The Europeanisation of Flanders: The search for appropriate indicators to measure

structural and cultural adaptation to the EU

Elisabeth Van Reybroeck

Faculty of Political and Social Sciences University of Antwerp (UIA)

Korte Sint-Annastraat 6

B-2000 Antwerp

Tel: +32 3 204 10 60 Fax: +32 3 204 10 80

E-mail: elisabeth.vanreybroeck@ua.ac.be

Paper to be presented at the PAC Conference September 2-4

Panel Europeanisation of National Government

1. Introduction This paper is the first exploring paper framed in a long-term research project 1about the Europeanisation of the Flemish, and in comparative perspective, the Belgian administrative and political world. The aim of this paper is not to present our first research results, but rather to explore and test the hypothesis for further research. This paper deals with the central question to which extent Flanders is europeanised. Although the main focus of the research project is the Europeanisation of Flanders, we will also use and examine the broader Belgian context. The reason for this is twofold: being a part of the Belgian federal state, the Flemish level is strongly interwoven with the Belgian one. Secondly, the degree of Europeanisation of Flanders will be measured in a comparative perspective of the whole Belgian context and the other regions and communities. In addition, Flanders is not recognized as such in the treaties on the European Union. Although article 203 TEU makes it possible for regional ministers to represent the entire federation in the Council of Ministers, formally only nation-states are recognized by the European Union treaties. Rather than discussing the degree of impact of Europe on domestic institutions, this paper aims to explore the extent to which Flanders and Belgium adapted their domestic institutions to the European Union, or the extent to which Flanders and Belgium are europeanised. Whether or not Belgium is more or less Europeanised than other member states, is not the question that will be dealt with in this paper. Neither will be dealt with the question why Flanders and Belgium are europeanised in a certain degree. This question can only be answered in a later phase of the research project. The first stage of the project mainly consists of a round up of the different dimensions of Europeanisation in the Flemish – Belgian situation (structures, cultures and policy content / polity, politics and policies) and their (causal) relationship with each other. With the aid of concrete indicators relating to these dimensions, the degree of Europeanisation of Flanders can be measured. The presentation and illustration of these indicators constitute the main part of this paper. 2. Definition of Europeanisation An important characteristic that distinguishes this paper from other research on Europeanisation is its focus on domestic arrangements. They are conceived as the dependent variable which is affected by European policies (Knill, 2001). Although we recognize that trough further European Integration a lot of policy domains were uploaded to the European level, and that the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance (Risse, Green Cowles, Caporaso, Risse, 2001) is an important dimension of Europeanisation, this study mainly focuses on domestic institutions and their adaptation to the European Union. This paper starts from a top-down approach (Börzel, 1999, Knill, 2001) of Europeanisation, and focuses more in particular on the results of this top-down pressure (adaptation or non-adaptation).

1 This research project is sponsored by the Policy Reseach Centre ‘Governmental Organisation in Flanders’. (installed by the Flemish government)

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Central concept in this paper is adaptation. In our paper, Europeanisation is the degree to which a state or sub-state level has adapted to the European Union. Seen in this way, Europeanisation or adaptation is the result of certain mechanisms and processes, interactions between the European and the national (subnational level). Top-down demands between the EU and the member states create adaptation pressures. The question is to which extent a member state has adapted or not adapted to these pressures. Adaptation to the EU is a very broad term that needs to be specified. Adaptation to the EU can take different forms. Scholars distinguish between Europeanisation of polity (institutions), politics (decision-making-processes) and policy (policy outputs) (Olsen, 2002). This paper will mainly focus on the Europeanisation of institutions. In this context, the historical institutionalist framework serves as a theoretical starting point (Knill, 2001). Based on the understanding that institutionally grown structures and routines prevent the easy adaptation to exogenous pressure, we will emphasise both institutional and ‘cultural’ aspects of EU-adaptation at the national level. Following Knill, adaptation can not only be seen as the adaptation of structures, but also of the (administrative) practices and routines. In other words, the historical institutionalist framework has to be modified in order to take in account both institutional and cultural adaptation. When a mere institutional focus is not sufficient to account for patterns of national adaptation, an agency-based approach has to be considered as subsidiary in cases where a mere institution-based perspective provides no sufficient explanation. (Knill, 2001) 3. The search for appropriate indicators to measure Europeanisation The processes, mechanisms reasons of Europeanisation are of a minor importance in this paper. Yet, we can only reveal those mechanisms if we know whether and to which extent there is adaptation to the European Union. In this stage of the project, the main research question is whether or not Flanders has adapted to the demands of the European level, with respect to institutional structures, administrative and political cultures and policy content. In this paper, To answer this question, it is important to indicate certain phenomena, practices, organisational aspects and cultures that can be seen as indicators of a ‘strong’ or - put in a negative way- ‘weak’ adaptation to the European Union. (Figure 1) Although different yardsticks can measure Europeanisation, we are, following from our definition of Europeanisation, looking for indicators that can be used to measure the structural and cultural adaptation of Flanders to the EU. The aim of the definition of these indicators is twofold; first of all, it is a valuable instrument for the empirical study of Europeanisation mechanisms and secondly, those indicators can be used to measure the degree of Europeanisation in a certain member state or sub-national entity. With the aid of those indicators one can compare the degree of Europeanisation in different member states or regions on an equal basis. This is also what will be done in the later stages of this project: the comparison of the degree of Europeanisation of Flanders, the Walloon Region, the Region Brussels-Capital, the French and the German-speaking Community and the Belgian federal level. Since we are especially interested in the adaptation both structural and cultural institutionalist elements, it is indispensable to explain Belgian federalism as the main institutional context of the Europeanisation of Flanders.

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4. Belgian federalism: a determining factor in the Flemish adaptation to the EU Before we can talk about the Europeanisation of the political and administrative structures and cultures in Flanders, we need to know how the federal state Belgium works and what specific position Flanders takes in this construction. If we don’t understand Belgian federalism, we won’t understand Flanders’ adaptation to the EU either. We assume that this federalism influences the adaptation of both political and administrative structures and cultures in Flanders. Our argument is similar to the one elaborated by Börzel, who concluded that federal states have more difficulties to adapt to the European Union than centralised states (Börzel 1999, Börzel, 2002). Because of the different layers within the state, it is more difficult to get al these different layers on a par with each other and on a par with the European Union. In addition, Börzel makes a distinction between competitive federalism and cooperative federalism. Federal states with sub-national levels cooperating with the national level have less difficulties adapting to the European Union then federal states characterised by a competition between the sub-national and the national level. According to us, Belgium can be seen as a state characterised by competitive federalism. The process of federalisation, that started in 1970 and recently reached a new phase with the Lambermont Agreement, shows that both regions and communities are never satisfied with their competencies. Especially with respect to European politics, Flanders is very active in circumventing the Belgian state level. Let’s take a look at the Belgian federal structure and the Flemish position in it, in particular with respect to European policy formulation and implementation. Since the beginning of the seventies, 5 consecutive state reforms (1970, 1980, 1988, 1993, and 2001) shaped Belgium into a fully-fledged federal state, with extensive competencies for the double sub-national level of Regions and Communities. There are three Regions2 created essentially as a response to aspirations of socio-economic autonomy and also three Communities3 predicted by aspirations of cultural autonomy (Vandevivere, 2001). One of the most important characteristics of the state reform of 1993, the so called Saint-Michiels-agreement is the in foro interno, in foro externo principle, which grants the Regions and Communities to right to conduct a foreign policy with respect to those policy fields that belong to their domestic competencies. In this respect, it is important to know that competencies are not homogeneously spread over the different levels within Belgium. A lot of typical European policy fields, like environmental policy, fall within the competency of both a federal and a regional minister. The in foro interno, in foro externo principle in combination with the absence of homogeneously spread competencies, has important consequences for the representation of Belgium within the European Council of Ministers and the implementation of European decisions in national, regional or community law. To handle this problem of representation within the European Union, the regions and communities signed a Cooperation Agreement with the federal level (8 March 1994). This agreement provides an elaborated arrangement for the representation of the Regions and the Communities in the Council of Ministers. The agreement makes a distinction between 4 major policy categories (6 after the transfer from agricultural and fishery policy to the regional level by the Lambermont Agreement), with each policy category defining which level is representing Belgium in the Council of Ministers. This means concretely that with respect to the so called “mixed policy domains” Belgium is represented by either a federal minister with 2 The Flemish Region, the Walloon Region and the Brussels-Capital Region 3 The Flemish Community, the French Community and the German Community

