the european power: the ideology of anti-democratic governance

8/2/2019 The European Power: The Ideology of Anti-Democratic Governance

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European

Union PowerTe Ideology of

Anti-democratic

GovernanceGeorge Buchan


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EuropeanUnion Power

Te Ideology of

Anti-democratic

Governance

George Buchan

The Bruges Group 2011Published in January 2011 by

The Bruges Group, 227 Linen Hall, 162-168 Regent Street, London W1B 5TB

www.brugesgroup.com

Bruges Group publications are not intended to represent a corporate view of European andinternational developments. Contributions are chosen on the basis of their intellectual rigour

and their ability to open up new avenues for debate.


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Te Autor

George Bucan is originally from the North East of Scotland, and has a BA (Hons.) in

Sociology from the University of Strathclyde and a Masters Degree in Strategic Studies from

the University of Aberdeen. Since leaving University in 2004, George has worked in security

analysis and business consultancy in London. He is currently a teacher and a freelance

writer.

Georges core interests have always been strategic studies, he has created and maintains his

own website on international relations and security; www.edinvillie.org. George is uent in both

English and French, and after a spell living in Italy, he is currently living on the French-Swiss

border with his Swiss wife.

Authors note: I would like to sincerely thank Robert Oulds and the Bruges Group for givingme the opportunity to have my work on the nature of democracy and the contrary nature of EU

governance published by them.


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Table of Contents

Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................................5

Part One: The Democratic Milieu.................................................................................................................5

The Nature of Democratic Power and Governance .................................................................8

Democratic Accountability .............................................................................................................................9

Democratic Representation .....................................................................................................................10

Summing Up: The Political Connection ...........................................................................................11

Part Two: The Structure and Nature of European Union Power .....................................13

The EU Structure .............................................................................................................................................15

The European Parliament .........................................................................................................................15

The European Commission .....................................................................................................................17

The Council of Ministers ............................................................................................................................20

The Wider Nature of EU Power ............................................................................................................21

Conclusions ..........................................................................................................................................................22

Part Tree: The EU in the International System .........................................................................24


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European Union Power:Te Ideology of Anti-democratic Governance

George Buchan

Introduction

The institutions of the European Union (EU) label themselves democratic through

emphasising the democratic attributes which are lightly sprinkled across the EU

system. However, the actual structure and workings of this from of governance

are very much undemocratic, and when this is combined with the nature of the

common European interest and the notion of political union, it becomes actively

anti-democratic. This is because in going back to the fundamental principles,concepts and values which create democratic legitimacy, the EUs self-dened and

self-marketed label of being democratically legitimate is not justied. Central to this

assertion is the application of the old English sports proverb: its the taking part that

counts.

Therefore, part one of this paper examines what constitutes democratic legitimacy

by going back to the roots of democratic governance, and by examining it in terms of

the nature of power which precedes it. The differences between different theoretical

models and forms of democratic governance are not covered because this paperfocuses on the common threads from which they are all formed. Therefore in placing

the structure and nature of the EU against this examination in part two, it becomes

blatant as to how and why the EU does not deserve its self-branded characterization

of democratically legitimate power and governance. Part three of this paper then

takes the results of parts one and two and puts them onto the international stage,

because there is an inherent link between the centralisation of internal power and

the inevitability of its external projection.

Part One: Te Democratic Milieu

There is a general equation of democracy and freedom as one and the same. On

the whole this is a fairly obvious and correct assumption, as it is democracy as a

form of governance and power which creates the public and political freedoms and

rights which creates this generic form and sense of freedom. However, whilst the

freedoms of a population are directly linked to how democratic their governance is, in

analysing the European Union, there must be a conceptual separation of democracy


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in terms of governance and political freedom, and democracy in terms of the civil

freedoms that democratic electorates enjoy. This conceptual separation must

exist because the European Union and its member state citizens are not directly

linked to each other; they are practically and pragmatically separated by means of

the member-state government. In terms of the EU, because the citizen and their

governance is intermediated by a third party (ironically being the member-state

government itself), the traditional nature of democratic governance in Europe is

changed because the European Union is a structure of political power existing and

working above the level of the nation-state. Specically, this is changed because

the traditional direct nature of the political connection between the governed and

the governing is short-circuited by the same intermediary, but also in that in working

above the nation-state a default direct political connection has not been created by

the EU, giving a taste of the form of governance that it embodies.

However, in returning to the public freedoms of EU member-state citizens, these

member states are some of the freest states on the globe. A very readable and

poignant study of this can be found at freedomhouse.orgin their grading of political

and civil freedom by nation1. What all democratic states have in common, is in

their domestic public arenas there is what I call (simply because I have not seen

it framed like this by anyone else yet) the free-market economics of democratic

politics2. This is simply an effective way to understand the nature of freedom in

democracies by analogising it with its political cousin the free market. This is

the idea that people are only involved in democratic politics as much or as little

as they freely choose to be (the double-edged sword of an unforced relationship),

and that their opinions only go as far as they are marketable, and that there is a

market for them3. Furthermore, it is the free interaction of all these different opinions

available in the democratic political marketplace which regulates political outcomes

and policies to generally be inline with overall democratic ideals, because the

government is obliged to be reective of its citizens opinions and interests if it wants

to remain in power. Therefore, what is key here is that there is an open public (and

media-based, hence the medias label as the Fourth Estate) political marketplacewithin democracies in which citizens can express their political views absolutely

and completely freely - this is the background environment to opinion-forming and

free political activity. This is the fundamental environment in which democracy is

1 www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=552

2 www.edinvillie.org/ReadingRoom/viewarticle.aspx?ArticleID=24

3 The British National Party is a good political example of this whereby its values are pretty muchunmarketable because they do not reect British values. There is no market for them, and so theyare kept on the margins of British politics where they ought to be.


