the feasibility of launching and detecting jamming attacks

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    The Feasibility of Launching and

    Detecting Jamming Attacks in

    Wireless Networks

    Wenyuan Xu, Wade Trappe, Yanyong Zhang, TimothyWood,

    WINLAB, Rutgers University

    Presented by

    Neel Saraiya

    10304581

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    Contents

    Introduction

    Jamming characteristics and Metrics

    Jamming attack models

    Statistics for detecting the jamming attacks Jamming detection with consistency check

    Conclusion

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    Introduction

    Wireless networks:-

    Low cost Availability and Popularity

    Varieties of application

    Threats:- Stealing information, corrupting data

    Objective:- Providing security and trustworthiness

    Attacks:- Radio interference

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    Jammers What?

    An entity who is purposefully trying to interfere withthe physical transmission and reception of wireless

    communications.

    How? (2 styles) MAC-layer DoS

    Bypass the MAC protocol, repeatedly send out packets

    Introduces packet collision

    PHY-layer DoS

    Jam transmission channel by emitting energy in the

    frequency band corresponding to the channel

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    Jammers Hardware

    Cell phone jammer unit:

    intended for blocking all mobile phone typeswithin designated indoor areas

    'plug and play' unit

    Waveform Generator

    Tune frequency to what ever you want

    MAC-layer Jammer (our focus) Mica2 Motes (UC Berkeley)

    8-bit CPU at 4MHz,

    128KB flash, 4KBRAM

    916.7MHz radio

    OS:TinyOS Disable the CSMA

    Keep sending out the preamble

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    Communication w/oJammer Communication interrupted by

    Jammer

    Jamming characteristics and Metrics

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    Contd Goal of jammer:

    Interfere with legitimate wireless communications

    Prevent a sender from sending out packets

    Prevent a receiver from receiving a legitimate packets

    Packet Send Ratio (PSR)

    The ratio of packets that are successfully sent out by a

    legitimate traffic source compared to the number of

    packets it intends to send out at the MAC layer

    Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR)

    The ratio of packets that are successfully deliveredto a

    destination compared to the number of packets that havebeen sent out by the sender

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    Jamming attack models

    Constant jammer

    Deceptive Jammer

    Random jammer

    Reactive jammer

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    Constant jammerBasically it uses

    Waveform generatorNormal wireless devices

    Keeps the channel busy by sending randombits.

    Prevents legitimate traffic source

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    Deceptive Jammer

    Constantly injects regular packets to the

    channel without any gap between subsequentpacket transmissions

    A normal communicator will be deceived into

    the receive state

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    Random jammer

    Use two different modes

    Jamming mode for tj time

    Sleeping mode for ts time

    tj and ts are fixed or random value

    Why use two different modes?

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    Reactive jammer

    Use the reactive strategy

    Less effective

    No energy conservation

    Harder to detect

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    Consider example

    Involving three parties:

    Normal nodes: Sender A receiver B

    Jammer X

    Parameters Distance

    Let dXB = dXA Fix dAB at 30 inches

    Power PA = PB = P X = -4dBm

    MAC Fix MAC threshold Adaptive MAC threshold

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    Contd

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    Experiment result

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    Experiment Observation

    Constant jammer: A constant jammer can completely block A from sending out

    packets, if it is close enough to A.

    When A use BMAC, although A can send out some packets, most of

    them are corrupted by the jammer. Thus, PDR is low.

    Deceptive jammer:

    A deceptive jammer continuously sends out packets, both A and B

    are forced to receive packets no matter which MAC protocol there

    use.

    Random jammer

    The longer a random jammer sleeps, the less impact it has on the

    normal traffic.

    The PSR measured in BMAC and 1.1.1MAC scenarios dont differ

    much, because the on state of random jammer is not long enough

    for the threshold to increase. Reactive jammer

    The sender is able to reliably send out its packet in all cases,

    however, most of the packets are corrupted with the presence of a

    jammer nearby.

    Even for short packets, the reactive jammer can effectively disrupt

    network communication.

