THE GLOBAL IDEATIONAL ORIGINS

OF NIGERIA'S COMMUNAL CONFLICTS:

DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE & SHARIA

DRAFT TO BE PRESENTEDAT THE 2002 CONFERENCE OF THE

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATIONMARCH 27, 2002

BY KEVIN H. ELLSWORTHINTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIESARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

Comment, Criticism, and Citations Welcomedkevin.ellsworth@asu.edu – http://www.public.asu.edu/~ellswork

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THE GLOBAL IDEATIONAL ORIGINS OF NIGERIA'S COMMUNAL CONFLICTS:DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE & SHARIA

INTRODUCTION

In1999 Nigeria embraced ‘democracy,’ and Nigerians began dying. Nigerians seeking

that freedom-inducing, peace-instilling, conflict-resolving, wealth-enabling ‘democracy’ found

lurking in its shadows violence, warfare, and death. When such profound tragedies appear

unexpectedly, several questions demand to be addressed. Is there a connection between

‘democracy’ and the death in its wake? If so, what is the nature of the relationship between

‘democracy’ and the communal violence that followed? Finally, what made that connection and

its dire consequences possible?

Many scholars describe various manifestations of the relationship between communal

relations and ‘democracy.’ Still others prescribe institutional means to prevent or restrain

communal violence in ‘democratic’ states. Scholars fall short, however, in their ability to

adequately explain how ‘democracy’ can become such fertile ground for communal violence.

They fail to explore discursive constructions of ‘democracy’ and how these discursive practices

affect the likelihood and magnitude of the communal conflicts that sometimes accompany

‘democratization.’ I propose to begin that exploration--to consider issues of discourse and

communal relations in order to understand how ‘democracy’ is written and read across both the

North-South and international-domestic divides, and to reveal how those processes affect

Nigeria’s domestic communal relations.

In pursuing this line of inquiry, I am taking seriously the challenges set out by Roxanne

Doty in the closing chapters of Imperial Encounters (1996) where she begins to “call attention to

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the meanings and identities that are constructed in the process of promoting democracy and

human rights and the meanings these signifiers are given” (1996, 144). Noting that while

promoting democracy the Reagan administration “also enabled a particular construction of the

meaning of democracy,” Doty argues that “what needs to be examined are the representational

practices that occur in the process of promotion. What meanings and identities are being (and

will be) constructed?”(144).

These challenges are especially applicable to the study of Nigerian democratization,

because, like the cases Doty considers, Nigerian ‘democracy’ was realized under intense

economic and social pressures from the United States. Furthermore, as U.S. policymakers have

promoted ‘democracy’ in Nigeria, they have wielded foreign aid (and the withholding thereof) as

a primary instrument in that policy. This fits nicely with Doty’s conception of foreign aid “as a

specific technique in the more general field of exercising power” (129). Doty explains, “The

importance of conceptualizing foreign aid in this manner is that it focuses. . .on what foreign aid,

as a practice, does” (129). “Foreign aid” she continues, “is but one of numerous domains for the

deployment of disciplinary techniques. So understood, the practice of foreign aid. . .is part of the

continuing drama in which meticulous rituals of power are played and replayed with various

twists, turns, and modifications” (129). It is these twists, these turns, and these modifications

that make Nigerian democratization and the role of U.S. foreign policy therein so fascinating.

1 This “novel conception of discourse” (Laclau 2000, x) has been crafted and nurtured atthe University of Essex’s graduate program in Ideology and Discourse Analysis. The facultyand graduate research pursued there “makes it possible to articulate the original system ofcategories introduced in Hegemony [and Socialist Strategy, 1985] in a more precise and detailedway” (Laclau 2000, x).

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Discourse Analysis

Central to this study lies the notion of discourse analysis. Motivated by reactions to

positivism, rationalism, and structuralism and drawing on linguistic insights, discourse analysis

has enabled some scholars to explore the farthest reaches of the abstract, while empowering

others to better interpret the empirical world around them. This research takes the latter road and

follows signposts set out by the writings of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and the ‘Essex’

school they inspired.1 This approach to discourse embraces the post-structural and post-positive

while simultaneously addressing methodological and epistemological issues in order to “put

forward plausible and empirically justifiable explanations of the social and political world”

(Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 1).

This so-named ‘Essex’ school offers a particularly appropriate foundation for

understanding Nigeria’s ‘democratic’ conflicts for five reasons. First, its deliberate focus on

discourse both compels and enables me to take seriously the speech, actions, and identities of the

Nigerian people as the window to understanding this moment in their history. Second, having

self-consciously developed a discursive epistemology, this approach to discourse analysis is

more manageably applicable to the empirical Nigerian case than other more abstract approaches

to discourse. Third, Laclau, Mouffe, and their students take agency seriously; “questions

surrounding the way social agents ‘live out’ their identities and act–questions that pertain to the

concept of subjectivity–are of central importance” (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 12). Taking

2 My desires to “assign responsibility” and “give life” to certain agents should notsuggest that I will endow agents with an autonomy outside of the discourse(s) they inhabit. Nordo I mean to suggest here that they exist ontologically prior to discursive ‘structures.’ Yetthroughout this research, I will explore how agents (embedded in discourse) find and expresstheir voices, their desires, and some measure of freedom especially where they find themselvesstraddling the horizons of discursive spheres or on the borderlines between discourses. In thissense I draw on Doty’s 1997 article where she likewise applies the insights of Laclau andMouffe to craft an understanding of the agent-structure problematique. Building on theconception of practice and the understanding of subject-position that follows, Doty draws onLaclau and Mouffe’s 1989 work to demonstrate that these understandings enable “us toconceptualize agents and agency without falling into the trap of attributing some timeless andunexplained quality to all subjects. . .” (Doty 1997, 384). Especially since “discourses areinherently open, contingent and overlapping [and] can create spaces within which practices ofresistance are made possible” and because discourses are “often contradictory, as are the subject-positions that are made available within them,” agency becomes possible (Doty 1997, 384-5).

3 Laclau explains that “An empty signifier is, strictly speaking, a signifier without asignified” (1996, 36). By introducing this new category with this paradox, Laclau raises anumber of fascinating questions regarding how societies organize themselves around their desireto signify the absent. He uses Hobbes conception of “Order” to illustrate his point; I will use‘Democracy.’ Applying his closing example (45) to my study of ‘democracy’ Laclau suggeststhat if a pro-democracy struggle is successful, ‘democracy’ may become the signifier of allstruggles against the ‘nondemocratic.’ If this were to happen, ‘democracy’ also “becomes thesurface inscription through which all [such] struggles will be expressed, so that the chain ofequivalences which are unified around this signifier tend to empty it, to blur its connection withthe actual content with which it was originally associated” (45).

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agency seriously enables me both to assign responsibility to those agents whose practices

maintain dangerous discursive constructions, and to give life and voice to the Nigerian people

who currently suffer under those constructions; both are central concerns of this research.2 No

understanding of Nigerian politics can be complete if it disempowers the Nigerian people to

either an abstraction of ‘Nigeria’ or to autonomous, disembodied discursive structures. With

Donald Horowitz, I assert that a “bloody phenomenon cannot be explained by a bloodless

theory” (Horowitz 1985, 140). Fourth, the ‘Essex’ approach has an explicitly political

orientation, especially in their consideration of the empty signifier3 around which “various

4 This processes–the emptying of ‘democracy’ through U.S. Foreign policy is beingexplored elsewhere (Ellsworth 2002).

5 See Garcia (1996), Pollis (1996), Myers et al (1996), Posse (1993), and Wilmer (1997)for applications of social constructivism to ethnic relations. Regarding social constructivism and

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political forces can compete in their efforts to present their particular objectives as those which

carry out the filling of that lack” (Laclau 1996, 44, quoted in Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 9).

