the fourth meditation - lex newman

7/28/2019 The Fourth Meditation - Lex Newman

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Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVol. LIX, No. 3, September 1999

The FourthMeditation1LEX NEWMANUniversity of Nebraska, Lincoln

Recent scholarship suggests that Descartes's effort to establish a truth criterion is notviciously circular(notwithstanding ts reputation)-a fact that invites closer scrutiny ofhis epistemological program.One of the least well understood featuresof the projectishis deduction of a truth criterion from theistic premises,a demonstrationDescartes sayshe provides in the Fourth Meditation: the alleged proof is not revealed by a casualreading, nor have commentators fared any better; in general, the relevance of theFourthMeditation has not been duly appreciated.This paperreconstructsthe argumentof the FourthMeditation, detailing the steps in the demonstration of the criterion andclarifying its role in the larger program. Surprisingly,Descartes deduces a truth crite-rion more fundamentalthan clarity and distinctness; this more fundamentalcriterionhelps explain what are otherwise cryptic (though central) epistemological moves in theSixthMeditation.

Accordingto the so-calledproblem of thecriterion,efforts to establish a truthcriterion involve an inevitable circularity: n advancingthe steps of a proofone thereby presupposesthe criterionone endeavorsto prove. Famously, theepistemological programof the Meditations was thoughtto provide a casestudy of the problem.Descartes's effortsto establish a criterionof clarityanddistinctness look (prima facie) to unfold as a circle defined by two arcs: heendeavorsto demonstratea veraciousGod by appealto the veracityof the cri-terion;he endeavorsto demonstrate he veracityof the criterionby appealto averacious God. As a perusalof recent scholarshipsuggests, it is now widelyheld thatthe projectis not straightforwardly ircular-numerous commenta-tors have challenged the first arc.2The second arc, however, is not in ques-

I am grateful to Robert Audi, Annette Baier, Paul Hoffman, Harry Ide, Nicholas Jolley,Alan Nelson, Ram Neta, Nelson Pike, Mark van Roojen, and an anonymous referee forPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, for commenting on earlier drafts of thispaper. I have also benefited from discussion of earlier versions of the paper with audi-ences in philosophy colloquia at HarvardUniversity, University of Pittsburgh,and theCalifornia Conferencein Early Modern Philosophy.

2 There are a variety of interpretations n the literature whereby the first arc is rejected.See, e.g., Sosa (1997), Loeb (1992), Van Cleve (1979), and Kenny (1970). Here's thegist of one such account(cf. Newman and Nelson 1999). Propositionsmay induce assent,in virtue of being clearly and distinctly perceived, even if the perceiverhas no proof ofclarity and distinctness as a generaltruth criterion. On this reading, the ThirdMeditationproofs of God (among others) are clear and distinct and thus assent-compelling, even

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allows Descartesto clarify in which circumstanceserrorwould be incompat-ible with the divine essence-call these f-type circumstances:

(1) If I should be in error in p-type circumstances, God would be adeceiver.

In concert with the ThirdMeditationarguments or God's veracity, (1) yieldsthe desired truthcriterion:judgments arising in ?-type circumstances areguaranteed rue.This interpretation as a surprisingconsequencefor the cele-bratedcircumstanceof perceiving a matterclearlyanddistinctly.Rather han0-type circumstancesconsisting in clearand distinct perception,such percep-tion turns out to be a special case of ?-type circumstances. Emerging fromthe Fourth Meditationis another truthcriterion more fundamentalthan theclarityanddistinctnesscriterion.This surprising esulthas welcome interpre-tive consequences. It helps explain seemingly cryptic epistemologicalmovesoccurring ate in the Meditations:primafacie, the Sixth Meditationmeditatorappears o strayfrom the rigorousstandardsof the earlyMeditations,formingjudgmentsthat areunwarranted y the clarityand distinctnesscriterion;on thepresent interpretation,hose judgmentsarise in 0-type circumstancesand arethusgrounded n the morefundamental ruthcriterion.

In what follows, I first reconstruct Descartes's theodicy for error andexplain how it yields the claim in (1). In Section 2, I reconstruct he demon-strationof the clarityanddistinctnesscriterionandexplain its relationto the0-type circumstancesthatyield the more fundamental ruthcriterion. I closeSection 2 with a brief discussion of the role of this more fundamentalcriterion n the Sixth Meditation.

1. The theodicy of the Fourth Meditation1.1. TheproblemIn the ThirdMeditation,Descartesarguesfor an omniperfectdeity. He opensthe FourthMeditation(AT 7:54) by reconsideringthe traditionalproblemofevil, as appliedto error-the form in which it is introduced n the First Medi-tation (AT 7:21). As typically construed,the problemrests on an apparenttension in the supposition of an omniperfectcreatorwho produces a worldwith evil. The apparent ension may be clarifiedby an analogy to ordinarymanufacturers, n analogywhichDescartesvariouslydevelops and to which Ilater return. Defect in the productsof ordinarycraftsmen would seem to beowed to a limitationof power,knowledge,or benevolentintention.When webelieve such defect is owed to a limitationin power or knowledge, we're aptto excuse the manufacturerrom moralculpability (though perhapsnot fromall legal responsibility). I shall refer to any such excusing condition as a

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morally sufficient reason (MSR).' In contrast,we admit of no MSR when webelieve the defect is owed entirely to a lapse of benevolent intention. Pre-cisely here lies the rub for the thesis of an omniperfect creator:since such abeing would not be limited in power or knowledge, it would seem to have noMSR forproducingcreatureswithdefect. As Gassendiobjects:[G]iven that [God] could have made things more perfectbut did not do so, this seems to showthat he must have lacked either the knowledge or the power or the will to do so. He was cer-tainly imperfect if, despite having the knowledge and the power, he lacked the will and pre-ferred imperfectionto perfection. (CSM 2:214-15, AT 7:308)It appearsthat the mere existence of defective creatures(e.g. those that err)amounts to a reductio ad absurdun on the supposition of an omniperfectcreator.

As will emerge, Descartes holds that this formulation of the problem istoo crude. It cannot be that an omniperfectcreatorwould have no MSR forproducing creatureswith any defect whatever, since (at least) the defect ofbeing a creature(andhence dependent) s unavoidable.9A sufficientlysubtletreatmentof the problemwouldneed distinguishamongtypes of defect, alongwith the prospects of there being MSRs for each. Towards these ends,Descartesinvokes the Aristotelianprivation-negation istinction(as discussedin Section 1.2).

Since, for Descartes, skeptical problems often rest on conceptual mis-takes, he must introduce them by way of hypotheses that (by his lights)involve disguised conceptualmuddles.Thus, notwithstanding is more-subtleFourthMeditation reatment,Descartesintroduces he problemof evil in less-subtle fashion by having his First Meditationmeditatormake the same mis-take that Gassendi later repeats-generating the reductio, by presupposingthat an omniperfectcreatorwould haveno MSR foranyoccurrenceof error:But if it were inconsistent with [God's] goodness to have created me such that I am deceivedall the time, it would seem equally foreign to his goodness to allow me to be deceived evenoccasionally; yet this last assertioncannotbe made.(CSM 2:14, AT 7:21)Never contested,in the Meditations, s the assumption hat there would be noMSR for a world with creatureswho systematicallyerr(a scenarioinspiredbythe Deceiver Hypothesis). In the above First Meditationremark,the naivemeditator s supposingthe following:

8 I borrow the term from Pike (1963).9 As Leibniz puts it: "A being exempt from limitation would not be a creature, but God.Every creature is limited in this sense, that its greatness, power, knowledge, and all itsother perfectionsare limited or restricted." 1965, 129)

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(2) A world with creatures that sometimes err is as contrary to thedivine essence as a world with creatures or whom error s unavoid-able.

Descartes thinks (2) rests on a conceptual mistake, but unless the mistake isrectified the undisputed fact of occasional error will impede any efforts toestablish finallyan omniperfectdeity. Thus, on the heels of the ThirdMedita-tion effort, the meditator is confronted with absurdity. Descartes opens theFourth Meditation by revisiting the problem, thereby setting the stage for adiscussionof theodicyin which (2) is to be challenged.1.2. Descartes's theodician trategyAmong the inherited doctrines on which Descartes relies is the thesis thatbeing is intrinsically good in that it comes from God. Evil, and indeed alldefect/imperfection,arenotpositive beings but insteadresult from anabsenceof being-much as one is temptedto construedarknessas nothingmore thanthe absence of light."' Following in the Aristoteliantradition,Descartes dis-tinguishes two varieties of imperfection: imperfect instances of a kind, andimperfect kinds. Only the former need involve intolerable imperfection forwhich an omniperfect creatorwould have no MSR, a claim I'll try to moti-vate with the craftsmananalogy.

A product is imperfect in one sense if it malfunctions. This is imperfec-tion in the instance. It is imperfect in another sense insofar as it lacks theperfectionof a more deluxe model (or perhapsan entirelydifferentproduct),whetheractualor merely possible. This is (comparative) mperfectionin thekind. In this latter sense, the defect need involve none other than a designlimitationof the sort to which all creaturesare susceptible:every productisessentially limited, even when produced by God. In contrast, the formervariety of imperfection (viz. imperfectionof instances) is intolerable in thecontext of an omniperfectmanufacturer: ince we admit of MSRs for suchmalfunction only if we believe it to result, at least in part, from some rele-vant limitation in the power or knowledge of the manufacturer,God wouldhave no such MSR. Given the "natureof God,"Descartes writes, "it seemsimpossible that he should haveplacedin [us] a facultywhich is not perfectofits kind, or which lacks some perfectionwhich it ought to have"(CSM 2:38,AT 7:55). This intuition,thatmalfunctioningproductsare irreconcilablewithan omniperfect manufacturer,provides Descartes the leverage he thinks isneeded in his eventualappealto p-typecircumstances in his epistemologicalprogram).1 Non-being theses date back at least as early as Plato, andtheir applicationto the problem

of evil is developed in the medieval periodby (among others) Plotinus (cf. Enneads 1.8),Augustine (cf. Enchiridion ch. IIf), and Thomas (cf. Summa Theologica (hereafterSTD1.48.3).



