'objectivity' of

the social sciences had been criticized and qualified by Max Weber in his famous

methodological contribution made in the first decades of the twentieth century.2 Itseems peculiar that Morgenthau who, as we know from his writings, was a keenfollower of Weber3 asserts the existence of the perennial and objective laws of

international politics without supporting or qualifying his claim.4The aim of this article is to understand why and how Morgenthau, in Politics

among Nations, throws the Weberian limitations on the objectivity of the social

sciences overboard and indulges in absolute statements. This investigation will show

* I would like to thank Professor Fred Halliday for introducing Carl Schmitt's ideas to me and

encouraging me to write this article. Many thanks also to Dr Christopher Coker and Henrik Thune

for many fruitful discussions, and my parents, Karen L?dtke, Elena Jurado and Anna Bertmar for

their help.1

Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd edn (New York,

1960), p. 4 (my emphasis). Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent quotations are from this edition.2 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York, 1949). See also Wissenschaft als

Beruf,Politik als

Beruf (Scienceas a Vocation, Politics as a

Vocation),ed. W. J. Mommsen and W.

Schluchter (T?bingen, 1992). I refer to this German edition since it was important for me to read

Weber's original text. Quotations in English are my own translations.3

Hans J. Morgenthau, 'Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography: 1904-1932', in Kenneth

Thompson and Robert J. Myers, Truth and Tragedy: A Tribute to Hans J. Morgenthau (New

Brunswick, NJ, and London, 1984), p. 7. The article was written in 1976 and first published in 1977.4See, e.g., Morgenthau's first book in the USA, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago, 1946), and

his article 'The Purpose of Political Science', in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), A Design for Political

Science: Scope, Objectives and Methods (Philadelphia, PA, 1966), pp. 63-79.

185


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186 Hans-Karl Pichler

that Morgenthau's solution to the value-determinacy of social science lies in his

conceptionof

politicsas a realm of

perpetualconflict and

strugglefor

powerand

domination. Interpreting international politics this way, the supreme valued end, i.e.,the national interest, pursued by all state-leaders becomes national self-preservation.

The isolation of this single value, which constitutes a defining feature of inter

national politics, allows Morgenthau to overcome the dilemma of the value

determinacy of social science, analyse international politics 'objectively' in the

abstract and draw universal patterns from it. Morgenthau's ideas on the nature of

politics and 'the Political', as this article will show, were informed by the German

political thinker Carl Schmitt. Schmitt developed his conception of 'the Political' in

the 1920s, when Morgenthau was still a student. By the late 1920s Schmitt's ideas on

politics and 'the Political' had already reacheda

wide audience, includingMorgenthau who knew Schmitt personally and refers to him on several occasions.5

Max Weber and Carl Schmitt were two of the most influential thinkers inWeimar

Germany, Weber as a philosopher of science and sociologist, Schmitt for his ideason the essence of politics and the role of the state. Morgenthau's intellectual roots

were grounded in the Weimar Republic, where he studied law first at the Universityof Munich and later in Berlin. In Munich he was introduced to the teachings of

Max Weber. He graduated in 1929 from Berlin after completing a doctoral thesis on

the nature and limits of international law.6 In 1932 he left Germany out of fear of

the imminent Nazi regime and, together with his wife, moved to Geneva where he

taught at the university. Five years later they emigrated to the United States. Afterworking for a brief period at Brooklyn College in New York, Morgenthau gained a

lectureship in law and European politics at the University of Kansas City. In 1943 he

found a permanent position at Chicago University. It was here that he wrote Politics

among Nations, his most famous work and the one upon which most of the analysisof this article is based.

The intellectual link between Morgenthau, Weber and Schmitt has already been

identified in IR literature.71 would like to build on this research by tracing the simi

larities between Morgenthau's thinking and that of Weber and Schmitt respectively,and by showing how, through his conception of 'the Political' and thus of inter

national politics, Morgenthau was able to overcome the value dilemma of

5Morgenthau writes about his meeting with Schmitt in 'Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography'.Moreover, Christoph Frei, in his excellent intellectual biography on Morgenthau, has scrutinized

Morgenthau's unpublished diaries and articles and discovered several manuscripts in which he talks

about Schmitt. See Christoph Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau: Eine intellektuelle Biographie, 2nd edn (Bern,

Stuttgart and Vienna, 1994). Frei argues that Nietzsche also had a strong influence on Morgenthau's

thinking. Among the influences he attributes to Nietzsche are Morgenthau's conception of the 'tragic'in life, and the idea that politics, just like life in general, is a permanent struggle either for survival or

for recognition. As Frei reveals, Morgenthau's diaries contain several references to Nietzsche. On one

occasion Morgenthau writes: 'One should make it a duty for oneself to read Nietzsche three times a

day. Perhaps then one would live in a greater way and achieve greater and higher things'. Quoted in

Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, p. 102 (my translation).6 Hans J. Morgenthau, Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen (The Nature and

Limits of International Law) (Leipzig, 1929).7 For a discussion see Alfons S?llner, 'German Conservatism in America: Morgenthau's Political

Realism', Telos, 72 (Summer 1987), pp. 161-77. For Weber and Morgenthau see Jim George,Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder, CO,

1994); Stephen P. Turner and Regis A. Factor, Max Weber and the Dispute over Reason and Value

(Tampa, FL, 1984); and Michael J. Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge,

LA, and London, 1986), pp. 134^65.


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hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives meaning to the

facts of internationalpolitics

and makes atheory

ofpolitics possible.'12

Morgenthau believes that there is an 'objective' order in international politics. It is

'the concept of interest defined as power [that] infuses rational order into the subjectmatter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics

possible'.13 From this, Morgenthau draws the methodological definition of realism

as a school of thought: A realist theory of international politics, then, will guard

against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with

ideological preferences.'14 In other words, realism provides a value-free and objective

analysis of international politics.

Morgenthau's acknowledgement of Weber's influence is brief but compelling. He

justifiedhis admiration for Weber in the

followingterms: 'While as a citizen he was a

passionate observer of the political scene and a frustrated participant in it, as a

scholar he looked at politics without passion and pursued no political purpose

beyond the intellectual one of understanding.'15 As Christoph Frei shows,

Morgenthau was introduced to the teachings of Max Weber first in 1925, when he

read Weber's Science as a Vocation, Politics as a Vocation. More significant than

Morgenthau's autobiographical references is the Weberian influence on his thoughton the methodology of the social sciences, discussed below.

Weber: science versus politics

Through science, Weber argues, it has become possible to understand the world

objectively. The price for this ability is, however, the 'disenchantment' of the world,the belief that 'in principle there are no unaccountable and mysterious powers any

longer' and that 'one can, in principle, control all things through calculation'.16

Science, and by this term he refers to natural science as well as social science,

destroys the religious and magical ideas about the meaning of life and the world

without being able to replace them. 'Who?apart from a few big kids, as there are

especially in the natural sciences?still believes today that the discoveries inastronomy or biology or physics or chemistry can tell us something about the

meaning of life, or better, could even just tell us: how one could go about finding the

traces of this "meaning", if it exists at all.'17 Science is limited to telling peopleabout the facts of the world. Unlike religion, it cannot provide them with an

ultimate explanation for their existence. The 'liberation from the rationality and

intellectuality of science is the fundamental precondition for a life in communion

with the divine'.18 Scientists do not ask 'whether the world they describe has a rightof existence: whether it has a "meaning" and whether itmakes sense to live in it'.19 If

12Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 5.

13Ibid., pp. 5-6.

14Ibid., p. 6.

15Morgenthau, 'Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography', p. 7.

16Weber, Wissenschaft als Beruf, Politik als Beruf, p. 87.

17Ibid., p. 92.

18 Ibid.19

Ibid., p. 94.


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Godfathers of 'truth' 189

they are real scientists, they concentrate exclusively on facts. They can only tell whatone must do in order to achieve a chosen

end,not what one

oughtto do in a moral

sense. The scientist must realize 'that the ascertaining of facts, the identification of

mathematical or logical facts' and the formulation of an answer to the question 'howone should act within the cultural community and the political associations are two

completely heterogeneous problems . . .Whenever the man of science introduces his

personal value-judgement, a full understanding of the facts ceases.'20 Hence, the

social scientist cannot give normative and ethical advice. To the ethical question,'Does the end justify the means?', Weber replies, 'If he does not want to become a

demagogue the teacher can only emphasise the necessity of this question.'21Politics, on the other hand, is the realm where people pursue their personal

interests. Since politicians choose their actions accordingto

their opinions{Gesinnungen) and opinions are always formed by personal values, politics cannot be

objective in its judgments. The social scientist must beware of political involvement,since 'politics does not belong to the lecture hall, especially if the lecturer engages

scientifically in politics'.22 For Weber the search for value-free politics is futile. Any

political problem allows several solutions, depending on the number of available

valued ends. Nevertheless, science and politics can support each other. It is the dutyof social science to assess critically the practical judgments of politicians throughrational and empirical methods, and of politics to expose itself to scientific criticism.