The heart of this paper explores the empty signifier named ‘democracy’–that signifier which has

been slowly and selectively emptied of its meaning in the discourse of U.S. policies of

democratic enlargement4 thereby creating that vacuum of meaning which Nigeria’s domestic

communal movements compete to fill. Finally, as Aletta Norval points out, “For Mouffe, as for

Laclau, politics is essentially concerned with the formation of an ‘us’ as opposed to a ‘them’”

(Norval 2000, 224). This is especially appropriate to the topic of this paper since the political

divisions between democratic and nondemocratic states in the international arena and the

divisions between ethnic and religious groups on the domestic area are so central to this study.

The theoretical underpinnings of discourse analysis can be introduces only very briefly

here. By way of introduction, however, it is necessary to lay out some rough foundation.

First, the claim that ethnic identities are socially constructed has recently risen to the

status of truism in the discipline of political science. Academic consensus proclaims that ethnic

identities and boundaries have no essential nature and little permanence. The now all-

encompassing literature on social constructivism has easily latched on to the ethnic project as

one of its own. Social constructivism, popularized by Nicholas Onuf (1989) and Alexander

Wendt (1992, 1999), boasted promise in disclosing the social nature of relations between

communal groups or between democratic and democratizing states.5 Likewise, studies on social

democracy, the very prolific literature on Democratic Peace Theory considers in its dyadic,normative school the social relationship among democracies, that makes it ripe for application ofa social constructivist approach. More directly Mark Peceny (ISQ, Spring 1999) suggests thatalthough many scholars of democratization hint at social constructivist processes, they do littleto capitalize on the social or international natures of that process.

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and political identity in general have found a comfortable bunk in the social constructivist camp.

These now-mainstreamed constructivist efforts, however, do little to delve beneath the apparent

contingencies regarding ethnic composition and boundaries. Despite their indispensable focus

on the intersubjective nature of identity and all representation, theories of social constructivism

tend to neglect agency and even more importantly, they neglect the processes that tie the agents

to the structures of meaning (Checkel 1999). Furthermore, they do little to place these

constructions within the larger context of discourses that reach beyond a simple ethnic content.

The larger context this research hopes to establish is that of a much broader discourse of

‘democracy.’ The meaning of ‘democracy’ is likewise never fixed, and despite academic and

policy attempts to conjure a stable ‘Democracy’ with a solid center, those attempts are

necessarily undermined by the contingency of that attempt. Rather than lend power to these

attempts to represent an essential meaning of ‘democracy,’ whose only impediment is a rational

operationalization, I suggest that the language and discourse surrounding ‘democracy’ reflects a

constant struggle among political forces to naturalize its meanings.

I will present how elements of ‘democracy’ are linked up with those elements defining

communal identities and relations in ways that can lead to violent communal conflict. This

particular discourse of ‘democracy’ will therefore become implicated in communal rivalries.

Methodologically speaking, how can these goals be realized? First, this study will

consider its primary data to be text, broadly defined. Unlike the positivist endeavors of the

6 In enumerating these “representational practices” Doty draws on the works of Lacauand Mouffe (1985), Spurr (1993), Morrison (1992), Foucault (1978), and Wolfe (1982)

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physical sciences, one cannot measure any tangible, essential, objective meanings of the key

elements of this study: ‘democracy,’ ‘ethnicity,’ or even ‘Nigeria.’ Instead, a discourse

generates temporally, contingently fixed meanings of these elements. This discourse consists of

the rhetoric among policy makers; words spoken and images interpreted in the news and on

radio; images found in advertisements, posters, and campaign literature for candidates and office

holders; the spoken word of average people, professors, and students; the actions of policy

makers and the public interpreted through their audiences’ particular cultural lense–all the forms

of communication that together generate meaning and portray as given the underlying elements

of ‘democracy’ and communal identities.

Embedded within this text lie representational practices which portray both the content of

the discourse and the privileging of various meanings and relationships. As described succinctly

by Doty (1996, 10-12)6 these representational practices follow a few key patterns, of which I will

mention only those most relevant to this research. The first among these is the use of nodal

points, those privileged signs upon which meanings are fixed. ‘Democracy,’ ‘Sharia,’ ‘Pariah,’

‘human rights,’ and ‘civilized’ are all crucial nodal points whose meanings will be disclosed

elsewhere (Ellsworth 2002). Second, one finds presuppositions, those self-evident truths whose

potentially political nature has been neutralized by the discourse. Presuppositions, important in

their own right are also most revealing in that they underlie the final two practices that will be

disclosed. Third, classifications or the presupposed categorization of states, people, and

governments are evident in how U.S. policy makers and Nigerians alike understand Nigeria’s

7Aletta Norval explains that “[w]here the logic of equivalence predominates, socialdivision tends towards a dichotomisation of political space, a paratactical division of the socialsphere into two opposing camps” (2000, 221). This happens, she explains quoting Mouffe(1993, 50), because political discourse “attempts to create specific forms of unity amongdifferent interests by relating them to a common project and by establishing a frontier to definethe forces to be opposed, the ‘enemy.’” As they were applied by Norval (1997) to explore the‘First’ vs. ‘Third’ world distinction, I will use of these logics in this research to illuminate the‘democratic’ vs. ‘nondemocratic’ dichotomization.

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international and domestic political relations. Fourth, these classifications are especially

important in the positioning of states (U.S. and Nigeria), communal groups (Ibo and Hausa),

religious groups (Christian and Muslim), and governments (democracy and nondemocracy) as

similar, opposed, or complementary. Finally, the logics of equivalence and difference illuminate

how political frontiers discursively divide political space into opposing camps or, instead,

undermine that division.7 How international space is divided between ‘democracies’ versus

others, and how Nigerian space is divided between religious and ethnic groups is another matter

I tackle elsewhere (Ellsworth 2002).

The discourse in which the United States and Nigeria find themselves is rife with these

representational practices. U.S. policy makers and Nigerians share presupposed understandings

of ‘democracy’ understood as complementary to ‘human rights’ and ‘civilization’ but in

opposition to the ‘nondemocracy’ and the ‘pariah.’ This shared discourse faces its limits,

however, when the presupposition of all these nodal points and their relative positions is

confronted by the ‘Sharia’ (Islamic law) which occupies radically different positions in the

discourse of Southern Nigeria and the United States than in predominantly Islamic, Northern

Nigeria.

8 “Crisis” might be a more appropriate term. The “flux” I mention, represents a temporalperiod in which change had enabled a rearticulation of certain signifiers. This flux might haveallowed for a crisis of identity except that political forces (expressed through certain U.S. policymakers) acted to fill the empty signifier, ‘democracy,’ thoroughly enough to avoid an overtmilitary crisis in the sort term. On the other hand, the subsequent competition of domestic forces(expressed through Nigerians in the North versus those in the South) asserting their desires to fill‘democracy’ have produced crises of meanings and of physical violence.

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Case Selection – Why Nigeria?

Building on these ontological insights, I explore the current process of ‘democratization’

in Nigeria, ‘democratization’s’ links with Nigeria’s domestic communal relations. Nigeria

presents itself as an ideal case for such a study. Both Nigeria’s national ‘democratic’ identity

and Nigeria’s intranational communal identities find themselves in states of flux that coincide

temporally and geographically thus demanding an explanation of their possible links.

Regarding Nigeria’s ‘democratic’ flux,8 Nigeria has, since the death of General Sani

Abacha in June 1998, moved steadily toward assuming an internationally acknowledged

‘democratic’ identity, culminating in the inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo on May

29, 1999. This began Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, the heir to three previous attempts to

democratize. Nigeria’s ‘democratic transition’ represents a field whereon the international

community, and especially U.S. foreign policy makers, seized upon the signifier ‘democracy’

and attempted to establish some hegemonic meaning most significant in its lack of meaning.

Regarding Nigeria’s communal flux, Nigeria offers a mosaic of subnational identity

groups, varying in content (religious, ethnic, and regional), size, and access to political-economic

resources. Unfortunately, the onslaught of communal violence since Nigeria’s ‘democratization’

occurred these identities which find themselves separated not only by the intersubjective

religious, regional, and ethnic chasms, but are also divided along the fault lines of competing

9 Nodal points are “privileged signifiers or reference points. . .in a discourse that bindtogether a particular system of meaning or ‘chain of significance’” (Howarth and Stavrakakis2000, 8).

