The European Union and its power over opinion what can Belarus tell us about the European identity

Mitch Heron

200846

MA International Studies amp Diplomacy

Submitted 15092011

Words 9992

Page | 2

I have read and understood regulation 179 (Regulations for Students of SOAS) concerning plagiarism I undertake that all material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me in whole or in part by any other person(s) I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination

I give permission for a copy of my dissertation to be held at the Schoolrsquos discretion following final examination to be made available for reference

Signedhelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphellip (student)

Datehelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphellip

Page | 3

Contents

Abstract Page 4

Introduction ` Page 5

Chapter 1 Constructing a European identity Page 8

Chapter 2 The European Union as a normative actor Page 21

Chapter 3 The Belarusian problem Page 30

Conclusion Page 49

Bibliography Page 52

Page | 4

Abstract

Europe has embarked upon an unprecedented process of state integration witnessing the widespread deferral of policy making to intergovernmental institutions The European Unionrsquos institutionalism has facilitated an assimilation of values into an increasingly coherent if complex regional identity A normative self-conception has emerged that Brussels has sought to project onto its external relations through the Common Foreign and Security Policy Brussels increasingly considers itself a transformative actor in global politics offering an alternative to great power realpolitik

This paper finds that while European multilateralism offers an environment conducive to a normative foreign policy the extent to which it is able to exert any ideational influence is constrained by the level of engagement it is willing to pursue Europe maintains a policy of isolating the Lukashenko regime and has failed to engage Belarusian civil society As a result it has had a negligible impact on Belarusian political culture Europersquos failure to adequately engage Belarus also suggests a contradiction within the European identity construction

Page | 5

Introduction

Since the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Europe has

sought to play an increasingly active role in global affairs It has demonstrated a growing

confidence in its unique political union that has so far resisted being undermined by its

economics This union has been founded upon a self-identity embodying a set of core

normative principles which Brussels has explicitly tried to extend to its external relations

The values Europe ascribes to its identity have become assimilated through the integration

process and have resulted in a multi-faceted self-conception a product of myriad local

national and regional identities interacting and competing in an increasingly complex

dynamic This process of assimilation has been facilitated in large part by Europersquos

increasing institutionalism enabling socialisation both at the community level and between

policy making elites

Since identity dictates an actorrsquos perceived interests an understanding of its identity and the

process of its formation are essential to understanding its perceived role in the international

community In this respect Europe considers itself to be a transformative power seeking to

define state interaction through the projection of its norms namely democracy plurality

multilateralism and respect for human rights Javier Solana former High Representative for

the CFSP describes the EU as a ldquoforce for good in the worldrdquo (2006)

Page | 6

Enlargement of the European Union plays a central role in this image embodying its

inclusivity and is considered an essential component of European security making Offers of

accession to neighbouring states explicitly define the limits of the Unionrsquos lsquoregionrsquo marking

the boundaries of the European identity Such a policy implicitly ascribes an alternative

identity to those European states without accession prospects

Investigating how Europe projects its norms onto states it considers not to share an identity

with will therefore elucidate any integrity in European claims to normativity as well as the

transformative power this process of norm projection entails Of particular interest in this

regard is Belarus a former-Soviet state alluded to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo which

has maintained consistently poor relations with the EU since its independence

This paper proposes that if the EU is to genuinely adhere to its normative identity instead of

excluding Belarus from European institutionalism it should actively seek to engage the

government of Minsk Meaningful engagement offers the greatest chance for Europe to

realise its transformative potential

The paper is set out as follows Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical rationale for states to

pursue regionalisation and the role institutional development plays in identity construction

Chapter 2 considers the potential for normativity in foreign policy making and establishes an

analytical framework for its assessment Chapter 3 discusses the development of EU-Belarus

relations arguing EU policy can be considered broadly normative however if the EU is to

demonstrate meaningful transformative influence a fundamental rethinking of its policies

Page | 7

must be implemented The paper concludes by suggesting that the nature of EU-Belarus

relations signifies a potentially destabilising conflict within the EUrsquos normative self-

conception

Page | 8

Chapter 1

Constructing a European Identity

In what has been descried as the ldquopost Keynesianhellip competitive staterdquo a ldquorescalingrdquo of

governance in the political economic and security spheres has occurred (Paasi 2009) As

state monopolies over economic and information transactions have been eroded ldquoalmost

every country in the world has chosen to meet the challenges of globalisation in part through

a regional responserdquo (Fawn 2009) This phenomenon has been accompanied by the

development of regionalism as an analytically distinct strand of IR scholarship

The definition of lsquoa regionrsquo within IR is contested however consensus has emerged over the

physical proximity of constituent states sharing aspects of identity that crucially enable self-

identification For the purpose of this paper I consider a region as defined by Pace ldquoa sub-

system of states linked by geographical relationship mutual interdependence and subjective

perception of belonging to a distinctive communityrdquo (2006 p27)

To IR theorists regions constitute miniaturised international systems subject to both

endogenous and exogenous forces As with the global system regional scholarship has

fostered the application of theoretical frameworks in order to interpret both their

development and patterns of behaviour

Page | 9

The concept of lsquoregionalisationrsquo defined as ldquothe explicit process of adapting norms and

identity to both align with and shape a new collective set of prioritiesrdquo (Warleigh-Lack

2010 p45) forms the basis of these debates This chapter will explore the theoretical

rationale for nation states to pursue cooperation and the extent to which they maintain

direction over the course of integration Regional studies through realism and

institutionalism has typically emphasised the centrality of the state within regional

interactions yet the post-Cold War development of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA)

from which lsquoregionalisationrsquo emerged has begun to view regional cooperation in ideational

rather than functional terms encompassing a plurality of actors beyond the state (Acharya

2007)

Such a debate is of particular relevance when considering the unprecedented level of

integration embodied by the European Union and its own apparent desire to be identified by

its ideational composition This in turn poses questions as to the nature of lsquopowerrsquo entailed

within European integration and Europersquos ability to capitalise upon the normativity it claims

to espouse

Inevitably loss of sovereignty and national identity remain critical elements of Europersquos

domestic political discourse (Sutcliffe 2010 p64) yet undoubtedly Europe is developing its

own unique regional identity through the process of integration This identity has

simultaneously been heralded as a potential model for supra-national global cooperation

(Giesmann 2010 p271) and derided as post-modern civilizational imperialism (Mayer

2010 p276) Understanding this process is therefore essential to understanding Europersquos

continued development and its role in a both globalised and regionalised world

Page | 10

Perhaps counter-intuitively given the neurosis underpinning realist assumptions of world

order realism has contributed significantly to regional discourse Regional cooperation is

viewed in purely self-interested functionalist terms with institution creation as a means to

engender efficiency gains and therefore maximise capability through state-state transactions

(Pace 2006) International institutions exist within an anarchical system and relative gains

theory remains central to realist analyses Institutions become new arenas for states to

compete through balance of power theory (Adler 2009 p63) Realists recognise the utility

of cooperation but resist interdependency States remain the sole arbiters of their sovereignty

Institutionalist discourse takes a similar understanding of the centrality of the state within

international institutions and the search for efficiency gains in an equally hostile global

system (Pace 2006 p30) The utility of an institution is dependent upon the compatibility of

goals of member states Institutions labouring amongst diametrically opposed state interests

will become an arena for competition However institutions serve to facilitate cooperation

when it is in the collective interest to do so (Webber 2007 p51)

Neo-liberal institutionalism furthers the functionalist argument by considering institutions an

ldquoinherent goodrdquo Droidge notes the socialisation and trust building effect on policy makers

and the legalising effect they transcribe on international relations (2007) This process it is

argued is evidenced in the EUrsquos tendency to create region wide legally binding norms Neo-

liberal institutionalism also contributes to NRA by positing domestic political and non-state

actors possess the capacity to influence the direction of institutional development (Pace

2006 p30)

Page | 11

The most innovative body of work within NRA however is comprised of constructivist

analyses According to Paasi regional integration is intimately linked with the process of

identity construction Regions are ldquomaderdquo through social practice and custom combining

both ldquomaterialrdquo and ldquovirtualrdquo elements (2009) While state interaction and institutional

development are conditioning factors regional characteristics are a result of power relations

encompassing numerous social spheres not simply limited to the process of cooperation at

the state level

Much academic literature concerns the proliferation of regional lsquosecurity communitiesrsquo

defined by Adler and Barnett as a ldquotransnational region comprised of sovereign states whose

people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful exchange [with] neither the expectation

of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputesrdquo (1998

pp30-34) Cooperation is fostered and capabilities are maximized through division of labour

(Acharya 2007)

The extent to which this division of labour is consensual or contested tacit or explicit varies

greatly between regional groupings (Fawcett 2004) yet the extent to which states are willing

to delegate tasks to an international institution may be highly illustrative of both the

preferences it will seek to pursue and process of cooperation it embarks upon

Laursen distinguishes between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo institutionalism suggesting states

pursuing the former possess fixed preferences and seek to maximise these preferences

Page | 12

through institutions (2010 pp10-12) A belief in the trustworthiness of the institution is the

minimum prerequisite for deferral of decision making capacity (Magnette 2007)

The extent to which rational institutionalism can lead to the development of a security

community is however questionable If institutions exist in an anarchic world with states

acting solely in self-interest cooperation will always be constrained A state unwilling to

make significant sacrifice for another cannot expect significant sacrifice in return In this

scenario neither state can be considered ultimately secure

Yet the EU constitutes both a region and security community as defined above exhibiting an

unusually explicit and extensive division of labour amongst its institutions An empirical

study by Caporaso and Min-hyung has also suggested that Europeans favour joint decision

making in areas such as foreign policy immigration monetary policy and defence areas

traditionally associated with state sovereignty (2009)

According to neo-liberal institutionalists such ldquopeculiar forms of political interactionrdquo (Pace

2006 p27) foster the process of socialisation ldquoparticipation in and accountability to

transnational institutions can transcend national boundariesrdquo modifying state behaviour as a

result (Fawcett 2004) At a basic level elite socialisation through institutionalised diplomacy

and cooperation develops familiarity leading to an expectation of essentially benign state

interaction Continuity of this expectation is essential Moravcsik argues such socialisation

also leads to ldquoasymmetrical interdependencerdquo the more a state comes to rely upon an

Page | 13

institution or collaborative network the more it will compromise its initial preferences to

maintain it (in Laursen 2010 p7)

Such an analysis may explain the level of integration witnessed in the EU If a member state

expects a partner state to compromise its initial preferences in favour of a collective

preference it too may be inclined towards collective decision making

Ruggie however suggests that within security communities states perceive insecurity both

individually and collectively This it is argued is a result of a constitutive process whereby

states begin to assimilate a collective identity that becomes endogenised into their own (in

Adler 1997) Such analyses argue that liberal-functionalist conceptions of regional

integration fail to account for the self-identification component crucial to a region or security

community

Magnette argues the emerging European citizenry is increasingly identifying itself with both

national and regional communities (2007) Increasing horizontal ties between states and the

development of vertical bonds between the European populous and Brussels are transforming

perceived political and social patronage structures

Participation in the integration process is essential for the association and development of a

lsquoEuropeanrsquo identity ldquoIdentity formation is directly proportional to individuals internalising

Page | 14

and articulating commitmentsrdquo (Winn 2001) Europeansrsquo commitments are increasingly

derived from their regulatory institutions

Other research finds EU discourse is increasingly prevalent at the sub-national level

Socialisation through EU institutions is serving to foster the local identities of areas such as

Wales and Catalonia through increased exposure to nation states Similarly Malta a country

whose population traditionally identifies itself along religious cleavages - described as ldquoa

nationless staterdquo - is developing both coherent lsquoMaltesersquo and lsquoEuropeanrsquo identities (Cram

2009)

Conceptualised as a progression from preference based lsquorational institutionalismrsquo towards a

lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo embodying many of the ideational elements associated with

constructivism the process of European institution building is perceived as contributing to

the web of ldquocognitive templates that define identities and preferencesrdquo (Laursen 2010 p12)

Academic literature on the nature of identity is unequivocal in its fluidity The ideational

developments described by Magnette and Cram have both coincided with and been

facilitated by European institutional development (Fawcett 2004) As Europersquos various

institutions permeate the day-to-day lives of the European populous institutionalism has

developed as a distinct ideational facet of Europersquos identity and one upon which numerous

others are dependent

Page | 15

Therefore if (neo-liberal) prevention of hegemony through plurality is taken as a function of

institutions it is conceivable that institutionalised multilateralism becomes a (constructivist)

legitimising tenet of European integration Magnette argues this search for plurality

inherently fosters a diffuse cosmopolitanism within the multi-dimensional European identity

(2007)

Constructivists argue the physical process of socialisation for instance as facilitated by the

Schengen Agreement goes beyond familiarising communities to one another by engendering

the development of a self-generating ldquotransnational cognitive communityrdquo (Adler 1997)

whereby both policy elites and the wider populous evolve their conceptions of the

community to which they belong and by extension for which they are responsible

This process of socialisation is supported by empirical research demonstrating European

integration has become increasingly accepted over time (Winn 2001) Europe has become an

ldquoobject of loyaltyrdquo (Paasi 2002) Yet an individualrsquos concept of lsquoEuropersquo to which this

loyalty has developed is notably diffuse an assimilation of co-optive and coercive social

interactions at the local national and regional levels

This exposes the failings of state centric interpretations of integration Inter-governmental

interaction simultaneously conditions and is conditioned by domestic perceptions of those

with which it is interacting Realist and institutionalist dismissal of local regional discourse

results in an artificial separation of the domestic and international realms at odds with post-

modern international relations

Page | 16

Asymmetrical interdependence similarly exposes a relative gains capability centred

framework as insufficient to understanding European integration Kaganrsquos realist

interpretation of Europe as being ldquomore accepting of failurerdquo and more concerned with

ldquoprocess over resultrdquo (in Acharya 2007) can be best reconciled with a constructivist

interpretation if the institutions have come to embody a process constitutive of characteristics

with which Europe collectively identifies Adler suggests ldquoWhat matters most is not short-

range success but the construction of a foundation for practice and behaviourrdquo (1997)

Constructivist interpretations of socialisation are also supported by research suggesting

Europersquos self-perception as a unitary actor is becoming increasingly positive (Caporaso amp

Min-hyung 2009) According to Hegel ldquoindividuals after having mutually recognised each

other recognise themselves and thus become citizenshellip to be acknowledged by the other

strengthens self-esteemrdquo (in Magnette 2007)

A cognitive process of grouping states together based on perceived homogeneity in

preference and practice occurs Institutionalised cooperation acts as a catalyst in this process

Cooperation leads to a harmonisation of interests and group members come to be viewed as

inherently rather than merely contingently positive (Cram 2009) Regions therefore

represent ideational as well as material entities

By understanding actorsrsquo interests as being conditioned by those with which it interacts

constructivism assumes what Tocci et al refer to as ldquobounded rationalityrdquo An actorrsquos

perceived interests being simultaneously determined by the underlying (often opaque)

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 2

I have read and understood regulation 179 (Regulations for Students of SOAS) concerning plagiarism I undertake that all material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me in whole or in part by any other person(s) I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination

I give permission for a copy of my dissertation to be held at the Schoolrsquos discretion following final examination to be made available for reference

Signedhelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphellip (student)

Datehelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphelliphellip

Page | 3

Contents

Abstract Page 4

Introduction ` Page 5

Chapter 1 Constructing a European identity Page 8

Chapter 2 The European Union as a normative actor Page 21

Chapter 3 The Belarusian problem Page 30

Conclusion Page 49

Bibliography Page 52

Page | 4

Abstract

Europe has embarked upon an unprecedented process of state integration witnessing the widespread deferral of policy making to intergovernmental institutions The European Unionrsquos institutionalism has facilitated an assimilation of values into an increasingly coherent if complex regional identity A normative self-conception has emerged that Brussels has sought to project onto its external relations through the Common Foreign and Security Policy Brussels increasingly considers itself a transformative actor in global politics offering an alternative to great power realpolitik

This paper finds that while European multilateralism offers an environment conducive to a normative foreign policy the extent to which it is able to exert any ideational influence is constrained by the level of engagement it is willing to pursue Europe maintains a policy of isolating the Lukashenko regime and has failed to engage Belarusian civil society As a result it has had a negligible impact on Belarusian political culture Europersquos failure to adequately engage Belarus also suggests a contradiction within the European identity construction

Page | 5

Introduction

Since the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Europe has

sought to play an increasingly active role in global affairs It has demonstrated a growing

confidence in its unique political union that has so far resisted being undermined by its

economics This union has been founded upon a self-identity embodying a set of core

normative principles which Brussels has explicitly tried to extend to its external relations

The values Europe ascribes to its identity have become assimilated through the integration

process and have resulted in a multi-faceted self-conception a product of myriad local

national and regional identities interacting and competing in an increasingly complex

dynamic This process of assimilation has been facilitated in large part by Europersquos

increasing institutionalism enabling socialisation both at the community level and between

policy making elites

Since identity dictates an actorrsquos perceived interests an understanding of its identity and the

process of its formation are essential to understanding its perceived role in the international

community In this respect Europe considers itself to be a transformative power seeking to

define state interaction through the projection of its norms namely democracy plurality

multilateralism and respect for human rights Javier Solana former High Representative for

the CFSP describes the EU as a ldquoforce for good in the worldrdquo (2006)

Page | 6

Enlargement of the European Union plays a central role in this image embodying its

inclusivity and is considered an essential component of European security making Offers of

accession to neighbouring states explicitly define the limits of the Unionrsquos lsquoregionrsquo marking

the boundaries of the European identity Such a policy implicitly ascribes an alternative

identity to those European states without accession prospects

Investigating how Europe projects its norms onto states it considers not to share an identity

with will therefore elucidate any integrity in European claims to normativity as well as the

transformative power this process of norm projection entails Of particular interest in this

regard is Belarus a former-Soviet state alluded to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo which

has maintained consistently poor relations with the EU since its independence

This paper proposes that if the EU is to genuinely adhere to its normative identity instead of

excluding Belarus from European institutionalism it should actively seek to engage the

government of Minsk Meaningful engagement offers the greatest chance for Europe to

realise its transformative potential

The paper is set out as follows Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical rationale for states to

pursue regionalisation and the role institutional development plays in identity construction

Chapter 2 considers the potential for normativity in foreign policy making and establishes an

analytical framework for its assessment Chapter 3 discusses the development of EU-Belarus

relations arguing EU policy can be considered broadly normative however if the EU is to

demonstrate meaningful transformative influence a fundamental rethinking of its policies

Page | 7

must be implemented The paper concludes by suggesting that the nature of EU-Belarus

relations signifies a potentially destabilising conflict within the EUrsquos normative self-

conception

Page | 8

Chapter 1

Constructing a European Identity

In what has been descried as the ldquopost Keynesianhellip competitive staterdquo a ldquorescalingrdquo of

governance in the political economic and security spheres has occurred (Paasi 2009) As

state monopolies over economic and information transactions have been eroded ldquoalmost

every country in the world has chosen to meet the challenges of globalisation in part through

a regional responserdquo (Fawn 2009) This phenomenon has been accompanied by the

development of regionalism as an analytically distinct strand of IR scholarship

The definition of lsquoa regionrsquo within IR is contested however consensus has emerged over the

physical proximity of constituent states sharing aspects of identity that crucially enable self-

identification For the purpose of this paper I consider a region as defined by Pace ldquoa sub-

system of states linked by geographical relationship mutual interdependence and subjective

perception of belonging to a distinctive communityrdquo (2006 p27)

To IR theorists regions constitute miniaturised international systems subject to both

endogenous and exogenous forces As with the global system regional scholarship has

fostered the application of theoretical frameworks in order to interpret both their

development and patterns of behaviour

Page | 9

The concept of lsquoregionalisationrsquo defined as ldquothe explicit process of adapting norms and

identity to both align with and shape a new collective set of prioritiesrdquo (Warleigh-Lack

2010 p45) forms the basis of these debates This chapter will explore the theoretical

rationale for nation states to pursue cooperation and the extent to which they maintain

direction over the course of integration Regional studies through realism and

institutionalism has typically emphasised the centrality of the state within regional

interactions yet the post-Cold War development of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA)

from which lsquoregionalisationrsquo emerged has begun to view regional cooperation in ideational

rather than functional terms encompassing a plurality of actors beyond the state (Acharya

2007)

Such a debate is of particular relevance when considering the unprecedented level of

integration embodied by the European Union and its own apparent desire to be identified by

its ideational composition This in turn poses questions as to the nature of lsquopowerrsquo entailed

within European integration and Europersquos ability to capitalise upon the normativity it claims

to espouse

Inevitably loss of sovereignty and national identity remain critical elements of Europersquos

domestic political discourse (Sutcliffe 2010 p64) yet undoubtedly Europe is developing its

own unique regional identity through the process of integration This identity has

simultaneously been heralded as a potential model for supra-national global cooperation

(Giesmann 2010 p271) and derided as post-modern civilizational imperialism (Mayer

2010 p276) Understanding this process is therefore essential to understanding Europersquos

continued development and its role in a both globalised and regionalised world

Page | 10

Perhaps counter-intuitively given the neurosis underpinning realist assumptions of world

order realism has contributed significantly to regional discourse Regional cooperation is

viewed in purely self-interested functionalist terms with institution creation as a means to

engender efficiency gains and therefore maximise capability through state-state transactions

(Pace 2006) International institutions exist within an anarchical system and relative gains

theory remains central to realist analyses Institutions become new arenas for states to

compete through balance of power theory (Adler 2009 p63) Realists recognise the utility

of cooperation but resist interdependency States remain the sole arbiters of their sovereignty

Institutionalist discourse takes a similar understanding of the centrality of the state within

international institutions and the search for efficiency gains in an equally hostile global

system (Pace 2006 p30) The utility of an institution is dependent upon the compatibility of

goals of member states Institutions labouring amongst diametrically opposed state interests

will become an arena for competition However institutions serve to facilitate cooperation

when it is in the collective interest to do so (Webber 2007 p51)

Neo-liberal institutionalism furthers the functionalist argument by considering institutions an

ldquoinherent goodrdquo Droidge notes the socialisation and trust building effect on policy makers

and the legalising effect they transcribe on international relations (2007) This process it is

argued is evidenced in the EUrsquos tendency to create region wide legally binding norms Neo-

liberal institutionalism also contributes to NRA by positing domestic political and non-state

actors possess the capacity to influence the direction of institutional development (Pace

2006 p30)

Page | 11

The most innovative body of work within NRA however is comprised of constructivist

analyses According to Paasi regional integration is intimately linked with the process of

identity construction Regions are ldquomaderdquo through social practice and custom combining

both ldquomaterialrdquo and ldquovirtualrdquo elements (2009) While state interaction and institutional

development are conditioning factors regional characteristics are a result of power relations

encompassing numerous social spheres not simply limited to the process of cooperation at

the state level

Much academic literature concerns the proliferation of regional lsquosecurity communitiesrsquo

defined by Adler and Barnett as a ldquotransnational region comprised of sovereign states whose

people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful exchange [with] neither the expectation

of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputesrdquo (1998

pp30-34) Cooperation is fostered and capabilities are maximized through division of labour

(Acharya 2007)

The extent to which this division of labour is consensual or contested tacit or explicit varies

greatly between regional groupings (Fawcett 2004) yet the extent to which states are willing

to delegate tasks to an international institution may be highly illustrative of both the

preferences it will seek to pursue and process of cooperation it embarks upon

Laursen distinguishes between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo institutionalism suggesting states

pursuing the former possess fixed preferences and seek to maximise these preferences

Page | 12

through institutions (2010 pp10-12) A belief in the trustworthiness of the institution is the

minimum prerequisite for deferral of decision making capacity (Magnette 2007)

The extent to which rational institutionalism can lead to the development of a security

community is however questionable If institutions exist in an anarchic world with states

acting solely in self-interest cooperation will always be constrained A state unwilling to

make significant sacrifice for another cannot expect significant sacrifice in return In this

scenario neither state can be considered ultimately secure

Yet the EU constitutes both a region and security community as defined above exhibiting an

unusually explicit and extensive division of labour amongst its institutions An empirical

study by Caporaso and Min-hyung has also suggested that Europeans favour joint decision

making in areas such as foreign policy immigration monetary policy and defence areas

traditionally associated with state sovereignty (2009)

According to neo-liberal institutionalists such ldquopeculiar forms of political interactionrdquo (Pace

2006 p27) foster the process of socialisation ldquoparticipation in and accountability to

transnational institutions can transcend national boundariesrdquo modifying state behaviour as a

result (Fawcett 2004) At a basic level elite socialisation through institutionalised diplomacy

and cooperation develops familiarity leading to an expectation of essentially benign state

interaction Continuity of this expectation is essential Moravcsik argues such socialisation

also leads to ldquoasymmetrical interdependencerdquo the more a state comes to rely upon an

Page | 13

institution or collaborative network the more it will compromise its initial preferences to

maintain it (in Laursen 2010 p7)

Such an analysis may explain the level of integration witnessed in the EU If a member state

expects a partner state to compromise its initial preferences in favour of a collective

preference it too may be inclined towards collective decision making

Ruggie however suggests that within security communities states perceive insecurity both

individually and collectively This it is argued is a result of a constitutive process whereby

states begin to assimilate a collective identity that becomes endogenised into their own (in