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able to ourish. Why this regulates political outcomes and democratic legislatures

is because the governments interests are directly related to its citizens, principally

because the primary governmental interest of holding power is inextricably tied to

their public election. At its most basic premise, therefore, the fundamental interest

of government to remain in power is directly related to its ability to generally reect

the interests of its citizens. If it does not, it will simply be voted out of power. This

is the foundational pretext for democracy; a pretext which the EU does not have

because, as will be seen in part two, its legislature is closed to the public yet is the

ultimate arbiter of power.

In terms of the European Union, the fundamental environment that enables

democracy to ourish - the democratic political marketplace - is all but non-existent,

and is so for three reasons. Whilst jumping ahead slightly, explaining this sets the

tone. Firstly, the political connection between the governed and the governingis diluted to such an extent that the legislature (the European Commission) has

no link, interaction with, and is not accountable to, member-state citizens; hence

the role of the member-state government as an intermediary because, as will be

detailed in part two, the institution that creates and produces legislation is closed

to the public. Because of this, there is no need or obligation for the legislature

to work in the interests of, or be reective of, its member-state citizens, and it is

not structurally or ideologically set up to act in this way. Secondly, and related,

when the source of political power is not the citizen, but a mix the member-state

governments and independent EU bureaucratic interests, there is no reason or

fundamental obligation to actually have a democratic political marketplace in which

European Union progression and legislative direction is publicly discussed and

debated, because, governance is an overwhelmingly closed practice. Thirdly, and

also related, public discussion and debate of European political union has not yet

been sparked enough to create the public interest for this debate to exist. The nature

of anti-democratic law-making and governance has not yet been sparked because

the member-state citizens are (therefore naturally) structurally and ideologically kept

out of its creation4

. When these three basic facets of EU governance are mixed intothe premise of a democratic political marketplace, the marketplace itself becomes

diluted at best.

However, in order to more fully understand how this works, the very foundations of

democratic governance and the fundamental principles which create the political

connection between the governed and the governing will now be brought back into

4 The current mix of consumer politics and political disengagement are helping to keep this publicdebate at a minimum people have no reason to become interested in governance kept out of theirreach when they are already disaffected with governance which is well within it.


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focus. How and where power comes from is the absolute and unqualied heart of

democracy, and the consequent labelling of any government and legislature as

democratically legitimate. It is the unchangeable foundational principle that the

citizen is the source of power and the source of the right to govern. This is the

essence and spirit from which all forms and models of democracy ow.

Te Nature of Democratic Power and Governance

The source of power and therefore the source of the right to govern in a democracy

is the citizen. This is impossible to overstate, because this is the very heart

of democratic theory, practice and ideology. Because there is no other source

from which democratic power and the subsequent right to govern originates,

democratic power and governance itself is best characterised as the consensualoutsourcing of power and control from the citizen to an elected assembly. However,

precisely because government is then centralised, it naturally opens up a gap

(of representation, accountability and interests) separating the citizens from their

government as they are not, then, left to run their own affairs in absence of a higher

level of control (which is anarchy). However, it is democracy which ideologically,

theoretically and pragmatically leaves the smallest possible degree of separation

between the citizen and the government because, at the most fundamental level,

the right to govern is derived precisely from the citizen, and consequently, all notions

of accountability, representation and (national) interests are also traced directlyback

to the citizen via a direct political connection.

The health of a democracy is therefore directly related to the extent of this gap

the closer a government is tied in principle and practice to its citizens, the more

democratic it is. This is because accountability to the citizen and representation of

their interests are inherently intertwined with the very right to govern, because the

governmental interest of holding power is tied to the majority of citizens allowing

it to happen. Therefore, the inherent ideological aim of democracy is that it is

the citizens who chart the course of governmental direction, policy and politicalproduction5. Whilst as with any ideal this gets diluted in practice, it is nonetheless

the underlining and guiding principle of governance, and therefore why the extent of

dilution is directly related to the proximity to democratic principles and the extent of

the separative gap. What cyclically keeps this theory of governance strong is the

democratic political marketplace: this makes government naturally accessible to the

5 This is why hope and change are highly emotive and therefore constant and blatant concepts inelection strategies; because it hits the electoral nerve of the citizen being the source of power, andfurthermore is a key word which inserts empowerment into the collective electoral consciousness.


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citizen and open to their inuence. Therefore, in terms of legislative and decision-

making processes and products, whilst they obviously must come from the top down

(the nature of government), what is key is that the ideology and processes preceding

such decision-making and legislative processes must come from the bottom-up -

public consent is democratic legislations means of production.

At best, the source of European Union power can be described as the citizen

by extension of the member-state government. As will be seen in discussing the

structure and nature of the European Union in part two, the citizen as the central

reference point has been replaced by members of member-state governments

and internal bureaucratic interests. However, democratic governance was never

created for the democratic government to hand its power and right to govern over

to any other body, and especially not to that of a closed independent legislature.

This is absolutely central to the Westphalian model of the nation-state. Despite itssimplicity, the right to govern coming directly from the citizen is not negotiable, nor

open to interpretation - it is one of the few zero-sum issues of democratic politics.

The EUs right to govern any amount of policy issues and areas above that of the

member-state therefore requires a public mandate to do so which must come in

the form of public referenda, otherwise by ratifying such powers, the member-state

breaks its fundamental principle of governance, and furthermore breaks the original

political connection between the governed and the governing by becoming an

intermediary of power rather than its guarantor.

To clarify further, we must go back to fundamental concepts of democratic

accountability and democratic representation, because when these are fused to the

nature of democratic power and the right to govern outlined above, it creates the

political connection between the governed and the governing, which is broken by

pan-EU centralisation of power and therefore political union.

Democratic Accountability

Because the source of power and the right to govern is the citizen in a democracy,

governmental accountability is structurally and ideologically directed there. In its most

basic and discernible form, this is the ability to remove a government from power

through free elections. Therefore, if the government looses track of the interests of its

citizens, it will practically loose their support, and therefore inevitably loose its right to

govern. Democratic accountability accordingly recognises the active political nature

of the citizen in the political decision-making and legislative process, particularly

in governments use of, and interaction with, the democratic political marketplace.