10 “Sharia” is the term used to represent the implementation of some interpretation ofIslamic Law. The significance of ‘Sharia’ in Nigeria’s ‘democratic’ conflicts will be explored ingreat depth in the second half of this paper.

11 A subject-position is the position a ‘real’ person assumes which is made possible andmeaningful by the discourse s/he inhabits. A Nigerian agent may, for example, adopt positionsof an African, a Nigerian, a woman, a mother, a Muslim, a democrat, a Yoruba, and so forthdepending on his positions in the various discourses he inhabits.

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discourses (i.e. competing domestic interpretations of ‘democracy’). Conflicts along these

discursive fault lines have cost several thousand lives in the past two years. The conflicts

centered on the nodal points9 of ‘democracy’ and ‘Sharia’10 are those most threatening to

Nigerians’ peace and security.

A final reason to utilize the Nigerian case for this research is that Nigeria’s social context

in the greater global society provides a unique opportunity to address how discourse is translated

across predefined national-international and North-South boundaries. Nigeria’s colonial history

and its subsequent position in the international world-economy has endowed it with a widely-

spoken national language, English, which facilitates the relatively easy diffusion of discursive

practices across international, national, and subnational barriers. Furthermore, because Nigeria

occupies what is considered to be two important subject-positions:11 first, as a geopolitical

hegemon in the West African security bloc and second, as a source of oil in the international

political economy, there exists abundant text to make such analysis possible.

In this research, I use Nigeria’s unique context to explore the links underlying the two

phenomena mentioned in this paper’s opening paragraph: first, the transnational discourse and

domestic implementation of ‘democracy’ and second, the reorganization/redefinition of

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Nigeria’s domestic communal relations. Elsewhere (Ellsworth 2002), I disclose how the

signifier ‘democracy’ is emptied, but a brief summary of this argument is nonetheless in order

here. The process begins in the international arena, where a discourse of ‘democracy’ emerges

out of a global society dominated economically and politically by the United States but a society

that incorporates Nigeria and the Nigerian elite as well. Within this discourse, certain meanings

and identities become privileged while others become marginalized and rendered insignificant.

Consequently, certain performances become necessary while other are made unnecessary.

Among these consequences, it becomes necessary for the U.S. to condition Nigeria’s behavior

and for Nigeria to adapt its behavior and assume a ‘democratic’ identity in order to capitalize on

the privileged status and concrete economic rewards dependent on a ‘democratic’ identity.

Within the domestic arena, a community of previously imagined yet forever reimagined

communal groups (primarily ethnic and religious in composition) tune in to the transnational

discursive practices (i.e. they eavesdrop) and privileged meanings of ‘democracy,’ interpreting

for themselves the meanings associated with the expectations and promises of ‘democracy’.

These communal groups adapt their performance and redefine their intercommunal relations in

accordance with these hegemonic meanings of ‘democracy,’ which privilege a zero-sum,

economistic, and competitive ontology.

More importantly, several of these communal groups find themselves within more

localized discursive spheres, with horizons that exclude other groups who nonetheless still

physically inhabit the Nigerian polity. In particular, Nigerians find themselves within a global

discourse in which ‘democracy’ has been endowed with social significance, but nevertheless

remains an empty signifier when meaningful applications are sought. A conflict thus arises when

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Nigerians inhabiting an ‘Islamic’ discursive sphere attempt to fill that signifier with ‘democratic’

meanings that conflict with the meanings asserted by Nigeian’s outside of that ‘Islamic’

discourse. These conflicts are best understood by exploring the nodal point, ‘Islam’ and the

“chain of signification” that provides new meaning to the already available signifier,

‘democracy’ (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 8).

Exploring the transnational discursive practices, therefore, enables us to better

understand both the Nigerian state’s behavior and the relationship among communal groups

within Nigeria. Such an exploration also promises to expose the political forces whose

‘practices’ enable some agents to benefit from the discourse or to direct its course. The

possibility that people continue to die, in part due to the U.S. foreign policies and the discourse

of ‘democracy,’ demands that we seek to better understand these processes and their

consequences. This understanding begins at the surface with the many positivist theories of

frustration-aggression and democratic transition, but then necessarily delves beneath these

theories to disclose the discourse within which political practice is meaningful.

Only with a deep exploration of how national and subnational relations are being

rearticulated and redefined can one first begin to reveal why expectations rise and why

frustration might result. Only with an exploration of how national and communal identities are

being reimagined can one begin to understand the emotional fire that accompanies that

frustration and the potential targets it will find for its release. Only a coherent model of how

communications flow across the social strata (international, national, subnational) and how

meanings are created, manipulated, and transferred ties it all together.

12 The choice of tools which the U.S. employs in its foreign policy is circmcribed by yetanother discourse underlying all foreign policy implementation. A deep-seated and unspokenbehaviorist discourse constrains what is thought possible (even what is imaginable) and limitsforeign policy options to those of material and social rewards and punishments. The nature andcontent of this behaviorist (latter named ‘Skinnerian’) discourse is being developed elsewhere.

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Application

How might such a model look? A one-dimensional chain of causes and effects will not

suffice. A two-dimensional model will provide a starting place, but only that. It is useful,

nevertheless, to begin with some mapping of the ‘agents’ and the practices that connect them.

Imagine first that we can temporarily isolate three subject-positions or spheres of agency:

U.S. policy-makers, Nigerian leaders, and the Nigerian public who have been preidentified as

politically and socially demarcated communal groups. First, the particular discourse regarding

the meaning and content of ‘democracy’ is found in the spoken and symbolic dialogue between

U.S. and Nigerian policy-makers and in the public statements and actions of each directed at the

broader audiences of each country’s domestic constituency as well as at the broader international

community. A set of linked meanings are thus established and alternative understandings of

‘democracy’ are disempowered.

From these representational practices, certain performances emerge as natural and

necessary. The U.S. must ‘encourage’ Nigeria to adopt a ‘democratic’ identity12 while at the

same time, U.S. policy makers must actively seek to redefine what ‘democracy’ is in a way that

allows the U.S. to overlook many seemingly ‘undemocratic’ Nigerian attributes and actions and

to provide seemingly undemocratic forms of geostrategic assistance and economic exploitation

while preserving these policy-makers’ idealistic rhetoric. Nigeria is likewise engaged in a very

limited performance made necessary by the generative affects of its shared discursive space with

13 By horizons I refer to those borders to which a particular discourse extends. As morepeople begin to share and practice a particular articulation of signifiers, they enter the discoursethat represents that “structured totality resulting from articulatory practice” (Howarth andStavrakakis 2000, 7), and the horizon of that discourse (or I like to think of it as discursivesphere) expand to include them.

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Figure 1. Horizons of ‘democratic’discourse expand from U.S. elite to Nigerianelite.

the U.S. Nigeria, in order to dawn its ‘democratic’ identity must hold elections through which it

can legitimize a set of local and national leaders. Beyond that performance, little else must

change. The U.S. policymakers find freedom in the construction of ‘democracy’ which enables

the pursuit of their economic and geopolitical interests absent the troubling accusations of

hypocrisy. Nigeria finds in its ‘democratic’ status the opportunity to re-engage with the United

States and thus it reaps the political and economic benefits bestowed directly from the United

States as well as those garnered from the larger global democratic society (debt forgiveness,

developmental assistance, and the cessation of sanctions).

We might at this point overlay another

dimension to this representation. This particular

‘democratic’ discourse (one of many that hover

around the world’s many political and academic

centers) whose initial horizons13 were limited to

U.S. policy makers had been adapted, negotiated,

and transformed so that its borders could

circumscribe Nigerian policy makers as well and

thus constrain the Nigerian state’s behavior and

identity (See Figure 1).

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Figure 2. The horizons of the ‘democratic’discourse expand from the international elitespheres to penetrate Nigeria’s domesticrealm.

