the erosion of a method: examples from grounded...

International Journal of Qualitative Studies in EducationVol. 18, No. 6, November-December 2005, pp. 729–750

ISSN 0951-8398 (print)/ISSN 1366-5898 (online)/05/060729–22© 2005 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/09518390500298204

The erosion of a method: examples from grounded theoryThomas Greckhamera* and Mirka Koro-LjungbergbaLouisiana State University; bUniversity of FloridaTaylor and Francis LtdTQSE_A_129803.sgm10.1080/09518390500298204International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education0951-8398 (print)/1366-5898 (online)Original Article2005Taylor & Francis186000000November-December 2005MirkaKoro-LjungbergUniversity of FloridaDepartment of Educational Psychology1414 Norman HallPO Box 117047GainesvilleFlorida [email protected]

Since its original inception in the 1960s grounded theory has been widely used by many qualitativeresearchers. However, recently epistemologically different versions of grounded theory have beenpresented and this epistemological diversity among grounded theorists and the erosion of themethod will be the major focus of this paper. The first section explores the question of what‘erosion’ of grounded theory means for the practice of qualitative research and the epistemologicalassumptions embedded in different uses of grounded theory are discussed. Furthermore, threeways to use qualitative methods are conceptualized: epistemological, strategic and intuitive. Addi-tionally, the first section describes the erosion that occurs when research methods are transferredfrom one epistemology to another. The second part of the paper raises the questions as to whetherit is possible to transfer methods from one epistemological realm and theoretical stance to anotherone to do qualitative research situated therein and how the erosion of a method influences qualita-tive research. To elucidate these questions, examples will be drawn from grounded theory to illu-minate the different uses of methods. Last, the authors ask why such a transfer would be attemptedaltogether. In this final part of the paper they discuss how grounded theory is used as a label, believ-ing that much of the current popularization of grounded theory is based on power, privilege andauthority.

Grounded theory has enjoyed a prominent position in the realm of qualitative analy-ses methods since its original inception by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and has sincethen been developed further (Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).In this paper we are interested in how the uses of grounded theory have shiftedduring past decades. Despite Glaser and Strauss’s (e.g. Glaser & Strauss, 1967;Strauss, 1987) argument that the label of methodology should be associated withgrounded theory, we will argue that grounded theory may be best understood as amethod—a set of techniques or procedures designed to produce a certain kind ofknowledge—that has evolved and continues maturing during the years to come. We

*Corresponding author. Louisiana State University, E.J. Ourso College of Business Administration,Rucks Department of Management, CEBA 3158, Baton Rouge LA 70803-6312, USA. Email: [email protected]

730 T. Greckhamer and M. Koro-Ljungberg

claim that time, cultural differences and the development of the qualitative field haveled to the—primarily epistemological—erosion of grounded theory (see also Stern,1994b). By erosion we mean the process that reshapes the method and its uses,simultaneously influencing the field and the applications of a particular method.1 Inthis paper, we emphasize the process of erosion rather than placing particular valueon its outcome (i.e. we do not propose that erosion produces something negative orchanges the ‘original’ in negative ways, but that erosion changes the appearance of amethod). In other words, we are interested in the process of change and the wearingof the surface of a method. Furthermore, this paper focuses on different aspects ofthe process of erosion and its consequential implications for the field of qualitativeresearch, which are illustrated by discussing the implications for those who areplanning to use grounded theory as their analytical approach.

The method of grounded theory has been widely accepted and adapted amongqualitative researchers and it is still used rather extensively. At the same time,however, grounded theory and its different uses have been a source of some critique(see e.g. Bryman, 1988; Silverman, 1993; Bryant, 2003). Yet, we believe thatfurther discussions related to the changes associated with grounded theory areneeded due to the continuing questions proposed by the current users of themethod. A part of the questioning and theoretical confusion among qualitativeresearchers originates in the conceptual uncertainty and the changing terminologyassociated with grounded theory. Strauss and Corbin (1994) acknowledge theconfusion and erosion of the method when they discuss how ‘many people still gettheir conceptions of grounded theory from the original book, and have missed thelater more realistic and balanced modifications of that book’s purposeful rhetoric’(p. 277). However, many scholars remain strong advocates of the theory-generatinganalysis method. For example, Stern (1994a) argues that grounded theory hasreached a prominent position among its supporters: ‘Since grounded theory hassome elements of both inductive and deductive modes, in grounded theory circles itis acknowledged to be the only true method of research—a frankly religious point ofview’ (Stern, 1994a, p. 116).

