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The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe: 1699-1703Author(s): Rifaat A. Abou-el-HajSource: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1969), pp.467-475Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/596616Accessed: 27-12-2016 14:13 UTC

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THE FORMAL CLOSURE OF THE OTTOMAN FRONTIER IN EUROPE: 1699-1703*

RIFAAT A. ABOU-EL-HAJ

CALIFORNIA STATE COLLEGE, LONG BEACH

In 1699 at Karlowitz and in 1700 at Istanbul, the Ottoman State acceded by treaty to the creation of joint border commissions for the demarcation of boundaries and differentiation of territory between the domains of the Sultan and those of the Holy Lea- gue powers. The creation of these commissions and the consequent closure of the Ottoman frontier in Europe signalled the end of an era in Ottoman-European relations. Ottoman Muslims, however, were unprepared for this sudden shift in policy. Hence the in- itial consequence of the closure of the frontier was internal strife in the form of open rebellion among the frontier elements whose livelihood had depended upon the open frontier.

ON JANUARY 26, 1699 at Karlowitz and on July 12, 1700 at Istanbul the Ottoman State signed negotiated treaties with their military antagonists of the previous fourteen years.' The formal cessation of hostilities following those years of war differed from all previous ones in both their general and specific aims. In the past, the aim of peace was no more than a temporary cessation of war,2 a truce accompanied by an Ottoman dictation of rough, vague, indefinite military zones between the belligerent forces to avoid major contacts and accidental confronta- tions. The fluidity of the frontier zones between the belligerents is evidenced by incessant raids and counterraids within and across the zones.

* I wish to express my gratitude to Eugene Asher, Robert Frazer and Andreas Tietze for their critical com- ments. A Summer Fellowship from the Foundation of Long Beach State College facilitated the writing of this article in 1968.

Once the two parties had recuperated militarily, they would again be ready for the formal resumption of hostilities.3

At Karlowitz and at Istanbul, the belligerents agreed with full Ottoman concurrence to a permanent peace.4 The most crucial feature of these agreements concerned the frontier articles. They are distinguished by three general characteristics: a clearly differentiated boundary between the former belligerents and a specific provision for the creation of a joint apparatus for the demarcation of this permanent political-linear boundary,- a time-table for the implementation of the territorial and other articles, and a declaration of adherence to the concept of territorial integrity.6

That the accession to diplomacy was unprece-

I For a detailed presentation of the negotiations at the Congress of Karlowitz between the Ottoman state and the Holy League powers (Habsburg Austria, Poland, Venice and Muscovy) see this author's "Ottoman Di- plomacy at Karlowitz," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 87.4, (October-December, 1967), 498-512. At Karlowitz, Muscovy agreed to a two year truce. The Tsar's representatives continued their negotiations with the Ottomans in Istanbul and concluded a separate peace treaty on July 12, 1700.

2 For example, in the sixteenth century, the Ottomans

would agree to a cessation of hostilities for a period of no more than eight years. Only in the subsequent century

would they consent to a truce of longer duration. For a brief discussion of this problem see Gunter E. Rothen- berg, The Austrian Military Border in Croatia 1522-1747, Urbana, Ill., 1960, 23-33, 62-65. (Hereafter cited as Rothenberg, Austrian Border 1622-1747).

3 On several occasions, hostilities were resumed, not formally, but as an extension of the raids which persisted throughout the truce period. For instances, see ibid.

4With Austria for twenty-five years, with Muscovy for thirty years and with Poland and Venice for an indefinite period of time. The collection of treaties used in this study is Muahedat Mecmuasi, Istanbul, 1294-98, 5 vols. (Hereafter cited as Muahedat Mecmuasi.)

6 It is quite possible that this demarcation of a political boundary was the first of its kind in early modern European history. Of the evolution of the concept of a boundary in the seventeenth century, G. N. Clark con- tends that "The tendency ... was towards a linear frontier. As yet, however, it was a tendency imperfectly fulfilled. For completion it had to await, amongst other things, the progress of map-making. I have not been able to discover a case of a frontier fixed literally on the map until the year 1718." G. N. Clark, The Seventeenth Century, Oxford, rev. ed., 1947, reprinted 1961, 144. (Hereafter cited as Clark, The Seventeenth Century.)

6 These observations are partly based upon a comparison of the territorial clauses of the treaties of 1699 and 1700 with prior Ottoman-European treaties.

467


468 Journal of the American Oriental Society, 89.3 (1969)

dented in Ottoman history is perhaps best evidenced by the way Mustafa Naima (ca. 1665- 1716), a contemporary chronicler, explained and excused the negotiated treaties. Publicly, this Ottoman apologist claimed that a formal cessation of hostilities at that juncture would not lead to permanent peace. As with similar occasions in

the dynasty's past, the cessation of hostilities was expected to provide only a respite.