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Descartes expresses the distinction between these two varieties of imper-fection in the Aristotelian jargon of privation and negation." In the Cate-gories, Aristotlewrites:We say that that which is capable of some particular aculty or possession has suffered priva-tion when the faculty or possession in question is in no way present n that in which, and at thetime at which, it should naturallybe present.We do not call thattoothless which has not teeth,or thatblind which has not sight, but rather hat which has not teeth or sight at the time when bynature t should.'2Relatingthe distinction to evil, Thomas observes:[A]n evil means the displacement of a good. Not thatevery absence of a good is bad, for it canbe taken in a negative and in a privative sense. The mere negation of a good does not have theforce of evil, otherwise it would follow that wholly non-existents were bad, also that a thingwas bad because it did not possess the qualityof something else, a man, for instance,who wasnot swift as a mountain-goatand strong as a lion. The absence of good taken deprivatively iswhat we call evil, thus blindness which is the privationof sight. (ST la.48.3)Both varieties of imperfectioninvolve a negation of being. Privative defectrendersbeings imperfect instancesof theirkinds. Purely negative defect ren-ders whole kinds as imperfect.13

An acceptable theodicy must avoid the attribution of privation to theomniperfectmanufactureras this that would entail contradiction).Descartesthus invokes a special case of creaturelyprivationto which Scholastics alsoappeal. As Thomaswrites, privation"is foundin a special manner n rationalcreaturespossessing will": it involves the kind of "shortcomingthat fallsunderthe control of the will" (ST la.48.5). The craftsmananalogy is againuseful. Consider a car without anti-lock brakes, one whose wheels havelocked-up resulting in a collision. Culpability might lie with themanufacturer-perhaps a mistakein the manufacturingprocess renderedthelock-up inevitable.Culpabilitymight insteadlie with the driver for misusingthe brakes-perhaps failing to use themin the mannerprescribed or drivingon slippery surfaces. Descartesargues,in effect, thatjudgmenterror s morelike this second case, in that the culpable privationlies in the misuse of ourwill: "ourerrors,if considered in relation to God, are merely negations; ifconsidered in relation to ourselves they are privations" (CSM 1:203, AT8a:17); God would "notgive me the kind of facultywhich would ever enableme to go wrong while using it correctly" CSM 2:37-38, AT 7:54).

In my use of jargon, my primaryaim will be to facilitate an understandingof Descartes,rather han a faithful renderingof the texts of Aristotelians.

12 Ch. 10. In the Metaphysics, he adds: "negation means just the absence of the thing inquestion, while in privationthere is also employed an underlyingnatureof which the pri-vation is asserted" bk. 4, ch. 2).13 Where 'pure' indicates the defect is non-privative.

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To help distinguish this user-culpablevariety of privationfrom the manu-facturer-culpable ariety, Descartes sometimes refers to the latter as positiveimperfectionn.4Were my faculties lackingsome perfection (i.e. being) neededfor truthful udging, the positive being it has-its design-would unavoid-ably tend towards error.Renderedunavoidable n this positive manner, sucherror would need be attributed o God since everything positive comes fromGod.But, as Descarteswrites, since Godis no deceiver therewould "bea con-tradiction that anything should be created by him which positively tendstowardsfalsehood" (CSM 2:103, AT 7:144).15

ThoughDescartesregardspositive imperfectionas incompatiblewith thedivine essence, he recognizes that even some purely negative imperfectionmight be problematic.The craftsmananalogy helps bringthis out. Grant hatthe driverof the car, in our earlierscenarioresulting n collision, has failed touse the brakes in the prescribedmanner. And grantfurther that the brakeshave no positive imperfection in that they work flawlessly when used in theprescribedmanner.Nonetheless, if the level of skill requiredto use them inthe prescribedmanner(e.g. on wet surfaces)is excessive, it would seem thatthe manufacturerbears some culpability for the collision-a fortiori whereanti-lock braketechnology is available.Likewise, grantthat our faculties ofjudging do not malfunctionwhen used correctly.Even so, if the level of skillrequiredto avoid error(e.g. in sensory contexts) is excessive, it would seemthat the manufacturerof our cognitive faculties bears some culpability-afortiori if our manufacturer s omniperfect, and can thus avail itself of allmannerof anti-errorechnology. By Descartes's own lights, using ourcogni-tive faculties in the prescribedmannerrequiressuch great expertise that herecommendswe "devote severalmonths,or at least weeks" to the First Medi-tationalone (CSM 2:94, AT 7:130), a Meditationthatpreparesus to be ableto withhold assent so as to avoid error. It would seem, then, that Descartesowes us more than an argumentestablishingthat ourfaculties of judging arefree frompositive imperfection.He must also addresswhetheran omniperfectmanufacturerwould have an MSR for endowingus with faculties that renderus highly susceptibleto error.As I readhim, he does.

A final clarification of importantdistinctions will help us appreciatehistheodicianstrategy:

Two categories of defect/imperfectionrelative to a product:(a) privative imperfection, .e. imperfectionof instances;two cases:

14 In the Fifth Replies, for example, Descartes complains that Gassendi erroneouslyassumes "thatour being liable to error s a positive imperfectionpositived imperfectione,when in fact it is simply (especially with respect to God) the negation of greaterperfec-tion among createdthings" (CSM 2:258, AT 7:376).

15 In the Principles 1.29, Descartes adds that "it is a complete contradiction o suppose that[God] might deceive us or be, in the strict and positive sense, the cause of the errors towhich we know by experience that we are prone"(CSM 1:203, AT 8a:16; my italics).



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(i) privative in relation to the manufacturer,.e. positive imperfection;(ii) privative n relationto the user;

(b) purely negative imperfection, i.e. imperfectionof kinds.Type (ai) imperfection is essentially incompatiblewith the divine essence;type (b) is not, since it involves no positive imperfection (as Descarteschar-acterizes it). If, however, type (b) imperfectionrenders he productsusceptibleto misuse (thus enabling type (aii) imperfection),its occurrence is problem-atic-especially in the context of anomniperfectmanufacturer.

The FourthMeditation theodicy mirrors these concerns. Descartes firstargues thatjudgment error results from our own misuse of will rather thanfrom positive imperfection. He then argues that God might well have anMSR for purely negative imperfection-that there might be the requisiteexplanation why God producedkinds so imperfectas to facilitatethe misuseof will thatresults in error.Granting he overall argument, he First Medita-tion supposition (in (2)) motivating the problem of error is shown to befalse: the moralimplicationsof occasionalerrorowed to creaturelymisuse arevery different han those of systematicerrorowed to positive imperfection.1.3. Part one of the theodicy:error is not owed topositive imperfectionAccording to Descartes,judgment resultsfrom the interplayof two subfacul-ties: the intellect and the will. Thus the candidates for positive imperfectionare the partsand theircomposition.Descartesbegins with the parts.'6

The intellect is found to be free of positive imperfection.Insofar as it con-tributes to judgment, it performswithout malfunction:"All that the intellectdoes is to enable me to perceive the ideas which are subjects for possiblejudgements;and whenregardedstrictlyin this light, it turnsout to containnoerrorin the propersense of that term"(CSM 2:39, AT 7:56).'7 And though

16 There is much of philosophical interest to explore in Descartes's theory of judgment, butinasmuch as numerous commentatorshave alreadydone so (cf. note 6 above), I shall ingeneral confine my discussion of the theoryto those mattersthatare centralto the theod-icy, or that otherwise anticipatethe eventual demonstrationof the truth criterion. In aneffort to forestall at least some objections, however, I want to locate myself (withoutargument) on two issues that have troubled interpreters.First, I think the two-facultyaccount is best read as applying to assent as opposed to belief-arguably, belief isentirely a function of the intellect (save perhaps that the will helps with attention).Second, to the extent that the Meditations advances a voluntarist doctrine concerningcreaturelyassent, I take it thatthe doctrineapplies only negatively (it is within our directvoluntarycontrolto withholdassentonly, but not to give assent) and with exceptions (wecannotbut assent when our perceptionof a matter s clear and distinct).

17 A malfunction of the intellect (insofaras it contributes o judging) would occuronly if thecontent to which I seemed to be attending,as the subjectof a possible judgment,were notthe content to which I were infact attending.But Descartes thinks this kind of error s notpossible, in keeping with his doctrine of the incorrigibility of the mental-a doctrineexpounded in the Second and Third Meditations(see AT 7:29 and 37). I can be mistaken

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limited in scope (i.e. in the range of matters understood),this limitation isnot, per se, evidence of positive as opposedto purely negativeimperfection.'As the meditator thus concludes, though the intellect may fail, in that"countless things may exist without there being any corresponding deas inme, it should not, strictly speaking,be said thatI am deprived privatess] ofthese ideas, butmerely that I lack them, in a negative sense" (CSM 2:39, AT7:56).The will is also found to be without positive imperfection, and on thiscount Descartesthinks thereis the least room for dispute.Says the meditator,"I think it is very noteworthythat there is nothing else in me which is soperfect and so great that the possibility of a further ncrease in its perfectionor greatnessis beyond my understanding"CSM 2:39, AT 7:56-57); indeed,"the will simply consists in our ability to do or not do something (that is, toaffirmor deny, to pursue or avoid)" (CSM 2:40, AT 7:57)-an ability thatDescartes thinks is unassailable.