This ‘democratic’ discourse, its expanding horizons, and its accompanying performances

are not, however, without their consequences. The rhetoric shared between Nigerian and U.S.

policy makers which articulated the meaning of ‘democracy’ is overheard by the Nigerian

population who represent, in raw numbers, Africa’s largest literate and politically engaged

population, one with easy access to a prolific free press and radio transmissions in a widely

understood language. As the U.S. models what appears to be a successful and prosperous

‘democracy,’ and as U.S. policy-makers begin to actively market ‘democracy’ in the Nigerian

state with all its accompanying promises, Nigeria’s population hears the many promises linked to

‘democracy.’ As Nigerian elite dawn a national ‘democratic’ status with its requisite election,

Nigeria’s population understands that all of these spoken and unspoken promises are soon to be

fulfilled.

Graphically, we might again imagine

that horizons of this discourse have now grown

beyond the elite social circles and have

penetrated into Nigeria’s domestic relations.

This expansion is not, however, as complete as

the initial expansion depicted in Figure 1.

Although a ‘democratic’ identity has taken hold

state-wide, those particular meanings

associated with ‘democracy’ presupposed in the

elite discourse, are now challenged by alternative discourses, especially the discourse of Islam in

northern Nigeria.

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Regarding the state-wide acceptance of the ‘democratic’ identity, Nigeria’s population is

unified in its acceptance of the ‘democratic’ label and its accompanying promises, but they are

not unified in how they seek to fulfill these promises. Although the entire state has adopted the

‘democratic’ identity, Nigeria’s Islamic and non-Islamic populations diverge profoundly in how

they fill that empty label with meaning. The individualist-competitive elements that are so

naturally linked to ‘democracy’ in the U.S. centered discourse are easily integrated into the

southern Nigerian’s world view. There, the greatest danger is the propensity to intensify conflict

around democratically-driven competitions. In the predominantly Islamic northern regions,

however, these so-called ‘western’ elements of ‘democracy’ are easily discarded or reinterpreted

in ways thought unimaginable in the western discourse of ‘democracy.’ As a result, a series of

devastating conflicts has emerged at the fault lines between these two world views.

THEORETICAL SUMMATION

To summarize, a ‘democratic’ discourse represented initially in U.S. and Nigerian elite

communications has privileged a construction of ‘democracy’ which necessitates a certain

minimal performances (especially elections) while emptying ‘democracy’ of any deeper

meaning. The effects are three-fold. First, the Nigerian state is engaging in a ‘democratic’

performance enabled by the emptying of ‘democracy’. Second, this discourse–powerful in both

its content and its emptiness–has penetrated Nigeria’s domestic arena where previously

constructed communal groups, whose own identities and intergroup relationships are always in

flux, hear this discursive meanings and its lack thereof. Third, the partial penetration of the

discursive horizon into Nigerian society has created a fault line between those Nigerians who

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more easily incorporate the western-centered discourse into their world view and those whose

subject-positions in an already pervasive Islamic discourse lead them to interpret and integrate

‘democracy’ much differently. As each group attempts to apply and realize their vision of

‘democracy,’ violence ensues. In particular, here I focus on those communal conflicts sparked

by Nigeria’s northern states’ implementation of Islamic law (Sharia). The bulk of this paper

portrays the communal nature of these conflicts and then analyzes scores of quotes that reveal

how the people involved in these conflicts have interpreted ‘democracy’ in ways that directly

and almost unavoidably contribute to the conflicts.

TRACKING COMMUNAL CONFLICT

First it is necessary to boldly display the consequences of these conflicts and document

deaths of thousands of Nigerians. After decades of moderate to low levels of communal

violence, Nigeria witnessed a rash of ethnic and religious bloodletting that it had not see in such

a costly and sustained levels since its civil war. Although communal conflicts are part and

parcel of Nigeria’s history, and seasons of pervasive peace are rare if they exist at all, the recent

escalation of ethnic/religious conflicts is remarkable even by Nigerian standards. To establish the

14 To achieve this, I searched the Post Express Wired’s archives for “(communal ORethnic OR regional OR religious OR tribal) and (kill OR killed OR death OR deaths OR died ORdie OR clash OR conflict OR riot OR riots)” and then skimmed each of the 1100-1200 articlesthat fit that query to tally the number of communal conflicts and the reported death tolls of eachconflict. After August 2001, when the Post Express Wired’s archive seems to end, I refer to asimilar search of the newspapers at www.allafrica.com.

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Figure 3. Death toll of communal clashes as reported in Post Express.

existence and magnitude of this trend, I reviewed five years of Nigerian news and quantified any

reference to deaths resulting from communal violence.14 The findings are depicted in Figure 3

above.

To what might one attribute this tragic pattern? Unfortunately, this undeniable spike in

both the quantity and the magnitude of communal conflicts immediately following the advent of

‘democratic’ governance in the second quarter of 1999. Whereas previous quarters rarely

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reported more than one conflict, and none of these with more than 100 reported deaths, the

quarter following the ‘democratic’ transition reported ten separate conflicts--several with very

substantial death tolls. Moreover, just as the initial wave of violence seemed to subside near the

end of 1999, an even more costly wave of communal conflicts beginning with the Sharia riots in

Kaduna cost Nigeria as many as 2,000 lives.

As developed elsewhere (Ellsworth 2002), the U.S.-Nigerian discourse of ‘democracy’

establishes binary opposites (the ‘democracy’ and the ‘nondemocracy’ or ‘pariah’) and ties to

these signs only to the behavioral attributes of “free and fair” elections, freedom of press and

assembly, and the freeing of dissidents. Other elements of a successful social transition from

outcast to partner were likewise spoken or implied--an open market economy and a cooperative

relationship with the United States also seemed to be important elements in the construction of

the ‘democracy.’ In contrast to clear communication of these behavioral and social elements of

‘democracy’, the more potentially delicate components of a liberal democracy remain

unidentified and unexplored so as to prevent their hindering a quick ‘transition.’

What went unspoken in the U.S.-Nigerian ‘democratic’ discourse has since been implied

on the ground in Nigeria. Where U.S. expectations remained vague (as not to create

impediments to attaining ‘democratic’ status), a heterodoxy of Nigerian domestic discourses has

built various conflicting interpretations of ‘democracy’ upon the common, sparse, economistic

foundation provided by the United States in word and deed. Relying in part on the unspoken

lessons gleaned from U.S. exemplarity in addition to vague notions of majority rule,

representation, and religious freedom, a number of domestic discourses have supplemented the

21

U.S. discourse with the following elements. Consequently, the three paths that join ‘democracy’

to communal conflict are as follows.

First, ‘democracy’ is associated with ‘representation,’ and in the liberal tradition,

‘democratic representation’ refers principally to the political representation of the individual or

of ‘the people’ collectively. These liberal interpretations stand in sharp contrast with how

‘representation’ may be interpreted and applied in deeply divided societies where such notions of

‘representation’ are instead supplanted by the desire to represent the communal group. Although

there is a general consensus among Nigeria’s communal groups (whether minority or majority)

regarding this interpretation, the problem emerges when exclusionary identities are written

deeply into the fabric of society, and ‘representation’ in a competitive system inevitably excludes

some group from their imagined fair share of political representation.

Second, ‘democracy,’ which has already been tied to substantial economic expectations

for all of Nigeria, is also interpreted as promising some degree of prosperity to each communal

groups through a ‘democratically’ enabled ‘fairness of distribution.’ These words arose

continually in my interviews and seemed to be bent so easily to serve almost any communal will.

For example, in the oil rich Delta states, ‘democracy’ demands that they keep their ‘fair’ share of

the oil revenue, whereas in the Northern states ‘democracy’ demands that the natural resources

belonging to Nigeria be shared ‘fairly’ with all of Nigeria’s states.

Third, throughout Nigeria ‘democracy’ is associated with ‘religious freedom,’ but this

liberal truism is greatly complicated by each region’s interpretation thereof. In northern Nigeria,

the most vigorously sought freedom is that tied to their closest held identity–freedom of religion.

