The external environment’seffect on management and

strategyA complexity theory approach

Roger B. MasonDurban University of Technology, Kwa Zulu-Natal, South Africa, and

Honorary Research Fellow, University of Wolverhampton, Wolverhampton, UK

Abstract

Purpose – This paper seeks to investigate the influence of the external environment on the choice ofstrategic management activities, from a chaos and complexity perspective, since a businessenvironment is a complex adaptive system.

Design/methodology/approach – The study in this paper was of an exploratory nature, using thequalitative techniques of case study, depth interviews and document analysis to collect data from twocompanies each in the IT and packaging industries, namely, more successful/less successful companies.

Findings – The paper finds that first, it was proposed that more successful companies in turbulentenvironments would use radical, fast and disruptive strategies. Furthermore, strategy making shouldbe a democratic, bottom-up process and should be organic, self-organising, adaptive and emergent.The results confirmed these propositions. Second, it was proposed that more successful companies instable environments would use more traditional management and strategies and more formal strategyplanning activities. The findings did not confirm this proposition, probably due to the fact that inreality a truly stable environment does not exist in South Africa.

Originality/value – This paper is of benefit to managers and strategists by emphasising a new wayto consider the future management and strategies of their companies. Since businesses and marketsare complex adaptive systems, using complexity theory to increase understanding of how to cope incomplex and turbulent environments is necessary, but has not been widely researched.

Keywords Strategic management, Complexity theory, Chaos theory, South Africa

Paper type Research paper

IntroductionThe business environment is comprised of a set of relationships between agents orstakeholders in the environment – relationships that are changed by individualdecisions taken (Lewontine, cited in Wheatley, 1996). These interactions continuously“co-create” the environment. The business environment is changing faster than everbefore (Achrol, 1991; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Kotter, 1996; Glass, 1996; Loewen,1997; Conner, 1998), with such change occurring in two major dimensions, complexityand turbulence (Dess et al., cited in Robbins, 1990; Huber, cited in Achrol, 1991).

Complexity is defined as the measure of heterogeneity or diversity inenvironmental, sub-factors such as customers, suppliers, socio-politics andtechnology (Teopaco, 1993; Lane and Maxfield, 1996; Chae and Hill, 1997;Chakravarthy, 1997). As complexity increases, the ability to understand and useinformation to plan and predict becomes more difficult (Black and Farias, 1997). As allsystems increase in complexity over time (Farrell, 1998), the increasing complexityleads to more change (Conner, 1998). As the system becomes more complex, makingsense of it becomes more difficult (Black and Farias, 1997) and adaptation to the

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0025-1747

DOI 10.1108/00251740710718935

changing environment becomes more problematic (Lane and Maxfield, 1996; Merry,1995).

Turbulence is defined as dynamism in the environment, involving rapid,unexpected change in the environmental sub-dimensions (Conner, 1998; Vorhies,1998). A stable environment changes little, but when it does, the change is predictable.In turbulent environments, there are many unexpected changes. Turbulence is thenatural state of the world (Benton and Lloyd, 1992; Mintzberg, 1994). It is caused bychanges in, and interaction between, the various environmental factors especiallybecause of advances in technology and the confluence of computer,telecommunications and media industries (McKenna, 1991; Samli, 1993; Iansiti,1995). The result of this growth in environmental turbulence has been the reduction oforderly competition, an increasing need for information, innovation and quicker cyclesof development, and more difficulty in predicting customer, product and servicerequirements (Achrol, 1991; Pine et al., 1993; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993;Chakravarthy, 1997). Thus, decision windows are shorter, risk of obsolescence isgreater, long-term control becomes impossible and managers have to learn new waysto operate in turbulent environments (Davis et al., 1991). The net result of thesechanges is an environment that Lynch (1995, p. 46) refers to as “chaotic, fragmentedand unpredictable and complex and turbulent”. Although this seems negative,Mavondo (1999) has shown that destabilisation in the environment leads toheterogeneity in the business environment, thereby avoiding “me too” strategies andencouraging differentiation.

Since complex and turbulent environments can be desirable, but since manybusinesses are uncertain about how to cope with such situations, it makes sense toidentify ways to handle such environments. Many believe that identifying a causativelink between environmental variables and management action is not possible becauseof the complexity of variables and the chaotic nature of environments (Windsor, 1995).However, recent research has stressed the inter-relationship between an organizationand its environment (Polonsky et al., 1999). Firms co-exist and co-evolve with theirenvironments and therefore are able to influence the environment to a greater extentthan previously thought (Brooks and Weatherston, 1997). Organisations shape theirenvironments by influencing their industries or collaborating with each other, therebygaining some control over some part of their environments. The environment is thusnot completely determined by external forces, but can also be influenced by the firm(Anderson et al., 1994, cited in Ford, 1997).