Granting that neither the intellect nor the will is positively imperfectwhen considered in isolation, it remains to be shown that there is no suchdefect in the designof theircooperation.Sowhat hen s thesource f mymistakes?t mustbesimply his: hescopeof thewill is widerthan hatof theintellect; ut nstead f restrictingt within hesame imits,I extend ts usetomatterswhichIdo notunderstandCSM2:40,AT7:58).At issue is whether this scope disparityis a positive imperfectionas wouldrender rrorunavoidable:If, however, simplyrefrain rommakinga judgementn caseswhereI do notperceive hetruthwith sufficient larityanddistinctness,henit is clear hatI ambehaving orrectly ndavoiding rror.But if in such casesI eitheraffirm rdeny,thenI amnotusingmy freewillcorrectlyCSM2:41,AT7:59-60).Errorresults from misuse of the will, and Descartes thinks he establishes aset of instructions or correctuse. In short,'9

as tothetruth f thecontent o whichI amattending,utnotas towhether amattendingtothatcontent.18 As themeditatorbserves, ack nthe ThirdMeditation,omesuch imitations essential:"even f my knowledge lways ncreasesmoreandmore,I recognize hat t will neveractuallybe infinite, ince t willneverreach hepointwhere t is notcapable f a furtherincrease"CSM2:32,AT7:47).1 Bear nmind,at thisstageof theFourthMeditation,hat 3) enjoysnodivineguarantee-it hasnotbeenderivedrom heological remises. Thiswill prove mportantn Section2.1.)Rather,hecompatibilityf thedivineessencewitherrors undernvestigation.hiserror-avoidingule, n (3), is advancedn an effort o show thatourfacultiesof judginghaveno positive mperfection;haterror insofar s we'reawareof it) canbe avoidedfwe use ourfacultiescorrectly.ncontext, hisconsequences needed n order o clearthe divine name.



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(3) I am using my faculty of judging in the correct manner (so as toensure the avoidance of error) f and only if I withholdassent exceptwhen my perceptionof a matter s clear and distinct.2"

And given (3),21 thinks Descartes, there is no evidence that our compositefaculty of judging is positively imperfectsince it does not malfunction whenused correctly;22rror s avoided when we withhold assent in the prescribedmanner.23What follows from God's essence is not thatthe faculty of judgingis uniformly inerrant,but that it "tend towards the truth"on those occasions"when we use it correctly" CSM 2:103, AT 7:144).In this incorrect use of free will may be found the privation which constitutes the essenceformalm] of error.The privation,I say, lies in the operationof the will in so far as it proceedsfrom me, but not in the faculty of will which I received from God, nor even in its operation,inso far as it dependson him. (CSM 2:41, AT 7:60; cf. AT 8a:19)

20 Since, according to Descartes, we're able to exercise the ability to withhold assent onexactly those occasions when our perceptionis not clear and distinct, the prescription n(3) entails thatwe should withhold assent whenever we can. To wit (andthis is alluded toat AT 7:59), I am correctly using my faculty of judging exactly when I follow the Methodof Doubt. Invoking a common-sense foundationalism (inspired by an architecturalmetaphor), the First Meditation meditator concludes that he ought to "hold back [his]assent from opinions which are not completely certainand indubitable" CSM 2:12, AT7:18); the (comparatively subtle) Fourth Meditation inquiry yields what amounts to thesame result.

21 It is somewhat unclear how strong an argumentDescartes thinks he has advanced, insupportof (3)-whether he intends that it is clearly and distinctly established, or insteadthat it rests on an argument o the best explanation.

22 Discussions concerning whether a thing is positively imperfect inevitably presuppose afinal cause-some telos for which it was designed. The meditator's working presumptionis that his intellect and will were designed for the purpose of error-free udgment. Yet,for all he knows, at this stage of the Meditations, there may be some other end, apartfrom judgment, for which the will and the intellect were designed, and concerning whichthey are positively imperfect; indeed, at this juncture,the meditatorhas not yet ruled outthe possibility that within him occur a variety of mentaloperations(perhaps nvolving thewill or the intellect) of which he is unaware (cf. Newman 1994). For his present pur-poses, however, this need not concern Descartes. Since the specific worry under consid-eration (without which a theodicy would be unnecessary)concerns whether the facultiesof judging are positively imperfect insofar as they result in judgment error, Descartesneed only show thatthey are not positively imperfectto this extent.

23 For all the meditatoryet knows (at this stage of the Meditations), he may be in errorevenon those occasions when his perception of a matter is clear and distinct, even if sucherror would escape his detection-indeed his comprehension. (Bear in mind that theresults of the Third Meditation theistic arguments ntendedto subdue such metaphysicaldoubts (at least, where motivatedby the Deceiver Hypothesis) are on hold, pending theoutcome of the theodicy.) But though the success of the larger anti-skeptical projectrequires that Descartes address this hypothetical category of error (prompted by meta-physical doubt), the only category of error that the present stage of the theodicy needaddress is discernible error-i.e. that precise errorby which one generatesthe reductiodiscussed in Section 1.1.

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Werethe facultyof judging incapableof being misused it might be a moreperfect kind, but all Descartesneeds to show, in this first stage of the theod-icy, is that it is a perfect instance-that it is not positively imperfect. Sinceerror s avoidedwith correctuse, in accordancewith (3), Descartesthinkshe'smet the burden.1.4. Part two of the theodicy:God mighthave an MSR or allowing errorIt remains to be shown whether God has an MSR for having producedsuchan imperfect kind of creature-one so prone towards error, albeit owedentirely to purely negative defect. Descartesexpounds his case by rejoininglikely objections. Again, the candidatesfor considerationare the parts andtheir composition.

The first objection concerns the scope of the intellect. Since we couldhave been endowed with a more perfect kind of intellect, namely one withwiderscope (thereby imiting the scope disparitybetween the intellect andthewill), an omniperfect creator would have no MSR for not doing so.Descartes's rebuttal s perhaps oo brief,but I thinkit is best read as a reduc-tio on the critic's suppositionthat God would have no MSR for creating akind of intellect with less-wide scope than is otherwisepossible. The suppo-sition results in the absurd (though formally consistent) claim that therewould be no MSR regardlessof how perfect an intellect were produced:nomatterhow wide its scope, a yet wider scope would remainpossible (cf. note18); "it is in the natureof a finite intellect to lack understandingof manythings, and it is in the nature of a createdintellect to be finite"(CSM 2:42,AT 7:60). This, of course,does not yet dischargethe worrythat thereis someminimum degree of perfection below which an omniperfect creator wouldhave no MSR. The responseto this residual worrycomes below.

"Nor",moving to the next objection,is there "cause for complainton thegroundsthat God gave me a will which extends more widely thanmy intel-lect" (CSM 2:42, AT 7:60). Had God limited its scope, ipso facto the willwouldhavebeen rendered less perfectkind.24

The final line of objectionconcerns the intellect-will composite. In viewof our aptitudeto err, it seems that God could have, and thus should have,done better.Some kinds seem so repugnantas to have no MSR. A passagefromGassendiis suggestive:It is certainlyno fault in a workman f he does not trouble to make an enormouskey to open atiny box; but it is a fault if, in makingthe key small, he gives it a shapewhich makes it difficult

24 Descartes can also be read as offering the stronger reply that any limitation in the will'sscope would render t an imperfect instance: he writes that "it seems that its naturerulesout the possibility of anythingbeing taken away from it" (CSM 2:42, AT 7:60), a claimthat can be taken to mean that to limit the will's scope would be to deprive it of a perfec-tion it should naturallypossess (rendering t positively imperfect).



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or impossible to open the box. Similarly, God is admittedlynot to be blamed for giving punyman a faculty of judging that is too small to cope with everything, or even with most things orthe most important hings; butthis still leaves room to wonder why he gave man a faculty whichis uncertain,confused and inadequateeven for the few matters which he did want us to decideupon. (CSM 2:218, AT 7:314)

Before considering Descartes's reply, I want to clarify two lines ofresponse that he does not offer but both of which providea somewhat tempt-ing reading of the texts. The meditator's remarkthat, in having freewill, it"means that there is in a sense more perfectionin me thanwould be the caseif I lacked this ability" (CSM 2:42, AT 7:60-61), might be thought to showthat freewill is supposedto provide God the MSR for producing errantcrea-tures. On this account, erroris taken as a necessary concomitant of genuinefreewill, yet Descartesconcedes the contrary:I can see, however, that God could easily have broughtit about that without losing my free-dom, and despite the limitations in my knowledge, I should nonetheless never make a mistake.He could, for example, have endowed my intellect with a clear and distinct perception ofeverything about which I was ever likely to deliberate;or he could simply have impressed itunforgettablyon my memorythat I should never make a judgementaboutanythingwhich I didnot clearly anddistinctlyunderstand. CSM 2:42, AT 7:61)It is also tempting to read Descartes as appealingto the principle of pleni-tude,25 specially in view of the popularityof plenitudeaccountsamongstthemedieval. Accordingly, God augmentedthe variety in creationprecisely inorderto augmentthe good of the creationas a whole. Says Thomas,Godbrought things into existence so thathis goodness might be communicated o creaturesand re-enacted through them. And because one single creature was not enough, he produced manyand diverse, so that what was wanting in one expression of the divine goodness might be sup-plied by another,for goodness, which in God is single and all together,in creatures s multipleand scattered. Hence the whole universe less incompletely than one alone shares and repre-sents his goodness. (ST la.47.1)As such, the perfection of the creation, as a whole, benefits from an espe-cially fine-grainedcontinuitybetween createdkinds;so fine-grained,perhaps,as to include even error-pronekinds,thusprovidingthe MSR for the creationof our world.