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Ideally, it uses this as a litmus test for the production of legislation. This is because

the support of the people is the primary requirement for election, and therefore the

right to govern is inherently intertwined with the ability to generally reect and be in

line with trends in public opinion and interests. Democratic accountability, then, acts

as an explicit and direct part of the political connection between the governed and

the governing because being accountable to the citizen is generically synonymous

with working in their interests. Furthermore, it means these interests are projected

from the people to the government via the democratic political marketplace, and

governments obligatory interaction with it. This then produces an inherently

bottom-up production process of what constitutes these interests in the rst place.

In short, if an electorate (including the very existence of the term) does not create

the interests by which government directs itself, these interests are not reective of

the citizen, and decisions and legislation based upon them are not democratically

legitimate because they avoid the underlying accountability process which makes

them democratic.

As will be seen in part two, the European Commission is the institution which creates

legislation. Because it is a closed structure (and therefore closed to the inuence

of public debate), the laws it produces has no structural means or ideological

obligation by which to be accountable to its member-state citizens. In addition to

this and in place of democratic accountability as the base for legislation, legislation

is a production of recommendations of the internal policy agencies each with their

predened mission of looking at how to harmonise the laws of the member-states in

their given policy remit. Therefore in terms of democratic accountability as outlined

above, EU legislative procedures cannot be anything less than anti-democratic.

Without accountability, such legislation cannot by default be representative.

Democratic Representation

In order for democratic accountability to exist and for the general democratic

milieu to be meaningful and responsive, representation must be a principle guidingfactor, and focused squarely on the citizen. The enactment of representation is

the pragmatic incarnation of the political connection between the governed and

the governing, and so the underlying rationale of representation, therefore, is that

democratic government works for and with its electorate.

In this fundamental expression, representation is a proclamation, alignment and

promotion of the general trends which encompass varying values and interests held


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by parts of the electorate a constituency is full of constituents6. This is how the

interests of the people being the interests of the government come to be essentially

and pragmatically one in the same thing. Moreover, it is the pragmatic evidence

by which to show that a government is working in the interests of its citizens.

Therefore, in the absence of a publicly elected legislature, and a representative

body (parliament) which cannot be integral to the very creation and formation of

legislation (the product of power), then the legislature cannot be proven to be

working in the interests of its citizens because there is no way to prove that they

are being represented. Naturally therefore, because parliament is powerfully weak

(excuse the oxymoron), democratic representation is also.

Therefore in terms of the EU, it is the separation of the legislative body, and indeed

the very roots of EU creation and progression, from the citizens of member-states

which makes the body itself, and the legislation it produces anti-democratic. This isfurther strengthened when the legislature is not always obliged to have parliamentary

input. It is impossible to sprinkle a system of governance with democratic traits and

then market its institutions and products as democratic. The European Parliament is

weak, which by default makes the only connection to the people weak. In turn, this

means that every other institution and their raison detreare not based on the citizen

being the source of power and the right to govern because the representative and

accountable link which would provide for this does not exist. As this does not exist,

it entirely changes the nature of the political connection between the governing and

the governed.

Summing Up: Te Political Connection

Government cannot be democratic without a two-way relationship characterised by

accountability to, and representation of, the citizen. As democracy gets its raison

detre from the citizen, government must be accessible to them, and vice versa,

in order for their interests to be understood before they can then be promoted.

Therefore government must have the underlying obligation (and desire) to engageits population because an electorate must pragmatically, structurally and ideologically

back up any label of democratic governance. A democratic government that is

created out of the reach of its constituents is a contradiction in terms.

6 Because this naturally starts at theindividual level, disagreement and marginalisation of views isalso a natural part of politics the end of Abraham Lincolns immortal quote is not you cantplease all the people all of the time for no reason.


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Part Two: Te Structure and Nature of European Union Power

The rst part of this paper organised the nature of democratic legitimacy by going

back to the principles upon which it is founded, and asserted that without these

key characteristics and their foundational values, governance cannot be labelled

democratic. The root from which all forms of democracy originate is the concept that

the citizen is the source of power and the source of the right to govern. Whilst there

are many different forms of democratic governance, these subsequent principles

cannot change because they are the product of their common underlying ideology.

Therefore, if the ideological base is interfered with, mainly by breaking or diluting

these principles, the consequent, fundamental and mandatory political connection

between what therefore must be termed an electorate and a compulsorily elected

government is likewise broken or made indirect. Then the subsequent form ofgovernance democratically regresses at best, and is actively antidemocratic at worst.

As tone lines voice with character, the citizen lines governance with democracy. The

original democratic principles therefore serve as the template with which to analyse

the self-styled and self-marketed EU governance as democratically legitimate. By

analysing EU governance this way, any sense of democratic decit occurring by

chance will be shown to be impossible.

However, when the EU is labelled anti-democratic, there is a common comparative

reaction with communist or autocratic frameworks of government. In turn, this

immediately clashes with the obvious free societies that we all live in, which is

central to EU advocates assertion that the EU is indeed democratic. Civil freedom

encompasses all the physical, abstract and economic freedoms of expression

in an individual, congregational and societal capacity, which is traditionally the

responsibility of the nation-state as it remains its guarantor through the traditional

Westphalian nation-state set-up (the result of defence and military capability). At

its core, the freedoms we have in European democracies are protected by our

nation-states and their military capabilities because the primary responsibility of the

democratic nation-state is the protection and well-being of its citizens7

. This is thecorner-stone of the theory behind the democratic nation-state. However in relating

this back to governance, civil freedom is the obvious side to democracy because it

is essentially the rules of engagement and interaction between citizens themselves,

7 This is why it is imperative rstly that the UK defence budget should be ring-fenced from budgetcuts and our armed forces should be given the best possible equipment and care, and secondlywhy defence cannot be allowed to be outsourced and centralised in Brussels as soon as theability to defend yourself is compromised, so is everything else because your protection cannot beguaranteed. There is a growing trend within European populations, which is also promoted in

Brussels for obvious political reasons, that defence is not really important anymore the threats areall coming from far away places. This cavalier and complacent attitude to national security will havedisastrous effects for our ability to defend ourselves when threats come to our own backyard,because a trivialisation of defence and defence expenditure is a trivialisation of the primaryresponsibility of the democratic nation-state.