If business environments are increasingly complex and turbulent, are they not thencomplex adaptive systems (CAS)? Many authors clearly see environments as CASs(Black and Farias, 1997; Tedesco, 1998; Peters, 1999; Prendergast and Berthon, 2000).Others highlight the presence of complexity constructs in business environments, suchas:

. Co-determination or co-evolution taking place between firms and theirenvironments (Achrol, 1991; Polonsky et al., 1999).

. Self-organisation and emergence occurring through a loose coupling ofparticipants in the environment (Tasaka, 1998; Peters, 1999; TedescoAnalytics, 2001).

. Environmental changes starting small and developing slowly and unpredictably,which is indicative of sensitive dependence on initial conditions (TedescoAnalytics, 2001).

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. Business environments exhibiting non-linearity (Black and Farias, 1997; TedescoAnalytics, 2001).

Furthermore, Black and Farias (1997) have explained how actions taken to reduceuncertainty can lead to non-linearity and unpredictability. When firms make changesin a market they create “ripples” that affect the whole market, forcing other firms to tryto improve their strategic “fit” to the shifting market. In other words, the marketplaceis in a continuous state of disequilibrium and the more participants there are in amarketplace, the more ripples there will be, leading to further disequilibrium and morecomplexity. Since environments do appear to be CASs, a complexity or chaosperspective should be used to understand the dynamics and behaviour and to guidestrategy development (Tedesco, 1998; Prendergast and Berthon, 2000; TedescoAnalytics, 2001).

Complexity/chaos theoryA collection of theories makes up the body of knowledge known as complexity andchaos theory (Boisot, 1999). The underlying idea “is that all things tend to self organiseinto systems” (Kelly, 1999, p. 5). These systems develop patterns that are created whena number of simple rules are applied over many iterations. Small differences at thestart of the process can eventually result in large differences in the system’sperformance. Many interactions in a system can produce unexpected patterns orbehaviours (Goldberg and Markoczy, 1998) because stimulating one part of the systemcan have unexpected effects in other, unanticipated, parts of the system. Suchunexpectedness is because of the nature of non-linear feedback networks (Stacey, 1996)and the interconnected and interdependent nature of CASs (Bar-Yam, 2000). Complexbehaviour is orderly, yet full of surprise. In other words, despite apparentuncontrollability, the system is not totally chaotic. The rules that generate thisbehaviour are part of the system, are not enforced by a single agent, or manager, andcannot be predicted from examining any single part of the system. The systemspontaneously self-organises as the various decentralised parts of the system interact.This emergence of adaptive behaviour happens at the edge-of-chaos where there isenough stability to sustain existence, but enough turbulence for creativity to overcomeinertia (Waldrop, 1992). Although CASs’ behaviours cannot be predicted, they can beinfluenced by encouraging mutually beneficial relationships between members of thesystems (Baskin, 1998).

Several chaos and complexity concepts have relevance to business. The centralconcept is self-organization, the process of a pattern of order emerging from a set ofsimple rules in an interconnected network. The process is not controlled by an outsideparty or “manager”, but spontaneously self-organises from the bottom up through theinter-relationships of the system’s parts. As a result, individual managers cannotpredict and plan longer-term outcomes (Wilkinson and Young, 1998; Frederick, 1998;Kelly, 1999), but by fine-tuning the simple rules that determine the system, it can bemoved between stability and chaos (Lewin, 1993). This continuous self-organisationallows and encourages an infinite variety of creative responses to emerge fromchanging environments. This emergence is the second important concept ofcomplexity theory. It happens when the system’s parameters change, leading to amovement towards disorder – important because too much order causes the system tobecome ossified. The implication is that to cope with change the system should be keptat the edge-of-chaos. CASs continuously reorganise themselves into new patterns of

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relationships and from these new patterns, new possibilities for action emerge (Merry,1998). Examples of self-organization and emergence include development of newstrategies (Conner, 1998), development of marketing tactics for specific prospects(Forrest and Mizerski, 1996), self-directed teams (Gault and Jaccaci, 1996) and growthof strategic alliances (Wilkinson and Young, 1998).

The third important concept is feedback. Stability occurs when negative feedbackdamps changes in variables, pushing the system back to its original state andproducing regular, predictable behaviour (Stacey, 1995; Thietart and Forgues, 1995;Glass, 1996). On the other hand, systems exhibit chaos, or explosive instability, whenpositive feedback amplifies many small changes (McGlone and Ramsey, 1998). As thesystem moves away from equilibrium, positive feedback will cause the system to movefurther away at an escalating rate (Oliver and Roos, 2000), leading to explosiveinstability, or chaos, and eventual collapse of the system. Together, positive andnegative feedback can act as countervailing forces on the system, pushing the systemtowards instability and at the same time damping changes to increase stability, and sobalancing at the “edge-of-chaos” (Thietart and Forgues, 1995). Positive feedback is theprinciple underlying increasing returns to scale, which specifies that the firm with asmall advantage early on can enjoy exponential growth until the advantage is so greatthat the advantage becomes “locked in”, and becomes an industry standard, ashappened with VHS video recorders and Microsoft Windows. Applications of positivefeedback have been shown in customer defections (Rasmussen and Mosekilde, 1988),product development (Millier, 1999), mass customisation (Saisse and Wilding, 1997)and advertising (Stacey, 1992; Glass, 1996).