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an assessor from the sub national level or a sub national minister with a federal assessor. The cooperation agreement provides at the same time a rotation mechanism for the appointment of the regional assessors, in order to guarantee that each region or community provides in turn the assessor or the head of the delegation. Category Competent policy level Head of Delegation Assessor

I Exclusively federal Federal None II Predominantly federal,

partly sub-national Federal Region / Community

III Predominantly sub-national, partly federal

Region / Community Federal

IV Exclusively sub-national Region / Community None V

(Fishery) Exclusively Flemish Region

VI (Agriculture)

Federal + Flemish and WalloonRegion

Federal Flemish Region Walloon Region

Table 1: Belgian representation categories in the EU Council

In this kind of representation mechanism, it is perfectly possible that a regional minister defends the official Belgian point of view and even commits Belgium with his decision. Because this point of view is the official Belgian one, an extended mechanism of coordination and position definition between the regions and the communities and the federal level is indispensable. The Belgian federal structure with its specific stipulations has undoubtedly implications on the preparatory, the transposition and the correction phase of European policy, both on the political and the administrative level. Effective and efficient coordination is a necessary condition for the functioning of the federal state on international for a, like the European Union. Starting from this hypothesis, the effectiveness and efficiency of these mechanisms with respect to the European context can be an indicator for Europeanisation. 5. Europeanisation operationalised. In this paragraph, I will try to make a list of characteristics of the administrative and political system which I think are signs or indicators of adaptation to the EU. Some of them are based on literature, others on previous research projects about implementation. (Dierickx, Bursens, Helsen, 2001, 2002) Starting from the historical-institutionalist logic, institutions consist of both a formal, structural part and an informal cultural part. Both the formal institutional architecture and the mentality of the policy makers working in those formal structures can be adapted to the European Union in a stronger or weaker way. Our central argument throughout research is as follows: Europeanisation can only take place if both structures and cultures adapt themselves to the European Union. The adaptation of political and administrative structures is an

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important, though not the only component of Europeanisation. Before we can talk about Europeanisation of domestic institutions, another necessary condition needs to be fulfilled (Knill, 2001). Political cultures are a second chapter in the Europeanisation story. Because of the different character of the administrative and the political system, it is necessary to split up between the political and the administrative part of the structures and cultures. Although those two layers are supposed to work together closely, this is not always the case in the Flemish situation. In addition, there can be a difference in the degree of Europeanisation between the political world and the administration. The main question is here to what extent the organisational structures and cultures in the administration and the political system are designed and prepared to deal with the upload and download of European policy. Although we are completely aware of the fact that the search for separate indicators is rather artificial and is sometimes a distortion of the political and administrative reality, we prefer to follow this research strategy for analytical reasons. When the Europeanisation indicators are identified, the indicators can be used to redesign the total image and to look for causal relationships. Reading this paper, it is important to keep in mind however that its only aim is to present a (exhaustive?) list of indicators for Europeanisation that can be used to measure concretely the degree of structural and cultural adaptation to the EU. The concrete description of the Europeanisation mechanisms at play in the Flemish situation and their explanation will only come up for consideration in later papers. 5.1. The administrative structures and cultures a. Organisation of the preparatory phase: upload structures Although Europeanisation is mostly associated with the downstream of European policy like the transposition of directives, adaptation to the EU already starts in the preparatory phase of EU policy. By preparatory phase, we mean the actions undertaken before the European legislation is discussed and adopted by the council of Ministers. In this phase, member states can influence Commission’s proposals by negotiating these proposals in expert committees. Member states and sub-national levels already have the possibilities -to a certain extent- in this stage to adapt future European legislation towards own national interests, in order to reduce later transposition costs. The degree in which they are capable to upload their national or sub-national policy wishes to the European level, is an indicator of Europeanisation. A first condition for uploading one’s policy options to the European level is that there is a unitary position to be uploaded. Especially in federal states, a coordination mechanism is needed to fulfil this task. The working and efficiency of these coordination mechanisms in the European context can be seen as a first indicator of the Europeanisation of the institutional upload structures. Due to the fact that sub-national entities are not recognized by EU treaties, complex mechanisms of coordination are already at work in the preparatory phase in federal states. Since Belgium can only take one position in the Council of Ministers, this position has to be a compromise between the Regions and Communities and the federal level. This means that Flanders’ most important channel to influence European legislation is the internal negotiation

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structure on European Affairs. This internal coordination between Regions, Communities and the federal level takes place in the Foreign Affairs Directorate European Affairs (P11). How does this P11 service work? When the Belgian Permanent Representation receives the drafts of Commission proposals, they are communicated to the different governments and the ministries involved. Those ministries prepare their positions on the issue and send representatives to the weekly meetings of the P11 (Dierickx, Bursens, Helsen, 2001). The P11 can meet in different compositions, depending on the issue at stake. Regardless of the issues at stake, representatives of the federal prime minister and his deputies, representatives of the sub-national ministers-president and representatives of the Belgian PR to the EU are entitled to attend all meetings (Dierickx, Bursens, Helsen, 2001). In the P11 meetings, all decisions are taken with unanimity and each level involved has a right of veto. When the P11 fails to take a decision, the Interministerial Conference on Foreign Policy (ICFP) has to take a decision. Now we know how the policy preparation in the Belgian federal state works, another question is popping up: Is this complex mechanism an example of a good Europeanised structure, is it adapted to the working of the policy formulation on the European level? Although we know that this question can only be answered by measuring or examining the cases in which Belgium had problems preparing European legislation or failed in the definition of a position in the Council of Ministers, we have strong indications that Belgian system does not fit into the ideal European scenario: a strong unitary position in the Council of Ministers, backed by a strong parliament. Although P11 was conceived to guarantee an equal representation of the different policy levels, it has evaluated to an overloaded and rather inefficient meeting. With too many participants and too many points on the agenda, P11 is not capable anymore to oversee the coordination of all policy domains. Therefore, a lot of other specialised coordination meetings were set up; which leads to a high number of permanent or ad hoc specialised coordination mechanisms. In addition, these committees can not officially define the Belgian position, which implicates that every position must still pass P11 for rubberstamping. (Bursens, 2002) A second indicator relating to the Europeanisation of the uploadstructures, is the presence of a good pro-active strategy. Already in the policy preparation phase and before the definition of the Belgian position, Belgian negotiators have to check out the Belgian or Flemish situation with the European proposals. This pro-active strategy and the early cooperation with the European level, the expert groups of the Commission more in particular, both via informal and formal channels increases the chances that draft European legislation shows a reasonable degree of fit with domestic legislation. The existence of certain representation mechanisms of civil servants within the expert groups or other advisory bodies in the Commission, a strong pro-active strategy during the legislative phase of the European Commission are indicators of a good internal organisational adaptation to the European legislative process. This pro-active strategy does not only consist of the delegation of negotiators to expert committees and other advisory bodies, but also of the early involvement of actors playing a role in the implementation process (e.g. parliaments and stakeholders). What can we tell about the Belgian and the Flemish pro-active strategy? Although the defining of the position in the Council of Ministers is elaborated into detail in the Cooperation Agreement, there is no such mechanism for another important aspect of the policy preparation: the representation of the different levels in the expert committees, other

