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Bandali al-Jawzi's Min Tarikh al-Harakat al-Fikriyyat fi'l-Islam: The First MarxistInterpretation of IslamAuthor(s): Tamara SonnSource: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Feb., 1985), pp. 89-107Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/163311 .

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 17 (1985), 89-107 Printed in the United States of America

Tamara Sonn

BANDALI AL-JAWZI'S MIN TARIKH AL-HARAKA T

AL-FIKRIYYA T FI'L-ISLAM: THE FIRST MARXIST

INTERPRETATION OF ISLAM

Bandali al-Jawzi (1871-1943) has been regaining popularity recently, particu-larly among his native Palestinians and Muslim nationalists of his adopted home,the Soviet Union. In 1977, for instance, the Union of Palestinian Journalists andWriters, in cooperation with the Oriental Institute of the Soviet Academy ofSciences, commemorated Jawzi as an outstanding Palestinian author. At thattime a collection of various of his articles on the Arabic language and historywas published in Beirut, as well as an edition of his only book, Min Tharkhal-Harakat al-Fikriyyat fil-Islam (The History of Intellectual Movements inIslam), first published in 1928. It is this recent exposure which has brought tolight the value of Jawzi's contribution and has allowed his work to take its right-ful place in Islamic intellectual history.

Jawzi's Min TarTkh s historically the first application of Marxism to thegenesis of Islam. As such, it initiated an entirely new phase in the history itsought to trace and set the stage for such landmark works as MontgomeryWatt's Muhammad at Mecca and Muhammad at Medina. For the identifyingcharacteristic of this approach is an attempt to understand the appearance of theProphet and his work in terms other than those of divine intervention.1 Themerits of such an approach can and certainly have been argued. Ali Shari'atidismisses the very idea in the title of his work, Marxism and Other WesternFallacies. He considers Marxism both illogical and dehumanizingly irreligious,encouraging "the confinement of human needs and ideals to the narrow limits ofmaterial consumption and power, and the triumph of economic needs over allothers."2 Maxime Rodinson, on the other hand, reasons thus:

It is perfectly possible for a believer o reject he archaic, dealistic outlook: God wouldstill be the first cause of natural and social evolution for such a person, but he wouldagree that God acts in nature by means of what the philosophers used to call secondarycauses.... If God acts through natural aws, why should he not act in the human worldthrough ocial laws?3

In any event, the intent of Jawzi's work is unmistakable and, in the context he setsforth, undoubtedly valuable. His goal is to reawaken the Islamic world to theessential nature of Islam. By focusing on the motivating factors in the Prophet'slife and subsequent revolutionary movements in Islam, Jawzi hopes to rekindle

? 1985 C(amhribide niversitrl Press 0020-7438/85/010089-19 $2.50

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90 Tamara Sonn

dedication in Muslim society to what he considers its ultimate ideal: social justicebased on the fundamental equality of all men before God. What follows is anexegesis of Bandali al-Jawzi's History, in which the author attempts to trace theprogress of that goal from its genesis in the heart of the Prophet to the presentday, followed by a brief comment on its potential impact on modern Islamicpolitical thought.

Jawzi begins his book with an introduction entitled "The Unity of SocialLaws." In it he claims that the Islamic world is subject to the same laws ofhistory as Western nations and, in fact, that that is what he will try to show inhis book:

The history of the East, the social and intellectual ife of its people n general, and that of

the Islamic people in particular, re subject o the same laws and factors to which the lifeand history of the western nations are subject, and . . . the nations of the East have passedin their long life and will continue to pass through he same social stages and changes asthe western nations. For there is no difference n this sense between the East and theWest, and one is not innately uperior o the other.4

In so doing, he claims to be following the reasoning of Soviet historian V. V.Bartol'd. Such early historians as Schlosser, Winckler, and especially Renan,Jawzi notes, had attempted to explain why the Christian West had developedfrom its "dark" ages to its current position at the forefront of modernity, whilethe Islamic East had remained apparently stagnant. They had found the answerin what was seen as the innately backward nature of the Islamic peoples. Sincethose ideas are now "passe," however, Jawzi feels no need to refute them. Rather,he tells us, the more modern historians (such as Bartol'd) have definitively shownthat it was the combined effect of such politicoeconomic factors as the barbarianinvasions, the Crusades, and the shift in trade routes which led to the temporaryeclipse of the East.

Yet Jawzi's purpose is not to trace Islamic intellectual history as a function ofsuch politicoeconomic factors. While he is, of course, imbued with a sensitivityto their effects on society, the history he traces is not that of the Islamic peoplesbut that of Islamic ideals. Indeed, he focuses specifically on only three groups:the Babakis, the Isma'ilis, and the Qarmatians. Surely a history of the intellectualmovements of Muslims would be more comprehensive. In fact, his particularview of the history of Islamic ideals constitutes a history of socialist ideals inIslam. His implication, however, is not that Islamic ideals are essentially social-ist. Rather, his view is simply that the true ideals of Islam have best been pre-served in those communities which have, throughout Islamic history, sought toimplement socialist principles.

It is this subtle distinction which forms both the context and goal of Jawzi'sfirst chapter, entitled "The Economic Bases of Islam." In it the author clearlyestablishes his Marxist approach:

For it is today well-established hat Islam, ike other great religions, s not only religiousthought but a social and economic matter as well, or, more precisely, more so than it isreligious hought.5



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Bandali al-Jawzi: The First Islamic Marxist 91

Citing such authorities as Caetani and deGoeje, he tells us, "The adherents of the

Islamic religion, like those of the other great religions before and after it, usedreligion as a means of achieving other goals." The tone of this argument appears,at first glance, somewhat hostile toward Islam. At the time Jawzi wrote, how-ever, he was working within the context of a period of intensive self-examinationon the part of Islamic society. The decline of the Ottoman Empire, combinedwith the emergence of the West, had brought into sharp contrast the weakness ofthe Muslim world in the face of foreign domination, and thinkers of every stripewere attempting to analyze its causes. Jawzi's contribution to that effort was ananalysis of the nature of the society Islam aims to establish; his conclusion wasthat the principle of economic justice constitutes the basis of social solidarity

which is the fundamental vision of Islam. He therefore devotes Chapter I toestablishing those principles as the fons et origo of Islam.