The fourth important concept is sensitive dependence on initial conditions (Briggsand Peat, 1999; Phillips and Kim, 1996). In a stable system, small changes have smalleffects, but in a CAS smaller changes or errors can grow exponentially with eachiteration, until no prediction accuracy is possible (Diamond, 1993). An infinite amountof precise data would be required to produce accurate long-term predictions (Mix,1993). However, many authors suggest ways of using the concept to cope in turbulentenvironments. Using small nudges to guide an event, rather than dramatic actions tocontrol it are suggested (Gibson, 1996; Wheatley, 1996). Traditionally a small changewould be ignored in business. However, the right kind of “nudge” at the correct time(the initial condition) can lead, through positive feedback, to major changes (Nilson,1995). Being a “first mover” is essential because sensitive dependence on initialconditions and positive feedback create a “flywheel affect” that reinforces earlysuccess, providing a significant advantage over the long-term (Hamel, 2000; Koch,2000). To be a successful first mover, a company must recognise the patterns and spotthe environmental clues that indicate which small changes to “nudge” (Ball andAsbury, 1989; Morrison and Quella, 1999). Such companies are able to influenceenvironmental changes in ways that are favourable to themselves, but unfavourablefor their competitors.

CASs have an underlying order or structure (Thietart and Forgues, 1995). Withinthe apparent randomness of a chaos system, patterns can be found by geometricallymapping the data. These patterns are known as attractors, the fifth importantcomplexity concept. The edge-of-chaos attractor, known as a “strange attractor”,reflects the area where maximum creativity and innovation happens (Herbig, 1990;Lewin, 1992). This transition between order and chaos is the point at which sensitivedependence on initial conditions causes small inputs to cause big changes. A uniquefeature of the strange attractor is that it always stays within certain boundaries, and

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therefore behaviour is broadly predictable within these boundaries, but never identical.Nilson (1995) refers to this as non-repetitive repetitiveness. Exactly where the systemwill go next cannot be predicted, but it will not go outside certain limits. In other words,the strange attractor allows change while maintaining some order. This boundedstability allows the CAS to continually adapt, coming close to the edge of chaos wherecreativity and innovation occur, but pulling it back from plunging over the edge intothe disorder and chaos that signify failure (Frederick, 1998). Strange attractors inbusiness could include corporate vision and values (Frederick, 1998; Bates, 1999),market entry and development activities (Black and Farias, 1998) and customerrelationship management (Kurtyka, 2000). Strange attractors have also been shownmathematically or via simulations in customer behaviour (Herbig and Golden, 1991),inventory levels (Rasmussen and Mosekilde, 1988), and advertising (Feichtinger et al.,1994).

ManagementMost managers have been brought up in, and trained for, an environment of certainty,whereas they now have to cope with increased complexity, uncertainty and turbulence.The traditional authoritarian, control-oriented management style, when applied in anuncertain environment, can lead to destabilisation of relationships and behaviours, andalso to unanticipated behaviours and possible explosive instability (McElwee, 1998).What is needed is a complex style of leadership – a transformational, facilitative orinfluencing leader (Slater and Narver, 1995; Fitzgerald and van Eijnatten, 1998).Managers need to set the organisation’s direction and create the environment in whichstaff can operate (Stacey, 1991; Gibson, 1996), and the lower levels can steer (control)the organisation in the direction specified by management (Senge, 1990; Gibson, 1996;McGlone and Ramsey, 1998). Managers create the conditions in which individuals,teams and the system are encouraged to respond spontaneously to the changingenvironment (Fitzgerald and van Eijnatten, 1998), thereby enabling people to“self-organise” and so keep pace with the rapid changes (Baskin, 1998). In other words,control should be local, through self-management, rather than global, by management.In complex and turbulent environments this style of management is best practiced inflat, decentralised, organic structures, as they can maintain global stability but absorba high degree of uncertainty and still adapt at the detail level (Peters, 1999; Prendergastand Berthon, 2000). In such an environment planning is still important, but it shouldhave a short time horizon, information should be freely distributed and used quickly, itshould be about how to do things rather than what to do, and it should includealternative possible outcomes (Skae, 1989; Nilson, 1995; Jones, 2000) – in other words,less prediction, control and stability and more self or group control to enable quickadaptation to the changes (Jaworski, 1988; Briggs and Peat, 1999).