Adler 1997) Such analyses argue that liberal-functionalist conceptions of regional

integration fail to account for the self-identification component crucial to a region or security

community

Magnette argues the emerging European citizenry is increasingly identifying itself with both

national and regional communities (2007) Increasing horizontal ties between states and the

development of vertical bonds between the European populous and Brussels are transforming

perceived political and social patronage structures

Participation in the integration process is essential for the association and development of a

lsquoEuropeanrsquo identity ldquoIdentity formation is directly proportional to individuals internalising

Page | 14

and articulating commitmentsrdquo (Winn 2001) Europeansrsquo commitments are increasingly

derived from their regulatory institutions

Other research finds EU discourse is increasingly prevalent at the sub-national level

Socialisation through EU institutions is serving to foster the local identities of areas such as

Wales and Catalonia through increased exposure to nation states Similarly Malta a country

whose population traditionally identifies itself along religious cleavages - described as ldquoa

nationless staterdquo - is developing both coherent lsquoMaltesersquo and lsquoEuropeanrsquo identities (Cram

2009)

Conceptualised as a progression from preference based lsquorational institutionalismrsquo towards a

lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo embodying many of the ideational elements associated with

constructivism the process of European institution building is perceived as contributing to

the web of ldquocognitive templates that define identities and preferencesrdquo (Laursen 2010 p12)

Academic literature on the nature of identity is unequivocal in its fluidity The ideational

developments described by Magnette and Cram have both coincided with and been

facilitated by European institutional development (Fawcett 2004) As Europersquos various

institutions permeate the day-to-day lives of the European populous institutionalism has

developed as a distinct ideational facet of Europersquos identity and one upon which numerous

others are dependent

Page | 15

Therefore if (neo-liberal) prevention of hegemony through plurality is taken as a function of

institutions it is conceivable that institutionalised multilateralism becomes a (constructivist)

legitimising tenet of European integration Magnette argues this search for plurality

inherently fosters a diffuse cosmopolitanism within the multi-dimensional European identity

(2007)

Constructivists argue the physical process of socialisation for instance as facilitated by the

Schengen Agreement goes beyond familiarising communities to one another by engendering

the development of a self-generating ldquotransnational cognitive communityrdquo (Adler 1997)

whereby both policy elites and the wider populous evolve their conceptions of the

community to which they belong and by extension for which they are responsible

This process of socialisation is supported by empirical research demonstrating European

integration has become increasingly accepted over time (Winn 2001) Europe has become an

ldquoobject of loyaltyrdquo (Paasi 2002) Yet an individualrsquos concept of lsquoEuropersquo to which this

loyalty has developed is notably diffuse an assimilation of co-optive and coercive social

interactions at the local national and regional levels

This exposes the failings of state centric interpretations of integration Inter-governmental

interaction simultaneously conditions and is conditioned by domestic perceptions of those

with which it is interacting Realist and institutionalist dismissal of local regional discourse

results in an artificial separation of the domestic and international realms at odds with post-

modern international relations

Page | 16

Asymmetrical interdependence similarly exposes a relative gains capability centred

framework as insufficient to understanding European integration Kaganrsquos realist

interpretation of Europe as being ldquomore accepting of failurerdquo and more concerned with

ldquoprocess over resultrdquo (in Acharya 2007) can be best reconciled with a constructivist

interpretation if the institutions have come to embody a process constitutive of characteristics

with which Europe collectively identifies Adler suggests ldquoWhat matters most is not short-

range success but the construction of a foundation for practice and behaviourrdquo (1997)

Constructivist interpretations of socialisation are also supported by research suggesting

Europersquos self-perception as a unitary actor is becoming increasingly positive (Caporaso amp

Min-hyung 2009) According to Hegel ldquoindividuals after having mutually recognised each

other recognise themselves and thus become citizenshellip to be acknowledged by the other

strengthens self-esteemrdquo (in Magnette 2007)

A cognitive process of grouping states together based on perceived homogeneity in

preference and practice occurs Institutionalised cooperation acts as a catalyst in this process

Cooperation leads to a harmonisation of interests and group members come to be viewed as

inherently rather than merely contingently positive (Cram 2009) Regions therefore

represent ideational as well as material entities

By understanding actorsrsquo interests as being conditioned by those with which it interacts

constructivism assumes what Tocci et al refer to as ldquobounded rationalityrdquo An actorrsquos

perceived interests being simultaneously determined by the underlying (often opaque)

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 3

Contents

Abstract Page 4

Introduction ` Page 5

Chapter 1 Constructing a European identity Page 8

Chapter 2 The European Union as a normative actor Page 21

Chapter 3 The Belarusian problem Page 30

Conclusion Page 49

Bibliography Page 52

Page | 4

Abstract

Europe has embarked upon an unprecedented process of state integration witnessing the widespread deferral of policy making to intergovernmental institutions The European Unionrsquos institutionalism has facilitated an assimilation of values into an increasingly coherent if complex regional identity A normative self-conception has emerged that Brussels has sought to project onto its external relations through the Common Foreign and Security Policy Brussels increasingly considers itself a transformative actor in global politics offering an alternative to great power realpolitik

This paper finds that while European multilateralism offers an environment conducive to a normative foreign policy the extent to which it is able to exert any ideational influence is constrained by the level of engagement it is willing to pursue Europe maintains a policy of isolating the Lukashenko regime and has failed to engage Belarusian civil society As a result it has had a negligible impact on Belarusian political culture Europersquos failure to adequately engage Belarus also suggests a contradiction within the European identity construction

Page | 5

Introduction

Since the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Europe has

sought to play an increasingly active role in global affairs It has demonstrated a growing

confidence in its unique political union that has so far resisted being undermined by its

economics This union has been founded upon a self-identity embodying a set of core

normative principles which Brussels has explicitly tried to extend to its external relations

The values Europe ascribes to its identity have become assimilated through the integration

process and have resulted in a multi-faceted self-conception a product of myriad local

national and regional identities interacting and competing in an increasingly complex

dynamic This process of assimilation has been facilitated in large part by Europersquos

increasing institutionalism enabling socialisation both at the community level and between

policy making elites

Since identity dictates an actorrsquos perceived interests an understanding of its identity and the

process of its formation are essential to understanding its perceived role in the international

community In this respect Europe considers itself to be a transformative power seeking to

define state interaction through the projection of its norms namely democracy plurality

multilateralism and respect for human rights Javier Solana former High Representative for

the CFSP describes the EU as a ldquoforce for good in the worldrdquo (2006)

Page | 6

Enlargement of the European Union plays a central role in this image embodying its

inclusivity and is considered an essential component of European security making Offers of

accession to neighbouring states explicitly define the limits of the Unionrsquos lsquoregionrsquo marking

the boundaries of the European identity Such a policy implicitly ascribes an alternative

identity to those European states without accession prospects

Investigating how Europe projects its norms onto states it considers not to share an identity

with will therefore elucidate any integrity in European claims to normativity as well as the

transformative power this process of norm projection entails Of particular interest in this

regard is Belarus a former-Soviet state alluded to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo which

has maintained consistently poor relations with the EU since its independence

This paper proposes that if the EU is to genuinely adhere to its normative identity instead of

excluding Belarus from European institutionalism it should actively seek to engage the

government of Minsk Meaningful engagement offers the greatest chance for Europe to

realise its transformative potential

The paper is set out as follows Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical rationale for states to

pursue regionalisation and the role institutional development plays in identity construction

Chapter 2 considers the potential for normativity in foreign policy making and establishes an

analytical framework for its assessment Chapter 3 discusses the development of EU-Belarus

relations arguing EU policy can be considered broadly normative however if the EU is to

demonstrate meaningful transformative influence a fundamental rethinking of its policies

Page | 7

must be implemented The paper concludes by suggesting that the nature of EU-Belarus

relations signifies a potentially destabilising conflict within the EUrsquos normative self-

conception

Page | 8

Chapter 1

Constructing a European Identity

In what has been descried as the ldquopost Keynesianhellip competitive staterdquo a ldquorescalingrdquo of

governance in the political economic and security spheres has occurred (Paasi 2009) As

state monopolies over economic and information transactions have been eroded ldquoalmost

every country in the world has chosen to meet the challenges of globalisation in part through

a regional responserdquo (Fawn 2009) This phenomenon has been accompanied by the

development of regionalism as an analytically distinct strand of IR scholarship

The definition of lsquoa regionrsquo within IR is contested however consensus has emerged over the

physical proximity of constituent states sharing aspects of identity that crucially enable self-

identification For the purpose of this paper I consider a region as defined by Pace ldquoa sub-

system of states linked by geographical relationship mutual interdependence and subjective

perception of belonging to a distinctive communityrdquo (2006 p27)

To IR theorists regions constitute miniaturised international systems subject to both

endogenous and exogenous forces As with the global system regional scholarship has

fostered the application of theoretical frameworks in order to interpret both their

development and patterns of behaviour

Page | 9

The concept of lsquoregionalisationrsquo defined as ldquothe explicit process of adapting norms and

identity to both align with and shape a new collective set of prioritiesrdquo (Warleigh-Lack

2010 p45) forms the basis of these debates This chapter will explore the theoretical

rationale for nation states to pursue cooperation and the extent to which they maintain

direction over the course of integration Regional studies through realism and

institutionalism has typically emphasised the centrality of the state within regional

interactions yet the post-Cold War development of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA)

from which lsquoregionalisationrsquo emerged has begun to view regional cooperation in ideational

rather than functional terms encompassing a plurality of actors beyond the state (Acharya

2007)

Such a debate is of particular relevance when considering the unprecedented level of

integration embodied by the European Union and its own apparent desire to be identified by

its ideational composition This in turn poses questions as to the nature of lsquopowerrsquo entailed

within European integration and Europersquos ability to capitalise upon the normativity it claims

to espouse

Inevitably loss of sovereignty and national identity remain critical elements of Europersquos

domestic political discourse (Sutcliffe 2010 p64) yet undoubtedly Europe is developing its

own unique regional identity through the process of integration This identity has

simultaneously been heralded as a potential model for supra-national global cooperation

(Giesmann 2010 p271) and derided as post-modern civilizational imperialism (Mayer

2010 p276) Understanding this process is therefore essential to understanding Europersquos

continued development and its role in a both globalised and regionalised world

Page | 10

Perhaps counter-intuitively given the neurosis underpinning realist assumptions of world

order realism has contributed significantly to regional discourse Regional cooperation is

viewed in purely self-interested functionalist terms with institution creation as a means to

engender efficiency gains and therefore maximise capability through state-state transactions

(Pace 2006) International institutions exist within an anarchical system and relative gains

theory remains central to realist analyses Institutions become new arenas for states to

compete through balance of power theory (Adler 2009 p63) Realists recognise the utility

of cooperation but resist interdependency States remain the sole arbiters of their sovereignty

Institutionalist discourse takes a similar understanding of the centrality of the state within

international institutions and the search for efficiency gains in an equally hostile global

system (Pace 2006 p30) The utility of an institution is dependent upon the compatibility of

goals of member states Institutions labouring amongst diametrically opposed state interests

will become an arena for competition However institutions serve to facilitate cooperation

when it is in the collective interest to do so (Webber 2007 p51)

Neo-liberal institutionalism furthers the functionalist argument by considering institutions an

ldquoinherent goodrdquo Droidge notes the socialisation and trust building effect on policy makers

and the legalising effect they transcribe on international relations (2007) This process it is

argued is evidenced in the EUrsquos tendency to create region wide legally binding norms Neo-

liberal institutionalism also contributes to NRA by positing domestic political and non-state

actors possess the capacity to influence the direction of institutional development (Pace

2006 p30)

Page | 11

The most innovative body of work within NRA however is comprised of constructivist

analyses According to Paasi regional integration is intimately linked with the process of

identity construction Regions are ldquomaderdquo through social practice and custom combining

both ldquomaterialrdquo and ldquovirtualrdquo elements (2009) While state interaction and institutional

development are conditioning factors regional characteristics are a result of power relations

encompassing numerous social spheres not simply limited to the process of cooperation at

the state level

Much academic literature concerns the proliferation of regional lsquosecurity communitiesrsquo

defined by Adler and Barnett as a ldquotransnational region comprised of sovereign states whose

people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful exchange [with] neither the expectation

of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputesrdquo (1998

pp30-34) Cooperation is fostered and capabilities are maximized through division of labour

(Acharya 2007)

The extent to which this division of labour is consensual or contested tacit or explicit varies

greatly between regional groupings (Fawcett 2004) yet the extent to which states are willing

to delegate tasks to an international institution may be highly illustrative of both the

preferences it will seek to pursue and process of cooperation it embarks upon

Laursen distinguishes between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo institutionalism suggesting states

pursuing the former possess fixed preferences and seek to maximise these preferences

Page | 12

through institutions (2010 pp10-12) A belief in the trustworthiness of the institution is the

minimum prerequisite for deferral of decision making capacity (Magnette 2007)

The extent to which rational institutionalism can lead to the development of a security

community is however questionable If institutions exist in an anarchic world with states

acting solely in self-interest cooperation will always be constrained A state unwilling to

make significant sacrifice for another cannot expect significant sacrifice in return In this

scenario neither state can be considered ultimately secure

Yet the EU constitutes both a region and security community as defined above exhibiting an

unusually explicit and extensive division of labour amongst its institutions An empirical

study by Caporaso and Min-hyung has also suggested that Europeans favour joint decision

making in areas such as foreign policy immigration monetary policy and defence areas

traditionally associated with state sovereignty (2009)

According to neo-liberal institutionalists such ldquopeculiar forms of political interactionrdquo (Pace

2006 p27) foster the process of socialisation ldquoparticipation in and accountability to

transnational institutions can transcend national boundariesrdquo modifying state behaviour as a

result (Fawcett 2004) At a basic level elite socialisation through institutionalised diplomacy

and cooperation develops familiarity leading to an expectation of essentially benign state

interaction Continuity of this expectation is essential Moravcsik argues such socialisation

also leads to ldquoasymmetrical interdependencerdquo the more a state comes to rely upon an

Page | 13

institution or collaborative network the more it will compromise its initial preferences to

maintain it (in Laursen 2010 p7)

Such an analysis may explain the level of integration witnessed in the EU If a member state

expects a partner state to compromise its initial preferences in favour of a collective

preference it too may be inclined towards collective decision making

Ruggie however suggests that within security communities states perceive insecurity both

individually and collectively This it is argued is a result of a constitutive process whereby

states begin to assimilate a collective identity that becomes endogenised into their own (in

Adler 1997) Such analyses argue that liberal-functionalist conceptions of regional

integration fail to account for the self-identification component crucial to a region or security

community

Magnette argues the emerging European citizenry is increasingly identifying itself with both

national and regional communities (2007) Increasing horizontal ties between states and the

development of vertical bonds between the European populous and Brussels are transforming

perceived political and social patronage structures

Participation in the integration process is essential for the association and development of a

lsquoEuropeanrsquo identity ldquoIdentity formation is directly proportional to individuals internalising

Page | 14

and articulating commitmentsrdquo (Winn 2001) Europeansrsquo commitments are increasingly

derived from their regulatory institutions

Other research finds EU discourse is increasingly prevalent at the sub-national level

Socialisation through EU institutions is serving to foster the local identities of areas such as

Wales and Catalonia through increased exposure to nation states Similarly Malta a country

whose population traditionally identifies itself along religious cleavages - described as ldquoa

nationless staterdquo - is developing both coherent lsquoMaltesersquo and lsquoEuropeanrsquo identities (Cram

2009)

Conceptualised as a progression from preference based lsquorational institutionalismrsquo towards a

lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo embodying many of the ideational elements associated with

constructivism the process of European institution building is perceived as contributing to

the web of ldquocognitive templates that define identities and preferencesrdquo (Laursen 2010 p12)

Academic literature on the nature of identity is unequivocal in its fluidity The ideational

developments described by Magnette and Cram have both coincided with and been

facilitated by European institutional development (Fawcett 2004) As Europersquos various

institutions permeate the day-to-day lives of the European populous institutionalism has

developed as a distinct ideational facet of Europersquos identity and one upon which numerous

others are dependent

Page | 15

Therefore if (neo-liberal) prevention of hegemony through plurality is taken as a function of

institutions it is conceivable that institutionalised multilateralism becomes a (constructivist)

legitimising tenet of European integration Magnette argues this search for plurality

inherently fosters a diffuse cosmopolitanism within the multi-dimensional European identity

(2007)

Constructivists argue the physical process of socialisation for instance as facilitated by the

Schengen Agreement goes beyond familiarising communities to one another by engendering

the development of a self-generating ldquotransnational cognitive communityrdquo (Adler 1997)

whereby both policy elites and the wider populous evolve their conceptions of the

community to which they belong and by extension for which they are responsible

This process of socialisation is supported by empirical research demonstrating European

integration has become increasingly accepted over time (Winn 2001) Europe has become an

ldquoobject of loyaltyrdquo (Paasi 2002) Yet an individualrsquos concept of lsquoEuropersquo to which this

loyalty has developed is notably diffuse an assimilation of co-optive and coercive social

interactions at the local national and regional levels

This exposes the failings of state centric interpretations of integration Inter-governmental

interaction simultaneously conditions and is conditioned by domestic perceptions of those

with which it is interacting Realist and institutionalist dismissal of local regional discourse

results in an artificial separation of the domestic and international realms at odds with post-

modern international relations

Page | 16

Asymmetrical interdependence similarly exposes a relative gains capability centred

framework as insufficient to understanding European integration Kaganrsquos realist

interpretation of Europe as being ldquomore accepting of failurerdquo and more concerned with

ldquoprocess over resultrdquo (in Acharya 2007) can be best reconciled with a constructivist

interpretation if the institutions have come to embody a process constitutive of characteristics

with which Europe collectively identifies Adler suggests ldquoWhat matters most is not short-

range success but the construction of a foundation for practice and behaviourrdquo (1997)

Constructivist interpretations of socialisation are also supported by research suggesting

Europersquos self-perception as a unitary actor is becoming increasingly positive (Caporaso amp

Min-hyung 2009) According to Hegel ldquoindividuals after having mutually recognised each

other recognise themselves and thus become citizenshellip to be acknowledged by the other

strengthens self-esteemrdquo (in Magnette 2007)

A cognitive process of grouping states together based on perceived homogeneity in

preference and practice occurs Institutionalised cooperation acts as a catalyst in this process

Cooperation leads to a harmonisation of interests and group members come to be viewed as

inherently rather than merely contingently positive (Cram 2009) Regions therefore

represent ideational as well as material entities

By understanding actorsrsquo interests as being conditioned by those with which it interacts

constructivism assumes what Tocci et al refer to as ldquobounded rationalityrdquo An actorrsquos

perceived interests being simultaneously determined by the underlying (often opaque)

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 4

Abstract

Europe has embarked upon an unprecedented process of state integration witnessing the widespread deferral of policy making to intergovernmental institutions The European Unionrsquos institutionalism has facilitated an assimilation of values into an increasingly coherent if complex regional identity A normative self-conception has emerged that Brussels has sought to project onto its external relations through the Common Foreign and Security Policy Brussels increasingly considers itself a transformative actor in global politics offering an alternative to great power realpolitik

This paper finds that while European multilateralism offers an environment conducive to a normative foreign policy the extent to which it is able to exert any ideational influence is constrained by the level of engagement it is willing to pursue Europe maintains a policy of isolating the Lukashenko regime and has failed to engage Belarusian civil society As a result it has had a negligible impact on Belarusian political culture Europersquos failure to adequately engage Belarus also suggests a contradiction within the European identity construction

Page | 5

Introduction

Since the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Europe has

sought to play an increasingly active role in global affairs It has demonstrated a growing

confidence in its unique political union that has so far resisted being undermined by its

economics This union has been founded upon a self-identity embodying a set of core

normative principles which Brussels has explicitly tried to extend to its external relations

The values Europe ascribes to its identity have become assimilated through the integration

process and have resulted in a multi-faceted self-conception a product of myriad local

national and regional identities interacting and competing in an increasingly complex

dynamic This process of assimilation has been facilitated in large part by Europersquos

increasing institutionalism enabling socialisation both at the community level and between

policy making elites

Since identity dictates an actorrsquos perceived interests an understanding of its identity and the

process of its formation are essential to understanding its perceived role in the international

community In this respect Europe considers itself to be a transformative power seeking to

define state interaction through the projection of its norms namely democracy plurality

multilateralism and respect for human rights Javier Solana former High Representative for

the CFSP describes the EU as a ldquoforce for good in the worldrdquo (2006)

Page | 6

Enlargement of the European Union plays a central role in this image embodying its

inclusivity and is considered an essential component of European security making Offers of

accession to neighbouring states explicitly define the limits of the Unionrsquos lsquoregionrsquo marking

the boundaries of the European identity Such a policy implicitly ascribes an alternative

identity to those European states without accession prospects

Investigating how Europe projects its norms onto states it considers not to share an identity

with will therefore elucidate any integrity in European claims to normativity as well as the

transformative power this process of norm projection entails Of particular interest in this

regard is Belarus a former-Soviet state alluded to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo which

has maintained consistently poor relations with the EU since its independence

This paper proposes that if the EU is to genuinely adhere to its normative identity instead of

excluding Belarus from European institutionalism it should actively seek to engage the

government of Minsk Meaningful engagement offers the greatest chance for Europe to

realise its transformative potential

The paper is set out as follows Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical rationale for states to

pursue regionalisation and the role institutional development plays in identity construction

Chapter 2 considers the potential for normativity in foreign policy making and establishes an

analytical framework for its assessment Chapter 3 discusses the development of EU-Belarus

relations arguing EU policy can be considered broadly normative however if the EU is to

demonstrate meaningful transformative influence a fundamental rethinking of its policies

Page | 7

must be implemented The paper concludes by suggesting that the nature of EU-Belarus

relations signifies a potentially destabilising conflict within the EUrsquos normative self-

conception

Page | 8

Chapter 1

Constructing a European Identity

In what has been descried as the ldquopost Keynesianhellip competitive staterdquo a ldquorescalingrdquo of

governance in the political economic and security spheres has occurred (Paasi 2009) As

state monopolies over economic and information transactions have been eroded ldquoalmost

every country in the world has chosen to meet the challenges of globalisation in part through

a regional responserdquo (Fawn 2009) This phenomenon has been accompanied by the

development of regionalism as an analytically distinct strand of IR scholarship

The definition of lsquoa regionrsquo within IR is contested however consensus has emerged over the

physical proximity of constituent states sharing aspects of identity that crucially enable self-

identification For the purpose of this paper I consider a region as defined by Pace ldquoa sub-

system of states linked by geographical relationship mutual interdependence and subjective

perception of belonging to a distinctive communityrdquo (2006 p27)

To IR theorists regions constitute miniaturised international systems subject to both

endogenous and exogenous forces As with the global system regional scholarship has

fostered the application of theoretical frameworks in order to interpret both their

development and patterns of behaviour

Page | 9

The concept of lsquoregionalisationrsquo defined as ldquothe explicit process of adapting norms and

identity to both align with and shape a new collective set of prioritiesrdquo (Warleigh-Lack

2010 p45) forms the basis of these debates This chapter will explore the theoretical

rationale for nation states to pursue cooperation and the extent to which they maintain

direction over the course of integration Regional studies through realism and

institutionalism has typically emphasised the centrality of the state within regional

interactions yet the post-Cold War development of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA)

from which lsquoregionalisationrsquo emerged has begun to view regional cooperation in ideational

rather than functional terms encompassing a plurality of actors beyond the state (Acharya

2007)

Such a debate is of particular relevance when considering the unprecedented level of

integration embodied by the European Union and its own apparent desire to be identified by

its ideational composition This in turn poses questions as to the nature of lsquopowerrsquo entailed

within European integration and Europersquos ability to capitalise upon the normativity it claims

to espouse

Inevitably loss of sovereignty and national identity remain critical elements of Europersquos

domestic political discourse (Sutcliffe 2010 p64) yet undoubtedly Europe is developing its

own unique regional identity through the process of integration This identity has

simultaneously been heralded as a potential model for supra-national global cooperation

(Giesmann 2010 p271) and derided as post-modern civilizational imperialism (Mayer

2010 p276) Understanding this process is therefore essential to understanding Europersquos

continued development and its role in a both globalised and regionalised world

Page | 10

Perhaps counter-intuitively given the neurosis underpinning realist assumptions of world

order realism has contributed significantly to regional discourse Regional cooperation is

viewed in purely self-interested functionalist terms with institution creation as a means to

engender efficiency gains and therefore maximise capability through state-state transactions

(Pace 2006) International institutions exist within an anarchical system and relative gains

theory remains central to realist analyses Institutions become new arenas for states to

compete through balance of power theory (Adler 2009 p63) Realists recognise the utility

of cooperation but resist interdependency States remain the sole arbiters of their sovereignty

Institutionalist discourse takes a similar understanding of the centrality of the state within

international institutions and the search for efficiency gains in an equally hostile global

system (Pace 2006 p30) The utility of an institution is dependent upon the compatibility of

goals of member states Institutions labouring amongst diametrically opposed state interests

will become an arena for competition However institutions serve to facilitate cooperation

when it is in the collective interest to do so (Webber 2007 p51)

Neo-liberal institutionalism furthers the functionalist argument by considering institutions an

ldquoinherent goodrdquo Droidge notes the socialisation and trust building effect on policy makers

and the legalising effect they transcribe on international relations (2007) This process it is

argued is evidenced in the EUrsquos tendency to create region wide legally binding norms Neo-

liberal institutionalism also contributes to NRA by positing domestic political and non-state

actors possess the capacity to influence the direction of institutional development (Pace

2006 p30)