But although the treaties of 1699 and 1700 were unique in Ottoman history, Naima insisted upon comparing them with earlier negotiations. For precedents in which Muslims were forced to ne- gotiate with non-Muslims at a disadvantage he turns, significantly enough, to pre-Ottoman Islamic history and selects, among others, the truce of 628 and those after the capture of Jerusalem in 1099, with pagans and Christians respectively. At Hudaybiya, the Prophet Mu- hammad was forced to come to terms with his enemies at Mecca. Side-stepping the historical

causes for this peaceful resolution of conflict between the Prophet of Islam and his pagan enemies, the chronicler explained that surely it was not due to the inability of the messenger of God to meet the Meccans in battle. Rather, it was to be taken as an act of mercy based upon a moral purpose. The formal cessation of hostilities between Muslim rulers and Crusading princes following the capture of Jerusalem is taken as the other historical precedent.

It is important to point out that these citations in justification of a peace with non-Muslims have at least one common denominator. The end result was invariably beneficial to the Muslims. Mecca was taken in three years from the treaty of Huday- biya and Jerusalem was recovered within eighty- eight years from the date of its capture (October 1187). From these examples, Naima's readers were expected to conclude, firstly, that conducting negotiations with non-Muslims at a disadvantage was not unprecedented-even the prophet had indulged in that; secondly, that the negotiations with non-Muslims led only to temporary cessation

of hostilities; and thirdly, that a truce ultimately served Muslim ends by being crowned with subse-

quent victories and recovery of Muslim lands. The difference between Naima's use and in-

terpretation of the nature of the peace of 1699 and 1700 and the historical reality is neither accidental nor purely etymological.8 For Naima was acting

as an apologist and spokesman for Amcazade Htiseyin Pasa, the Grand Vezir, to whose lot fell the unpleasant task of acceding to territorial losses as a price for making peace.9 As apologist

for this Grand Vezir, he was writing in defence of the Ottoman establishment and in justification of the necessity to end hostilities at that juncture. Thus, an explanation for Naima's contentions

must be sought in some of the revolutionary implications of the peace treaties. For the peace treaties, with their boundary clauses, created both ideological and practical dilemmas for the in-

cumbent Sultan and Ottoman leadership. The negotiated agreements of 1699 and 1700 implied in their territorial delimitations at least two

modern principles of international law: acceptance

of a political boundary and adherence to the concept of the inviolability of the territory of a sovereign state.'0

At that time, when the Ottoman state was un- able to defend itself, the adoption of and adherence to these principles of international law would serve as the best defence against its am-

bitious neighbors. But the acceptance of a politi-

cal boundary and the principle of territorial in-

tegrity implied a sudden abandonment of the raison d'etre of the Ottoman dynasty, whose dis-

7Naima, Tarih-i Naima, Istanbul, 1281-83, I, 12-44 of the author's introduction. (Hereafter cited as Naima, Tarih.)

8 At no point in either the chronicles or the archives is the term "truce" (muhadene) used to describe either the aim of the negotiations or the documents which refer to the Karlowitz and Istanbul treaties. Instead, the treaties are properly designated as "peace treaties" (sulh-u salah, "peace and amity").

I This Grand Vezir was Naima's patron, and had encouraged him to write his Tarih. For reference to this patronage, see Naima, Tarih, I, 9-11 of the author's introduction and Rasid, Tarih-i Rasid, Istanbul, 1282, II, 533. (Hereafter cited as Rabid, Tarih.)

10 On the seventeenth century development and establishment of the concept of sovereignty in international law, see Clark, The Seventeenth Century, 140.


ABOU-EL-HAJ: Formal Closure of Ottoman Frontier in Europe 469

pensation for leadership of Islam was contingent upon its ability to maintain continuous warfare with the infidel. From its inception, the Ottoman dynasty had adopted as the core of its ideology the Muslim ideal of the expansion of the realm of Islam (dariil-Islam) at the expense of the realm of

war (dariil-harb). Fired with this ideal, the dynasty's warriors were able to create from a small

client principality of the Seljuks of Rum an Em- pire which became an heir to both the caliphs of the 'Abbasid Empire and the emperors of Byzan- tium. Their primary advantage over the dozen or so other principalities of Anatolia was their ability to maintain the Ghazi tradition, which thrived upon an open frontier. An open Ottoman-Byzan- tine frontier attracted unemployed Ghazis from the rest of Anatolia and the Muslim world, and afforded them the opportunity to realize not only personal gain through booty, but also by injunc- tion of Islam the ideal of territorial expansion. The technique for expansion was incessant warfare by the Ghazis-an ideal occupation for semi- nomadic tribes. Incessant warfare took the form of continuous raiding, which softened the enemy and eventually facilitated gradual cultural and territorial absorption. In the meantime, the frontiers were pushed further into enemy territory, creating new zones which in turn succumbed to Ottoman rule under the impact of Ghazi raids."

