THE GENEALOGY OF METHODOLOGY & THE METHODOLOGY OF

GENEALOGY: PUTTING ACCOUNTING INTO CRISIS.

By

Ken McPhailUniversity of Glasgow

Draft 2.2 (Adelaide Revisions)

ABSTRACT

Michel Foucault’s histories and his method of genealogy have generated a considerable

amount of debate in many academic disciplines and arguments about the accuracy, probity

and veracity of Foucault’s histories have also entered into the accounting history arena

(Funnell 1996; 1998; Fleischman et al 1996; Miller, Hopper & Laughlin 1991; Parker 1999;

Fleischman, Mills & Tyson 1996; Hammon & Sikka 1996; Carnegie & Napier 1996; Tyson

1993) and accounting research in general (see Neimark 1990; Armstrong 1994; Hoskin 1994;

Grey 1994). This essay attempts to contribute to this debate. It presents a new interpretation

of Foucault’s method: a genealogical interpretation of Foucault’s genealogical method. The

paper suggests that genealogy differs quite fundamentally from traditional historiographical

method. It is contended that the aim of genealogy is to put into crisis and therefore that

applications of genealogy within accounting research should endeavour to put accounting into

crisis.

AcknowledgementsI would like to thank Rob Gray for his help in developing the ides in this paper.

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INTRODUCTIONThe work of Michel Foucault has generated a considerable amount of debate within the

accounting history arena (Funnell 1996; 1998; Fleischman et al 1996; Miller, Hopper &

Laughlin 1991; Parker 1999; Fleischman, Mills & Tyson 1996; Hammon & Sikka 1996;

Carnegie & Napier 1996; Tyson 1993) and accounting research in general (see Neimark 1990;

Armstrong 1994; Hoskin 1994; Grey 1994). This essay attempts to contribute to this debate

by providing a genealogical interpretation of Foucault’s genealogical method.

It is quite difficult to place Foucault's method within any specific tradition. Indeed, Foucault

himself resisted classification, for example, he says,'I think I have been situated in most squares on the political checkerboard, one after another

and sometimes simultaneously: as anarchist, leftist, ostentatious or disguised Marxist,

nihilist, explicit or secret anti-Marxist, technocrat in the service of Gaullism, new liberal,

etc.....It’s true I prefer not to identify myself and that I'm amused by the diversity of ways I

have been judged and classified,’ (Foucault, in Rabinow 1984; see Grey 1994)

Foucault’s aversion to classification is however not a personal idiosyncrasy but an integral

part of his philosophy. He does not wish to promote a general method. Foucault's argument

is basically that the formalisation of Method can become substituted for the uncritical and

unreflective application of a series of procedures1. Hoskin (1994) explains Foucault's

argument as follows,‘Method comes easily to persuade researchers of their sovereign rationality and

consequently to overlooking the reflexive problems of how the method itself and their own

use of method is generated,’ (Hoskin 1994).

Thus, what we have in Foucault is not so much a method as an attitude or predisposition and

it is this attitude that will be discussed in this paper.

A number of accounting academics have drawn on the work of Michel Foucault in order to

present new and critical histories of accounting (see for example Preston 1992; Loft 1986;

Miller & O’Leary 1987; Hopwood 1987 and Hoskin & Macve 1988). Indeed Miller, Hooper

and Laughlin (1991) suggest that such is the extent of these new approaches that one may

legitimately talk of a new accounting history paradigm2. However despite the burgeoning

number of projects which have, ‘drawn on’ (Preston 1992) or been ‘inspired by’ (Miller &

O’Leary 1987; Loft 1986) Foucault’s notions of genealogy and archaeology, the literature as

1 Foucault is quite close to Derrida on this point (Norris 1988).

2 Miller, Hopper & Laughlin 1991 also include new Marxist perspectives in their category of newaccounting histories.

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yet lacks a systematic delineation of Foucault’s method of historical analysis (although see

perhaps Miller & O’Leary 1987, and Hopwood 1987).

This paper suggests that Foucault’s histories differ quite fundamentally both from traditional

accounting histories and from many of the new Foucauldian studies of accounting. The paper

attempts to contribute to the debate over the way in which Foucault’s method has been

employed within accounting research to date and in particular addresses the claim that some

of these studies are conservative and lack critical impact (see Neimark 1990; Armstrong

1994; Hoskin 1994; Grey 1994). This essay links Foucault with the work of the early critical

theorists and the Frankfurt School and suggests that the very essence of genealogy is to put

into crisis.

This link with Critical Theory is quite important. From an analysis of the accountancy

literature it seems that Foucault is often deleteriously labelled a postmodernist or conservative

theorist and viewed in sharp contradistinction to critical theorists and Marxist historiography

(see Neimark 1990; Armstrong 1994; Hoskin 1994; Grey 1994). Habermas (1994, in Hoy

1994) for example criticises Foucault for what he perceives as his complete rejection of

modernity. He condemns Foucault as a postmodernist, 'Young Conservative, enemy of the

project of modernity,' (Habermas 1984, in Simons 1995). However, I believe that neither

Foucault’s philosophy, nor postmodernism per se simply rejects modernity. Foucault was not

completely opposed to every characteristic of the enlightenment (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1994)

and indeed, he personally refuted claims that he was a postmodernist3 (Hoy 1988). This essay

attempts to challenge the postmodern interpretation of Foucault’s work. It will be argued that

Foucault follows in the tradition of the early critical theorists, although his work also

represents a fundamental break from this tradition.

The paper is split into two sections. Following a short preamble, section one provides the

historical context within which Foucault’s method of genealogy developed and should

therefore be understood. Section two considers the main characteristics of Foucault’s method

of genealogy.

PREAMBLE

Debate over the validity of a specific piece of research often appears to concentrate on the

accuracy of a particular research technique and the ability of its concomitant methodology to

3 An interesting anecdote is that in an interview in Telos, Gerard Raulet asked Foucault aboutpostmodernism. Foucault replied, 'What is postmodernism? I'm not up-to-date.' (Thanks to Scott Moorof the Foucault list for this point).

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generate knowledge. This seems particularly so within the debate surrounding the new

accounting histories (see for example Tyson 1993 and Funnell 1996). However, the nature of

this debate perhaps belies a more fundamental set of assumptions about the function of

historiography and research in general (see Parker 1999, Gaffikin 1992), i.e. that the primary

objective of research is to help us understand (the past) better. The genealogical method

delineated in this paper starts from the assumption that the function of research is not only to

generate knowledge but to generate knowledge in a conscious attempt to change both the

subject studied and our knowledge of ourselves, that is, it assumes that research should take

the form of a radical praxis.

Research undoubtedly plays an active role in constructing the world investigated. This may

seem a rather obvious point, few people who have considered the effects of Copernicus's

astronomy, Newton's physics or Darwin's biology could deny the impact of research on

society (see, for example, Checkland 1990; Arrington & Francis 1989). Research into a

particular issue can have quite significant social and political effects. However, apart from

the more tangible consequences, research also effects society in a more subtle kind of way

through the legitimation of particular ways of generating knowledge, and perhaps also the

institutionalisation of specific ways of thinking. The social and political nature of research is

highlighted by Galtung (1977, in Morrow & Brown 1995) when he says,‘Far from being universal, a methodology even contributes to the definition and maintenance

of a certain social structure by being compatible with it, or to its downfall and replacement

by another by being incompatible with it.’

Checkland (1990) suggests that scientific research in particular has had a profound effect on

society and on the way we think, he says,'More than being merely a product ... science is an invention of our civilisation - a cultural

invention - and it is probably the most powerful invention ever made in the whole history of

mankind. Our world in the 20th century is essentially the world created by the activity of

science, and not only created physically in our cities, our transportation, and our

communication systems, but also created institutionally in our political and administrative

procedures, in the way we organise our society. Rationalism and empiricism, twin outcomes

of the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century, have influenced all our civilisation, not only

its mere technology.' (Checkland 1990 pp23)

The discipline of accounting history, perhaps until fairly recently, has been almost exclusively

based on and legitimated by the objective, positivist methodology of science (Parker 1999;

Hammond & Sikka 1996). However new accounting histories represent a challenge, not only

to this approach to historiographical analysis but also to both the social and cognitive

structures it helps to maintain.