In fact, the concept of religion may help us to understand the popularity ofgrounded theory. Science and its theories as well as religion are instruments availableto individuals to maintain socially constructed realities (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).Theories and religions utilize labels, contextualized concepts and belief systems, oftenforming ‘unquestionable’ sets of knowledge within a theory or religion. This commonaspect of theories and religions is important because it effectively legitimizes uncer-tain reality constructions of societies or social groups with ultimate reality (Berger,1969). Similarly, grounded theory offers labels, proposes belief systems and presentsa set of analytical techniques that constitute a ‘rigorous, orderly guide to theory devel-opment’ (Glaser, 1978, p. 2). In addition, religion gives a sense of direction (Geertz,1973), providing comforting answers and guidelines. The same sense of guidance isfound in grounded theory even though the amount and the depth of acceptable guid-ance from a qualitative perspective (that emphasizes inductive approaches) has beenquestioned. Thus, grounded theory might be viewed as a systematic and controlled

The erosion of a method 731

approach for qualitative analysis with clearly specified analytical procedures that canassist many researchers in the analysis process.

As mentioned earlier, faith and religion are by definition social constructions andthus collective phenomena (Berger, 1969; Geertz, 1973). Therefore, a believer of acertain denomination will always find supporters on her/his side. A qualitativeresearcher utilizing grounded theory can, by the same token, rely on the support ofmany colleagues. Supporters not only offer spiritual assurance, but also they get orga-nized and create a set of sacred scripts—the bible in Christianity, the torah in Judaismor the Koran in Islam. ‘Discovery of grounded theory’ and ‘Basics of qualitativeresearch’ present two sacred scripts used among many grounded theorists. Finally,religion and its central themes are intimately related to issues of power and control(for more on power see, e.g., Foucault, 1972, 1980, 1994, 1995). The same is truefor different grounded theory approaches, including a contest for the ownership of themethod, as we will argue in more detail in the last section of the paper.

Moreover, in modern times religion has faced problems of legitimization in the faceof reality—loss of their traditions. Fundamentalists have tried, among other strate-gies, to entrench themselves in subcultures within larger society, hoping to stem thetide of modernization (Berger, 1969). In similar ways, grounded theory has expandedduring the crusade of qualitative inquiry. It has ridden at the top of the qualitativewave that has hit social sciences during the past decades. Grounded theorists havebeen among the first to establish widely accepted analytical approaches (also amongquantitative researchers) and detailed strategies to study and analyze qualitative data.Grounded theory has protected itself against many critics by establishing detailedprocedures to ensure validity and scientificity. It grounds its analysis in data yetfocuses on theory development. This means that grounded theory draws from bothqualitative and quantitative inquiries by staying open to data while aiming to producetheory and arguments logically and systematically.

Recently, different versions and diverse sects of grounded theory have dominatedthe literature and the question of what is grounded theory has become a contestedissue. Some researchers have produced alternative interpretations of the theoreticalperspective embedded in or suitable for the grounded theory method, locating it inphenomenology (Richardson, 1999) or in hermeneutics (Rennie, 1998, 2000). Thepresent paper mainly refers to the discussions of a recent and widely acknowledgedversion of grounded theory, social constructivist grounded theory (Charmaz, 2000,2002; Charmaz & Mitchell, 2001). This version does not only reinterpret the episte-mological foundations of ‘original’ grounded theory as illustrated in the works ofRichardson (1999) and Rennie (1998, 2000), as Charmaz and her colleagues haveutilized, shaped and further elaborated the grounded theory method.

As qualitative researchers with some previous knowledge and research experiencewith grounded theory, we were confused by these different conceptions and by thediversity of sects within grounded theory presented in the literature. Our confusionwas bi-focused: the first author was confused as a doctoral researcher who was study-ing the epistemological and theoretical foundations of qualitative methods and howthey interrelated whereas the second author was concerned from the perspective of a


qualitative methodologist who teaches and writes about qualitative methods, andtheir theoretical and conceptual connections.