Descartes'sactualreplyinvolves neitheran appealto freewill nor to pleni-tude-though I have yet to justify the latter claim. Instead, he appeals toanother nheriteddoctrine,26he principleof organicunities-a principle that

25 As does Calvert (1972).26 One that finds expressionin Plato (cf. the Laws bk. 10) and is developed by the medievalsfor purposes of theodicy.

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allows that the good of a whole may be enhanced by decreases in the perfec-tion of its parts.27 ays the meditator,Had God made me this way [inerrant], hen I can easily understand hat, considered as a total-ity, I would have been more perfect than I am now. But I cannot therefore deny that there mayin some way be more perfection in the universe as a whole because some of its parts are notimmune from error ..21 (CSM 2:42-43, AT 7:61)For all we know, urges Descartes, the creation-as a whole-is more perfectin virtue of our faculties of judging being a less perfect kind.29

To the extent that the principle of plenitude allows that decreases in theperfection of parts (i.e., of kinds in the parts) may add to the perfection of a27 In terminology I borrow from G. E. Moore, in view of the similarity between his principle

and Descartes's. In one of Moore's formulations, the principle is defined as the thesis"that he intrinsic value of a whole is neither identical with nor proportional o the sum ofthe values of its parts" 1988, 184). I take talk of "parts" o apply not only to local hunksof being butalso to local distributionsof being.

28 According to Plotinus, "we are like people who know nothing about the art of paintingand criticise the painter because the colours are not beautiful everywhere, though he hasreally distributed the appropriate colours to every place" (Enneads 111.2.11;cf. also111.2.3).Thomas adds: "God and nature and any agent do what is better for the whole,and for each part as subservingthe whole, yet not in isolation ... That whole composed ofthe universe of creatures s the better and more complete for including some things whichcan and do on occasion fall fromgoodness without God preventing t." (ST la.48.2)

29 Notwithstandingthe account of the Fourth Meditation (in which the meditator says that"there is no doubtthat [God] always wills what is best" (CSM 2:38, AT 7:55)), there areboth textual and doctrinal reasons to suppose that Descartes rejects the principle of thebest (vis-ei-vis the kind of world to actualize); that he holds, instead, that-for all weknow-God may have an MSR for bringing about any arbitraryworld absent positiveimperfection.

The textual consideration stems from a remark to a correspondent (2 May 1644)concerning the Fourth Meditation account: "I do not know that I laid it down that Godalways does what he knows to be the most perfect,and it does not seem to me that a finitemind can judge of that. But I tried to solve the difficulty in question, about the cause oferror,on the assumptionthat God had made the world most perfect, since if one makesthe opposite assumption, the difficulty disappears altogether" (CSMK 232, AT 4:113).This is consistentwith Descartes's practice of using the voice of his meditator-spokesper-son to express all manner of views-whether those he means to debunk,or his own doc-trines, or, as in the present case, views he means to assume for the sake of argument.Notice too that Descartes's actual Fourth Meditation appeal to organic unities commitshim to nothing stronger han that, for all we know, God has an MSR for producing errantkinds, since doing so renders the world more perfect (majorperfectio, AT 7:61), ratherthan that it renders he world most perfect.

The doctrinalconsideration s this: it is plausibleto supposethatDescartesrejectsthatthe notion of a most perfect world is coherent. His Third Meditation discussion of theintellect commits him to the doctrine that a most perfect created intellect is incoherent(see note 18 above). Arguably, Descartes holds the same with regardto a most perfectcreated world. Indeed, accordingto Thomas, such a world-qua most perfect set of par-ticulars/parts-is incoherent,since there is infinite distance (as it were) between God andany possible creature(Scriptum super Sententias, 1.44.1.2). Thomas does allow, how-ever, that for any given world-qua set of parts-there is a most perfect ordering (cf. STla.25.6). For a helpful discussion of Thomas' view, see Kretzmann 1991).



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whole, it is similar to the principle of organic unities (as invoked byDescartes), but there are importantdifferences. First, the principle of pleni-tudeexplainsincreases n theperfectionof a whole-as are owed to decreasesin the parts-only in ceteris paribus contexts in which the comparativelyimperfectpartsareadded to the whole (without displacing existing parts).30But Descartes's appeal to organic unities allows that such increases in theperfection of the whole might be explained even where the comparativelyimperfectparts displace otherwiseexisting parts. Second, though the princi-ple of plenitudeprovides an a priori explanationas to why a world is moreperfect with the addition of errant kinds than without (ceteris paribus),Descartes's applicationof organic unities turns on an appealto human igno-rance:for all we know, our world is better (with error) than it would other-wise be. Indeed, given ouressentially finite, creaturelyperspective,the prob-lem is far worse: for all we could know, our world is better than it wouldotherwise be.

We have now seen bothpartsof Descartes's FourthMeditationtheodicy.Granting hat both stages succeed, his argumentundermines he claim in (2)on which the problem of error(as characterized n the First Meditation) isbased.1.5. Burdenof proofGiven my account, Descartes's theodicy may seem inconsonant with theMethod of Doubt. According to the objectionI have in mind, the meditatorcannot accept a theodicy as dubious as thatwhich I have reconstructed,onewhose second stage turns on the claim that, for all we know, God has anMSR for having created our world. Rather,as it would seem, the Method ofDoubt requiresthat Descartesproducea decisive argumentshowing that thecreatordoes have therequisiteMSR. I believe the objectionis unfounded,butI shall have to introducea pairof distinctionsto makemy case.The problem of error(and of evil in general) and the effort at solving itboth come in strongerand weakerversions.On the solution side, (whatI amcalling) "strong" heodiciesreston a specific proposalfor anMSR thatwouldexplainthe occurrenceof error n the actualworld;"weak" heodiciespropose,instead, thatwe cannotrule out therebeing some such MSR.31On the prob-lem side, the worry may be formulatedas a logical or an evidentialproblem.According to the logical problem,the occurrenceof error s logically incom-patible with the existence of an omniperfectcreator-thus providing for ademonstrationof the impossibilityof God's existence. This is the version of30 For example, the principle of plenitude provides an explanation of why world W, with

parts a, b, andc, is less perfectthan world Wr,with partsa, b, c, andd. But it is not appli-cable to comparisons between the same world W (with parts a, b, and c) and a worldW", with partsa, b, and d.31 Cf. Plantinga'sdistinction between a theodicyfor evil and a defense of evil (1974, 28).

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the problemthat Descartes introducesin the First Meditation. According tothe evidential problem, "even if it is possible that God has a morallysufficient reason for creatingthe sort of world we experience ... the facts ofevil constituteevidence against the hypothesis that the world was created,andis governed, by an omnipotent,omniscient,perfectly good God."32

In the context of the Meditations, it is sufficient that Descartes offers aweak theodicy in response to the logical problem. On the problem side, onlythe logical problemcould have any force: on the heels of the Third Medita-tion in which Descartes purports o establish, with demonstrativecertainty,the existence of an omniperfect being, the evidential problem does no dam-age-a successful demonstration f p is not underminedby a merely probableargumentthat not-p. The logical problem, however, is enough to force themeditatorto suspend judgment concerning the Third Meditationdemonstra-tion (i.e. when not attendingto it) until further nquirycan resolve the ten-sion in supposing an omniperfect creator of a world with error. On thesolution side, a successful weak theodicy is sufficient to thwartthe logicalproblem: successfully making the case that, for all we know, there is noinconsistencybetween errorand the divine essence discredits he claim that weknow there to be one.1.6. Theprivation-negationdistinctionand ?-typecircumstancesI claimed, at the outset,that Descartes needs to establishthe following:

(1) If I should be in errorin ?-type circumstances, God would be adeceiver.

We are now in position to make headway in understanding?-type circum-stances-a result we'll need in the subsequenteffort to reconstruct he proofof a criterionof truth.

In view of the epistemic character of the appeal to organic unities, theonly species of imperfectionthat Descartes could rule out as incompatiblewith the divine essence is positive imperfection. Indeed, Descartes's rathertortuousexplanatory moves, vis-a-vis the possibility of our having positiveimperfection,arerequisiteto the constructivephase of his theistic epistemol-ogy. The theistic steps in the epistemological programdependon (1), and(1)depends on being able to establish a species of errorwith which the divineessence is incompatible. Suppose Descartes had taken a weak epistemicstance when he confronted the possibility of our faculties having positiveimperfection. For instance, suppose he had argued (nothing stronger than)that, for all we know, our cognitive faculties have no positive imperfection;or that, for all we know, God has an MSRjustifying the productionof crea-32 Adams and Adams (1990, 16); cf. Pike (1963, 192ff).



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tures with positive imperfection.Had Descartes made such an argument,he'dbe unable to establish (1). In turn,the theistic component of his epistemol-ogy would be stillborn. He would be unable to rule out the possibility thatGod is compatiblewithall mannerof judgmenterror.

An interpretiveprinciplethus emerges:(4) Descartes asserts thatGod would be a deceiver if p were false (i.e. ifthe meditator's assent to p were to result in error) only in circum-

stances in which positive imperfectionin the meditator'sfaculty ofjudging would contribute o sucherror.33

Because of (4), (1) must be understood n terms of positive imperfection.Andsince, in the finalanalysis, every claim to knowledge (scientia) in the Medita-tions rests on (1), all such knowledge claims must be understood n terms ofpositive imperfection.As I noted at the outset, Descartes thinks that his Fourth Meditationresults "needto be known both in order to confirm what has gone before andalso to make intelligible what is to come later"(CSM 2:11, AT 7:15). Aswe've now seen, the FourthMeditation theodicy is needed to reconcile anapparent ontradiction esultingfrom the ThirdMeditationproof of God. It isalso needed to make sense of Descartes's appeals to God as no deceiver, inconnection with (1) and (4). We have yet to cash-in the notion of a ?-typecircumstance or a truthcriterionspecifiedin terms of clarityanddistinctness.I want now to turnto thatpartof Descartes'sproject.Ourinterpretiveprinci-ple, (4), will proveespecially fruitful n reconstructing he argument.