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and their government, (which become guaranteed as rights) by which we live on a

pragmatic daily basis. This is why for example, freedom of speech, the media and

the consequent ability to speak out against the government is seen as a synonym

for democracy.

Therefore at rst glance this anti-democratic label seems to be a contradiction in

terms. But it is in the existence of EU power working above and independently to

that of the member-state (and by default its citizens) which is the key to unlocking

the nature of EU power, and also its inbuilt gravitational pull towards political union.

At this point it is vitally important to note that due to its obligation to be protected,

civil freedom is not something that can be embarked on by the EU as it does not yet

have the centralised capacity or capability to defend it. However, despite the state

remaining the guarantor of civil freedom, it is no longer the top tier of political power

and therefore the link between the governed and the governing is short-circuited bythe national government itself.

This is why civil freedom and political freedom can be separated within the

framework of EU governance. Democratically however, this is virtually impossible

because there is a traditional direct connection between government and the citizen.

But, the EU works above national government, and furthermore, does so with an

independent power-base and legislature8. National government then, ironically,

becomes an intermediary (between the citizen and the EU), and the onlyelected

body, the European Parliament, cannot regulate the legislature. Therefore, civilfreedom is effectively answerable to one source (the nation-state), and political

freedom answerable to another (the EU); the implication being that they are no

longer intertwined by a common foundation in the citizen.

As civil freedom is focussed on the citizenry and the nature of their actions, political

freedom is likewise focussed on government and nature of its actions. Therefore

when the connection between civil and political freedom is diluted or broken (and

as the citizen lines governance with democracy), governance takes on a different

character as its focus begins to black out what surrounds it. The idea is akin to living

alone in the city there is no one else to whom you must take into account in your

immediate actions, and it is entirely possible to be completely shut-off from everyone

else, yet the surrounding millions exist and are part of city life. Therefore, in the

introduction of a higher level of governance which is independent of the nation-state,

the EUs power and right to govern becomes the citizen by extension of the state

8 Legislation is taken to encompass EU laws, regulations and directives because these becomelegally binding and are sourced in Brussels. For this paper, the importance is less on how theyanatomically differ, and more on the fact that they are legally binding and therefore constitute thepragmatic incarnation of power.


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(hence its demotion to an intermediary), and changes the nature of political freedom

because the direct connection between the governed and the governing is broken.

It is political freedom, therefore, which is being decayed through European political

union, because it changes the traditional nature of democracy by how it connects

itself to the citizen. Indeed, the political structure of the European Union is not set

up to introduce a separate and accompanying direct line.

Te EU Structure

The Lisbon Treaty, which lays the foundations for near, medium and long term EU

power and governance, is currently allowing the Parliament more say in the creation

of legislation, which in itself shows the undemocratic nature of what preceded it.

Time will tell precisely how the Lisbon treaty will pragmatically manifest itself, butby looking to EU history9, it can be guaranteed that without outside intervention, as

a form of governance it will continue to consolidate and expand its power, whilst

lightly seasoning its structures and institutions with democratic attributes in order to

continue to style and market itself as legitimate governance.

Te European Parliament

The only publicly elected institution is the European Parliament. In considering thispoint in relation to part one of this paper, these two sentences will form their own

paragraph as a statement of their importance.

Whilst the European Parliament is elected by the citizens of member-states, it is

important to qualify the quality of this democratic legitimacy from the bottom up.

Historically speaking, the rst elections to the European Parliament were in 1979

meaning that EU creation and progression until then was wholeheartedly anti-

democratic because it was completely independent to, and closed off from, the

very peoples it was set up to encompass. This is what sets the tone for discussingthe nature of EU interests, and exemplies its entirely different source of power

and right to govern than that of the democratic nation-state. What helps qualify the

nature of EU power is, barring the traditional electoral connection of the legislature

to the citizen, that the only elected institution is not the initiator of legislation. This

therefore means there is no pragmatic or ideological political connection between

original drafting of legislative acts and member-state citizens.

9 An excellent and extremely detailed account of this can be found in The Great Deception: Can theEuropean Union Survive, by Christopher Booker and Richard North.


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It is precisely because member-states cannot opt out of such legislative acts

which exemplies how EU power lies above and independent of the nation-state:

the legislative acts it passes are legally and pragmaticallymore powerful than the

sovereignty of member-state parliaments. In addition to parliamentary input into

legislative creation being minimal at best, the nature and hierarchy of EU power is

seen by the three ways in which the parliament is taken into account in passing such

proposals, by the Commission. The rst is co-decision whereby the Commissions

proposals go to the Parliament and the Council to be looked at and amended if they

see t. What is key is that the parliament amends previously created legislative

proposals, and this is the most common form of passing legislation. The second

form is assent, whereby the parliament must give the ok to a proposal by simply

accepting or rejecting it (giving a straight yes or no answer). The nal form is by

consultation. Consultation is exactly that the Commission informs Parliament that

it has created a new law with no need for parliamentary consent to it. Therefore, the

degradation of the role of parliament in the EU political system is clear.

In then returning to the foundational democratic principle of the citizen being the

source of power and right to govern, nothing could seem further away. This is rstly

because there is no political tie between the creation of legislation and member-state

citizens, and secondly because there is only one democratically-based institution,

all other institutional powers cannot be sourced directly from the citizen by default.

Therefore, there is no real democratic legitimacy just a sprinkling. Furthermore,

the concept of governmental parliamentary majority cannot exist, because the

legislature exists separately to the parliament. Therefore, in stating that parliament

thus expresses the democratic will of the Unions citizens (more than 490 million

people) and represents their interests in discussions with the other EU institutions10,

we can see how the other institutions which are more powerful that the parliament

have no inherent obligation to adhere to the interests of the 490 million citizens.