Both of us had been raised in an open, critical and democratic European argu-mentation climate and thus we were tuned for gaps and inconsistencies in thoughts,theories and conceptual connections. Even though we are part of white, hegemonicand privileged (research) communities, we constantly seek for outlets to break freeand disturb the balance of the culturally or discursively assumed (research) identi-ties. As a result, we are not claiming any neutrality of our writings, being aware that‘all research is political’ (Hatch, 2002), ours being no exception. Instead, we areaware of our political intentions to keep questioning the surface, assumed appear-ances, and the ‘typical’ practices of qualitative research in general and of groundedtheory in particular and we acknowledge that we are affected by our prior experi-ences and our biased values that are associated with critical and poststructuralperspectives.

Despite the facts that we have been using grounded theory in some of our researchprojects and that we acknowledge the contributions of grounded theory to the field ofqualitative research, we see grounded theory merely as one method among others inthe sense defined above—a set of techniques or procedures designed to produce acertain kind of knowledge. Therefore, in this paper we do not claim to be groundedtheorists, who only utilize this one method in their work, nor do we make any claimsas to the true nature or the ownership of the method. Furthermore, we will illustratethat all uses of grounded theory are partial and limited. In addition, we do notpropose any new ways to utilize grounded theory. However, a number of questionsoccurred to us, interrogating what qualitative researchers are to make of the newdifferentiation of ‘objectivist’ and ‘constructivist’ grounded theory (Charmaz, 2000)as well as what grounded theorists are grounding their work in. More specifically, weraise three questions: (1) What does an ‘erosion’ of grounded theory mean for thepractice of qualitative research? (2) Is it possible to transfer methods or analyticalsteps of a particular method from one epistemological realm and theoretical stance toanother one to do qualitative research situated therein? (3) Why would such a transferbe attempted altogether?

In addition to answering these questions we will contribute to and continue thedialogue of the epistemological and theoretical diversity embedded in groundedtheory. Our aim is to engage fellow qualitative researchers in the analysis of differentversions of grounded theories in order to contrast their theoretical and epistemologicalfoundations and to raise questions about researchers’ own beliefs related to groundedtheory and its uses. For this purpose, we conceptualize alternative uses of methods asa basis for exploring the research questions of the paper.

Alternative possibilities to utilize methods

We assert that it is vital for qualitative researchers to be aware of and lay open thetheoretical and epistemological foundations of their research to the community ofinterested readers. Furthermore, we propose that theoretical perspective and


epistemology and the type of knowledge a researcher desires to produce influencesthe type of data collection and analysis methods used. Crotty (1998) explains:‘Justification of our choice and particular use of methodology and methods is some-thing that reaches into the assumptions about reality that we bring to our work. Toask about these assumptions is to ask about our theoretical perspective’ (p. 2). Differ-ences in the selection of data collection and analysis methods and their distinctiveuses indicate a researcher’s epistemological interests and possible epistemologicalcommitments. Additionally, we believe that the processes of data collection and anal-ysis are interrelated, serving ultimately the epistemological goal of particular knowl-edge production. Researchers can neither collect data without keeping in mind theirepistemological purpose nor can they use particular analysis methods without consid-ering their appropriateness to produce the type of knowledge desired. Therefore, weclaim that researchers should be aware of the theoretical, epistemological and concep-tual connections and of the history of the methods used. However, this practice iscurrently far from being standard in the literature on and the practice of qualitativemethods. Thus, in the following we propose and discuss three different possibilitiesto utilize methods: the epistemological use of methods, the strategic use of methodsand the intuitive use of methods.

The epistemological use of method assumes that researchers acquire knowledge ofthe epistemological background and the theoretical assumptions embedded in amethod and take these into account when using the method. When epistemologicalconsiderations guide the method selection, the uses of the method produce knowl-edge that is both adequate and legitimate regarding the discourse in which themethod operates. Thereby scholars share an argumentation system embedded in aparticular discourse and they acknowledge their memberships in particular commu-nities of practitioners. Hence, the research process becomes more transparent andgains conceptual support from a particular epistemology. We refer to this use ofmethod as consistent ‘scientific’2 practices, because the epistemology, the theoreticalperspective and methods used are consistent with their knowledge productions andare informed by each other.