2. The criterion of truthDescartes's most famous formulationof a truthcriterion s in terms of clarityand distinctness, and I shall hereafter refer to this criterion as the "C&DRule". As Section 2 unfolds, my defense of a numberof theses will emerge:the conclusion that the C&D Rule is divinely guaranteed s not drawn untilthe last paragraphof the FourthMeditation;the theodicy provides steps thatare essential to the demonstrationof the C&D Rule; and the C&D Rule restson a yet more fundamental truthrule, one that helps explain central SixthMeditation nferences.2.1. Whyafurtherargument or the C&D Rule is neededTwo passages might temptone to supposethatDescartes intends to establishthe C&D Rule at an earlierpointthan the last paragraph f the FourthMedi-tation. In both cases, an argument n supportof a criterionof clarityand dis-

33 I am assumingthatexpressions such as "God would be a deceiver" are typically ellipticalfor some such as "God,who is omnipotentand omniscient,would be a deceiver."

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tinctnessis advanced,but in neithercase does the argumentyield the desidera-tum.

The first passage occurs early in theThirdMeditation:I am certain that I am a thinking thing. Do I not therefore also know what is required for mybeing certain about anything? In this first item of knowledge cognitionn] there is simply aclear and distinct perception of what I am asserting; this would not be enough to make mecertain of the truthof the matter f it could ever turn out thatsomething which I perceived withsuch clarity and distinctness was false. So I now seem to be able to lay it down as a generalrule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctlyis true. (CSM 2:24, AT 7:35)Many commentators ocus on this passage,34with an eye towards the follow-ing account. (Call this the "cogito-derived" ccount.)The meditator's(above)reflections on clarity and distinctness-as the epistemic ground of thecogito-are intendedto establish that the C&D Rule is credible, barringthediscovery of a doubt that defeats its credibility. It is then discovered (twoparagraphs ater) that, though the Deceiver Hypothesis does underminetheC&D Rule, it is the only sceptical hypothesis that provides any reason fordoubt. Thus, subsequent to refuting the Deceiver Hypothesis (later in theThird Meditation),the unconditionalcredibilityof the C&D Rule is therebyestablished.

There are serious problems with this account,35not the least being that,when synopsizing his own case for the C&D Rule, Descartes in no wayalludes to the cogito-derived account; instead, he explicitly states that theC&D Rule is established in the FourthMeditation (AT 7:15). Nor does heavail himself of thecogito-derivedaccount,whenpressedby the secondobjec-tors as to the veracityof clear and distinctperception; ather,he respondswitha Fourth Meditationline of argument(reconstructedbelow, in Section 2.3)that is in no way derivativeof the above ThirdMeditationpassage.The prob-lem with the cogito-derivedaccountis that,in context, Descartes is claimingnot that the Deceiver Hypothesis (and equivalent doubts) provides the onlyreason for doubtingthe credibilityof the C&D Rule, but thatit provides theonly reason for doubtingthe credibility of the particular,"very simple andstraightforward"matters intuited"utterlyclearly"-those that all undertheC&D Rule, as "forexamplethat two andthree addedtogethermake five, andso on" (CSM 2:25, AT 7:36). Yet the express ground for the overly opti-mistic conjecture,36oncerningthe status of the generalrule (the C&D Rule),is not that it is perceived clearly anddistinctly. The conjecturerests insteadon a hasty generalization from one instance-an induction insufficient toestablish the C&D Rule even subsequent to refutation of the Deceiver34 Cf. note 4 (above) for references to secondaryliterature n which this passage is treated.35 Cf. Bennett (1990, 91ff), who considers and rejects a series of (what he characterizes

as) "disasters or the derivationof the truthruleon AT 7.35" (93).36 . jam videorpro reguld general posse statuere ...



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Hypothesis.37 But in view of the constraint (imposed by the Method ofDoubt) to regard,as if false, mattersthat are in the least respect doubtful, theburden of a charitable nterpretation-a burdenthatcogito-derived accountsfail to meet-is to show how the meditatorarrivesat clarityand distinctnessof the C&D Rule.38Moreover,Descartes purports o groundthe C&D Rulein a divine guarantee:he thinks he shows that the divine essence is incompat-ible with our being in error when we're relying on the C&D Rule (cf. AT7:144).39But given the cogito-derived account,the only premises available tothe meditator, on the topic of the incompatibility of the divine essence witherror, are those advanced in the First Meditation, those whereby all error sassumed to be incompatible with an omniperfect deity. (Recall (2) fromSection 1.1.) As such, the only results thatthe meditatorcould drawprior tothe FourthMeditationare eitherthat we never err (thus renderingsuperfluousthe C&D Rule) or that the divine essence eventually will be established ascompatible with all mannerof error thus ruiningthe C&D Rule). No wonderDescartes says that "it was not possible to prove [the C&D Rule] before theFourth Meditation" (CSM 2:9, AT 7:13). The above Third Meditation pas-sage seems best read as intended to suggest the criterionthat will emerge asthe eventual mark of the truth-if anythingwill.

The second temptingpassage is one we have alreadyconsidered in Section1.3). It occurs in the FourthMeditationwhere Descartes advances (3), the ruleforcorrect udging:

(3) I am using my faculty of judging in the correct manner (so as toensurethe avoidance of error) f andonly if I withhold assentexceptwhen my perceptionof a matter s clear and distinct.

The temptation s to supposethat(3) just is the desired C&D Rule, a readingthat has the benefit of putting the proof of the C&D Rule in the FourthMeditation.The problemfor this account is that(3) does not (and,in context,could not) have a divine guarantee:he argument rom which (3) derives can-not be representedas drawingin any way on the divine essence; to the con-trary,(3) is advancedfor theodicianpurpose n an effort to vindicate that Godis a possible being (cf. note 19 above). Later n the FourthMeditation(giventhe interpretation amdefending),Descartesagainadvancesa prooffor a truth

37 Indeed, this early ThirdMeditationpassage is consistent with the coherentist interpreta-tion of Frankfurt he offers a cogito-derived account) who writes: "Descartes's reason-ing in the Meditations is designed not so much to prove thatwhat is clearly and distinctlyperceived is true, as to establish that there are no reasonable groundsfor doubting this"(1970, 178-79).

38 By the time of the Fifth Meditation, Descartes claims to have "amplydemonstrated" heC&D Rule (CSM 2:45, AT 7:65).

39 Cf. Williams's discussion (1978, 188).

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rule.It is this latereffortthatDescartes ntends to produce the requisitedivineguarantee,and the effort to which I now turn.2.2. The explicit FourthMeditationproof of the C&D RuleWith theodicyin hand,the meditator'svery next step is to offer the followingargument in the lastparagraph f the FourthMeditation):[A] The cause of error must surely be the one I have explained; for [B] if, whenever I have tomake a judgement, I restrainmy will so that it extends to what the intellect clearly and dis-tinctly reveals, and no further, hen it is quite impossible for me to go wrong. This is because[C] every clear and distinct perception is undoubtedly something [est aliquid,4() andhencecannot come from nothing, but must necessarily have God for its author. Its author, I say, isGod, who is supremely perfect, and [D] who cannot be a deceiver on pain of contradiction;hence [B] the perception s undoubtedly rue. (CSM 2:43, AT 7:62; text markersadded)

Assuming the passage non-enthymematic, he argumentamounts to the fol-lowing (the letteringof the stepscorrelateswith the textmarkersabove):(C) Every clear and distinct perception has positive being and hence

comes from God.(D) God is nota deceiver.(B) If I clearlyanddistinctlyperceivethatp, thenp is true.41(C), (D)](A) The earlierexplanation thatwhich led to (3)) of the cause of error s

correct. (B)]First, notice that the inference from (B) to (A) confirmsmy earlier claim (inSection 2.1): Descartesdistinguishesthe argument n supportof (3) from thatin supportof (B) (the C&D Rule); the proofof (B) reinforces the explanationon which (3) is based. Second, notice that the argument or (B) is surely anenthymeme.42 My primaryaim, in Section 2.3, is to uncover the missingpremise(s) neededto completethis argument.40 The French, here, reads "something real and positive" (quelque chose de reel et de

positft).41 Some of Descartes's formulationsof the C&D Rule suggest that what is guaranteed isconcept containment/exclusion (cf. AT 7:65,78, and 115-16), rather than the truth ofpropositional contents. I shall assume that all such talk of clearly and distinctly perceiv-able concept containment/exclusion is translatableinto talk about the truth of proposi-tional contents. Also, Descartes uses "perceive"/perception" (percipiolperceptio) withmuch wider scope than is the currentpracticein philosophy: for Descartes, to perceive Xis, roughly, to be aware of X, and as such, the objects of perception may include con-cepts, propositions, sensory qualia,or the like.

42 As stated, (B) simply does not follow from (C) and (D). And the most obvious candidatefor an implied premise is a claim that Descartes surely rejects, namely: If a perceptionhas positive being, and hence comes from God, then, since God is no deceiver, the con-



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2.3. Patching-uptheproof with some help from the SecondReplies and (4)While responding to concerns (voiced by the second objectors) about theC&D Rule, Descartes offers remarksstrikingly similar to those in the lastparagraph of the Fourth Meditation (I have marked the similarities withprimedtextmarkers):[D'] Since God is the supreme being, he must also be supremely good and true, and it wouldtherefore be a contradictionthat anything should be created by him which positively tendstowards falsehood. [C'] Now everythingreal which is in us must have been bestowed on us byGod (this was proved when his existence was proved); moreover, we have a real faculty forrecognizing the truthand distinguishingit from falsehood, as is clear merely from the fact thatwe have within us ideas of truthand falsehood. [B'] Hence this faculty must tend towards thetruth,at least when we use it correctly (that is, by assenting only to what we clearly and dis-tinctly perceive, for no other correct method of employing this faculty can be imagined [fingipotest]). [D'] For if it did not so tend then, since God gave it to us, he would rightlyhave to beregarded as a deceiver. (CSM 2:103, AT 7:144)Along with the similarities, there are supplementalremarks:the content ofthe D' passages goes beyond that in D, and B' includes more than B. As Ishall argue, when the work of the theodicy is taken into considerationtheenthymematic Fourth Meditation passage is best read as containing thesesupplementalremarks mplicitly.