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advisory bodies of the Commission or the Council Working groups. For national experts, this is an unique opportunity to influence European politics and to orientate the future European legislation towards own national interests, in order to reduce transposition costs. Coming to the Belgian situation, the representation in those bodies can be characterised as decentralised and ad hoc, without a general rotation mechanism. Depending on the policy domain, the technical ministry (in cooperation with the Permanent Representation), P11 or a specialised mechanism appoint the civil servants representing their policy level in the advisory bodies. Due to this ad hoc system, it happens that two or three civil servants participate in an expert committee or a council working group. When there is little or no coordination of their position, this can lead to a rather schizophrenic situation: three civil servants with three different positions in the advisory or preparing bodies and only one position in the Council of Ministers. It is clear that this regulation does not lead to an optimal Belgian Representation in Commission advisory Committees and Council Working Groups. Not only the mechanisms of delegation play a role in the in the uploading of national policy options to the European level, the capacities and negotiating mandate are a more hidden but not less important factor in the European policy preparation phase. Before talking about the more cultural aspect of the negotiating capacity, we’ll describe the mandate for Belgian negotiators. The appointment of Belgian negotiators in the advisory bodies of the Commission, two scenarios can take place: In the first place, the Commission itself can invite certain experts on the matters to be discussed. Secondly, it can happen that the Commission does not dispose of the data of Belgian experts. In that case, the Permanent Representation is asked to appoint the experts. When the number of experts is not sufficient to fill in all the places, each available expert is appointed. When the number of candidate-experts exceeds the number of places, P11 has to make a choice. Unfortunately, this system does neither guarantee continuity with previous meetings nor the appointment of the most capable experts. With respect to the negotiations in the Council Working Groups, the 1994 Cooperation Agreement stipulates that if a joint stand cannot be reached within the internal deliberations, the Belgian representative must abstain from voting in the Council due to the absence of a mandate. Having to abstain however, gives Belgium no impact on the contents of the European legislation. In addition, it may occur that the dynamics of the negotiations demand an urgent adaptation of the Belgian position. It is clear that the described complex coordination mechanism cannot come into play at such moments. If the Belgian negotiator is not able to receive a new mandate in time, the Cooperation Agreement obliges him to take a stance ‘ad referendum’, along the lines of what is likely to reflect the general interest. The definitive Belgian position – based on a consensus through the coordination mechanism- must be send to the presidency within 3 days. It is obvious that in such situations the impact of Belgium is extremely small. It must be clear by now that the complex procedures make it difficult to reach a coherent and a clear mandate. Besides the formal negotiating mandate, there is a more cultural factor at play in the negotiating process. The formal negotiating mandate is not sufficient to influence the European negotiations. The personal negotiating capacities of civil servants are a crucial factor in the uploading capacities of a member state. What do we know about the negotiating capacities of the Belgian civil servants? Research by Beyers points out that Belgian negotiators have a low self-esteem compared to negotiators from other member states. Belgian civil servants think they aren’t prepared very well, don’t have clear instructions from their ministries and have no political feedback. (Beyers, 1997)

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This fragmented and ad hoc preparation of European policy is a symptom of a weak adaptation. The internal Belgian intergovernmental mechanisms are set up from the preoccupation of coordination between the different policy levels, rather than from the point of view of efficiency on the European level. The absence of a decent formal and informal pro-active strategy in combination with preoccupied and complex mechanisms of representation and policy preparation leads to a European legislation in which Belgian and Flemish concerns and policy options are only represented in a minor way. The fact that the cooperation agreement only stipulates the coordination and does not mention the earlier stages of policy preparation, is one of the best examples of a bad adaptation to the European policy cycle. The weak adaptation of the administrative structures (the unclear ad hoc regulation for the representation in advisory bodies and council work groups, the complexity of the position definition and the relative inefficiency of P11).can hardly result in a good adaptation to the European legislation. If even the administrative structures are not adequately adapted to the possibilities of influencing the legislation offered by European Union to the member state, then the result of the legislation process will certainly not be in favour of that member state. The consequences are in proportion: an increased chance on a misfit between national and European policy, which leads (or can lead) to a rather difficult or incorrect and late implementation and even to reprimands from the Commission or convictions by the European Court. b. Organisation of the transposition phase: download structures When the council (or council and parliament) adopts new legislation, the member states get a new task: the correct and in time transposition of the adopted legislation. Transposition can be defined as the whole of necessary measures to incorporate European law into national law. After the adoption of a piece of European legislation by the Council, it follows mainly the same way as a piece of national legislation, passing both administrative and political structures. Since the political structures are discussed in the next part of the paper, will focus here on the adaptation of the administrative structures to the European demand of correct and in time implementation of directives. Of course, Belgian federalism does not only influence the functioning of the preparatory phase, but also the transposition phase of European policy. The absence of a hierarchy of norms (federal laws and regional decrees stand on equal footing) means that each level has to implement European legislation which falls inside their competencies. The combination with the presence of vertically and horizontally fragmented competencies makes that implementation is rarely the case just one ministry. Adopted European legislation enters the Belgian transposition process through the Permanent Representation. Consecutively, P11 designates the pilot department and possible co-pilot-departments, which are responsible for the transposition and coordination with other departments involved. Within the pilot department, a European coordinator is charged with the transposition dossier and its coordination. Such European coordinators are appointed in every federal ministry and in each of the Regions and the Communities. They function as interface between the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their department and are charged with the transmission of information to the responsible departments of their ministry. In addition, they monitor the transposition in their ministry and brief the PR of completed dossiers. The whole transposition process is monitored by J12, the legal Service within the