The strategic use of method,3 on the other hand, is directed by the particular goals ofthe researcher rather than by epistemological and theoretical motives. The strategicuse of methods implies that epistemologies, theoretical perspectives and methods arenot necessarily informed by each other and therefore may not be consistently used.In contrast to epistemological use of a method the strategic use distances itself fromthe epistemological and theoretical assumptions that are embedded in the particularmethod and/or that are included in the prevailing discourses controlling the uses ofmethods. We call this detachment from the epistemology and from controllingdiscourses disrupting ‘scientific’ practices. Moreover, the inconsistencies are presum-ably a result of a conscious decision on the part of the researcher to pursue certainobjectives in order to achieve his/her goals instead of relying on the boundaries of aparticular theoretical perspective or discourse. Therefore, the active role of theresearcher as well as epistemological and theoretical awareness seems evident in thestrategic use of a method. Researchers engaging in this type of utilization of methods


should be asked to define the purpose of the particular use of a method and theyshould consider what is possibly achieved by using methods strategically.

The intuitive use of method refers to the uses of methods by researchers who appearto be unclear or uncertain about the epistemology and the theoretical stance relatedto the method and its analytical procedures. At the minimum some researchers do notmake their epistemological background and theoretical perspective explicit for thereaders. The intuitive use of method could be partly caused by limited communica-tion, partial naivety or by effects of power that lead researchers to neglect or impairthemselves to see the importance of communicating their underlying theoreticalconnections and assumptions. Kirk and Miller (1986) state that ‘above all, the fieldresearcher is at the mercy of the world view of his or her subjects’ (p. 31) and Crotty(1998) encourages everyone to examine particular methods and methodologiesbecause only then ‘one discovers a complexus of assumptions buried within it’ (p. 66).Without the discovery of buried assumptions the intuitive use of theory operates atthe level of hidden ‘scientific’ practices that leaves an important part of scholarship aside(e.g. communication of underlying assumptions of truth, reality and knowledge).

Mapping the terrain of grounded theory

Our reading of the constructivist version of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2000, 2002),as well as our interpretations of the traditional or ‘objectivist’ camp4 developed anddescribed by Glaser and Strauss and later also at least partly by Corbin (e.g. Glaser,1978, 2002; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) left us with the desirefor clarification related to central theoretical questions. The contributions of thesescholars are historical, yet they do not form a homogeneous body of literature. Rather,they contain nuanced differences in the theoretical positions among each other. Theexisting literature makes intelligible somewhat steady conceptual and technical devel-opment of the analytical techniques used under the cover term of grounded theory(see also Goulding, 2002).

Nevertheless, we believe that a useful way to gain a more sound understanding ofa research method is to distinguish epistemologies, theoretical perspective andresearch methods embedded and described, for example, in grounded theory litera-ture. This conceptualization is based on the premise that the distinction of elementsof social research that are informing each other and are interrelated is important forthe practice of qualitative research. While the literature on grounded theory oftendiffers in methodological nuances, the work of Charmaz and her colleagues varies onepistemological and theoretical grounds. These authors express the usefulness ofgrounded theory techniques, but they do not agree with Glaser and Strauss’s episte-mological and theoretical foundations (Charmaz, 2000, 2002; Charmaz & Mitchell,2001). Charmaz and her colleagues claim to transfer grounded theory to a differentepistemology and theoretical perspective, explicitly refuting the objectivist and posi-tivist stance of previous versions of grounded theory. This makes their contributionsparticularly important for the present discussion of the erosion and the different usesof methods, as will be discussed in more detail below.


Terrain of research methods

Research methods refer to the concrete techniques or procedures the researcherengages in to gather and analyze data (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998; Crotty, 1998; Schram,2003). In order to emphasize the link between these techniques or procedures andepistemology, we claim that methods have been designed to produce a certain kindof knowledge. From our perspective, grounded theory may best be described as aresearch method, because at its core it is a set of procedures and analytical steps toanalyze data and produce particular knowledge.