I reconstruct he argument rom the above Second Replies passage as fol-lows:

(5) God exists [as omnipotentandomniscient]andis no deceiver. [D'](6) It is impossible that any faculty bestowed on me by God has posi-

tive imperfection.[(5); D'](7) My facultyof judging has been bestowed on me by God. [C'](8) It is impossible that my faculty of judging has positive imperfec-

tion. [(6),(7)](9) Were I in error when using my faculty of judging in the correct

manner(i.e. accordingto the only accountof correct use thatcan beimagined),thenmy facultyof judgingwould have positive imperfec-tion. [B', D']

(10) I am not in error when using my faculty of judging in the correctmanner(i.e. accordingto the only account of correctuse thatcan beimagined).[(8),(9)]

tent perceived is true. Descartes must reject this, since every perception (qua mode ofmind) has positive being-no matterhow obscure and confused.

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(11) I am using my faculty of judging in the correctmanner(i.e. accord-ing to the only accountof correctuse that can be imagined) if andonly if I withhold assent except when my perceptionof a matterisclear anddistinct.[(3);B']

(12) I am not in error f I withholdassentexcept when my perceptionofa matter s clear anddistinct.[(10),(11);B']

The inferencesto (8), (10), and(12), are trivial.(5) and(7) areresultsof ThirdMeditation arguments,both of which are available to the meditatorsubse-quentto the theodicywhichvindicatesthe divineessence. That leaves (6), (9),and (11) to be explained.

The supplemental content of the Second Replies text (viz. that whichexceeds the explicit remarksof the enthymematicFourthMeditationpassage)is expressed in (6), (9), and (11). And each of these claims is elucidated byconsiderationof the theodicy of the Fourth Meditation.The incompatibilityof positive imperfectionwith the divine essence explains the inference from(5) to (6). The interpretiveprinciple n (4) (discussedin Section 1.6) explainswhy (9) is implied by D' andB': in such passages, Descartes must be under-stood as invoking the notion of positive imperfection.And (11) is none otherthana more precise formulationof (3) (itself advancedas partof the effort attheodicy). In Section 2.4, I'll return o the matterof why Descartes thinks(9)is true and the importanceof the awkwardparentheticalclause appearing n(9), (10), and (11); for now, I'll note only thatI ampreservingthe awkward-ness of Descartes's own remarks(see the second parentheticalclause in theblock quoteabove).

Since all of the supplementalremarksderive from the theodicy, they arenaturalcandidates or implicitpremisesto readinto the argumentof the prob-lematic (enthymematic)passageoccurring n the finalparagraph f the FourthMeditation.And in doing so, the argument hereexactly parallelsthat which Ihave reconstructed n (5) thru(12). I thus propose we read thatproblematicFourthMeditationpassageas follows:The cause of error must surely be the one I have explained [viz. the explanation based on thescope disparity,alnaccount thatsuggests the correct-userule in (3)]; for if, wheneverI have tomake a judgement, I restrainmy will so that it extends to what the intellect clearly and dis-tinctly reveals, and no further,then it is quite impossible for me to go wrong. This is becauseevery clear and distinct perception is undoubtedly something, and hence cannot come fromnothing, but must necessarily have God for its author. Its author, I say, is God, who issupremely perfect, and who cannot be a deceiver on pain of contradiction [though an other-wise omniperfectcreator surely would be a deceiver were I in error in such circumstances,since myfaculty of judging wouldbe positively imperfect];hence the perception s undoubtedlytrue.(CSM 2:43, AT 7:62)



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The firstinterpolations intendedto capture ines (3) and(11); in context, thetext must be readthis way, since the cause of error(as proposedin (3)/(11))is, as the meditatorsays, "theone I have explained".The second interpolationis intended to capture ines (6) and(9); given ourinterpretative rinciple, (4),the appeal to God as no deceiver must be understood in terms of positiveimperfection. Since, then, (12) entails the C&D Rule, it turns out, upontakinginto consideration he work of the theodicy,that the FourthMeditationdemonstrationof the C&D Rule falls neatlyinto place.2.4. The more undamental ruthcriterionto which DescartesappealsReturningto (9), I want to pursue Descartes's reasons for accepting it-apursuitthat will suggest a more fundamental ule of truthon which Descartesis leaning. I shall hereafterrefer to this more fundamentaltruthrule as theInclination-Without-CorrectionRule (IWC Rule) which I formulate as fol-lows:

(13) p is true,if I clearlyanddistinctly perceive that:(i) I am positively inclined to assent to p; and(ii) I have no faculty/capacity or correctionby which I could ascer-

tain thatnot-p.On my account, conditions (i) and (ii) are, at bottom, the ?-type circum-stances that (togetherwith appealsto the divine essence) groundall positiveknowledge claims in the Meditations, ncluding knowledgeof the C&D Ruleitself.

In the very same Second Replies passage from which (5) thru (12) istaken, Descartes appeals to the IWC Rule while defending the C&D Rule.The context is this. The second objectors complain, in effect, that Descartesfails to establish a divine guaranteeof the C&D Rule because he does notrule out the possibility that God might "treatmen as a doctortreats the sick,or a fatherhis children."In such cases, continue the objectors,"there s fre-quent deception thoughit is always employed beneficiallyandwith wisdom."And thus, for all Descartes has shown, God might likewise employ decep-tion-perhaps, indeed, we're occasionally deceived even concerningmattersthatwe perceive clearly anddistinctly. (CSM 2:90, AT 7:126) The objectionis especially serious, since the real possibility that God would resortto suchdeceptionis fatalto Descartes'sepistemology (cf. Section 1.6 above).As often occurs, Descartes's reply to his objectors helps clarify someaspect of the Meditationsthat would otherwise remain obscure. In this case,the response sheds light on the precise circumstancesunder which he thinkspositive imperfectionoccurs, thushelping to clarify the groundof (9). In thereply, Descartes draws an analogybetween his efforts (in the FourthMedita-tion) to reconcile deceptionrelative tojudgmentand his efforts (in the Sixth

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Meditation) to reconcile deception relativeto bodily behavior.In both cases,the credibilityof the positive inclinationswith which the creatorhas endowedus are in question:43n the one case, inclinations stemmingfrom our intellec-tual natureurge us towardstruthful udging; in the other, inclinations stem-ming from our composite nature urge us towards beneficial behavior.44AsDescartes argues,the divine essence is compatiblewith our having positive(and thus God-given) yet misleading inclinations-a claim that is somewhatsurprising, in ways broughtout by the analogy with doctors. Presumably,ordinarydoctorsresortto deception (e.g. to create a positive frameof mind inthe patient)preciselybecausethey lack the knowledgeor the powerneeded tootherwise ensure proper healing. Since, however, an omniperfect doctorwould not want for such technology, the analogy helps reinforce the suspi-cion thatan omnipotentdoctor would have no MSR for calling on deception.Nonetheless, Descartes holds thatGod can endow us with errant nclinationswithout thereby rendering us positively imperfect, so long as we're alsoendowed with a meansfor correctingsuch error.In the absence of any meansof correction,however, it would renderus positively imperfect,andthis is thebasis of the IWC Rule (stated n (13)). As Descartesexplains,God does allowthatwe are sometimesdeceived, as when a personwith dropsyhas "apositiveimpulse [impelliturpositive] to drink which derives from the natureGod hasbestowed on the body in order to preserve it" (my italics); and yet, as43 Descartes uses a variety of expressions when referring to what I am calling a positive

inclination: n the Third Meditationhe refers to "natural mpulses" (impetus naturales) bywhich one may have been "pushed"or "impelled"(fuisse impulsum) (AT 7:39); in theFourth, an "inclination"or "propensity" n the will (propensio in voluntate) (AT 7:59); inthe Sixth, a "great propensity to believe" (magnam propensionem ad credenduin) (AT7:79-80), a "realor positive propensity" o believe (realis sive positive propensio) (AT7:83), and being "impelled by nature"(a natural impellitur) (AT 7:84). Even merelyprobable reasoning may positively incline: the Fourth Meditation meditator remarks, ofprobable conjectures, that they may "pull me [me trahant] in one direction" (CSM 2:41,AT 7:59).

44 As he writes to Mersenne: "For my part,I distinguish two kinds of instinct. One is in usqua humanbeings, and is purelyintellectual: t is the natural ight or mental vision. ... Theother belongs to us qua animals, and is a certain impulse of naturetowards the preserva-tion of our body, towards the enjoymentof bodily pleasures,and so on" (CSMK 140, AT2:599).

Though the texts are somewhat unclear, Descartes appears to hold that some of ourinclinations to judge are not positive in the sense of coming from God, but instead resultfrom improper(privative) use of our faculties of reasoning and judgment-resulting "notfrom naturebut from a habit of making ill-considered udgements"(CSM 2:56, AT 7:82).For instance,we're typically inclined to suppose thatobjects are just as they seem in sen-sory experience: the tendency is to suppose, as the meditatorobserves, "that stars andtowers and other distant bodies have the same size and shape which they present to mysenses" (CSM 2:57, AT 7:82). After furtherreflection, however, the meditator adds that"althougha star has no greatereffect on my eye than the flame of a small light, that doesnot mean that there is any real or positive inclination in me to believe that the star is nobigger than the light; I have simply made thisjudgementfromchildhoodonwardswithoutany rationalbasis" (CSM 2:57, AT 7:83; italics added). Cf. Principles 1:71.