In summary, management in a complex and turbulent environment should beorganic, with the manager concentrating on creating an internal environmentconducive to co-evolution. Decision-making should be decentralised, learning andexperimentation facilitated and change encouraged. Management must provide theinformation to support this approach and control must be exercised through self orgroup control. This can be called self-organising management.

Strategy in dynamic environmentsThere is agreement amongst chaos and complexity authors that traditional strategymaking is ineffective in turbulent environments. Traditional strategy making is not

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innovative, creative or original, leading to strategic rigidity (Nilson, 1995; Edgar andNisbet, 1995; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998, and Roos, 1999). Strategic success formulaebecome rapidly obsolete in volatile markets (Conner, 1998), and competitors makestrategies irrelevant by rewriting the rules of the game (Fradette and Michaud, 1998).These problems happen because traditional strategy making is often based on:

. Information that is obsolete by the end of the planning process (Nilson, 1995;Loewen, 1997; Frederickson, cited in White, 1998).

. The assumption of a stable environment (Volberda, 1997; Chakravarthy, 1997).

. The assumption that the firm can, to an extent, control its environment (Gooldand Quinn, 1990; Cravens, 1991, White, 1998).

This ineffectiveness of traditional strategic planning is partly due to the inability topredict in environments that are near the edge-of-chaos (New Marketing ImperativesRoundtable, 1994; Kurtyka, 2000), because the system is continually and unpredictablychanging, and therefore managers have to continually obtain new information tounderstand the environment. Any plan is therefore obsolete before it has been fullyimplemented. Staff who have to cope with environmental shocks are restricted by adetailed, prescriptive plan (Glass, 1996).

Strategic planning is evolving to meet these changing conditions (Wall and Wall,1995). Strategy is being done differently, such as involving more people in the process,delegating to those closest to the customers and using cross-functional teams. Strategyhas become a trial-and-error process, evolving through the discovery of what works.As a result planning cycles are shorter, and because quick responses are required,tactics often dictate strategy. In the 1990s, bottom up planning became the norm.Stacey (1992) suggests that strategy making should be a spontaneous self-organisingprocess, with groups of managers informally discussing strategic issues. Senguptaet al. (2000) suggest a reactive learning system that monitors environmental deviationsinstantly, communicates the problem or opportunity, and empowers individuals forprompt decision making, instead of strategic planning.

Eisenhardt and Sull (2001) are more prescriptive, recommending that strategy inturbulent environments must be flexible but disciplined, which requires a set ofstrategic rules help managers to cope with opportunities and threats comingrapidly at them without having to refer to superiors or do slow strategic planningexercises.

Wheatley (1993) is even more radical. She maintains that self-organising systemshave a clear sense of identity – values, traditions, competencies, culture, and corebeliefs. Therefore, any action is based on a reference to these principles and soadapting to environmental change does not need to be reactive or uncertain. This isknown as self-reference. The system knows what to do in a turbulent environment. Asa result autonomy at a local level is encouraged, as individuals will be directed by theself-reference system, rather than by orders or strategic plans from above.

A fundamental problem of strategy making in a fast changing environment is toachieve “adaptive innovation” at the edge-of-chaos, while still achieving consistent andreliable execution of the strategy. Brown and Eisenhardt (1998)) maintain that this isachieved by “improvisation”, a balance between the too much structure and too muchchaos. Improvisation requires lots of experimentation and competitive moves todestabilise the market and push it to the edge-of-chaos, but with sufficient structurethat change can be efficient (priorities, deadlines and responsibilities), but not so rigidthat change is discouraged. One strategic framework for coping with turbulence

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suggests that a firm must produce chaos through repeat innovation (Chakravarthy,1997). Merely being a first mover is not enough, as competitors can get a “free ride”and, because of the difficulty in defending a strategy in a turbulent environment, thefirm may be overtaken or side-stepped by competitors. It is essential, therefore, toinnovate continuously to the extent of making one’s own products obsolete andreplacing them, before a competitor does.

Other issues supporting such a strategy making framework are the ability to adaptfaster than competitors (Hooley and Beracs, 1997), being flexible to keep up with orstay ahead of changes (Chakravarthy, 1997; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998), risking themistakes of fast responses and learning quickly from these mistakes (Chattell, 1995;Barnett, 1996; Glass, 1996), and using strategic alliances to leverage competencies(Chakravarthy, 1997; Joshi et al., 1998).