It is useful here to distinguish methodology and method, because grounded theoryis sometimes referred to as a methodology (e.g. Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Someresearchers define methodology as guiding theory, general logic or the theoreticalperspective of a research project (e.g. Bogdan & Biklen, 1998; Schram, 2003).However, we find these definitions somewhat confusing, particularly in comparisonwith the definition of theoretical perspective. Therefore, we agree with Crotty (1998)who defines methodology as ‘the strategy, plan of action, process or design lyingbehind the choice and use of particular methods and linking the choice and use ofmethods to the desired outcomes’ (p. 3). In this case, grounded theory may beconsidered a methodology in the sense that it links the choice and the use of methods(coding, sampling) to desired outcomes (theory development or theory grounded indata). Nonetheless, we argue that even though grounded theory recommends tech-niques that assist researchers in data collection, for instance theoretical sampling orthe use of memos, it does not specify whether interviews, observation, archives orother data-collection methods would be the most appropriate for its purposes.Instead, it suggests and accepts a variety of data-collection methods from varioussources. Additionally, due to the erosion of grounded theory one design or plan ofaction cannot be identified, but rather it appears that there are different strategies toutilize the analytical techniques subsumed under the grounded theory method.

Most grounded theorists agree with the general goal of the method: the systematicgeneration of theory from data. Most of them also emphasize the need to followparticular analytical proceedings (e.g. comparisons, coding, memoing) during theanalysis that begins as soon as the first data have been collected. Nevertheless, theanalytical steps grounding theory into data have evolved from rather vague theoreticalideas in early texts such as ‘general method of comparative analysis’ (Glaser &Strauss, 1967), ‘theoretical sensitivity’ (Glaser, 1978), to more elaborate analyticalprocedures such as open, axial or selective coding in later texts (Strauss & Corbin,1998). While the analytical steps such as open and selective coding or theoreticalsampling (Glaser, 1978; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) themselves have stayed somewhatuntouched, their emphasis in the analysis process has changed. In Glaser’s earlyworks coding procedures were not given more importance than any other introducedanalytical concepts such as theoretical sensitivity or theoretical sampling. However,the central part of Strauss and Corbin’s work focuses on different coding techniques.Overall, all methods used were still designed to allow core problems and processes toemerge from the data as well as to avoid forcing data into pre-determined categories.


Additionally, grounded theorists emphasize that the in-depth study of the dataensures the sensitizing of concepts and the identification of gaps in our knowledgeand in the emerging theory.

Terrain of theoretical perspectives

Theoretical perspective refers to the philosophical stance informing the methodologyand methods combining interrelated assumptions, concepts and propositions thatform a particular view of the world (e.g. LeCompte & Preissle, 1993; Crotty, 1998;Bernard, 2002). A theoretical perspective is guided by a particular epistemology.Discussions regarding the theoretical perspective associated with grounded theory ingeneral can turn into heated arguments. We believe that this happens for a numberof reasons.

First, the general opinion among contemporary qualitative researchers resists andrejects positivism because it conflicts with the goals of qualitative inquiry (for examplethe in-depth study of individual experiences). Thereby, few if any scholars desire toidentify themselves as positivist qualitative researchers. However, we think that thisview is mistaken and misleading. Positivist qualitative research might appear contra-dictory or even absurd if one considers epistemological goals and purposes or positionaldifferences, but the positivist perspective continues to be in frequent use along withsuccess and popularity that definitely indicates its place within qualitative inquiry.

Second, some researches do not acknowledge or admit the positivist ruins in theirwork (for example the goal of prediction and control or the need for comparisongroups and generalization). They conduct qualitative research and analyze data qual-itatively, but their conceptual and theoretical priorities, worldviews, epistemologies,as well as used terminology and labels, refer to positivist discourse. Additionally, theirresearch is built upon hypothesis-driven designs and prediction. In grounded theoryStrauss and Corbin (1998) assert the importance of describing how hypotheses areformulated and validated as well as how hypotheses explain data. Furthermore, in thecase of grounded theory developed by Glaser, Strauss and Corbin, the philosophicalstance has to be inferred from the literature, given the lack of explicit discussionsthereof.