The ipside of this is that representation of the citizens interests does not have the

innate power itself to be an actively part of legislation creation, which runs in direct

contradiction to the nature of democratic power.As the parliament has the only link to the democratic political marketplace, it

becomes important to frame this in terms of voter turn-out, as this is the pragmatic

product of its interaction. The average voter turn-out for the 2009 European

elections was 43%, which has steadily decreased from the rst (1979) elections

with a 61.99% turnout11. The International Institute for Democratic and Electoral

10 http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/parliament/index_en.htm

11 www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/turnout_en.html


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Assistance (IDEA) found that voter turnout for national elections across all states

that are now EU member-states has historically averaged at 83%12; 3% off double

that of the last European Parliament turnout. This in itself raises serious questions

about the EUs interaction with its citizens, which are answered in looking at its

structure and interests, and is indicative of why the grass-roots democratic political

marketplace needed to create a result to the contrary is not an inherent objective of

a closed legislature.

Fundamentally however, the parliaments description of promoting the will of the

Unions citizens avoids an actual public mandate for the power to do so in the

rst place, and by default the mandate for the EU system of governance. In going

back to the fundamentals of democratic power, this acts in direct contradiction to

them because the nation-state is not there to outsource the power invested in it by

its people to any other body, and specically so without their consent. However,coming from the nature of EU parliamentary power towards the legislature (the

Commission), it does not have the legal power to control the legislature, only

supervise it13. Furthermore, whilst individual Commissioners can be sacked by the

parliament it has no say in who exactly are to be appointed in the rst place; as this

is the role of the Council of Ministers who have taken an oath to put the interests of

the EU above their member-states14. This sums up the nature of EU parliamentary

power post fact.

Te European Commission

The product of power is legislation. Therefore, the nature of legislation is not just

reective of its power source, but is also a reective of the governmental system

in which it is produced, and its underlying values and principles. Therefore,

the democratic legitimacy of legislation is directly related to the strength of the

relationship between the legislature and the citizen.

12 www.idea.in/publications/voter_turnout_weurope/upload/Full_Reprot.pdf

13 Hence its self-dened capacity as democratic supervision as stated at http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/parliament/index_en.htm

14 In being appointed a European Commissioner, the inauguration includes the swearing of an oath toact in the interests of the European Union as a whole above that of the member-state. Thereforethe prospective Commissioner becomes legally bound to demote the interests of the member-stateand therefore its citizens and promote the institutional interests of the EU.


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The Commissioners recite an oath to swear to put the interests of the EU as a

whole above the interests of their country.15 Therefore, this is underlying principle

upon which the selection of European Commissioners must be based. This is

inherently anti-democratic because it is the epitome of the outsourcing of power

invested in a government by its citizens to another (unelected) body without the

required public mandate to do so. Any power said to be democratically legitimate by

relieving oneself of the primary responsibility towards ones nation, and furthermore

replacing that with responsibility to the nature of a structure like the EU, is a

contradiction in terms.

The European Commission is where legislation is created, produced and motioned,

and therefore is the embodiment of EU power. In terms of its power relationship with

the Parliament, it is very much the bread-winner rstly because it actually produces

legislative acts which the Parliament then post-fact may have the opportunity to giveits input, and secondly because it dictates which of the three available parliamentary

decision-making options outlined above will be used. The European Commission

exists fairly independently from the parliament and has no direct link to member-state

citizens because it is unelected. It is a second-hand connection which by denition

defeats the purpose of democracy. In going back to the nature of democratic power,

because it has no direct link to the peoples of Europe, it cannot legitimately be

accountable or representative of them. This becomes a cyclical (and self-fullling)

process because the preceding ideology and structures that would require it to be

otherwise do not exist. In terms of legislative production, the European Commission

receives recommendations from internal EU agencies and committees which all

have the pre-dened primary aim of looking at how to harmonise member-state

policies in their given areas. These recommendations form the bases for legislation

because these are what the Commission use as research to create it. Therefore, the

nature of EU interests, as referenced to throughout this paper, immediately replace

those of the citizen because they are predened by institutional bureaucracy.

In terms of how the Commission is created, as it is not publicly elected,

Commissioners are selected by the Commission President (nominations frommember-state governments), the list of which must be approved rstly by the

Council and after that down to the Parliament16. At no point is the citizen included

and parliament comes last in the hierarchy. The role of the Commission is to

15 www.europarl.org.uk

16 As stated at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/basicfacts/index_en.htm#process and http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/parliament/index_en.htm


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represent the common European interest17. Therefore the denition of interest is

the creation of institutional bureaucratic political ideals (and is therefore specically

drawn from EU treaties) as it does not have any fundamental base in the citizenry.

Therefore, the common European interest has no democratic legitimacy because

they cannot be traced back to the citizen, directly or otherwise. However, after

legislation is passed in parliament, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) along

with the Commission perform their fundamental roles to certify and enforce that all

legislation passed is implemented uniformly across all member-states. Therefore, all

legislation that is put to the parliament is purely a product of internal and predened

EU guidance and vision under the role of the Commission and the ECJ in the

capacity of guardian of the Treaties18. If the Council decides that a member state

is not implementing a legally binding EU legislative act, then the ECJ has the power

to impose penalties on the member-state in question, which is the absolute and

clearest example of independent supranational power.

A current example of this is the Commission currently looking into Frances expulsion

of the Roma. If it is not satised that France is adhering to the 2004 EU Directive

on the Freedom of Movement, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, France will

be ned via the ECJ.

However, as self-interest is the foundation of human nature, the point of national

interests are to benet the nation-state. In a democracy they are inherently

intertwined with the benet of its population. The EU as an independent body is nodifferent the point of the common European interest is to solely benet the EU

institutions and particularly so due to the overwhelmingly unelected nature of the

power that they hold. Because there is no electoral link between legislative power

and the member-state citizens, EU interests have no obligation to go any further

than, or be representative of, anything other than the institution itself. This is an

important point to bear in mind for part three of this paper in covering the EU in the

international system. However, in order to round off the nature of EU political power,

its third political institution, the Council of Ministers, is the next to be put against the

democratic template of part one.