Page | 11

The most innovative body of work within NRA however is comprised of constructivist

analyses According to Paasi regional integration is intimately linked with the process of

identity construction Regions are ldquomaderdquo through social practice and custom combining

both ldquomaterialrdquo and ldquovirtualrdquo elements (2009) While state interaction and institutional

development are conditioning factors regional characteristics are a result of power relations

encompassing numerous social spheres not simply limited to the process of cooperation at

the state level

Much academic literature concerns the proliferation of regional lsquosecurity communitiesrsquo

defined by Adler and Barnett as a ldquotransnational region comprised of sovereign states whose

people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful exchange [with] neither the expectation

of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputesrdquo (1998

pp30-34) Cooperation is fostered and capabilities are maximized through division of labour

(Acharya 2007)

The extent to which this division of labour is consensual or contested tacit or explicit varies

greatly between regional groupings (Fawcett 2004) yet the extent to which states are willing

to delegate tasks to an international institution may be highly illustrative of both the

preferences it will seek to pursue and process of cooperation it embarks upon

Laursen distinguishes between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo institutionalism suggesting states

pursuing the former possess fixed preferences and seek to maximise these preferences

Page | 12

through institutions (2010 pp10-12) A belief in the trustworthiness of the institution is the

minimum prerequisite for deferral of decision making capacity (Magnette 2007)

The extent to which rational institutionalism can lead to the development of a security

community is however questionable If institutions exist in an anarchic world with states

acting solely in self-interest cooperation will always be constrained A state unwilling to

make significant sacrifice for another cannot expect significant sacrifice in return In this

scenario neither state can be considered ultimately secure

Yet the EU constitutes both a region and security community as defined above exhibiting an

unusually explicit and extensive division of labour amongst its institutions An empirical

study by Caporaso and Min-hyung has also suggested that Europeans favour joint decision

making in areas such as foreign policy immigration monetary policy and defence areas

traditionally associated with state sovereignty (2009)

According to neo-liberal institutionalists such ldquopeculiar forms of political interactionrdquo (Pace

2006 p27) foster the process of socialisation ldquoparticipation in and accountability to

transnational institutions can transcend national boundariesrdquo modifying state behaviour as a

result (Fawcett 2004) At a basic level elite socialisation through institutionalised diplomacy

and cooperation develops familiarity leading to an expectation of essentially benign state

interaction Continuity of this expectation is essential Moravcsik argues such socialisation

also leads to ldquoasymmetrical interdependencerdquo the more a state comes to rely upon an

Page | 13

institution or collaborative network the more it will compromise its initial preferences to

maintain it (in Laursen 2010 p7)

Such an analysis may explain the level of integration witnessed in the EU If a member state

expects a partner state to compromise its initial preferences in favour of a collective

preference it too may be inclined towards collective decision making

Ruggie however suggests that within security communities states perceive insecurity both

individually and collectively This it is argued is a result of a constitutive process whereby

states begin to assimilate a collective identity that becomes endogenised into their own (in

Adler 1997) Such analyses argue that liberal-functionalist conceptions of regional

integration fail to account for the self-identification component crucial to a region or security

community

Magnette argues the emerging European citizenry is increasingly identifying itself with both

national and regional communities (2007) Increasing horizontal ties between states and the

development of vertical bonds between the European populous and Brussels are transforming

perceived political and social patronage structures

Participation in the integration process is essential for the association and development of a

lsquoEuropeanrsquo identity ldquoIdentity formation is directly proportional to individuals internalising

Page | 14

and articulating commitmentsrdquo (Winn 2001) Europeansrsquo commitments are increasingly

derived from their regulatory institutions

Other research finds EU discourse is increasingly prevalent at the sub-national level

Socialisation through EU institutions is serving to foster the local identities of areas such as

Wales and Catalonia through increased exposure to nation states Similarly Malta a country

whose population traditionally identifies itself along religious cleavages - described as ldquoa

nationless staterdquo - is developing both coherent lsquoMaltesersquo and lsquoEuropeanrsquo identities (Cram

2009)

Conceptualised as a progression from preference based lsquorational institutionalismrsquo towards a

lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo embodying many of the ideational elements associated with

constructivism the process of European institution building is perceived as contributing to

the web of ldquocognitive templates that define identities and preferencesrdquo (Laursen 2010 p12)

Academic literature on the nature of identity is unequivocal in its fluidity The ideational

developments described by Magnette and Cram have both coincided with and been

facilitated by European institutional development (Fawcett 2004) As Europersquos various

institutions permeate the day-to-day lives of the European populous institutionalism has

developed as a distinct ideational facet of Europersquos identity and one upon which numerous

others are dependent

Page | 15

Therefore if (neo-liberal) prevention of hegemony through plurality is taken as a function of

institutions it is conceivable that institutionalised multilateralism becomes a (constructivist)

legitimising tenet of European integration Magnette argues this search for plurality

inherently fosters a diffuse cosmopolitanism within the multi-dimensional European identity

(2007)

Constructivists argue the physical process of socialisation for instance as facilitated by the

Schengen Agreement goes beyond familiarising communities to one another by engendering

the development of a self-generating ldquotransnational cognitive communityrdquo (Adler 1997)

whereby both policy elites and the wider populous evolve their conceptions of the

community to which they belong and by extension for which they are responsible

This process of socialisation is supported by empirical research demonstrating European

integration has become increasingly accepted over time (Winn 2001) Europe has become an

ldquoobject of loyaltyrdquo (Paasi 2002) Yet an individualrsquos concept of lsquoEuropersquo to which this

loyalty has developed is notably diffuse an assimilation of co-optive and coercive social

interactions at the local national and regional levels

This exposes the failings of state centric interpretations of integration Inter-governmental

interaction simultaneously conditions and is conditioned by domestic perceptions of those

with which it is interacting Realist and institutionalist dismissal of local regional discourse

results in an artificial separation of the domestic and international realms at odds with post-

modern international relations

Page | 16

Asymmetrical interdependence similarly exposes a relative gains capability centred

framework as insufficient to understanding European integration Kaganrsquos realist

interpretation of Europe as being ldquomore accepting of failurerdquo and more concerned with

ldquoprocess over resultrdquo (in Acharya 2007) can be best reconciled with a constructivist

interpretation if the institutions have come to embody a process constitutive of characteristics

with which Europe collectively identifies Adler suggests ldquoWhat matters most is not short-

range success but the construction of a foundation for practice and behaviourrdquo (1997)

Constructivist interpretations of socialisation are also supported by research suggesting

Europersquos self-perception as a unitary actor is becoming increasingly positive (Caporaso amp

Min-hyung 2009) According to Hegel ldquoindividuals after having mutually recognised each

other recognise themselves and thus become citizenshellip to be acknowledged by the other

strengthens self-esteemrdquo (in Magnette 2007)

A cognitive process of grouping states together based on perceived homogeneity in

preference and practice occurs Institutionalised cooperation acts as a catalyst in this process

Cooperation leads to a harmonisation of interests and group members come to be viewed as

inherently rather than merely contingently positive (Cram 2009) Regions therefore

represent ideational as well as material entities

By understanding actorsrsquo interests as being conditioned by those with which it interacts

constructivism assumes what Tocci et al refer to as ldquobounded rationalityrdquo An actorrsquos

perceived interests being simultaneously determined by the underlying (often opaque)

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

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Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

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Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

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Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

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Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

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EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

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Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

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Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

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Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

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Page | 56

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Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

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Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

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Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

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Page | 57

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Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 5

Introduction

Since the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Europe has

sought to play an increasingly active role in global affairs It has demonstrated a growing

confidence in its unique political union that has so far resisted being undermined by its

economics This union has been founded upon a self-identity embodying a set of core

normative principles which Brussels has explicitly tried to extend to its external relations

The values Europe ascribes to its identity have become assimilated through the integration

process and have resulted in a multi-faceted self-conception a product of myriad local

national and regional identities interacting and competing in an increasingly complex

dynamic This process of assimilation has been facilitated in large part by Europersquos

increasing institutionalism enabling socialisation both at the community level and between

policy making elites

Since identity dictates an actorrsquos perceived interests an understanding of its identity and the

process of its formation are essential to understanding its perceived role in the international

community In this respect Europe considers itself to be a transformative power seeking to

define state interaction through the projection of its norms namely democracy plurality

multilateralism and respect for human rights Javier Solana former High Representative for

the CFSP describes the EU as a ldquoforce for good in the worldrdquo (2006)

Page | 6

Enlargement of the European Union plays a central role in this image embodying its

inclusivity and is considered an essential component of European security making Offers of

accession to neighbouring states explicitly define the limits of the Unionrsquos lsquoregionrsquo marking

the boundaries of the European identity Such a policy implicitly ascribes an alternative

identity to those European states without accession prospects

Investigating how Europe projects its norms onto states it considers not to share an identity

with will therefore elucidate any integrity in European claims to normativity as well as the

transformative power this process of norm projection entails Of particular interest in this

regard is Belarus a former-Soviet state alluded to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo which

has maintained consistently poor relations with the EU since its independence

This paper proposes that if the EU is to genuinely adhere to its normative identity instead of

excluding Belarus from European institutionalism it should actively seek to engage the

government of Minsk Meaningful engagement offers the greatest chance for Europe to

realise its transformative potential

The paper is set out as follows Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical rationale for states to

pursue regionalisation and the role institutional development plays in identity construction

Chapter 2 considers the potential for normativity in foreign policy making and establishes an

analytical framework for its assessment Chapter 3 discusses the development of EU-Belarus

relations arguing EU policy can be considered broadly normative however if the EU is to

demonstrate meaningful transformative influence a fundamental rethinking of its policies

Page | 7

must be implemented The paper concludes by suggesting that the nature of EU-Belarus

relations signifies a potentially destabilising conflict within the EUrsquos normative self-

conception

Page | 8

Chapter 1

Constructing a European Identity

In what has been descried as the ldquopost Keynesianhellip competitive staterdquo a ldquorescalingrdquo of

governance in the political economic and security spheres has occurred (Paasi 2009) As

state monopolies over economic and information transactions have been eroded ldquoalmost

every country in the world has chosen to meet the challenges of globalisation in part through

a regional responserdquo (Fawn 2009) This phenomenon has been accompanied by the

development of regionalism as an analytically distinct strand of IR scholarship

The definition of lsquoa regionrsquo within IR is contested however consensus has emerged over the

physical proximity of constituent states sharing aspects of identity that crucially enable self-

identification For the purpose of this paper I consider a region as defined by Pace ldquoa sub-

system of states linked by geographical relationship mutual interdependence and subjective

perception of belonging to a distinctive communityrdquo (2006 p27)

To IR theorists regions constitute miniaturised international systems subject to both

endogenous and exogenous forces As with the global system regional scholarship has

fostered the application of theoretical frameworks in order to interpret both their

development and patterns of behaviour

Page | 9

The concept of lsquoregionalisationrsquo defined as ldquothe explicit process of adapting norms and

identity to both align with and shape a new collective set of prioritiesrdquo (Warleigh-Lack

2010 p45) forms the basis of these debates This chapter will explore the theoretical

rationale for nation states to pursue cooperation and the extent to which they maintain

direction over the course of integration Regional studies through realism and

institutionalism has typically emphasised the centrality of the state within regional

interactions yet the post-Cold War development of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA)

from which lsquoregionalisationrsquo emerged has begun to view regional cooperation in ideational

rather than functional terms encompassing a plurality of actors beyond the state (Acharya

2007)

Such a debate is of particular relevance when considering the unprecedented level of

integration embodied by the European Union and its own apparent desire to be identified by

its ideational composition This in turn poses questions as to the nature of lsquopowerrsquo entailed

within European integration and Europersquos ability to capitalise upon the normativity it claims

to espouse

Inevitably loss of sovereignty and national identity remain critical elements of Europersquos

domestic political discourse (Sutcliffe 2010 p64) yet undoubtedly Europe is developing its

own unique regional identity through the process of integration This identity has

simultaneously been heralded as a potential model for supra-national global cooperation

(Giesmann 2010 p271) and derided as post-modern civilizational imperialism (Mayer

2010 p276) Understanding this process is therefore essential to understanding Europersquos

continued development and its role in a both globalised and regionalised world

Page | 10

Perhaps counter-intuitively given the neurosis underpinning realist assumptions of world

order realism has contributed significantly to regional discourse Regional cooperation is

viewed in purely self-interested functionalist terms with institution creation as a means to

engender efficiency gains and therefore maximise capability through state-state transactions

(Pace 2006) International institutions exist within an anarchical system and relative gains

theory remains central to realist analyses Institutions become new arenas for states to

compete through balance of power theory (Adler 2009 p63) Realists recognise the utility

of cooperation but resist interdependency States remain the sole arbiters of their sovereignty

Institutionalist discourse takes a similar understanding of the centrality of the state within

international institutions and the search for efficiency gains in an equally hostile global

system (Pace 2006 p30) The utility of an institution is dependent upon the compatibility of

goals of member states Institutions labouring amongst diametrically opposed state interests

will become an arena for competition However institutions serve to facilitate cooperation

when it is in the collective interest to do so (Webber 2007 p51)

Neo-liberal institutionalism furthers the functionalist argument by considering institutions an

ldquoinherent goodrdquo Droidge notes the socialisation and trust building effect on policy makers

and the legalising effect they transcribe on international relations (2007) This process it is

argued is evidenced in the EUrsquos tendency to create region wide legally binding norms Neo-

liberal institutionalism also contributes to NRA by positing domestic political and non-state

actors possess the capacity to influence the direction of institutional development (Pace

2006 p30)

Page | 11

The most innovative body of work within NRA however is comprised of constructivist

analyses According to Paasi regional integration is intimately linked with the process of

identity construction Regions are ldquomaderdquo through social practice and custom combining

both ldquomaterialrdquo and ldquovirtualrdquo elements (2009) While state interaction and institutional

development are conditioning factors regional characteristics are a result of power relations

encompassing numerous social spheres not simply limited to the process of cooperation at

the state level

Much academic literature concerns the proliferation of regional lsquosecurity communitiesrsquo

defined by Adler and Barnett as a ldquotransnational region comprised of sovereign states whose

people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful exchange [with] neither the expectation

of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputesrdquo (1998

pp30-34) Cooperation is fostered and capabilities are maximized through division of labour

(Acharya 2007)

The extent to which this division of labour is consensual or contested tacit or explicit varies

greatly between regional groupings (Fawcett 2004) yet the extent to which states are willing

to delegate tasks to an international institution may be highly illustrative of both the

preferences it will seek to pursue and process of cooperation it embarks upon

Laursen distinguishes between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo institutionalism suggesting states

pursuing the former possess fixed preferences and seek to maximise these preferences

Page | 12

through institutions (2010 pp10-12) A belief in the trustworthiness of the institution is the

minimum prerequisite for deferral of decision making capacity (Magnette 2007)

The extent to which rational institutionalism can lead to the development of a security

community is however questionable If institutions exist in an anarchic world with states

acting solely in self-interest cooperation will always be constrained A state unwilling to

make significant sacrifice for another cannot expect significant sacrifice in return In this

scenario neither state can be considered ultimately secure

Yet the EU constitutes both a region and security community as defined above exhibiting an

unusually explicit and extensive division of labour amongst its institutions An empirical

study by Caporaso and Min-hyung has also suggested that Europeans favour joint decision

making in areas such as foreign policy immigration monetary policy and defence areas

traditionally associated with state sovereignty (2009)

According to neo-liberal institutionalists such ldquopeculiar forms of political interactionrdquo (Pace

2006 p27) foster the process of socialisation ldquoparticipation in and accountability to

transnational institutions can transcend national boundariesrdquo modifying state behaviour as a

result (Fawcett 2004) At a basic level elite socialisation through institutionalised diplomacy

and cooperation develops familiarity leading to an expectation of essentially benign state

interaction Continuity of this expectation is essential Moravcsik argues such socialisation

also leads to ldquoasymmetrical interdependencerdquo the more a state comes to rely upon an

Page | 13

institution or collaborative network the more it will compromise its initial preferences to

maintain it (in Laursen 2010 p7)

Such an analysis may explain the level of integration witnessed in the EU If a member state

expects a partner state to compromise its initial preferences in favour of a collective

preference it too may be inclined towards collective decision making

Ruggie however suggests that within security communities states perceive insecurity both

individually and collectively This it is argued is a result of a constitutive process whereby

states begin to assimilate a collective identity that becomes endogenised into their own (in

Adler 1997) Such analyses argue that liberal-functionalist conceptions of regional

integration fail to account for the self-identification component crucial to a region or security

community

Magnette argues the emerging European citizenry is increasingly identifying itself with both

national and regional communities (2007) Increasing horizontal ties between states and the

development of vertical bonds between the European populous and Brussels are transforming

perceived political and social patronage structures

Participation in the integration process is essential for the association and development of a

lsquoEuropeanrsquo identity ldquoIdentity formation is directly proportional to individuals internalising

Page | 14

and articulating commitmentsrdquo (Winn 2001) Europeansrsquo commitments are increasingly

derived from their regulatory institutions

Other research finds EU discourse is increasingly prevalent at the sub-national level

Socialisation through EU institutions is serving to foster the local identities of areas such as

Wales and Catalonia through increased exposure to nation states Similarly Malta a country

whose population traditionally identifies itself along religious cleavages - described as ldquoa

nationless staterdquo - is developing both coherent lsquoMaltesersquo and lsquoEuropeanrsquo identities (Cram

2009)

Conceptualised as a progression from preference based lsquorational institutionalismrsquo towards a

lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo embodying many of the ideational elements associated with

constructivism the process of European institution building is perceived as contributing to

the web of ldquocognitive templates that define identities and preferencesrdquo (Laursen 2010 p12)

Academic literature on the nature of identity is unequivocal in its fluidity The ideational

developments described by Magnette and Cram have both coincided with and been

facilitated by European institutional development (Fawcett 2004) As Europersquos various

institutions permeate the day-to-day lives of the European populous institutionalism has

developed as a distinct ideational facet of Europersquos identity and one upon which numerous

others are dependent

Page | 15

Therefore if (neo-liberal) prevention of hegemony through plurality is taken as a function of

institutions it is conceivable that institutionalised multilateralism becomes a (constructivist)

legitimising tenet of European integration Magnette argues this search for plurality

inherently fosters a diffuse cosmopolitanism within the multi-dimensional European identity

(2007)

Constructivists argue the physical process of socialisation for instance as facilitated by the

Schengen Agreement goes beyond familiarising communities to one another by engendering

the development of a self-generating ldquotransnational cognitive communityrdquo (Adler 1997)

whereby both policy elites and the wider populous evolve their conceptions of the

community to which they belong and by extension for which they are responsible

This process of socialisation is supported by empirical research demonstrating European

integration has become increasingly accepted over time (Winn 2001) Europe has become an

ldquoobject of loyaltyrdquo (Paasi 2002) Yet an individualrsquos concept of lsquoEuropersquo to which this

loyalty has developed is notably diffuse an assimilation of co-optive and coercive social

interactions at the local national and regional levels

This exposes the failings of state centric interpretations of integration Inter-governmental

interaction simultaneously conditions and is conditioned by domestic perceptions of those

with which it is interacting Realist and institutionalist dismissal of local regional discourse

results in an artificial separation of the domestic and international realms at odds with post-

modern international relations

Page | 16

Asymmetrical interdependence similarly exposes a relative gains capability centred

framework as insufficient to understanding European integration Kaganrsquos realist

interpretation of Europe as being ldquomore accepting of failurerdquo and more concerned with

ldquoprocess over resultrdquo (in Acharya 2007) can be best reconciled with a constructivist

interpretation if the institutions have come to embody a process constitutive of characteristics

with which Europe collectively identifies Adler suggests ldquoWhat matters most is not short-

range success but the construction of a foundation for practice and behaviourrdquo (1997)

Constructivist interpretations of socialisation are also supported by research suggesting

Europersquos self-perception as a unitary actor is becoming increasingly positive (Caporaso amp

Min-hyung 2009) According to Hegel ldquoindividuals after having mutually recognised each

other recognise themselves and thus become citizenshellip to be acknowledged by the other

strengthens self-esteemrdquo (in Magnette 2007)

A cognitive process of grouping states together based on perceived homogeneity in

preference and practice occurs Institutionalised cooperation acts as a catalyst in this process

Cooperation leads to a harmonisation of interests and group members come to be viewed as

inherently rather than merely contingently positive (Cram 2009) Regions therefore

represent ideational as well as material entities

By understanding actorsrsquo interests as being conditioned by those with which it interacts

constructivism assumes what Tocci et al refer to as ldquobounded rationalityrdquo An actorrsquos

perceived interests being simultaneously determined by the underlying (often opaque)

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 6

Enlargement of the European Union plays a central role in this image embodying its

inclusivity and is considered an essential component of European security making Offers of

accession to neighbouring states explicitly define the limits of the Unionrsquos lsquoregionrsquo marking

the boundaries of the European identity Such a policy implicitly ascribes an alternative

identity to those European states without accession prospects

Investigating how Europe projects its norms onto states it considers not to share an identity

with will therefore elucidate any integrity in European claims to normativity as well as the

transformative power this process of norm projection entails Of particular interest in this

regard is Belarus a former-Soviet state alluded to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo which

has maintained consistently poor relations with the EU since its independence

This paper proposes that if the EU is to genuinely adhere to its normative identity instead of

excluding Belarus from European institutionalism it should actively seek to engage the

government of Minsk Meaningful engagement offers the greatest chance for Europe to

realise its transformative potential

The paper is set out as follows Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical rationale for states to

pursue regionalisation and the role institutional development plays in identity construction

Chapter 2 considers the potential for normativity in foreign policy making and establishes an

analytical framework for its assessment Chapter 3 discusses the development of EU-Belarus

relations arguing EU policy can be considered broadly normative however if the EU is to

demonstrate meaningful transformative influence a fundamental rethinking of its policies

Page | 7

must be implemented The paper concludes by suggesting that the nature of EU-Belarus

relations signifies a potentially destabilising conflict within the EUrsquos normative self-

conception

Page | 8

Chapter 1

Constructing a European Identity

In what has been descried as the ldquopost Keynesianhellip competitive staterdquo a ldquorescalingrdquo of

governance in the political economic and security spheres has occurred (Paasi 2009) As

state monopolies over economic and information transactions have been eroded ldquoalmost

every country in the world has chosen to meet the challenges of globalisation in part through

a regional responserdquo (Fawn 2009) This phenomenon has been accompanied by the

development of regionalism as an analytically distinct strand of IR scholarship

The definition of lsquoa regionrsquo within IR is contested however consensus has emerged over the

physical proximity of constituent states sharing aspects of identity that crucially enable self-

identification For the purpose of this paper I consider a region as defined by Pace ldquoa sub-

system of states linked by geographical relationship mutual interdependence and subjective

perception of belonging to a distinctive communityrdquo (2006 p27)

To IR theorists regions constitute miniaturised international systems subject to both

endogenous and exogenous forces As with the global system regional scholarship has

fostered the application of theoretical frameworks in order to interpret both their

development and patterns of behaviour

Page | 9

The concept of lsquoregionalisationrsquo defined as ldquothe explicit process of adapting norms and

identity to both align with and shape a new collective set of prioritiesrdquo (Warleigh-Lack

2010 p45) forms the basis of these debates This chapter will explore the theoretical

rationale for nation states to pursue cooperation and the extent to which they maintain

direction over the course of integration Regional studies through realism and

institutionalism has typically emphasised the centrality of the state within regional

interactions yet the post-Cold War development of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA)

from which lsquoregionalisationrsquo emerged has begun to view regional cooperation in ideational

rather than functional terms encompassing a plurality of actors beyond the state (Acharya

2007)

Such a debate is of particular relevance when considering the unprecedented level of

integration embodied by the European Union and its own apparent desire to be identified by

its ideational composition This in turn poses questions as to the nature of lsquopowerrsquo entailed

within European integration and Europersquos ability to capitalise upon the normativity it claims

to espouse

Inevitably loss of sovereignty and national identity remain critical elements of Europersquos

domestic political discourse (Sutcliffe 2010 p64) yet undoubtedly Europe is developing its

own unique regional identity through the process of integration This identity has

simultaneously been heralded as a potential model for supra-national global cooperation

(Giesmann 2010 p271) and derided as post-modern civilizational imperialism (Mayer

2010 p276) Understanding this process is therefore essential to understanding Europersquos

continued development and its role in a both globalised and regionalised world

Page | 10

Perhaps counter-intuitively given the neurosis underpinning realist assumptions of world

order realism has contributed significantly to regional discourse Regional cooperation is

viewed in purely self-interested functionalist terms with institution creation as a means to

engender efficiency gains and therefore maximise capability through state-state transactions

(Pace 2006) International institutions exist within an anarchical system and relative gains

theory remains central to realist analyses Institutions become new arenas for states to

compete through balance of power theory (Adler 2009 p63) Realists recognise the utility

of cooperation but resist interdependency States remain the sole arbiters of their sovereignty

Institutionalist discourse takes a similar understanding of the centrality of the state within

international institutions and the search for efficiency gains in an equally hostile global

system (Pace 2006 p30) The utility of an institution is dependent upon the compatibility of

goals of member states Institutions labouring amongst diametrically opposed state interests

will become an arena for competition However institutions serve to facilitate cooperation

when it is in the collective interest to do so (Webber 2007 p51)

Neo-liberal institutionalism furthers the functionalist argument by considering institutions an

ldquoinherent goodrdquo Droidge notes the socialisation and trust building effect on policy makers

and the legalising effect they transcribe on international relations (2007) This process it is

argued is evidenced in the EUrsquos tendency to create region wide legally binding norms Neo-

liberal institutionalism also contributes to NRA by positing domestic political and non-state

actors possess the capacity to influence the direction of institutional development (Pace