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Descartes continues,"this is not inconsistentwith the goodness or veracity ofGod, and I have explained why in the Sixth Meditation"(CSM 2:102, AT7:143). Descartes intends that due consideration of his Sixth Meditationtreatmentof dropsy-typeerrorestablishes a numberof relevantpoints, includ-ing that we're bound to be misled occasionally given our composite nature(involving mind and body); and that, notwithstanding his design limitation,God made surethat we're misleadon those occasions as would have the leastnegative impact on our overall well-being. More to our present concern,Descartes evidently thinks thata due considerationof his treatmentprovides,as he has his the meditatorsay,the greatest help to me, not only for noticing all the errors o which my nature s liable, but alsofor enablingme to corrector avoid them withoutdifficulty. (CSM 2:61, AT 7:89)

It is precisely this capacity to correct error thatDescartes emphasizes inhis defense of the C&D Rule in the context of replyingto the second objec-tors. His reply establishes that he thinks this capacity for correction(whichrenderscondition (ii) of the IWC Rule unfulfilled) distinguishesdropsy-typeerror rom the circumstancesaproposto the C&D Rule:In the case of our clearest and most carefuljudgements, however, this kind of explanation [asI offer for dropsy error]would not be possible, for if such judgements were false they couldnot be corrected by any clearer judgements or by means of any other natural faculty. In suchcases I simply assert that it is impossible for us to be deceived. Since God is the supreme being,he must also be supremely good and true, and it would therefore be a contradiction that any-thing should be createdby him which positively tends towards falsehood [positive tendat infalsum].45 CSM2:102-3, AT 7:143-44; italics mine)Descartes is here leaning on the IWCRule: condition(ii) is statedexplicitly,and the largercontextconcerns whetherGod could allow us to be mistaken nour "clearest and most careful judgements"-judgments which are formedonly if condition (i) holds. In such cases, namely where (i) and (ii) are bothfulfilled), "it is impossible for us to be deceived." And why so? The passagesuggests that the IWC Rule follows from the impossibility of positive

45 There are two readingsof this last claim: (a) it would be contradictory hat the faculty ofjudgment should generally tend towards falsehood; (b) it would be contradictory hat itshould tend towards falsehood on any particular occasion. The discussion of dropsy mayseem to suggest (a), since the correction, there, involves the move away from a particu-lar judgment towards a general judgment. But this would be to confuse two differentapplications of the particular-generaldistinction. In the context of the discussion ofdropsy, the distinction is appliedto the content, p, to which one is inclined; in the contextof whether (a) or (b) is the correctreading, the distinction concerns how often God cantolerate error owed to positive imperfection-whether he can allow that positive imper-fection results in error on some particular occasions, so long as it does not generallyresult in error.Clearly, reading (b) must be the right one: any and all positive imperfec-tion is incompatiblewith the divine essence (as we have seen), yet reading(a) allows thatthe faculty sometimestends towardsfalsehood.

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imperfection togetherwith the following claim (again, our interpretiveprin-ciple, (4), proves useful): My faculty of judging would be positively imper-fect, if p were false even thoughI clearlyanddistinctlyperceivedthat,46

(i) I am positively inclined to assent to p, and

(ii) I have no faculty/capacity or correctionby which I could ascertainthatnot-p.And since the divine essence rules out the possibility of positive imperfec-tion, (13) is a consequence.

The awkwardparenthetical lause in (9) is plausiblyread as invoking con-ditions(i) and ii).47 Condition i) is implied,since the FourthMeditationexplanationof errorbased on the scope disparity s takenas being so persua-sive. And Descartes thinks (ii) holds, since (as he says in the SecondReplies), "no othercorrectmethod of employingthis faculty [of judging] canbe imagined"(2:103, AT 7:144). Under these circumstances,namely ?-typecircumstances,the explanationof errormust be correct on pain of positiveimperfection.

Grantingthis account, the IWC Rule groundsthe C&D Rule in virtue ofgrounding (9). Though in reply to the second objectors, Descartes offers ameta-level proof (as we've seen)-one in which the IWC Rule is applied toanotherproof (viz. the earlierargument or (3))-the C&D Rule may also bederivedstraightforwardlyrom the IWCRule withoutappealto (3). Clause(i)of the IWC Rule holds: when the perceptionof p is itself clear and distinctthere is "agreatinclination in the will" (CSM 2:41, AT 7:59), so greatas to46 Since the appeal, here, is to clarity and distinctnessqua rule of evidence, rather han qua

rule of truth, the appeal does not conflict with my claim that the IWC Rule is more fun-damental than the C&D Rule. This (evidential) appeal is needed, since, given both theMethod of Doubt and the FourthMeditation nquiryinto the cause of error,the meditatoris obliged to withhold assent unless his perception s clear and distinct(cf. note 20 above).That appetites, such as that specified in condition (i), are (according to Descartes) clearlyand distinctly perceivable is established in the Principles: concerning "sensations, emo-tions and appetites," Descartes writes that "these may be clearly perceived provided wetake great care in our judgements concerning them to include no more than what isstrictly contained in our perception-no more than that of which we have inner aware-ness" (CSM 1:216, AT 8a:32); he later adds that "painand colour and so on are clearlyand distinctly perceived when they are regardedmerely as sensations or thoughts" (CSM1:217, AT 8a:33). I shall have more to say, below, about the clarity and distinctnessrequirementvis-a'-viscondition (ii).47 The plausibility of (9) is-with some strain-supported by ouranalogy to ordinarymanu-facturers.Consider that there are cases in which car manufacturersare responsible forour inclinations as to the properuse of theirproducts,as when they design pictorialiconsfor various of the car's features (e.g., a picture of a horn, where one should press tosound the horn). In such cases, if the icon would naturally ncline one towardserror,andthe manufacturerprovided no means by which the errant inclination could be corrected(e.g., with instructionsin the owner's manual), it is plausible to suppose that we wouldjudge that the caris positively imperfect.



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impose an irresistible psychological urge to assent (cf. AT 7:36, 7:65, and7:69). Clause (ii) also holds: in that the denial of a clearly and distinctly per-ceived p involves "manifest contradiction [repugnantiam]"48 (CSM 2:25, AT7:36), we cannot make intelligible sense of correcting such p by a clearerjudgment.

The IWC Rule promises also to ground judgments stemming from lessimpressive inclinations. So long as an inclination is positive, it provides adegreeof epistemological leveragetowards ruth n conjunctionwith the IWCRule. As such, conditions (i) and (ii) might be fulfilled even where pexpressed a hypothesis, a scenariogermaneto Descartes's Sixth Meditationmoves (discussed below, in Section 2.5).

To sum up, I take Descartes to hold that the IWC Rule is epistemicallypriorto the C&D Rule. When pressed by the second objectors,as to why theC&D Rule is guaranteed,Descartes responds with the IWC Rule. Further-more, line (9) (and the IWC Rule on which it rests) is implicit in the FourthMeditationdemonstrationof the C&D Rule (so I have argued). Finally, theC&D Rule can be derived from the IWC Rule, thoughthe IWC Rule cannotbe derived from the C&D Rule. I turn now to a brief consideration of theexplanatorypowerof my accountfor the Sixth Meditation.2.5. Theprominence of the IWC Rule in the Sixth MeditationThough this is not the place for a detailed (and needed) treatment ofDescartes's Sixth Meditation,I do at least want to establishthe value of theIWCRule in explainingtwo of the central arguments here:the argument orthe existence of the external,corporealworld,andthe argumentby which themeditatorpurports o establish that he is not dreaming.49 he IWC Rule war-rants clear and distinct conclusions that might otherwise appearto be theresultof risky inferences in which the meditator s strayingfromthe rigorousstandardsof theFourthMeditation.5048 I take it thatmanifest repugnancyneed not be understoodas involving formal contradic-

tion, a claim supportedboth by the translationoptions (for repugnantia) and Descartes'sown examples (at AT 7:36) among which is the cogito.

49 Cf. also Newman (1997).50 Curley writes: "In the FourthMeditationDescartes had maintained that God would be a

deceiver only if what we falsely believed were something we could not but believe [i.e.,something we perceived clearly and distinctly]. If we gave our assent wrongly to aproposition we were merely inclined to believe (albeit very strongly), the fault would beours for misusing our will, not God's. By the Sixth Meditation Descartes's ethic of beliefis considerably less Pelagian." (1978, 229-30) As I have in effect argued, Descartes'sGod is considerably less tolerant of misguided inclinations than Curley supposes-evenresistible inclinations may (in accordance with the IWC Rule) provide the basis of cor-rect judgment. Nonetheless, there is an apparent tension: As urgedin the Fourth Medita-tion (cf. (3), the rule for correct use), one is misusing one's faculty of judging if oneassents to mattersthatare less thanclear and distinct. Yet, since perceptions falling shortof clarity and distinctness may satisfy condition (i) of the IWCRule, the latter rule seems

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In the final stage of his Sixth Meditationargument or the existence of anexternal, corporealworld, the meditatorreduces, to three, the logically possi-ble options for an externalcause of his involuntarysensory ideas: (a) actualcorporealsubstance, (b) God, or (c) some kindof creaturedistinct frombody(AT 7:79). But, says the meditator,"since God is not a deceiver" both (b) and(c) canbe ruledout,for God has given me no faculty at all for recognizing any such source for these ideas; on thecontrary,he has given me a great propensity to believe that they are produced by corporealthings. (CSM 2:55, AT 7:79-80)Forthose readersexpecting Descartes to eliminatethe incorrectoptions by anexpress appeal to the C&D Rule, this inference should seem quite mysteri-ous. The C&D Rule alone does not warrantthe conclusion. Suppose themeditatorwere (somehow) able to avail himself of the C&D Rule in absenceof the underlyingFourthMeditationprinciplesI am attributing o Descartes.In that case, there would be no basis for eliminating options (b) or (c)-atleast, none thatwould survivethe Methodof Doubt.This shortcomingwouldarise in thatthe meditator'sinitial5 evidential basis for his judgment is notthathe clearly anddistinctly perceives that(a) is the correctoption, nor thathe clearlyanddistinctly perceives that(b) and (c) arebothincorrect; nstead,his basis is that he has "a great propensityto believe" that (a) is correct. Assuch, the C&D Rule does not warranta clear anddistinctjudgmentas to thecorrectnessof any of the threeoptions.52As we arenow in position to appre-

to license the formationof judgments on occasions that amount to a misuse of one's fac-ulty of judging. It would seem, if we take seriously the FourthMeditationstandardof cor-rect use, that the Sixth Meditationmeditator s engaged in systematic abuse of his facultyof judging.