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Starting from the assumption that research is a social and political activity highlights the

consequences of research, at least to the extent that they can be known or anticipated. This

may push the debate back from epistemological issues of method, truth and knowledge to a

more fundamental, ethical debate about the kind of society we want to live in, rather than

producing research which consciously or otherwise acts to shore up the inequalities and

inequities in the prevailing system. Arrington and Francis (1989) make this point clear when

they say,‘The practice of accounting and theorising about the practice are always and already

informed by ethics which help to create the material conditions of human life. To deny the

value-ladeness of one’s theorising is to deny responsibility for the consequences of your

theories.'

From this, similarly value laden perspective, the choice of method and methodology are

essentially political and ethical decisions. It would appear that traditional accounting

historians have been preoccupied with the defensibility of their analysis and the rigour of their

method and perhaps little consideration has been given to the ethical justification for the study

or the consequences of the interpretation provided (see Parker 1999).

SECTION ONE: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT.

This section attempts to provide the context for understanding Foucault’s method of

genealogy. It provides some historical background to the two methodological strands that

Foucault knotted together. The paper contends that Foucault’s method is located at the

junction of philosophical hermeneutics and Critical Theory. Without an appreciation of this

context it is impossible to understand the characteristics of the genealogical method discussed

in section two.

Hermeneutic Philosophy

The first theoretical strand that is important for understanding Foucault’s method of

genealogy is hermeneutics.

Hermeneutics is the theory of interpretation of meaning (Audi 1995; Llewellyn 1993).

Traditionally this notion was related to the interpretation of ancient texts and as such had a

relatively narrow application. However hermeneutics evolved into a whole philosophical

position that emerged in Germany in the twentieth century (see Audi 1995). Hermeneutics

draws an analogy between the interpretation of a text and any attempts to understand social

action (Llewellyn 1993). While there are a number of significantly different hermeneutical

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positions within the social science literature all are characterized by an attempt to get beyond

the subject-object dichotomy.

The hermeneutical turn which has taken place in the broader social sciences has been

manifest in the accounting literature. It has been introduced into organisational theory

(Boland 1989) and management accounting theory (Llewellyn 1993) and also has been used

in the analysis of accounting education (Power 1991a). Recently within the accounting

history literature Fleischman et al (1996) have drawn on Gadamer’s hermeneutics in their call

for greater dialogue amongst the various parties in the new historiographic debate. However

this methodological position has not yet been used to develop an understanding of Foucault’s

method of genealogy.

There are two related issues here which are important to understanding the impact that

hermeneutics has had on accounting research. The first issue relates to attempts which have

been made to apply hermeneutics as a method for investigating accountancy (see Llewellyn

1993). The second issue relates to the, 'linguistic turn,' within hermeneutic philosophy. This

linguistic aspect has been used to develop new perspectives for understanding the role that

accounting plays in society.

In relation to this second issue some researchers have viewed accounting as a kind of

language system (see Laughlin 1981,1987; Cooper 1983; Roberts and Scapens 1985, Lavoie

1987). Boland (1989) for example stresses the importance of hermeneutics in appreciating the

interpretative nature of accounting. He says, 'accountants are engaged in the interpretative act

as both readers and writers of organisational texts,' however he contends that accountants

have become conditioned into interpreting situations in specific ways. Laovie (1987) literally

studies accountancy as the language of business. Schweiker (1993) provides a hermeneutic

examination of the process of giving an account, in an attempt to stress the moral dimension

of accounting. Francis (1994) studies auditing from a hermeneutic perspective and suggests

that it is a hermeneutic activity (see also Manicas 1993) and Power (1991a) has introduced

hermeneutics to the study of accounting education. He analyses the process of professional

accounting training from a Habermasian perspective and suggests that they can be

conceptualized in terms of a distorted speech situation.

There are two basic divisions in hermeneutics. The first is based on the work of the German

philosopher and historian Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). This approach attempts to develop

hermeneutics as a method for social science research and seems to be related to the first sense

in which hermeneutics is being applied within accounting research. The second strain of

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hermeneutics is generally called, ‘Hermeneutic Philosophy,’ and is based on the work of

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Foucault’s method of genealogy draws on this second strain

of hermeneutic philosophy.

The work of the German philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) on understanding

represents the beginning of hermeneutics as it has developed from Dilthey (Audi 1995).

Schleiermacher developed a method of analysis known as the hermeneutic circle. This notion

is based on the observation that in social science both the researcher and the individuals being

researched are connected by particular traditions and customs, essentially because they are

part of the same society or community. The concept of the hermeneutic circle refers to the

idea that the interpretation of a specific situation or event depends upon an interpretation of

the whole social context within which the event takes place and conversely the interpretation

of the whole context depends upon the interpretation of its constituent parts. The method

proceeds firstly with an initial overview of the subject matter, this overview informs an

examination of the parts which in turn elucidates the concept of the whole. This is repeated in

an iterative process which, it is assumed, will gradually lead to a better understanding of the

situation (see Llewellyn 1993; Boland 1989; Audi 1995).

From this analysis it is hopefully clearer how the subject-object dichotomy is transcended

within hermeneutics. Both the researcher (the subject) and the individuals being researched

(the object of the study, which may be subjects) are seen to be linked together to the extent

that both belong to a generally similar cultural and historical tradition. The differences in the

understanding of both the researcher and the object of his/her research are mutually exposed

and reconciled in the course of the research. As such, this approach is significantly different

to the empirico-scientific approach described above.

From a hermeneutic perspective, the study of society is seen as an endless process of

reassessment rather than a transition from ignorance to truth, as is characteristically the case

within positivist research (Bauman 1978). Bauman (1978) describes the hermeneutic circle as

a process where understanding is seen to go in circles rather than in a linear process towards

progressive enlightenment. In hermeneutics, there is no correct place from which to begin or

end.

The strain of hermeneutics that emanates from Dilthey’s work is generally called,

'Hermeneutic Theory' (as opposed to, Hermeneutic Philosophy,’ which will be described later,

see Audi 1995). Hermeneutic Theory is concerned with the problem of how an individual can

objectively understand meaning (Bleicher 1980) and, as such, still represents what seems to

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be a fairly innocuous attempt to increase understanding. Within this type of hermeneutic

analysis, it is assumed that any situation has a meaning independent from the act of

interpreting the situation (Winograd & Flores 1987). Thus, while it is important to note the

fundamental differences between hermeneutics and scientific methodology, it is also

important to note that this particular form of hermeneutics seems to remain a neutral tool for

generating a better understanding of things. As such, both science and Hermeneutic Theory

may be seen to have generally similar aspirations, although, as we have seen above, the way

in which they attempt to achieve them is fundamentally different.

The second strain of hermeneutics is generally termed philosophical hermeneutics and is

associated with the work of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger elaborates his philosophical

hermeneutics at two levels. Firstly, he contends that the nature of being lies not in the essence

of the thing itself but rather lies in the structures within which things are situated and which

create the space for them to be. However in the second part of his thesis Heidegger suggests

that the, 'deep truth,' behind our partial and taken-for-granted interpretations is just more

interpretation, an 'unsettling groundlessness,' (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). Thus, from this

perspective Freud’s contention that consciousness is somehow underpinned by the libido and

Marx’ argument that consciousness is underpinned by economic structures are exposed as just

more interpretation (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). Thus in Heidegger the notion of the

hermeneutic circle is radicalized such that it is taken to apply to everyday life and

interpretations of the deep meanings behind everyday life.

Hermeneutic philosophy has been developed by Hans-Georg Gadamer (see Vattimo 1988;

Bleicher 1980; see also Boland’s 1989 analysis of the work of Gadamer and its implications

for organisational theory). In Gadamer’s work hermeneutics is conceptualised not as a

method of investigation (as in Dilthey’s Hermeneutic Theory) but as a characteristic of all

knowledge and as such a feature of everyday life (see Audi 1995). Gadamer develops the

second major contribution Heidegger has made to hermeneutics (see Bleicher 1980).

Heidegger provides a link between being and language (Vattimo 1988). This aspect of

Hermeneutic philosophy is particularly important for understanding Foucault’s notion of the

construction of the self through discourse. Heidegger’s famous dictum, 'the being that can be

understood is language,' is developed by Gadamer. Gadamer explains that when Heidegger

said that, ‘language is the house of being,’ he meant that,'it is not so much a matter of showing that every experience of the world is made possible

for the individual by the possession of language; language is not that which the individual

speaks but rather that which speaks the individual,' (Vattimo 1988).