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs. J12 has got a coordination function for the federal as well for the regional aspects of transposition. Its main role is to circulate information between the ministries who are responsible for transposition and the PR who has to notify to the European Commission. J12 presides three-monthly meetings with the European coordinators, in which the ongoing transposition is discussed. The report of these meetings is presented in the Belgian Council of Ministers and has to stimulate the competent ministers and their administrations to draw attention on difficult or retarded transposition dossiers. (Dierickx, Bursens, Helsen, 2001) When the competent administration(s) wrote the draft of legislation, the further transposition follows the same path as internal national or sub-national legislation. Since we are mainly interested in the functioning of the administration during the transposition phase, the description of the further trajectory of European legislation would lead us too far. The mere description of the administrative transposition of European directives is still no answer on the question to which extent the administration is europeanised. On the first sight, the transposition of European legislation seems to bee organised quite well. Though, implementation records indicate that something is wrong in the Belgian transposition process. Assuming that European legislation contains administrative implications differing from domestic arrangements, implementation effectiveness can be expected to increase as domestic administrative arrangements are adapted to European policy requirements. (Knill, 2001) The hypothesis is that a highly Europeanised member state would show an excellent implementation record, for several reasons: such a member state could be aware of the obligation to implement European policies and therefore putting a lot of effort in transposing, implementing and enforcing European legislation; or it could have changed its policies in the past hence having reduced the adaptational pressure of new legislation. One of the tasks of the European Commission is to monitor the implementation performance of the member states. Statistical information is indispensable to carry this duty. The Commission’s Secretariat-General regularly publishes the Internal Market Scoreboard and each year a detailed implementation report is put together. Table 2 shows calculations based on several of those implementation reports. (Dierickx, Bursens, Helsen, 2001) It must be stressed that a high degree of Europeanisation is not the same as a high pro-integration profile. It is possible for a member state to have a rather sceptical view on European integration on the one hand, but being very ‘Europeanised’ on the other hand, either in terms of being very loyal in implementing what is commonly agreed or in terms of encountering a low level of adaptational pressure. Table 1 indeed confirms that there is no correlation between the pro-European profile of a member state on the one hand and the implementation record on the other. On the contrary, some of the most notorious euro-sceptical member states (Denmark, Sweden) end up to be the best pupils of the European class. On the other end of the ranking, European supra-nationalists (Belgium and Germany) are performing much worse.

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implementation deficit (%)

total of Infringements (n)

administrative procedures (n)

legal procedures (n)

“01 “00 “99 “98 “01 “00 “99 “98 “01 “00 “99 “98 “01 “00 “99 “98 DK 4 3.7 3.4 2.3 62 55 51 34 58 53 49 33 4 2 2 1 S 5.8 5.0 4.1 4.3 86 74 62 63 80 70 60 62 6 4 2 1 FIN 5.8 5.2 3.8 4.0 87 77 57 58 81 72 56 57 6 5 1 1 L 9.1 10.2 11.2 10.8 134 152 168 157 117 130 145 145 17 22 23 12 NL 9.3 10.2 7.9 6.7 138 153 119 98 123 137 112 91 15 16 7 7 P 11.6 13.0 12.2 14.9 172 194 184 218 158 178 166 207 14 16 18 11 IRL 11.7 10.9 11.5 10.1 173 162 172 147 146 142 152 136 27 20 20 11 UK 13.9 9.7 8.9 9.9 207 144 134 144 185 134 125 137 22 10 9 7 A 14.4 11.5 10.9 9.4 213 171 164 137 198 157 154 132 15 14 10 5 B 15.3 13.7 15.4 20.6 227 205 232 301 204 186 203 267 23 19 29 34 E 15.4 12.6 11.6 14.5 228 188 174 212 202 175 162 193 26 13 12 19 D 17.1 16.4 14.7 14.5 254 245 222 212 226 220 203 196 28 25 19 16 EL 17.3 18.8 18.3 16.6 255 280 275 242 221 241 241 214 34 39 34 28 I 23.2 23.1 19.8 24.6 345 345 298 359 288 293 254 328 57 52 44 31 F 24.9 30.8 29.4 29.8 369 461 443 435 316 388 380 393 53 73 63 42 TOT 2950 2906 2755 2817 2603 2576 2462 2591 347 330 293 226 EU-Average

13.3 13.0 12.2 12.9 197 194 184 188 174 172 164 173 23 22 20 15

Table 2: The implementation records of the 15 EU members states: calculations based on several ‘Reports on Monitoring the Application of Community Law’4

Table 2 shows that in 2001, Belgium failed to transpose correctly 15.3 % of all directives that had to be implemented. When we see that even euro-sceptic countries as Denmark, Finland and the UK do better, we can already conclude that Europeanisation is not the same as European-mindness. The good implementation record of the euro-sceptic Scandinavian countries and the relatively bad implementation record of euro-loving countries Belgium can only be explained by domestic factors constraining implementation. Either the bad implementation can be the result of a large misfit between the Belgian and European policy options (bad Europeanisation of the Belgian policy) or of a bad Europeanisation of the implementation structures. When we hypothesise that a bad implementation record is a 4 These figures were calculated for two research projects dealing with the lagging implementation in Belgium: Dierickx, Bursens, Helsen (2001), How to Explain the Belgian Integration Paradox? Structural and Cultural Explanations for the Failing Transposition of European Directives in Belgium. Antwerpen, UA The second is currently being finalised and formulates suggestions on how to improve the Belgian implementation record, based on a comparative analysis of Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Austria

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symptom of bad adaptation to the demands of the European Union, it is clear that the complex division of competences and the matching implementation structures as described in the previous paragraphs play a role in the bad implementation record and the weak Europeanisation of Belgium and Flanders. It is important to mention however, that table 2 only takes in account the implementation record of the whole Belgian level. In order to measure the Europeanisation of Flanders and compare it to the degree of Europeanisation in the other Regions and Communities, it will be necessary to split up the records in accordance with the different sub-national-identities. The question is, however, whether bad implementation records are always and only caused by badly Europeanised structures. It can also happen however that the download structures are well europeanised, but that the European policy to be implemented does not fit with the domestic policy options. In that case, the implementation record is not so much due to the download structures, but rather to the poor adaptation of the upload structures. Further examples will show that Belgian and Flemish policy options aren’t europeanised as well. c. Presence of ‘Europe-related’ or ‘Europe-oriented’ reforms Another important indicator of adaptation in general is the nature of administrative reforms. The redesigning of the organisational structure of a ministry in view of a better adaptation to the European policy making mechanisms, is one of the best examples of Europeanisation of the public administration. Those reforms can take different forms: the appointment of European coordinators within the different ministries, the set up of European services within the ministries, clustering or relocation of specific services or departments in order to get a better cooperation or communication on European matters, the withdrawal of coordinating services from a specific ministry and make them more general, the design of a new organisational chart or a change in the personnel structure. Another possibility is that certain temporary reforms or temporary services, which were set up to meet specific problems or challenges with respect to European policy making, like the EU presidency or the preparation of an Inter Governmental Conference get a permanent character, because they proved to be very useful. The adaptation of the administrative structures to the European policy process can also result in a specific personnel strategy and personnel staffing of a ministry: the recruitment of civil servants with a ‘European profile’ (specific training or experience) proves that that the ministry adapts to the growing importance of European matters within its field of competence. What about these Europe-related reforms in the Flemish and Belgian administration? During the last years, both the federal and the Flemish administration underwent major reforms. The general reform of the federal administration (the so called Copernicus-program) can hardly be seen as a reform in the view of the European policy making process. The program aims at administrative reform of all federal ministries, including a new human resources system, the abolishment of the cabinet system and the modernisation of organisational charts in all ministries. Overall, the management perspective process dominates the whole reform process, and political aspects, let alone links with the European policy level, are almost completely absent. The report from external consultants on the organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs didn’t even refer once to the potential impact of the European level on the organisation of the Ministry. It is clear that the current administrative reforms on the federal level are not the very picture of Europeanisation of the public administration.