The apparent ension dissolves when one distinguishesthe psychological inclination toassent from the content towards which one is inclined. For Descartes, whether I aminclined to assent to p is something I may perceive clearly and distinctly, even if my per-ception thatp is itself less than clear anddistinct.(Cf. note 46.) But in order to invoke theIWC Rule, vis-a-vis the contentp, the meditator's initial perceptionof p (that which isantecedent to the invocation) need only be clear and distinct in the former, but not thelatter sense. His subsequent perception (thatwhich results from invoking the IWC Rule)is upgraded o clarity and distinctness n the lattersense.

Given that the IWC Rule licenses inferences to claims with empirical content, theextent to which Descartes is (as the received view has it) a strong foundationalist s not atall straightforward.Indeed, in Principles 3:43-44 and 4:205-6, Descartes looks to bearguing, of the a posteriori partof his physics, that the divine guaranteecould-in prin-ciple-extend to such claims. On a plausible readingof these texts, the respect in whichDescartes thinks his a posteriori account falls shortof the requisite rigorconcerns condi-tion (ii) of the IWC Rule. Indeed, Descartes's claims that the Meditations provide thefoundation for his physics (cf. the letter to Mersenne of 28 January 1641) may well beintendedto refer to the entire project-including the a posteriori part.

51 I mean to use 'initial' in the same sense as I do in note 50, where I distinguishbetweenthe meditator's nitial andsubsequentperceptionof p.

52 The meditator would have no grounds for rejecting what the later Berkeley regards asthe correct alternative, namely option (b). Leibniz (among others) appears to think that



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ciate, this otherwise mysterious inference is rendered ntelligible if construedas an appealto conditions (i) and(ii) of the IWC Rule. The "greatpropensityto believe" fulfills condition (i).53The furtherclaim, that"God has given meno faculty at all for recognizing any such source [as (b) or (c)] for theseideas," fulfills condition (ii). Together, these claims provide the basis for thejudgmentthat(a) is the correctoption.54

Turning our attentionto the end of the Sixth Meditation,and Descartes'seffort to solve the dreamingproblem,the IWC Rule againexplains the infer-ential work. On a standardreading of the passage (one that is mistaken),Descartes is offering a wholly naturalistic olution to the problem of dream-ing; thereadingfindsprimafacie support rom the following passage:I now notice that there is a vast difference between [dreamingand waking], in that dreams arenever linked by memory with all the other actions of life as waking experiences are. ... Butwhen I distinctly see where things come from and where and when they come to me, andwhen I can connect my perceptions of them with the whole of the rest of my life without abreak, then I am quite certain that when I encounter these things I am not asleep but awake.(CSM 2:61-62, AT 7:89-90)On this account,Descartes's solution to the dreamingproblemis thoughttorest (solely) on a continuitytest: since continuitywith past experiences holdsonly for one's waking experiencesbut not one's dreamexperiences, checkingfor the requisitecontinuityprovidesa meansfor knowingthatone is awake.

Descartes would (indeed, does) have grounds for eliminating option (b), but complainsthat Descartes never does argue againstoption (c): "The core of [Descartes's] argumentis this: The reason for our sensation of materialthings is outside us; therefore, these sen-sations come to us either from God, or from some other agent, or from the things them-selves. They do not come from God, if these things do not exist; for otherwiseGod wouldbe a deceiver; they do not come from anotheragent-this he.forgot to prove; thereforethey come from the things themselves, which therefore must exist. It may be answeredthat the sensationsmay come from an agent other thanGod; forjust as, for some weightyreasons, he permitsotherevils, he may also permitthis deceit, withoutthereby becominga deceiver ..." (1965, 41; my italics)53 It is by no means clear that Descartes is entitled to assert this "great propensity tobelieve" option (a), though I'll not be able to address such concernshere.

54 Given Descartes's brand of representationalrealism in connection with standardmech-anist doctrines(which he endorses), it is crucial that the divine essence turnout compati-ble with ubiquitousbut erroneous udgmentsto the effect that the real qualities of bodiesare just as they seem in sensory experience. As noted earlier(cf. note 44), Descartes canbe read as denying that such inclinations(as to suppose thatobjects are as they seem) aregenuinely positive inclinations. On this reading, condition (i) of the IWC Rule isunfulfilled where p expresses such claims as, e.g., thatapples are red just as they seem,that stars have the same relative size as they seem, and the like. Even barring this inter-pretation, Descartes can protecthis appearance-realitydistinction by blocking condition(ii)-he thinks he can show (and indeed has shown) how to correct the inclination tojudge that objects are as they seem. The wax passage, for instance, is supposed to showthat "none of the features" (presumably, determinate as opposed to determinable fea-tures) that the meditator arrives at "by means of the senses" are part of the essence ofthe wax (CSM 2:20, AT 7:30).

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This "solution"promptstwo obvious objections(both of which areraisedby Hobbes,AT 7:195-96). First,it seems one could dreamthe requisite con-tinuity. Second, this solution is available to the atheist since it involves noappealto divine veracity(indeed,it couldhave been offeredin the FirstMedi-tation).

On closer inspection,however, it turnsout thatDescartes'sproposedsolu-tion includes theistic steps intendedto complementthe appealto continuity.In context, the dreamingpassagecomes on the heels of Descartes's treatmentof dropsy-type error (as discussed in Section 2.4 above). The treatmentofdropsy is supposed to shed light on Descartes's proposed solution of thedreamingproblem.The dreamingpassageopens with the meditatordiscussinghis abilityto correct sensoryerror:I can almost always make use of more than one sense to investigate the same thing; and inaddition,I can use both my memory,which connects present experiences with precedingones,and my intellect, which has by now examined all the causes of error.Accordingly, I should nothave any further fears about the falsity of what my senses tell me every day; on the contrary,the exaggerated doubts of the last few days should be dismissed as laughable. This appliesespecially to ... my inabilityto distinguishbetween being asleep and being awake. (CSM 2:61,AT 7:89)Referring o the worry(that he is dreaming)as "exaggerated"uggests that heis strongly inclined to thinkhe is awake.As such, he needs only to establishcondition (ii) of the IWC Rule and he'll have a divine guaranteeof beingawake.Thus,says the meditator speakingof sensory appearances),when I distinctly see where things come from and where and when they come to me, andwhen I can connect my perceptions of them with the whole of the rest of my life without abreak, then I am quite certain that when I encounterthese things I am not asleep but awake.And I ought not to have even the slightest doubt of their reality if, after calling upon all thesenses as well as my memoryand my intellect in order to check them,I receive no conflictingreports rom any of these sources. Forfrom thefact that God is not a deceiver it follows thatincases like these I amcompletely free from error.(CSM 2:62, AT 7:90; my italics)Central o the inferenceis the meditator'seffortto ascertain he correctnessofthejudgmenttowardswhich he is inclinedby means of his variousfaculties:the inclination is sufficient to warrant he judgment that he is awake, pro-vided his faculties do not enable him to ascertainthat he is instead dream-ing.55On my account,the cases like these to which Descartes refersarethosewhere conditions (i) and (ii) of the IWC Rule are both satisfied-namely, 4-

S One might have thoughtit implausibleto establishthat one is dreaming (especially giventhat, in accordancewith the IWC Rule, condition (ii) need be clearly and distinctly per-ceived). But as Descartes writes, when "we are asleep and are aware that we aredreaming,we need imaginationin orderto dream, but to be aware that we are dreamingwe need only the intellect"(CSM 2:248, AT 7:358-59; my italics).



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type circumstances.The continuity test is involved in Descartes's procedure,but t playsan ancillary ole to condition ii).56Condition (ii) turns out to be much more problematic in Descartes's

treatmentof the dreaming problem than in his argument or the existence ofthe materialworld. The meditator'srespectivelevels of confidence,in the twocases, reflect the complication involved. When arguing for the existence ofthe materialworld, Descartes regardsit as decisive that condition (ii) holds,anda decisive conclusion is drawn.When arguingas to how he can know thathe is awake,Descartes adds animportant aveatin concession of how onerousa task it is to establish condition (ii):But since the pressure of things to be done does not always allow us to stop and make such ameticulous check, it must be admitted that in this humanlife we are often liable to make mis-takes about particularthings, and we must acknowledge the weakness of our nature. (CSM2:62, AT 7:90)

3. ConclusionEvidently, it strikes most readers of the Meditations that the FourthMedita-tion amounts to a detour from what is otherwise an orderly, foundationalistproject. I have argu

the fourth meditation - lex newman

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