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Gadamer contends that the problem of language is the most crucial issue in hermeneutics. He

presents language not as an objectification or a system of symbols that we use4 but, using

terminology similar to Heidegger’s, he says language is, 'that which speaks to us,' (Bleicher

1980).

Like Heidegger, Gadamer views the hermeneutic circle as characteristic of all knowledge and

activity (Boland 1989; Bleicher 1980; see also Winograd & Flores 1987; Fleischman et al

1996). Gadamer (1975, 1976) contends that we are confronted everyday by an essentially

meaningless world that we immanently make meaningful. He says, 'the world must be

interpreted by us if we are to engage in purposive action in it.' However he also contends that

the way in which we make the world meaningful is an historic act and therefore that our

cognition is unavoidably prejudiced and biased. Gadamer places considerable emphasis on

the role that language plays both as the location within which we ascribe meaning to things

and also as the harbinger of bias.

For Gadamer language is the place where the, ‘collective ethos of a historically determined

society,’ is manifested4. He suggests that language encapsulates the cultural history of a

particular society and embodies the shared world (or collective consciousness) of the

members of that society (Thompson 1981). Gadamer thus construes language as more than

just the faculty of speaking. Gadamer's ideas on language may be taken as referring to,‘a kind of collective consciousness, which, although it serves as a basis for our judgments, is

not always fully apparent to us,’ (Vattimo 1988).

This short analysis of Gadamer’s contribution to the hermeneutic tradition hopefully clarifies

the notion and objectives of the hermeneutic circle. Both the researcher and the researched are

seen to be participants in a historically generated language. In his philosophy, the hermeneutic

process involves a situation whereby the two ‘horizons,’ that of the researcher and the

researched are, ‘fused together’ (Outhwaite 1994). Gadamer construes understanding as a

continuing historical process in which, 'prejudices are challenged and horizons broadened,'

(Audi 1995). At this boundary, or horizon, to use Gadamer’s terminology, where world views

meet, it is assumed that prejudices will be revealed and subsequently, that we will become

aware of the constraints they place on our thinking (Winograd & Flores 1987).

4 Language has always been an important aspect of hermeneutic thinking. Dilthey, for example,highlighted the importance of the role that language plays in understanding. He contended thatlanguage is not a system of logical relationships, as some linguistic theory assumes, and therefore thatthe interpretation of meaning can not be reduced to the search for and study of simple linguistic rules.

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Gadamer argues that to present the world in this way means that understanding is not the

terminus we reach when all influence and bias is eliminated, as is assumed in positive

science5, rather it is, 'a moving dialectic that always takes place anew at the horizon of our

prejudice,' (Boland 1989). Indeed hermeneutics suggests that progress or understanding is

made when individuals discuss their interpretations and attempt to understand the differences

between them6.

Foucault’s work was undoubtedly influenced by his reading of Heidegger. Eribon (1989) for

example recounts how Foucault had once commented:‘I still have here the notes I took when I was reading Heidegger. I’ve got tons of them! And

they are much more important than the ones I took on Hegel or Marx. My entire philosophical

development was determined by my reading of Heidegger.’

Foucault’s work draws on philosophical hermeneutics in two important respects. Firstly his

work is both influenced and characterised by the unsettling groundlessness of Heidegger’s

philosophical hermeneutics. Foucault’s work seems to rest on the premise that the, 'deep

truth,' behind our partial and taken-for-granted interpretations is just more interpretation. His

work paradoxically represents a shift from a search for deep truth to the study of

interpretations or the study of truths or knowledge. Foucault is interested in how certain

interpretations have come to dominate in an almost haphazard way and how they are

sustained through networks of power relations. He also attempts to show the groundlessness

of these prevailing interpretations7 (see Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). Foucault’s method of

genealogy represents a conscious attempt to replace the prevailing social structure with

something else, if only temporarily. Foucault’s work also draws heavily on Heiddeger’s

dictum that, ‘the being that can be understood is language.’ Echos of Heidegger can be heard

in Foucault’s contention that subjectivity is constructed through discourse. The links between

Foucault and philosophical hermeneutics are deveoped in more detail in the second section

under the heading, ‘genealogy is interpretation.’

5 Gadamer's examination of prejudice and tradition is situated within his critique of positive science.Even those scientific techniques which appear most neutral are set within a nexus of traditions andprejudices (see Bleicher 1980).

6 Habermas suggests that hermeneutic understanding is incomplete because it fails to recognise thatlanguage is not just a means of communication but is also used as a medium for control and domination(Outhwaite 1995).

7 There are of course contradictions in Foucault’s position. However, he recognises this and in anattempt to remain consistent attempt to deligitimise his own interpretation.

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However, while Foucault's work draws heavily on Heideggers philosophical hermeneutics it

also represents a radical departure from the hermeneutic tradition. Foucault’s position was

essentially takes us beyond hermeneutics (see Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). His work differs

from philosophical hermeneutics on a number of accounts. Firstly, while hermeneutics

replaces the Cartesian line with a spiral both tend upwards, having pretensions of progress

and development. Foucault brought into question the enlightenment tenet of progress (see

Hoy 1994). Secondly Foucault’s method of genealogy is more critical than hermeneutics, it

searches for strategies of power and the interests served by specific dominant interpretations.

Finally, Foucault’s position is different because he changed the focus of attention from

language to discourse.

Marxism & Critical Theory

The second major methodological strand that is important for understanding Foucault’s

method of genealogy is Critical Theory.

This section commences by highlighting four aspects of Marxist theory that are critical for

understanding the development of Critical Theory and Foucault’s genealogical position8.

These aspects are praxis; historical materialism; dialectics and immanent critique.

Praxis

The notion of praxis has a long history which dates back to the work of Aristotle (Audi 1994).

Within Marxist theory it has two related meanings. The first aspect is summed up in Marx

moral exhortation to, 'not only interpret the world but also to change it.' (Roderick 1986). As

such Marx contends that there should be a close correlation between theory and practice.

Contemporary analysis of the notion of praxis goes even further in challenging the distinction

between theory and practice. It is suggested that praxis pre-dates and pre-empts theory and is

not simply the application of it. The second aspect of praxis relates to Marx belief that human

beings act upon the world, that is they ‘work.’ In particular, Marx links praxis with the

economic system of production and exchange which is set up within society to meet human

needs (Abercrombie et al 1994; Audi 1995). Within contemporary philosophy, the notion of

praxis is seen to be related more to communication and discourse than a specific system of

8 Having said this however, there are so many different interpretations of Marx’s work that any attemptto identify even the most basic elements of his thinking, particularly by someone not trained inphilosophy, is bound to be simplistic and partial.

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production, as the discussion of hermeneutics above has indicated. Foucault’s method of

genealogy is more specifically related to the first sense of praxis.

Historical Materialism & Dialectics

The second important issue is Marx notion’s of historical materialism. Marx quite

fundamentally rejected any possibility of a world of ideas beyond the material world. He also

rejected materialism because of its deterministic view of individuals. Instead Marx combines

materialism with his belief in the historically changing nature of human agency.

Marx9 believed that our understanding of the world, our actions and our perceptions of our

needs all result from social-historical processes (Roderick 1986; Poster 1984) and in

particular he suggested that there was a direct correlation between individual class

consciousness and the role individuals play in the economic system.

The importance of the notion of historical materialism will hopefully be more apparent when

we remember the arguments made within Gadamer’s form of hermeneutic philosophy.

Gadamer argued that the language of our collective consciousness is the outcome of historical

processes.

From a Marxian perspective, this historical process is characterised by struggle, particularly

the struggle between classes10. Marx believed this conflict was attributable to the actual

material structure of society, a structure that was both determined by and reflected in the

mode of production. Marx's dialectic relates to the contradictions found in the struggle

between classes. He believed that the process of history does not follow strict logical laws

but was the outcome of class conflict. There are three aspects of dialectics which are pertinent

to the ensuing discussion (see Poster 1984): Firstly, dialectics contains the notion of progress.