The above shows that strategy making in a complex, turbulent environment isdifferent when approached from a complexity and chaos viewpoint. A firm’s strategyshould involve a vision or identity, bottom-up emergence of the strategy involving allthe staff, balancing between structure and rapid change through flexibility and rapidadaptability, and initiating change rather than reacting to environmental change. Thiscan be called emergent strategy making.

MethodThe problem to be researched was defined as understanding how more successfulSouth African companies, operating in environments of differing complexity andturbulence, differ in their use of management and strategic activities from companiesthat are less successful. To solve this problem, four propositions were developed:

P1. It was proposed that the more successful company (ITA) in thecomplex/turbulent environment would use self-organising management andemergent strategy making processes.

P2. It was proposed that, in the complex/turbulent environment, the lesssuccessful company (ITB) would use traditional management and strategymaking processes.

P3. It was proposed that the more successful company (PA) in the simple/stableenvironment would use traditional management and strategy makingprocesses.

P4. It was proposed that, in the simple/stable environment, the less successfulcompany (PB) would use self-organising management and emergent strategymaking.

The research problem has inherent in it the difficulties of understanding managementand strategic approaches, the assessment of success, and the lack of research in thespecific field. These difficulties dictated the need for a qualitative exploratory study.The approach chosen was the case study method to enable the problem to be studiedintensively (Welman and Kruger, 1999). Two companies each in a simple/stableindustry and a complex/turbulent industry were selected to represent the moresuccessful and less successful companies.

Maximal variation sampling was used to select the companies. This method strives“to integrate only a few cases, but those which are as different as possible, to disclosethe range of variation and differentiation in the field” (Flick, 1998, p. 70).

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The sample was selected through a two-stage process:

(1) First the most complex/turbulent and most simple/stable industries wereselected via a questionnaire posted to experts such as stock brokerageindustry analysts and management consultants. The results highlighted theIT industry as the most complex/turbulent, and packaging as the mostsimple/stable.

(2) Within each industry, a most successful and a less successful company waschosen, based on a Delphi process, using panels of experts specialising in the ITand packaging industries, such as consultants, journalists and buyers. Thepanellists nominated ITA as more successful and ITB as less successful in theIT industry, and PA as more successful and PB as less successful, in thepackaging industry. To obtain the companies’ co-operation anonymity wasnecessary.

Data was collected via depth interviews with knowledgeable managers in thecompanies, including directors, managers and staff. Interviews took about an houreach, were based on an interview guide and audiotape recorded and, in addition, noteswere taken. Furthermore, various company documents were collected and analysed,for example, annual reports, brochures, web pages, advertisements, meeting minutes,manuals, etc.

A combination of techniques was used to analyse the material. Thematic coding,using NVIVO software, was used to deconstruct and reconstruct the transcripts so asto categorise findings according to each of the two perspectives being studied(stable/turbulent and more/less successful). Content analysis was used to paraphrase,summarise and reduce the field note data and the documents to generalisations in orderto compare them with the research problem and propositions. This analysis was donemanually by summarising and aggregating the interview notes and the documentaryevidence into tables to compare the two companies in each industry against each otherand against the proposals, and to compare the companies similar in success to eachother and against the proposals.

“Method-appropriate criteria” such as data triangulation, methodologicaltriangulation, prolonged engagement and an audit trail were used to validate theprocedures and to ensure trustworthiness in the study (Flick, 1998).

FindingsThe results of the analyses were summarised for each company and are presented asfour cases below:

Case 1 – ITA – more successful company in complex/turbulent industryITA has a culture of acceptance and encouragement of change. Adapting and beingflexible are critical abilities. They react quickly to achieve an advantage overcompetitors, as is shown by the following extracts:

Decisions around selecting technology, that time is very short.

Reducing time to market.

ITA change frequently, have experience in handing change, and therefore have learntto cope with change, as the following extract shows:

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. . . in any period of six months this company will change and that change is expected.

However, planning is not precluded:

Everything is planned carefully . . . but those changes have to made very quickly.

They adopt a short planning horizon (three to six months) that forces them to facechange regularly. This results in ITA being proactive and having a positive attitude torisk:

It is a culture that accepts trial and error.

They are “agile, constantly innovative, and open to change”. As expected of asuccessful company in a turbulent market, ITA was prepared to be aggressive in orderto lead, and control, their market.

ITA’s management style is open and democratic, with independent andentrepreneurial action encouraged, which the following extract shows:

. . . to get the guys at the coalface to come up with innovations and new ways to do things.

This is supported by the fact that they “. . . rely on self control, we do not go aroundchecking up on (people)”. This does not imply a laissez faire approach – they have“iron fisted control, intolerance of failure”. This does not detract from the findings,because tight control refers primarily to financial control.

They have few policies and procedures, relying on some basic principles and staffwho know what to do. This informality and lack of “rules” is typical of the flexibilityneeded for a successful company in a turbulent environment to be sensitive to, takequick advantage of, small and rapid environmental.