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Although the reforms of the Flemish administration are still in its infancy (approved by the Flemish government, but still not in progress), the program ‘Beter Bestuurlijk Beleid5’ seems to have an internal focus. The program foresees in the reorganization of the organizational structure of the Ministry of the Flemish Community into 13 homogeneous policy domains, the reduction of the ministerial cabinets, a new and more flexible personnel strategy, more transparency and efficiency and a reorganisation of the advisory system (http://www2.vlaanderen.be/ned/sites/bbb/). Focussing on internal problems and starting from a management perspective, this reform seems to suffer from the same non-Europeanisation disease. Apart from this general reform programs, a few incremental changes have been made in the internal organisation of the public service. The earlier mentioned European coordinators and European services within the ministries illustrate this. In 1998, the European coordinators were put into place by governmental commissioner F. Willockx in order to catch up with the implementation deficit. The appointment of those coordinators or ‘transposition managers’, who had to follow a complete transposition dossier from the very beginning till the end, only resulted in a short improvement. This can be explained by the fact that the task of European coordinator is supplementary to the daily job, which leads often to work overload. Secondly, the function of European coordinator can only be exercised by civil servants who represent authority in their ministries (Dierickx, Bursens, Helsen, 2001). Although the appointment of European coordinators was a good initiative to increase the adaptation of the administrative structure and the functioning of the ministries with respect to European affairs, it can hardly be seen as a crucial factor in the Europeanisation of the administrative structures. Besides the appointment of transposition managers, ministries can in many other ways adapt themselves to the demands of European integration. They can for instance, create specific European cells or services, peopled by European experts, responsible for the preparation, the transposition and correction phase of European policy and for the questions of other civil servants on European matters. In the Belgian and Flemish administrative structure, most technical ministries do not have a special European cell or service, but European Affairs are mostly handled by the civil servants as a part of their job. d. European awareness within the administration Although we are aware of the fact that it is very difficult to measure “cultures” in an objective way, and of the fact that the differences between the administrative and the political cultures are not always clear and that the distinction can be somewhat artificial, certain aspects of the Flemish administrative culture, who are according to us indicators of a Europeanised administrative culture, will be highlighted in this part. A first indicator of Europeanised cultures is what we call “European awareness”. This is a very broad term with a lot of aspects caught in it. A first aspect of European awareness is the European awareness in a more specific way: a civil servant is aware of the reality of the European level if he or she knows that this European level has a certain influence, either very small or very big, on his work, decisions, on the context of domestic work space. When we

5 a program to improve the working, efficiency and transparency of the Flemish administration

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talk about awareness, we do not expect the civil servant to know into the very detail the influence and the consequence of each peace of European legislation, but that he or she is aware of the fact that he or she takes into account that European legislation has an influence on national, regional or local laws. The mere fact that he or she is aware about the existence and the implications of the European level makes it possible that he / she can ask for further explanation of that he or she informs himself / herself when a certain problem with European policy making appears. Whether or not the or civil servant at issue has no exhaustive knowledge of the European law and policy making process, this awareness makes it possible that in case of doubt, an European expert can be consulted, so that at least the bad adaptation resulting from an unwilling lack of European knowledge can be banned. Knill also recognizes that for example the success of implementation is also dependent on the preferences and capabilities of administrative actors dealing with practical enforcement. (Knill, 2001) Like in the previous paragraphs, this argument needs to be differentiated. The fact that one is aware of European level does not guarantee a high degree of Europeanisation. On the contrary, a high level of awareness of the European reality leads under certain circumstances to a bad Europeanisation: the more one is aware of the consequences of the European policy decisions on the domestic level, the more it is possible to circumvent and abuse European regulation intentionally, in order to cover up internal problems. This strategy will certainly not lead to a better adaptation of domestic policy to the European one. At the same time, this is an example of the fact that Europeanised structures and cultures not always result in an Europeanised domestic policy. Despite the previous reasoning, we are still convinced that the European awareness of civil servants is an important, if not the most important indicator of the Europeanisation of the administrative cultures. e. European knowledge within the administration An indicator that closely relates to the one of European awareness, but that has to be separated from it, is the knowledge of the European policy making process and legislation. When we talk about knowledge in this context, we do not mean factual or scholastic knowledge of the European institutions and the policy cycle, but rather the knowledge that is necessary and useful to function in the administration, with respect to the European context. Knowledge can be seen as the reverse part of awareness: if you don’t have any idea about what Europe is, it is difficult to develop a European reflex. The more knowledge of the European Union, the more likely it is the development of a European reflex. It can be argued that most of the civil servants ‘know’ the European context of their job, i.e. the procedures, policy cycle, what they have to do with that certain kind of dossiers,…; but, that they can not see their little part in a broader European scope. This results in civil servants who know what they have to do, but actually don’t exactly know what they are doing. Since it is very difficult and delicate to measure European knowledge of the higher civil servants in a direct way, we decided to measure knowledge rather via indirect questions. In our questionnaire to be spread among the higher civil servants of different federal and regional ministries, we focus mainly on questions about European on the job training, the need of extra training on European subjects, the feeling of being informed well on European dossiers,…

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5.2. The Europeanisation of political structures and cultures By political structures, I mean the characteristics of the political system, the political aspects of the institutional domestic organisation, things like: federal state, organisation of the parliamentary system, relation between the government and the parliament, the competencies of ministers, the internal organisation of European affairs within the government… a. Parliament As said in above, a good pro-active strategy involves timely all the relevant actors in the European policy making process, in order to get a result that fits more closely the domestic sensibilities and policy wishes. An early involvement of actors like the stakeholders and the parliament, who play an important role in the implementation of European legislation, speaks of a good adaptation of the internal decision making processes to the European ones. The involvement of the national and sub-national parliaments in the European policy cycle is a first indicator of the Europeanisation of the parliament and the political system in general. In Belgium and in Flanders, parliaments are neither in a formal nor in an informal way involved in the preparatory phase of European policy. Parliaments are only minimally informed about the proposals and discussions on the European level. The small involvement of the legal force can also lead to problems in the implementation phase: parliaments are feeling passed by and instead of cooperating loyally in the implementation, they stick to discussing the modalities of the proposal adopted at European level. A second indicator of Europeanisation is the degree of attention that is given by parliamentary bodies to the control of the government’s European policy. In a parliamentary democracy, the parliament is expected to control the policy of the government. Normally, this has to be also the case with respect to European policies. National, regional or community ministers who are representing their country or region in the European context are also submitted to this parliamentary scrutiny. Since the parliament is the representation of the citizens, a strong parliamentary control on the national ministers acting in the Council of Ministers, helps to reduce the democratic deficit within the European Union. The lack of parliamentary control on the European policy of the different governments can be seen as an indicator of a poor Europeanisation. In order to exercise this scrutiny, parliaments need to be prepared and organised for this task. So, the internal organisation, the existence, the activity and the working of parliamentary working groups on European affairs are a second important indicator of the European adaptation of the political system. The presence of a strong, well-working commission for European Affairs, which prepares and evaluates for example the governmental point of view with respect to European affairs, can be seen as an indicator of a strongly Europeanised parliament. In the Belgian federal parliament, the Federal Advisory Committee on European Questions is responsible for the information of the parliament on European Questions and of the control of Government actions at the European level as regards to the preparation and implementation of European policy (Vandevivere, 2001). The Committee focuses its work on the coordination of the European dimension in the parliament, European institutional affairs, important European