Although by the middle of the fifteenth cen-

tury the Ottoman dynasty had established more formal instruments of conquest and territorial absorption, viz. the sipahis and the janissaries, the old frontier conditions persisted well into the seventeenth century, with raids supplementing formal warfare. Thanks to direct countermeasures,

taken by the European powers, expansion of Ottoman territory in the West through raiding had been minimized,'2 except in areas where classi- cal frontier conditions continued to exist, as in the

Polish and Russian spheres. As late as the 1680's, the frontier was open,"3 and raiding remained a

way of life and provided a mode of living for a substantial number of Ottoman subjects both in the west and in the east, along the Podolian and Ukrainian frontiers. Thus, both in theory and in fact, the Ottoman dynasty, until the treaties of Karlowitz and Istanbul, maintained the ideology of the Ghazi tradition.

The practical implications of the acceptance of international law were perhaps just as relevant as

the ideological. As long as the Ottoman establishment could pretend that the aims and the consequences of the negotiations had to be seen in the light of the precedents cited by Naima, and as long as Ottoman subjects were able to draw the desired conclusions about these negotiations, there was little likelihood of any major repercussions to the cessation of hostilities.

Measures were taken, however, at every level of the Ottoman government-local and central, tribal and sedentary-for the implementation and enforcement of the treaties, and the guarantee of peaceful co-existence between the subjects of the former belligerents. Anxious to meet the timetables set by the treaties for boundary rectifica- tion, the Ottoman state responded with alacrity to the creation of joint commissions almost im- mediately after treaty ratification. All the treaties had specified, with few exceptions,'4 as exact a boundary as was possible for the negotiators to de- limit from a distance. The regions where distance, unfamiliarity with the nature of the terrain, and the lack of natural barriers existed, were left for demarcation with specific boundary posts by the joint commissions.'" By the time the various de-

11 For a detailed study of the role of the frontier in early Ottoman expansion, see Paul Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire, London, 1938, reprinted 1966, especially 33-51.

, 12 The Habsburgs began to take counter-measures as early as 1518. For a full discussion of these arrangements see Rothenberg, Austrian Border 1522-1747, 15 ff.

13 The frontier zone between the Ottomans and Habs- burgs extended for several miles. To deter raiding, major strongholds were built by the Habsburgs at the fringes of the frontier zones, usually supplemented by minor forti- fied positions.

14 E.g. articles V and VII of the treaty with Muscovy provided demilitarized zones of twelve and ten hours in the Ur-Kapi/Perekop and Azov regions respectively.

15 The commissions were created by article V of the Habsburg, article VIII of the Venetian, and article VII of the Russian treaties. Commissioners appointed were: Ibrahim Agha, kapici baai, for the Habsburg boundary



marcators had completed their respective tasks,'6 the Ottoman State had along most of its frontier for the first time in its history defined linear boundaries which were differentiated by natural

barriers where those existed, and by artificial but visible markers where none existed.'7

Contrary to Naima's contention and the declared public view of the aims of the negotiations at Karlowitz and Istanbul, the Ottoman establishment had negotiated not the usual agreements

of cessation of hostilities but peace treaties, and silently but diligently was enforcing the provisions'8 and meeting the timetables for implementation set by some of the treaties.'9

demarcation, March 2-12, 1699. (Copy of the Order is in Istanbul: Baabakanlik Artivi [Prime Minister's Ar-

chives], Mtihimme defteri no. 110: 617. Hereafter cited as Mfthimme defteri.) Ibrahim Agha, kapici bati, for the Polish boundary demarcation, June-July, 1703. (Copy of the order is in Vienna: Osterreichische Nationalbiblio- thek, A.F. 159, 197a. Hereafter cited as Vienna: A.F. 159.) Ibrahim Efendi, sipah katibi, for the Russian

boundary demarcation, July 12, 1703. (Mentioned in

Vienna: A.F. 159, 90b-91a. The commander of Agu fort was appointed to demarcate the boundary and differenti- ate the territory of the Ottoman state in the area of Azov as specified by article VII of the treaty. Op. cit.,

90b-91a and 189a-190a.) Yusuf Pa~a, governor of Ozii/ Ochakov, was designated over-all supervisor of the boundary demarcations with Poland and Muscovy, March 12-21, 1699. (Copy of the order is in Mfthimme defteri no. 110: 626 and in Vienna: Osterreichische Na- tional-bibliothek, H.O. 179, 87a. Latter source hereafter cited as Vienna: H.O. 179.) The indefiniteness of the frontier with these three powers necessitated the con- stant aid of local inhabitants in the exact differentiation of Ottoman from other possessions and the demarcations of the various boundaries.

For a description of the general contents of Vienna: H.O. 179 and A.F. 159 see Gustave Flftgel, Die Arabischen, Persichen und Tirkischen Handschriften der Kaiserlich-Koniglichen Hofbibliothek, Vienna, 1865, I, 271-72. Both manuscripts consist mostly of copies of letters issued from the Divan (chancery) during the rea- set and sadaret of Rami Mehmed Efendi/Pa~a. The authenticity of the letters cited in this study has been de- termined by the examination of the contents of each letter and through comparison with orders on the same topic in Muthimme defters nos. 110 and 111. Since there are gaps in the forementioned Muthimme defters for this period, these collections of letters complement the archi- val sources.