Through the dialectical process, progress is made towards the resolution of conflict and

contradiction. Secondly, in order for this to happen, Marx depends on individuals who will

recognise the contradictions within society and act to resolve them; and finally, if the

8 In some forms of Marxism, what Roderick (1986) calls, ‘Scientific Marxism,’ there is a rigid anddeterministic correlation between the mode of production (the base) and ideology, or falseconsciousness (the superstructure), such that the relationship is assumed to be governed by laws. Fromthis perspective, human agency becomes subsumed within the structures of society (Roderick 1986). 10 It is important to note in passing the relationship between historical materialism and Foucault’smethods of analysis. The fact that Foucault called what he was doing archeology and genealogy(two notions with obvious historical connotations) is not without significance.

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contradictions are not acted upon, then this means that the members of the dominated class

are characterised by a false consciousness.

Immanent Critique

The final issue of importance is the notion of immanent critique (or internal critique). Because

Marx claimed that reason itself was shaped by the struggle between classes through history

and the mode of production, this apparently removes the ability of reason to act as a basis for

critique (Poster 1984). The method of immanent critique represents an attempt to try and get

round this problem. Immanent critique is a method of criticism that proceeds only by

appealing to those values actually found in a given social and historical context. As such, it

does not require an external basis (Poster 1984).

Critical Theory

Marxist theory was developed by the Early Critical Theorists and the Frankfurt School.

Towards the end of the 19th century Germany experienced a rapid development in capitalism.

It was within this milieu that a social research institution, now commonly known as the

Frankfurt School, was established. The institution was deliberately set up outside the

academic community and was not initially associated with any university. This was because

the members of the Frankfurt School believed that the universities had become too

conservative. Indeed, the aims and work of the institute represented a concerted attempt to,

're-engage learning.' The early theorists who worked at the institute believed that the rapid

expansion of capitalism was having a deleterious effect on society. They argued that one way

to combat this malaise was through education but suggested that in order to realize its

potential, education first had to, 're-engage' with learning. The important point to highlight

here is that the Frankfurt School was set up during a period when capitalism was flourishing.

The early theorists contended that a proper understanding of society required a broader kind

of analysis than Marxism offered. They suggested that a form of analysis11 was required that

incorporated ideas from different branches of the social sciences and they subsequently

11 The school engaged in research which combined theoretical and empirical inquiry based on amaterialist perspective.

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attempted to reinterpret Marx. They argued this was essential because the nature of society

had changed such that it did not fit into the old Marxist categories. They were particularly

concerned with the non-revolutionary nature of the proletariat and, in an attempt to try and

understand this characteristic of capitalist societies, changed their focus of attention away

from the working class towards culture and power in general (Rose 1978; Poster 1984). They

attempted to reconceptualise the Marxist perspective of the individual particularly in his/her

relationship to the economic system of production (Poster 1984) and in doing so they

incorporated developments within the field of psychology into their critical analysis of society.

Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno were amongst the most prominent

early critical theorists. Their work, which was primarily an analysis of western reason,

represents what has been called the, 'rational turn,' in Critical Theory. This was the first of

two theoretical turns within Critical Theory. The second turn can be found in the work of

Jurgen Habermas and relates to the incorporation of the study of language into social critique

(see Wolin 1992).

The early critical theorists studied reason for two reasons. Firstly, they studied reason

because it seemed as though the notion of class struggle had been eclipsed and they wanted to

investigate the way in which the working classes had apparently been psychologically and

culturally integrated into the capitalist system. They also studied reason because they believed

that, 'western rationalism,' was responsible for the political malaise.

The early critical theorists incorporated Max Weber’s work on rationality into Marxist

analysis. As I suggested above this was essentially related to the problem of revolution or

more specifically the lack of it. The problem was that according to orthodox Marxist theory

the economic conditions existed that should have resulted in a revolution. However, this was

not the case, the revolution had not happened. Horkheimer and Adorno, and later Marcuse,

argued that orthodox Marxism did not fully explain the, 'subjective conditions,’

(consciousness) that were also required for revolution (Roderick 1986). These issues were

originally developed by a number of intellectuals who are generally considered to be the

predecessors to the Frankfurt School. This group includes, for example, Lukacs and Gramsci,

amongst others, and they have become known as the, ‘Western Marxists.’ These theorists

suggested that the capitalist system had somehow managed to subjugate the revolutionary

consciousness of the working class.

15

In The Dialectic of the Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer argued that western reason

was partly to blame for this impasse12. Their argument was based on Max Weber’s notion of,

‘the paradox of reason.’ Weber believed that, 'our increasing degree of instrumental mastery

over the natural and social world,' had been achieved at the cost of freedom. Adorno and

Horkheimer represented the enlightenment tenet of progress as increasing domination. Wolin

(1992) says, 'Benjamin's notion of history as the incessant process of ruination and decline

appears to be a determinant influence on the thinking of Adorno and Horkheimer.’

Adorno and Horkheimer argued that liberation could only be realised through a complete

break from western instrumental reason (Roderick 1986). However, their argument obviously

has significant repercussions for the possibility of immanent critique. Marx had suggested that

critique could be based on values within society, like freedom and justice. However,

Horkheimer and Adorno argued that even those kinds of notions (freedom & justice) were

being reinterpreted within a capitalist framework. They contended that this form of critique

may no longer be possible if, as they believed, capitalism had been able to legitimate itself not

only through recourse to social values like justice and equity but through the rise in the

material standard of living. In other words they argued that capitalism ‘self legitimates.’

This view of rationalism ultimately creates problems for the critical theorists for by equating

reason with domination they undercut both their own analysis and their objective of

disillusionment and empowerment. Wolin (1992) sums up this problem nicely when he says,'when enlightenment becomes equated with, “myth,” and domination, the project of human

emancipation (and the goal of liberal education) renounces its most essential means: rational

reflection and critical thinking. Without them the whole project of human emancipation

descends into esoterics.' (Wolin 1992).

However the problem remains how can critique proceed if reason has been completely co-

opted?

Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse had three different responses to this problem. Horkheimer

turned to religion, viewing it as, ‘one of the last repositories of hope beyond a society

dominated by instrumental reason,’ (Wolin 1992). Adorno's approach to the problem was to

turn from reason to aesthetics as an alternative way of knowing (Wolin 1992; Poster 1984).

Adorno believed that art may be considered an alternative vehicle for conveying knowledge

and truth. He argued that art conveys knowledge, not through clarity of analysis and argument,

as in instrumental reasoning, but rather through images, sounds and colour. It is important for 12 Adorno and Horkheimer fused Nietzsche and Weber together (See Rose 1978) and this isparticularly important for understanding Foucault.

16

understanding the analysis of Foucault’s work that a few characteristics of Adorno's aesthetics

are highlighted. Adorno distinguished between contemporary pop-art which he believed was

intended to convey irrationality and non-meaning and other forms of art. His theory of

aesthetics is associated with earlier forms of art which attempt to convey meaning and

understanding. Indeed, he warns that contemporary art is dangerously close to turning into, ‘a

vehicle of affirmation, that is the uncritical mirror image of the happy consciousness of late

capitalism’ (see Wolin 1992; Rookmaaker 1994).

Where Horkheimer turns to religion and Adorno turns to art, Marcuse turns to the imagination.

He argues that imagination plays a crucial role in social change. Wolin (1992) explains that, ‘By virtue of its capacity to take the materials with which it is provided in the here and now

and refashion them according to the demands of the spirit, the imagination serves as a

harbinger of an emancipated sensibility,’

Another attempt to deal with the problem of foundations for critique is found in the work of

Habermas. Habermas attempts to salvage reason through his concept of, ‘the ideal speech

situation,’ (Wolin 1992). He objects to the way in which reason was presented as totally co-

opted within the early critical theorists analysis and fears that this perspective disregards may

of the good aspects of modernity, like (intellectual) progress, enlightenment and

development13 (Wolin 1992).

Wolin, (1992) contends that of all the poststructualrist philosophers, Foucault’s project seems

closest to the early critical theorists14. He says,‘Foucault and the early critical theorists share not only a common set of methodological

concerns but share other concerns as well, particularly the mechanisms of domination and

power,’ (Wolin 1992).

Indeed, Poster (1984) claims that Foucault not Habermas is the main hope for advancing

Critical Theory! (see also Wolin 1992).

13 Foucault, on the other hand, resorts to aesthetics (Simons 1995). Foucault’s notion of aesthetics is,however, different from Adorno’s. He emphasises the role of unreason in art and can be seen to usethis artistic approach in his critiques of rationality.

