9

THE FATE OF SOLZHENITSYN: A N ANAL YTICAL N O TE

Pham Chung

The fate of many Soviet intellectuals (writers, scientists . . . . ) who had the audacity to speak out against various aspects of the Soviet System is well-known: some work in force-labor camps, some languish in "mental asylums", and some are exiled in foreign lands. Alexander Solzhenitsyn is awaiting the consequences of his latest challenge to the Soviet authority in his new book, The Gulag Archipelago.

Following is an analytical note on the problem of the Soviet authority in dealing with Solzhenitsyn, which is essentially the decision whether to punish or not to punish the famed writer. Speaking of punishment, one can at the outset rule out certain familiar forms of punishment as they would not be "operative" in the case of Solzhenitsyn. One such form of "punishment" is to allow a person to go to a foreign country and deny him reentry permit. As is well known, Solzhenitsyn has steadfastly refused to go abroad for fear of such eventuality. Another possible form of punishment is simply to declare a person "mentally ill" and haul him to a "mental asylum". This form of punishment would also be unlikely in the case of Solzhenitsyn. Since what he has written about, which is known world-wide, appears to be quite sane, putting such a person in a "mental asylum" would immediately

OSe the question of the sanity of the authority making such a decision. The likely rm of punishment, if that is the decision of the authority, is imprisonment in the

"conventional" sense of the term. The decision to imprison or not to imprison the famed author carries with it

two distinct sources of "costs": one "internal", the other, "external". An imprisonment decision would surely give rise to "external costs" in the form of adverse reactions and protest from abroad. In the first place, such a course of action would alienate communist parties in the West which have explicitly endorsed individual l ibert ies, , , , freedom of thought and expression, of demonstration, .... of the diffusion of writing (e.g. The French Communist Party, The Italian

Coramunist Party). Second, adverse reactions of the public in the West in general which woUld be more reluctant to support their government's efforts to further improve East-West "detente". At least part of these "external costs" is quantifiable.

118 PUBLIC CHOICE

It is in the form of lost economic opportunities which may be otherwise obtained from detente (e.g. economic and technical aid from the U. S. A. and Western Europe, the extension of long-term credit, and the granting of most-favored-nation treatment in trade etc.). Let x be the imprisonment time (say, number of months), and y, the potential "external cost" (as perceived by the Soviet authority) generated by adverse reaction and protest from abroad, one can write : opportunities which may be otherwise obtained from detente (e.g. economic and technical aid from the U. S. A. and Western Europe, the extension of long-term credit, and the granting of most-favored-nation treatmentin trade etc.). Let x be

• " " " ~ ' a l the imprisonment rime (say, number of months), and y, the potennal extern cost" (as perceived by the Soviet authority) generated by adverse reaction and protest from abroad, one can write:

y = y ( x ) (1)

(1) is assumed to have the following properties: y(0) = 0; y{ (x) > 0. Since the adverse reaction from abroad can be expected to be associated largely with the decision to "imprison", the curve represented by y(x) can be expected to rise very sharply at low values of x and taper off, such as depicted by the OA curve in Figure 1.

While a decision not to imprison would not generate "external cost" (i.e. y(0) = 0), it would impose tremendous "internal cost". Surely, to let a critic who has indeed challenged the legitimacy of the existing regime go free would give encouragement to others (particularly the intellectuals) to do the same. And this is a home-grown source of instability to the system which is most dangerous. Severe punishment can be assumed to be a deterrent to this kind of "internal cost". At least, this seems to be historically the belief of leaders in authoritarian societies. Let z represent the "internal cost" as subjectively perceived by the authority, one can write:

=~(x) (2)

with the properties: z(0) = K, (K = very large), and z'(x) < 0. The "internal cost" curve can be assumed to be something like the curve EE in Figure 1. The total cost (c) faced by authority is then the sum of (1) and (2):

c = y(~) + z(x) = c(x) (3)

Assume that (1) and (2) are monotonic as represented by OA and EE, then the total cost curve would be something like tt~e curve KGB in Figure 1. This curvature seems most reasonable. Between the "external costs" generated by adverse reactions from abroad and the "internal costs" generated by letting a home-gown source of "subversive activity" develop, which is a threat to a totalitarian system, the latter source of "cost" sould undoubtedly be given a tremendous amount of weight. Moreover, the "external costs',, while they may be substantial in the short-run, may be negligible in the long-run. The experiences of Soviet armed intervention in the East Berlin Uprising in 1953, the Hungarian Revolution and the Poznan (Poland) Uprising in 1956, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 seem to indicate that. A home-grown source of threat to the security of the

NOTES 119

K

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regime, on the other hand, would be more dangerous in the long-run. Given a U-shape total cost curve llke KGB, one can predict that a rational decision of the authority would be imprisonment with the optimal time OX!

One can present a case in which the optimal course of action is not to imprison. Up to this point, I have implicitly assumed that the authority would follow the "traditional" pattern in punishing critics of the system. The public is prepared for the event by some "trumped up" charges publicized in government- controlled publications, the defendent is then convicted and hauled to jail. The accused is not allowed a "public defense". Now, if the famed author is prosecuted and allowed a public defense, this woiald probably change the shape of the "internal cost" curve -z(x). The resulting exposition of repressive actions of the existing regime of which the public heretofore is either unaware or vaguely aware may

120 PUBLIC CHOICE

impair the willing support of the public for the system. The more servere punishment in this case may engender greater "costs" in terms of lessened willing depicted by a curve like BB in Figure 2. The total cost curve in this case would be monotonic increasing such KG (fig. 2). The course of action that would minimize total cost would be non-punishment. It would be very unlikely, however, that a totalitarian authority would let the famed writer expose its repressive activities in a public defense.

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Editor Note" This Article was received before the K.G.B. made up its mind.