Jawzi begins with a description of the socioeconomic milieu of Mecca at thetime of the birth of Islam. Like Lammens and Hartmann, he describes Mecca asa rich commercial city, and contends that commercial activity, along with itsrelated values, was the dominant feature of Meccan life, even overshadowing theyearly religious pilgrimage to the KaCbah.6 His point in describing the level ofmercantile activity in seventh-century Mecca is to establish the extent to whichthe quest for monetary profit had become the focal point of Meccan life, ofwhich he regards the pervasive existence of usury (ribi) as the greatest indica-

tion. Again relying directly on Lammens, Jawzi states that the practice of usurywas widespread among Meccan merchants and that their rates reached 100%.7Rodinson questions Lammens's contention; he believes the practice of usury wasactually limited to a relatively smaller sector of Meccan commerce.8 Lammens'sdescription of the essential role played by transactions with a fixed time limitand payment of interest as well as speculation in all types of goods is, however,no doubt accurate.9 We need only consult the Qur'an to verify that a debtor whocould not pay his loan when due was given an extension, at the end of whichtime the amount due was double that originally set: "Believers, devour not riba,doubled and redoubled, and fear God."'0 Similarly, "Those who devour riba

shall not rise again." 1 (Indeed, riba was such an accepted practice that even theQur'anic injunctions against it were not sufficient to abrogate the practice. Later,the Muslim legists went to great lengths to provide hiyal (means by which toaccommodate the practice).12

It was into such an atmosphere that the Prophet was born. Accordingly, Jawzipresents Muhammad as the voice of social reform, uniquely qualified to servesuch a role. Mecca was ripe for social reform. Jawzi presents the Prophet as aman of abiding sympathy for the plight of the underprivileged classes. No doubtthis group had never before been so carefully scrutinized or conscientiouslyexposed to the light of history. More to the point, however, Jawzi believes thatno one was more suited to the challenge of rectifying the inequities in the socialstructure than Muhammad, because of his unusual position in that social struc-ture. Having been born into a less than prosperous branch of the powerfulQuarysh, Muhammad was well situated to witness the extravagances of the



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92 Tamara Sonn

wealthy in contrast to the humble lives of the poor. There are reports of otherssimilarly situated who likewise rejected certain aspects of Meccan life on thegrounds of its irreligiosity. Ibn Ishaq, for example, related that Waraqa b. Nawfaland Zaid b. 'Amr b. Nufayl, both Qurayshites, spoke out against idolatry andleft their homes seeking "the true religion of Abraham." The former apparentlyfound it in Christianity. Zaid, on the other hand, followed his own course, wor-shipping the one, true God, observing a dietary regime, and condemning thepractice of female infanticide.13 However, what distinguished Muhammad fromthese so-called Hanifis was his overriding concern not with the purity of religiouspractice but with those whom religious practice sought to benefit.

It is Jawzi's description of the nature of the Prophet's mission that com-prises the key to understanding his view of the economic bases of Islam. The keypassage follows:

These differences n poverty and wealth among the members f one tribe were what calledthe attention of the Arab prophet o the social strife ound among the classes of people nhis community and [lead him] to search for its sources. They were what caused him todeclare a war of words against the class of shameless oppressors who monopolize theresources of wealth and capitalize on the burdens of the poor and artless dwellers of thedesert.14

Thus, Jawzi characterizes the social strife in pre-Islamic Mecca as the vast dis-crepancy between poverty and wealth, and finds its source in the monopoly of

resources by the wealthy. He does not, however, attempt to characterize Islam asessentially socialist or communist. Had he done so, he would have attempted todenounce private ownership of property as conflicting with the Prophet's prin-ciples. On the contrary, however, the Qur'an clearly recognizes ownership ofprivate property as an integral part of life when, for instance, it prescribes rulesfor inheritance.15 Indeed, it recognizes as perennial and perfectly natural distinc-tions in levels of wealth among people: "Do not covet what Allah has bestowedin bounty upon one more than another" (4:36). Similarly, the recognition ofwage labor is an implicit recognition of variations in levels of personal wealth.'6In addition, a number of traditions surface in discussions carried on in the var-ious schools of Islamic law concerning the practice of rental and land tax indicat-ing that the Prophet himself as well as some of his companions and successorshad owned lands which they leased in return for a fixed amount.17 Furthermore,the very existence of zakah (the pillar of Islam which requires the giving of almsfor the poor) as a principle of intervention in private wealth is, at the same time,a recognition of the existence of private wealth. Finally, the Qur'an's attitudetoward trade is one of safeguarding its validity; it condemns fraudulent practice,advocates honest dealings, and requires cessation of trade only during certainreligious celebrations. Thus, it too recognizes the validity of the endeavor toaugment personal holdings. Jawzi, in clear acknowledgment of this trend, is notin agreement with those who hold that the Qur'an opposes private ownership ofland.18 He states emphatically that we cannot "force the Meccan reformer amongthe socialists or communists who say that his call was aimed at socialist or com-munist goals."19 Elsewhere:



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The opinion of some, that the Prophet ntended o abolish private ownership of propertyand make t common, .e., the property f the community or nation, s false; such extremecommunistic houghts did not occur to the Prophet except in the first stage of his sociallife.20

Having thus established that the Prophet did not seek to revolutionize theMeccan economic system, Jawzi focuses on the nature of the Prophet's reform.Rather than prohibiting or even impeding private ownership or enterprise, theProphet simply set such endeavors into a new perspective. Wealth, he taught, isimportant neither for man's happiness nor for the salvation of his soul. While itmay be pleasant for those who have it, those who achieve it at the expense ofothers will certainly have been better off without it. The ultimate reward of thosemotivated

by greedis eternal

perdition,while those who suffer at their hands will

do so only temporarily; their reward will be eternal happiness. The Prophet didnot attack the advantages of wealth. He merely attacked the acquisition ofwealth based on the disadvantage of others, such as usury and the misuse of theproperty of the helpless. In this he was a champion of the poor and neglected,"the orphans and helpless and pitiful people."21 Ironically, no one recognizedthis more clearly than the Meccan wealthy. They realized that if the poor receivedtheir rights and ceased to be exploitable, their own power and wealth would besignificantly reduced. Jawzi regards this realization on the part of the Meccansas an implicit admission of their guilt. So apparent was the inequity of the sys-

tem,even to those whom it benefited that

theyrealized the survival of the

systemdemanded the expulsion of the Prophet from their midst.That the Prophet, realizing the Meccans' determination, willingly transferred

his nascent community to Medina is significant for Jawzi. It marked a turningpoint in the development of the Prophet's work. No longer a beleaguered bandof nonconformists, they became a proper community in an atmosphere hospitableto their nourishment and growth. More significantly, however, this stage pro-vides for the student of Islam a glimpse of Islam's true goals. Free of the com-pulsion brought on by political opposition and the demands incurred underpolitical dominance, the community was able, under the direct guidance of the

Prophet,to

developas it chose. It is therefore to the Medinan Muslim com-

munity we must look for the true nature of Islam. As Jawzi states:

The Arab nation began o carry out [the Prophet's] rders and defer o his judgment n allmatters. Thus it became easy for him to carry out his promises and realize what he hadbeen called to do in Mecca n terms of social reform and what he had dreamt of for yearsin terms of exalted principles uch as justice, brotherhood, reedom or women and slaves,and fighting the causes of suffering and poverty among the citizens of his community,indeed, n all the Arab communities.22

It is in this context that Jawzi makes some rather enigmatic statements regard-ing the Prophet's goals: "No doubt the Arab prophet did not intend by his wordsand deeds in Mecca and Medina to uproot the causes of social evil and kill all itsroots, as the socialist groups today try to do irrespective of their name or ten-dencies"; and, "We can say that Muhammad excelled in describing the diseasesof Arab society and enumerating them, more so than in remedying them and