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debates, and the discussion of general documents, but it does not take care of the specific and technical policies implemented by the European Union. It is rather rare that a technical matter is discussed in the Committee on European and when it happens, the technical commissions do not take the conclusions in consideration. (Vandevivere, 2001) In general, one can say that Belgian parliamentary Control on European matters is one of the weakest in Europe. Belgian Parliament is not a part of the European decision-making process. Concrete influence of the parliament on European affairs is limited for many reasons, among others the lack of time and expertise on European affairs of the MP’s, the fact that the government needs no agency of the parliament to negotiate in the Council of Ministers and the permissive consensus on Europe among politicians. Besides the federal parliament, the Flemish parliament has also set up a Committee on European Affairs (Commission on Foreign and European Affairs), but its members do not meet very often, leaving place for traditional parliamentary scrutiny and a minimal role in transposition of EU directives. (Vandevivere, 2001). Although a lot more research need to be done on the role of the Flemish parliament and the functioning of this Commission in the European decision-making process, we already assume that the degree of Europeanisation of the Flemish parliament is nearly as low as the federal parliament. The mere fact that European affairs are discussed in the commission that is also responsible for Foreign Affairs, shows that Europe is not seen as a matter of first interest. In addition, the people who constitute this Commission are not that familiar with European policy. Only two of them mention Europe as a specific field of interest or expertise. (http://www.vlaamsparlement.be) The question is of course whether the lack of parliamentary control on European affairs is caused by a lack of interest from national and regional politicians for European affairs, or it has to do more with the weakness of the parliament with respect to the executive forces in general. In our research, we can examine this by the study of parliamentary texts and the statements from the members of parliament. Although we can not prove that the low degree of parliamentary scrutiny on European matters is only caused by a lack of Europeanisation, we argue that European matters are of a minor importance in the Belgian and the Flemish parliament. One the one hand, this is the result of institutional and constitutional factors, due to which the parliament has only little participation in the Belgian European policy preparation and implementation. On the other hand, however, it has to do with the lack of interest and knowledge of members of parliament and politicians more in general. This hypothesis will be elaborated in the next section of the paper. b. Governmental organisation Apart from the degree of involvement of the parliaments in the European policy making process, (and the adaptation of their internal organisation and working to this reality), the internal governmental organisation is another indicator of the adaptation of the political system to the demands of the European Union. The existence of a special ministry for European affairs can be an important indicator of the degree of Europeanisation. When we argue that the presence of a special ministry for European Affairs is a signal that Europe is still seen as an “external factor” that has no place within the technical ministries. On the other hand, the presence of a European ministry can be

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seen as an example of good Europeanisation, when we argue that it implies a special and high attention for Europe and a better coordination if the different policy stages. The same reasoning can be made for the place of the European service within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When the coordinating service (between regions and the federal level) and the biggest responsibility for European Affairs is placed within the Ministry of foreign Affairs, this can be a symptom of the fact that Europe is mainly considered as an external, foreign policy level, what can hardly be called ‘a good adaptation’ of domestic structures to the European Union. Another indicator of Europeanisation that has to do with the internal governmental organisation is the division of European dossiers between the different ministers. The more European Affairs are prepared within the technical ministries, the more Europe is seen as an inevitable political reality that penetrates in all policy domains. On the other hand, the first minister or the minister of foreign affairs being dominant in European matters can be a reflection of the importance of these. Neither the federal government nor the Flemish government have a special Ministry of European Affairs. As already said above, the Direction European Affairs is placed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the competence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Although P11 has a special coordinating status, its place is not ideal when we talk about adaptation of the different policy domains. Although in principle each minister is responsible for the European dimension in his / her policy domain, we can see that mainly the prime minister and the minister of Foreign Affairs play an important role in major European policy dossiers. In the Flemish situation, the case is slightly different. The difference lays mainly in the division of competencies in the government. Formally seen, there is no minister competent for European affairs, there is only a minister for foreign policy. In addition, the minister for welfare, health and equal opportunities is also charged with development cooperation. The minister-president is also charged with certain aspects of foreign policy. Theoretically, each minister is responsible for the European dimension of his/ her policy domain. In practice, the minister-president plays a prominent role in sensible and political European dossiers, like the definition of the vulnerable zones or other controversial and sensible dossiers. This complex division of European and foreign policy competencies does not witness of a well-considered European strategy. c. Political parties The third important political actor besides the parliament and the government, are the political parties. The organisation and the priorities of political parties can also give an image of the degree of Europeanisation of a political system. The differentiation and campaigning of political parties on European themes like the Euro, the enlargement, the agricultural policy,… are an example of Europeanisation of the political system, and not only of the political system, but also of the public opinion: political parties would never build their campaigns around European themes if they could not have electoral benefit from it.

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The attitude of the political parties in Flanders and Belgium can be best characterised by the term ‘pro-European consensus’. Being one of the founding fathers, Belgium was and still is one of the most pro-European member states. This pro-European attitude or European-mindness must not be overestimated however, let alone equalled with a Europeanised political system. The unconditional Belgian support for the European project was and is not always inspired by ‘Europeanised’ reasons. The pro-European attitude and the consensus about it are not as much predicted by pure European reasons, then by economic and internal-political considerations. Except the extreme right-wing party Vlaams Blok, all political parties subscribe the pro-European consensus. Although it is changing a little bit the last few months, one can not argue that Belgian political parties are campaigning in favour or against certain European policy aspects. Since European elections, let alone national or regional elections have never been won or lost on European themes, it is not necessary or electoral remunerative for parties to focus on European matters. And even if they would focus on certain European policy aspects, it is still questionable whether the public opinion would be sensible to it, because the Belgian public opinion is characterised by a permissive consensus. d. Europe-oriented state-organisation or reforms Now we discussed the different parts of the state organisation separately, we can wonder whether the total state organisation and the constitutional design are adapted to the European Union. As mentioned earlier, unitary state structures are more adapted to the European demands than federal states (Börzel, 2002). Though, there exist differences between federal states. Federal states with sub-national levels cooperating with the national level have less difficulties adapting to the European Union then federal states characterised by a competition between the sub-national and the national level. According to our view, Belgium is characterised by a competitive form of federalism. Apart from the fact whether we are dealing with a cooperative or a competitive form of federalism, the organisation and the division of competencies in the federal structure is a more important question. Parallel to the reforms of the public service, the Europeanisation of the federal organisation can best be measured by looking at the degree to which the reforms took in account or were started from a European point of view. In 1993, the so-called St-Michiels-Agreement conducted major reforms in the Belgian state organisation. Due to the in foro interno, in foro externo principle, the Belgian situation was not adapted anymore to the European treaties before the change of Article 146 (203 TEU). Since the St-Michiels Agreement was inspired by domestic political factors (the regional right to conduct treaties was a demand formulated by regionalist parties, who were indispensable partners to reach an overall agreement) and their institutional consequences, the agreement did not take in account the consequences for the European context and the European policy making process. On the contrary, Belgium even tried –and succeeded- to change the European treaty to make it more compatible with the Belgian federal state architecture. (change of article 146 EU) In 2000, Belgium witnessed yet another round of negotiations which led to more competencies for the regional levels. While the so-called Lambermont Agreement didn’t alter the division of competencies with respect to foreign relations, it did shift policy fields with major European and international aspects to the level of the Regions: foreign trade, development co-operation and above all agriculture. The latter can be regarded as one of the most Europeanised (in the bottom-up perspective) policy fields. One could therefore expect