17 http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/basicfacts/index_en.htm#process

18 http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/comm/index_en.htm


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Te Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers is the nal piece of the puzzle that is EU political

power. The ministers in the Council act on behalf of their member-state by being

empowered to make decisions on behalf of their government. The democratic

legitimacy as described by the EU is that they are then answerable to their

member-state government19, despite their primary loyalty being to the EU and the

common European interest. Furthermore, most of the Councils responsibilities

fall under areas in which member-states have [already] decided to hand over their

sovereignty and award decision-making powers to the EU institutions20. In terms of

democratic legitimacy then, the Council works in primary loyalty to the EU without

a public mandate to do so, in areas that have been outsourced to Brussels without

a public mandate to be outsourced. Nothing could be further from the nature ofdemocratic governance of part one.

An example of this is EU Fishing quotas, or Total Allowable Catches (TACs) which

are proposed by the Commission under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), and is

also under the mandate of the Councils regulation on xing shing opportunities21.

Due to this, national governments do not control the shing in their own waters

and other member-state eets are allowed to sh foreign waters under the guiding

principle that EU shing grounds are a common resource22. This is a case of the

EU having direct material control over member-state territories. Having grown up in

the North East of Scotland I have seen the disastrous effects of this anti-democratic

principle on local economies through the years.

However, the general principle of the above three institutions of keeping the citizen

directly out of the political process is indicative of the wider nature of EU power, and

one does not need to dig deep to nd this.

19 http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/council/index_en.htm

20 ibid

21 http://ec.europa.eu/sheries/documentation/publications/cfp_factsheet/tacs_en.pdf

22 A good overview of this can be found at www.civitas.org/eufacts/FSPOL/AG5.htm


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Te Wider Nature of EU Power

In terms of nancing, the EU has its own resources23, which are collected by

member-states on behalf of the EU through national taxation systems and then

transferred to the EU budget, i.e. indirect taxation. Interestingly, in terms of funding, it

is in the description of the role of the ECJ where the EU refers to its funds as coming

from the taxpayer whereby The Courts job is to check that funds, which come from

the taxpayer are spent properly24. This is an explicit reference to taxation without

representation, which is the very antithesis of democratic governance.

Therefore, EU funding runs in the same vein as its take on power and representation:

the citizen by extension of the state. In terms of the gures, however, 12% of its

budget comes from import duties on goods coming from outside the EU. 11% of its

revenue comes from a harmonised amount collected straight from member-state

VAT resource, which is a more explicit direct taxation as it is in fact a cut of VAT.

However the big money, 76% of the budget, comes from a harmonised percentage

of member-state Gross National Income (GNI), or funds from the taxpayer as

stated above. Therefore, having at least 87% of its own resources coming from

the pockets of member-state citizens, it is indirect taxation with the smallest level of

representation available in any European state. This is fundamentally contradictory

to democratic governance and legitimacy, and is a poignant means by which to

characterise the nature of EU power.

This top-down approach to governance is also characterised by the EU Parliament

ofces throughout Europe. For example, the EU parliament ofce in Scotland is a

classic information ofce. It assists and advises the European Parliament and its

United Kingdom ofce on matters relating to Scotland, aims to increase awareness

of the parliament and the impact of its activities in Scotland, as well as highlighting

the work of the six Scottish Members of the European Parliament25. There is no

mention of two-way interaction with the Scottish population in its list of duties26,

which are characterised in a political advisory capacity to various institutions and

media outlets, and is naturally, unelected.

23 A breakdown of this can be found on http://ec.europa.eu/budget/budget_glance/where_from_en.htm

24 http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/auditors/index_en.htm

25 http://www.europarl.org.uk/scotland

26 http://www.europarl.org.uk/sites/all/modules/tinymce/tinymce/jscripts/tiny_mce/plugins/lemanager/les/regional_posters/Scotland_MOD.pdf


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If the state is the representation of the citizen, and the EU is a representation of the

state, then logic goes that the EU is then a representation of the citizen. But this

intentionally misses out the fundamental way by which to distinguish democratic

governance from undemocratic governance a direct line between the governed

and the governing which enables representation of the citizen and their interests,

and accountability to them due to the right to govern coming directly from them.

The three blatant examples of this style of governance and the nature of its guiding

interests are the ratication of the Lisbon Treaty, the preceding European Constitution

and the introduction of the euro, which are also the recent key milestones towards

EU political union. With the ratication of the Lisbon Treaty, only people of Ireland

have accepted the enactment of this by public mandate, after having voted against it

a rst time (which is exactly why there was a second). This in itself dees democratic

logic and principles. No other peoples of any member-state have been afforded thisopportunity it has all been ratied by the heads of member-states; the incarnation

of the very outsourcing of the power and right to govern which this paper has

explained. Only four states had a public referendum on the previous Constitution:

France and the Netherlands voting against, and Spain and Luxembourg voting for.

Despite all 27 member states needing to ratify the rst (and the consequent second

by default), the Lisbon Treaty nonetheless came into effect on 1st December, 2009

across the EU. Thirdly, the euro. Only Denmark and Sweden held referenda on the

Euro, both rejecting it (Denmark, France and Ireland having already held referenda

on the preceeding Maastricht Treaty). Nonetheless, 16 member states now have

this as their national currency. These are classic examples of the surrendering of

sovereignty without the public mandate to do so as accorded by the principles of

democratic governance and legitimacy.

Conclusions

What immediately sets the EU apart from the democratic tradition is rstly that its

legislative body has no direct link to the member-state citizens as it is completelyindependent of any public election, which therefore means its ability to perform its

duties and what these duties entail and the rationale behind them have absolutely

no obligation to be tied to the member-state citizens, or be representative of their

interests. Secondly (and subsequently), there is only onepublicly elected institution,

the parliament, which has very limited inuence in the EU political process and

system of governance as seen by its powers and duties outlined above. Thirdly

(and therefore), due to the closed nature of all other institutions, and particularly

due to the default situation whereby the remaining unelected institutions hold power,


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the interests driving the power they hold cannot be structurally or ideologically

traced back to the citizen because the citizen is not the source of power, or right

to govern. Because the democratic bond is therefore broken at the beginning, the

source of power and right to govern comes from independent decision-making by

member-state governments, ministers who are legally obliged to demote national

interests in preference of the Common EU interest, and unelected EU bureaucrats

who hold power within the unelected power-holding institutions.