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94 Tamara Sonn

uprooting their causes." Jawzi himself is no doubt convinced that personal wealthis indeed the unique source of social evils. He states that the Prophet, "if he had

wanted to kill the roots of all social disorders . . . would have resorted, after hebecame a man of unlimited power in the Arabian peninsula, to other meanswhich we have mentioned." This is clearly a reference to what he pointed outthat the Prophet did not do: "remove wealth from its owners and distribute it tothe needy equally."23 The author then goes on to contrast the Prophet's chosenmeans with those of such "European political reformers" as Lenin and Mussolini,yet he does not deduce therefrom a defect in the Prophet's work. Rather, heconsiders the Prophet's means as at once appropriate to the times and an indica-tion of the Prophet's orientation. Nevertheless, he considers the failure to banprivate property responsible for the fact that after the Prophet's death, "thepoor, the prisoners, the orphans, the widows"-those whom the Prophet soughtto benefit-were once again plunged into their former plight. Despite the expressaims and practice of the Prophet and his early successors, Jawzi points out, the

money collected for the benefit of the needy was used "mostly for the needs ofthe state." Accordingly, he concludes:

... it became as if the call of the Prophet and his social revolution, his labors andthose of his early caliphs, were only to strengthen his adversaries in their center, indeed toaugment their wealth and power. And even stranger, it was as if the Meccan merchants ofthe past benefited from the Islamic movement and its ideas and principles, and that they

had establishedone of the

greateststates in the world between which and the nation

which the Prophet founded there was scarcely any relationship.24

Jawzi's implication is, therefore, that had the Prophet actually removed wealthfrom its owners and distributed it equally among all members of the community,he would have thereby rooted out the source of evil in society and precludedsuch a reversion. As it was, however, he did not

... completely kill the causes of discontent by prohibiting, for example, personal tradeand putting it completely under the control of the government which he founded inMedina, or prohibiting slavery definitively, and taking property from its owners and mak-

ing it the property of those who worked it, or monopolizing the rest of the sources ofindividual wealth which were and are still the source of social evils, or using other meansdemonstrated by some socialists of this century.2

Again, however, Jawzi does not conclude that the Prophet failed. On the con-trary, he succeeded brilliantly at what he set out to accomplish. It was simplythat his goal was not that of modern communists:

... The Prophet was not an enemy of personal wealth or banking and was not againstthe accumulation of all land in the hands of a few. Indeed, he was not in principle anenemy of slavery nor an advocate of the necessity of complete equality of women ... in

terms of rights and duties. He was only against inequity in the operations of these socialsystems and their excesses.26

The goal of the Prophet was not to change the principles of just society or tocreate a revolutionary one; his goal was to reassert the established universal



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principles of equality and justice and to establish a particular community based

thereupon.Jawzi presents, therefore, a picture of the Prophet as an Arab social reformer.His vision is that of a just society based on the universal principles of love,equality, and brotherhood. His temporal goal, however, was to establish thissociety in microcosm, as it were. Arabia was his laboratory. A society based onsuch principles would be strong, unified, and prosperous, just as a society lack-ing respect for those principles would falter and disintegrate. Accordingly, theProphet did not seek to wipe out the sources of evil in society. A convincedcommunist may believe that the root of all evil is private ownership and that thedisallowance thereof will effect a truly just society. The Prophet, however, cor-

relates the strength of a society with its treatment of the weak, poor, and helpless.The greed and cruelty of man which deadens his sensitivity to the plight of his fel-low man is not analyzed except as the source of social fragmentation and decay.It is Jawzi, then, not the Prophet, who believes that the root of social injustice isin private ownership. Nevertheless, Jawzi analyzes, since the Prophet did notlegislate against it, even the society he created sank back into depravity soonafter his death, due to his followers' disposition of property in the empire theybuilt. This was particularly true in Persia. Still, the spirit of justice and equalityhe inspired survived, as is evident in the history of revolutionary struggles toreturn to that norm which punctuate the history of Islam. It is that history which

Jawzi, then, proceeds to present.Before doing so, however, he devotes Chapter II, "The Arab Empire and theVanquished Nations," to describing the seeds of discontent sowed by the succes-sors of the Prophet. In Chapter I Jawzi asserted that the goal envisioned by theProphet was a just society. He believed that all men are equal before God, andthat that equality should be reflected in the temporal order. While this did notentail for him equal distribution of material possessions, it did preclude theexploitation of any individual or group on the basis, or for the purpose, of eco-nomic advantage. The Prophet's teachings on such matters, however, were con-cerned not with matters of administrative detail but with the principles on which

that community should be based. It was up to the successors of the Prophet,therefore, to implement those principles, taking into consideration the specificcircumstances involved in each case. Their challenge was to administer thegrowing Islamic nation, balancing the increasing diversity of its elements withthe fundamental principle of equality which constituted its raison d'etre. InChapter II, Jawzi claims that the successors of the Prophet failed to meet thatchallenge and thus sowed the seeds of discontent which flowered into the seriesof revolutions by which he sees the history of Islam characterized.

Jawzi offers an explanation for the failure on the part of the Prophet's succes-sors to adhere to their leader's principles. The practical demands involved in

conquering and settling, combined with those of administering the newly acquiredterritories, seem sufficient to Jawzi to overwhelm even the most idealistic sensi-tivities. Nevertheless, he traces the root of the social disorders which plaguedthe Islamic community to "the system of taxes which the Prophet established,combined with the changes and additions thereto instituted by his caliphs,"



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especially under 'Umar and the Umayyads.27 The overall effect of their policieswas a system of taxes which were "a heavier burden on the shoulders of thevanquished nations than on the victors."28

Jawzi does not deny the benefit accruing to those who converted to Islam.Acknowledging the spiritual edification of those who truly grasped the principlesof Islam, he also recognizes the improvement in the overall security of the newempire in contrast to that of the declining days of the Sasanid and Romanregimes and the heavy demands made on them by their continued warfare andebbing fortunes. Similarly, he acknowledges that the status of the converts was,in general, higher than that of nonconverts, the former being exempted at leastfrom the tribute tax. He reflects the attitude of the early conquerors, however,when he claims that the non-Arab converts were not put on a status equal tothat of the Arab conquerors. This was the attitude revealed in the policy, attrib-uted to Umar, of denying citizenship in the peninsula to all non-Muslims and ofrestricting the Arab conquerors outside the peninsula to exclusively Arab garri-son towns.29 This inequal treatment and the abuses in taxation in the conqueredlands reached such an extent, he notes, that they led to the murder of 'Umar bythe disgruntled slave of his Persian governor.30

