Mind Association

The Explanatory Power of Chomsky's Transformational Generative GrammarAuthor(s): Jane SingletonSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 83, No. 331 (Jul., 1974), pp. 429-431Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2252745 .

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The Explanatory Power of Chomsky's Transformational Generative Grammar

JANE SINGLETON

One of the main difficulties in Chomsky's account of generative grammars and linguistic theories is to determine what exactly these grammars and theories explain. In some places Chomsky seems to be saying that they explain how a set of sentences might be generated and in others that they explain how these sentences are actually generated. On the whole his earlier writings accord with this first view and it is not until his more recent writings that a subtle change of emphasis inclines him to the second view. Only this first view is justified and when this is realised a lot of the contemporary discussion on questions of innateness will be rendered groundless.

In I956, in Syntactic Structures, p. I4, Chomsky wrote, 'Each grammar is related to the corpus of sentences in the language it describes in a way fixed in advance for all grammars by a given linguistic theory'. Diagram- matically, his position is the following,

Corpus of L -RGenerative Grammar of L Relationship fixed in advance by given linguistic theory

The linguistic theory then can be used as a standard for evaluating various grammars that each generate the corpus of L. That is, the closer the gram- mars are to having relation R with the corpus of L, the better they are. Therefore, all Chomsky's remarks so far have been concerned with how the corpus of L might be generated and not with how it is actually pro- duced.

By I964, Chomsky's remarks about linguistic theory and generative grammar have moved to the second view mentioned above. Two passages from Current Issues in Linguistic Theory illustrate this point; 'The central fact to which any significant linguistic theory must address itself is this: a mature speaker can produce a new sentence of his language on the appro- priate occasion, and other speakers can understand it immediately, though it is equally new to them' (p. 7), and 'The generative grammar is inter- nalized by someone who has acquired a language.... In performing as a speaker or hearer he puts this device to use' (p. io). Now, what he says in this first quote is in accordance with his views expressed in Syntactic Structures to the extent that the corpus of L to be described by a grammar is not a completed set. Consequently, any grammar proposed, if it is to be adequate must contain recursive rules so that it can generate new sen- tences. However, Chomsky's remarks in this quote go further than this. He suggests that a linguistic theory should be able to explain the fact that a mature speaker can produce a new sentence on 'the appropriate occasion'. Now it is this last phrase that gives the clue to his mistake. A grammar of

429

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430 J. SINGLETON:

the sort suggested by Chomsky containing recursive rules might be ade- quate to the task of generating all and only all grammatical sentences but it contains no provision to ensure their utterance on the 'appropriate occasion'. The sentences generated by the grammar might be produced as randomly as, for example, are a parrot's phrases. Consequently, the genera- tive grammar does not explain why we produce relevant grammatical sentences and not just any grammatical sentence on a given occasion.

Also, as is made explicit in the second quotation, Chomsky is now putting forward the theory that a generative grammar is the explanation of the production of sentences by the speakers of a language and of the understanding of sentences by the hearers. Now, apart from the prima facie improbability of supposing that these complex rules are what we are consciously or subconsciously following when we produce or understand sentences, there are other reasons against this suggestion. Firstly, Chomsky offers no arguments to support his claim that in addition to generating a certain set of sentences, transformational generative grammar explains the production of this set of utterances by a mature speaker. Secondly, many utterances produced by native speakers are ungrammatical so that an adequate transformational generative grammar is not one that generates this set but only those that are considered grammatical by the native speakers. That is, an adequate grammar will be in the position represented diagrammatically below,

A. (clear grammatical sentences)-recognised as such by native speakers

generated by grammar

However, in some cases the native speaker is undecided whether or not a sentence is grammatical. In these cases, if Chotnsky's position is correct, the position will be as follows in B and not as shown in B',

B. (grammatical or non-grammatical sentences?)-intuitions of native speaker are undecided on this point

I grammar is undecided in these cases

B'. (grammatical or non-grammatical sentences?)-intuitions of native speaker are undecided on this point

I grammar has decision procedure for these on the basis of the rules used for A above: therefore, unlike the native speaker's intuitions it is not undecided.

In Syntactic Structures however, Chomsky considers that the position is as I have described it in B' whereas if his later views on what a transfor- mational generative grammar is explaining are correct, he should adhere to B. The grammar does not in fact provide an explanation of why the native speakers should be uncertain in some cases whether or not a sen- tence is grammatical and therefore if used as an explanation of native speakers' intuitions the grammar is unsatisfactory at this point.

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TRANSFORMATIONAL GENERATIVE GRAMMAR 43I

It might be countered that Chomsky's confusion concerning exactly what a generative grammar and linguistic theory explain do not materially affect his account and as such is not of much importance. However, Chomsky proceeds to build on the assumption that generative grammars and linguistic theory explain the production of sentences. For example, in Current Issues in Linguistic Theory, he considers that a linguistic theory is an attempt to specify what it is we bring to language acquisition that makes it possible for us to recognize deviant examples in primary linguistic data and extract some sort of generative grammar. This in turn leads him to talk of innate procedures, constraints, etc. brought by the language learner to the problem of language acquisition.

These remarks and many others indicate just how far away from his initial remarks concerning linguistic theory in Syntactic Structures he is getting. The most that can be claimed for Chomsky's generative grammar is that it provides an adequate procedure for generating all and only all the grammatical sentences. There is no justification for the further claim that it is the actual procedure that is used by native speakers and hearers to produce and understand sentences respectively.

UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX

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