Based on our readings we propose that the philosophical stance or epistemologicalintentions of these authors are ultimately positivist or post-positivist, similar to Kuhn(1990, 1996) and Popper (1959). Crotty (1998) refers to this ‘less attenuated formof positivism known today as post-positivism’ as a theoretical approach that focuseson probability, a certain level of objectivity and approximations of the truth.5 Aresearcher with a positivist and/or post-positivist stance starts with a conviction thatscientific knowledge is both accurate and certain at least to some extent. Meaning isdiscovered, that is, meaning that is already inherent in the objects. For a positivist,what is given in direct experience is what is observed, the observation in questionbeing scientific observation carried out in the form of ‘the scientific method’ (Crotty,1998, p. 20). Furthermore, we believe that both positivist and post-positivist perspec-tives are based primarily on the epistemology of objectivism (see also Crotty, 1998).


Therefore, the slightly different means to achieve this epistemological goal does notmake a distinctive difference in our coming arguments and thus we will not furtherdifferentiate different degrees of positivism later in this paper.

The positivist stance of grounded theory is illustrated well by Glaser (1978), whowrites: ‘Grounded theory is based on systematic generation of theory from data, thatitself is systematically obtained from social research’ (Glaser, 1978, p. 2). Glaser’sargument illuminates the importance of logical analysis. Another example in whichthe objectivist epistemology and the positivist stance become apparent is the analogybetween social research and the natural sciences drawn by Strauss and Corbin(1998): ‘Although we are studying objects more worldly than, yet often just as elusiveas, the sun and the stars, we, like Galileo, believe that we have an effective method fordiscovery’ (p. 1).

Terrain of epistemologies

Epistemology is the theory of knowledge that is embedded in the theoretical perspec-tive and thereby in the method. It involves a certain understanding of how we knowwhat we know, e.g. through objectivism, constructionism and subjectivism and theirvariants (see Audi, 1995; Crotty, 1998; Pollock & Cruz, 1999; Williams, 2001, formore extensive discussion on epistemology). Furthermore, epistemological consider-ations often focus on how knowledge is obtained (the problem of method) and ifknowledge is worth having (the problem of value). In addition, epistemology plays animportant role in the current discussion surrounding different versions of groundedtheory. Charmaz’s (2000) claim of coexistence of two versions of grounded theoryapparently rests, at least as the labels suggest, on the distinction of different epistemo-logical foundations, one being ‘objectivist’ and the second being ‘constructivist’.

We agree with Charmaz that the epistemology of objectivism has prevailed in thewritings of Glaser, Strauss and Corbin even though their epistemological positionsand arguments have not been explicitly discussed. Objectivist accounts that holdmeaning and reality apart from the operation of any consciousness, individual, orsubjective processes construct the basic arguments in Glaser and Strauss’s writings.Meaning and knowledge are merely discovered. Glaser and Strauss (1967) explain:

We argue in our book for grounding theory in social research itself—for generating it fromthe data. We have linked this position with a general method of comparative analysis—different from the more specific comparative methods now current—and with variousprocedures designed to generate grounded theory. Although our emphasis is on generatingtheory rather than verifying it, we take special pains not to divorce those two activities,both necessary to the scientific enterprise. (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. viii)

However, the epistemological position presented by Glaser and Strauss has elementsnot only of objectivism but also of subjectivism. On the one hand they emphasize theneed to generate theory. This process is assured by careful procedures that ensuresystematic discoveries of meanings. Additionally, their grounded theory proposes thatdata are viewed as objective and external, which enables researchers to control andmanipulate data. On the other hand the authors claim that the goal of grounded


theory is to stay open to actual happenings in data and to let the data speak forthemselves (Glaser, 1978). We believe that staying ‘truly’ open for data, allowing datato have voices and meanings of their own, becomes difficult if researchers are usingcareful and systematic procedures to discover meaning because in this case research-ers are controlling the data and not vice versa. Consequently, the assumed ‘objectiv-ist’ answer to the question of what grounded theory is grounded in becomes morecomplex than presented in the literature. Can grounded theory be grounded in dataif data themselves (or participants) do not have an impact on the theory development?