The Umayyad caliphate, marking the shift in the center of power from Arabiato Syria, should have brought relief. It is recorded that the Syrian populacerejoiced over the new caliph.31 Additionally, Christians achieved very high statusin the Umayyad court. MuCawiyah's wife, Maysun, was a Christian, as were hisphysician, whom he later appointed financial administrator of Hims, and thecourt poet, al-Akhtal. However, the Umayyads' dual occupation with internalstruggles against pro-cAlids and continued territorial conquests in North Africa,Khurasan, and beyond further strained the imperial budget. MuCawiyah's gov-ernor in Basra and later Kufa, Ziyad b. Abih, ruled that center of Shicism withan iron hand. And Lammens notes that in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, the caliphexploited the immense estates inherited from the former regime.33 Withoutscruple, he says, drawing on Yacqubi, he had them incorporated into his civil listand made into appanages.34 This comment refers to another of the abuses whichbecame common

duringthis

period,that of

granting leadingMuslims the

largeestates of previous landlords and treating them fiscally as Muslim properties inthe peninsula-that is, they were exempt from the kharaj (land tax) and subjectonly to the zakah, which was much lower.35 In the same vein, Jawzi mentions therepressive measures taken by al-Hajjaj, the Khurasani governor, to guard againstdepletion of the treasury. It is true, Jawzi notes, that 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Aziz(cUmar II, 717-720 A.D.) sought to return to the policies of his predecessors,according to which any Muslim, regardless of nationality, was exempt from trib-ute tax, while kharaj land continued to be joint property of the Muslim com-munity.36 Unfortunately, this practice quickly led, as before, to a depleted

treasuryand the

rulingwas soon overturned.37

Again,there is evidence of bias

against non-Arabs and non-Muslims. For example, it was 'Umar b. CAbd al-Aziz who promulgated laws restricting the Christians and Jews from govern-mental positions and subjecting them to other humiliating regulations, such asthose concerning distinctive haircuts and clothing.38 The dissatisfaction thus



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engendered finally burst forth in the form of an open rebellion by the Iraqi army,led by a Yemeni chief, Ibn al-Ash'ath, in which Basra and Kufa joined together.Although the rebellion was put down, it marked the end of any expectation ofloyalty from the Iraqis of Basra and Kufa. It also, combined with the dissent ofthe Shi'ites, who had never acknowledged the legitimacy of the Umayyads andtherefore become a symbol of the focus for all forms of dissatisfaction, eventu-ally led to the downfall of the Umayyads.39

The 'Abbasid state established in its place, however, likewise failed to meet theexpectations of those who helped establish it. Indeed, Jawzi notes, for the dissat-isfied classes it represented little more than a change of masters from theUmayyads. He does not deny that improvements were made in state machinery.He praises the farsighted and beneficent qualities of al-Mansur, which is surpris-ing considering the treachery of that caliph, which included the murder of AbuMuslim.40 Nevertheless, al-Mansur and his ministers from the Barmakid familyeffected certain reforms which benefited the peasants. In addition to creatingmosques and other public works, they made vast improvements in agriculture.Realizing that agricultural revenues were their chief support, they rehabilitatedold canals and built new ones, so that the entire Sawad was connected by anetwork of channels.41 As a result of this and other improvements (e.g., in trans-portation and communications), the economy prospered during the first centuryof the 'Abbasid reign. Ibn Khaldun tells us, for instance, that the land tax col-lected in the days of al-Ma'mun amounted to more than 400 million dirhems.42

It did not take long, however, to discover that the motivating force behindsuch prosperity was concern for the welfare of the state only insofar as itenhanced that of its leaders. No sooner had the cAbbasids become victorious, forexample, than they began a policy of oppression of the Umayyads and those whohad cooperated with the Umayyads. The historians of the age have immortalizedthe story of the feast to which members of that house were invited and whichcontinued despite the slaughter of eighty of them; the bodies were simply coveredover and the merriment continued.43 The Persian freedman mentioned above,Abu Muslim al-Khurasani, had led a group of Iranian peasants and clients, nom-inally allied with the Yemenis, in a triumphant revolt against the Umayyad gov-ernor in Khurasan.44 This defeat had been under the black banner of Muhammadwhich the 'Abbasids adopted as their standard, and had been instrumental in thedownfall of the Umayyads. Abu Muslim had also defeated al-Mansur's uncle,the governor of Syria under al-Saffah, when the uncle disputed his nephew'sclaim to the caliphate (745 A.D.). Once al-Mansur's claim was thus secured,however, Abu Muslim was executed during an audience with the caliph.45 Jawzialso notes the attempt of al-Mansur, no doubt evidenced in his reliance on theBarmakid family, to arbitrate between the interests of the Arabs and the Persians.The wisdom of his approach is seen in the success of the administration. The'Abbasids soon felt threatened by that success, however, and by the time ofHarun al-Rashid, despite the contributions of the Barmakid family to the wel-fare of the state, found it expedient to crush them.46

In addition, the abuses within the fiscal system, at the expense of the peasants,continued virtually unabated. Aware that land taxes provided the main support



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98 Tamara Sonn

of the state, the government of Persia had traditionally attempted to ensure thehighest yield possible from the land. Wise administrators realized the efficacywithin that effort of providing for the well-being of the peasants on whose laborthe crop depended-hence the policies of the Barmakids. On the local level,however, the system was open to widespread abuse, since the assessment andcollection of taxes was, in the final event, left to individuals.

As often happens, the greater the dissatisfaction expressed by the populace,the more cause they were given for dissatisfaction. Their increasing restivenessled the caliphs steadily to increase military strength to combat the populace. Theentire reign of al-Ma'mun (812-833 A.D.), in fact, has been characterized as a"time of trouble," so absorbed was he in quelling popular rebellions.47 Despitehis

promotionof sciences and literature in the Arabic language, and the found-

ing in Baghdad of the "house of wisdom" with its rich collection of manuscriptsand its observatory, it was not until the year 204 A.H. (819-820 A.D.) that al-Ma'mun was able to enter Baghdad and take possession of the caliphal palace.In addition to the uprisings in Egypt and Syria, among the most bitter andlongstanding revolutions was that of the Khurramis, led by Babak, which Jawziexamines in his next chapter, "Babak and His Socialist Doctrine."