2006 p30)

Page | 11

The most innovative body of work within NRA however is comprised of constructivist

analyses According to Paasi regional integration is intimately linked with the process of

identity construction Regions are ldquomaderdquo through social practice and custom combining

both ldquomaterialrdquo and ldquovirtualrdquo elements (2009) While state interaction and institutional

development are conditioning factors regional characteristics are a result of power relations

encompassing numerous social spheres not simply limited to the process of cooperation at

the state level

Much academic literature concerns the proliferation of regional lsquosecurity communitiesrsquo

defined by Adler and Barnett as a ldquotransnational region comprised of sovereign states whose

people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful exchange [with] neither the expectation

of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputesrdquo (1998

pp30-34) Cooperation is fostered and capabilities are maximized through division of labour

(Acharya 2007)

The extent to which this division of labour is consensual or contested tacit or explicit varies

greatly between regional groupings (Fawcett 2004) yet the extent to which states are willing

to delegate tasks to an international institution may be highly illustrative of both the

preferences it will seek to pursue and process of cooperation it embarks upon

Laursen distinguishes between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo institutionalism suggesting states

pursuing the former possess fixed preferences and seek to maximise these preferences

Page | 12

through institutions (2010 pp10-12) A belief in the trustworthiness of the institution is the

minimum prerequisite for deferral of decision making capacity (Magnette 2007)

The extent to which rational institutionalism can lead to the development of a security

community is however questionable If institutions exist in an anarchic world with states

acting solely in self-interest cooperation will always be constrained A state unwilling to

make significant sacrifice for another cannot expect significant sacrifice in return In this

scenario neither state can be considered ultimately secure

Yet the EU constitutes both a region and security community as defined above exhibiting an

unusually explicit and extensive division of labour amongst its institutions An empirical

study by Caporaso and Min-hyung has also suggested that Europeans favour joint decision

making in areas such as foreign policy immigration monetary policy and defence areas

traditionally associated with state sovereignty (2009)

According to neo-liberal institutionalists such ldquopeculiar forms of political interactionrdquo (Pace

2006 p27) foster the process of socialisation ldquoparticipation in and accountability to

transnational institutions can transcend national boundariesrdquo modifying state behaviour as a

result (Fawcett 2004) At a basic level elite socialisation through institutionalised diplomacy

and cooperation develops familiarity leading to an expectation of essentially benign state

interaction Continuity of this expectation is essential Moravcsik argues such socialisation

also leads to ldquoasymmetrical interdependencerdquo the more a state comes to rely upon an

Page | 13

institution or collaborative network the more it will compromise its initial preferences to

maintain it (in Laursen 2010 p7)

Such an analysis may explain the level of integration witnessed in the EU If a member state

expects a partner state to compromise its initial preferences in favour of a collective

preference it too may be inclined towards collective decision making

Ruggie however suggests that within security communities states perceive insecurity both

individually and collectively This it is argued is a result of a constitutive process whereby

states begin to assimilate a collective identity that becomes endogenised into their own (in

Adler 1997) Such analyses argue that liberal-functionalist conceptions of regional

integration fail to account for the self-identification component crucial to a region or security

community

Magnette argues the emerging European citizenry is increasingly identifying itself with both

national and regional communities (2007) Increasing horizontal ties between states and the

development of vertical bonds between the European populous and Brussels are transforming

perceived political and social patronage structures

Participation in the integration process is essential for the association and development of a

lsquoEuropeanrsquo identity ldquoIdentity formation is directly proportional to individuals internalising

Page | 14

and articulating commitmentsrdquo (Winn 2001) Europeansrsquo commitments are increasingly

derived from their regulatory institutions

Other research finds EU discourse is increasingly prevalent at the sub-national level

Socialisation through EU institutions is serving to foster the local identities of areas such as

Wales and Catalonia through increased exposure to nation states Similarly Malta a country

whose population traditionally identifies itself along religious cleavages - described as ldquoa

nationless staterdquo - is developing both coherent lsquoMaltesersquo and lsquoEuropeanrsquo identities (Cram

2009)

Conceptualised as a progression from preference based lsquorational institutionalismrsquo towards a

lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo embodying many of the ideational elements associated with

constructivism the process of European institution building is perceived as contributing to

the web of ldquocognitive templates that define identities and preferencesrdquo (Laursen 2010 p12)

Academic literature on the nature of identity is unequivocal in its fluidity The ideational

developments described by Magnette and Cram have both coincided with and been

facilitated by European institutional development (Fawcett 2004) As Europersquos various

institutions permeate the day-to-day lives of the European populous institutionalism has

developed as a distinct ideational facet of Europersquos identity and one upon which numerous

others are dependent

Page | 15

Therefore if (neo-liberal) prevention of hegemony through plurality is taken as a function of

institutions it is conceivable that institutionalised multilateralism becomes a (constructivist)

legitimising tenet of European integration Magnette argues this search for plurality

inherently fosters a diffuse cosmopolitanism within the multi-dimensional European identity

(2007)

Constructivists argue the physical process of socialisation for instance as facilitated by the

Schengen Agreement goes beyond familiarising communities to one another by engendering

the development of a self-generating ldquotransnational cognitive communityrdquo (Adler 1997)

whereby both policy elites and the wider populous evolve their conceptions of the

community to which they belong and by extension for which they are responsible

This process of socialisation is supported by empirical research demonstrating European

integration has become increasingly accepted over time (Winn 2001) Europe has become an

ldquoobject of loyaltyrdquo (Paasi 2002) Yet an individualrsquos concept of lsquoEuropersquo to which this

loyalty has developed is notably diffuse an assimilation of co-optive and coercive social

interactions at the local national and regional levels

This exposes the failings of state centric interpretations of integration Inter-governmental

interaction simultaneously conditions and is conditioned by domestic perceptions of those

with which it is interacting Realist and institutionalist dismissal of local regional discourse

results in an artificial separation of the domestic and international realms at odds with post-

modern international relations

Page | 16

Asymmetrical interdependence similarly exposes a relative gains capability centred

framework as insufficient to understanding European integration Kaganrsquos realist

interpretation of Europe as being ldquomore accepting of failurerdquo and more concerned with

ldquoprocess over resultrdquo (in Acharya 2007) can be best reconciled with a constructivist

interpretation if the institutions have come to embody a process constitutive of characteristics

with which Europe collectively identifies Adler suggests ldquoWhat matters most is not short-

range success but the construction of a foundation for practice and behaviourrdquo (1997)

Constructivist interpretations of socialisation are also supported by research suggesting

Europersquos self-perception as a unitary actor is becoming increasingly positive (Caporaso amp

Min-hyung 2009) According to Hegel ldquoindividuals after having mutually recognised each

other recognise themselves and thus become citizenshellip to be acknowledged by the other

strengthens self-esteemrdquo (in Magnette 2007)

A cognitive process of grouping states together based on perceived homogeneity in

preference and practice occurs Institutionalised cooperation acts as a catalyst in this process

Cooperation leads to a harmonisation of interests and group members come to be viewed as

inherently rather than merely contingently positive (Cram 2009) Regions therefore

represent ideational as well as material entities

By understanding actorsrsquo interests as being conditioned by those with which it interacts

constructivism assumes what Tocci et al refer to as ldquobounded rationalityrdquo An actorrsquos

perceived interests being simultaneously determined by the underlying (often opaque)

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 7

must be implemented The paper concludes by suggesting that the nature of EU-Belarus

relations signifies a potentially destabilising conflict within the EUrsquos normative self-

conception

Page | 8

Chapter 1

Constructing a European Identity

In what has been descried as the ldquopost Keynesianhellip competitive staterdquo a ldquorescalingrdquo of

governance in the political economic and security spheres has occurred (Paasi 2009) As

state monopolies over economic and information transactions have been eroded ldquoalmost

every country in the world has chosen to meet the challenges of globalisation in part through

a regional responserdquo (Fawn 2009) This phenomenon has been accompanied by the

development of regionalism as an analytically distinct strand of IR scholarship

The definition of lsquoa regionrsquo within IR is contested however consensus has emerged over the

physical proximity of constituent states sharing aspects of identity that crucially enable self-

identification For the purpose of this paper I consider a region as defined by Pace ldquoa sub-

system of states linked by geographical relationship mutual interdependence and subjective

perception of belonging to a distinctive communityrdquo (2006 p27)

To IR theorists regions constitute miniaturised international systems subject to both

endogenous and exogenous forces As with the global system regional scholarship has

fostered the application of theoretical frameworks in order to interpret both their

development and patterns of behaviour

Page | 9

The concept of lsquoregionalisationrsquo defined as ldquothe explicit process of adapting norms and

identity to both align with and shape a new collective set of prioritiesrdquo (Warleigh-Lack

2010 p45) forms the basis of these debates This chapter will explore the theoretical

rationale for nation states to pursue cooperation and the extent to which they maintain

direction over the course of integration Regional studies through realism and

institutionalism has typically emphasised the centrality of the state within regional

interactions yet the post-Cold War development of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA)

from which lsquoregionalisationrsquo emerged has begun to view regional cooperation in ideational

rather than functional terms encompassing a plurality of actors beyond the state (Acharya

2007)

Such a debate is of particular relevance when considering the unprecedented level of

integration embodied by the European Union and its own apparent desire to be identified by

its ideational composition This in turn poses questions as to the nature of lsquopowerrsquo entailed

within European integration and Europersquos ability to capitalise upon the normativity it claims

to espouse

Inevitably loss of sovereignty and national identity remain critical elements of Europersquos

domestic political discourse (Sutcliffe 2010 p64) yet undoubtedly Europe is developing its

own unique regional identity through the process of integration This identity has

simultaneously been heralded as a potential model for supra-national global cooperation

(Giesmann 2010 p271) and derided as post-modern civilizational imperialism (Mayer

2010 p276) Understanding this process is therefore essential to understanding Europersquos

continued development and its role in a both globalised and regionalised world

Page | 10

Perhaps counter-intuitively given the neurosis underpinning realist assumptions of world

order realism has contributed significantly to regional discourse Regional cooperation is

viewed in purely self-interested functionalist terms with institution creation as a means to

engender efficiency gains and therefore maximise capability through state-state transactions

(Pace 2006) International institutions exist within an anarchical system and relative gains

theory remains central to realist analyses Institutions become new arenas for states to

compete through balance of power theory (Adler 2009 p63) Realists recognise the utility

of cooperation but resist interdependency States remain the sole arbiters of their sovereignty

Institutionalist discourse takes a similar understanding of the centrality of the state within

international institutions and the search for efficiency gains in an equally hostile global

system (Pace 2006 p30) The utility of an institution is dependent upon the compatibility of

goals of member states Institutions labouring amongst diametrically opposed state interests

will become an arena for competition However institutions serve to facilitate cooperation

when it is in the collective interest to do so (Webber 2007 p51)

Neo-liberal institutionalism furthers the functionalist argument by considering institutions an

ldquoinherent goodrdquo Droidge notes the socialisation and trust building effect on policy makers

and the legalising effect they transcribe on international relations (2007) This process it is

argued is evidenced in the EUrsquos tendency to create region wide legally binding norms Neo-

liberal institutionalism also contributes to NRA by positing domestic political and non-state

actors possess the capacity to influence the direction of institutional development (Pace

2006 p30)

Page | 11

The most innovative body of work within NRA however is comprised of constructivist

analyses According to Paasi regional integration is intimately linked with the process of

identity construction Regions are ldquomaderdquo through social practice and custom combining

both ldquomaterialrdquo and ldquovirtualrdquo elements (2009) While state interaction and institutional

development are conditioning factors regional characteristics are a result of power relations

encompassing numerous social spheres not simply limited to the process of cooperation at

the state level

Much academic literature concerns the proliferation of regional lsquosecurity communitiesrsquo

defined by Adler and Barnett as a ldquotransnational region comprised of sovereign states whose

people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful exchange [with] neither the expectation

of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputesrdquo (1998

pp30-34) Cooperation is fostered and capabilities are maximized through division of labour

(Acharya 2007)

The extent to which this division of labour is consensual or contested tacit or explicit varies

greatly between regional groupings (Fawcett 2004) yet the extent to which states are willing

to delegate tasks to an international institution may be highly illustrative of both the

preferences it will seek to pursue and process of cooperation it embarks upon

Laursen distinguishes between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo institutionalism suggesting states

pursuing the former possess fixed preferences and seek to maximise these preferences

Page | 12

through institutions (2010 pp10-12) A belief in the trustworthiness of the institution is the

minimum prerequisite for deferral of decision making capacity (Magnette 2007)

The extent to which rational institutionalism can lead to the development of a security

community is however questionable If institutions exist in an anarchic world with states

acting solely in self-interest cooperation will always be constrained A state unwilling to

make significant sacrifice for another cannot expect significant sacrifice in return In this

scenario neither state can be considered ultimately secure

Yet the EU constitutes both a region and security community as defined above exhibiting an

unusually explicit and extensive division of labour amongst its institutions An empirical

study by Caporaso and Min-hyung has also suggested that Europeans favour joint decision

making in areas such as foreign policy immigration monetary policy and defence areas

traditionally associated with state sovereignty (2009)

According to neo-liberal institutionalists such ldquopeculiar forms of political interactionrdquo (Pace

2006 p27) foster the process of socialisation ldquoparticipation in and accountability to

transnational institutions can transcend national boundariesrdquo modifying state behaviour as a

result (Fawcett 2004) At a basic level elite socialisation through institutionalised diplomacy

and cooperation develops familiarity leading to an expectation of essentially benign state

interaction Continuity of this expectation is essential Moravcsik argues such socialisation

also leads to ldquoasymmetrical interdependencerdquo the more a state comes to rely upon an

Page | 13

institution or collaborative network the more it will compromise its initial preferences to

maintain it (in Laursen 2010 p7)

Such an analysis may explain the level of integration witnessed in the EU If a member state

expects a partner state to compromise its initial preferences in favour of a collective

preference it too may be inclined towards collective decision making

Ruggie however suggests that within security communities states perceive insecurity both

individually and collectively This it is argued is a result of a constitutive process whereby

states begin to assimilate a collective identity that becomes endogenised into their own (in

Adler 1997) Such analyses argue that liberal-functionalist conceptions of regional

integration fail to account for the self-identification component crucial to a region or security

community

Magnette argues the emerging European citizenry is increasingly identifying itself with both

national and regional communities (2007) Increasing horizontal ties between states and the

development of vertical bonds between the European populous and Brussels are transforming

perceived political and social patronage structures

Participation in the integration process is essential for the association and development of a

lsquoEuropeanrsquo identity ldquoIdentity formation is directly proportional to individuals internalising

Page | 14

and articulating commitmentsrdquo (Winn 2001) Europeansrsquo commitments are increasingly

derived from their regulatory institutions

Other research finds EU discourse is increasingly prevalent at the sub-national level

Socialisation through EU institutions is serving to foster the local identities of areas such as

Wales and Catalonia through increased exposure to nation states Similarly Malta a country

whose population traditionally identifies itself along religious cleavages - described as ldquoa

nationless staterdquo - is developing both coherent lsquoMaltesersquo and lsquoEuropeanrsquo identities (Cram

2009)

Conceptualised as a progression from preference based lsquorational institutionalismrsquo towards a

lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo embodying many of the ideational elements associated with

constructivism the process of European institution building is perceived as contributing to

the web of ldquocognitive templates that define identities and preferencesrdquo (Laursen 2010 p12)

Academic literature on the nature of identity is unequivocal in its fluidity The ideational

developments described by Magnette and Cram have both coincided with and been

facilitated by European institutional development (Fawcett 2004) As Europersquos various

institutions permeate the day-to-day lives of the European populous institutionalism has

developed as a distinct ideational facet of Europersquos identity and one upon which numerous

others are dependent

Page | 15

Therefore if (neo-liberal) prevention of hegemony through plurality is taken as a function of

institutions it is conceivable that institutionalised multilateralism becomes a (constructivist)

legitimising tenet of European integration Magnette argues this search for plurality

inherently fosters a diffuse cosmopolitanism within the multi-dimensional European identity

(2007)

Constructivists argue the physical process of socialisation for instance as facilitated by the

Schengen Agreement goes beyond familiarising communities to one another by engendering

the development of a self-generating ldquotransnational cognitive communityrdquo (Adler 1997)

whereby both policy elites and the wider populous evolve their conceptions of the

community to which they belong and by extension for which they are responsible

This process of socialisation is supported by empirical research demonstrating European

integration has become increasingly accepted over time (Winn 2001) Europe has become an

ldquoobject of loyaltyrdquo (Paasi 2002) Yet an individualrsquos concept of lsquoEuropersquo to which this

loyalty has developed is notably diffuse an assimilation of co-optive and coercive social

interactions at the local national and regional levels

This exposes the failings of state centric interpretations of integration Inter-governmental

interaction simultaneously conditions and is conditioned by domestic perceptions of those

with which it is interacting Realist and institutionalist dismissal of local regional discourse

results in an artificial separation of the domestic and international realms at odds with post-

modern international relations

Page | 16

Asymmetrical interdependence similarly exposes a relative gains capability centred

framework as insufficient to understanding European integration Kaganrsquos realist

interpretation of Europe as being ldquomore accepting of failurerdquo and more concerned with

ldquoprocess over resultrdquo (in Acharya 2007) can be best reconciled with a constructivist

interpretation if the institutions have come to embody a process constitutive of characteristics

with which Europe collectively identifies Adler suggests ldquoWhat matters most is not short-

range success but the construction of a foundation for practice and behaviourrdquo (1997)

Constructivist interpretations of socialisation are also supported by research suggesting

Europersquos self-perception as a unitary actor is becoming increasingly positive (Caporaso amp

Min-hyung 2009) According to Hegel ldquoindividuals after having mutually recognised each

other recognise themselves and thus become citizenshellip to be acknowledged by the other

strengthens self-esteemrdquo (in Magnette 2007)

A cognitive process of grouping states together based on perceived homogeneity in

preference and practice occurs Institutionalised cooperation acts as a catalyst in this process

Cooperation leads to a harmonisation of interests and group members come to be viewed as

inherently rather than merely contingently positive (Cram 2009) Regions therefore

represent ideational as well as material entities

By understanding actorsrsquo interests as being conditioned by those with which it interacts

constructivism assumes what Tocci et al refer to as ldquobounded rationalityrdquo An actorrsquos

perceived interests being simultaneously determined by the underlying (often opaque)

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 8

Chapter 1

Constructing a European Identity

In what has been descried as the ldquopost Keynesianhellip competitive staterdquo a ldquorescalingrdquo of

governance in the political economic and security spheres has occurred (Paasi 2009) As

state monopolies over economic and information transactions have been eroded ldquoalmost

every country in the world has chosen to meet the challenges of globalisation in part through

a regional responserdquo (Fawn 2009) This phenomenon has been accompanied by the

development of regionalism as an analytically distinct strand of IR scholarship

The definition of lsquoa regionrsquo within IR is contested however consensus has emerged over the

physical proximity of constituent states sharing aspects of identity that crucially enable self-

identification For the purpose of this paper I consider a region as defined by Pace ldquoa sub-

system of states linked by geographical relationship mutual interdependence and subjective

perception of belonging to a distinctive communityrdquo (2006 p27)

To IR theorists regions constitute miniaturised international systems subject to both

endogenous and exogenous forces As with the global system regional scholarship has

fostered the application of theoretical frameworks in order to interpret both their

development and patterns of behaviour

Page | 9

The concept of lsquoregionalisationrsquo defined as ldquothe explicit process of adapting norms and

identity to both align with and shape a new collective set of prioritiesrdquo (Warleigh-Lack

2010 p45) forms the basis of these debates This chapter will explore the theoretical

rationale for nation states to pursue cooperation and the extent to which they maintain

direction over the course of integration Regional studies through realism and

institutionalism has typically emphasised the centrality of the state within regional

interactions yet the post-Cold War development of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA)

from which lsquoregionalisationrsquo emerged has begun to view regional cooperation in ideational

rather than functional terms encompassing a plurality of actors beyond the state (Acharya

2007)

Such a debate is of particular relevance when considering the unprecedented level of

integration embodied by the European Union and its own apparent desire to be identified by

its ideational composition This in turn poses questions as to the nature of lsquopowerrsquo entailed

within European integration and Europersquos ability to capitalise upon the normativity it claims

to espouse

Inevitably loss of sovereignty and national identity remain critical elements of Europersquos

domestic political discourse (Sutcliffe 2010 p64) yet undoubtedly Europe is developing its

own unique regional identity through the process of integration This identity has

simultaneously been heralded as a potential model for supra-national global cooperation

(Giesmann 2010 p271) and derided as post-modern civilizational imperialism (Mayer

2010 p276) Understanding this process is therefore essential to understanding Europersquos

continued development and its role in a both globalised and regionalised world

Page | 10

Perhaps counter-intuitively given the neurosis underpinning realist assumptions of world

order realism has contributed significantly to regional discourse Regional cooperation is

viewed in purely self-interested functionalist terms with institution creation as a means to

engender efficiency gains and therefore maximise capability through state-state transactions

(Pace 2006) International institutions exist within an anarchical system and relative gains

theory remains central to realist analyses Institutions become new arenas for states to

compete through balance of power theory (Adler 2009 p63) Realists recognise the utility

of cooperation but resist interdependency States remain the sole arbiters of their sovereignty

Institutionalist discourse takes a similar understanding of the centrality of the state within

international institutions and the search for efficiency gains in an equally hostile global

system (Pace 2006 p30) The utility of an institution is dependent upon the compatibility of

goals of member states Institutions labouring amongst diametrically opposed state interests

will become an arena for competition However institutions serve to facilitate cooperation

when it is in the collective interest to do so (Webber 2007 p51)

Neo-liberal institutionalism furthers the functionalist argument by considering institutions an

ldquoinherent goodrdquo Droidge notes the socialisation and trust building effect on policy makers

and the legalising effect they transcribe on international relations (2007) This process it is

argued is evidenced in the EUrsquos tendency to create region wide legally binding norms Neo-

liberal institutionalism also contributes to NRA by positing domestic political and non-state

actors possess the capacity to influence the direction of institutional development (Pace

2006 p30)

Page | 11

The most innovative body of work within NRA however is comprised of constructivist

analyses According to Paasi regional integration is intimately linked with the process of

identity construction Regions are ldquomaderdquo through social practice and custom combining

both ldquomaterialrdquo and ldquovirtualrdquo elements (2009) While state interaction and institutional

development are conditioning factors regional characteristics are a result of power relations

encompassing numerous social spheres not simply limited to the process of cooperation at

the state level

Much academic literature concerns the proliferation of regional lsquosecurity communitiesrsquo

defined by Adler and Barnett as a ldquotransnational region comprised of sovereign states whose

people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful exchange [with] neither the expectation

of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputesrdquo (1998

pp30-34) Cooperation is fostered and capabilities are maximized through division of labour

(Acharya 2007)

The extent to which this division of labour is consensual or contested tacit or explicit varies

greatly between regional groupings (Fawcett 2004) yet the extent to which states are willing

to delegate tasks to an international institution may be highly illustrative of both the

preferences it will seek to pursue and process of cooperation it embarks upon

Laursen distinguishes between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo institutionalism suggesting states

pursuing the former possess fixed preferences and seek to maximise these preferences

Page | 12

through institutions (2010 pp10-12) A belief in the trustworthiness of the institution is the

minimum prerequisite for deferral of decision making capacity (Magnette 2007)

The extent to which rational institutionalism can lead to the development of a security

community is however questionable If institutions exist in an anarchic world with states

acting solely in self-interest cooperation will always be constrained A state unwilling to

make significant sacrifice for another cannot expect significant sacrifice in return In this

scenario neither state can be considered ultimately secure

Yet the EU constitutes both a region and security community as defined above exhibiting an

unusually explicit and extensive division of labour amongst its institutions An empirical

study by Caporaso and Min-hyung has also suggested that Europeans favour joint decision

making in areas such as foreign policy immigration monetary policy and defence areas

traditionally associated with state sovereignty (2009)

According to neo-liberal institutionalists such ldquopeculiar forms of political interactionrdquo (Pace

2006 p27) foster the process of socialisation ldquoparticipation in and accountability to

transnational institutions can transcend national boundariesrdquo modifying state behaviour as a

result (Fawcett 2004) At a basic level elite socialisation through institutionalised diplomacy

and cooperation develops familiarity leading to an expectation of essentially benign state

interaction Continuity of this expectation is essential Moravcsik argues such socialisation

also leads to ldquoasymmetrical interdependencerdquo the more a state comes to rely upon an

Page | 13

institution or collaborative network the more it will compromise its initial preferences to

maintain it (in Laursen 2010 p7)

Such an analysis may explain the level of integration witnessed in the EU If a member state

expects a partner state to compromise its initial preferences in favour of a collective

preference it too may be inclined towards collective decision making

Ruggie however suggests that within security communities states perceive insecurity both

individually and collectively This it is argued is a result of a constitutive process whereby

states begin to assimilate a collective identity that becomes endogenised into their own (in

Adler 1997) Such analyses argue that liberal-functionalist conceptions of regional

integration fail to account for the self-identification component crucial to a region or security

community

Magnette argues the emerging European citizenry is increasingly identifying itself with both

national and regional communities (2007) Increasing horizontal ties between states and the

development of vertical bonds between the European populous and Brussels are transforming

perceived political and social patronage structures

Participation in the integration process is essential for the association and development of a

lsquoEuropeanrsquo identity ldquoIdentity formation is directly proportional to individuals internalising