'All actions, the political ones in particular, must let themselves be irritated by

science through the debate about values and be corrected through the confrontationwith disagreeable facts.'23

In On Methodology, however, Weber takes a step back from this scientific

enthusiasm. 'The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively uponthe ordering of a given reality according to categories which are subjective in a

specific sense, namely, in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge andare based on the presupposition of the value of those truths which empirical

knowledge alone is able to give us ... It should be remembered that the belief in the

value of scientific truth is the product of certain cultures and is not a product of

man's original nature.'24 The analysis of social reality, Weber now argues, is not only

culture-specific, but also influenced by the personal value orientations and interestsof the social scientist. Social reality is informed by the values held by the peopleinvolved. Since these values are difficult to detect in the analysis of social processes,

any scientific analysis of these processes will be conditioned by these values and

unable to reach objectivity. Weber writes: 'The "objectivity" of the social sciences

depends rather on the fact that the empirical data are always related to those

evaluative ideas which alone make them worth knowing and the significance of the

empirical data is derived from these evaluative ideas.'25 To assess the validity of

values, however, is beyond the powers of science. 'These evaluative ideas are for their

20Ibid., pp. 97, 98.

21Ibid., p. 103.

22Ibid., p. 96.

23W. Schluchter, Wertfreiheit und Verantwortungsethik: Zum Verh?ltnis von Wissenschaft und Politik beiMax Weber (T?bingen, 1971), p. 26.

24 Max Weber, Methodology, p. 110.25

Ibid., p. 111.


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part empirically discoverable . . . but their validity can not be deduced from

empiricaldata as such.'26

These statements seem to contradict those made in Science as a Vocation, Politics

as a Vocation. If values inform people's interests as well as social scientists' analysis,how can scientific analysis ever be more than a subjective and limited interpretationof events? The puzzle can be solved by qualifying Weber's conception of objectivity.

Weber's objectivity is directed only towards the past. If social reality is informed bythe changing values of a large number of players, it is impossible to predict in which

direction it will evolve. With past events, history that is, objectivity is possible,because events can no longer change. They are thus open to the scrutiny of the

social scientist, who, in patient labour, explores all facets of the different motiva

tional forces lying beneatha

particular historical event until its dynamics and itssignificance become comprehensible. Moreover, with past events it is easier for the

social scientist to evaluate the influence of his/her own value orientations on the

outcome of the analysis, as the event does not stand in such an immediate relation

to his/her own personal interests. Weber's social science is historical science. It is not

based on scientific relativism. In Weber's own words: 'Now all this [i.e. what he had

said about the value-determinacy of social science] should not be misunderstood to

mean that the proper task of the social sciences should be the continual chase fornew view-points and new analytical constructs. On the contrary: nothing should be

more sharply emphasised than the proposition that the knowledge of the cultural

significance of concrete historical events and patterns is exclusively and solely the finalend which, among other means, concept-construction and the criticism of constructs

also seek to serve.'27 Social science, as long as it remains historical science, can be

objective. However, this objectivity is possible only with regard to a specific event

and never to social reality as a whole in a generalizing fashion.

Morgenthau's views on the possibility of objectivity in social science are almost

identical with those of Weber. And yet Politics among Nations is packed with claims

to absolute objectivity. The first of the 'Six Principles of Political Realism' openswith the statement: 'Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is

governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.'28 The next

subsection will try to explain this apparent contradiction.

Morgenthau: realism's quest for objectivity

The similarity of Morgenthau's views to those of Weber becomes apparent in some

passages of Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, published in 1946, two years before

Politics among Nations. In this work, which can be seen as a critique of the positivisttradition of social science in the USA, Morganthau writes: 'The social sciences can,

at best, present a series of hypothetical possibilities, each of which may occur undercertain conditions. Which of them will actually occur is anybody's guess.'29 The

social world, Morgenthau argues, is too complex to be analysed and understood

26 Ibid.27 Ibid.28

Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 4 (my emphasis).29

Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 130.


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However, there is a further way in which Morgenthau can justify his claims to the

objectivityof his theories.

By isolatingnational

self-preservation,and with it

powermaximization, as the supreme valued end (the national interest) of all state leaders

in international politics, Morgenthau is able to overcome the problem of the value

determinacy of social and political science because all state-leaders cannot but

pursue this one valued end. If this is so, the social scientist is not distracted by the

complexity of value orientations present in social dynamics pursuing, for instance,such ends as a 'good life'. The possible outcomes of the struggle for power and self

preservation are neither culturally relative nor dependent on the interpretation of

the social scientist. Only two options exist: the state either survives or it perishes.