16 In some areas, the final agreements over boundary differentiation were not reached until 1703 and after. For example, agreement over Brod was not reached until August 12, 1703. Joseph von Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, Pest, 1827-35, VII, 63. However, the joint Habsburg-Ottoman Commission began the demarcation of the boundary in March-April, 1699 and reached preliminary agreements in mid-May, 1699. Muahedat Mecmuasi, II, 240. Other agreements were reached: on July 15, 1700 for most of the Croation boundary (op. cit., 232); on July 20, 1700 for the Bihad (op. cit., 235); and on February 4, 1701 for Temesvar (op. cit.,

(40). The joint Commission demarcated the whole length of the Ottoman-Habsburg boundary proceeding from the Sirmium, into Bosnia-Croatia and from there along the boundary between Temesvar and Transylvania.

17 The full texts of the Habsburg-Ottoman and Vene- tian-Ottoman border agreements are printed in Muahe- dat Mecmuasi, II, 217-71. Although the texts of the Polish and Muscovite border agreements were not available to this author, the meetings and contentions of the commissioners can be reconstructed from copies of in- structions and orders sent by the Ottoman Court to its representatives on the commissions, and to the various governors and commanders concerned.

The boundary with Poland was delimited mostly by the "natural boundaries" which separated the Ottoman from the Polish domains before 1672. For the implemen-

tations of Polish-Ottoman territorial clauses see orders in: Muhimme defteri no. 110: 611-613, 619, 622, 623, 626- 627; Miihimme defteri no. 111: 6-8, 56-57, 102, 114, 116, 131, 143 (dated March, June, August-September, Octo- ber, 1699). Other orders in Vienna: H.O. 179, 71a, 71b, 77a-78b; and Vienna: A.F. 159, 197a.

For the implementations of the Muscovite-Ottoman territorial clauses see orders in: Muhimme defteri no. 110: 582, 612-613; and Miihimme defteri no. 111: 1-2, 5, 30, 31-32, 114, 166; and Vienna: H.O. 179, 28a-b, 28b-29a, 31a, 33a-b, 87b-88a, 88b; and Vienna: A.F. 159, 34a-b, 49a-49b, 69b-70a, 87a, 90b-91a, 189a-190a, 192a-193b, 193b-195a.

18 See below the example of Nogay-Tatar violations of the treaties and Ottoman measures to deter their re- currence.

19 Time-tables were set by some of the treaties for evacuation of forts and regions. For example, article III of the treaty with Poland set the middle of May, 1699 (Old Style), as the deadline for Ottoman evacuation of fort Kamenets-Podolsk, a major Ottoman garrison in Podolia. Orders were sent out in mid-March, 1699, in- forming the commanders concerned of the deadline for evacuation. Miihimme defteri no. 110: 611-613, 619, 622- 23, 626 and Miihimme defteri no. 111: 6, 7, 8, 56, 57, 102, 116, 131, 147. These orders span a period of seven months to October, 1699. The deadline was not met, but already



Ottoman adherence to the spirit and the letter of the peace treaties and the Sultan's official and practical attempts at enforcing their provisions did not go unchallenged. A chain reaction was registered, first in the Bujak20 and then in the Crimea. Here, along the frontiers shared by the Ottomans, Poles and Muscovites, there persisted social and economic conditions very close to those of the Ghazis of early Ottoman history. The closure of the frontiers and the enforcement of

prohibitions against violations of Muscovite and Polish domains were bound to result in the dis- location and alteration of the mode of life and livelihood of Ottoman subjects in the region.

The Nogay Tatars,2' inhabitants of the Bujak, initially reacted to the frontier articles by isolated

acts of violation. Despite several warnings from the Ottoman Court, unauthorized forays into Russian and Polish territory persisted. A show of force by the central authorities did not deter the violations, but rather projected the defiance into

an open rebellion.22 The Nogays were declared

outlaws and rebels against the Sultanate and

were not amnestied until they were willing to ac-

cept the following stiff conditions: agree to return

to "legal" employment (namely cultivation and

herding) and pay the two taxes of 6ar23 and

Cadet-i aghnam;24 promise to desist from acts which in any way might be construed as violations of the

treaties (with Poland and Muscovy) and agree

that violators of whatever rank would be interned and punished; abandon their heretical practices and traditions25 which were contrary to the canon

in August-September, 1699, the garrison was reassigned to other forts on the Ottoman frontier. Register for reassignment of this garrison is in Istanbul: Baabakanlik Arsivi, Maliye defteri no. 6006: 90-109. (Hereafter cited as Maliye defteri no. 6006). Article X of the Ottoman- Habsburg treaty stipulated that Hungarians and Tran-

sylvanians who had switched (sic) their allegiance during the recent war from the Emperor to the Sultan were to be settled in the areas far removed from the border, which was to be shared by the two states for the serenity of the people of the area and security of the border. Orders were issued in late June and early October, 1699 for the settlement of these Ottoman allies in villages south of the Danube in the Vidin district. Miihimme defteri no. 111: 57-58, 132. The operation for their resettlement took seven months starting on June 21, 1699 to January 31, 1700. Register for their resettlement is in Maliye defteri no. 6006: 56-79.