The strategic direction of ITA is based on goals set by top management, but thedetails of the plan evolve from the environment. This is reflected in the followingextracts:

The way (planning) evolves is not cast in concrete.

(Planning) might be reactive to market demands or reaction to customer demands or evencompetition or even suppliers.

In other words, strategies are both planned from the top down and evolve fromelsewhere in the company. The plan is flexible – “it will be adapted quickly” and “wecan and do change our minds.” They are very aggressive, shaking the market up anddeveloping new ways of doing business – “we will be seen by the industry as beinginnovative and constantly changing.” They aggressively enter new markets as isreflected in the following extracts:

Continuous entry into new markets.

. . . use competitive advantage to obtain dominant position in embryonic stages of marketdevelopment.

Their strategy making process involves the strategy emerging from a wide range ofinfluencers, such as “market demands or reaction to customer demands or evencompetition or even suppliers”. Adaptation is seen as a key method of strategy making– they prepare for change and do not see it as only reacting to change. Thus, ITA usequick adaptation to change as a strategic tool, as was anticipated of a more successfulcompany in a turbulent and complex market. They place a lot of emphasis on

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relationship building, partnerships and strategic alliances with their customers andsuppliers, using the relationships to adapt to change and to grow in new markets, aswell as maintaining existing markets.

The above shows that ITA uses self-organising management and emergentstrategy making, thus confirming P1.

Case 2 – ITB – less successful company in complex/turbulent industryITB changes slowly, appearing to resist change. This is illustrated by the fact that theychange “. . . slower than our customers. We are not proactive generally.” This issupported by comments such as “grow steadily through partnerships” and “improve. . . in a controlled manner.” Since they avoid change, they are not experienced in copingwith change. ITB adopt a long-term planning horizon (“We are on a three year plannow”), thereby trying to maintain the status quo and avoid having to cope with change.ITB is thus reactive, as is shown by them saying “We follow what (others) are doingbecause inevitably they set the trend.” They see this as “a lower risk . . . we do notcause change,” because “we need to . . . be cautious.”

In other words, ITB do not welcome or encourage change, but delay having tochange until it is inevitable. Even then change is seen as something to be plannedcarefully to avoid the inherent risks. This means that they do not take advantage ofopportunities created by innovation and developments in this turbulent industry. Theemphasis seems to be on cautious efficiency rather than adaptive flexibility.

ITB’s management style is open and democratic, as is reflected by:

. . . everyone can take routine decisions. That’s your internal process – that is trust.

. . . because I believe people want that freedom, they are mature, they are rich in knowledge.You cannot go and hound them all the time.

They also rely on self-management and control:

You were responsible for a project and they actually allowed you to do it, nobody checked onyou, you worked your own hours.

There are few policies and procedures, which is not consistent with a less successfulcompany struggling to cope with a turbulent environment. It may be that thisinformality has been adopted because it is the “fashionable” style in the industry. ITBuses formal strategic planning conducted by management, via a long-term (three years)plan. It is more conservative and reactive, possibly due to a restricted strategic vision,as is indicated by this extract:

Strategic vision is probably one of our liabilities . . .we are very good at . . . doing the samething, but the brand new thing about where you need to go, that is needed . . .

This planning appeared to be unsuccessful, as “(the plan) was all airy fairy but no oneknew how we were going to achieve this, there were no milestones”.

Although many interviewees stressed that adapting was important, there is a beliefin the company that efficiency and concentrating on current business is moreimportant, so they wait for the market to move and then react – “we do not have theprocesses dynamic enough to support quick running”.

ITB place a lot of emphasis on relationship building with customers, but use themonly to maintain existing business. Their neglect of market development is shown by

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the fact that “they spoke about developing new markets . . . but in reality they stayed inthe same line.”

ITB’s formal, planned approach was expected of a less successful company in aturbulent and complex environment, but their less formal management style was notexactly as expected. Therefore Proposal 2 was partially confirmed.

Case 3 – PA – more successful company in simple/stable industryPA have a positive and proactive attitude to change, instigating change in theirindustry to gain a competitive advantage – “. . . (disrupting the market) is one of thekey strategies.” Although they appear slow and deliberate, they have learnt to takedecisions quickly and to implement rapid change when necessary (“It depends on whatthe changes are but they can be done very quickly”). Their mission statement reflectsthis too, namely “fast, efficient and professional” and “deceptively fast.” This is asuitable method for a fundamentally stable environment that has pockets of turbulenceand rapid change, and for a company prepared to instigate changes to keep ahead ofthe competition. Their approach to planning is consistent with this, taking a longerterm view on strategic issues such as product development (“. . . looking at a cycle ofthree to four years”), while in operational matters they adopt a short term view (“We donot look beyond 12 months”). In other words, PA emphasise stabilising actions most ofthe time, which the following extract shows:

I think in some ways we have kept the market stable . . . in some instances we have actuallybrought people into the company not to ruin the market.