Page | 14

and articulating commitmentsrdquo (Winn 2001) Europeansrsquo commitments are increasingly

derived from their regulatory institutions

Other research finds EU discourse is increasingly prevalent at the sub-national level

Socialisation through EU institutions is serving to foster the local identities of areas such as

Wales and Catalonia through increased exposure to nation states Similarly Malta a country

whose population traditionally identifies itself along religious cleavages - described as ldquoa

nationless staterdquo - is developing both coherent lsquoMaltesersquo and lsquoEuropeanrsquo identities (Cram

2009)

Conceptualised as a progression from preference based lsquorational institutionalismrsquo towards a

lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo embodying many of the ideational elements associated with

constructivism the process of European institution building is perceived as contributing to

the web of ldquocognitive templates that define identities and preferencesrdquo (Laursen 2010 p12)

Academic literature on the nature of identity is unequivocal in its fluidity The ideational

developments described by Magnette and Cram have both coincided with and been

facilitated by European institutional development (Fawcett 2004) As Europersquos various

institutions permeate the day-to-day lives of the European populous institutionalism has

developed as a distinct ideational facet of Europersquos identity and one upon which numerous

others are dependent

Page | 15

Therefore if (neo-liberal) prevention of hegemony through plurality is taken as a function of

institutions it is conceivable that institutionalised multilateralism becomes a (constructivist)

legitimising tenet of European integration Magnette argues this search for plurality

inherently fosters a diffuse cosmopolitanism within the multi-dimensional European identity

(2007)

Constructivists argue the physical process of socialisation for instance as facilitated by the

Schengen Agreement goes beyond familiarising communities to one another by engendering

the development of a self-generating ldquotransnational cognitive communityrdquo (Adler 1997)

whereby both policy elites and the wider populous evolve their conceptions of the

community to which they belong and by extension for which they are responsible

This process of socialisation is supported by empirical research demonstrating European

integration has become increasingly accepted over time (Winn 2001) Europe has become an

ldquoobject of loyaltyrdquo (Paasi 2002) Yet an individualrsquos concept of lsquoEuropersquo to which this

loyalty has developed is notably diffuse an assimilation of co-optive and coercive social

interactions at the local national and regional levels

This exposes the failings of state centric interpretations of integration Inter-governmental

interaction simultaneously conditions and is conditioned by domestic perceptions of those

with which it is interacting Realist and institutionalist dismissal of local regional discourse

results in an artificial separation of the domestic and international realms at odds with post-

modern international relations

Page | 16

Asymmetrical interdependence similarly exposes a relative gains capability centred

framework as insufficient to understanding European integration Kaganrsquos realist

interpretation of Europe as being ldquomore accepting of failurerdquo and more concerned with

ldquoprocess over resultrdquo (in Acharya 2007) can be best reconciled with a constructivist

interpretation if the institutions have come to embody a process constitutive of characteristics

with which Europe collectively identifies Adler suggests ldquoWhat matters most is not short-

range success but the construction of a foundation for practice and behaviourrdquo (1997)

Constructivist interpretations of socialisation are also supported by research suggesting

Europersquos self-perception as a unitary actor is becoming increasingly positive (Caporaso amp

Min-hyung 2009) According to Hegel ldquoindividuals after having mutually recognised each

other recognise themselves and thus become citizenshellip to be acknowledged by the other

strengthens self-esteemrdquo (in Magnette 2007)

A cognitive process of grouping states together based on perceived homogeneity in

preference and practice occurs Institutionalised cooperation acts as a catalyst in this process

Cooperation leads to a harmonisation of interests and group members come to be viewed as

inherently rather than merely contingently positive (Cram 2009) Regions therefore

represent ideational as well as material entities

By understanding actorsrsquo interests as being conditioned by those with which it interacts

constructivism assumes what Tocci et al refer to as ldquobounded rationalityrdquo An actorrsquos

perceived interests being simultaneously determined by the underlying (often opaque)

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 9

The concept of lsquoregionalisationrsquo defined as ldquothe explicit process of adapting norms and

identity to both align with and shape a new collective set of prioritiesrdquo (Warleigh-Lack

2010 p45) forms the basis of these debates This chapter will explore the theoretical

rationale for nation states to pursue cooperation and the extent to which they maintain

direction over the course of integration Regional studies through realism and

institutionalism has typically emphasised the centrality of the state within regional

interactions yet the post-Cold War development of the New Regionalism Approach (NRA)

from which lsquoregionalisationrsquo emerged has begun to view regional cooperation in ideational

rather than functional terms encompassing a plurality of actors beyond the state (Acharya

2007)

Such a debate is of particular relevance when considering the unprecedented level of

integration embodied by the European Union and its own apparent desire to be identified by

its ideational composition This in turn poses questions as to the nature of lsquopowerrsquo entailed

within European integration and Europersquos ability to capitalise upon the normativity it claims

to espouse

Inevitably loss of sovereignty and national identity remain critical elements of Europersquos

domestic political discourse (Sutcliffe 2010 p64) yet undoubtedly Europe is developing its

own unique regional identity through the process of integration This identity has

simultaneously been heralded as a potential model for supra-national global cooperation

(Giesmann 2010 p271) and derided as post-modern civilizational imperialism (Mayer

2010 p276) Understanding this process is therefore essential to understanding Europersquos

continued development and its role in a both globalised and regionalised world

Page | 10

Perhaps counter-intuitively given the neurosis underpinning realist assumptions of world

order realism has contributed significantly to regional discourse Regional cooperation is

viewed in purely self-interested functionalist terms with institution creation as a means to

engender efficiency gains and therefore maximise capability through state-state transactions

(Pace 2006) International institutions exist within an anarchical system and relative gains

theory remains central to realist analyses Institutions become new arenas for states to

compete through balance of power theory (Adler 2009 p63) Realists recognise the utility

of cooperation but resist interdependency States remain the sole arbiters of their sovereignty

Institutionalist discourse takes a similar understanding of the centrality of the state within

international institutions and the search for efficiency gains in an equally hostile global

system (Pace 2006 p30) The utility of an institution is dependent upon the compatibility of

goals of member states Institutions labouring amongst diametrically opposed state interests

will become an arena for competition However institutions serve to facilitate cooperation

when it is in the collective interest to do so (Webber 2007 p51)

Neo-liberal institutionalism furthers the functionalist argument by considering institutions an

ldquoinherent goodrdquo Droidge notes the socialisation and trust building effect on policy makers

and the legalising effect they transcribe on international relations (2007) This process it is

argued is evidenced in the EUrsquos tendency to create region wide legally binding norms Neo-

liberal institutionalism also contributes to NRA by positing domestic political and non-state

actors possess the capacity to influence the direction of institutional development (Pace

2006 p30)

Page | 11

The most innovative body of work within NRA however is comprised of constructivist

analyses According to Paasi regional integration is intimately linked with the process of

identity construction Regions are ldquomaderdquo through social practice and custom combining

both ldquomaterialrdquo and ldquovirtualrdquo elements (2009) While state interaction and institutional

development are conditioning factors regional characteristics are a result of power relations

encompassing numerous social spheres not simply limited to the process of cooperation at

the state level

Much academic literature concerns the proliferation of regional lsquosecurity communitiesrsquo

defined by Adler and Barnett as a ldquotransnational region comprised of sovereign states whose

people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful exchange [with] neither the expectation

of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputesrdquo (1998

pp30-34) Cooperation is fostered and capabilities are maximized through division of labour

(Acharya 2007)

The extent to which this division of labour is consensual or contested tacit or explicit varies

greatly between regional groupings (Fawcett 2004) yet the extent to which states are willing

to delegate tasks to an international institution may be highly illustrative of both the

preferences it will seek to pursue and process of cooperation it embarks upon

Laursen distinguishes between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo institutionalism suggesting states

pursuing the former possess fixed preferences and seek to maximise these preferences

Page | 12

through institutions (2010 pp10-12) A belief in the trustworthiness of the institution is the

minimum prerequisite for deferral of decision making capacity (Magnette 2007)

The extent to which rational institutionalism can lead to the development of a security

community is however questionable If institutions exist in an anarchic world with states

acting solely in self-interest cooperation will always be constrained A state unwilling to

make significant sacrifice for another cannot expect significant sacrifice in return In this

scenario neither state can be considered ultimately secure

Yet the EU constitutes both a region and security community as defined above exhibiting an

unusually explicit and extensive division of labour amongst its institutions An empirical

study by Caporaso and Min-hyung has also suggested that Europeans favour joint decision

making in areas such as foreign policy immigration monetary policy and defence areas

traditionally associated with state sovereignty (2009)

According to neo-liberal institutionalists such ldquopeculiar forms of political interactionrdquo (Pace

2006 p27) foster the process of socialisation ldquoparticipation in and accountability to

transnational institutions can transcend national boundariesrdquo modifying state behaviour as a

result (Fawcett 2004) At a basic level elite socialisation through institutionalised diplomacy

and cooperation develops familiarity leading to an expectation of essentially benign state

interaction Continuity of this expectation is essential Moravcsik argues such socialisation

also leads to ldquoasymmetrical interdependencerdquo the more a state comes to rely upon an

Page | 13

institution or collaborative network the more it will compromise its initial preferences to

maintain it (in Laursen 2010 p7)

Such an analysis may explain the level of integration witnessed in the EU If a member state

expects a partner state to compromise its initial preferences in favour of a collective

preference it too may be inclined towards collective decision making

Ruggie however suggests that within security communities states perceive insecurity both

individually and collectively This it is argued is a result of a constitutive process whereby

states begin to assimilate a collective identity that becomes endogenised into their own (in

Adler 1997) Such analyses argue that liberal-functionalist conceptions of regional

integration fail to account for the self-identification component crucial to a region or security

community

Magnette argues the emerging European citizenry is increasingly identifying itself with both

national and regional communities (2007) Increasing horizontal ties between states and the

development of vertical bonds between the European populous and Brussels are transforming

perceived political and social patronage structures

Participation in the integration process is essential for the association and development of a

lsquoEuropeanrsquo identity ldquoIdentity formation is directly proportional to individuals internalising

Page | 14

and articulating commitmentsrdquo (Winn 2001) Europeansrsquo commitments are increasingly

derived from their regulatory institutions

Other research finds EU discourse is increasingly prevalent at the sub-national level

Socialisation through EU institutions is serving to foster the local identities of areas such as

Wales and Catalonia through increased exposure to nation states Similarly Malta a country

whose population traditionally identifies itself along religious cleavages - described as ldquoa

nationless staterdquo - is developing both coherent lsquoMaltesersquo and lsquoEuropeanrsquo identities (Cram

2009)

Conceptualised as a progression from preference based lsquorational institutionalismrsquo towards a

lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo embodying many of the ideational elements associated with

constructivism the process of European institution building is perceived as contributing to

the web of ldquocognitive templates that define identities and preferencesrdquo (Laursen 2010 p12)

Academic literature on the nature of identity is unequivocal in its fluidity The ideational

developments described by Magnette and Cram have both coincided with and been

facilitated by European institutional development (Fawcett 2004) As Europersquos various

institutions permeate the day-to-day lives of the European populous institutionalism has

developed as a distinct ideational facet of Europersquos identity and one upon which numerous

others are dependent

Page | 15

Therefore if (neo-liberal) prevention of hegemony through plurality is taken as a function of

institutions it is conceivable that institutionalised multilateralism becomes a (constructivist)

legitimising tenet of European integration Magnette argues this search for plurality

inherently fosters a diffuse cosmopolitanism within the multi-dimensional European identity

(2007)

Constructivists argue the physical process of socialisation for instance as facilitated by the

Schengen Agreement goes beyond familiarising communities to one another by engendering

the development of a self-generating ldquotransnational cognitive communityrdquo (Adler 1997)

whereby both policy elites and the wider populous evolve their conceptions of the

community to which they belong and by extension for which they are responsible

This process of socialisation is supported by empirical research demonstrating European

integration has become increasingly accepted over time (Winn 2001) Europe has become an

ldquoobject of loyaltyrdquo (Paasi 2002) Yet an individualrsquos concept of lsquoEuropersquo to which this

loyalty has developed is notably diffuse an assimilation of co-optive and coercive social

interactions at the local national and regional levels

This exposes the failings of state centric interpretations of integration Inter-governmental

interaction simultaneously conditions and is conditioned by domestic perceptions of those

with which it is interacting Realist and institutionalist dismissal of local regional discourse

results in an artificial separation of the domestic and international realms at odds with post-

modern international relations

Page | 16

Asymmetrical interdependence similarly exposes a relative gains capability centred

framework as insufficient to understanding European integration Kaganrsquos realist

interpretation of Europe as being ldquomore accepting of failurerdquo and more concerned with

ldquoprocess over resultrdquo (in Acharya 2007) can be best reconciled with a constructivist

interpretation if the institutions have come to embody a process constitutive of characteristics

with which Europe collectively identifies Adler suggests ldquoWhat matters most is not short-

range success but the construction of a foundation for practice and behaviourrdquo (1997)

Constructivist interpretations of socialisation are also supported by research suggesting

Europersquos self-perception as a unitary actor is becoming increasingly positive (Caporaso amp

Min-hyung 2009) According to Hegel ldquoindividuals after having mutually recognised each

other recognise themselves and thus become citizenshellip to be acknowledged by the other

strengthens self-esteemrdquo (in Magnette 2007)

A cognitive process of grouping states together based on perceived homogeneity in

preference and practice occurs Institutionalised cooperation acts as a catalyst in this process

Cooperation leads to a harmonisation of interests and group members come to be viewed as

inherently rather than merely contingently positive (Cram 2009) Regions therefore

represent ideational as well as material entities

By understanding actorsrsquo interests as being conditioned by those with which it interacts

constructivism assumes what Tocci et al refer to as ldquobounded rationalityrdquo An actorrsquos

perceived interests being simultaneously determined by the underlying (often opaque)

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

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Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

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Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

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Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

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EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

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Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

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Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

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Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

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Page | 56

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Page | 57

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Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 10

Perhaps counter-intuitively given the neurosis underpinning realist assumptions of world

order realism has contributed significantly to regional discourse Regional cooperation is

viewed in purely self-interested functionalist terms with institution creation as a means to

engender efficiency gains and therefore maximise capability through state-state transactions

(Pace 2006) International institutions exist within an anarchical system and relative gains

theory remains central to realist analyses Institutions become new arenas for states to

compete through balance of power theory (Adler 2009 p63) Realists recognise the utility

of cooperation but resist interdependency States remain the sole arbiters of their sovereignty

Institutionalist discourse takes a similar understanding of the centrality of the state within

international institutions and the search for efficiency gains in an equally hostile global

system (Pace 2006 p30) The utility of an institution is dependent upon the compatibility of

goals of member states Institutions labouring amongst diametrically opposed state interests

will become an arena for competition However institutions serve to facilitate cooperation

when it is in the collective interest to do so (Webber 2007 p51)

Neo-liberal institutionalism furthers the functionalist argument by considering institutions an

ldquoinherent goodrdquo Droidge notes the socialisation and trust building effect on policy makers

and the legalising effect they transcribe on international relations (2007) This process it is

argued is evidenced in the EUrsquos tendency to create region wide legally binding norms Neo-

liberal institutionalism also contributes to NRA by positing domestic political and non-state

actors possess the capacity to influence the direction of institutional development (Pace

2006 p30)

Page | 11

The most innovative body of work within NRA however is comprised of constructivist

analyses According to Paasi regional integration is intimately linked with the process of

identity construction Regions are ldquomaderdquo through social practice and custom combining

both ldquomaterialrdquo and ldquovirtualrdquo elements (2009) While state interaction and institutional

development are conditioning factors regional characteristics are a result of power relations

encompassing numerous social spheres not simply limited to the process of cooperation at

the state level

Much academic literature concerns the proliferation of regional lsquosecurity communitiesrsquo

defined by Adler and Barnett as a ldquotransnational region comprised of sovereign states whose

people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful exchange [with] neither the expectation

of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputesrdquo (1998

pp30-34) Cooperation is fostered and capabilities are maximized through division of labour

(Acharya 2007)

The extent to which this division of labour is consensual or contested tacit or explicit varies

greatly between regional groupings (Fawcett 2004) yet the extent to which states are willing

to delegate tasks to an international institution may be highly illustrative of both the

preferences it will seek to pursue and process of cooperation it embarks upon

Laursen distinguishes between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo institutionalism suggesting states

pursuing the former possess fixed preferences and seek to maximise these preferences

Page | 12

through institutions (2010 pp10-12) A belief in the trustworthiness of the institution is the

minimum prerequisite for deferral of decision making capacity (Magnette 2007)

The extent to which rational institutionalism can lead to the development of a security

community is however questionable If institutions exist in an anarchic world with states

acting solely in self-interest cooperation will always be constrained A state unwilling to

make significant sacrifice for another cannot expect significant sacrifice in return In this

scenario neither state can be considered ultimately secure

Yet the EU constitutes both a region and security community as defined above exhibiting an

unusually explicit and extensive division of labour amongst its institutions An empirical

study by Caporaso and Min-hyung has also suggested that Europeans favour joint decision

making in areas such as foreign policy immigration monetary policy and defence areas

traditionally associated with state sovereignty (2009)

According to neo-liberal institutionalists such ldquopeculiar forms of political interactionrdquo (Pace

2006 p27) foster the process of socialisation ldquoparticipation in and accountability to

transnational institutions can transcend national boundariesrdquo modifying state behaviour as a

result (Fawcett 2004) At a basic level elite socialisation through institutionalised diplomacy

and cooperation develops familiarity leading to an expectation of essentially benign state

interaction Continuity of this expectation is essential Moravcsik argues such socialisation

also leads to ldquoasymmetrical interdependencerdquo the more a state comes to rely upon an

Page | 13

institution or collaborative network the more it will compromise its initial preferences to

maintain it (in Laursen 2010 p7)

Such an analysis may explain the level of integration witnessed in the EU If a member state

expects a partner state to compromise its initial preferences in favour of a collective

preference it too may be inclined towards collective decision making

Ruggie however suggests that within security communities states perceive insecurity both

individually and collectively This it is argued is a result of a constitutive process whereby

states begin to assimilate a collective identity that becomes endogenised into their own (in

Adler 1997) Such analyses argue that liberal-functionalist conceptions of regional

integration fail to account for the self-identification component crucial to a region or security

community

Magnette argues the emerging European citizenry is increasingly identifying itself with both

national and regional communities (2007) Increasing horizontal ties between states and the

development of vertical bonds between the European populous and Brussels are transforming

perceived political and social patronage structures

Participation in the integration process is essential for the association and development of a

lsquoEuropeanrsquo identity ldquoIdentity formation is directly proportional to individuals internalising

Page | 14

and articulating commitmentsrdquo (Winn 2001) Europeansrsquo commitments are increasingly

derived from their regulatory institutions

Other research finds EU discourse is increasingly prevalent at the sub-national level

Socialisation through EU institutions is serving to foster the local identities of areas such as

Wales and Catalonia through increased exposure to nation states Similarly Malta a country

whose population traditionally identifies itself along religious cleavages - described as ldquoa

nationless staterdquo - is developing both coherent lsquoMaltesersquo and lsquoEuropeanrsquo identities (Cram

2009)

Conceptualised as a progression from preference based lsquorational institutionalismrsquo towards a

lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo embodying many of the ideational elements associated with

constructivism the process of European institution building is perceived as contributing to

the web of ldquocognitive templates that define identities and preferencesrdquo (Laursen 2010 p12)

Academic literature on the nature of identity is unequivocal in its fluidity The ideational

developments described by Magnette and Cram have both coincided with and been

facilitated by European institutional development (Fawcett 2004) As Europersquos various

institutions permeate the day-to-day lives of the European populous institutionalism has

developed as a distinct ideational facet of Europersquos identity and one upon which numerous

others are dependent

Page | 15

Therefore if (neo-liberal) prevention of hegemony through plurality is taken as a function of

institutions it is conceivable that institutionalised multilateralism becomes a (constructivist)

legitimising tenet of European integration Magnette argues this search for plurality

inherently fosters a diffuse cosmopolitanism within the multi-dimensional European identity

(2007)

Constructivists argue the physical process of socialisation for instance as facilitated by the

Schengen Agreement goes beyond familiarising communities to one another by engendering

the development of a self-generating ldquotransnational cognitive communityrdquo (Adler 1997)

whereby both policy elites and the wider populous evolve their conceptions of the

community to which they belong and by extension for which they are responsible

This process of socialisation is supported by empirical research demonstrating European

integration has become increasingly accepted over time (Winn 2001) Europe has become an

ldquoobject of loyaltyrdquo (Paasi 2002) Yet an individualrsquos concept of lsquoEuropersquo to which this

loyalty has developed is notably diffuse an assimilation of co-optive and coercive social

interactions at the local national and regional levels

This exposes the failings of state centric interpretations of integration Inter-governmental

interaction simultaneously conditions and is conditioned by domestic perceptions of those

with which it is interacting Realist and institutionalist dismissal of local regional discourse

results in an artificial separation of the domestic and international realms at odds with post-

modern international relations

Page | 16

Asymmetrical interdependence similarly exposes a relative gains capability centred

framework as insufficient to understanding European integration Kaganrsquos realist

interpretation of Europe as being ldquomore accepting of failurerdquo and more concerned with

ldquoprocess over resultrdquo (in Acharya 2007) can be best reconciled with a constructivist

interpretation if the institutions have come to embody a process constitutive of characteristics

with which Europe collectively identifies Adler suggests ldquoWhat matters most is not short-

range success but the construction of a foundation for practice and behaviourrdquo (1997)

Constructivist interpretations of socialisation are also supported by research suggesting

Europersquos self-perception as a unitary actor is becoming increasingly positive (Caporaso amp

Min-hyung 2009) According to Hegel ldquoindividuals after having mutually recognised each

other recognise themselves and thus become citizenshellip to be acknowledged by the other

strengthens self-esteemrdquo (in Magnette 2007)

A cognitive process of grouping states together based on perceived homogeneity in

preference and practice occurs Institutionalised cooperation acts as a catalyst in this process

Cooperation leads to a harmonisation of interests and group members come to be viewed as

inherently rather than merely contingently positive (Cram 2009) Regions therefore

represent ideational as well as material entities

By understanding actorsrsquo interests as being conditioned by those with which it interacts

constructivism assumes what Tocci et al refer to as ldquobounded rationalityrdquo An actorrsquos

perceived interests being simultaneously determined by the underlying (often opaque)

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 11

The most innovative body of work within NRA however is comprised of constructivist

analyses According to Paasi regional integration is intimately linked with the process of

identity construction Regions are ldquomaderdquo through social practice and custom combining

both ldquomaterialrdquo and ldquovirtualrdquo elements (2009) While state interaction and institutional

development are conditioning factors regional characteristics are a result of power relations

encompassing numerous social spheres not simply limited to the process of cooperation at

the state level

Much academic literature concerns the proliferation of regional lsquosecurity communitiesrsquo

defined by Adler and Barnett as a ldquotransnational region comprised of sovereign states whose

people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful exchange [with] neither the expectation

of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputesrdquo (1998

pp30-34) Cooperation is fostered and capabilities are maximized through division of labour

(Acharya 2007)

The extent to which this division of labour is consensual or contested tacit or explicit varies

greatly between regional groupings (Fawcett 2004) yet the extent to which states are willing

to delegate tasks to an international institution may be highly illustrative of both the

preferences it will seek to pursue and process of cooperation it embarks upon

Laursen distinguishes between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo institutionalism suggesting states

pursuing the former possess fixed preferences and seek to maximise these preferences

Page | 12

through institutions (2010 pp10-12) A belief in the trustworthiness of the institution is the

minimum prerequisite for deferral of decision making capacity (Magnette 2007)

The extent to which rational institutionalism can lead to the development of a security

community is however questionable If institutions exist in an anarchic world with states

acting solely in self-interest cooperation will always be constrained A state unwilling to

make significant sacrifice for another cannot expect significant sacrifice in return In this

scenario neither state can be considered ultimately secure

Yet the EU constitutes both a region and security community as defined above exhibiting an

unusually explicit and extensive division of labour amongst its institutions An empirical

study by Caporaso and Min-hyung has also suggested that Europeans favour joint decision

making in areas such as foreign policy immigration monetary policy and defence areas

traditionally associated with state sovereignty (2009)

According to neo-liberal institutionalists such ldquopeculiar forms of political interactionrdquo (Pace

2006 p27) foster the process of socialisation ldquoparticipation in and accountability to

transnational institutions can transcend national boundariesrdquo modifying state behaviour as a

result (Fawcett 2004) At a basic level elite socialisation through institutionalised diplomacy

and cooperation develops familiarity leading to an expectation of essentially benign state

interaction Continuity of this expectation is essential Moravcsik argues such socialisation

also leads to ldquoasymmetrical interdependencerdquo the more a state comes to rely upon an

Page | 13

institution or collaborative network the more it will compromise its initial preferences to

maintain it (in Laursen 2010 p7)

Such an analysis may explain the level of integration witnessed in the EU If a member state

expects a partner state to compromise its initial preferences in favour of a collective

preference it too may be inclined towards collective decision making

Ruggie however suggests that within security communities states perceive insecurity both

individually and collectively This it is argued is a result of a constitutive process whereby

states begin to assimilate a collective identity that becomes endogenised into their own (in