Any analysis of international politics cannot but move between these two extremes,

both of which are easily identifiable and unambiguous.While this uncovers the logic behind Morgenthau's calls for power maximization,

it is still necessary to explain why Morgenthau defines international politics as a

realm of perpetual struggle for power and argues so forcefully for the preservation of

the state. For answers to these questions one needs to look at the origins of

Morgenthau's ideas on the nature of politics. It is here that Carl Schmitt enters the

picture. Morgenthau was deeply influenced by Schmitt in his conception of politicsin general and 'the Political' in particular. This assertion is based on two facts.

Firstly, Morgenthau's and Schmitt's definitions of 'the Political' are very similar.

Secondly, Morgenthau knew Schmitt personally and tried, as we know from his

diaries and articles, to expand on Schmitt's ideas on the topic.35 Morgenthau andSchmitt met in Berlin in 1929. According to Morgenthau, the meeting was a disaster,

with Schmitt talking incessantly and Morgenthau not really having a chance to putforward his views. Later Morgenthau writes: 'The disappointment was total. When I

walked down the stairs from Schmitt's apartment, I stopped on the landing between

his and the next floor and said to myself: Now I have just met the most evil man

alive.'36

In an attempt to find answers to the questions raised above, the next section will

illustrate Schmitt's ideas and then compare them with Morgenthau's.

The nature of the political

Schmitt's ideas about 'the Political' are a response to the modern liberal state in

general and the difficulties of parliamentary democracy in the Weimar Republic in

35 See Morgenthau, 'Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography'. Further remarks on Schmitt are

contained in unpublished manuscripts. Among them are Morgenthau's inauguration speech at

Geneva University, 'Der Kampf der deutschen Staatslehre um die Wirklichkeit des Staates' (The

Struggle of German Political Science for the Reality of the State) (Geneva, 1932), and '?ber den Sinnder Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit und ?ber die Bestimmung des Menschen' (On the Meaning of Science

Today and the Vocation of the Human Being) (Geneva, 1934). All these are cited in Frei, Hans J.

Morgenthau.36

Morgenthau, 'Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography', p. 16. It needs to be kept in mind,

however, that this strongly negative judgment ismost certainly conditioned by Morgenthau's attemptto distance himself from German acquaintances that had been involved with the Nazi regime.Schmitt was one of them, as he was nominated 'Staatsrat' (counsellor of the state) by Goering in

1933.


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particular. The difficulty in finding a stable government coalition for Germany after

World WarI,

as well as thealleged

socialist threat and the social divisionresulting

from it, created a sense of confusion among many political observers. They feared

that Germany might not be able to regain the alleged internal unity and the greatpower status it had possessed before World War I. Schmitt's ideas should be read as

a very strong and often brilliant expression of a mood which prevailed among manyintellectuals who had been educated under the pre-World War I imperial order.

Schmitt, just like Morgenthau, feared that politics was disintegrating, and attributed

this process to the negative influence of liberalism.

Schmitt: conflict as the essence of 'the Political'

Schmitt's reflections on the nature of politics are a product of his concern that, in

the modern state of the early twentieth century, the political element was being

supplanted by liberal, that is legalistic and pluralist, forms of social organization.

Against this, Schmitt identifies conflict and struggle as the essence of 'the Political'.

He writes: 'The political can be understood only in the context of the ever present

possibility of the friend and enemy grouping, regardless of the aspects which this

implies for morality, aesthetics and economics.'37 While in economics the categories

are profitable/unprofitable and in morality good/bad, 'the definition of the notion ofthe political can only be arrived at through the discovery and determination of the

specifically political categories, since the political does have its own categories'.38 The

determining categories of politics are the opposites of friend and enemy. Wherever

and whenever there is an enemy, 'the Political' exists. Although the enemy is not

necessarily morally bad or evil, it is a foe not just in a figurative sense but in a veryexistential way. 'He simply is the other, the alien, and it is enough that in a veryexistential sense he is something so different and alien that war with him is possiblein the extreme case . . .The notions friend and enemy are to be understood in their

concrete, existential meaning, not as metaphors or symbols.'39

Schmitt's conception of human nature is the ultimate source of his ideas aboutpolitics. All real political theories', he holds, 'presume the human being to be a

"dangerous" and dynamic being'.40 They 'cannot take an anthropological

"optimism" as their point of departure. By abolishing the possibility of an enemy

they would also abolish any specifically political consequences.'41 If human naturewere good, in other words, 'the Political' would disappear.