They destabilise the environment when it suits them, and are able to cope with theinstability that this causes. These findings reflect the opposite of what was expected,namely that PA should follow a stabilising strategy. Despite this commitment todestabilisation, they have a strong need to maintain stability in other areas of theiroperation, specifically in terms of competition. Thus PA encourages stability, exceptwhen it suits them to destabilise!

PA’s management style is open and transparent – everyone can contribute andmotivation and commitment is generated through involvement. Structures are looseand overlap, and people can get involved in, and comment on, any aspect of thebusiness, as is reflected below:

The company has always had a very open way about things, and you have meetings wherethey dish out the financials to everybody from cleaner up . . . the company trusts people, andif you have a view on something you can speak.

This freedom does not imply a lack of discipline or control. The culture of the companyencourages self-control and makes it clear what the decision should be. They refer to itas “self policing”, which imposes conformity to the corporate goals. Consistent withthis democratic style, PA had no written policies and procedures. Although this wasnot expected of a successful company in a stable environment, it is not surprisingconsidering the innovation and creativity in this company.

PA’s approach to strategy is innovative and aims at doing things differently – amaverick – but not overly aggressive. Strategy development is predominantly a topmanagement activity, but with strategies discussed with staff who are invited tosubmit ideas. Strategies are “extremely focussed”, but not in writing. Althoughprojects are carefully planned, the strategy is not, as is shown by:

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Opportunities are seen along the way and to some extent it can be . . . impulsive . . . go in acertain direction and make those decisions pretty much there and then.

Success results from this “. . . off the cuff, not in a reckless way, but decisive” strategymaking method that is based on a clear idea of who they are and where they want to go.PA’s planning is short term, continually monitoring the environment and maintainingflexibility to adapt quickly to anticipated changes. Strategic planning is a continuouslyevolving process, changing and developing based on changing environmental factors.Although long-term relationships were developed with larger customers, this is notprevalent throughout PA’s customer base.

PA’s approach to strategy and management is generally what was expected of asuccessful company in a turbulent environment, rather than in a stable environment,and thus P3 is not confirmed.

Case 4 – PB – less successful company in simple/stable industryPB has a reactive approach to change and change slowly:

I think if the company can get away with what they have got they will stick with it, but if it istechnological they will wait and see if it is going to work properly before they change anything.

PB, when they do change, do so with reluctance – “The move away from (ourtraditional market) was forced upon us.” There is no longer term or shorter termplanning. Other than the annual budget, no real consideration is given to futureenvironmental changes. Although this could be acceptable in a rapidly changingenvironment, in a stable market some form of longer term planning would beadvantageous. PB are the victim of change rather than being able to avoid the negativeimpacts, as is shown in this extract:

Well this industry changes with the other industries that we deal with, so if they change thenwe follow suit.

PB is a long established, family business. Their management style was disciplinarianand authoritarian, involving a bureaucratic, family oriented style. The previousManaging Director “ran this place like an army concentration camp, people were notallowed to think for themselves.” At the time of the study they were trying to introducedemocratic management but some staff were not comfortable with this style, which isreflected in their attitudes to control by managers or by the Policy and Proceduremanuals, or by the Managing Director’s comment – “Not that there should bepolicemen but there should be checking.” PB has a formal policy and proceduresystem, which has curbed people from making decisions “as there is no system forbypassing the procedure so you hesitate to take a decision.”

PB avoids strategic aggression and prefers to “go carefully in the market, not totramp on too many toes.” PB’s strategic approach is to concentrate on the currentsituation, as is reflected by the fact that they are “company, product, and technologyoriented.” Strategy and planning is primarily budgeting and production planning.There is no strategic planning, with strategies neither being planned, nor evolving. Atbest it can be said that their strategy is a reaction to environmental changes, anattempt to “keep up”, or as one manager said, “We see something going that way andwe follow it and . . . blunder along.” They are at the mercy of the environment – unableto have any say in their strategic direction. In other words, they do not adapt toenvironmental changes but are reactive and slow in taking the required decisions.

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They emphasise efficiencies in current markets rather than developing new markets.Although they have long-term relationships, these are not strategic, but revolve aroundsalesforce relationships.

The strategy and planning approach adopted by PB is not consistent with what wasexpected of a less successful company in a stable environment, and therefore P4 wasnot confirmed.

Discussion of resultsTo provide a clearer view of these findings, a summary of the three data sources(interviews, documents and field notes) is plotted in Table I. A score of 2 indicates thatempirical findings match what the literature proposed, a score of 1 indicates a partialmatch and 0 indicates a mismatch.

