The ESDP: challenges and opportunities

The EU is developing something like a ‘strategic culture’?

• Definition of ‘strategic culture’: institutional confidence and process to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate policy instruments/ a general recognition of the EU ‘s legitimacy as an international actor with military capabilities /Cornish and Edwards, 2001)

• Assessing the EU security actorness:- Conceptual definition of the EU as a security actor- Institutional and bureaucratic structure- Capabilities- ESDP/ NATO relations

Conceptual definition• The European Security Strategy: complex security threats and risks,

strategies and policy instrument/ global ambition• The Petersberg Tasks (Article 17, TEU)- a broad and ambiguous

political commitment• The Helsinki Force Catalogue: broad scope of action- low and high

intensity military engagementGeographical area of concernWhen and how force will be used• The difference between NATO and ESDP- ‘collective defense’ was

the Atlantic Alliance’s fundamental rationale , the ESDP operations voluntary i.e. undertaken by coalitions of the willing

• Conclusion: to compartmentalize security agenda does not make sense, blending of policy instruments; no collective defense commitment but development of external responsibilities in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict stabilization

Institutional and bureaucratic structure

• Three permanent bodies established within the Council General Secretariat structure: PSC, EUMC, and EUMS/ composition and competences

• The role of the HR/SG and his offices/ Policy Unit (Treaty of Amsterdam)

• No strategic operational HQs for the Petersberg operations

• Conclusion: the intergovernmental nature of ESDP/ a process of institutionalizing and socialisation pressures of the formal structures and informal process

Capabilities

• Helsinki Headline Goal- how autonomous the force will be/ the issue of funding of ESDP- it’s not centrally funded/ national defense budget reduced

• Gaps/ lacks in capabilities: operational capabilities (medical and other combat services) and crucial strategic capabilities (strategic air and sea transport, command and control systems and strategic intelligence)

• EU/NATO working group on capabilities• Civilian crisis management capabilities

ESDP/ NATO relations• NATO- 1996 Berlin 1996 NAC- ESDP and CJTFs/ separate but not separable capabilities and assets- Washington Summit 1999- the Berlin Plus compromiseAssured EU access to NATO planning capabilitiesPre-identified NATO’s assets and capabilities, available to EUIdentification of a range of European command optionsAdaptation of NATO’s defense planning system• The EU, the Feira 2000 arrangements for modalities for cooperation and consultationCooperation on security issuesCooperation on definition of capabilities goalsEU access to NATO assetsDefinition of permanent consultation arrangements• Principles that underpin ESDP/NATO relations: the different nature of the two organizations; full

respect for the autonomy of EU decision-making• ConclusionNATO’s right of first refusalMost of the EU/ NATO MSs double-hatted their military and other officials that work on cooperation

tasksFor most demanding Petersberg tasks the EU will be dependent on NATO

Scenarios for EU crisis management role

• Global role• Approach: the EU’s existing external functions and competences

(development aid and security sector reform) to be improved and protected by application of low scale military force

• Scenarios /Cornish and Edwards, 2001):- Security of the EU representatives in kidnap-prone areas- Security of EU construction projects- Transport and storage of aid supplies in areas open to predation of

organized criminals- Provision of military cordons (land or sea) to assist EU sanctions

and embargoes- De-mining and disarmament operations where EU is active- Evacuation of EU representative in a hostile environment• Conclusions