'The Political' exists only where the possibility of war, within and between

societies, is given. A world within which the possibility of war is ultimatelyeliminated, a completely pacified planet in other words, would be a world without

the friend/enemy divide and hence a world without politics.'42 The fact that war

37 Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (The Concept of the Political) (Berlin, 1963), p. 36. All

quotes made from this text are my own translations.38

Ibid., p. 26.39

Ibid., pp. 27, 28.40

Ibid., p. 61.41

Ibid., p. 64.42

Ibid., p. 35.


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occurs only exceptionally does not diminish its determining character on politics.'The ultimate

consequenceof the

politicalbloc formation into friends and enemies

becomes real only in actual conflict. It is from this most extreme possibility that the

life of human beings derives its specific political tension.'43 Although peacefulcoexistence during normal times makes it difficult to know the friend from the

enemy, the political tension is always present beneath the surface and ready to eruptin the case of an emergency.

These strong statements need to be read in the context of Schmitt's critique of

liberalism. He blames liberal thought for obfuscating 'the Political' by trying to

reduce it to the status of other realms in society such as economics or culture. The

liberal argument for pluralism and the basic equality of all associations in the state,

Schmitt argues, is derived from the observation that individuals, in their private lives,live in a whole variety of relationships and associations at any one time. For Schmitt

this analogy is flawed because it neglects the difference between the individual and

the state and denies the political unity of the state.

Schmitt is not anti-democratic. His critique is directed against what he believes to

be the liberal conception of politics. While democracy makes everything political by

including all facets of life and all people in the political process, liberalism tries to

privatize the public sphere. 'In liberal thinking the political concept of conflict is

transformed into economic competition and intellectual debate. In place of a clear

distinction between the two conditions "war" and "peace" appear the dynamics of

perpetual competition and perpetual discussion. Hence the state turns intosociety'.44 Schmitt considers this process dangerous because it neglects the

possibility of an inner or outer enemy.If liberalism were given a free hand, the state's role would be reduced to 'playing

one association out against the other in the name of the free individual and his

freedom of relationships, whereby all questions are decided upon from the

perspective of the individual'.45 By curtailing the realm of state authority, liberalism

endangers the welfare of the people. In a world governed by liberal principles, 'there

might be very interesting opposites and contrasts, competitions and intrigues of all

sorts, but never an opposition of such force as to justify the demand on people to

sacrifice their own life and to give people the inner strength to shed their own bloodand kill others'.46 The consequences of forgetting that struggle is the essence of 'the

Political' may be lethal. 'If a people is afraid of the risks entailed in a politicalexistence another people will easily be found which will relieve it from its troubles by

assuming the role of "protector" and thereby gain political power over it.'47

This extreme situation Schmitt defines as the case of emergency

(Ausnahmezustand). In a situation of such imminent existential danger, there needs

to be a sovereign able to defend society and restore order. In the modern era this

duty falls on the state since it alone can create the political unity necessary for the

defence of society. The state decides upon the existence or non-existence of the

enemy and yields the jus belli, the right to decide upon the lives of the citizens. Forextreme cases of peril, Schmitt envisages a 'commissarial dictatorship' whose duty it

43 Ibid.44

Ibid., pp. 70-1.45

Ibid., p. 45.46

Ibid., pp. 35-6.47

Ibid., p. 53.


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is to restore peace and order. Once the existential threat is over, however, the

dictatorshipis to hand executive

powerback to the constitutional

government.For

Schmitt the emergency is never the rule, as it is with Fascism and Nazism.48

Schmitt criticizes liberalism for destroying political unity within the state by

fragmenting society. 'The political unity must, if necessary, demand the sacrifice of

life. For the individualism of liberal thought this claim is impossible to reach'.49 If

unity within society ceases to exist, 'the Political' vanishes with it. This does not

mean that all details of the life of the people in the state are determined by the

sovereign and by 'the Political'. Economic, social, cultural and moral associations all

exist under the rule of law. However, 'every religious, moral, economic, ethical or

other antithesis transforms itself into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to

divide human beings into friends and enemies'.50 In other words, the possibility ofconflict and, ultimately, the case of emergency can never be excluded and lies behind

all forms of social life.

However, in his theory of 'the Political' and the case of emergency Schmitt leaves

two fundamental questions unanswered: why is conflict the essence of 'the Political'

and why is it that 'the Political' is always present? Both these questions find an

answer inMorgenthau's theory of 'the Political'.

Morgenthau: 'the Political' as the key to objectivity

Some of Morgenthau's earliest, and very 'Schmittian', comments on the nature of

'the Political' are contained in his doctoral thesis on international law, written in

1929. Herein, Morgenthau argues that 'political questions in the area of interstate

relations are questions that influence the individuality of one state against that of

others and are related to the preservation and assertion of that individuality within

the community of states'.51 He argues that the scope of international law is neces

sarily limited because there is no political power to enforce it. According to

Morgenthau, the belief that international law will solve the problems of inter

national politics is short-sighted and based on a wrong understanding of the natureof 'the Political'. The struggle for power will push states into violent conflict with

each other.