This summary illustrates that the findings for the companies in thecomplex/turbulent environment were generally consistent with the literature. Themore successful company (ITA) used self-organising management and emergentstrategy making as proposed by the literature, while the less successful company (ITB)did not. The findings for the simple/stable environment, however, were not consistentwith the expectations for this environment and were not as proposed by the literature.The more successful company (PA) performed like a successful company in acomplex/turbulent environment, while the less successful company (PB) partially usedthe approaches expected of the more successful company.

Overall, ITA and PA both performed as expected of a successful company in acomplex/turbulent environment, and ITB and PB both performed as expected of a lesssuccessful company in a complex/turbulent environment. In other words, P1 and P2,relating to the complex/turbulent environment, can be accepted, but P3 and P4,relating to the simple/stable environment cannot be accepted.

Since the findings generally supported P1 and P2, it is concluded that the use ofcomplexity and chaos theories can be helpful to understand complex/turbulent marketdynamics. However, the accuracy of specific predictions of management and strategicapproaches can be questioned, as not every management or strategy issue behavedexactly as predicted. Possible reasons for this may be:

. Since the South African environment has become complex and turbulent over thepast decade, even less successful companies may be adopting the tacticspredicted for more successful companies. In fact, the predicted approaches may

Turbulent/complex Stable/simpleMore successful Less successful More successful Less successful

Factors IT DA FN IT DA FN IT DA FN IT DA FN

Attitude to change 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0Management 2 2 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0Strategy 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 1Relationships 1 2 0 1 2 2 1 2 0 1 0 2Total 7 8 6 5 8 6 2 3 1 2 0 3Gross scores 21 19 6 5Percent 87.5 79.2 25.0 20.8

Notes: IT ¼ Interview transcripts; DA ¼ Document analysis; FN ¼ Field notesTable I.Summary conclusions

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even apply to unsuccessful companies, but by definition the unsuccessfulcompanies are no longer in business, and so cannot be examined.

. How companies perceive their markets may be more important than the actualstate of the markets. Since all ITB interviewees believed their industry to bechanging significantly, their management and strategic actions may have beencopied, but poorly implemented, from companies they perceive to be successfulin their industry.

. Although the environment may determine management and strategy actions,they may have little effect on success. Other issues may be more importantdeterminants of success, for example, the quality of implementation of thestrategies.

. Although the computer industry is complex and turbulent, the conservatisminherent in South African business may have led ITB to adhere to traditionaltactics, as “they are the right thing to do”, or because “the competitors are doingthem”, even though not environmentally determined.

With regard to the simple and stable environment, P3 and P4 were not accepted,therefore questions must be asked regarding the relevance and accuracy of themanagement and strategic actions suggested by the literature for this environment.Although the complexity/chaos theory approach may not be entirely accurate, thereare other possible reasons for the unexpected results:

. Since the South African environment has become complex and turbulent over thepast decade, the packaging environment may not be sufficiently stable to reflectthe expected strategies. Even the most stable industry in South Africa may beturbulent enough for companies to follow the approaches expected in acomplex/turbulent market.

. How companies perceive their markets may be more important than the actualstate of the markets. Most packaging interviewees believed their industry to bechanging significantly, and therefore it makes sense that some of their actionswould be like those of a company in a complex/turbulent environment.

. Although the nature of the environment may determine the management andstrategic approaches to follow, they may have little effect on success. Maybesuccessful companies in any environment would follow similar management andstrategic approaches.

. The packaging industry may be in a state of transition, moving from stabilitytowards turbulence, which was not sufficiently understood by the panellists whonominated the industries and the companies.

Implications for managers and for further researchThis study has highlighted the relevance of chaos and complexity theories astechniques to better understand the market dynamics being experienced by companiesin many South African industries. It has further highlighted the complex nature of theproblem and the difficulty in making conclusive statements about success or failure inthe rapidly changing South African market. Nevertheless, it is believed that thesetheories can help to develop superior management and strategic approaches for theenvironment in which a firm operates, and also to better understand the behaviour anddynamics of competitors in a market.

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It is hoped that some of the anomalies and difficulties outlined above can beresolved by further research over a wider range of companies and in differentindustries. Furthermore, it is believed that quantitative research focussing on a specificindustry could be very helpful in more clearly differentiating the management andstrategic approaches of more successful from less successful companies.

As a general conclusion it is felt that the overall objective of the study has been metby showing that more successful companies, operating in environments of differingcomplexity and turbulence, do differ, to a considerable degree, in their use ofmanagement and strategy making approaches, from those that are less successful.

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Further reading

Capra, F. (1996), The Web of Life: A New Synthesis of Mind and Matter, Flamingo, London.

Corresponding authorRoger B. Mason can be contacted at: rogerm@dit.ac.za

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