It is this nature of EU power which illustrates the nature of its underlying interests

(particularly in terms of political union) as anti-democratic. Governmental interests

are democratically legitimate when government and legislature are politically

tied to an electorate. If this political tie does not exist and the electorate has no

substantive capability, and furthermore legislation is produced by predened goals

of internal agencies set up by the legislature itself, interests become the desires ofbureaucracy. What repels public interest even further is that the manifestation of

EU interests are the treaties which have created EU power itself, and these treaties

have been created behind closed doors. This suppresses public interest by default

and therefore cannot democratically legitimate. This is why the simple passing

or rejection of such legislation by an elected chamber becomes irrelevant to any

characterisation of democratic legitimacy. The power-interests relationship in the

EU can therefore be characterised as an in-house cyclical process of self-fullling

prophecy. Finally, the democratic political marketplace has not yet been roused and,

due to the nature of EU interests and closed governmental practice, the EU does

not have the normative practice, theory or ideology that it must meaningfully interact

(through accountability and representation) with its citizens anyway.

At best the link between the governed and the governing in the EU is characterised

as the citizen by extension of the state, and at worst is characterised as actively

anti-democratic. In characterising the citizen as an extension of the state, the citizen

is relieved of their status as (primary) source of power and right to govern, which

strangles democracy right at the outset. The nature of EU power is consequently

an un-mandated outsourcing (or pooling of sovereignty) of the power invested bymember-state electorates in their national governments. Therefore, the source of

power is government itself, not the citizen, and the institutions which hold this power

are overwhelmingly unelected, and therefore unaccountable and unrepresentative

of the member-state citizens. The democratic normative behaviours do not exist

because neither does the structure, theory or ideology that must precede it.

Therefore, there is no comparable meaning of the word electorate because the

product of power, legislative creation and production, circumvents the citizen.


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Therefore, any argument that the EU is a democratic form of governance (and

particularly so if it is because the member states which make up are) misses the

very point of democratic legitimacy, and more so has been shown to be inadequate.

Bureaucracy cannot sprinkle features of democracy over a form of governance

which circumvents its people and then market it as democratic, and even more so

when the nation-state itself short-circuits the link between the governed and the

governing. Metaphorically speaking, if the shepherd speaks well of the wolf, the

sheep are in trouble.

Part Tree: Te EU in te International System

In light of the nature of the EU structure and power examined in part two, it is

important to briey look at the EU in the international context because it is preciselythis nature of internal centralisation which creates an inevitably need to consider its

position on the international stage.

In terms of power politics, which the international system is based on, the EU can

be characterised by hard power projection internally and soft power projection

externally. Hard power can be played internally because there is no situational

requirement for military capability, which is partly why the EU is not a natural

political entity, and partly why it can be characterised as a post-modernist bubble in

the international system. This also helps to explain why political and civil freedomcan be separated as outlined in part two. However, the pooling of sovereignty

and centralisation of power inherently creates the outward propensity for power

projection and its structural and institutional requirements. Furthermore, as the

nature of internal EU power is not democratically legitimate, neither is the power

that it projects into the international system. It is at this point where the common

European interest becomes important as this is what replaces national interests

on the international stage. As national interests are the tools of power politics, the

common EU interest becomes the basis for the EUs international toolkit.

Without a consolidated internal power base, the interests of the body cannot be

projected externally. This can be seen by the regular dysfunction, and customary

inability of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to deal with hard security

issues, and its resolutions tending to be left to the natural forces within the

international system.

National interests are highly difcult to translate into a collective due to the differing

nature of the interests themselves, and subsequent differences in threat perception,

and it is this which characterises the nature of inter-governmental cooperation.


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Therefore this is why the common EU interest favours pooled sovereignty over

inter-governmental cooperation: because it pragmatically contradicts the propensity

for political union and therefore the EUs ability to (inevitably) project single unit

power. The ability to play internal hardball is the prerequisite to project power. This

is simply power politics at play.

In coming back to the nature of EU power, the capacity to do this is embodied in

the Commission and Council. Both have a mandate to act rst and foremost in

the common European interest, which has no democratic political relationship to

the interests of member-state citizens. The Council has the power to conclude

international agreements between the EU and other states and NGOs in broad

areas such as trade, co-operation and development or they may deal with

specic subjects such as textiles, sheries, science and technology, transport

etc27. Therefore the European Council acts as the mouthpiece for the EU on theinternational stage. However, the Commission does likewise in its capacity to

negotiate international agreements, and as stated on its website, enables member

states to speak with one voice in international forums such as the World Trade

Organisation28. The president of the Commission holds a seat at the G8, and

through the Lisbon Treaty an EU seat at the United Nations is being searched for,

and particularly so at the Security Council. The parliament, which is the closest

to representing the people, has no place on the international stage. It is in this

bilateral dealings and negotiations that the EU pragmatically takes on the role as a

supranational state, because such work is, precisely, bilateral29.

This is an example of the EU taking on characteristics of a nation-state through

its internal centralisation of power. However, the only (and vital) part of this which

it misses is its own military capability, which is why it can only currently project

limited soft power. However, the seeds of its own military capability are found in the

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the nature of the Rapid Reaction

Force, and the new EU diplomatic corps. These represent the three facets of power

projection in their infancy: a political framework for foreign policy conceived within

the foreign policy itself, a military capability and a diplomatic entity with which torepresent its interests. It is important to remember here that foreign policy is the

protection and projection of national interests in the international environment it

always has been and always will be. To paraphrase Richard Hass, foreign policy

27 http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/council/index_en.htm

28 ibid

29 In line with this, also note the 12% of its budget coming from import duties from countries outsidethe EU as outlined in part two.