20 Bujak/Budjak was the term used for Bessarabia. 21 For details on the Nogay Tatars, see H. H. Ho-

worth, History of the Mongols, London, 1880, II, part 2, 1026-27. (Hereafter cited as Howorth, History of the Mongols.)

22 For the Nogay Tatars' rebellion in 1701, see op. cit.,

I, part 1, 566 and I. H. Uzungaraili, Osmanli Tarihi, Istanbul, 1956, IV, 1., 11-12. The Nogay rebellion of

1700-01 was encouraged and led by Ghazi Giray, the brother of the incumbent Khan Devlet Giray. Ghazi Giray had been discontented with his brother's policy of appointments and at an opportune moment rebelled, carrying the Nogays with him on a major raid across the Polish boundary in defiance of the peace treaty. After the raid, he and his allies crossed back into the Bujak. Ac-

cording to Defterdar, the Crimean prince wanted either himself or his father, the former Khan Selim Giray, appointed to the Khanate. Short of that, he and his allies refused to obey and heed Devlet Giray. Fearing the worst from an outbreak of conflict between the two brothers, the Sultan ordered an expeditionary force to march against Ghazi Giray and his Nogay allies. Faced with an overwhelming force, the rebels dispersed after a tense confrontation lasting for fifteen days. Ghazi Giray, still refusing to swear allegiance to his brother, chose to return to the Court at Edirne, where he was imprisoned for seventeen days and subsequently exiled to Rhodes on August 6, 1701. Istanbul: SUleymaniye Kiitiiphanesi, Esad Efendi ktb. 2382, Defterdar Mehmed Papa, Zubdet Ul-vakay, 380a-382a (hereafter cited as Defterdar, Zubdet.) Date given in Istanbul: Beyazit Umiimi KUttphanesi, 2369, Silihdar Mehmed Agha, Nfisretname, 276a (hereafter cited as Silihdar, Nfisretname.) For a slightly different interpretation of the Nogay rebellion

see H. Inalcik, "Budjak", Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, B. Lewis, et al. Eds., 1954. (hereafter cited as E.I. 2.)

23 The bsr or 'ushr was a land tax payable to the sultan. For details see H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, London, 1962, Vol. I, part 2, 19 and especially note 7.

24 The 'adet-i aghndm was a sheep tax. For details see op. cit., Vol. I, part I, 240 and E.1.2.

25 The Nogays had apparently retained several of their pre-Islamic native customs. One of the customs, mentioned as contrary to the sheriat, consisted of the distri-

bution of the property of orphans. In order to ensure the adherence of the Nogays to Islamic practices, mosques, medreses, and mektebs were to be built and established on their lands and ulema from the capital imported to edu- cate them in the Islamic sciences. Both the strict conditions for their settlement and the indoctrination in



law/sheriat and accept tutoring from the ulema in the principles of orthodox Islam;26 and obey Im- perial orders.27 Settlement on the land and in doctrination into orthodoxy were meant to retire the Nogays as an independent military and political force and assure the Ottoman state of obedient subjects. The overall intent of these conditions was two-fold: to deter violations of the Polish- Russian boundaries and secure stability in the border regions.

Within less than two years from their amnesty, the Nogays entered (late in 1702) into an alliance with the Crimean Khan to abrogate the treaties.28 The Crimea had been a semi-independent, albeit beneficiary,29 tributary principality of the Otto- man Sultanate which had had at one point in its

history the freedom to conduct direct diplomatic contacts with Poland and Muscovy. Crimean Tatar sovereignty was perhaps best evidenced by the practice of exacting tribute from these two states.A0 However, by ratifying articles IV3tand

VI' of the Polish-Ottoman treaty and V-VIII3 of

the Muscovite treaty, the Sultan had quite ex- plicitly acceded to the discontinuance of this prac-

tice and recognized the inviolability of the demarcated boundaries with these powers. The

reduction of the zonal frontier to the linear boundary along all the Polish frontier and most

of the Russian34 not only required a change in the Tatar mode of living but marked the termi- nation of the last vestiges of their sovereignty.

The ostensible occasion for the Khan's rebellion

was the persistence of reports that Moscow was

preparing for a resumption of hostilities,35 despite

Islamic orthodoxy point to an attempt at a final solution to the Nogay problem and implies their obsolescence as an instrument of war.