Adler 1997) Such analyses argue that liberal-functionalist conceptions of regional

integration fail to account for the self-identification component crucial to a region or security

community

Magnette argues the emerging European citizenry is increasingly identifying itself with both

national and regional communities (2007) Increasing horizontal ties between states and the

development of vertical bonds between the European populous and Brussels are transforming

perceived political and social patronage structures

Participation in the integration process is essential for the association and development of a

lsquoEuropeanrsquo identity ldquoIdentity formation is directly proportional to individuals internalising

Page | 14

and articulating commitmentsrdquo (Winn 2001) Europeansrsquo commitments are increasingly

derived from their regulatory institutions

Other research finds EU discourse is increasingly prevalent at the sub-national level

Socialisation through EU institutions is serving to foster the local identities of areas such as

Wales and Catalonia through increased exposure to nation states Similarly Malta a country

whose population traditionally identifies itself along religious cleavages - described as ldquoa

nationless staterdquo - is developing both coherent lsquoMaltesersquo and lsquoEuropeanrsquo identities (Cram

2009)

Conceptualised as a progression from preference based lsquorational institutionalismrsquo towards a

lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo embodying many of the ideational elements associated with

constructivism the process of European institution building is perceived as contributing to

the web of ldquocognitive templates that define identities and preferencesrdquo (Laursen 2010 p12)

Academic literature on the nature of identity is unequivocal in its fluidity The ideational

developments described by Magnette and Cram have both coincided with and been

facilitated by European institutional development (Fawcett 2004) As Europersquos various

institutions permeate the day-to-day lives of the European populous institutionalism has

developed as a distinct ideational facet of Europersquos identity and one upon which numerous

others are dependent

Page | 15

Therefore if (neo-liberal) prevention of hegemony through plurality is taken as a function of

institutions it is conceivable that institutionalised multilateralism becomes a (constructivist)

legitimising tenet of European integration Magnette argues this search for plurality

inherently fosters a diffuse cosmopolitanism within the multi-dimensional European identity

(2007)

Constructivists argue the physical process of socialisation for instance as facilitated by the

Schengen Agreement goes beyond familiarising communities to one another by engendering

the development of a self-generating ldquotransnational cognitive communityrdquo (Adler 1997)

whereby both policy elites and the wider populous evolve their conceptions of the

community to which they belong and by extension for which they are responsible

This process of socialisation is supported by empirical research demonstrating European

integration has become increasingly accepted over time (Winn 2001) Europe has become an

ldquoobject of loyaltyrdquo (Paasi 2002) Yet an individualrsquos concept of lsquoEuropersquo to which this

loyalty has developed is notably diffuse an assimilation of co-optive and coercive social

interactions at the local national and regional levels

This exposes the failings of state centric interpretations of integration Inter-governmental

interaction simultaneously conditions and is conditioned by domestic perceptions of those

with which it is interacting Realist and institutionalist dismissal of local regional discourse

results in an artificial separation of the domestic and international realms at odds with post-

modern international relations

Page | 16

Asymmetrical interdependence similarly exposes a relative gains capability centred

framework as insufficient to understanding European integration Kaganrsquos realist

interpretation of Europe as being ldquomore accepting of failurerdquo and more concerned with

ldquoprocess over resultrdquo (in Acharya 2007) can be best reconciled with a constructivist

interpretation if the institutions have come to embody a process constitutive of characteristics

with which Europe collectively identifies Adler suggests ldquoWhat matters most is not short-

range success but the construction of a foundation for practice and behaviourrdquo (1997)

Constructivist interpretations of socialisation are also supported by research suggesting

Europersquos self-perception as a unitary actor is becoming increasingly positive (Caporaso amp

Min-hyung 2009) According to Hegel ldquoindividuals after having mutually recognised each

other recognise themselves and thus become citizenshellip to be acknowledged by the other

strengthens self-esteemrdquo (in Magnette 2007)

A cognitive process of grouping states together based on perceived homogeneity in

preference and practice occurs Institutionalised cooperation acts as a catalyst in this process

Cooperation leads to a harmonisation of interests and group members come to be viewed as

inherently rather than merely contingently positive (Cram 2009) Regions therefore

represent ideational as well as material entities

By understanding actorsrsquo interests as being conditioned by those with which it interacts

constructivism assumes what Tocci et al refer to as ldquobounded rationalityrdquo An actorrsquos

perceived interests being simultaneously determined by the underlying (often opaque)

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 12

through institutions (2010 pp10-12) A belief in the trustworthiness of the institution is the

minimum prerequisite for deferral of decision making capacity (Magnette 2007)

The extent to which rational institutionalism can lead to the development of a security

community is however questionable If institutions exist in an anarchic world with states

acting solely in self-interest cooperation will always be constrained A state unwilling to

make significant sacrifice for another cannot expect significant sacrifice in return In this

scenario neither state can be considered ultimately secure

Yet the EU constitutes both a region and security community as defined above exhibiting an

unusually explicit and extensive division of labour amongst its institutions An empirical

study by Caporaso and Min-hyung has also suggested that Europeans favour joint decision

making in areas such as foreign policy immigration monetary policy and defence areas

traditionally associated with state sovereignty (2009)

According to neo-liberal institutionalists such ldquopeculiar forms of political interactionrdquo (Pace

2006 p27) foster the process of socialisation ldquoparticipation in and accountability to

transnational institutions can transcend national boundariesrdquo modifying state behaviour as a

result (Fawcett 2004) At a basic level elite socialisation through institutionalised diplomacy

and cooperation develops familiarity leading to an expectation of essentially benign state

interaction Continuity of this expectation is essential Moravcsik argues such socialisation

also leads to ldquoasymmetrical interdependencerdquo the more a state comes to rely upon an

Page | 13

institution or collaborative network the more it will compromise its initial preferences to

maintain it (in Laursen 2010 p7)

Such an analysis may explain the level of integration witnessed in the EU If a member state

expects a partner state to compromise its initial preferences in favour of a collective

preference it too may be inclined towards collective decision making

Ruggie however suggests that within security communities states perceive insecurity both

individually and collectively This it is argued is a result of a constitutive process whereby

states begin to assimilate a collective identity that becomes endogenised into their own (in

Adler 1997) Such analyses argue that liberal-functionalist conceptions of regional

integration fail to account for the self-identification component crucial to a region or security

community

Magnette argues the emerging European citizenry is increasingly identifying itself with both

national and regional communities (2007) Increasing horizontal ties between states and the

development of vertical bonds between the European populous and Brussels are transforming

perceived political and social patronage structures

Participation in the integration process is essential for the association and development of a

lsquoEuropeanrsquo identity ldquoIdentity formation is directly proportional to individuals internalising

Page | 14

and articulating commitmentsrdquo (Winn 2001) Europeansrsquo commitments are increasingly

derived from their regulatory institutions

Other research finds EU discourse is increasingly prevalent at the sub-national level

Socialisation through EU institutions is serving to foster the local identities of areas such as

Wales and Catalonia through increased exposure to nation states Similarly Malta a country

whose population traditionally identifies itself along religious cleavages - described as ldquoa

nationless staterdquo - is developing both coherent lsquoMaltesersquo and lsquoEuropeanrsquo identities (Cram

2009)

Conceptualised as a progression from preference based lsquorational institutionalismrsquo towards a

lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo embodying many of the ideational elements associated with

constructivism the process of European institution building is perceived as contributing to

the web of ldquocognitive templates that define identities and preferencesrdquo (Laursen 2010 p12)

Academic literature on the nature of identity is unequivocal in its fluidity The ideational

developments described by Magnette and Cram have both coincided with and been

facilitated by European institutional development (Fawcett 2004) As Europersquos various

institutions permeate the day-to-day lives of the European populous institutionalism has

developed as a distinct ideational facet of Europersquos identity and one upon which numerous

others are dependent

Page | 15

Therefore if (neo-liberal) prevention of hegemony through plurality is taken as a function of

institutions it is conceivable that institutionalised multilateralism becomes a (constructivist)

legitimising tenet of European integration Magnette argues this search for plurality

inherently fosters a diffuse cosmopolitanism within the multi-dimensional European identity

(2007)

Constructivists argue the physical process of socialisation for instance as facilitated by the

Schengen Agreement goes beyond familiarising communities to one another by engendering

the development of a self-generating ldquotransnational cognitive communityrdquo (Adler 1997)

whereby both policy elites and the wider populous evolve their conceptions of the

community to which they belong and by extension for which they are responsible

This process of socialisation is supported by empirical research demonstrating European

integration has become increasingly accepted over time (Winn 2001) Europe has become an

ldquoobject of loyaltyrdquo (Paasi 2002) Yet an individualrsquos concept of lsquoEuropersquo to which this

loyalty has developed is notably diffuse an assimilation of co-optive and coercive social

interactions at the local national and regional levels

This exposes the failings of state centric interpretations of integration Inter-governmental

interaction simultaneously conditions and is conditioned by domestic perceptions of those

with which it is interacting Realist and institutionalist dismissal of local regional discourse

results in an artificial separation of the domestic and international realms at odds with post-

modern international relations

Page | 16

Asymmetrical interdependence similarly exposes a relative gains capability centred

framework as insufficient to understanding European integration Kaganrsquos realist

interpretation of Europe as being ldquomore accepting of failurerdquo and more concerned with

ldquoprocess over resultrdquo (in Acharya 2007) can be best reconciled with a constructivist

interpretation if the institutions have come to embody a process constitutive of characteristics

with which Europe collectively identifies Adler suggests ldquoWhat matters most is not short-

range success but the construction of a foundation for practice and behaviourrdquo (1997)

Constructivist interpretations of socialisation are also supported by research suggesting

Europersquos self-perception as a unitary actor is becoming increasingly positive (Caporaso amp

Min-hyung 2009) According to Hegel ldquoindividuals after having mutually recognised each

other recognise themselves and thus become citizenshellip to be acknowledged by the other

strengthens self-esteemrdquo (in Magnette 2007)

A cognitive process of grouping states together based on perceived homogeneity in

preference and practice occurs Institutionalised cooperation acts as a catalyst in this process

Cooperation leads to a harmonisation of interests and group members come to be viewed as

inherently rather than merely contingently positive (Cram 2009) Regions therefore

represent ideational as well as material entities

By understanding actorsrsquo interests as being conditioned by those with which it interacts

constructivism assumes what Tocci et al refer to as ldquobounded rationalityrdquo An actorrsquos

perceived interests being simultaneously determined by the underlying (often opaque)

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 13

institution or collaborative network the more it will compromise its initial preferences to

maintain it (in Laursen 2010 p7)

Such an analysis may explain the level of integration witnessed in the EU If a member state

expects a partner state to compromise its initial preferences in favour of a collective

preference it too may be inclined towards collective decision making

Ruggie however suggests that within security communities states perceive insecurity both

individually and collectively This it is argued is a result of a constitutive process whereby

states begin to assimilate a collective identity that becomes endogenised into their own (in

Adler 1997) Such analyses argue that liberal-functionalist conceptions of regional

integration fail to account for the self-identification component crucial to a region or security

community

Magnette argues the emerging European citizenry is increasingly identifying itself with both

national and regional communities (2007) Increasing horizontal ties between states and the

development of vertical bonds between the European populous and Brussels are transforming

perceived political and social patronage structures

Participation in the integration process is essential for the association and development of a

lsquoEuropeanrsquo identity ldquoIdentity formation is directly proportional to individuals internalising

Page | 14

and articulating commitmentsrdquo (Winn 2001) Europeansrsquo commitments are increasingly

derived from their regulatory institutions

Other research finds EU discourse is increasingly prevalent at the sub-national level

Socialisation through EU institutions is serving to foster the local identities of areas such as

Wales and Catalonia through increased exposure to nation states Similarly Malta a country

whose population traditionally identifies itself along religious cleavages - described as ldquoa

nationless staterdquo - is developing both coherent lsquoMaltesersquo and lsquoEuropeanrsquo identities (Cram

2009)

Conceptualised as a progression from preference based lsquorational institutionalismrsquo towards a

lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo embodying many of the ideational elements associated with

constructivism the process of European institution building is perceived as contributing to

the web of ldquocognitive templates that define identities and preferencesrdquo (Laursen 2010 p12)

Academic literature on the nature of identity is unequivocal in its fluidity The ideational

developments described by Magnette and Cram have both coincided with and been

facilitated by European institutional development (Fawcett 2004) As Europersquos various

institutions permeate the day-to-day lives of the European populous institutionalism has

developed as a distinct ideational facet of Europersquos identity and one upon which numerous

others are dependent

Page | 15

Therefore if (neo-liberal) prevention of hegemony through plurality is taken as a function of

institutions it is conceivable that institutionalised multilateralism becomes a (constructivist)

legitimising tenet of European integration Magnette argues this search for plurality

inherently fosters a diffuse cosmopolitanism within the multi-dimensional European identity

(2007)

Constructivists argue the physical process of socialisation for instance as facilitated by the

Schengen Agreement goes beyond familiarising communities to one another by engendering

the development of a self-generating ldquotransnational cognitive communityrdquo (Adler 1997)

whereby both policy elites and the wider populous evolve their conceptions of the

community to which they belong and by extension for which they are responsible

This process of socialisation is supported by empirical research demonstrating European

integration has become increasingly accepted over time (Winn 2001) Europe has become an

ldquoobject of loyaltyrdquo (Paasi 2002) Yet an individualrsquos concept of lsquoEuropersquo to which this

loyalty has developed is notably diffuse an assimilation of co-optive and coercive social

interactions at the local national and regional levels

This exposes the failings of state centric interpretations of integration Inter-governmental

interaction simultaneously conditions and is conditioned by domestic perceptions of those

with which it is interacting Realist and institutionalist dismissal of local regional discourse

results in an artificial separation of the domestic and international realms at odds with post-

modern international relations

Page | 16

Asymmetrical interdependence similarly exposes a relative gains capability centred

framework as insufficient to understanding European integration Kaganrsquos realist

interpretation of Europe as being ldquomore accepting of failurerdquo and more concerned with

ldquoprocess over resultrdquo (in Acharya 2007) can be best reconciled with a constructivist

interpretation if the institutions have come to embody a process constitutive of characteristics

with which Europe collectively identifies Adler suggests ldquoWhat matters most is not short-

range success but the construction of a foundation for practice and behaviourrdquo (1997)

Constructivist interpretations of socialisation are also supported by research suggesting

Europersquos self-perception as a unitary actor is becoming increasingly positive (Caporaso amp

Min-hyung 2009) According to Hegel ldquoindividuals after having mutually recognised each

other recognise themselves and thus become citizenshellip to be acknowledged by the other

strengthens self-esteemrdquo (in Magnette 2007)

A cognitive process of grouping states together based on perceived homogeneity in

preference and practice occurs Institutionalised cooperation acts as a catalyst in this process

Cooperation leads to a harmonisation of interests and group members come to be viewed as

inherently rather than merely contingently positive (Cram 2009) Regions therefore

represent ideational as well as material entities

By understanding actorsrsquo interests as being conditioned by those with which it interacts

constructivism assumes what Tocci et al refer to as ldquobounded rationalityrdquo An actorrsquos

perceived interests being simultaneously determined by the underlying (often opaque)

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 14

and articulating commitmentsrdquo (Winn 2001) Europeansrsquo commitments are increasingly

derived from their regulatory institutions

Other research finds EU discourse is increasingly prevalent at the sub-national level

Socialisation through EU institutions is serving to foster the local identities of areas such as

Wales and Catalonia through increased exposure to nation states Similarly Malta a country

whose population traditionally identifies itself along religious cleavages - described as ldquoa

nationless staterdquo - is developing both coherent lsquoMaltesersquo and lsquoEuropeanrsquo identities (Cram

2009)

Conceptualised as a progression from preference based lsquorational institutionalismrsquo towards a

lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo embodying many of the ideational elements associated with

constructivism the process of European institution building is perceived as contributing to

the web of ldquocognitive templates that define identities and preferencesrdquo (Laursen 2010 p12)

Academic literature on the nature of identity is unequivocal in its fluidity The ideational

developments described by Magnette and Cram have both coincided with and been

facilitated by European institutional development (Fawcett 2004) As Europersquos various

institutions permeate the day-to-day lives of the European populous institutionalism has

developed as a distinct ideational facet of Europersquos identity and one upon which numerous

others are dependent

Page | 15

Therefore if (neo-liberal) prevention of hegemony through plurality is taken as a function of

institutions it is conceivable that institutionalised multilateralism becomes a (constructivist)

legitimising tenet of European integration Magnette argues this search for plurality

inherently fosters a diffuse cosmopolitanism within the multi-dimensional European identity

(2007)

Constructivists argue the physical process of socialisation for instance as facilitated by the

Schengen Agreement goes beyond familiarising communities to one another by engendering

the development of a self-generating ldquotransnational cognitive communityrdquo (Adler 1997)

whereby both policy elites and the wider populous evolve their conceptions of the

community to which they belong and by extension for which they are responsible

This process of socialisation is supported by empirical research demonstrating European

integration has become increasingly accepted over time (Winn 2001) Europe has become an

ldquoobject of loyaltyrdquo (Paasi 2002) Yet an individualrsquos concept of lsquoEuropersquo to which this

loyalty has developed is notably diffuse an assimilation of co-optive and coercive social

interactions at the local national and regional levels

This exposes the failings of state centric interpretations of integration Inter-governmental

interaction simultaneously conditions and is conditioned by domestic perceptions of those

with which it is interacting Realist and institutionalist dismissal of local regional discourse

results in an artificial separation of the domestic and international realms at odds with post-

modern international relations

Page | 16

Asymmetrical interdependence similarly exposes a relative gains capability centred

framework as insufficient to understanding European integration Kaganrsquos realist

interpretation of Europe as being ldquomore accepting of failurerdquo and more concerned with

ldquoprocess over resultrdquo (in Acharya 2007) can be best reconciled with a constructivist

interpretation if the institutions have come to embody a process constitutive of characteristics

with which Europe collectively identifies Adler suggests ldquoWhat matters most is not short-

range success but the construction of a foundation for practice and behaviourrdquo (1997)

Constructivist interpretations of socialisation are also supported by research suggesting

Europersquos self-perception as a unitary actor is becoming increasingly positive (Caporaso amp

Min-hyung 2009) According to Hegel ldquoindividuals after having mutually recognised each

other recognise themselves and thus become citizenshellip to be acknowledged by the other

strengthens self-esteemrdquo (in Magnette 2007)

A cognitive process of grouping states together based on perceived homogeneity in

preference and practice occurs Institutionalised cooperation acts as a catalyst in this process

Cooperation leads to a harmonisation of interests and group members come to be viewed as

inherently rather than merely contingently positive (Cram 2009) Regions therefore

represent ideational as well as material entities

By understanding actorsrsquo interests as being conditioned by those with which it interacts

constructivism assumes what Tocci et al refer to as ldquobounded rationalityrdquo An actorrsquos

perceived interests being simultaneously determined by the underlying (often opaque)

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 15

Therefore if (neo-liberal) prevention of hegemony through plurality is taken as a function of

institutions it is conceivable that institutionalised multilateralism becomes a (constructivist)

legitimising tenet of European integration Magnette argues this search for plurality

inherently fosters a diffuse cosmopolitanism within the multi-dimensional European identity

(2007)

Constructivists argue the physical process of socialisation for instance as facilitated by the

Schengen Agreement goes beyond familiarising communities to one another by engendering

the development of a self-generating ldquotransnational cognitive communityrdquo (Adler 1997)

whereby both policy elites and the wider populous evolve their conceptions of the

community to which they belong and by extension for which they are responsible

This process of socialisation is supported by empirical research demonstrating European

integration has become increasingly accepted over time (Winn 2001) Europe has become an

ldquoobject of loyaltyrdquo (Paasi 2002) Yet an individualrsquos concept of lsquoEuropersquo to which this

loyalty has developed is notably diffuse an assimilation of co-optive and coercive social

interactions at the local national and regional levels

This exposes the failings of state centric interpretations of integration Inter-governmental

interaction simultaneously conditions and is conditioned by domestic perceptions of those

with which it is interacting Realist and institutionalist dismissal of local regional discourse

results in an artificial separation of the domestic and international realms at odds with post-

modern international relations

Page | 16

Asymmetrical interdependence similarly exposes a relative gains capability centred

framework as insufficient to understanding European integration Kaganrsquos realist

interpretation of Europe as being ldquomore accepting of failurerdquo and more concerned with

ldquoprocess over resultrdquo (in Acharya 2007) can be best reconciled with a constructivist

interpretation if the institutions have come to embody a process constitutive of characteristics

with which Europe collectively identifies Adler suggests ldquoWhat matters most is not short-

range success but the construction of a foundation for practice and behaviourrdquo (1997)

Constructivist interpretations of socialisation are also supported by research suggesting

Europersquos self-perception as a unitary actor is becoming increasingly positive (Caporaso amp

Min-hyung 2009) According to Hegel ldquoindividuals after having mutually recognised each

other recognise themselves and thus become citizenshellip to be acknowledged by the other

strengthens self-esteemrdquo (in Magnette 2007)

A cognitive process of grouping states together based on perceived homogeneity in

preference and practice occurs Institutionalised cooperation acts as a catalyst in this process

Cooperation leads to a harmonisation of interests and group members come to be viewed as

inherently rather than merely contingently positive (Cram 2009) Regions therefore

represent ideational as well as material entities

By understanding actorsrsquo interests as being conditioned by those with which it interacts

constructivism assumes what Tocci et al refer to as ldquobounded rationalityrdquo An actorrsquos

perceived interests being simultaneously determined by the underlying (often opaque)

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 16

Asymmetrical interdependence similarly exposes a relative gains capability centred

framework as insufficient to understanding European integration Kaganrsquos realist

interpretation of Europe as being ldquomore accepting of failurerdquo and more concerned with

ldquoprocess over resultrdquo (in Acharya 2007) can be best reconciled with a constructivist

interpretation if the institutions have come to embody a process constitutive of characteristics

with which Europe collectively identifies Adler suggests ldquoWhat matters most is not short-

range success but the construction of a foundation for practice and behaviourrdquo (1997)

Constructivist interpretations of socialisation are also supported by research suggesting

Europersquos self-perception as a unitary actor is becoming increasingly positive (Caporaso amp

Min-hyung 2009) According to Hegel ldquoindividuals after having mutually recognised each

other recognise themselves and thus become citizenshellip to be acknowledged by the other

strengthens self-esteemrdquo (in Magnette 2007)

A cognitive process of grouping states together based on perceived homogeneity in

preference and practice occurs Institutionalised cooperation acts as a catalyst in this process

Cooperation leads to a harmonisation of interests and group members come to be viewed as

inherently rather than merely contingently positive (Cram 2009) Regions therefore

represent ideational as well as material entities

By understanding actorsrsquo interests as being conditioned by those with which it interacts

constructivism assumes what Tocci et al refer to as ldquobounded rationalityrdquo An actorrsquos

perceived interests being simultaneously determined by the underlying (often opaque)

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 17

incentive and power structures shaping social interaction and the ldquoconceptual prismrdquo through

which an actor interprets and prioritises these interests (2008 p6) This conceptual prism can

be considered the lsquovaluesrsquo to which an actor ascribes In this way an actorrsquos identity and

interests are intimately linked and inherently subjective

Political discourse is critical to the process of cognitive grouping and the development of this

ideational framework Buzan refers to the securitising effect of ldquospeech actsrdquo creating an

object of reference around which a narrative can be constructed (in Acharya 2007) Identity

construction is considered a two way process political and social elites ldquonarratehellip a response

to the demand for a collective imagerdquo (Paasi 2009) Yet any narrative must enjoy legitimacy

amongst the regionrsquos citizenry With a plurality of actors seeking to exert influence public

opinion is crucial for any narrative to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction The

resulting narrative is often idealised and representative of elite interests

While the full extent to which an lsquoout grouprsquo is necessary to build an lsquoin grouprsquo is contested

identity is essentially positional intimately linked with identification or recognition of onersquos

self and the other (Spencer 2008 p8) Adler conceptualises the identification process into

four stages who am I Who is the other What rules do I abide by Can the other abide by

my rules (1997) While regionalism tends to seek to find similarities amongst groups (Pace

2006 p40) it also fosters reductionist perceptions of boundaries whereby actors are either

lsquoinrsquo or lsquooutrsquo (Webber 2007)

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 18

This paper supports Paasirsquos contention that the world exists as ldquoa constellation of more or

less bounded spacesrdquo (2009) Within regionalism territoriality is paramount to the

demarcation of political economic and cultural affinity However unlike the nation-state a

regionrsquos territory is rarely immutable While regional schemes are never ldquopurely intellectualrdquo

(Fawn 2009) and never exempted from geography the ldquoflexible otheringrdquo (Arat-Koccedil 2010)

demonstrated by inclusionexclusion discourse and infused within lsquowidening vs deepeningrsquo

debates witnessed in many regional systems show regional territoriality to be equally as

conceptual as cartographic

Such fluidity poses implications for policy makers If a region or security community is

perceived as offering tangible benefits such as economic cooperation or perpetual peace

such a grouping may lsquoattractrsquo other members Such an attraction has been seen in the EUrsquos

eastward expansion Distinguished from the rebalancing associated with realist

bandwagoning this attraction implies the presence of lsquopullrsquo rather than lsquopushrsquo motives for

regionalisation

That not all regions attract all states within their proximity suggests rationalist capability

maximisation or transaction efficiency fail to adequately explain the rationale for integration