In practice, this ‘democratic’ freedom is expected to naturally take the form of the long awaited

22

reintroduction of Sharia, or Islamic law. In southern Nigeria ‘freedom of religion’ is interpreted

as the freedom from religious imposition, which they feel should naturally accompany a

‘democratic’ (read secular) state.

What happens when these interpretations of ‘democracy’ are exercised in a political

system whose primary settlement mechanism is periodic electoral competitions? Interest groups

(defined communally) are compelled to compete in each of three major fields, each associated

with a particular construction of ‘democracy’ listed above. First, who is represented? In other

words, how are constituencies defined, how are subnational political borders drawn, and what

communal groups will ultimately be represented in office. Second, to whom are economic

resources dispensed? In other words, how do local and regional groups compete with each other

for political control of economic assets as well as jockey with state and federal government for

their share of the tax revenue from such assets. Third, which law rules? That is, which laws and

which legal system will be established (liberal-secular or religious). Unfortunately, as each of

these competitive games is overlaid upon a ‘democratic’ playing field already filled with

entrenched identity groups and nonnegotiable identity-laden symbolism, violent conflict can all

too easily erupt. Whereas the first two of these fields of conflict are discussed elsewhere

(Ellsworth 2002), the following examples will clarify the third–the ‘democratic’ conflicts over

religious law and the Sharia.

RULED BY WHAT – SECULAR OR ISLAMIC LAW?

Today the conflicts brought about earlier by economic and political competition have

been eclipsed by those concerning religious law. Democratic governance demands some type of

15 There have been other religious/ethnic conflicts in Nigeria since the recentinauguration of ‘democracy’ that are not directly linked to Sharia (Islamic law) but might insteadbe linked to a general feeling of religious tension. For example, in southern areas where largeMuslim minority populations live, a religious crisis can easily emerge within an already tenseatmosphere. For example, in July 1999 in Ogun State a Hausa woman was killed for violating a“no-movement” requirement in observance of the Yoruba cultural festival. Hausa reactedviolently and soon more than 40 people had died on both sides of this religious divide (Adedeji1999). Violence then spread to the far reaches of the North where in Kano, Muslims retaliatedagainst Christian enclaves. Within a week 70 more were dead and thousands more weredisplaced.

16 Once again, refer to Figure 4, which depicts how the students I polled (Ellsworth 1999)value their religious identities. In a nation deeply divided, where religious identification far

23

Figure 4. Mean rank (1 representing thehighest ranked, 6 the lowest) of eachidentity category, contrasting North andSouth. Asterisk indicates ANOVAstatistical significance (Ellsworth 1999).

law, yet the selection of which specific type of law a country adopts is by no means

predetermined, nor is such a selection solely an empirical issue devoid of political, cultural, and

identity conflicts.

Over the past three years, Nigeria has faced a number of very deadly disputes related to

Nigerian states’ adoption and implementation of

Sharia (Islamic legal system) as the official code

of law.15 When supported by a majority of the

population, many claim, the adoption of Sharia is

‘democratic,’ and when challenged to separate

church and state, they respond that it would be

‘undemocratic’ not to establish as law the will of

a state’s majority citizens. It seems, that such

conflicts are yet one more inevitable consequence

of ‘democratic’ transition in a deeply divided

religious society.16 In an interview one Northern

outweighs any personal affiliation to national or subnational political structures, conflicts overIslamic law have been Nigeria’s most violent since the inauguration of ‘democracy.’

24

Muslim, Ibrahim Alhassan, claimed that “To every Muslim, Islam is more important than a

nation. Without Sharia, Islam has no value in Nigeria” (Ibagere 2000).

Brief History of Sharia (Religious) Conflicts

This recent round of Sharia-related conflicts began when Zamfara state first adopted

Sharia in October 1999, just five months after the advent of ‘democracy.’ This announcement

set in motion a cascade of Nigeria’s Northern states announcing and then officially enacting

Sharia law.

Table 1. Time Line of Nigerian States Adapting Sharia.

State Date Signed Date Enacted

1 Zamfara Fall 1999 January, 2000

2 Niger Feb 22, 2000 May 4, 2000

3 Sokoto May 29, 2000 (?) May 4, 2000

4 Kano March 5, June 21 November 26, 2000

5 Katsina August 1, 2000 ?

6 Jigawa August 2, 2000 “Later in Year”

7 Yobe August 7, 2000 October 1, 2000

8 Borno August 19, 2000 ?

9 Kebbi December 1, 2000 December 1, 2000

10 Bauchi February 27, 2001 March 31, 2001

Note: Kaduna State, initially the site of the most violent conflicts over Sharia, announced that itwould enact Sharia, but due to the extremity of the bloodshed rescinded that plan soon thereafter.

17 An alternative estimate provided by U.S.-based Human Rights Watch put the death tollcloser to 700 (Farah 2000).

25

Sources: 1. 2. 3. 4. (Agence France Presse 2000a) 5. (Abubakar 2000) 6. 7.(Agence FrancePresse 2000b) 8. (Agence France Presse 2000c) 9. (Agence France Presse 2000d) 10. (AgenceFrance Presse 2000e).

When Zamfara first announced it would adopt the Sharia, the seeds of unrest were

already present, but remained nonviolent in their manifestation. Nevertheless, a storm was

brewing. In the announcement ceremony, Zamfara’s governor claimed that the Muslim faith

could not be complete without Sharia. Many outside the ceremony supported the Sharia arguing

that Muslims in Nigeria had for years “endured subjugation and denial of their rights to live as

[M]uslims” (Emerole et al 1999). Echoing those sentiments, the Secretary-General of the

Nigeria Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs argued that “No true Moslem can oppose or avoid

Sharia” (Emerole et al 1999).

Commenting on Zamfara’s new Sharia law at the time of its adoption, Nigeria’s Vice

President, Atiku Abubakar, was clearly unaware of what this peaceful ceremony had set in

motion. “Events are still unfolding as regards the issue. As at now, the Federal Government is

just watching” (Faturoti et al 1999). Soon thereafter the storm soon broke with ferocious

consequences.

Ground zero was located in Kaduna, the Northern region’s second largest city, where the

Sharia was announced several months later but with much more dire consequences. Fighting

between the Christians and Muslims broke out in late February 2000 and within four days had

cost an estimated 1,000 lives.17 Corpses littered the streets. Upon fleeing, one Christian

26

commented succinctly “Nigeria is divided. I am going home to the eastern region” (Nwosu

2000b). Framed even more in the competitive zero-sum attitude, another fleeing resident

claimed that “the Moslems don’t want peace with us, they want to make us follow their religion,

they have to know we will never accept Sharia. Never” (Nwosu 2000a). Yet another claimed

while employing one interpretation of ‘democracy’ that “the Moslems should realise that Nigeria

is a Christian country. The majority of us in Nigeria are Christians and we will resist any

attempt to force us into Islam” (Nwosu 2000a).

Upon visiting Kaduna, President Obsanjo was horrified exclaiming in a televised address,

“I could not believe Nigerians were capable of such barbarism against one another,” and vowed

he would resist any attempt to dismember the country. Yet to the international audience, and

especially to foreign investors he assured that this bloodbath was “a hiccup that will be put

behind us” (Cornwell 2000). Echoing this unwarranted optimism in August 2000, President

Obasanjo argued in an interview that best approach to Sharia is to ignore it. “I think [S]haria will

fizzle out. To confront it is to keep it alive” (Farah 2000). It did not “fizzle out.” As

summarized by one reporter,

Two bouts of bloody riots, in February and May between Christians and Muslims,led to more than 2,000 deaths, following attempts by the northern Kaduna Stategovernment to introduce Sharia there. Several churches and mosques were setablaze and properties destroyed. Hundreds more were killed in reprisal attacksagainst northern Muslim immigrants in the largely Christian south-east (Ibagere2000).