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    Need a secure and dependable network

    Need to differentiate between different

    scenario

    For ex:- exceeds network capacity

    Statistics for detecting jamming

    attacks

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    Statistics for detecting jamming

    attacks contd

    There are three methods.

    Signal strength

    Carrier sensing time

    Packet delivery ratio

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    Signal strength Idea:

    The signal strength distribution may be affectedby the presence of a jammer

    Assume:

    Network devices can gather enough noise level

    measurements during a time period prior to jammingand build a statistical model describing normal energylevels in the network.

    Two strategies:

    Basic average and energy detection

    Signal strength spectral discrimination

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    Basic average and energy

    detection Uses either the average signal value or the

    total signal energy over a window ofN signal

    strength measurements.

    when the jammer emits a constant amplitudesignal the detection statistic is

    when the jammer emits a powerful noise-likesignal the detection statistic is

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    Basic average and energy detection

    ExperimentConsider Six experimentsFor first two experiments

    consider

    Sender Receiver

    A B

    Exp 1

    Packets = 20Rate=5.28kbps

    Exp 2

    Packets= Max trafficRate= 6.46kbps

    For next four exp.consider

    Sender Receiver JammerA B X

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    Spectral discrimination experiment

    Figure 3: Plot of the first two higher order crossings, D1 vs. D2, fordifferent jammer

    andcommunication scenarios.

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    Carrier Sensing Time

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    Contd

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    Packet Delivery Ratio

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    Packet Delivery RatioThe PDRs are low in thepresence of jammers

    PDR is effective indiscriminating jammingfrom congested networkscenario.

    Low PDR can be caused bynetwork dynamics:

    Sender Battery failure Sender moving out of the

    communication range PDR cannot differentiatejamming attacks fromother scenarios such as poor

    link quality.

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    Jamming detection with consistency

    check Two methods:-

    1. Signal strength consistency check

    2. Location consistency check

    Signal strength consistency check

    Goal to discriminate jamming attacks from,

    normal congested scenarios

    other cases caused by poor link quality, sudden failures of nodes Observation:

    PDR is a relative good statistic, we can build some strategies upon

    PDR to achieve enhanced jammer detection.

    Normal scenarios:

    high signal strength => a high PDRLow signal strength => a low PDR

    Low PDR:

    Hardware failure or poor link quality, low signal strength

    Jamming attack, high signal strength

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    Signal strength consistency check

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    Signal strength consistency check Build a (PDR,SS) look-up table empirically

    Measure (PDR, SS) during a guaranteed time of non-interfered network.

    Divide the data into PDR bins, calculate the mean and variance for the data

    within each bin.

    Get the upper bound for the maximum SS that world have produced a particular

    PDR value during a normal case.

    Partition the (PDR, SS) plane into a jammed-region and a non jammed region.

    Experiment setup:

    The sender power: - 5dBm

    Data rate: 20packets/sec

    Packets are 33 bytes

    Average PDR over 200 packets

    SS were sampled every 1msec for 200msec

    PDR bins: (0,40) (40,90)(90, 100)

    PDR threshold 65%

    99% confidence bar

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    Location consistency check Goal:-Detect presence of radio interference attack

    Uses GPS or other localization techniques

    Idea:-

    Check the jamming status using PDR

    ofneighbors

    Keeps the records of PDR and location of

    neighboring nodes

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    Location consistency check

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    ConclusionDue to the shared nature of the wireless medium, it

    is an easy feat for adversaries to perform a jamming-

    style denial of service against wireless networks.

    We presented four different jammer attack models.

    We have studies the effectiveness of them by

    constructing prototypes using the MICA2 Mote

    platform and measured the PSR and PDR.

    We showed that a single measurement statistic is not

    enough to definitively conclude the presence of a

    jammer.

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    ContdWe introduced the notion of consistency checking,

    where the PDR is used to classify a poor link quality,and then a consistency check is performed todetermine whether the poor link quality is due tojamming.

    We presented two enhanced detection algorithms:

    1)Employing signal strength as a consistency

    check

    2)Employing location information as a

    consistency check

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    Thank You