It has been argued that Babak's revolution represented the desire of the Iranianpeoples to reassert their Persian culture against that imposed by the Arabconquerors.48 Jawzi argues that such a movement would not have amassed afollowing had it not been for the failure of the prevailing regime, regardless ofnational affiliation, to provide a suitable social and economic milieu. He acceptsthe testimony of Tabari and Baghdadi that Babak's movement indeed embracedthe communistic system of Mazdak.49 Perhaps most significant to Jawzi inaccepting that testimony is the similarity in the circumstances which brought thetwo movements into historical light. As described in the foregoing chapter, thecondition of the peasants in Iran under Islam was no better, and perhaps worse,than that under the Persians. The majority of land continued to be held by thefew privileged landowners, who exploited it to their immediate economic advan-tage. The peasants who worked the land were no more than commodities in that

system; indeed, theywere little more than slaves. Jawzi considers this sufficient

explanation for the continued existence of communistic sentiment among themanipulated masses. Their sustenance lay in the land to which they were enslavedby private owners. It was, therefore, natural for them to consider their freedomto lie in the freedom of the land which they worked. As the author of the SiyasatName points out, this did not entail strictly communal ownership but ratherdistribution of land according to need: "Riches must be shared and distributedaccording to need."50 Nevertheless, the Babakis, like the Mazdakis, soughtredemption from suffering at the hands of large-scale landowners in the reestab-lishment of communal living which had existed prior to the development of

feudalistic private property and which continued to live, in an idealized way, inthe minds of these peasants.In response to traditional Sunni historiography, which denounces the Babakis

as thieves and godless brigands, Jawzi claims that, aside from the activities ofsome who may have used the sect as a cover for illegal activities, and the leniency



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of the sect toward the drinking of wine and toward certain marriages disallowedby Islam (although permissable in Zoroastrianism, for example), there is littleaccuracy in these accounts. In particular, their attitudes toward women weremisunderstood, if not purposely misrepresented. For his part, Jawzi claims theBabakis sought to raise the social status of women by giving them rights andresponsibilities on a par with those of men. This view is reflected in the analysisof Soviet historian Belyaev:

As to the ugly legend about a "community f women," his could have arisen as a reflec-tion of the enlightened position of Khurrami womenfolk n the distorted Moslem mirrorof the world. The peasant women (especially mong the mountaineers) ook a full part inproductive work and even in Moslem countries enjoyed a relative ndependence ntirely

alien to idle city women and especially o the wives and daughters of the feudals, themerchants nd the clergy. It is known hat Khurrami women wore neither he veil nor anyrestricting arments such as the paranja, and were not subject to any kind of seclusion,for this would have been incompatible with their work at home and in the fields.51

Jawzi concludes his treatment of the Babaki movement with a detailed historyof the military and strategic aspects of their 20-year campaign against the caliphalforces, followed by an assessment of their ultimate failure. Two factors, heclaims, account for their downfall. First, they limited their call to the Iranianpeople. Jawzi feels that their chances for success would have been greater hadthey sought to include all Islamic people in their call. Second, he notes that themovement was weakened by its inclusion of partisans who were not so concernedwith its justice as with personal gain. It is known, for instance, that many of thelocal ruling class were attracted by the Khurramis' initial successes against thecaliph and, jealous of their power, sought to protect their own property andperhaps even reassert their autonomy by joining forces with or, at least, notopposing the enemy of the caliph. Unfortunately, these were fickle friends and,as al-Afshin achieved offensive strength, they retrenched on the side of thedominant force.52 Both factors stood to be overcome through a more highlydeveloped system of indoctrination. The motivating force, that of social justice,survived the demise of Babak and achieved momentum with the Khurramis'legatees, the Isma'ilis, who are the subject of Jawzi's fourth chapter.

The historical link between the Khurramis and Isma'ilis is by no means asettled matter,53 nor is it one that troubles Jawzi. He presumably accepts thethesis, based primarily on the evidence of the Siyasat Name,54 hat the remnantsof the Mazdaki-Babaki movement were assimilated into Shi'ism. In any event,he does not argue the issue, referring simply to the "ideological relationship"between the two groups, based on similar social goals. In fact, Jawzi believes theIsma'ilis represent an advanced stage in the development of those goals, for theIsmacilis distinguished themselves, he claims, by learning from the mistakes oftheir

predecessors.As

above,the most

grievousdefect in the Babaki

program,according to Jawzi, lay in their exclusivity. They were not concerned withspreading their call for social justice beyond their regional boundaries; indeed,they recruited their followers from the members of one class only, the oppressedclass. Jawzi credits the Ismacilis with having realized the fallacy of this policy



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100 Tamara Sonn

and having set out actively to overcome it. Furthermore, he believes the Isma'ilisovercame the defect in the Khurrami approach which prompted the latter toattack only the system to which they were subject; the Isma'ilis extrapolatedfrom that to an attack on the ideological bases of all oppressive political systems.

The program adopted by the Isma'ilis was one of gradual initiation and hadtwo levels. The outer form (zahiriKya) was but a guise for the uninitiated. Trueknowledge lay in grasping the inner (batiniyva) truth. The first step toward thatgoal was, therefore, casting doubt on all standard beliefs in the exoteric form. AsJawzi describes, missionaries were trained to sow such doubt only gradually. Notall believers were capable of grasping the esoteric truth; those who displayedsuch inability were to be left alone, while more capable minds were to beadvanced according to set stages of initiation.

Jawzi notes the effectiveness of this method of proselytizing in engenderinggroup solidarity through utter faith in the group leaders. Initiates were taught totrust with their newly acquired truths no one except their teachers. He also notesthat this secrecy was the source of extreme suspicion on the part of the unini-tiated. Isma'ilis were therefore accused of being everything from atheists, mate-rialists, and anarchists to Persian nationalists and Sabians. And, like the Babakis,they were considered sexually promiscuous and debauched because they per-mitted internecine marriages and the drinking of wine.

Without doubt, Isma'ili syncretism, esotericism, and secrecy obscured theultimate goals of the group and made it difficult for even their contemporarypartisans to render justice to their views. Jawzi warns, therefore, that extremecaution must be exercised with regard to sources and that reliability must beaccorded only to IsmaCili sources themselves. Accordingly, in an effort to vindi-cate the IsmaCilis, and apparently accepting that the Fatimid caliphs were trulyIsma'ili, he cites the trend among some Fatimids toward monogamy as evidenceof Ismacili concern for family welfare.55 Similarly, he quotes Nasr Khusrow'stestimony that the Qarmatians avoid wine for the sake of social stability, althoughthe question of IsmaCili inks with that group is problematic.

More convincingly, he argues that the discrepancies in reports of their behavior

and beliefs result from their policy of addressing peoplein

termsthe

particularaudience could best understand and accept. He refers to their two programs,"maximum et minimum," meaning the exoteric and esoteric aspects of theirbelief. He believes that the Isma'ilis did have an overall goal ensconced in theircomplex programs, one centered on social values. Accordingly, he believes thatIsma'ilism is more properly termed a school of thought than a religion. Indeed,he characterizes their attitude toward religious doctrine as follows: Since it clearlydoes not benefit the ignorant classes-those who believe it blindly-it is of useonly to the ruling classes in maintaining their privileged positions. The enlight-ened few who can understand the esoteric meanings presented in essentially

exoteric religious dogma, on the other hand, are, as a result, not in need of it.The Isma'ili doctrine is, therefore, not subversive of the truths contained in reli-gious dogma. It simply considers dogma an obfuscation of doctrine, pointless forthose who cannot see through it and superfluous for those who can. This beingthe case, the Isma'ilis were rationalists, according to Jawzi, differing from the



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Mu'tazilites in that they saw no need for reconciling religious doctrine and rea-son;

theysaw no need for

religiousdoctrine at all.