26 The Court would assign a kadi to supervise their practices and ascertain their adherence to the sheriat.

27 The conditions are spelled out in Mfhimme defteri no. 111: 404-05 in an order to the governor of Ozii Yusuf Papa, who was expected to implement them. A summary of the order can be seen in Rabid, Tarih, II, 507-08.

28 As one contemporary chronicler explained, the Tatars were never known to engage in planting and plow- ing [as means of gainful employment]; they made their living from stealing and raiding. Defterdar, Ziibdet, 407a. Booty and slaves were the principal sources of in- come for the Tatars. For a brief presentation of the ex- tent of Tatar slave trade see B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire, Oxford, 1949, 15-17.

The timing of the Crimean Tatar rebellion is explained by another Ottoman contemporary on very practical grounds. Whatever material and financial resources they had were expended during the four years following the truce signed with Muscovy at Karlowitz. (Silihdar, Niisretname, 282a.)

29 As rulers of a Muslim principality with limited resources, the Crimean Khans were paid subsidies from the Ottoman treasury.

80 For example, the Khans collected tribute to the amount of 90,000 gurus from Muscovy. Silihdar, Niisret- name, 282a.

a1 Article IV of the treaty with Poland states in part:

"None of the subjects of the sublime Empire, of what condition soever, especially the Tatars of any nation soever, shall on the score of any pretence or contro- versy whatsoever exercise hostilities against the subjects of the King of Poland, and against their frontiers, nor commit excursions, carry off persons to captivity, drive away cattle nor do them any damage or injury; and the viziers, beglerbeys, and the Han of Crim Tartary, with the other sultans, and the Woy- wod of Modavia, shall be expressly commanded by royal edicts, to be very diligent in observing and keep- ing peace and tranquility on the frontiers, and that

they do not injure the subjects of Poland, carrying off their people, driving away their cattle or by hurt- ing or molesting them in any other way; and that they inquire most strictly after the disturbers and trans- gressors of the articles of peace . .. " William Hor- sley, The Political History of Europe, 800-1716, Lon- don, 1746, 276. 32 Article V of the treaty with Poland states: "Whereas the kingdom of Poland had been free time out of mind, it shall not be disturbed by any hostility on the part of the sublime Empire, or the nations thereunto subject, under colour of any pretension whatsoever; nor shall be bound to comply with such pretensions by virtue of the articles of peace." Ibid. 33 Article V of the treaty with Muscovy created a

march of no man's land between Ur-Kapi and Azov; article VI created another march of no man's land between Ur-Kapi and fort Muye~. These two marches, though disarmed, were to be exploited by subjects of both states for their livelihood. A third area was specified by article VII starting from Azov and ten hours in the direction of Kuban, in which Muscovite subjects were to be given freedom of movement. Article VIII discon- tinued tribute to the Tatars.

3 Articles V, VI, VII created three zones. See above, note 33.

36 Silihdar details Russian activities north of and at



the recently signed peace treaties. The Khan would have liked to anticipate Russian moves, declare war and neutralize Russian gains during the previous war. An embassy was dispatched to the Ottoman Court with the latest intelligence on Russian preparations.36 The envoys were to con-

vince the Court of the genuineness of their intelligence and to solicit the Sultan's consent and support for the resumption of hostilities against Russia. In Edirne they were received by the Mufti,37 the Court's spokesman, not only with doubt of the accuracy of their reports and intelligence, but with an affirmation of the Ottoman pledge to uphold the thirty years peace with the Tsar. The incredulity of the Tatar envoys at this response can best be illustrated by selections from

a contemporary chronicler's rendition of their expressed puzzlement

"We came [for succor] to the guardian (vekil) of 5,100,000 of the people of Islam. All these [Muslims], are they to remain without protection (?) because the peace with the Muscovite nation is well-established and firm? The Muscovite building of [all sorts of] naval vessels on the sea and construction of all

[kinds] of forts on the land, how are these [threats] to be met? While those [the Muslims] are denied the

right [to respond] by virtue of the treaty, (the Rus- sians) would be encouraged.... Is this [to be construed as] zeal for the faith?"38

To the Tatars the Mufti's response smacked of treason. In their determination to break the peace, their envoys turned to subversion. The Grand Vezir, Dal Taban Mustafa Pasa, who was known for his hostility to the peace treaties,39 had upon his own investigations been convinced of the authenticity of the Tatar allegations. When ap- proached by the Khan's deputies, he advised them to break the peace unilaterally, with the promise that he himself would lend support with forces from Ottoman European domains once he had discredited the Mufti at the Court.40

The Khan had already dispatched, without the

Sultan's permission, one of his lieutenants into the Bujak with 5,000 warriors from the Crimea, with the intention of raising troops in anticipation of a favorable response from the Court for a declaration of war.4' When the expected response did not