Erosion caused by different uses of a method

The erosion of a method is a lengthy and complex process and, importantly, theprocess of erosion complicates the definition and identification of a method. Theprocess of erosion also impacts the research community’s or an individual’s determi-nation of whether a method has been created and whether appropriate labels shouldbe used. When a method has been created, its earliest versions often include initiallabels and some unique analytical procedures that differentiate the method fromothers. In the case of grounded theory, Glaser and Strauss (1967) named andintroduced many of the concepts (e.g. comparative method, theoretical sampling,memos) used by grounded theory’s different variants. However, at the time, thecontent of initial labels was loosely defined and the conceptual schema of groundedtheory was incomplete. Later, selective concepts were developed further and someadditional labels such as different coding strategies were added. In this process, thecontent of grounded theory became at least partly redefined, tuned, modified andepistemologically contested.

In the following, we will discuss how the potential uses of methods we definedearlier in the paper contribute to erosion in different ways. The presented usesillustrate different options researchers have at their disposal when deciding how to useor apply a method. Two of these options imply a conscious decision—epistemologicaland strategic use of method—while the intuitive use of method is an option albeitprobably unconsciously elected.

The epistemological use of a method does not cause erosion and thus is here discussedonly briefly. Once a researcher operates under the same epistemology that is/wasembedded in the discourse that controls or initiated the method and he/she followsthe proceedings or proposed steps of the method consistently, the method can beexpected to produce knowledge it was designed to produce. In addition, in the caseof the epistemological use of a method, conducted research is plausible to be acceptedby other researchers sharing the same epistemological beliefs associated with theparticular method. Even if the application of the method or some of its analyticalprocedures differs slightly, the method might still not produce epistemologicallydifferent knowledge to the extent that would erode the method per se.

The strategic use of a method causes epistemological erosion because by our definitionof the strategic use of methods the epistemology, theoretical perspectives and methodsare not forming a consistent belief system or an internally coherent meaning


generation and argumentation structure. For example, constructivist grounded theorymakes the conscious and openly declared decision to transfer the grounded theorymethod to a new epistemological terrain. Charmaz asks: ‘Must grounded theory beobjectivist and positivist? No’ (Charmaz, 2000, p. 513). She further asserts that ‘a revi-sioned grounded theory must take epistemological questions into account’ (Charmaz,2000, p. 523) and that the social constructivist grounded theory can be a way into thefuture to get out of the trap of positivism. Charmaz and Mitchell (2001) explainfurther that their methodological strategies and epistemological stance differ from thework of Strauss and Corbin.

The theoretical stance and epistemology Charmaz claims for her constructivistgrounded theory are symbolic interactionism and constructionism/constructivism,6

respectively. She explains that ‘my approach to grounded theory builds upon asymbolic interactionist theoretical perspective with constructivist methods’ (Charmaz,2002, p. 678). However, this leaves unclear to the reader just what constructivistmethods are. Furthermore, the explicit declaration of epistemology and theoreticalstance are not always consistent with the arguments advanced in the constructivistversion of grounded theory. As will be demonstrated in more detail below, the writingson constructivist grounded theory sound, at times, objectivist to us.

In constructivist grounded theory, data ‘are reconstructions of experience; they arenot the experience itself. Whether our respondents ply us with data in interviewaccounts they recast for our consumption or we record ethnographic stories to reflectexperience as best as we can recall and narrate, data remain reconstructions’(Charmaz, 2000, p. 514).

This is not a clearly constructivist perspective, because such a constructivistperspective would take the position that the data are co-constructed rather thanreconstructed in the social situation of the interview (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995) ordata are our own constructions of other people’s constructions (Geertz, 1973),respectively.