Ethnic Spillover

This communal conflict, although marked primarily by religious differences, has not been

contained solely within the religiously divided communities. Instead, it almost immediately

18 This statement was premature. I’ll need to update that in September 2001, anotherSharia riot swept Jos city wherein hundreds were killed.

19 Some blamed this conflict initially on outsiders from neighboring communities (NoAuthor 2000, Non-indigenes). Although this is a comforting theory, evidence months latersuggested that instead “several prominent citizens of the area were alleged to have sponsored theagitation that led to the crisis” (Leman 2001).

27

spilled over into ethnic-based conflicts as well. Soon after the religious conflict began in

Kaduna, an Igbo organization, the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of

Biafra (MASSOB), claimed that because Christian Igbo were targeted in the Kaduna riots, it

would soon “mobilise Igbos in retaliate (sic) against Hausas in the South.” They furthermore

added that “Igbos resident in Kaduna, in particular, and in the North in general, should use every

amount of force available to defend themselves, with any ammunition in their possession . . . “

(Ukeh 2000). In fact, after the approximately 1,000 people died in the North, Hausas were then

“killed by the hundred[s] in Aba in Nigeria’s southeastern corner as groups of local Christians

exacted a bloody revenge for murdered relatives, their bodies brought home on the back of a

trailer” (Cornwell 2000).

Although such large-scale conflicts appear to have subsided,18 various small outbreaks

have cost and continue to cost Nigerians their lives. On September 7, 2000, after a committee

visited the predominantly Christian Bambam village to poll opinions regarding support for

Sharia, Christian and Mulsim groups both began peaceful marches in support of their favored

policy. The marches passed peacefully, but that evening the killings began19 which led by the

end of the day to the deaths of more than 20 people and the burning of two churches and two

mosques along with many homes and businesses (Doki 2000). The religious nature of this

conflict and its ties to Sharia were clear. One young man, Musa, recounted that some attackers

28

called “Allahu Akbar!” (“God is great”) as they burned buildings and killed villagers. Reporters

visiting Bambam to assess its aftermath report that pro-Sharia slogans were scribbled in English

and Arabic stating ‘Sharia no going back,’ ‘Sharia forever’ and ‘Sharia is a most’(Doki 2000).

Months later some report that “Hundreds of lives were lost” (Leman 2001).

In discussing the mayhem almost two weeks after the initial conflict, a community

Chriatian leader, Reverend Solomon Hussaini Kalshingi clarified that “Of course the clamour for

and against Shariah is still with us and it is the bone of contention,” and spoke of Gombe States’s

religious makeup being a crucial issue when understanding this conflict. He explained,

The fact is that in Gombe State, there are eleven local governments, four out ofthese number are in the northern part of the state. These four local governmentsare dominated by Muslims, Christians do not have influence there. The other fourlocal governments in the southern parts of the state are dominated by Christians.There, Muslims have no influence. Apart from these are the major localgovernments of Gombe, Yamaltu, Deba and Akko. If there is much disagreements(sic) or lack of consensus in these local governments, it would be a reflection oftheir multi-ethnic and multi-religious diversity because Christians, Muslims, andeven traditional religious worshippers are there (No Author 2000, Non-indigenes).

Yet, he concluded that “We have lived together, coexisted side-by-side for ages” (No Author

2000, Non-indigenes). An unfortunate lesson on the volatile nature of divided societies can be

drawn from these words. Gombe State, positioned between the Christian and Muslim worlds

finds itself particularly vulnerable to religious-based conflicts. It is in many ways a microcosm

of the entire Nigerian State which finds itself similarly positioned and facing the same volatile

issues of “multi-ethnic and multi-religious diversity.”

Again in February 2001 a riot in the nearby state capital of Gombe (also named Gombe)

cost four lives when rioting Muslim youth sacked two Christian churches. According to reports,

thousands of Muslim youths took to the streets protesting a visit by the Israeli Ambassador to

29

Nigeria who came to speak with state officials about economic matters and to inaugurate a

Shalom Club for Christians who have been on pilgrimage to Israel. Some government officials,

however, “linked the riots to frustration by various Muslim groups over the delay in the

implementation of the Sharia law”(Leman 2001).

It should not be surprising that political debate over the nature of religious law could

easily evolve into debates over religion and then into outright warfare. At a rally at the Katsina

Central Mosque, Alhaji Datti Ahmed engaged in such inflammatory speech as to declare that

“what [President] Obasanjo is trying to pracicalise is war against our religion, against our sharia

and war against us.” Accusing Obasanjo of implementing a Christian agenda he charged that,

“[Obasanjo] said ‘One Nigeria One God.’ But who is the God of Obasanjo. It is Jesus who is his

God.” Unfortunately this rhetoric could easily turn more violent. In response to this

‘declaration’ or war, he claimed that the North is forming and “Islamic Suicide Squad” preparing

in the bush to defend Islam. His justified these actions by claiming that “instead of living a

second class citizen it is better for me to become a martyr” (No author 2000, North Is Raising).

Sharia’s ‘Democratic’ Discourse

How might we account for this often-called ‘fundamentalist revival’? Such

‘reawakening’ of identities is often portrayed in the popular press and in some academic

literature as resulting from an absence of authoritarian control–the “taking the lid off the boiling

pot” theory. To the contrary, the statements of those involved in the Sharia conflicts suggest that

these conflicts are tied more closely to the presence of ‘democracy.’ For example as Borno

state’s Governor, Mala Kachallah, inaugurated a Sharia Implementation Committee in February

20 Similarly, Datti Ahmed, a Muslim leader and former presidential aspirant suggestedthat Christians opposing the Sharia may leave. “The only thing they have to do is to vacate theplace and go where the climate is good for them” (Roughton 2000).

30

2001, he utilized a nation of ‘democracy’ in Sharia’s defense. Dismissing those who opposed

the Sharia, he claimed that “Sharia was in response to the yearnings and aspirations of the

majority of the people.” Regarding the ‘democratic’ notion of ‘rights’ he explained that the

“government will ensure that the rights of all its citizens are protected and guaranteed as

enshrined in the constitution and indeed the Sharia legal system” (No author 2001, Borno

Governor).

Likewise, Muzzammil Hanga, leader of the Muslim Lawyers Forum (MLF) and head of

Publicity of Sharia Implementation Committee, explained that Kano State joined other Sharia

states because “the time for a clearly defined status of Muslims had come with the advent of

democracy. They saw no other apt environment and time than that now that there is freedom for

all” (Ikyur 2000, Italics added for emphasis). At that same ceremony Dr. Datti Ahmed, former

President of the Social Democratic Party, boldly warned that “to oppose our effort as a state in

this regard (of adopting Sharia) is to oppose democracy. . .” (parenthetical reference added by

reporter– Ikyur 2000). To clarify, he explained that “if any state wants another system cherished

by the vast majority of its citizens we will regard it as their right to establish such a system

within our federal democratic set up.” Furthermore, he suggested that any resident was free to

leave the state and relocate elsewhere “if any individual feels too uncomfortable with any set up

established by the majority in any state” (Ikyur 2000).20

Similarly, Isa Ibdulsalam, an academic who is advising Kano State government on the

reintroduction of Sharia claims that the introduction of Sharia is “the benefit of democracy. . . .

21 Drawing on this quote and other observations, the one western reporter staying in Kanonotes the irony that, although defended as a ‘democratic’ imperative, Sharia has also grown inpopularity as Sharia’s advocates have critiqued Nigeria’s ‘democratic’ project. He claims that “

There is little doubt that many ordinary Nigerians embrace Islamic law as an actof desperation rather than a religious value system. Islamic intellectuals may talkof Sharia as a rulebook for life, but it is sold to many ordinary Muslims as asolution after so many failed alternatives - democracy, military rule and now thereign of President Olusegun Obasanjo” (McGreal 2000).

31

The people can come forward and demand something. Under previous regimes, people didn’t

have that freedom” (Singer 2001).