To achieve accession a prospective state must be seen to be aligning its values and identity

with those of the region with which it presumably already identifies However if a state is yet

to be admitted to a regional community the community have yet to recognise the prospective

statersquos identity as consistent with its own Such a contradiction demonstrates constructivist

notions of identity and perception to be integral to regionalisation

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 19

It is important to note that institutionalist functionality remains essential to regionalisation

within the New Regionalism Approach Regardless of the underlying processes a security

community remains such only in the absence of war International institutions regardless of

the ideational framework in which they become centred must enjoy functional competence

in order to maintain legitimacy It is upon this legitimacy that Europersquos ideational framework

has been constructed

The nation state also remains a central aspect of regional integration and international

institutions remain dependent upon them not least financially Yet the plurality of actors able

to both influence and legitimise ideational discourse and processes of integration also lend

weight to Laursenrsquos lsquosociological institutionalismrsquo However without a comprehensive

empirical study into the development of regional integration globally caution should be

applied presenting the conceptual distinction between lsquorationalrsquo and lsquosociologicalrsquo

institutionalisms as a progression

The European Union as a social and political entity can therefore be considered a product of

its multi-faceted ideational composition This composition has been facilitated and

conditioned by its institutional development which has in turn emerged as a facet of its

identity transcribing multilateralism and plurality onto the European value structure

European institutionalism exerts influence not only over its own citizenry but also over lsquothe

othersrsquo with which it interacts Europersquos institutional identity can therefore be conceived as a

potentially uniquely power wielding instrument

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 20

Whilst discussing the role of hegemony within regionalism Adler states ldquoPower is more than

just material The authority to determine the shared meanings that embody identities

interests and practiceshellip to define what constitutes acceptable play and to get others to

commit to those rules is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of powerrdquo (1997) The

following chapters will explore the EUrsquos ideational composition and discuss the extent to

which the EU has sought and has been able to capitalise upon its emerging ideational

influence

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 21

Chapter 2

The European Union as a Normative Actor

As demonstrated above the establishment of the EU as a coherent lsquoregionrsquo and lsquosecurity

communityrsquo has in large part been a result of its institutional development This process of

institutionalised integration has simultaneously become a component of European identity

and provided a platform for the development of common values to which the EU and its

members claim to adhere This chapter will outline some core principles the EU regards as

central to its ideational identity before introducing the concept of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo

and asking whether it is possible for Europersquos multilateralism to facilitate the reproduction of

its values in its external relations An analytical framework for assessing normativity in

European foreign policy will be laid out

The EU routinely seeks to explicate its values through its external communiqueacutes the

preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon speaks of the ldquohumanist inheritance of Europerdquo determining

ldquothe universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person freedom

democracy equality and the rule of lawrdquo upon which the Union is founded (2007) The

Lisbon Treaty also conveys the legal authority for the EU to accede both the 1950 European

Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

Previously member states alone could be parties to these treaties

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 22

Article 10 of the Lisbon Treaty states ldquoThe Unions action on the international scene shall be

guided by the principles which have inspired its own creationhellip democracy the rule of law

the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms respect for

human dignity the principles of equalityhellip and international lawrdquo (2007) The 2003

European Security Strategy (ESS) and 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS

(RIESS) have also made explicit references to the promotion of international institutionalism

ldquothe development of a stronger international society well-functioning institutions and a rule

based international order is our objectiverdquo (ESS 2003)

Europe not only demonstrates its belief in the normativity entailed within the pluralising

effects of regionalisation and multilateralism (see Strategy on the external dimension of the

area of Freedom Security and Justice 2005) but also defines the role it seeks to play in their

promotion ldquoAt the global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral orderhellip Our

experience gives the EU a particular role in the fostering of regional integration Where

others seek to emulate ushellip we should seek to support themrdquo (RIESS 2008)

The EU is widely considered a unique actor in global politics ostensibly due to its

commitment to individualistic rights though commentators have long debated categorizing

its nature In 1973 Ducircchene published a highly influential article arguing the EC represented

a lsquocivilian powerrsquo ldquolong on economic power and relatively short on armed forcesrdquo (p19)

More recently Nye considered the EU a lsquosoft powerrsquo defined by a preference to use co-

optation rather than coercion in its diplomatic relations (2004 p5)

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 23

Arguably of greater recent influence has been Mannersrsquo contribution introducing the concept

of lsquoNormative Power Europersquo (NPE) (2002) Manners argued that the European historical

context its hybrid polity and politico-legal institutions lend it a unique legitimacy in the

international community Accompanied by its explicit commitment to individual rights

diplomatic cooperation and the legalisation of international relations Manners suggested the

EU should be conceptualised by its ideational identity rather than its material capabilities It

is through this ideational identity that the EU wields ldquopower over opinionrdquo seeking to

determine what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations (Manners 2002)

Such a conception appears to have struck a resonance with European policy makers and it is

for this reason further investigation into EU foreign policy is warranted Brussels has been

keen to ascribe normativity to the European sui generis identity and as such is regularly

alluded to in elite discourse However the concept is far from universally accepted with

instrumentalist commentators instead highlighting divergences between rhetoric and policy

arguing the EU utilises asymmetrical dialogue in order to impose conditionality on its

lsquopartnersrsquo under the auspices of normativity (Kasson et al 2008)

Unsurprisingly no single definition of lsquonormativityrsquo has been accepted within foreign policy

discourse yet in order to assess the European model some criteria must be established As

argued above the interests and values of any given actor are inherently subjective How one

actor perceives the values to which it abides will likely be different to the perceptions of

another It is therefore not enough to assume the norms the EU claims to project are

inherently normative even if they become established as normal It is equally possible that

they instead represent (or mask) the EUrsquos particularistic interests

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 24

Sjursen discusses the lsquouniversalisationrsquo of norms Is a norm to which the EU claims to abide

applicable in any circumstance If so it may be possible to determine if the norm is pursued

out of principle or ldquowhether it is the right thing to do in a particular contextrdquo (2006) In this

way a norm may be considered valid if the consequences of an action are recognised as

preferable by all affected parties

Yet it is conceivable that certain norms contradict each other Tocci et al suggest it is the

tendency to apply the right norm to the right circumstance that is essential in determining any

notion of normativity (2008 p6) Youngs has argued the EU distinguishes itself from other

actors such as the US by adapting the norms it champions to a given context (2004) Yet this

too may invite instrumentalist critique as the EU picks and chooses when to apply its

principles according to the interests itrsquos pursuing

It is therefore necessary to establish if the EUrsquos values are consistently pursued even if their

promotion jeopardises its interests Tocci et al articulate the distinction between lsquomilieursquo and

lsquopossessionalrsquo goals ldquoMilieu goals are those which while indirectly related to a particular

actorrsquos specific interests are essentially concerned with the wider environmentrdquo (2008 p7)

It is suggested a normative actor would seek to shape the milieu for the collective benefit

rather than solely furthering its own interests or lsquopossessionsrsquo

The EUrsquos promotion of institutionalism would certainly appear consistent with such a

concept however it is equally possible that a hegemonic actor would seek to pursue its

interests through the milieu if it felt capable of monopolising the institutional development

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 25

for its own gain If the EU seeks to define what is lsquonormalrsquo in international relations it is

implicitly seeking to define the values and interests and therefore identity of the milieu It is

for this reason it is also necessary to consider empowerment within European foreign policy

The need to determine lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo in policy making in order to arrive at a

conception of normativity has also been highlighted (Bicci 2006) To what extent does the

EU seek to include those affected by its foreign policy in the policy making process and to

what extent is it able adapt its policies based on past experiences and expected consequences

of norm promotion in relation to a specific actor In effect does it simply impose rules from

above or does seek to enable those with which it interacts to have a say in the interests and

values of the milieu Ultimately does European foreign policy seek to empower those it

impacts

An understanding of how Europe perceives the world and more importantly the threats its

faces may offer an insight as to the extent to which it is able or prepared to empower external

actors A study on the 2003 ESS has argued European multilateralism represents a uniquely

pragmatic approach to international security Europe is primarily concerned with the

ldquobreakdown of political process in an inter-dependent worldrdquo leading to instability and

conflict (Berenskoetter 2005) Europe may therefore have concluded that empowerment is

the best way of ensuring political and social cohesion European plurality underpinned by the

continual need for popular legitimacy appears to substantiate this

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 26

Drawing heavily on Berenskoetter Mitzen suggests Europersquos habitual institutionalism and

procedural intra-European interaction lends it to natural inclusivity and reflexivity

demonstrated in its multifaceted identity War between France and Germany is now

unthinkable due to the institutionalised and habitualised cooperation and diplomacy the EU

has fostered (2006) This has not just led to the coalescing of interests and values amongst

these two members but because these interests and values are fluid they are also open to

constant critique and development through the process of socialisation

According to Manners Europersquos belligerent past offers justification for its normativity

(2002) yet this can only be the case if belligerence has developed into accommodation The

ESS refers to Europersquos history ldquoas a source of critical self-reflectionrdquo (Berenskoetter 2005)

and concludes that contemporary threats faced by the world are a product of social

instability modernisation and alienation resulting in actual or perceived marginalisation

Marginalisation acts as a conditioning factor in the constitutive process of identity formation

in the same way as plurality acts to foster a sense of inclusion and empowerment

Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential to eliminating marginalisation

Such a Kantian analysis suggests a value laden European foreign policy has the potential for

normativity by seeking to empower the individual through the milieu Europersquos unbridled

promotion of international law is concurrent with this Developed multilaterally over a

number of centuries international law conveys binding obligations on governments with

regard both their domestic and international conduct and in the process bestows statutory

rights and thus status over all individuals International Law is therefore inherently inclusive

and universal International law serves to moderate the risks of hegemony by codifying

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 27

norms and dictating their interpretation ensuring ldquochoices are not crude reflections of

political contingencyrdquo (Tocci et al 2008 p11)

EU rhetoric certainly adheres closely to the principles of inclusivity and reflexivity speaking

of ldquojoint ownershiprdquo of initiatives ldquodefined by common consent [that] will thus vary from

country to countryrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004) However the EU also speaks of policies

based on ldquothe awareness of shared values and common interestsrdquo (ENP Strategy Paper 2004)

As such it sounds contradictory to speak of universally applicable norms based on shared

values that also derive from individual interests

Yet if these principles are adopted during the policy making process it is reasonable to

assume the values and interests of partner countries will be accounted for in the policy

outcome If these interests and values prove incompatible with those of the EU then either no

policy agreement will be reached or it will suffer a legitimacy deficit amongst one or both

parties In this case it will be either poorly implemented or poorly enforced

If however there is no inherent conflict within a policy it can be assumed to be based on

lsquoshared valuesrsquo and as such will enjoy conceptual legitimacy resulting in greater likelihood of

effective implementation and adherence If such a policy is also implemented and adhered to

within the milieu it can be assumed that a policy is founded upon interests and values that

fundamentally align with those of the milieu If the policy also serves to empower individuals

to help determine the interests and values to which the milieu adheres then it can be

considered normative

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 28

If on the other hand actors within the milieu fail to adhere to the policy it would suggest a

failure to align with collectively held values This does not necessarily make it anti-

normative but will result in a process of arbitrage as the international community seeks to

arrive at policies which align themselves as best as possible with lsquoshared values and common

interestsrsquo reconcilable with the myriad identities held throughout the milieu

It is therefore possible to arrive at a framework for assessing the normativity of a given

policy It is first necessary to separate the policy objective from the means employed to enact

it It is next necessary to establish if a policy promotes a norm or set of norms that are

essentially empowering Is an individual or other actor likely to acquire new found rights or

status as a result of the policy and will such empowerment be applicable consistently

throughout the milieu

Secondly the lsquoinclusivityrsquo and lsquoreflexivityrsquo of the policy must be assessed To what extent

are the existing interests and values of the third party incorporated into the policy thus

demonstrating a voice in the decision making process and do what extent does it represent

those of the EU Finally any normative policy must adhere to international law

Evidently then there is potential for normativity in foreign policy but it is dependent upon

one actor actively accommodating another within its decision making process Such a

conception is at odds with traditional notions of foreign policy but the habitualised

accommodation fostered by multilateral decision making may provide the necessary

conditions

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 29

That the EU has been so explicit in its promotion of normative values will also reinforce any

institutional tendency towards normativity As was discussed in Chapter 1 elite rhetoric

plays a role in transcribing identity onto the European citizenry The values embedded within

this identity disseminate becoming self-legitimising any policy popularly perceived as

diverging from the promotion of normativity will therefore suffer a legitimacy deficit The

EUrsquos pluralistic civil society empowers public opinion to be a conditioning factor on policy

direction

Norms represent behavioural tendencies that are deemed concurrent with an actorrsquos identity

Just as identity becomes assimilated through socialisation collectively held norms and values

follow the same process Dissemination of a norm requires institutionalised interaction to act

as a platform to facilitate its adoption the adoption of a norm by a third party demonstrates

its transformative power It is in this way that the EU has sought to construct an ideational

and institutional environment in order to foster and project normativity The following

chapter discusses whether the EU has been able to realise this environment in its relations

with Belarus

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 30

Chapter 3

The Belarusian Problem

European expansion considered ldquoa powerful driver for stabilityrdquo (RIESS 2008) has come to

be viewed as integral to European normativity and demonstrative of its inherent inclusivity

As discussed in the previous chapters Europe has sought to oversee a coalescing of identity

in order to facilitate integration Speaking in 2002 Romano Prodi then President of the

European Council articulated the aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as ldquoto

extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles values and standards which define the

very essence of the EUrdquo (in Klinke 2007)

The ENP has been considered the CFSPrsquos greatest success facilitating two expansions Yet it

appears to assume a natural desire amongst partner states for engagement and integration

with Brussels Belarus has demonstrated little such ambition The nature of EU-Belarus

relations instead suggests a fundamental discrepancy in identity

This section discusses the development of EU-Belarus relations and using the criteria

articulated in Chapter 2 assesses whether the EU has been able to establish a framework for

engagement demonstrating normativity within its policies It then examines the

transformative power entailed within EU strategy and asks whether Europe has been able to

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 31

foster collectively held values in order to attract both the Lukashenko regime and wider

Belarusian society toward a European conception of regionalisation In light of the findings

recommendations are made as to how the EU could increase its influence in Belarus

Following a brief period of post-Soviet reform under Stanislau Shushkevich in 1994

Alexandr Lukashenko won Belarusrsquo first presidential election embarking on a programme

concentrating state authority within the presidency and fostering a highly centralised planned

economy Subject to numerous sanctions regimes by Europe and the West and often referred

to as lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo Belarus classified by Freedom House as ldquonot freerdquo

(freedomhouseorg)1 has maintained consistently poor relations and pariah notoriety with

much of the outside world

Constitutional amendments in 1996 established a new bicameral parliament yet broadened

presidential authority the EU suspended the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

signed in 1989 effectively ending any formalised contact (Vanderhill 2008) The following

year Belarusrsquo observer status in the Council of Europe (CoE) was revoked (Klinke 2007) In

2004 a CoE report accused the Belarusian state of complicity in the disappearances of four

prominent opposition figures in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential

elections both labelled ldquodeeply flawedrdquo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) (freedomhouseorg)2

1 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) 2 httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 32

A further constitutional amendment following a referendum in 2004 abolished presidential

term limits With a claimed turnout of 90 Lukashenko enjoyed 79 of the vote however

the OSCE claimed the election fell ldquosignificantly shortrdquo of recognised international

standards citing police raids on campaign offices forced participation and detention of

opposition campaigners (Vanderhill 2008) Similar condemnation accompanied the ldquoviolent

suppressionrdquo of opposition figures in the 2006 and 2008 elections (European

Council Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Belarus)

Following the 2004 CoE report visa bans were introduced for the officials considered

directly responsible for the disappearances as well as those suspected of committing electoral

fraud These restrictions were broadened following the 2006 election to include Lukashenko

Asset freezes were also put in place against senior ministers (CoE Common Position

2006276 CFSP)

In 2007 as a result of violence against trade union leaders Belarus joined Myanmar as one

of the only two countries excluded from Europersquos Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)

(CoE regulation No 19332006) Further travel bans and asset freezes have been imposed

following violations of international electoral standards during the December 2010

presidential elections whereby Lukasheko won with 7965 of the vote (Belarus Electoral

Commision)3

3 httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811)

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 33

The apparent attempts at isolation demonstrated by such a comprehensive sanctions regime

are mirrored in Europersquos institutional relations with Minsk Belarus remains the only

European state denied entry to the Council of Europe and shares its place with Myanmar

outside the GSP While Belarus is included within the EUrsquos Eastern Partnership (EaP)

initiative it is not party to the EUrsquos flagship European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

therefore doesnrsquot receive the level of engagement enjoyed by other the EaP members

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova and Ukraine Belarus remains the only EaP

participant without a PCA and therefore has no timetabled action plan for cooperation

Despite this the EU continues to seek engagement on some level While the US has

denounced Belarus as an ldquoOutpost of Tyrannyrdquo the EU has been keen to distinguish

Lukashenko from such despots as Jong-Il and Mugabe (Marples 2009) Certain lsquosuccessesrsquo

notably during 2008 can be highlighted Following the outbreak of war in Georgia despite

considerable pressure from Russia Lukashenko chose not to recognise the break-away

provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Under pressure from Europe Belarus also released

a number of political prisoners and loosened restrictions on media plurality encouraging the

EU to temporarily relax some travel restrictions

Yet with seemingly no coherent institutional structure for collaboration EU-Belarus relations

have developed along an ad hoc agenda Having established the centrality of institutionalism

to Europersquos potential for normativity and value alignment such a process of interaction may

prove to be founded on opportunistic or purely functionalist engagement The EU has been

keen to illustrate that is has significant shared interests with Belarus notably energy transit

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 34

immigration and organised crime yet it has also been vocal to say the least in its demands

for democracy civil and human rights

The EUrsquos stated objectives both through general EaP declarations and statements unique to

Belarus appeal for democratic development the promotion of human rights and plurality

through a free and functioning civil society ldquoThe principle objectives of EU cooperation

with Belarus are to support the needs of the population directly and indirectly support

democratisation and mitigate the effects of self isolationrdquo (Country Strategy Paper 2007-

2013)

Undoubtedly these constitute fundamentally empowering goals with the explicit intention of

offering the Belarusian population input into the direction of their milieu Similar rhetoric of

ldquoownership and involvementrdquo can be found throughout EU declarations proclaiming the

EUrsquos desire to promote the ldquoprosperity stability and security which its own citizens enjoyrdquo

(EU Non-paper 2006) Yet while there has been consistency in rhetoric the EUrsquos strategies

for engagement with Belarus have evolved over time

Following the suspension of the PCA the sole mechanism through which the EU interacted

with Belarus was through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(TACIS) established in 1991 The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)

had decided on a twin track approach to Belarus comprising limiting political engagement

whilst fostering integration with other societal groups The programme was heavily involved

in the Chernobyl clean-up operation as well as financing border demarcation with Latvia and

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 35

Lithuania As its name suggests it constitutes a purely technical though humanitarian

focussed organisation promoting scientific cooperation (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) It

fostered minimal governmental or civil interaction

2005 saw the adoption of ldquopeople-to-peoplerdquo contact as an objective of TACIS in order to

remedy this apparent deficit There was an expansion of student exchanges through the

ERASMUS programme as well as schemes enabling cross border trade between small

businesses (ENPI Strategy Paper 2007-2013) The following year the EU began funding a

Polish based TV station offering an alternative to the Belarusian state-run networks

(Vanderhill 2008)

However societal interaction was compromised by the conditionality placed on Belarusrsquo

government In 2006 the EU published a lsquonon-paperrsquo articulating ldquowhat the EU can do for

Belarusrdquo yet demanding the adoption of twelve points of reform including democratic

elections a free press and independent judiciary (Non-paper 2006) A major component of

this new stance was the imposition of a new visa regime following the Schengen extension in

2007 A single entry EU visa rose from as little as euro5 (for Lithuania) to euro60 roughly half an

average monthly salary (Korosteleva 2009)

In 2007 the TACIS programme became absorbed into the newly created European and

Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) The ENPI was split into two policy areas

social and economic development accounting for 70 of its funding and democratic

development and good governance accounting for the remaining 30 (ENPI Strategy Paper

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 36

2007-2013) However out of a total budget of euro7m only euro130 000 was allocated to civil

society and micro projects The remainder was spent continuing the Chernobyl clear up and

enhancing border and customs controls (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

While considered generally constructive by both parties due to the sensitive nature of these

projects engagement relied upon a level of collaboration with Minsk Technical and expert

cooperation with little opportunity for lsquopeople-to-peoplersquo interaction remained the central

focus (Bosse 2009)

2008 initiated a significant shift in EU policies As a result of the prisoner release travel

restrictions for thirty six government officials were temporarily suspended (Marples 2009)

The following year semi-formalised diplomatic relations were resumed with the opening of

the Office of Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (BISS Yearbook 2009) In

May that year Lukashenko signed the Protocol of the Eastern Partnership Innitiative

permitted the registration of the opposition party lsquoFor Freedomrsquo and enabled the sale of

opposition news-papers at government run kiosks (Marples 2009)

Declaring the ldquoend of conditionalityrdquo Javier Solana became the first European politician to

visit Minsk in 2009 (BISS Yearbook 2009) While visa restrictions remained in place for

some officials others visited various European capitals throughout 2009 and 2010 (BISS

Yearbook 2009 2010) 2009 witnessed the lsquode-politicisationrsquo of many of the EUrsquos

interactions with Belarus as the ENPI was placed under the authority of the European

Commission therefore not requiring financial approval for individual projects by member

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 37

states (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) The commission later pledged to lower financial barriers

to visas declaring the situation ldquowhere Belarusian citizens are discriminated against to be

unacceptablerdquo (Russia amp FSU General News 090710)4

Technical and expert level cooperation continued particularly in border control Belarus

adopted various European technological advancements harmonising its procedures with both

the EU and Ukraine however reform of organisational culture remains elusive (Longhurst

2011) International safety standards for heavy goods vehicles were also adopted (Bosse amp

Korosteleva 2009)

The evolution of the EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus suggests reflexivity in its policy making

process The EUrsquos initial stance can be categorised as a lsquoprincipledrsquo approach refusing

contact in all but the most essential areas (notably concerning the Chernobyl catastrophe and

attempting to implement effective border controls) This approach leaves the EU open to

instrumentalist critique Undoubtedly mitigating the effects of Chernobyl can be considered a

humanitarian exercise one in which the EU has taken the lead expending considerable time

and resources Yet considering the politicisation of migration within much of the EU

arguments that Brussels sought to hide behind a shroud of normativity in order to justify

abandoning Belarus beyond areas considered critical to EU interests seem persuasive

4 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 38

Yet the evolution demonstrates a gradual acceptance that conditionality was failing to bring

about the wider reforms the EU seeks instead serving only to entrench perceptions of the

futility in engaging Belarus In an interview in 2006 Luis Moreno heavily involved in the

TACIS programme listed Belarus as ldquothe only serious problem the EU facedrdquo claiming

ldquoBelarus is unlikely to changerdquo (Demokratizatsiya 2006)

The dropping of conditionality with the EaP in 2009 was designed to facilitate at least in

theory increased engagement The EUrsquos strategies towards Belarus increasingly diverged

from strategies pursued with full ENP members Technical cooperation on issues such as

energy security was able to advance amidst mutual recognition of shared interest with

democracy being brought up only at the periodic request of individual members (Bosse

2009)

Some commentators have highlighted this as hypocritical given the continued rhetorical calls

for fundamental reforms however there appears to have developed an understanding that with

relations so strained any cooperation would be preferable (It must be remembered that

political sanctions were still in force) A pragmatism shared by both sides generated out of

increased engagement By removing the veto power of national politicians wary of having to

explain to their electorates why they were funding lsquothe last dictatorship in Europersquo

consistency in cooperation essential for any socialisation effect began to be fostered

The EUrsquos sanction regime has also demonstrated itself to be broadly reflexive proving to be

incrementalist and mostly targeted towards political elites The exception to this is Belarusrsquo

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 39

exclusion from the GSP which has been criticised both by Minsk and civil groups in Belarus

The actual impact on Belarusrsquo trade is contested but it must be noted that EU regulations

require a suspension to be recommended by the International Labour Organisation (Tocci et

al pp32-34) and so can be considered consistent with milieu values Travel restrictions have

also been supported by Belarusian opposition groups (Russia amp FSU General News

090211)5 and have excluded certain members of government such as the foreign minister in

order to maintain some contact at the diplomatic level (Russian amp CIS Business and

Financial Newswire 310111)6

The inclusivity of EU policies however is less clear cut being constrained by both procedural

and substantive barriers As discussed above the vast majority of engagement has occurred

at the technicalexpert level Mechanisms for interacting with the Belarusian citizenry have

been limited despite the stated aim of the EaP to promote civil society and people-to-people

relations

In 2009 the Belarusian European Forum comprising various non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) and political groups was established The first meeting also attracted some

Belarusian MPs suggesting a level of domestic legitimacy not witnessed before This was

accompanied by a Civil Society Forum however both led to attempts in Minsk to replace

participating NGOs with government organised NGOs (GONGOs) undermining any efforts

towards plurality and causing Brussels to withdraw support (Ulakhovich 2011) NGOs have

5 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) 6 httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811)

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 40

had modest successes the EUrsquos decision to liberalise the visa regime has been attributed to

lobbying by civil society groups (BISS 2010) however at the time of writing EU visas

continue to cost euro607 - Russian and Ukrainian citizens pay just euro358 (Office for a Democratic