14 Work by Mark Poster (1984, 1989, 1990) has attempted to appropriate postmodernist themes intoCritical Theory (see Morrow & Brown 1994). This perspective is based on the belief that bothmodernism and postmodernism on their own are essentially incomplete, but when taken together bothpositions could potentially inform each other and perhaps negate their worst excesses (Aronowitz &Giroux 1991). Morrow & Brown (1994) explain that Poster draws mainly on the work of Foucault inhis attempts to combine modern and postmodern themes. It is of course not inconsequential that Posteruses Foucault’s work as the basis for his argument.

17

Foucault made the association between his own work and the work of the early critical

theorists himself towards the end of his life (Morrow & Brown 1994). He situates his own

agenda firmly in line with the critical theorists contending that we must embrace,‘critical thought that will take the form of an ontology of ourselves, an ontology of the

present; it is this form of philosophy that, from Hegel, through Nietzsche and Max Weber, to

the Frankfurt School, has founded a form of reflection in which I have tried to work.’

(Foucault ,in Wolin 1992)

Foucault thus suggested that there was a profound affinity between his method of genealogy

and the critique of instrumental reason that Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse had been

involved in.

Foucault wasn’t really introduced to critical theory until after May 1968 (Poster 1984). His

education had exposed him to different influences. Indeed, he complained that his lecturers

had not address the Frankfurt School, and suggested that this body of work would have been

helpful to him. Poster (1984, see also Smart 1994) argues that after May 1968 Foucault

carried out a clarification of his ideas based on the work of the Western Marxists. The reason

why the 1968 revolution had such an effect on Foucault was because it was different from

what Marxist theory predicted. The revolution took place at all levels of society. The

demands that were being made were for a more fundamental participation and creative role

within society in general and not just for an equal share in the material produce of capitalism

(Poster 1984). It was after this event that Foucault began to focus more explicitly on the

relationship between power and knowledge (Poster 1984). Foucault was interested in the way

in which power normalized individuals, constructing them as docile bodies. The parallels

between this aspect of Foucault’s work and the Frankfurt schools critique of instrumental

reason are hopefully quite obvious. However, there are also some important and quite

fundamental differences. Foucault’s ideas on power represent a fundamental advance in the

study of rationality and also the possibility of resistance. Foucault changed the focus from the

study of the negative effects of power (i.e. rationality as domination in Horkheimer and

Adorno’s emancipation/domination dialectic), away from the notion of reason as repression

and developed a notion of power as a formative force that shaped and constituted individuals

(Poster 1984). Foucault studied the way in which subjectivity was created through discourse.

The relationship between Foucault’s work and Critical theory is developed in section two

below under the subheadings genealogy is the study of power; genealogy is dialectics;

genealogy is critique and genealogy is praxis. Foucault’s study of power is viewed as an

extension of the project undertaken by the early critical theorists and the critical

18

interpretations (Foucault’s praxis) that he uses to generate dialectical tension are explored

more fully.

The two methodological strands briefly discussed in this section provide the context for

understanding Foucault’s method of genealogy. The characteristics of Foucault’s

genealogical method can only be understood if it is seen to emerge from a combination of

hermeneutic philosophy and critical theory. The following section explains Foucault’s

histories in more detail.

SECTION TWO: FOUCAULT’S METHOD OF GENEALOGY.

This section delineates Foucault’s method of historical analysis. After a brief consideration of

the different domains of analysis in Foucault’s work, ten characteristics of his form of

historiography are discussed in some detail.

Three distinct arenas of analysis can be found in Foucault’s work: an analysis of systems of

knowledge; an analysis of power; and an analysis of the way in which individuals discipline

themselves (Davidson 1994; Prado 1995). Foucault employed three different modes of

analysis to study each of these three domains: archaeology, for analysing systems of

knowledge; genealogy, for analysing power; and ethics, for analysing how individuals

construct themselves as ethical subjects (Foucault in Rabinow 1994; Davidson 1994; Smart

1985; McPhail 1999).

Foucault used his method of archeology to study discourses. Archeology does not attempt to

reveal the hidden meaning behind discourse but rather has three different objectives (see

Smart 1985). Firstly, the Foucauldian archeologist studies the structure of discourse.

Secondly, they investigate the factors that contribute to the existence of a discourse and the

conditions under which the discourse continues to exist in the same form. And finally, they

attempt to study the effects of discourse. Rather than investigate what was known (history) or

how knowledge is possible (epistemology), Foucault focused on how fields of discourse or

knowledge are structured and the effect these structures have on human beings (Major-Poetzl

1983).

Genealogy is Foucault’s second mode of analysis. The difference between archeology and

genealogy is that where as archeology appeared to be more of an objective description,

genealogy explicitly considers the role that power plays in the structure of discourse (Smart

1985). Genealogy represents a more overt commitment to critique and the analysis of power.

19

Finally, Foucault’s notion of ethics involves the relationship to oneself, or, 'ethical self

understanding,' but this is not detached from the other two areas of study (Foucault in

Rabinow 1994) Simons 1995). Thus after Foucault had studied the way in which the social

sciences construct individuals as both objects and subject’s, his attention turned to focus more

specifically on how individuals discipline themselves as ethical subjects (see Hoy 1994;

Hacking 1994; Davidson 1994).

There is some dubiety and debate as to whether these three methods of analysis represent

breaks in Foucault’s thought and changes in direction or whether they represent developments

in his thought and are essentially related (See Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982; Hoskin 1994; Megill

1985). For the purposes of this essay, archaeology, genealogy and ethics are considered to be

complementary (see Prado 1995).

The remainder of the paper considers some of the characteristics of genealogy. The object is

not to disregard archeology and ethics but to take the essential elements of them and combine

them with a genealogical perspective as I think Foucault does. The salient elements are

presented first and these are followed by a more detailed discussion. The main characteristics

are as follows (see Dreyfuss & Rabinow 1982):

1. genealogy is empirical;

2. genealogy is opposed to conventional historical method;

3. genealogy is critique;

4. genealogy is interpretive;

5. genealogies are based on an analysis of the present;

6. genealogy attempts to combine the analysis of power and knowledge and actively

looks for strategies of power;

7. genealogy focuses on surface events and avoids the search for deep meanings;

8. the genealogist attempts to view from a distance, to present a broad, general

picture.

9. genealogy is praxis

10. genealogy is dialectical

Genealogy is Empirical

The first important characteristic of Foucault's genealogical method is that it is empirical15

(Hoy 1988). Indeed, Foucault describes genealogy as, 'gray, meticulous, and patiently

14The issue of the role of empirical research in critical accounting has been addressed recently byLaughlin (1995). He explains how changes have taken place in accounting research since the 1970's

20

documentary,' (Foucault 1977, in Prado 1995). His genealogies are based on similar kinds of

documentary evidence as traditional methods of archive analysis and, as such, Foucault’s

genealogies claimed the, ‘status of knowledge,' (Davidson 1994). While some of the new

accounting histories may tend to place greater emphasis on the interpretation over the facts

(see Tyson 1995), it is hard to see how the same charge could be made against Foucault. He

may have looked in different places for the facts and he may have interpreted those facts in an

unusual way, but his histories were always characterised by lots of ‘historical digging’

(Merquior 1985).

Genealogy is Opposed to Conventional Historical Method.

However, while it is true that Foucault used a conventional method of historical investigation,

it is important to point out that Foucault's genealogies are not an objective form of historical

analysis. Neimark (1990) seems to suggest this when she argues that Foucault, 'resurrects a

form of value-free analysis that had previously been rejected in critiques of conventional

social sciences.' However, Foucault’s method is not objective (Poster 1984). Despite its

apparent objectivity genealogy is actually a reaction against traditional forms of historical

analysis (Smart 1985). Foucault challenges the way in which conventional methods attempt

to, 'search for the exact essence of things.' This charactristic represents one of the major

tensions between old and new accounting histories (see Miller, Hopper & Laughlin 1991;

Carnegie & Napier 1996; Funnell 1996; 1998; Fleischman 1996).