Azov. He reports that Peter's plans were not confined to annexation of the Crimea, but included a drive further into Muslim territory perhaps as far south as Istanbul. Azov, he continues, had become a subcapital of the Tsar. Several other forts were supposed to have been built, and Russians were encouraged to migrate for settlement in and around them. Other than 10,000 men to help him in his military and naval preparations, Peter is alleged

to have brought 20,000 men from France, Holland, England, Spain, Genoa and Venice. For them, salaries

had been assigned. Already fifty galleys, 300 Cekdiris, galitas and frigates were ordered and built. Silihdar, Ntisretname, 282a,

Anderson partly confirms Silihdar's report, pointing out that despite the truce of 1699 and the peace of 1700 the Russians continued their ship-building. Such activities were confined to areas north of Azov [at Voronezh especially] and out of the reach of Ottoman spies and in- formants. See R. C. Anderson, Naval Wars in the Levant, Liverpool, 1952, 41.

36 Sutton, the English envoy to the Ottoman Court, noted on December 11, 1702, that the Tatar mission was

"striving to give the Port jealousy of the Muscovites and engage it in a war with them, to effect which they came with frequent alarms from the Frontiers." London: Public Record Office, State Papers 97: 21, 102b. (Here- after cited as Sutton, SP 97: 21.) A little over a fortnight later (December 26) he elaborates, "tho their [Tatars'] management in this particular is not judged to proceed so much from their fears as the desire they have to breed a quarrel with Muscovy, they living very uneasily under the present Peace, by which the incursions allowed them by former treaties, are strictly forbidden." Op. cit., 104b.

37 The mufti, Feyzullah Efendi, had dominated political life at the Court from the beginning of Sultan Mu- stafa II's reign. Silihdar, Ntisretname, 282a.

38 Quotation from Silihdar, Niisretname, 282a. 39 It is interesting to note that Dal Taban Mustafa

Papa was the Governor of Bosnia during the year the treaties of Karlowitz were negotiated. During his tenure in office in Bosnia, he had conducted several successful raids against Habsburg and Venetian positions. His unhappiness with the peace treaties may be attributed to the fact that he thought the Ottoman state had made peace too soon and at a great disadvantage. Op. cit., 266a-267a.

40 Sutton reports Dal Taban Mustafa Paaa's designs in the following manner: "He had formed dangerous Projects, designing to have made great alterations in the government, and to have established his power and made himself popular by renewing the war with some of the neighbouring powers, in order to which he had so dis-

posed matters as to have an army above 100,000 before summer." Sutton, 97: 21, 121a.

41 Reported in Silihdar, Niisretname, 282b and Ho- worth, History of the Mongols, Vol. II, 1, 568-70.



materialize, the Khan turned to active recruit-

ment and impressment of troops in the Bujak for

possible maneuvers against Ottoman forts at

Akkerman and Kili, whose garrisons would serve as the vanguard of any efforts on the part of the

Court to suppress his revolt.42 An oath of fidelity to the Khan was taken by

both Crimean and Bujak Tatars, followed by a declaration of refusal to accept or seek the guid-

ance, orders and directives of the central govern-

ment.43 By this act the Tatars withdrew from

Ottoman jurisdiction, ceased to be Ottoman sub-

jects and thereby were released from the international commitments of the Dynasty.

The implications of Tatar withdrawal from

Ottoman rule were not lost to the Court. For by

this unilateral act the Tatars were demonstrating

loss of confidence in the Dynasty's ability and

willingness to uphold its mandate to defend the

frontier of Islam. Measures had to be taken for an

immediate but decisive suppression of the Tatars.

Although Dal Taban Mustafa Papa, the Grand

Vezir, was identified as their most prominent sup-

porter and ally" he was not dismissed im-

mediately. Instead the Sultan, in his attempt at

neutralizing the obvious psychological and moral

advantages of the Grand Vezir's support of the

rebel cause, ordered him to issue over his own

name and signature the official commands neces-

sary for the suppression of the Tatars.45 A new

Khan was installed on December 10, 1703, and

three weeks later, on January 3,46 he was dis-

patched to the Crimea with the express mandate to regain Tatar loyalty and suppress the rebellion. Early in January of the same year massive

military forces were assembled under the command of Vezir Yusuf Papa, the commander of

Ozti, as an expeditionary force in support of the new Khan.47

The Court's calculations and measures proved

successful. Without the promised support from the Grand Vezir, rebel resolve collapsed. In the face of regular Ottoman troops their resistance melted

away, and the rebel Khan faced the dismal choice of surrender or exile. He chose the latter, and with

42 These reports reached Istanbul, for Sutton points out on January 23, 1703 that he had heard of Tatar plundering in the Bujak, and in the Bender, Ismail, and Kili districts and adds that these were falsely reported since the Tatars had upon arrival to these areas sought lodging, and when they were denied they took it by force. Sutton, SP 97: 21, 116a.