Jawzi formulates the Isma'ili vision of a just society based on two principles:equality of the sexes and abolition of private property. Such emphasis, however,is open to question. Despite the Siyasat Niame's repeated assertions of the identityof Mazdakism and Qarmatianism, and Ibn Rizam's description of the Qarmatiansas communists, a question remains regarding the Qarmatians' relationship tomainstream Isma'ilism.56 Jawzi obviously accepts the validity of the identity, buthe may have overstated the case in referring to communism and equality of thesexes as the two most important aspects of the Isma'ili program, if he is speakingin terms other than personal opinion, since Isma'ili literature itself is noticeably

lackingin communist doctrine. The best source we have of Isma'ili belief is their

"Epistles of the Brotherhood of Purity," in which, it is true, the privilegedclasses (especially wealthy merchants and rural landowners) are attacked throughsatirical descriptions of their behavior. Since the latter group devotes itself exclu-sively to amassing fortunes, it is no wonder "their condition is worse than that ofthe wretched slaves and the poor and weak, their minds constantly tormented byworries about their wealth."57 Perhaps this is the source of their moral depravity,which allows them to watch "their poor neighbors and orphan children of theirbrother, and the downtrodden among their people, fallen on the roads, hungryand ailing and afflicted and crippled, begging for a crust of bread . . . while they

do not pay any attention to them or pity them."58 This is not, however, sufficientjustification to call the Isma'ilis communists or even socialists. Of their ownapproach, the Epistles say

We do not seek assistance rom any of our brothers n religious matters before we assistthem in worldly affairs. If a brother were needless of us, that is what we want for him. Ifhe needed us, that is what we want from him, until we have provided or him all that isessential for him in worldly matters, so that he can be free from care and unify histhoughts or us, thereby becoming ndependent y the strength of his soul, discernment fhis reason and purity of his nature.9

Similarly, equality of the sexes does not seem to have played a major role in theoverall Isma'ili program. As Jawzi himself notes, it certainly was not acceptedby all Isma'ilis.60

Jawzi is on surer ground when he describes their emphasis on the brotherhoodof men or, as he puts it, "internationalism."6' There is no doubt that the Isma'iliswere unimpressed by ethnic, national, or racist sentiment. This was reflected intheir preaching against religious fanaticism, pivotal in their appeal to Muslims ofall sects, as well as to Christians, Jews, Mazdakis, Manicheans, Mandeans, andSabians. Indeed, this policy of extreme tolerance was viewed by Sunni confes-sionalists as utter lack of discretion and accounted in large part for allegations ofIsma'ili irreligiosity. Again, the Epistles state:

... It befits our brothers that they should not show hostility to any kind of knowledgeor reject any book. Nor should they be fanatical in any doctrine, for our opinion and ourdoctrine embrace all doctrines, and resume all knowledge (4:105).



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102 Tamara Sonn

... There are some men who think and believe, by their religion and doctrine, n pity

and sympathy for all men. They lament those who are guilty and seek forgiveness orthem. They have pity on all livingcreatures nd wish well to all. This is the religion of thepure ones, the ascetics and the well-doers among the believers. Such, too, are the doc-trines of our noble brothers (4:108).62

Jawzi concludes his chapter on the Isma'ilis with a call for more study, partic-ularly of their influence on the Christian Middle Ages, on monastic orders, andon the development of guilds, for example. He then attributes the ultimatedemise of Isma'ilism to the combined effect of the Turkish and Christian inroadsinto the area. The spirit of the Isma'ilis, however, did not die. He believes thattheir emphasis on reason prepared the way for the great Islamic philosophers,mentioning Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Tufayl specifically, as well as thescience of tafsir (Qur'anic commentary) and the Sufi works of Ibn cArabi, Al-Ghazali, and Al-Hallaj even more so. Similarly, he believes it was Isma'ilismwhich paved the way for liberal thought in Islam, particularly as expressed in thepoetry of Abu al-cAla al-Ma'arri and Ibn al-Hani.

The question of Isma'ili influence on the invaders from the West is one whichparticularly fascinates Jawzi. He takes it up again in his conclusion. Before doingso, however, he devotes a final chapter to the Qarmatians of Bahrain, that groupof Isma'ilis which actually can be called socialistic. Because Jawzi has character-ized the ultimate goal of the Isma'ilis as social justice and has declared himselfpersonally convinced that private property is the root of social evils, it comes asno surprise that he considers the Qarmatians the greatest of the Isma'ilis and"most kindred to them."

Regardless of whether the Qarmatians were mainstream or dissident Isma'ilis,historical sources generally support Jawzi's account of their development fromthe time of their appearance in Kufa. Like deGoeje, Jawzi accepts Ibn Rizam'sdescription of ninth- and tenth-century Mesopotamia as a hotbed of social dis-content. The best evidence of this is the Zanj rebellion of the late ninth century.Tabari describes the condition of black slaves imported from the east coast ofAfrica to work in the swamps and mines of lower Mesopotamia as so wretchedthat they were persuaded to rebel in 869 A.D.64 t took 14 years and numerousexpeditions before the caliphal armies were able to suppress the bloody rebellion.Under such circumstances, Jawzi believes it is no wonder that a community suchas that of Hamdan al-Qarmati was successful.

Jawzi next turns to the internal order; picking up the theme of social justice,he describes it as at once egalitarian and socialistic. He observes that Qarmatiangovernment was by a sort of administrative council. Although the six membersof the council were from a single leading family, that of Abu Tahir, they ruled inconsultation with their deputies, and government was effected by consensus ofthe entire council. Although Jawzi does not explicitly state it, he implies a con-nection between the ideal form of Muslim government by a council of first-among-equals on the one hand, and government through consultation on theother. The comparison he does draw explicitly is to modern Soviet government.65He allows that a detailed comparison of the two systems is beyond the scope of



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the work, yet his point of comparison is clearly the lack of an elite in either case.While it is obvious that one could counter that Abu Tahir's family constitutes akind of elite, Jawzi notes that the Qarmatian government, like that of SovietRussia, was born of a revolution by the oppressed classes. Presumably, hebelieves that the lack of an oppressed class precludes the emergence of an elite.