Why is 'the Political' defined as struggle for power leading to conflict? In search

for an answer, Morgenthau turns to the individual. 'The most basic fact of existence

which cannot be subdivided further is the fact of life itself . . . Before and in all

combinations of human motivation there is one basic force: the impulse for life

which strives for survival and recognition.'52 The achievement of either aim, survivalor recognition, Morgenthau argues, requires power, but with one crucial difference.

While the struggle for survival is the result of a lack of power, the search for

recognition is the product of an excess of power. Both are natural and innate urges.

48 Paul Hirst, 'Schmitt: Enemy or Foe?', Telos, 72 (Summer 1987), p. 21.49

Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, pp. 70, 45.50

Ibid., p. 37.51

Morgenthau, Die internationale Rechtspflege, pp. 59-60.52

Hans J. Morgenthau, ?ber die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen, p. 10, quoted in

Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, pp. 132-3 (my translation).


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In Morgenthau's words, 'the struggle for power is universal in time and space and isan undeniable fact of

experience.'53 Apartfrom

referring dogmaticallyto

experience,Morgenthau delivers no proof for this anthropological statement. He merely asserts

that 'it is the most convincing element of human motivation'.54 If the struggle for

power is an innate urge of human beings it follows that 'the Political is to be under

stood as a force that exists within the individual and is necessarily directed towards

other people in the form of "a desire for power".'55The meaning of the term 'power' is left open by Morgenthau. In Science: Servant

or Master? he remarks that everyone always strives for power, the scholar seeking

knowledge, the mountaineer climbing a rock-face, the poet trying to catch theessence of life in words. The struggle for power is thus omnipresent. Yet, not all

these manifestations of the struggle for powerare

also political. It is only 'when they[the people] choose as their object other men that they enter the political sphere'.56In opposition to the struggle for power, 'the Political' is not always present. It

appears only when the struggle for power is directed against other human beings,not against the natural world. With this statement, the struggle for power acquires a

social dimension. It moves from the purely personal and individual level onto the

social plain. As a dynamic between people, the struggle for power becomes social

conflict, i.e., politics. This explains why Morgenthau defines 'the Political' as 'the

point of reference of all social activity'.57 In defining 'the Political' this way,

Morgenthau, unlike Schmitt, identifies both the origin of 'the Political' and the

conditions under which it appears. Schmitt considers 'the Political' only in relationto the state and does not talk about its origins. Morgenthau realized this short

coming early on. In an unpublished article written in 1930, he remarks that thoughhe admires Schmitt's 'exceptional mental intensity and reliable instinct', it was a pitythat 'instead of penetrating to the deepest roots of the reality of the state, he stops

half way'.58

Morgenthau defines 'the Political' not as something fixed, but as a property that is

kept to a higher or a lower degree, just as bodies keep heat. However, there is a

difference: one can measure the degree of a body's temperature with the help of a

mercury column and a scale. In the area of 'the Political', such an objective standard

does not exist. The specific political element thus consists 'in the degree of intensitywith which a matter of state activity can be related to the individuality of the state

itself . . .Questions on which the preservation of the existence of the state depends,

obviously stand in the closest imaginable relation to the individuality of the state.'59

The idea that 'the Political' manifests itself in varying degrees of intensity is an

extension of Schmitt's notion of 'the Political', which is confined to the criteria of

the friend/enemy distinction. Schmitt was so impressed by this addition to his own

53Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 33.

54Morgenthau, ?ber die Herkunft des Politischen, p. 10, quoted in Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, pp. 132-3

(my translation).55Morgenthau, ?ber die Herkunft des Politischen, p. 9, quoted in Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, p. 132 (my

translation).56 Hans J. Morgenthau, Science: Servant or Master? (New York, 1972), p. 31.57 Hans J. Morgenthau, diary entry, 31 May 1930, quoted in Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, p. 180 (my

translation).58

Morgenthau, ?ber die Herkunft des Politischen, p. 25, quoted in Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, p. 124 (my

translation).59

Morgenthau, Die internationale Rechtspflege, pp. 70-1.


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theory that he congratulated Morgenthau on it in writing. This event was also thereason for their

meetingin Berlin in 1929.60

Morgenthau's thought on 'the Political' matches Schmitt's on most other points.Firstly, both share the view that everything is potentially political. For Morgenthauthe precondition is only that someone's search for power is directed towards another

human being. Whether this occurs in the field of art or of politics per se is irrelevant.