Others acknowledge Sharia’s grassroots ‘democratically’ driven ascension of Sharia, and

suggest that under ‘democratic’ elected officials have no choice but to implement the will of the

majority. For example Kano’s state governor, Rabiu Kwankwaso, resisted implementing Sharia

at first but was overwhelmed by its popular support and in the words of one reporter he was

“vilified by the very citizens who elected [him]” (McGreal 2000). Suliman Kumo, one of

Kano’s leading Islamic scholars, explained

If you are a politician you can’t ignore the appeal. The governor of Kano tried hisbest to sideline the issue . . . but he realised he had no alternative but to make adeclaration in favour of sharia. For some incomprehensible reason the shariaissue has become so emotional and the one issue that has united people innorthern Nigeria. I’ve never seen a single issue do this in Nigeria. Partly it’srebellion against a non-functioning [Nigerian political] system (McGreal 2000).21

Other governors faced similar ‘democratic’ pressures which they felt helpless to resist.

One reporter explains that although, “The Kano governor’s decision to introduce Sharia goes

against an accord suspending implementation that Mr Obasanjo said he reached with the 19

northern governors after riots in Kaduna last February,” the governor had little choice but to defy

the President’s accord. “Colleagues said Mr Kwankwaso’s hesitation over the issue had

threatened his political survival”(Wallis 2000b).

22 As part of this celebration but in a remarkably anti-‘democratic’ spirit, the Governoralso commissioned N385 million (about $4 million) to improve the “Sani Abacha” road namedfor one of Nigeria’s most ruthless dictators.

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Speaking at the recent anniversary of Sharia in Zamfara State, Governor Ahmed Sani

Yerima implied that the Sharia was consistent with ‘democracy’ because “Today, all Muslims

support Sharia” (Kelejaiye 2001). It is noteworthy, however, that he noted no contradiction

between the ‘democratic’ reference to a ‘majority will’ and what followed in his speech.

Because the national Nigerian Police Force had been reluctant to enforce the Sharia, the

Governor warned that “If the police continue with this attitude for next month the vigilante

group will have the powers to arrest and present for prosecution violators of Sharia laws. The

Attorney-General is hereby mandated to prosecute such culprits” (Kelejaiye 2001).22

Finally, other brief allusions to some interpretation of ‘democracy’ are frequently found

in passing statements by those officials attempting to provide their religious law with a sense of

‘democratic’ legitimacy. Zamfara’s governor spoke of “freedom of religion” claiming that,

“. . .Sharia law has been recognized for centuries throughout Nigeria’s Muslim north,

particularly in such civil matters as marriage and inheritance, and that by guaranteeing freedom

of religion, the constitution allowed Zamfara to enforce Islamic law” (Simmons 2000). The

governor of Sokoto State in a symbolic act signed Sharia into law on May 29, 2000--the first

anniversary of the return to ‘democracy.’

Others, especially from Nigeria’s Southern or Christian populations are not convinced by

these interpretations of ‘democracy.’ In stark contrast to these supportive views, for example,

the Minister of Information and National Orientation, Professor Jerry Gana, explains that the

imposition of Sharia was not a fulfillment of ‘democracy’ but an attempt to derail it.

33

[Gana] argued that if the federal government had prosecuted the shariaproponents, those involved would have painted it that federal government wasprosecuting the moslems without taking into consideration that it was aconstitutional matter. ‘The issue of sharia, yes, it is a constitutional issue. But given the religious nature of that particular problem it was essentially apolitical trap to derail democracy’ (This Day 2001).

Echoing the opinion that Sharia threatens the Nigerian State, the esteemed author Chinua Achebe

claimed, while visiting Nigeria in 1999, that Nigeria is “sicker than we feared” identifying Sharia

as “the greatest threat to the federation” (Jaggi 2000, journalist’s paraphrasing).

Finally, outside of Nigeria, President Obasanjo has been quite critical of the Sharia

project. While speaking at Harvard University in November 1999, Obasanjo argued that Islamic

Law contradicted Nigeria’s constitution. He claimed, “We have a constitution in Nigeria and the

constitution is against any state religion. To that extent, no part of Nigeria can formulate or go

for anything that is a state religion -- it is unconstitutional” (Johnson 2000). President Obasanjo,

a Baptist from southeastern Nigeria, continued to explain that although Nigeria’s federal system

permits the states to adopt their own laws, “blanket implementation of any religious law is not

permitted” (Johnson 2000, journalist’s phrasing).

As interesting as these accusations may be, it is all the more revealing how ‘democratic’

images and rhetoric are then used to rebut those accusations. Responding to fears that Sharia

might lead to a dissolution of the Nigerian state, Ibrahim Datti Ahmad, president of the Supreme

Council for Sharia in Nigeria, claimed, “I don’t see any division happening at all. Muslims are

not thinking along those lines. I hope other people who are making so much noise will realize

sharia is a fact of life for us here” (Farah 2000). Then activating the ‘democratic’ discourse he

added. “We give [non-Muslims] the right to live as they want where Muslims are not a majority,

23 Some states are in a real danger of dissolving. The Sharia controversy has also tied inwith the representational issues of drawing borders. Just as several of Africa’s Sahel nations(like Sudan and Chad) have faced national religious divides that threaten the viability of aunified state, some central Nigerian states find themselves likewise pulled apart when internalreligious schisms run across political borders. For example Reverend Filibus Gwama, the BornoState head of the Christian Association of Nigeria, suggests that in Borno state, where Sharia isbeing considered, Christian leaders speak of dividing Borno into Muslim and Christian sections. He explains,

We want to be very blunt and frank that the Christians cannot condone theestablishment of Sharia in Borno. We shall firmly create and recognize southernBorno as an entity that shall not in any way be affected by Sharia laws (Mejias2000).

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so what is the problem? Here, we are a majority in a democracy, and happily we are now in a

position to choose, and we choose to go back to sharia.”23 Commenting on the long-term

implications of this trend, Ibrahim Datti Ahmad predicted that Sharia will eventually become law

in 19 of Nigeria’s 36 states (Farah 2000).

Similarly, at the inauguration of Sharia for Kebbi State in December 2000, Governor

Mohammed Adamu Aliero defended Sharia by stating that,

Of all assertions against sharia, none is more baffling than the much talked aboutallegation that sharia was yet another way of undermining democracy in Nigeria. Unfortunately, those who hold this erroneous view failed to realise that we whoare championing the cause of sharia are products and beneficiaries of the currentdemocratic dispensation (Editorial Staff 2000).

It is all the more telling to note the source of some rebuttals. For example, one of the

great champions of ‘democracy’ in Nigeria’s history, the democratically elected President

Shagari to whom then General Obsanjo turned over his military-led government, sharply

criticized Obsanjo’s efforts to suspend Sharia during the earlier Kaduna riots. Shagari declared

such attempts to resist the implementation of Sharia as “unconstitutional” (Cornwell 2000).

35

‘DEMOCRATIC’ DISCURSIVE HETERODOXY

Such debates over the democracyness of Sharia, reveal how easily the ‘democratic’

discourse is turned to justify and legitimize either of the two diametrically opposed conceptions

of the role of Sharia in a ‘democratic’ state. What hegemonic qualities the ‘democratic’

discourse might have possessed (its econom[ist]ic nature) seem to have been split into two

heterodoxic discourses as they have been applied in Nigeria’s Southern and Northern regions.

Evidence of these multiple discursive spheres is found in many particular applications of

‘democracy.’ Below I will briefly present both sides of that divide as ‘democracy’ is used to

promote different views of first, religious freedom; second, peace and order; and third, the

protection of minority rights.

FREEDOM OF/FROM RELIGION

Previous statements have already presented the Northern/Muslim views of Sharia as

fulfillment of the ‘democratic’ freedom to practice their religion. The following quotes suggest

once more that in the Muslim areas freedom of religion is prized, whereas in the Christian

communities, the guarantee of a ‘democratic’ secular state that protects freedom from religion is

more important.

From the North, Abdulatif Adegbite, the secretary general of the Nigerian Supreme

Council for Islamic Affairs, spoke from Abeokuta, Ogun State. “Our religion does not allow us

not to apply Sharia. It is part and parcel of Islam. You can not have freedom of religion without

observing Sharia. I do not see why [opponents] should dogmatically insist we have no right to

apply Sharia to ourselves” (Eagle 2000).