43 Reported in Silihdar, Nusretname, 282b. 44 Op. cit., 282a-b. 45Dal Taban Mustafa Papa was dismissed from office

January 25, 1703, and executed three days later. His orders bearing dates from December 30, 1702 to January 9, 1703, went out to Ottoman commanders, governors and officers for participation in the suppression of the Tatar rebellion. Mihimme defteri no. 112: 417 ff.

46 Silihdar, Nusretname, 282a-b. 47 The governor of Ozu, Yusuf Papa, expected to re-

ceive support from Rumeli beylerbeyi Ibrahim Papa, Skodra, Dukagin and Prizren commander Hodaverdi Papa, Yanya commander Arslan Pasa, Kustendil com-

mander Davud Pasa, Delvine and Ohri commander Timur Halil, Elbasan and Usktip commander Eyup along with their household troops, zuema and timar holders. Former Nikopolis sancak commander Ali and Serhadlu Mehmed Papa were to march along with 400 musket-carrying infantrymen, and Selanik sancak commander Ibrahim was to march along with his household and 15,000 Albanian troops stationed in Selanik. Bel- grade commander Hasan Pasa was to command and march with 3,000 Albanian troops stationed in Silistre and Nikopolis.

In addition, fifteen odas of the Janissaries amounting to 2,000 men were ordered from Istanbul under the command of the Zenberekci Bali. 1,500 levends (marines) were also ordered under the command of a deputy to the Kapudan Papa primarily for the defence of fort Kili. The princes of Moldavia and Wallachia were expected in turn to watch Tatar movements on the frontier, especially from the Bujak. Orders to Yusuf Papa and the forementioned commanders, officers and princes are in Muhimme defteri no. 112: 415, 416.

Sutton reports on January 3, 1703, that fifteen odas of the Janissaries (comprising 4,000 men) were expected to proceed to Edirne on their way to the Muscovite frontier. Sutton SP 97: 21, 106a. On January 23, 1703, he reports that 600 bostancis and eight odas of the Janissaries had left Istanbul. 2,000 levends had apparently been dispatched on their way to the Danube and 600 topcus and 1,200 cebecis were dispatched to the same frontier. Numan Papa, of Kiitahya, had been ordered to march with 14-15,000 men along with the others. Op. cit., 116a-b.



his exile the Tatars' efforts at forcing the Ottoman

state to break the peace with Russia came to an end.48

The anxiety of the Ottoman state to meet and

honor its treaty obligations, here evidenced by the suppression of both the Nogay violations and the

Crimean Tatar threat to resume hostilities against Russia, bring to the fore the genuine dilemma and paradox with which the Ottoman State was con- fronted in the early 1700's. The Tatar mode of living and warfare, once an asset in the promotion of its interests on a fluid frontier, had become a liability in the light of new exigencies. Stabiliza- tion of the borders required a readiness on the part of the state to exercise direct restraint on these frontier elements until a change in their mode of living had been effected.49 But Ottomans generally, and the Tatars specifically, had not been prepared either ideologically or institutionally for this readjustment. Thus, viewed in the light of current Muslim expectations, the emergence of the

Sultan as an upholder of international law with non-Muslims was seen as a betrayal of the faith and the state (din-u devlet), a charge which was corroborated by the government's readiness to meet both the spirit and the letter of its treaty obligations.50 By 1703, when most of the remain- ing boundary demarcations had been completed, it had become apparent to Muslim Ottomans in general that the abandonment of the Ghazi tradition and the formal closure of the frontier were in fact the consequences of the peace treaties of Karlowitz and Istanbul."

48 Reported in Silihdar, Niisretname, 282b. Sutton reported that he received news of the submission of the Crimean Tatars on January 27, 1703, two days after the dismissal of Dal Taban Mustafa Papa. Sutton, SP 97: 21, 114a.

49 A corollary to this requirement was the development of a policy of centralism. In the Ottoman case, however, the enforcement of centralism failed since it coincided with the growing weakness in the control of the Dynasty over the provinces in the eighteenth century. See, "Derebey", E.I.2.

50 In a document dated March 12-21, 1699, this readiness to accept the peace treaties with non-Muslims as

binding was justified by reasons of faith and state. The governor of Ozu, Yusuf Papa, was exhorted by the Sultan

to uphold the treaty provisions with Poland and Mus- covy since, "peace and treaties are to be upheld in ac-

cordance with [the Koranic verses] "And do not violate your oaths once ye have made them" (al-Nahl, 91), "for those who make a solemn promise are responsible for upholding it" (al- 'Isra', 34); [for] the breaking of prom- ises and oaths brings nothing but ill-effects. Further-

more, the upholding of the treaty is a necessity of the din-u devlet and is required of the honor and dignity of my Sultanate." Muhimme defteri no 110: 626-27.

51 A serious response followed that summer, when military elements in the capital (Istanbul) in conjunc-

tion with other forces from Ottoman society rebelled, removed and replaced the Sultan and all those who were

associated with the peace treaties. The author intends to elaborate on the coup d'etat of 1703 in a forthcoming study.


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