Belarus)

In 2009 EaP members were invited to participate in EuroNest a European wide inter-

parliamentary forum However the EU wanted to invite opposition and civil society groups

contesting the legitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly (BISS 2010) Minsk refused

and despite orchestrating a joint deacutemarche with the other five members of the EaP calling for

Belarusrsquo inclusion Belarus remained the only EaP member excluded from the summit in

April 2011 (EuroNest)9

The lack of adequate inclusivity has been fuelled by both parties Minsk maintains strict

controls on civil society groups in Belarus and political dissent continues to be violently

suppressed The registration process for participation in human rights and democracy

promotion projects provide the Belarusian government with effective veto power It is not

uncommon for regional administrations to approve a scheme only for it to be blocked in

Minsk Strict auditing processes within TACIS are also a significant barrier to funding as

accountability of NGOs is deemed insufficient (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009)

7 httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 090911) 8 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) 9 httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911)

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 41

These developments cloud notions of normativity in EU strategy Few would debate that the

EU seeks to empower the Belarusian population or that it has demonstrated some reflexivity

in its policy developments It has also by and large sought to promote milieu enhancing

goals The fact that the Belarusian government has been willing to cooperate on issues of

border management both with the EU and Ukraine as well as over energy transit and

organised crime demonstrate cooperation over collectively held interests Yet the lack of

policy implementation fostering pluralism in society demonstrates significant discrepancy in

values between EU and Belarusian policy makers TACISrsquo auditing structures also

demonstrate incongruity in institutional culture

The continued marginalisation of civil groups should be considered in light of the EUrsquos

policy intentions The utility of pragmatic engagement over principled non-engagement is

increasingly being recognised in order to foster a socialisation effect According to a German

ambassador ldquothe more dialogue there is the more the regime will find itself vulnerable to the

effects of modernisation and growing public awarenessrdquo (Korosteleva 2009) The EU is

effectively lsquoplaying the long gamersquo with Minsk hoping that it will oversee a diffusion of its

norms to the wider Belarusian society

In this regard EU foreign policy towards Belarus can be regarded broadly normative in that it

is attempting to pursue consistent milieu enhancing goals that fundamentally seek to

empower a suppressed population Reformist rhetoric and political isolation alone have

proven to have had a negligible impact so have been supplemented with a certain degree of

practical cooperation

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 42

Yet despite this there is little evidence of substantive progress in the EUrsquos relations with

Belarus The Lukashenko regime has not instigated any policies of democratisation nor

departed from its authoritarian trajectory Freedom House continues to cite significant

restrictions on political and civil liberties and Belarus remains subject to a comprehensive

EU sanctions regime Such lack of progress significantly undermines any notion of a

European led ideational transformation

As already stated Europe is playing the long game but its failure to instigate ideational

change is only in part a symptom of temporal brevity a fundamental failing in its policies is

also exposed Europersquos relations with its neighbourhood assume an inherent desire for greater

engagement with Brussels The mechanisms Europe has at its disposal are wholly inadequate

for influencing a regime and citizenry that are at best indifferent to European advances

The values and norms central to EU identity upon which its legitimacy has been constructed

namely democracy human rights and plurality have very little tradition in Belarus As a

result EU attempts at norm promotion are likely to enjoy very little social traction without

some level of demand from the Belarusian citizenry

Significant shifts in social conceptions take time and norm diffusion requires consistent and

sustained socialisation through information flows and communication networks An

empirical study has found a direct correlation between levels of inter-governmental and

societal interaction and the prevalence of norm diffusion ldquodiffusion is in large part a function

of how open and interactive states arerdquo (Koptein amp Reilly 2000)

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 43

Yet a 2008 survey demonstrates the lack of interaction between EU and Belarusian society

83 of those questioned had never been to an EU country 59 had had no contact with a

foreigner in three years of the 6 of population that regularly used the internet just 9 used

a European portal The only independent European oriented newspaper in Belarus enjoys a

national circulation of 04 (Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Since the imposition of the

Schengen visa travel to EU countries has fallen 66 (Office for a Democratic Belarus

2009)10

As a result of the severe media restrictions that continue to be implemented by the

Lukashenko regime awareness of the EU is incredibly low 60 of respondents had never

heard of the ENP whilst 52 believed Belarus maintains strong relations with the rest of the

world It is also worth noting that when relations with the EU are mentioned in state media it

is always on a bi-lateral state-state basis The EU is never referred to as a unitary actor

(Bosse amp Korosteleva 2009) Such restrictions are specifically designed to prevent the

dissemination of an EU identity When respondents were asked whether closer relations with

the EU should be pursued the most common answer at 406 was ldquoI donrsquot knowrdquo

(Vanderhill 2008)

Evidently then attempts to alleviate the consequences of a severely constrained society are

warranted but EU policies are failing to do so by transcribing illegitimacy on the Lukashnko

regime which simply isnrsquot shared by Belarusians While to the outside world Lukashenko

heads a violent authoritarian state he enjoys widespread domestic support and maintains

legitimacy built upon relative economic success and social stability

10 httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911)

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

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Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 44

In 2010 the UN Development Programme listed Belarus 61st of 169 in its Human

Development Index up from 67th in 2005 citing strong education and social security

programmes (UNDP)11 Between 2006 and 2010 Belarus improved from 151st to 127th in

Transparency Internationalrsquos corruption index (Transparency International)1213 Belarusrsquo

economic growth has also been consistently higher than other members of the EaP

(Longhurst 2011)

Domestic support is manifest Another 2008 survey found 73 of the population considered

their economic wellbeing ldquostablerdquo 606 believed ldquolife will improve under Lukashenkordquo

and when asked which would be preferable economic development or democracy 66

chose economic development 227 chose democracy (Korosteleva 2009) With legitimacy

built upon economic prosperity Lukashenkorsquos approval suffered following the global

recession falling to 392 however the most prominent opposition figure in the same survey

managed just a 44 rating (Marples 2009)

This demonstrates the challenges the EU faces in trying to foster a domestic opposition

movement Even if the EU was able to adequately engage civil society through the policies it

enacts there is little tradition of opposition politics what movement exists though broadly

pro-European is incoherent and ldquowithout any sort of appeal to the wider populationrdquo

(Dangerfield 2011) For norm diffusion to occur both the norm and instigating actor must

enjoy some degree of legitimacy to gain social acceptance and achieve reproduction

11 httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) 12 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) 13 httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911)

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 45

The EU also talks of Belarusrsquo lsquoself isolationrsquo but concurrent with Fawnrsquos statement in

Chapter 1 Belarus has a long history of and continues to pursue regional integration in the

post-Soviet space Belarus is a member of the Eurasia Economic Community and customs

union with Russia and Kazakhstan It is also a member the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation Therefore while the EU prevents any meaningful elite socialisation by

excluding Belarus from European institutions Belarusian officials maintain regular formal

and informal contact with much of Eurasia

Socialisation of the wider population follows a similar pattern In 2009 as a result of the

economic crisis Belarus began a limited privatisation process and EU-Belarus expert working

groups sought to lay the groundwork for legal harmonisation of business transactions (BISS

Yearbook 2010) the EU now accounts for 251 of Belarusrsquo trade (EUROSTAT 2011)14

Despite this consistency in defamatory rhetoric from Brussels fuels perceptions of

corruption and state interference preventing significant private investment from Europe and

perpetuating conceptions of Belarus as being outside of EU norms As a result Russian firms

continue to increase their presence in the Belarusian private sector (Marples 2009)

Increased contact with Russian businesses serves to spread Russian business practices and

norms Belarusians are also able to travel visa free to Russia The EUrsquos Schengen zone has

played a major role in the harmonisation of European identity there is every reason to

believe Russian-Belarusian socialisation will have a similar effect

14 httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911)

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 46

The dearth of commonly agreed policies demonstrates there to be significant incompatibility

of norms between the EU and Belarus however both parties continue to impose political and

institutional boundaries preventing meaningful integration or people-to-people contact to

remedy this That Minsk is reluctant to allow engagement is understandable as the reforms

Brussels demand threaten elite control however the barriers the EU imposes are an imperfect

result of its supposed normative stance

The EU is hoping that technicalexpert cooperation will lead to a wider diffusion of its norms

yet this is unlikely to happen with the current process of engagement What cooperation that

has occurred has become dependent not on the promotion but circumvention of European

values While the EUrsquos rationale for this circumvention can be considered normative it

cannot plausibly expect its norms to be socialised to the wider population when they are not

being socialised between actors actually engaging each other Europersquos failure to liberalise its

visa regime is therefore unforgivable

The EUrsquos strategy of fostering a lsquobottom uprsquo development of its norms is further

compromised by the situation within Belarus The EU suffers from such lack of awareness

that it doesnrsquot enjoy any significant legitimacy and nor do those seen to be supporting it

norm promotion by an actor popularly perceived as illegitimate will never acquire social

traction As long as the current political climate in Belarus remains for the EU to develop

legitimacy it must be seen to be engaging with the Lukashenko regime

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 47

Pursuing engagement with Minsk will accelerate the dissemination process The coalescing

of values at elite level within the EU has occurred through habitualised cooperation and

diplomacy While there have been visits to Minsk by EU officials and member states have

hosted some visiting Belarusian ministers the EU cannot credibly hope to wield any

ideational influence over a state whose power structures are monopolised by the policy

making elite when it maintains a policy explicitly precluding elite socialisation

EU policies have had and will continue to have minimal impact on the governance of

Belarus Despite an evolutionary policy the EUrsquos limited engagement is failing to exert any

ideational influence and more importantly is failing the Belarusian population The EU has

decided that Belarus is incapable of abiding by its rules yet if the EU genuinely wishes to

extend its values to the citizens of Belarus it must do so by demonstrating further reflexivity

in its policies and accommodate the unique political environment in Belarus By doing this it

has a far greater chance of enacting genuinely inclusive policies and therefore promoting

civil empowerment

This presents problems for European policy makers and the concept of Normative Power

Europe EU foreign policy is seeking to pursue normative goals and by attempting to isolate

the leaders of an undemocratic and violent regime is ostensibly pursuing these goals through

normative means Political isolation in the name of normativity has become such a feature of

European politics that it has become self-legitimising amongst the European citizenry

Engagement with Minsk will therefore suffer a significant legitimacy deficit The EUrsquos

decision to remove funding authority from Council members demonstrates recognition of this

contradiction

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 48

Yet if the EU is to truly justify its normative self-conception it must demonstrate belief in the

transformative power of its institutionalism By inviting Belarus to participate in the

European experiment the EU has a far greater chance of instigating much needed reforms in

a severely oppressed society It may also find that Belarus has something to contribute to the

constitutive process of European identity formation

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 49

Conclusion

The process of regionalisation demonstrates the assimilation of identity through integration

to be the most striking characteristic of habitualised state cooperation The institutionalism

Europe has embarked upon has facilitated the construction of a multi-faceted identity that has

surpassed mere transnationalism and come to represent the interests and values of both the

policy making elite and emerging European citizenry This citizenry possesses an

unprecedented level of empowerment enabling it to express its preferences through myriad

competing outlets yet Europersquos institutions are uniquely able to condition the preferences

and value structures of both members and non-members alike

That Europe as a region has been able to construct a tangible identity provides not only for

self-identification but for its recognition by others As other actors consider the values which

the EU embodies they are by doing so determining the course of engagement they will seek

with the EU Belarusrsquos intransience in its rejection of European pluralism reflects the

fundamental incompatibility of their respective value sets

European foreign policy has been subjected to instrumentalist critique arguing normativity is

merely a rhetorical tool for the promotion of its particularistic interests That despite an

evolutionary policy the nature of engagement with Belarus has remained largely consistent

amid demands for democracy and human rights has been cited as evidence of this Yet the

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 50

fact it is overwhelmingly in European interests to extend its normative values to its

neighbourhood demonstrates a failure of policy rather than lack of normativity

European multilateralism has developed as a means to combat marginalisation demonstrating

inclusivity and accommodation to be critical elements of an essentially normative identity

This drive for empowerment is witnessed in Europersquos eastward expansion and the ambitions

of its Belarusian strategy Yet the EUrsquos relations with Belarus suggest fundamental conflicts

within the construction of its normative self-conception

Europersquos normativity is founded upon its inclusivity but the inherent nature of identity is to

project alterity an entityrsquos identity is continually reaffirmed by establishing and maintaining

differentiation from others This nature sits ill with an inherently inclusive self-conception

Social Identity Theory dictates that the more an individual identifies with a group the more

likely it is to try and exclude others from membership (Curley 2009) That Polish and

Latvian calls for the liberalisation of the EUrsquos visa regime have been blocked by the lsquoold

Europersquo of France and Germany supports this (Korosteleva 2009)

The EUrsquos response to this conflict has been to remove the veto powers of member states

perceived as unhelpfully susceptible to domestic populism Yet such a response merely

contributes to the already prescient debate on the democratic deficit within the EU It is

arguable that Europersquos pluralism mitigates this deficit but if this is the case then outlets must

be found for the European citizenry to consider the ideational implications that EU policies

towards states such as Belarus entail

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 51

European policy makers have begun to speak of lsquoenlargement fatiguersquo The direction this

debate pursues will dictate the continued evolution of the European Union and wields huge

potential to fundamentally alter the European normative self-conception It is for this reason

that the enlargement debate must not be confined to the murmurings of Brussels nor the

musings of academia Europersquos plurality is its greatest asset and its citizens must utilise it

Equally though Brussels must improve its public diplomacy and better articulate the full

implications of its policies

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 52

Bibliography

Acharya A 2007 The emerging regional architecture in world politics World Politics 59(4) pp629-652

Adler E 1997 Imagined (Security) Communities Cognitive Regions in International Relations Millennium - Journal of International Studies 26(2) pp249-277

Adler E Greve P 2009 When security community meets balance of power overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance Review of International Studies 35(1) pp59-84

Arat-Koccedil S 2010 Contesting or affirming ldquoEuroperdquo European enlargement aspirations for ldquoEuropeannessrdquo and new identities in the margins of Europe Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18(2) pp181-191

Barbeacute E et al 2009 Which rules shape EU external governance Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp834-852

Berenskoetter FS 2005 Mapping the Mind Gap A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies Security Dialogue 36(1) pp71-92

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2010 Belarusian Yearbook 2009 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2009 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) 2011 Belarusian Yearbook 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Bicchi F 2006 ldquoOur size fits allrdquo normative power Europe and the Mediterranean Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp286-303

Bickerton C The Perils of Performance EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 28 pp24-42

Bickerton C 2010 Functionality in EU foreign policy towards a new research agenda European Integration 32(2) pp213-227

Boumlrzel TA 2009 The New Regionalism in Western Europe Territorial Restructuring and Political Change Michael Keating Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing 1998 pp ix 242 Canadian Journal of Political Science 32(04) p800

Bosse G 2009 Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the valuessecurity nexus in EUndashBelarus relations Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp215-227

Bosse G Korosteleva E 2009 Changing Belarus The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership Cooperation and Conflict Jpurnal of the Nordic International Studies Association 44(2) pp143-165

Brock L 2006 Ordering International Politics ldquoNeo-Liberalrdquo and ldquoPost-Constructivistrdquo Geopolitics 11(3) pp535-540

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 53

Caporaso JA amp Kim M-hyung 2009 The dual nature of European identity subjective awareness and coherence Journal of European Public Policy 16(1) pp19-42

Cram L 2009 Identity and European integration diversity as a source of integration Nations and Nationalism 15(1) pp109-128

Council of the European Union 2008 Council conclusions on Belarus published 13102008

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on Belarus published 17112009

Council of the European Union 2009 Council conclusions on human rights and democratisation in third countries published 08122009

Council of the European Union 2010 Internal security strategy for the EU towards a European security model published 23022010

Council of the European Union 2010 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP published June 2010

Curley TM 2009 Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion International Studies Quarterly 53(3) pp649-668

Dangerfeild M 2011 Belarus Moldova and Ukraine in or out of the European regional international society European Integration 33(2) pp215-233

De Vreese C Kanyla A 2009 News framing and support for a CFSP Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3) pp4553-481

Dijkstra H 2010 Explaining variation in the role of the EU Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-making Journal of European Public Policy 17(4) pp527-544

Droidge M 2007 Joined at the hip regionalism and interegionalism Journal of European Integration 29(2) pp229-248

Ducircchene F 1973 The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence Chapter 1 pp1-21 in (eds) Kohnstamm M Hager W A Nation Writ Large Foreign policy problems before the European Community Macmillan London Edwards G 2009 The construction of ambiguity and the limits of attraction Europe and its neighbourhood Chapter 3 pp43-59 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon European Commission 2003 European Security Strategy A secure Europe in a better world published 12122003 European Commission 2005 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of Freedom Security and Justice published 12102005 European Commission 2006 What the EU could do for Belarus(Non-Paper)

European Commission 2007 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative Belaruscountry strategy paper2007-2013amp National Indicative Programme 2007-2011

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 54

European Commission 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - providing security in a changing world published 11122008

European Commission 2010 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers published 13122010

European Commission 2011 Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force measures adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy updated 11082011

EUROSTAT 2011 Belarus-EU bilateral trade and trade with the world published 08062011

Fawcett L 2004 Exploring Regional Domains A Comparative History of Regionalism International Affairs 80(3) pp429-446

Fawn R 2009 ldquoRegionsrdquo and their study wherefrom what for and whereto Review of International Studies 35(S1) p5

Finnemore M Sikkink K 1998 Internal norm dynamics and political change International Organization52 (4) pp887-917

Finnemore M Sikkink K 2001 Taking stock the constructivist research programme in international relations and comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) pp391-417

Flemes D 2010 Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Freyburg T amp Richter S 2010 National identity matters the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans Journal of European Public Policy 17(2) pp263-281

Gaumlnzle S 2009 EU Governance and the European Neighbourhood Policy A Framework for Analysis Europe-Asia Studies 61(10) pp1715-1734

Geismann H 2010 The EU regional power global pole paper tiger - or what Chapter 13 pp257-273 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Hoffmann M 2003 Constructing a complex world The frontiers of international relations theory and foreign policy-making Asian Journal of Political Science 11(2) pp37-57

Hyde-Price A 2006 ldquoNormativerdquo power Europe a realist critique Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp217-234

Jerez-Mir M Real-Dato J amp Vaacutezquez-Garciacutea R 2009 Identity and Representation in the Perceptions of Political Elites and Public Opinion A Comparison between Southern and Post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp943-966

Klinke I 2007 The EUs strategy of strategic non-engagement in Belarus challenging the hegemonic notion of the EU as a toothless value diffuser Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 27 p25-43 Koptein J Reilly D 2000 Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the post-communist world World Politics 53(1) pp1-37

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 55

Korosteleva E 2009 The limits of EU governance Belarus response to the European neighbourhood policy Contemporary Politics 15(2) pp29-245

Lake DA 2009 Regional hierarchy authority and local international order Review of International Studies 35(S1) p35

Lausen F 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Lavenex S 2008 A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy integration beyond conditionality Journal of European Public Policy 15(6) pp938-955

Lavenex S amp Schimmelfennig F 2009 EU rules beyond EU borders theorizing external governance in European politics Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp791-812

Lavenex S et al 2009 Modes of external governance a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp813-833

Longhurst K 2011 Appraising the European Neighbourhood Policy background implementation and recommendations Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(3) pp5-24

Magnette P 2007 How can one be European Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity European Law Journal 13(5) pp664-679

Manners I 2006 Normative power Europe reconsidered beyond the crossroads1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp182-199

Manners I Normative Power Europe A Contradiction in Terms Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2) pp235-258

Marples D 2009 Outpost of tyranny The failure of democratisation in Belarus Democratization 16(4) pp756-776

Matonytė I amp Morkevičius V 2009 Threat Perception and European Identity Building The Case of Elites in Belgium Germany Lithuania and Poland Europe-Asia Studies 61(6) pp967-985

Mayer H 2009 The long legacy of Dorian Gray why the EU needs to redefine its role in global affairs Chapter 1 pp6-24 in (eds) Jones E Van Genugten S 2009 The future of European foreign policy Routledge Abingdon

Mayer H 2010 France Germany UK responses of traditional to rising powers Chapter 14 pp273-292 in (ed) Flemes D Regional leadership in the global system ideas interests and strategies of regional powers Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Mitzen J 2006 Anchoring Europersquos civilizing identity habits capabilities and ontological security1 Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp270-285

Moreno L 2006 The genesis of European relations with Ukraine and Belarus Demokratizatsiya 14(4) pp535-544

Nash M 2009 The boldest outreach the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union Contemporary Review 291(1694) pp306-311

Nye J 2004 Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics Public Affairs New York

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 56

Obydenkova A 2006 New Regionalism and Regional Integration the Role of National Institutions Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4) pp589-610

Orbie J 2008 Europes global role external policies of the EU Ashgate Publishing Surrey

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2006 Republic of Belarus presidential election of 19th March 2006 election observation mission report published 07062006

Paasi A 2002 Regional Transformation in the European Context Notes on Regions Boundaries and Identity Space and Polity 6(2) pp197-201

Paasi A 2009 The resurgence of the region and regional identity theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe Review of International Studies 35(1) pp121-146

Pace M 2006 The politics of regional identity meddling with the Mediterranean Routledge Oxon

Rigoni A 2011 The impact of the Eastern Partnership of the EU on governace and economic development in Eastern Europe Council of Europe published 08022011

Scheuer A Schmitt H 2009 Dynamics in European Political Identity Journal of European Integration 31(5) pp551-568

Sjursen H 2006 The EU as a ldquonormativerdquo power how can this be Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) pp235-251

Smith K 2005 The outsiders the European neighbourhood policy International Affairs 81(4) pp757-773

Smith M 2004 Towards a theory of EU foreign policy making multilevel governance domestic politics and national adaptation to Europes common foreign and security policy Journal of European Public Policy 11(4) pp740-758

Soumlderbaum F StÅlgren P amp Van Langenhove L 2005 The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism a Comparative Analysis Journal of European Integration 27(3) pp365-380

Spencer S 2006 Race and ethnicity culture identity and representation Routledge London

Sutcliffe J 2010 Critical interpretations of integration in North America and the EU a comparative evaluation Chapter 4 pp63-82 (ed) in Laursen 2010 Comparative regional integration Europe and beyond Ashgate Publishing Surrey England

Tocci N et al 2008Who is a normative foreign policy actor The EU and its global partners Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels

Ulakhavich V 2011 Belarus and the Eastern Partnership still a long way to go Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft 3 pp82-94

Vanderhill G 2008 The EU and non-accession states the cases of Belarus and Ukraine Perspectives Central European Review of International Affairs 16(2) pp53-76

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 57

Webber M 2007 Inclusion exclusion and the governance of European security Manchester University Press Manchester

Winn N 2001 In search of Europes internal and external borders politics security identity and the EU Perspectives on European Politics and Society 1(1) pp19-48

Youngs R 2009 Democracy promotion as external governance Journal of European Public Policy 16(6) pp895-915

Youngs R 2004 Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EUrsquos External Identity JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2) pp415-435

Internet Sources

Belarus Electoral Commission Results of 2010 presidential elections Available

at httpwwwbelarusbyengovernmentbelarus-electionspresidential-elections-in-belarus (Accessed 300811) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Delegations Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomedelegations (Accessed 060911) EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly Timetable of meetings Available at httpwwweuronesteuroparleuropaeueuronestcmshomemeeting (Accessed 060911) EuroStat ldquoEU-Belarus trade relationsrdquo Available at httptradeeceuropaeudoclibdocs2010septembertradoc_113351pdf (Accessed 050911) Freedom House country profile Belarus Available at httpwwwfreedomhouseorgtemplatecfmpage=22ampyear=2010ampcountry=7780 (Accessed 240811) Office for a Democratic Belarus ldquoRound table on Schengen visa liberalisation Policy towards Belarus and Belarus-EU Cooperation in Tourism Takes Place in Brusselsrdquo Published 20042009 Available at httpdemocraticbelaruseunode6499 (Accessed 050911) Russian and CIS Business and Financial Newswire ldquoEU Council approves sanctions against Belarusrdquo Published 31012011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=effc7868-773e-42c1-a16c-2cf6a8b3f0dd40sessionmgr15ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=57723136 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU General News ldquoEU to simplify entry rules for Belarusiansrdquo Published 09072010 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=cfc08542-5195-4a95-a991-d856cf94f83f40sessionmgr4ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=52050462 (Accessed 240811) Russia and FSU Genral News ldquoBelarus opposition figure urges EU to hold firm stance against Belarusrdquo Published 09022011 Available at httpwebebscohostcomehostdetailsid=deff18eb-

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources

Page | 58

4c8d-4621-8abb-26e709f2f04a40sessionmgr12ampvid=1amphid=15ampbdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWNvb2tpZSxpcCx1cmwsc2hpYiZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmU3ddb=bwhampAN=58000187 (Accessed 240811) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2006 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2006 (Accessed 060911) Transparency International Corruption perception index 2010 Available at httpwwwtransparencyorgpolicy_researchsurveys_indicescpi2010results (Accessed 060911) United Nation Development Programme Human development index Available at httphdrstatsundporgencountriesprofilesBLRhtml (Accessed 310811) Visa Free Europe Country report Belarus 2011 Available at httpvisa-free-europeeuwp-contentuploads201106Belarus-countryraportPASOSpdf (Accessed 09092011)

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter 1
• Constructing a European Identity
• Chapter 2
• The European Union as a Normative Actor
• Chapter 3
• The Belarusian Problem
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Internet Sources