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that the negotiations which led to the decision to regionalize agriculture would be to a great extent informed by the European context. However, this was again not the case. Research by Beyers and Steensels (2001) and interviews with civil servants both confirm that the politicians who negotiated the Lambermont Agreement hardly used European arguments. Their discourse was almost completely dominated by domestic arguments. Even the Federal Minister for Agriculture, who is after all very intensively involved in European agricultural negotiations, referred not even once to the European requirements a regionalization of agriculture would have to take into account. Only after the conclusions of the political negotiations were made public, civil servants form the Agriculture Department, who were called in to operationalise the political agreement, pointed to the consequences of the compromise for the efficiency of Belgium’s representation in the agricultural fora of the European Union. In other words, only civil servants, supported by the direct stakeholders (farmers organisations), seemed to be Europeanised enough to consider the impact of the reform on the European policy-making mechanism within Belgium. Our conclusion in this respect therefore reflects the evaluation of Beyers and Steensels (2001): ‘The absence of communication between Belgian politics and the bureaucracy implicates the non-Europeanised character of domestic reform, although the substantive content of this reform is highly europeanised’. e. European awareness of politicians It is not sufficient however, if only civil servants are aware of the European dimension of their work. Politicians also bear a huge responsibility for the Europeanisation of the domestic structures. As policymakers, politicians should be aware of the restrictions or possibilities the European contexts puts to the domestic policy making process. In the Belgian and the Flemish situation, however, it happens all the time that politicians ‘forget’ to check out their decisions to the (upcoming) European legislation. And if they are aware of the European level, they often minimize the impact or abuse it to push trough unpopular domestic measures. As next examples will prove, this lack of European awareness among politicians is not only present in domestic decisions on both the federal and regional level, but also in the implementation of European legislation. In the beginning of August, federal minister for public health, environment Magda Aelvoet (Flemish green party AGALEV) announced a proposal to put a ban on fluor supplements. One day after the news was announced, newspapers wrote that the ministers proposal would make no chance, since a European directive on additives will take effect on July 31, 2003. This directive does not ban fluor as an additive. It does not witness from a strong European awareness if one makes a policy proposal that is in contradiction with an upcoming European directive. In addition, minister Aelvoet says that she was informed about the directive and that she had tried to ban fluor from the list of authorized food supplements, but that it didn’t work out in Europe. Still, Aelvoet hopes the Belgian proposal to work inspiring on the Commission. This strategy does not speaks in favour of a strong Europeanisation: the preparation of a European directive was already going on for o long time, and Belgium should have uploaded better its policy options in the different European channels of policy preparation, namely the expert committees and the advisory bodies of the Commission. Another example can be found in the quarrelling about the definition of the vulnerable zones, with respect to the implementation of the nitrates directive. In 1991, the Council adopted Directive 91/676/EEC concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates

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from agricultural sources, better known as the nitrates directive. The aim of the directive is to protect drinking water against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources. By encouraging good agricultural practices, member states can provide all waters with a general level of protection against pollution in the future. Certain zones, draining into waters vulnerable to pollution require special protection and must be indicated as vulnerable zones by the member states. For these zones, the directive regulates codes of good agricultural practice about manure and storage of manure. In order to guarantee these codes, member states had to create action programmes and control and monitor the water collection area. The transposition deadline for the nitrates directive was December 19, 1993. (Dierickx, Bursens, Helsen, 2001) Flanders developed a lot of action programmes (MAP’s), but failed to transpose the directive correctly, up to the present. The last few months, the Flemish government was still quarrelling about the definition of the vulnerable zones, the liberal party supporting the farmers associations and the green party supporting the environmental action groups. In her proposal of the definition of the vulnerable zones, the green minister for environment and agriculture, Vera Dua marked 54% of Flanders as vulnerable zone. The liberal minister-president Dewael, who found that this percentage was too high, called his minister to order. Dewael promised the farmer’s organisation that he would defend the farmer’s interest with the European Commission. But, even before the Flemish government could send its plan on the definition of the vulnerable zones, Flemish MEP Bart Staes checked out the Flemish plan with the European Commission (DG Environment). In an answer to Bart Staes, M. Wallström stated that the Commission would never agree with the Flemish definition of the vulnerable zones and that at least 80% of Flanders should be marked as vulnerable zone. This example shows that a lack of European awareness can have important consequences in the implementation phase. It does not speaks in favour of a very Europeanised political culture when the minister-president thinks that the stipulations of the nitrate directive are still negotiable with the European Commission. In addition, the Flemish government neglected to check its plan with the European Commission. If they had done, they would have known that the Commission could never agree with the 54%. It is a signal of poor Europeanisation that it is the task of an MEP to check the government’s plan with the Commission. The thought of internal compromises between liberal and green ministers and the showing of good will being sufficient to implement legislation, is an indicator of a very poor Europeanised culture. It can be even worse: probably, both the minister-president and his colleague Dua were aware of the fact that they had to mark those vulnerable zones in order to implement correctly the nitrates directive. They probably wanted to do their adherents a favour. So, actually they ‘abused’ Europe for an internal political strategy, what is not really an indicator of a Europeanised political culture. It is clear that the Belgian political culture of ‘internal compromise and appeasement of the communities’ does not fit very well the European way of thinking and working. f. European knowledge of politicians The European knowledge of politicians is the second part of this indicator. Although we don’t have concrete results on this topic yet (a survey will take place in the beginning of next year), we presume that European knowledge of politicians and especially of members of parliament is not very high. Both in the federal and the Flemish parliament, only a minority of the members are specialized in European Affairs.

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Although knowledge about the European policy making processes and legislation certainly contributes to a high degree of Europeanisation, this knowledge can also be ‘abused’ by politicians. In certain cases, politicians use Europe as an excuse in order to push through unpopular internal measures. We can e.g. refer to Jean-Luc Dehaene, the first minister who guided Belgium into the Euro-zone, thanks to stringent savings. Although Dehaene can hardly be accused of an anti-European attitude or a lack of European knowledge, he continued to defend his economic measures as ‘imposed by Europe’. 6. Schematic design of the identified Europeanisation indicators Now we discussed the different indicators that can be used in order to measure the Europeanisation of administrative and political structures and cultures, table 3 shows the same indicators in a more schematic way. I hope your feedback can help to refine these indicators, in order to develop a kind of measuring instrument that can be used to measure the degree of Europeanisation in different member states and sub-national states, and compare them to each other on an equal basis.

Structural

Uploadstructures:

- Internal position definition – coordination

- Pro-active strategy - Negotiating mandate / capacities

Downloadstructures

- Implementation records Reforms

- Temporary reforms with the eye on the EU presidency / IGC

- EU perspective in general administrative reforms

- Personnel strategy - Incremental changes in

organisational charts and task division

Administrative

Cultural

European awareness

European knowledge

- European subjects during schooling - Specialised on the job training - Definition of one’s position in the

European policy cycle

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Structural

Parliament

- Pro-active strategy of the parliament - Parliamentary scrutiny - European working groups or

committees

Governmental organisation - Ministry of European Affairs? - Division of European dossiers

among ministers - Position of the European

(coordinating) Service

Political parties - Campaigning on European issues - Debating on European issues

Europe-oriented state organisation / reforms

- State reforms or division of competencies in accordance to the EU-level

Political

Cultural

European awareness of politicians

- Awareness of the restrictions and possibilities of the European level

- Use / abuse of the European context

European knowledge of politicians - Training and experience

Figure 2: Schematic presentation of the identified Europeanisation indicators 7. Europeanisation of policy options as a result of the Europeanisation of structures and cultures? Although most classic Europeanisation scholars distinguish between the Europeanisation of policy, polity and politics (Börzel and Risse, 2000) we question this distinction. The Europeanisation of the policy options is yet, according to us, the result of the Europeanisation of the structures and cultures. It is difficult to pursue intentionally a strongly Europeanised policy when the structures who are responsible for the development of those policies and the policy makers who make up those structures, are not Europeanised. Europeanisation of policies is often the result of the Europeanisation of the policy-making structures and cultures. As the examples of the fluor-ban and the vulnerable zones showed, the distinction between distinction between the structures – cultures and policy options is rather artificial.