Fiction

Scientific methodology is characterised by a belief that it is possible to gradually refine the

method of analysis as earlier erroneous theory is replaced by later, more sophisticated, truer

ones (Hoy 1994). Foucault rejects this position. His archaeology of the human sciences is an

attempt to show that this notion of progressive enlightenment is false (but see Armstrong

1994). Similarly, Davidson (1994) contends that Foucault’s later genealogical works are not

an attempt to, 'erect shining epistemological foundations,' but rather attempt to show that what

we take to be knowledge is actually rooted in power (but see Merquior 1985 and Said 1983 in

Neimark 1990).

because normative ideas were not taken up and used in practice. He argues that empirical research inaccounting is now of central importance and explains that this has arisen as a consequence of a need fora better descriptive understanding of how accounting currently functions in society. He argues that thisgreater understanding is to be used in the development of more appropriate normative systems. Copper(1981, in Laughlin 1995) says, '...only through a well grounded understanding of how systems operatecan we prescribe how accounting systems should be changed.'

21

Foucault intentionally created a tension between his work and the kind of objective history

that attempted to discover the chain of causes which lead to particular historical events.

Indeed, genealogy is the antithesis of historiographical method of writing about history as if it

were a story about the progress of freedom and enlightenment16 (Hoy 1994; Parker 1999;

Carnegie 1996). In his book, Discipline and Punish, Foucault presents a story of progress,

but it’s the development of the spread of the discipline of the prison throughout society not of

enlightenment. Reading such a history of progress disturbs conventional notions of progress.

Like Nietzschean genealogies, Foucault’s histories,‘question the tendency of the present to evaluate its own progressiveness positively. Each

present invents its own past, but Foucault has invented a past for some future present,'

(Walzer 1994).

In contrast to this style of historical writing Foucault contended that he had written fictions,

he says,'As for the problem of fiction, it is for me a very important problem; I am well aware that I

have never written anything but fictions. I do not mean to go so far as to say that fictions are

beyond truth. It seems to me that it is possible to make fiction work instead of truth, to

induce truthful effects with a fictional discourse, and to operate in such a manner that the

discourse of truth gives rise to or “manufactures,” something that does not yet exist, that is,

“fictions” it. One “fictions” history on the basis of a political reality that makes it true, one

fictions a politics not yet in existence on the basis of historical truth,’ (The history of

Sexuality, Finas interview p193 in Megill 1985)

Foucault’s books are fictions not because his interpretations are not historically justifiable by

the methods of traditional historical investigation but because the circumstances do not exist

(as yet) to validate them. As we shall see shortly, Foucault is a concerned critic rather than an

objective historian (Hammond & Sikka 1996; Parker 1999).

Parody

Megill (1985) argues that while Foucault’s book, The Archaeology of Knowledge, is often

viewed as a positivistic discourse on method, it is in fact a parody. He argues that, The

Archaeology of Knowledge, is a parody of Descartes, Discourse on Method, and says,‘When one looks at it closely its supposed method turns out to be disturbingly elusive. The

Archaeology of Knowledge is anti-methodological rather than methodological. For all its

quasi-scientific manner, the work is an attack on science, on the whole idea of objective

knowing. Foucault is engaged in undermining a whole structure of thinking, a whole

approach towards reality that he sees as oppressive and uncreative.' (Megill 1985).

Foucault's method may therefore be parodic.

16 As such, genealogies are therefor rather pessimistic.

22

Genealogy As Critique

From the introductory characteristics mentioned above it can be seen that Foucault’s method

of genealogy is a form of social critique (Megill 1985, see also Carnegie & Napier 1996). I

contended above that although Foucault’s method of critique follows in the tradition of the

early Critical Theorists and the Frankfurt School his method of critique is quite significantly

different in a number of respects (Smart 1985; Simons 1995; Hoy 1994).

The first point to note is that Foucault’s diffuse notion of power means that although society

may be characterised by a dominant and hegemonic rationality, it never manages to

completely subjugate all forms of opposition towards it. Thus, Foucault suggests that society

is always characterised by a degree of struggle and resistance. Indeed, he depicts genealogy

as being involved in this struggle, describing it as, ' the struggle against the effects of the

power of a discourse that is considered to be scientific.'

Smart (1985) describes genealogy as local struggle. Smart is talking here not about

geographical locality but rather discursive locality. Grey (1994) explains that, 'local struggles

do not occur in restricted geographical space but rather in a restricted discursive space.'

Foucault believed that neither comprehending the world nor changing it depends on grasping

a total understanding of society and how it can be transformed into a utopian state. In

keeping with his views on power, he believed that change does not occur by transforming the

whole of society at once (for example revolution) but rather by getting involved in specific

local struggles (Hoy 1994). Genealogy is an attempt to get involved in these local struggles

and this relates to the idea of praxis introduced above.

The second important point in relation to the issue of critique is that Foucault viewed critique

not in the conventional sense of revealing the true nature of society, but in the post-structural

sense of putting into crisis (Megill 1985). Foucault hoped that we would find his genealogies

threatening (see Hoy 1994). He says, the genealogist seeks to write, ‘effective history.’ This

relates to the issue of fiction discussed above and also the arguments on the aesthetic nature

of Foucault’s work. Rabinow & Dreyfus (1982; 1994) explain that effective history means,

‘to put everything in historical motion, to dissolve the comforting illusion of identity and

firmness and solidity.’ Similarly, Foucault (1977a) describes effective interpretations as,‘those that will disorder order, those that will break up what is extant, those that will turn the

present into the past, history that disturbs what was previously considered

immobile;....fragments what was thought unified;....shows the heterogeneity of what was

imagined consistent with itself.'(Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays &

Interviews p147).

23

Where as Foucault thinks that many examples of conventional history legitimates the present,

effective history attempts to break up the prevailing order of things. As Foucault puts it,

history becomes effective when it 'introduces discontinuity into our very being.' Thus, the

aim of genealogy is to disrupt commonly held conceptions of society and practices within

society (Smart 1985; Davidson 1994). While Foucault’s texts were presented with detached

objectivity, they were intended to be 'bombs, directed against what he perceived to be very

real problems' (Megill 1985).

Recently within the accounting history literature there have been calls for an increased

appreciation of the power of narrative (see Parker 1999; Funnell 1996; 1998). Foucault uses

narrative in a powerful and provocative way. For many historians, narrative is the ‘bedrock’

of their work, however these narratives are taken to reflect the lived experience of the past

(Parker 1999). Foucault’s narratives are intended to disrupt the lived experience of the

present.

Genealogy As Interpretation.

The fourth aspect of genealogies is that they are interpretations. This characteristic may

initially not seem very different from conventional historiography. Carr (1964 in Carnegie &

Napier 1996) for example contends that, ‘interpretation is the life-blood of history.’ However

Foucault’s genealogical interpretations are significantly different from conventional

accounting histories. There are four important aspects here. Firstly, the way in which

Foucault's genealogies are based on Heidegger’s argument regarding the pervasiveness of

interpretation, Secondly, the way in which Foucault uses this assumption as a tool for opening

up society to social critique. The third issue relates to the goal of Foucault’s interpretations

and the final issue relates to the aesthetic qualities of Foucault’s work.

The first issue relates to the extent to which Foucault’s interpretations are based on

Heidegger’s philosophical hermeneutics. Genealogy is based on Heidegger’s notion that

behind interpretation there is only more interpretation. Foucault believed that because of the

influence of history and culture it is difficult, if not impossible, to get a totally detached view

of society. In his book, Nietzsche Freud & Marx, Foucault says,‘There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret because, when all is said and done,

underneath it all everything is already an interpretation.'

This first step is an essential prerequisite for Foucault’s method of genealogy. Genealogy

does not attempt to uncover hidden meaning but rather tries to show the groundlessness and

arbitrariness of existing interpretations. Foucault says,

24

'The deepest truth that the genealogist has to reveal is the secret that things have no essence

or that there essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.'

The second issue of importance in Foucault's interpretations is the way in which he uses

Heidegger’s hermeneutic as a basis for social critique. The view expressed in the quote above

seems to condemn us to the vagaries of equally arbitrary interpretations. However, Foucault’s

method of analysis is quite subtle on this point. Foucault was concerned with the way in

which interpretations are created and imposed within society. In this assumption of the

groundlessness and arbitrariness of interpretation Foucault opens up society for critique. This

is essential for Foucault’s main task which is to study how specific interpretations of the

world have come to dominate; how these interpretations are sustained and the effect they have

on individuals. As such, genealogy attempts to reveal and analyse the way in which

conventional interpretations emerge from a matrix of power relationships. Poster (1985), for

example, argues that genealogy is essentially to do with, 'tracing the history of modes of

domination.'