Schmitt's view is identical.61 Secondly, both thinkers use similar arguments in their

critique of liberalism. In words that could be taken from Schmitt, Morgenthauwrites: 'Under the impact of nineteenth century liberalism, Anglo-American societyhas been strongly influenced, and at times dominated, by a philosophy that denies

politics a prominent and honourable place in the order of things. Politics as conflict

of interests decided througha

struggle for power is here regarded as an ephemeralphenomenon, a kind of residue of either aristocratic or capitalistic society, for thetime being to be pushed into a corner fenced off by constitutional safeguards and

ultimately to be abolished altogether.'62 Finally, Morgenthau also shares Schmitt's

negative view of human nature. 'The drives to live, to propagate, and to dominateare common to all men.'

This claim to the universality of the struggle for power lends him the basic

argument for defining international politics as a realm of power politics. Since the

struggle for power is a basic feature of human life, Morgenthau asks, 'is it surprisingthat international politics is of necessity power politics?'63 where 'the absence of any

form of rational regulation makes violence into the measure and the means of prooffor the position of a state'.64 Hence, in interstate relations Schmitt's case of

emergency, defined as a situation of existential conflict, becomes the norm.

If the case of emergency is the norm in international politics, it follows that all

political thinking and advice for action in international politics must be oriented

towards the end of the preservation of the state. Since self-preservation is guaranteed through power, it is justified to equate the national interest with the pursuit of

power. National self-preservation through power maximization becomes both the

key value and the key end towards which all political resources are directed in allstates. Morgenthau writes, Tn a world where a number of sovereign nations compete

with and oppose each other for power, the foreign policies of all nations mustnecessarily refer to their survival as their minimum requirement.'65 Here lie the rootsof his famous formula, 'International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for

power.'

Once all alternative values which state leaders might want to pursue are subordinated to the maximization of power and the value of self-preservation,

Morgenthau is able to claim objectivity in his analysis. As noted earlier, Weber's

argument against the objectivity of social science is that every end pursued in socialaction is informed by the values of the people involved. The social scientist can

neither know all these different values nor give a judgment on them, as values are

60Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, p. 169.

61 In Der Begriff des Politischen, p. 76, Schmitt writes, '[the fact] that economic differences have become

political. . . shows that the political can be reached from economics as well as from any other field'.62 Hans J. Morgenthau, The Restoration of American Politics (Chicago and London, 1962), p. 90.63

Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 35.64

Morgenthau, Die internationale Rechtspflege, p. 77.65 Hans J. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago and London, 1958), p. 66.


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part of the personal realm beyond the grasp of science. In Morgenthau's theory ofinternational

politics,national

self-preservation throughthe maximization of

poweris a clear, universal value contained in the very definition of international politics.All actions in the international system exclusively serve the end of powermaximization in order to guarantee national survival. In contrast to such political

questions as 'what is a good life?', whose interpretation is open to a variety of

different answers all conditioned by the values held by different people, national self

preservation is a fundamental and universally valid existential question which allows

only one interpretation: the state either survives or it perishes. There is no solution in

between. To preserve the state, state leaders must and will maximize the power of thestate. It is in their own interest to do so, because the state guarantees their personal

survival just like that of societyas a

whole. Due to these conditions, all ambiguity inthe interpretation of social facts disappears.66 Like the state-leader, the social

scientist cannot but share the supreme value of self-preservation in his/her own

existential interest. Since the social scientist's analysis is thus informed by the same

value as that of the state leader and there is only one possible valued end, analytical

objectivity is possible.

Finally, it is still necessary to explain why Morgenthau argues so forcefully for the

preservation of the state in Politics among Nations.611 believe that the answer lies in

his conception of morality combined with his ideas about the nature of inter

national politics. Morgenthau believes in the existence of universal moral values and

argues that 'it is the moral duty of people of the mind today to preserve the eternalmoral ethical values in a clear conceptual order'.68 Yet, in the anarchic and violent

international system dominated by the struggle for power, there is no room for

altruistic action and a moral life. Such a life is only possible within the state, where

sanctions guarantee the respect of moral norms and laws. Through the existential

security it offers the individual and society, the state thus constitutes the only moral

space in an amoral world. If the state perishes, however, this moral realm also

disappears. It follows that the preservation of the state is a moral act in itself.

Indeed, for Morgenthau the state is not allowed to pursue any other end than itsown self-preservation, even if this can be achieved only by immoral means. In his

book In Defense of the National Interest Morgenthau makes this point even more

66 For this logic to work it must be assumed that power maximization is a straightforward process and

that all actions of state-leaders during their public function are directed towards this goal at all times.