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Although we do not want to argue that a good Europeanised policy can only be and always is the result of a good Europeanisation of structures and cultures, it certainly helps. But, this does not alter the fact that a high degree of adaptation of the domestic policy to the European Union policy demands can also be the result of other external factors. Policy options in some domains already bear a lot of resemblance with the European policy options, due to for instance the lobbying of private actors or the fact that some countries already have higher norms for some policy domains (like environmental or social protection) Knill also recognizes that policy content and administrative implementation are often closely related. The other way round, policy decisions to some extent always entail decisions on corresponding administrative arrangements. While being aware of the fact that the degree to which policy contents and administrative implications are coupled may vary from policy to policy and from sector to sector, it cannot be ignored that the growing importance of European policies leaves its mark on domestic administrations. There is a tight coupling of European policy content and administrative requirements for domestic implementation. (Knill, 2001) In general, one can state that structures (and administrative styles and cultures) influence the degree in which European policy is implemented. Yet, European policy does not arise out of the blue. Just like internal policy, that can show a greater or a smaller extent of fit with the European policy, European policy is developed in a policy cycle, with also domestic structures and cultures playing an important role. The knife cuts both ways: domestic structures and cultures are changing under the influence of European integration, but domestic structures and cultures are also responsible for a stronger or weaker Europeanised policy. Strongly Europeanised structures and cultures have more chance generating a strongly Europeanised policy then non-adapted structures and cultures. For this reason, we only focused on indicators of the adaptation of the domestic structures and cultures to the European Union. Reasoning that the fit / misfit of policy options is a result of the Europeanisation of political and administrative structures and cultures, there is no need of separate indicators to measure the adaptation of the policy. This does not exclude, however, that in a later phase of the research, there will be a comparison with regard to the content between Flemish / Belgian policy documents and European ones. 8. Conclusions This paper was the first one framing in a research project that deals with the question to which extent Flanders is europeanised. To answer this question, it is necessary however to look for concrete characteristics and phenomena that can be considered as indicators of structural and cultural adaptation to the European Union, both within the administration and the political system. The search for those indicators is reflected in this paper, which only aims at listing up the Europeanisation-indicators and never pretends to explain the degree of Europeanisation in Flanders. Based on the historical- institutionalist logic of formal and informal institutions, we decided to deal both with the structural and the cultural part of the administrative and political adaptation to the EU. Although we admit it is sometimes difficult to separate political and administrative structures and cultures, previous research on implementation records pointed out that both the politicians and the administration play a different role in the transposition or

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non-transposition of European legislation. The distinction between the administrative and political structures and cultures is not seen as a distinction between the interwoven political and administrative policymaking mechanisms, but rather as a difference between ‘the constitutional and political system of a member state’ and the administration as a part of the European policy making cycle. After the definition of the indicators of administrative and political structural and cultural indicators for Europeanisation, we made a first attempt to employ these indicators in the Flemish and the Belgian situation. We are completely aware, however, of the fact that the mere application of these indicators on the Flemish context will never result in conclusions about the degree of Europeanisation Flanders. Yet, there does not exist legally stamped measure for the degree of Europeanisation. The absence of such a scale makes a comparative research indispensable. This is the reason why the research project will also have an comparative component, which will compare Flanders to the French Community, the Walloon Region, the German-speaking Community, the Brussels-Capital Region and the federal Belgian level. The comparison between the different levels will provide us with a lot of information on the differences in the degree of Europeanisation, so that the Flemish degree of Europeanisation can be compared to other Belgian ones. From this comparison, it will be easier to draw conclusions about the Flemish mechanisms of Europeanisation. As said in the introduction, this was the first paper of the long-term research project on Europeanisation. In the next months, further research will be done on the administrative and political cultures (survey among civil servants and politicians) and the working of the up-and downloadstructures in the Regions and Communities. 9. References Beyers, J., Bursens, P., Kerremans, B. (2001), “Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg: Diversity among the Benelux Countries” in Zeff, E., Pierro, E., Boulder, Lynne Rienner (Eds.), The EU and the Member States: Co-operation, Co-ordination and Compromise. Beyers, J., Steensels, C.(2001), An Exploration of Some Social Mechanisms Affecting Domestic Political Actors' Europeanisation: the Belgian Case, ECSA Seventh Biennial Conference, Madison, Wisconsin, May 31-June 2 Börzel, T. (1999) “Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional adaptation to Europeanization in Germany and Spain.”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37 (4): 573-596 Börzel, T., Risse, T. (2000), When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change, European Integration Online Papers, 4: 15 Börzel, T. (2002) States and Regions in the European Union. Institutional Adaptation in Germany and Spain, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 269p. Bursens, P. (2002a) Belgium’s adaptation to the EU. Does Federalism Constrain Europeanisation?, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Torino, March 22-27

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Bursens, P. (2002b) “Why Denmark and Belgium Have Different Implementation Records. On transposition Laggards and Leaders in the EU.” in Scandinavian Political Studies, 25 (2), 173-195 Dierickx, G., Bursens, P., Helsen,S. (2001), How to explain the Belgian Integration Paradox? Structural and Cultural Explanations for the Failing Transposition of European Directives in Belgium. Antwerp: UA, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences. Green Cowles, M., Caporaso, J. Risse, T., (Eds) (2001), Transforming Europe: Europeanisation and Domestic Change, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Heritier, A., et alii (2001), Differential Europe: New Opportunities and Restrictions for Policu-Making in Member States. Berlin: De Gruyter, 342 p. Kerremans, B. (2000), “Determining a European Policy in a Multi-Level Setting. The Case of Special Coordination in Belgium”, Journal of Regional and Federal Studies, 10 (1): 36-61 Knill, C. (2001), The Europeanisation of National Administrations. Patterns of Institutional Change and Persistence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 258 p. Lejeune, Y. (1999), La participation de la Belgique à l’élaboration et à la mise en oeuvre du droit européen, Brussel: Bruylant, 813 p. Maurer, A., Wessels, W. (Eds. ) (2001), National Parliaments on their way to Europe: Losers or Latecomers? , Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlaggesellschaft Olsen (2002), The many faces of Europeanization, ARENA working paper No. 2/2002 Raunio, T., Wiberg, M. (1999), Does Consensus Lead to Ignorance? National Parliaments and the Legitimacy of EU Governance, ECPR Joint Sessions Mannheim, March 26-31 1999 Trondal, J. (2002), The Europeanisation of Research and Higher Educational Policies – Some Reflections, European Integration online Papers, 6 (12): 1-22 Vandevivere, C. (2001), The Federal Parliament of Belgium: Between Wishes, Rules and Practice, in Maurer, A. and Wessels, R. (Eds.), National Parliaments on their way to Europe: Losers or Latecomers? , Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlaggesellschaft Website of the Flemish Parliament, http://www.vlaamsparlement.be Website ‘Beter Bestuurlijk Beleid’: http://www2.vlaanderen.be/ned/sites/bbb/

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