After summarizing the Qarmatian tax structure, Jawzi next examines the topicof private property.66 Astutely observing that the question of individual owner-ship of land at that time is anachronistic, he refers to the "communistic character"of property administration. Not only were fields bought with common funds, butthere were no individual taxes. Furthermore, those in need were advanced funds,without interest, until more solvent times, as were newcomers into the area (atleast those with skills). Also,

grainwas

processed bystate-owned and

operatedmills. Finally, commerce was carried on with token money which could not beexported. What he does not deal with, although he reports it, is the distinctlynoncommunistic nature of the government's exploitaion of slave labor. NasrKhusrow reports that the majlis (governing council) owned some 30,000 blackslaves for agricultural work. While there is no reason to assume that these slaveswere mistreated, as were those who finally launched the Zanj rebellion, slavelabor of any sort is clearly not in keeping with the principles of communismwhich demand equal treatment for all people and ownership of the means ofproduction by the laborers. It is apparently for this reason that Jawzi presentsthe

communitynot as communist

perse but as one which

implementedcommu-

nistic principles at least to a limited extent.He concludes his treatment of the Qarmatians with a defense of their morals

and sincerity, particularly with regard to the 'Alids. Concerning morals, hereiterates Nasr Khusrow's testimony that the Qarmatians were just, generous,and temperate. His defense of their sincerity is, on the other hand, more com-plex. He feels compelled, first of all, to deny their apparent duplicity concerningthe Fatimids. While he admits that they at one time supported the Fatimids andthen turned against them, he explains the breach in terms of the Qarmatiandisillusionment with the Fatimid al-Mu'izz and his apparently worldly goals. It

was, therefore,as

deGoeje relates, a doctrinal dispute which eventually led to theopen conflict between the two, one in which the Qarmatians believed they weredefending their revolutionary principles against the Fatimids, who had seeminglyabandoned these.67 Also, the conflict should not be interpreted as shallow com-mitment to the house of 'Ali. Jawzi explains that the purely religious practices ofthe Qarmatians were insignificant; such principles as emanation and transmigra-tion of souls, while ensconced in IsmaCilism, are more properly the domain ofmetaphysics and need not concern the ordinary practitioner. The thrust ofQarmatian beliefs was the ideals of social justice which the promised mahdiwould implement. That it was 'Alids who promised to do so was secondary,

therefore; the vehicle was insignificant relative to the principle. For this reason,similarly, cultic practices were not important to the Qarmatians. While they didnot prohibit such practices and even allowed a mosque to be built for travellers,the Qarmatians simply considered the practices unimportant in terms of social



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104 Tamara Sonn

justice. Finally, Jawzi again shows his belief in socialism by attributing the suc-cess of the Qarmatian community, its longevity and prosperity, to that system;

and its ultimate demise to outside forces.In his conclusion, Jawzi reasserts his regard for the Islamic social goals and hisbelief in their enduring impact upon revolutionary movements, both MiddleEastern and Western. In this vein he briefly traces the Babi and Bahai move-ments in Islam, noting an "ideological link" between them and Isma'ilism. Healso speculates on the influence of Isma'ili social doctrine and organizationaltechniques on the development of such religious orders as the Jesuits, as well ason the development of trade and craft guilds and the order of Freemasons.Again calling for more research on the topic, he contends that, in any event,what he has set forth should be sufficient to show that it was not the backward-

ness which prevented Islamic society from developing into a full-blown capitalis-tic society, as Western society did. He presents Islamic society as one led astrayand, in fact, overcome by foreign forces when its fundamental principles wereignored; only in that sense were the Western invaders able to curtail its progress.Yet, considering that Islamic society had developed up to the last precapitaliststage set out by Marx, that of guilds, and in view of the fact that true Islamicsocial goals are fundamentally in keeping with those of Marxist socialism, theauthor concludes that Islamic society will indeed progress through the samestages of development as the West-but, going the West one better, the capitaliststage in Islamic society will be short.

It should be emphasized again, however, that it would be inaccurate to accuseJawzi of attempting to show that Islam is fundamentally socialist or that only asocialist regime is truly Islamic. Rather, the author reveals himself to be person-ally convinced that socialism is ultimately just. Its relationship to Islam, how-ever, is not presented as one of identity. In fact, as Jawzi expresses in the firstchapter, Islam specifically does not advocate socialism or communistic principles.On the basis of its assertion of the equality of all men before God, however,Islam envisions a society which reflects that equality in socioeconomic relationsamong men. In this sense, therefore, a truly just socialist society reflects thefundamental tenets of Islam. Jawzi's attempt to establish Islamic principles as

fundamentally in accordance with those of Marxism must, therefore, be taken atface value. Had his goal been to promulgate class consciousness among hisnative Arabs, to whom he dedicates his work, surely he would have concentratedon that struggle in Islamic history. Rather, he concentrates on the basic compat-ibility of Islamic and socialist values. His case is, therefore, one for the reasser-tion of those fundamental values as the basis of solidarity and strength.

It is in this context, then, that the question of Jawzi's place in Islamic intellec-tual history must be considered. There is, of course, no denying that Jawzi is notyet among those thinkers now considered as mainstream Islamic modernists,such as Afghani, Abduh, or even his contemporary Constantine Zurayk. His

work has only recently been rediscovered and the extent of its impact remains tobe seen despite his blatantly revisionist approach to Islamic revolutionary history.Jawzi's presentation is supported, to the extent he claims, by valid scholarshipand deserves consideration on that level. Perhaps more intriguing is the veryphenomenon of its recent revival, particularly in view of the current Middle



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Eastern struggle. It is not surprising that Jawzi's work has found ready acceptanceamong Palestinian nationalists, for instance. On the other hand, the History,

attempts to show that Islam, despite its non-socialist underpinnings, is funda-mentally conducive to the establishment of a just society in specifically socialistterms. On the other, the basis of Jawzi's argument is that the goal of socialjustice is universal. His conviction centers on the unique compatibility of Islamicand socialist objectives-a society in which the equality of all men before God isreflected in the temporal order. It is the burden of foreign domination and itsinevitable exploitation which have obfuscated those goals and impeded progresstoward their realization. Achieving national autonomy is therefore a necessaryprerequisite to the progress. Jawzi's work, then, could be considered attractive toall those-socialists and non-socialists alike-committed to that struggle. In any

event, however, on the historical level, Jawzi's History, as the first Marxistinterpretation of the genesis of Islam, certainly deserves scrutiny as a freshapproach to Islamic intellectual history and, as such, a contribution to it.

SCHOOL OF RELIGIONUNIVERSITY OF IOWA

NOTES

tThere are, of course, those who would dispute that this approach is essentially Marxist. Forpurposes of the present article, I am adopting Maxime Rodinson's description: "All we [Marxists]are rejecting here is the idea that the mission of the Prophet was an unexpected miracle in theevolution of Arab society of the time." See M. Rodinson, Marxism and the Muslim World, JeanMatthews, trans. (New York and London, 1981), p. 36.