Foucault has been criticised for not explicitly evaluating conventional interpretations

(Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). He was more interested in making individuals aware of the kind

of rationality that pre-empts their interpretations. His histories were active attempts to reveal

the taken-for-grantedness of conventional interpretations. It may be helpful to point out that

this aspect of Foucault’s method relates to the dialectical nature of genealogy.

Foucault attempts to re-describe common situations in such a way that his interpretations are

recognised as a challenge to the views and traditions that are reinterpreted (Prado 1995).

Foucault thus attempts to create conflict through interpretation. Using his rhetorical skills he

attempts to exacerbate our collective uneasiness. Building on Heidegger, he attempts to use

his interpretations as a way of provoking individuals into action (Megill 1985; Dreyfus &

Rabinow 1982).

Foucault examined the content of hegemonic discourses from the point of view that is

required to make it meaningful. This idea is incorporated into the requirement in Foucault’s

genealogies to start with an analysis of the present. We shall see shortly how genealogical

interpretation is not arbitrary but rather is based on what Foucault perceived to be the most

important problems facing society. With this image available, he then attempted to present a

counter image, what Churchman (1971, in Checkland 1990) calls its, 'deadliest enemy.'

Checkland (1990) argues that at this point the conflict between these world-views can

construct a new world-view in which the nature of the conflict is understandable. In a similar

25

kind of way, Foucault’s critique operates through the use of difference, the difference

between present and previous forms of society (Poster 1984). Foucault believed that the

power operating within our society could be revealed through the juxtaposition of a

conventional interpretation of society with an equally coherent but different interpretation of

historical societies (Poster 1984).

The final issue in this section relates to the aesthetic nature of Foucault’s interpretations.

Given Foucault’s views on the deleterious effects of western instrumental reason, it is perhaps

not surprising that his interpretations contain certain aesthetic qualities (Megill 1985). This

relates to the discussion of foundations for critique in section one above. Simons (1995; see

also Wolin 1992) suggests that Foucault turns to aesthetics and unreason as a basis for

critique. Megill (1990) contends that Foucault's books were intended to be works of art17.

However, it is important here to realise that Foucault did not see art as existing in harmony

with the prevailing rationality but rather as confronting it and challenging it (Megill 1985).

Megill (1985) contends that Foucault wanted his texts to, 'go out into the world and by the

power of their rhetoric to change it.' Wolin (1992) explains that Foucault, like Adorno turns

from reason to aesthetics (See Megill 1985). However, Foucault’s aesthetic is different from

Adorno's. Goya heralds the kind of art that Foucault is interested in. Goya explored the

boundary between, ‘reason and its other’. Wolin (1992) argues that Foucault’s search for an

origin outside discourse on which to base his critique ultimately takes him to unreason. Wolin

(1992) seems to imply that this attitude is anarchistic and perhaps even fascist, however this

seems to contravene his earlier interpretation of Foucault as following in the tradition of the

early critical theorists. His observation that Foucault resorted to unreason, whether it is

accurate or not, could be open to an alternative interpretation. For example, the sociologist

Herbert Garfinkle advocated the use of unreason as a positive sociological tool. Garfinkle’s

ethnomethodologies involved instructing his students to go home and act in an unexpected

and unreasonable manner, for example, as lodgers. Garfinkle’s aim was to expose the taken

for granted assumptions and meaning system within that particular situation. This would

seem to be more in keeping with Foucault’s critical stance. From this perspective, unreason

can be seen to have quite an important and perhaps even modern function.

This aesthetic perspective contributes towards understanding the issue of fiction in relation to

Foucault’s interpretations. It may also be helpful to remember Marcuse’s arguments about

the critical potential of the imagination. It could be that through the aesthetic qualities of his

16 In the 1940 and 50s Foucault’s friends were painters writers and musicians rather than philosophers.It may be that the literary and artistic avant-garde had a significant impact on Foucault's work (Megill1985).

26

fictions, Foucault hoped that the readers imagination would be stirred up. He may be close to

Fredriche Nietzsche in this respect. Nietzsche maintained that the only valuable

historiography is one that seeks to provide, 'life-enhancing myths,' (Megill 1985). The real

value of the historians work, he asserted, lay,'in its taking a familiar, perhaps commonplace theme, an everyday melody, and composing

inspired variations on it, enhancing it to a comprehensive symbol, and thus disclosing in the

original theme a whole world of profundity power and beauty,' (Megill 1985).

As such, Nietzsche argues for the rejection of history as representation in favour of its re-

creation as literature, poetry and myth18 (Megill 1985). Why? because he believes that to

represent a reality is to legitimate it and perpetuate it (see Megill 1985). Heidegger, in his

book, The Anaximander Fragments, explains this further when he says, 'all historiography

predicts what is to come from images of the past,' (in Megill 1985). However, Foucault's

history is completely different because in demonstrating the foreignness of the past he

undercuts the legitimacy of the present (Poster 1984).

The following sections consider some more characteristics of the kind of interpretation that

Foucault presents.

Genealogy & The Analysis of The Present

The fifth important aspect of Foucault’s method is that it begins with an analysis of the

present (see Merquior 1985). Although Foucault presents his work as a form of historical

analysis, he does not attempt to capture the past as it, 'actually was,' (Megill 1985). Foucault

was more interested in our present situation than in ancient societies. In his book, Discipline

and Punish, Foucault says,'I would like to write the history of the prison with all the political investments of the body it

gathers together in its closed architecture. Why? Simply because I am interested in the past?

No, if one means by writing history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means

writing the history of the present.'

Foucault was not trying to understand past societies. Rather, he provided a historical

interpretation of the present that explicitly began with a diagnosis of the current state of

society, he said, 'I begin my analysis with a question posed in the present,' (Foucault, in Prado

1995). Foucault isolated what he perceived to be the central issues of society and attempted to

provide a historical account of how the situation arose. This characteristic of Foucault’s

interpretations serves to highlight again that they were not objective. It reveals the

genealogists involvement in genealogy and the, ‘pragmatic intent’ of their analysis. Foucault

18 This aspect of genealogical interpretation seems related to Trevelyan’s idea of history. Trevelyancontended that historical narratives should be poetic (Parker 1999).

27

subtitled one of his works, ‘a history of the present,’ to admit frankly that the account was not

a neutral, objective description.

Genealogy & Power

Thus genealogy begins with an analysis of society. This analysis proceeds by looking for

ways in which power is effected in society. The analysis of power seems to be one of the

defining characteristics of the new accounting histories (Carnegie & Napier 1996). As Funnell

(1996) comments, ‘reliance on a realist form of history and exposure to it’s alleged

deficiencies, it is proposed, has blinded traditional accounting history to discourses of power.’

Genealogy is essentially the study of power and how it operates within society, however it

involves quite a specific view of the way in which power operates and this influences where

the genealogist will look for data and how they will interpret the data. The genealogist

actively looks for, ‘strategies of domination,’ (see Hacking 1994). Thus the interpretation that

the genealogists provides is preempted by a conscious commitment to articulate his/her

studies in terms of the operation of power.

Parker (1999) explains that the primary aim of accounting histories has been to learn about

the human experience in the discipline of accounting. Foucault however provided us with a

particular slant on this objective. The objective of genealogies is to consider how power

operates in order to construct individuals through discourse (Hopwood 1987). The genealogist

attempts to convey the, ‘history of the modern subject.’ The central theme of these kinds of

studies is to show the processes of subjectification. As such, ‘the genealogist is interested in

the modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects,’ (Foucault, in Hoskin

1994, Hoy 1994).

Genealogy Focuses On The Surface

Foucault did not study the individuals own interpretations of their actions. Genealogy

therefore is not essentially the study of human beings but rather the study of discursive space.