36

From the Christian perspective one reporter quotes Ferdinand Obi Abbas, a Christian

who works in a tiny electronics shop, and explains that “It’s not Islam as a religion that we worry

about,” he says. “We have a secular state, where people are free to practice their own religions.

And to keep one Nigeria, this must not change” (Roughton 2000, Italics added).

A ‘DEMOCRATIC’ PEACE – SHARIA AS A CURE TO CRIME VERSUS A CAUSE OF WAR

From the North – Sharia brings Peace and Order

Because of the harsh penalties mandated by Sharia, and because of the officially

sanctioned vigilante squads who enforce the punishments with enthusiasm, crime has dropped in

the Sharia States. In the words of one reporter, “Bands of vigilantes in frayed red uniforms,

armed with homemade machetes, whips, and clubs, roam this poor and parched state on the edge

of the Sahara, detaining anyone suspected of misconduct. The list of possible offenses is long,

and justice is swift and severe. In the past year, one cattle thief lost a hand, an unwed teen

mother received 100 lashes, and countless other men and women endured similar public lashings

for lesser transgressions. Not surprisingly, crime has plummeted by more than half” (Singer

2001). Quoting one Northern policeman, Musa Ossa, “People here are afraid to commit crime.

We don’t have many thieves anymore” (Singer 2001).

Zamfara’s Governor Sani says his aim is to create a society of high morality, social order,

peace and progress, stating that, “We Muslims believe that there is only one solution to human

problems, and that is going back to divine rules and regulations.” He continued, “Once you have

divine rules governing your life, there will be peace and stability” (Simmons 2000). Abbas

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Ibrahim, a Muslim handyman from Zamfara State, “talks about sharia in the same manner as

Americans fed up with crime might discuss the death penalty”(Singer 2001).

Even at the height of the early massacres, some believe that Kano’s declaration of Sharia

helped avert even greater bloodshed. After the initial riots in Kaduna cost so many

Christain/Igbo lives and retaliations in Aba took its toll on the Muslim populations, many feared

an unending escalation of revenge. However, some Northern state officials insist that the quick

passage of Sharia in Kano “was the key to defusing tension” because it quickly ended the

debates and allowed for peace enhancing prayer services the following Friday (Cornwell 2000).

The Southern View

Among the Christian populations, the links joining ‘democracy,’ order, and Sharia are

not so apparent. Raising the specter of civil war, Rev. Hamidu Samaila, Secretary of the

Evangelical Church of West Africa claims that “There is every possibility this country will split.

Christians will have no freedom of worship, and freedom of movement will be restricted. All we

are after is peace, but as soon as sharia is implemented, that will be gone” (Farah 2000).

Some Southern critics are also quick to point out that although Sharia may be justified by

constructing it as a cure to Nigeria’s political ailments, it is clearly not free of political

manipulation itself. Typical of stories coming out of the North, consider the experience of one

devout northern Muslim, Mohammed Sani. Speaking with a reporter, Sani recounted an incident

from August 2000 which began when he was preaching to fellow Muslims near the main mosque

in Gusau (Zamfara’s capital). Pointing to the plethoria of propaganda posters and banners

“featuring the governor’s photograph and praise for sharia law” he explained that “they give this

38

state the feel of China under Mao.” He aruged, “This is a political campaign. Not sharia.” and

went on to argue that “sharia is from God not a governor” (Singer 2001).

Mohammed Sani continued to criticize the governor for his political opportunism and

those enforcing Sharia for their unfair implementation, enforcing harsh judgments on the poor

while requiring no enforcement among the rich and powerful, finally stating that this was all

“Because this governor is using sharia law for his own political purposes” (Singer 2001).

Consequently, he was arrested and brought before judge Umar Shitu who explained, “He went

right into the mosque and criticized the government. . . . We tried to make him understand that

he can cause anarchy. He refused to listen. We decided to put him in prison,” where he spent

four months. An Islamic leader and advisor to Zamfara’s governor explained, “Islam does not

permit someone to criticize the government” (Singer 2001).

Another related incident has added to the feeling that Sharia dissuades political

expression. A prominent member of an opposition political party was brought to sharia court

accused of throwing a stone at the governor’s convoy. Although judge Shitu admitted to a

reporter months later that, “We weren’t convinced that he threw the stone,” the accused spent

two weeks in jail (Singer 2001).

‘DEMOCRATIC PROTECTIONS OF MAJORITY VERSUS MINORITY RIGHTS

From the North–No exemption for Minorities

At the inauguration of Sharia in Kano, the governor, “Mr Kwankwaso said there would

be no exemptions from sharia, withdrawing an earlier statement that a predominantly non-

Muslim area would be exempted” (Oboh 2000). As a result Christian businesses, especially

39

those associated in any way with alcohol, have been forced closed. “Sharia has affected us

badly,” said Umeadi, a Christian hotel owner whose earnings helped put his 10 children through

school. Contradicting those who claim that only Muslims are being held subject to Islamic law,

he reasons that,“if it was a thing for Muslims only, then they would not have forced me to close

down.” Although he has lived in the North for 25 years, Umeadi says he is on the verge of

packing up and moving (Simmons 2000).

Sam Emeka Anosike, President of the Zamfara branch of the Nigerian Bar Association,

says Christians will have no protection from Sharia. “If it’s the law of the land, whoever offends

that law will be brought to book,” he explained. “Sharia is for everybody” (Simmons, 2000). In

the most open public statement on this subject, Zamfara’s Governor now says he “draws no

distinction between Muslims and Christians” (McGreal 2000). This despite some unusually

harsh penalties for those who transgress Islamic law.

Among sentences passed by the Islamic courts there in recent months are theamputation of a man’s leg for stealing a bicycle and an arm for stealing a cow. InAugust two motorbike-taxi drivers were lashed for carrying female passengers.The most controversial sentence was 180 lashes imposed on a pregnant unmarriedgirl. She will be publicly flogged 40 days after the baby is delivered (McGreal2000).

It seems that Christians are even being held to the purely Islamic elements of Sharia. “In Kano,

city employees in one district have been warned that they will be fined a day’s pay every time

they miss prayers (McGreal 2000).

40

CONCLUSION

Communal conflict occurs under many circumstances and in many conditions. In

addition to the many communal conflicts described above, Nigeria also exhibits violent

communal conflicts that appear in no way related to ‘democratization.’ Nevertheless, given the

sharp rise in communal conflicts accompanying ‘democratization,’ and given the degree to

which many of the conflicts are directly linked to ‘democratic’ competition over representation,

economic assets, and rule of religious versus secular law, it appears that ‘democratization’ in

Nigeria is strongly associated with its rising levels of communal violence. Most importantly,

the nature of this association is expressed not only in its rational manifestation (as the players

attempt to adjust to and capitalize on the new rules of the game), but these expression of

rationality are made possible only because particular meanings of ‘democracy’ have been

communicated to, internalized within, and then expressed through the very minds of the agents

involved (i.e. the discourse-enabled associations between ‘democracy’ and communal identities

and ambitions are occurring in the minds of those citizens and leaders).

This suggests that the relationship between ‘democracy’ and communal relations in

Nigeria illustrates the interconnectedness of the international and the national discursive spheres.

The U.S.-Nigerian discourse of ‘democracy’ seems to have penetrated Nigeria’s domestic sphere

where Nigerian citizens have drawn on this ‘democratic’ discourse and their communal identities

to seek the fulfillment of ‘democracy’s’ promises of political representation, a fair share of

Nigeria’s economic resources, the promise of religious freedom. All of this implies that research

in international relations and comparative politics should not be done in isolation of one another.

Furthermore, it cautions international policy makers to carefully consider the social effects of

41

their rhetoric and consider the possible unintended consequences of their rhetoric and policies as

they affect not only actors on the international stage but within domestic realms as well.

42

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