2Ali ShariCati, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies, R. Campbell, trans. (Berkeley, 1980), p. 51.3Rodinson, Marxism, pp. 35-36.4Bandali al-Jawzi, Min TarTkh al-Harakat al-Fikrivyat fil-Islm (Beirut, 1928), pp. 10-11. (All

translations of Jawzi's work by author.)5Ibid., p. 12.6H. Lammens, La Mecque b la veille de I'hgire (Beirut, 1924), pp. 135 ff.; M. Hartmann, De,

Islamische Orient, Vol. II: Die Arahische Frage (Leipzig, 1909), p. 455.'Jawzi, Min Tarkh, p. 18.8M. Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, Brian Pearce, trans. (Austin, 1973), p. 35.9Lammens, La Mecque, pp. 136 ff., 155 ff., 213 ff.t'Sura 3:125, The Koran Interpreted, Arberry, trans. (New York, 1955), p. 89."Sura 2:276, ibid., p. 69; cf. 30:69.'2J. Schacht, Das Kitii al-Hijal fi'l-Fiqh (Hannover, 1924), discusses various hiyal. Cf. Rodinson,

Islam and Capitalism, p. 35.'31bn Hisham, Sirah, Wtistenfeld, ed. (Gottingen, 1858), p. 143; cf. Leone Caetani, Annali del'slam

(Milano, 1905), 1:181-92.14Jawzi, Min TarTkh, . 25.'5On the recognition of private property in Islam, see L. Gardet, Ia Cite musulmane: vie sociale et

politique (Paris, 1954), pp. 79-90.'6See, e.g., Sura 28:26 ff.; 18:76; 36:21; 52:40.'7Abu Yusuf Yaqub, Le Livre de l'imp6t foncier (Kitih al-Kharai), E. Fagnan, trans. (Paris,

1921), pp. 133-39.'See, e.g., Nasir Ahmed Shaikh, Some Aspects of the Constitution and Economics of Is/am

(Woking, 1961), pp. 139-229. This trend in Islam is clearly set out in Rodinson, Islam and Capital-ism, pp. 12-27.



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106 Tamara Sonn

'9Jawzi, Min TarTkh, pp. 25-26.20Ibid., p. 33.

2lbid., p. 27.22Ibid., p. 30.231bid.,p. 31.241bid.,pp. 31 and 38-39.25Ibid., pp. 32-33.26Ibid., p. 33.27Ibid., p. 41.28Ibid.29Philip K. Hitti, Histort of the Arabs, 10th ed. (New York, 1970), p. 169.30Tabari, Tar-kh al-Rusul wa'l-Muluk, M. deGoeje et al., eds. (Leiden, 1871-1901), 1:2,622-23;

Ya'qubi, Tarikh, Th. Houtsma, ed. (Leiden, 1883), 2:183.3Tabari, TarTkh, 1:3409-10; Mas'udi, Kitib al-Tanb'h wa'l-lshraf, M. deGoeje, ed. (Leiden,

1893-1894), 5:80, 104.32Ibn 'Asakir, Al-T7arkh al-KahTr, CAbd al-Qadir Badran and Ahmad 'Ubayd, eds. (Damascus,

1329-1351), 5:80, Ya'qubi, Tarnkh, 2:265.33Cf. Baladhuri, Futuh al-Buldan, M. deGoeje, ed. (Leiden, 1866), pp. 293 ff.34Ya'qubi, Tarnkh, 2:278 ff.35C. Cahen, "Kharadj," Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1954-), 4:1,031.36Ibn CAsakir, Tahrkh, 4:80; Ya'qubi, Tarikh, 2:362. Cf. H. A. R. Gibb, "The Fiscal Rescript of

CUmar II," Arabica, 2, 1 (January 1955), 1-16 for discussion of cUmar I's attempt to maintain unityof Arabs as well as remove the grievances of the mawial (clients).

37Ya'qubi, Kitab al-Buldan, M. deGoeje, ed. (Leiden, 1892), p. 339. Cf. Ya'qubi, T7rTkh, 2:227;T. W. Arnold, The Preaching of Islam, 2nd ed. (London, 1913), p. 81.

38Cf. Ibn 'Asakir, T7rakh, 1:178-80; Al-lbshishi, Al-Mustatraf (Cairo, 1314), 1:100-101; AbuYusuf, Kitab al-Kharaj, pp. 152-53; A. S. Tritton, The Caliphs and Their Non-Muslim Subjects(Oxford, 1930), pp. 5-35.

39This, notwithstanding the analysis of Jawzi's Min Tar?kh by Werner Ende (Arabische Nationund islamische Geschichte [Beirut, 1977], pp. 88-91) as a positive judgment on the Umayyads.

40Cf. Tabari, Tarnkh, 3:330.4lIbid., 3:391; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kimilfi'l- arlkh, C. J. Tornberg, ed. (Leiden, 1867-1874), 4:14.42Hitti, History, p. 320.43YaCqubi, Tar?kh, 2:425-26; Mas'udi, Al-Tanb?h, 6:76; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 5:329-30.44Tabari, 7rTakh, 2:1,953 ff.451bid.,3:105-17.461bid., 3:680.47E. A. Belyaev, Arabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate in the Earl Middle Ages, A. Govritch,

trans. (Jerusalem, 1969), p. 218.48See, or example, E. M. Wright, "Babak of Badhdh and Al-Afshin During the Years 816-41AD-

Symbols of Iranian Persistence Against Islamic Penetration in North Iran," The Muslim World, I(1948), 43-59 and 2 (1958), 124-31.

49The Sivasat Name traces the link through the widow of Mazdak, Khurrama. She is said to havefounded a secret sect, the Khurramdiniyya, to which both Abu Muslim and Sinbad belonged, whichespoused the original Mazdaki principle of salvation through return to communal living. See Nizamal-Mulk, Sivasat Name, C. Sch6fer, ed. and trans. (Paris, 1891-1897), p. 255.

5?Ibid., p. 248.5 Belyaev, Arabs, Islam, p. 239.52Jawzi, Min Tar?kh, p. 88.53SeeG. H. Sadighi, Les mouvements religieux Iraniens (Paris, 1938), for a detailed analysis.54Nizam al-Mulk, Siyasat Name, p. 268.55Fatimid legitimacy has been the subject of debate, although Jawzi's view is widely accepted. See

B. Lewis, The Origins of Isma'ilism (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 44 ff., for analysis.56Bernard Lewis discusses the question in detail, ibid., and comes to the generally accepted conclu-

sion that the Qarmatians were originally Isma'ilis but developed independently of Iraqi Isma'ilis.



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57lkhwan al-Safa', Rasa'il Ikhwan al-Safa', Seyyed Hossein Nasr, trans., in Isma'ili Contribu-tions to Islamic Culture (Tehran, 1977), pp. 33 ff.

"Ibid., p. 300.591bid.,p. 40.60Jawzi, Min TrrTkh, p. 109.61Ibid., p. 110.62Lewis, The Origins, p. 94.63This s not to deny the passing comments of some others, such as Ibn Hazm (I. Friedlander, "The

Heterodoxies of the ShT'a," JAOS, 28 [1907]: 37 and 29 [1908]: 19-20), and Ibn Hawqal (Al-Masalikwa'l-Mamalik, M. deGoeje, ed. [Leiden, 1873], p. 210). Cf. Asin Palacios, Abenmasarra y su Escuela(Madrid, 1914), pp. 99-103.

64Tabari, TarIkh, 3:1,785-86.65Jawzi, Min Tar'kh, p. 149.66Jawzi's discussion of taxation among Qarmatians is from deGoeje, Memoire, pp. 15 ff., which

follows Ibn Hawqal's account.67DeGoeje, Memoire, pp. 59 ff.

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