Morgenthau is silent on this point. However, if the possibility is conceded that not all acts of the

state-leaders in international politics are directed towards the goal of power-maximization, the

question arises how the social scientist can distinguish between those that are and those that are not.

This dilemma poses a serious threat to the unity of Morgenthau's theory of international politics and

to his claims to analytical objectivity. It seems peculiar to me that Morgenthau does not expand on

this point. However, it is not within the scope of this article to investigate this question.67 The reference to Politics among Nations is important here, as the state-centric nature of Morgenthau's

theories weakens in his later work. Already in Dilemmas of Politics, written in 1958, he makes clear

that the institution of the state is a not eternal but a particular historical manifestation of political

organization: 'As long as the world is politically organized into nations, the national interest is indeedthe last word in international politics' (p. 66, my emphasis). In 'The Intellectual and Political

Functions of Theory', written in 1970, Morgenthau even adopts a radical critique of the state as an

institution. In the nuclear age, he argues, the state is no longer able to protect its citizens adequately.Therefore, a new form of political organization needs to be found. See Hans J. Morgenthau, 'The

Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory', in James Der Derian (ed.), International Theory:Critical Investigations (London, 1995).

68Morgenthau, 'Kann in unserer Zeit eine objektive Moralordnung aufgestellt werden?', p. 114, quoted

in Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, p. 187 (my translation).


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resolutely: And, above all, remember always that it is not only a political necessitybut a moral

dutyfor a nation to follow in its

dealingswith other nations but one

guiding star, one standard for thought, one rule for action: THE NATIONAL

INTEREST.'69If political action follows a predefined end, what is the responsibility of political

science? On this Morgenthau has a very clear prescription: 'The task of political

philosophy in our age, then, is to apply the perennial truths of politics to the

political world for the dual purpose of understanding it and of solving its

problems.'70 Political science is to take the role of a tutor reminding state leaders of

the necessity of power maximization and trying to devise ways to escape the 'lust'

for power of other states. In sum, political science's task is to aid the state in its

struggle for survival.

Conclusion

This article pursued two related aims. Firstly, it uncovered the intellectual link

between Morgenthau, Weber and Schmitt. A close look at Morgenthau's predecessors helps to shed some light on those dogmatic, power-political statements

that are spread all over Politics among Nations. Secondly, this article showed how

Morgenthau's claims to the objectivity of his theory of international politics can bejustified from within the logic of his conceptions of social science and the nature of

politics.

Morgenthau's ideas of 'the Political' and international politics make sense as longas they are seen in the context of the case of emergency, i.e., the struggle for national

self-preservation within the international system. Beyond this they have little to say.

They do not make up a general theory of international relations in terms of the

economic, cultural, religious or social exchange between peoples and states. Today it

is a truism that international relations is about more than relations between states

and their existential conflicts. For Morgenthau it was not. He never denied the

existence of relationships other than political ones within and across societies.Ultimately, however, they are all subordinated to the case of emergency. This pointallows Morgenthau to assert that international politics as a whole needs to be

analysed through the logic of the case of emergency which calls for powermaximization by any means.

There are many problems with Morgenthau's ideas about politics, and they havebeen widely remarked upon.71 Most of these critiques, however, focus on the

epistemological and ontological inconsistencies of Morgenthau's theories and do not

search for his philosophical godfathers. A genealogy of this kind inspires the reader

to interpret Morgenthau's ideas as part of a philosophical continuum, that of

German political and social thought in the pre-World War II period, rather than inisolation. For instance, the idea that conflict constitutes the essence of 'the Political'

69Quoted in S?llner, 'German Conservatism in America', p. 171.

70Morgenthau, Restoration of American Politics, p. 66 (my emphasis).71

See, e.g., George, Discourses of Global Politics, and Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A

Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations (London, 1994).


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was widely known and shared among German political thinkers of the 1920s and

1930s, partlydue to Schmitt's influence. This

explains why Morgenthaudoes not

indulge in detailed proof of his forceful statements in this matter. As has been

shown, to him it was not only reasonable, but even obvious to argue this way.

Morgenthau has long been considered a theorist within the American positivisttradition. The aim of this article was to cast doubt on this reading by showing how

his work was an attempt to transfer the 'typically' European philosophical problemsof power and domination into an American political system engulfed by liberal

thought. How these ideas were transformed after being introduced into the

American liberal tradition is an interesting question for future research.

the godfathers of truth weber and schmitt morgenthautheory

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