This is not because Foucault believed that an individual’s understanding of the world was

unimportant or distorted. Foucault did not look for underlying meanings, rather he looked on

the surface for the co-ordinates of power. By focusing on the surface, Foucault is not

suggesting that things are trivial or frivolous, but rather that meaning is something that takes

place on the surface. He explained this aspect of genealogy in his book, Nietzsche, Freud,

Marx,‘Whereas the interpreter is obliged to go to the depth of things, like an excavator, the

moment of interpretation of the genealogist is like an overview which allows the depth to be

laid out in front of him in a more profound visibility.' ( in Rabinow & Dreyfus 1982)

28

While conventional history focuses and to some extent gains its legitimacy from the archive,

Foucault concentrated on a different kind of archive. For Foucault, the archive is discourse

(see Carnegie & Napier 1996). Discourse in a Foucauldian sense is has both material and

discursive qualities and is essentially viewed as space. The surface that Foucault is interested

in is conseptualised in spacial rather historical terms. Indeed, Foucault may ultimately be a

spatial theorist rather than an historian (see McPhail 1999). From this perspective, Miller and

O’Leary’s (1998) recent study of the spatial reorganising of the manufacturing process at

Caterpillar’s Decatur plant is essentially a genealogical study (see also Arnold 1998, Miller &

O’Leary 1998 & Froud et al 1998).

On one occasion Foucault commented that, ‘a comprehensive and critical understanding of

spatiality,’ was at the centre of all his writings (Soja 1997). In an interview in 1989, he said,

‘Geography must indeed lie at the heart of my concerns. People have often reproached me for

these spatial obsessions, which have indeed been obsessions for me. But I think through them

I did come to what I had basically been looking for: the relations that are possible between

power and knowledge.’ Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge has been widely discussed in

the literature. It has been the inspiration behind a number of new accounting histories (see for

example Hopwood 1987; Miller & O’Leary 1987 and Loft 1986) however I would suggest

that this quote suggests that Foucault was interested in power and knowledge from aspacial

perspective rather than an historical perspective (Soja 1997; McPhail 1999).

Genealogy As Praxis

The next important characteristic of genealogies is praxis.

Marx had a profound impact on Foucault's work. In one interview Foucault said that his intention was,'not so much the defalsification and restitution of a true Marx, but the unburdening and

liberation of Marx in relation to party dogma, which has constrained it, touted it and

brandished it for so long.' (Neimark 1990)

On another occasion Foucault says,‘I often quote concepts, texts and phrases from Marx, but without feeling obliged to add the

authenticating label of a footnote with a laudatory phrase to accompany the quotation. As

long as one does that one is regarded as someone who knows and reveres Marx, and will be

suitably honoured in the so called Marxist journals. But I quote Marx without saying so,

without quotation marks and because people are incapable of recognising Marx's texts I am

thought to be someone who doesn't quote Marx.....It is impossible at the present time to

write history without using a whole range of concepts directly or indirectly linked with

Marx's thought and situating oneself within a horizon of thought which has been defined and

29

described by Marx. One might even wonder what difference there could ultimately be

between being a historian and being a Marxist,' (Foucault ,in Neimark 1990).

While Foucault can be seen to provide the basis for a new form of discourse analysis, behind

this method, and his research in general, there is, I believe, the intention to disrupt

conventional perceptions of the issues he studies. The object of Foucault’s method may be

summed up in Marcuse’s desideratum to,‘Make the established language itself speak that which it conceals or excludes, for what is to

be revealed and denounced is operative within the universe of ordinary discourse and action,

and the prevailing language contains the metalanguage.’ (Marcuse 1991).

His method of analysis is based on the assumption that the function of research is both to

increase our awareness of what is going on in society and to change society in the process.

Although Foucault’s histories can be viewed as a form of praxis, his position is more radical.

Marx argues for the close collaboration of theory and practice (see Megill 1985). Foucault

however conflated theory into practice. Megill (1985) argues that, ‘there is a hiatus in Marx

between the interpretation of the world and its transformation.’ Foucault bridges this lacuna.

In a conversation in 1972 with Gilles Deluze, Foucault says, 'theory does not express,

translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice,' (Megill 1985).

Genealogy as Dialectics

The final important characteristic of genealogy is dialectics.

The second important Marxist notion for understanding Foucault’s method of critique is

dialectics. Marx used the notion of dialectics to explain the process of historical changes.

Within conventional thinking, society progresses through the increased accumulation of

scientific knowledge and increased standards of living as measured for example by GNP.

Marx suggested that in fact it was a completely different set of factors that conditioned the

future. Marx argued that capitalist societies were replete with inherent contradictions that

would lead to their own destruction. He suggested that this dialectical society evolved

through a process of resistance and transformation. Marx believed that ideological changes in

society were linked with changes in the economic system of production.

Marx used the notion of dialectics as a conceptual tool to analyse and critique society. Marx’s

dialectical method was not just about trying to deduce knowledge, but rather, was a critique of

power and domination within capitalist societies (Poster 1984).

30

Hegel was very influential within the milieu in which Foucault developed his work (Megill

1985) and indeed a significant part of Foucault’s thesis can be viewed as a challenge to

Hegel’s notion of dialectics (Megill 1985). Hoy (1994) argues that Foucault rejects Hegel’s,

‘dialectic of contradiction.’ However, while Foucault’s work can be viewed as a reaction

against Hegelian dialectics, there may be a sense in which he developed his own form of

dialectical method. Poster (1984) presents genealogy as an alternative to Marx’s dialectic.

Foucault’s dialectic is not between ideology and reality as in Marx, or between what is and

what could be as in Marcuse (see Marcuse 1991) or between language and reality as in

Adorno, although I do think that Foucault was influenced by Marcuse’s notion of imagination

and Adorno’s negative dialectics. Foucault's dialectic is between genealogical interpretations

of history as progressive subjugation and conventional interpretations of history as

progressive enlightenment. The dialectic occurs between the conventional, taken for granted

view of the world and Foucault's alternative description of it (see Poster 1984). While

conventional historiographic approaches view the past as a simulacrum of the present

Foucault’s genalogical approach attempts to present the past as disjointed from the present.

(Carnegie & Napier 1996)

CONCLUSION

Where genealogy has been used within accounting research, there seems to have been a strict

application of historical method. For example, Hopwood (1987) gives an account of the

historical development of Josiah Wedgwood’s costing system; Loft (1986) provides an

account of the development of current costing techniques by the government during the First

World War and Miller and O'Leary (1987) study how standard costing practices emerged in

the USA at the turn of the century (see Armstrong 1994). Neimark (1990) expresses concern

about these applications of Foucault’s method. Her complaint is that these kinds of historical

analysis are not critical enough. This objection apparently relates to the extent to which

Foucault’s work is removed from, what she believes, is its Marxist foundation. Neimark says,'Plucking Foucault away from Marx removes his work from its ground, robs it of what could

be its emancipatory potential and thereby yields a Foucault that readily reinforces the current

global integration of capitalism and its ideologies.' (Neimark 1990).

Given the radical and critical nature of Foucault’s genealogies, perhaps this reservation is not

unfounded.

This paper has attempted to explain how Foucault’s genealogies were undertaken as a form of

social criticism. However, the problem remains that Foucault does not appear to provide a

basis for his method. Indeed, opponents of Foucault suggest that his critiques failed because

31

he offered no moral, political or rational standards to justify his claims (Hoy 1994). Neimark

(1990), for example, calls Foucault a relativist and contends that,'like all relativist philosophers, Foucault is open to questions about his own grounding. How

can Foucault know what he claims without some general concepts, without a theory.'

The problem of a basis for Foucault’s work has been highlighted by a number of theorists

(Wolin 1992). Once you argue that reason itself is duplicitous with power, to what do you

turn in order to analyse and critique society? Both Habermas and Taylor criticise Foucault on

this point. Habermas in particular criticises the normative basis of Foucault’s method of

genealogy. Habermas attempts to identify an inconsistency in Foucault’s work between his,

‘happy positivism’ and the value choices he espouses or seems to espouse (i.e. its normative

basis).

However, this perhaps overlooks the claims of Foucault’s thesis on power. Foucault argued

that knowledge is always produced by power and, as such, is always tied to specific interests.

While it may be the case that from within a particular system of thought, for example

Marxism, it may be possible to derive a fairly clear set of justifications for political action,

that does not mean that that action has any ultimate grounding. The basis for choosing

between Marxism and Fascism for example, will be justified by reference to some other

system of values like humanism, but the choice of the second system again has no grounding.

Thus, to be a Marxist may ultimately just be an intuitive or arbitrary decision. It is not just

Foucault who has an insurmountable problem providing an ultimate grounding for his beliefs

(Grey 1994). ‘As with the related question of the grounding of political belief, epistemic

privilege may ultimately be a matter of faith.’

32

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