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is not a form of therapy; it is all about protecting your national interests. Therefore,

again we come back to the nature of EU interests, and therefore must have digested

its comparison to the nature of democratic nation-state interests. Therefore, the job

of national security and protection cannot be held by the EU as it does not have the

capability to do this yet. Therefore it is still held by the nation-state, which is another

reason as to why people have difculty in understanding how the EU is a form of

government because it does not have the independent capability to be the physical

guarantor of the protection and defence of its citizens. The primary objective of the

nation-state is to protect its people, and this comes from the protection and defence

of its national borders.

It is this lack of independent military capability which goes some way to explaining

the EU as a post-modernist bubble in the international system. The very rst

practical objective of an EU military capability was not to protect its citizens; it wassymbolic projection of power. In addition to this, EU bureaucracy is rmly rooted in

the avoidance of conict and so has a natural aversion to its use, hence the ever

closer union of the peoples. This is characterised by political union coming around

through the dissolving of sovereignty not through force but through politics itself.

Therefore, in the progression of centralisation of power and dissolving (pooling) of

national sovereignty, the EU has rejected the Clauswitzian trinity and notion that

war is the continuation of politics by other means, because politics and war have

no inherent need to be related. What makes it a post-modern bubble rather than a

post-modern structure, then, is that the EU itself has created an internal situation

which simply cannot be translated into the wider international system or context, yet

it has taken on, and has always needed, characteristics of the traditional nation-state

in its ability to look outwards.

Many parallels can easily be drawn between EU structures and these traditional

facets and characteristics of a traditional nation-state. A state must have an

autonomous legal structure with an autonomous legislative body and government,

and sovereign borders (which the EU has by default through its member states) over

which the legal and legislative bodies have legally binding authority. Furthermore, anation-state must have an autonomous central bank with own currency used within

these borders, and an organised police which enforces the internal rule of law. The

EU has all these, perhaps bar Europol. However in addition to Europol, the wider

nature of crime and justice is regulated by the Justice and Home Affairs committee

in terms of dealing with cross-border crime and crime related security issues and the

protection of EU external borders. Therefore the aim of the Justice and Home Affairs

Council is to create a single area of freedom, security and justice within the EUs

borders, which, importantly, is backed up by the ECJ and the Commission.


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27

This is why harmonisation is the EUs key to political union. However, what is

absolutely essential for any of the above to exist in the rst place is a common

identity coupled with self-determination this is the cement with which a nation-state

is built. This is why the seeming triviality or novelty of EU cultural proposals and

identity-related facets are by no means trivial or novel. In the creation of a single

European identity, there is a creation of a cultural glue with which to reinforce and

consolidate EU structural and political power, because this foundation has not yet

been made concrete. This is exemplied by the nature of the democratic political

marketplace outlined in parts one and two, and in the details of voter turn out to

European Parliamentary elections.

Therefore on the international stage, the EU is a curious political beast as it is

missing the cornerstones of statehood: a common identity (which is why Jacques

Delors recently stated that Europe needs a soul) and military capability. Yet, due toits internal attrition and centralisation of political power, it naturally creates a place

for itself on the global stage, and essentially before its time. However, the most

troubling aspect of this, in showing the trail of EU power right from its very base and

through its internal structures, is that the power projected out into the international

system is without a direct political link to the 490 million people that it claims to

speak for, and is therefore inherently anti-democratic.


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ThE BRUGES GROUP

The Bruges Group is an independent allparty think tank. Set up in February 1989, its aim was to promote the idea of

a less centralised European structure than that emerging in Brussels. Its inspiration was Margaret Thatchers Bruges

speech in September 1988, in which she remarked that We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state

in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level. The Bruges Group has had a major effect on publicopinion and forged links with Members of Parliament as well as with similarly minded groups in other countries.

The Bruges Group spearheads the intellectual battle against the notion of evercloser Union in Europe.

Through its groundbreaking publications and wideranging discussions it will continue its ght against

further integration and, above all, against British involvement in a single European state.

WhO WE ARE

honorary President: The Rt. Honthe Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven,

LG OM FRS

Vice-President: The Rt. Hon theLord Lamont of Lerwick

Cairman: Barry Legg

Director: Robert Oulds MA

head of Researc: Dr HelenSzamuely

Wasington D.C. Representative:John OSullivan, CBE

Founder Cairman:Lord Harris of High Cross

Former Cairmen:Dr Brian Hindley, Dr Martin Holmes &

Professor Kenneth Minogue

Academic Advisory Council:Professor Tim Congdon

Professor Kenneth Minogue

Professor Christie DaviesProfessor Norman Stone

Dr Richard Howarth

Professor Patrick Minford

Ruth Lea

Andrew Roberts

Martin Howe, QC

John OSullivan, CBE

Sponsors and Patrons:E P Gardner

Dryden Gilling-Smith

Lord KalmsDavid Caldow

Andrew Cook

Lord Howard

Brian Kingham

Lord Pearson of Rannoch

Eddie Addison

Ian ButlerThomas Grifn

Lord Young of Graffham

Michael Fisher

Oliver Marriott

Hon. Sir Rocco Forte

Graham Hale

W J EdwardsMichael Freeman

Richard E.L. Smith

BRUGES GROUP MEETINGS

The Bruges Group holds regular highprole public meetings, seminars, debates and conferences. These enable

inuential speakers to contribute to the European debate. Speakers are selected purely by the contribution they can make

to enhance the debate.

For further information about the Bruges Group, to attend our meetings, or join and receive our publications, please see

the membership form at the end of this paper. Alternatively, you can visit our website www.brugesgroup.com or contact us

at [email protected].

Contact usFor more information about the Bruges Group please contact:

Robert Oulds, Director

Te Bruges Group, 227 Linen Hall, 162-168 Regent Street, London W1B 5TBTel: +44 (0)20 7287 4414

Email: [email protected]

the european power: the ideology of anti-democratic governance

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