Charmaz (2002) explains that all variants of grounded theory include the followinganalytical steps: (a) simultaneous data collection and analysis, (b) pursuit of emergentthemes through early data analysis, (c) discovery of basic social processes within thedata, (d) inductive construction of abstract categories that explain and synthesizethese processes, (e) sampling to refine the categories through comparative processes,and (f) integration of categories into a theoretical framework that specifies causes,conditions and consequences of the processes studied. For us, structured analyticalsteps enhance the discovery of meaning that in turn refers to objectivism. It appearsthat Charmaz’s emphasis on analytical steps seeks approval as a scientific method.Furthermore, Charmaz conflicts her argument elsewhere (Charmaz, 2000, p. 515)when she explains that theorists code emerging data as they collect them, implyingthat research is a cyclic process without steps or the stages of analysis.

Charmaz (2002) also works against constructivism in her arguments regarding datacollection. She asserts that the interviewer assumes direct control over the constructionof data and she explains that her own research was based on ‘detailed interview guides’(p. 676). We believe that a constructionist (or in Charmaz’s terms constructivist)


epistemology would favor more unstructured interview guides that would allowco-construction of knowledge during the interview. In addition, the interviewer wouldshare control over the conversation with the participants. This point illustrates thatepistemological and theoretical differences are consequential for the processes of bothdata collection and data analysis as already mentioned earlier.

Intuitive use of a method also causes epistemological erosion because the ways knowl-edge is produced differ either within the same historical period due to the differentepistemological positions taken by various researchers or because the epistemologicalbeliefs of the individual researcher change over time. Because by our definition of thisuse of a method these different positions are not subject to discussion or reflection,researchers find themselves in a position where it is easily possible to choose methodsconsidering neither their own epistemological and theoretical orientation nor thosethat are embedded in the methods they choose from.

We have argued that the essential works of grounded theory (Glaser, 1978;Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) represent at leastsome elements of the intuitive use of a method. It can be claimed that Glaser andStrauss created a functional method but they did not furnish it with clear andconsistent epistemological or theoretical foundations. Bryant (2003) even arguesfurther and proposes that an uninformed use of key arguments of science or episte-mology might indicate a fundamental conceptual weakness in grounded theory.Conceptual weakness might be the byproduct of intuitive use of a method, inparticular if epistemological consistency or conceptual stability is expected. In thiscontext we do not want to propose right or wrong ways to use grounded theory,but we have to acknowledge that intuitive use of method contributes to the concep-tual confusion associated with the method. We provide several examples to illus-trate this point.

To start with an example of conceptual inconsistency, Glaser and Strauss (1967)write that they cannot bypass or separate the generation of theory from the verifica-tion process because both of them belong to science. The emphasis of groundedtheory is not in the verification process but the authors claim that verification is stillneeded for rigorous science. ‘Although our emphasis is on generating theory ratherthan verifying it, we take special pains not to divorce those two activities, both neces-sary to the scientific enterprise’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. viii). Later, however,Glaser changes his position and revises the role of verification by stating: ‘Thesehypotheses are probability statements, not facts that are verified. Grounded theory isnot verificational’ (Glaser, 1992, p. 29). We believe that any method is considerablyaltered if verification appears or does not appear as part of the epistemological aimseven if verification itself does not form the focus of the method.

Another example of intuitive use of a method is found in ways grounded theoryfocuses on letting data speak for themselves and the ways it states to stay open tohappenings in data (Glaser, 1978). According to Glaser (1992), the method allowscodes to emerge as they may with no preconception. However, at the same timeGlaser proposes that the situated core problems and processes that emerge can betranscended and taken beyond the substantive area being studied. Our concern is


how situated, subjective data can be treated in generalizable ways or how they canresult in a generalizable and objective theory. More specifically, can systematic meth-ods themselves guarantee this transfer from data collected in a particular context togeneralizable applications of the same data? In other words, it makes a difference ifrandom, situated, experienced data are used to produce a generalizable theory or ifcontrolled and objectified data lead to a generalizable theory.

To give a final example of the intuitive use of a method, Glaser criticizes Charmaz’sconstructivist approach to grounded theory by asserting that ‘ConstructivistGrounded Theory … is a misnomer’ (Glaser, 2002, p. 1) without actually discussingthe epistemological dimension of either his or Charmaz’s approach to groundedtheory. Thus, it appears that Glaser desires to exclude other forms of grounded theorywithout accounting for epistemological assertions and their implications. In otherwritings he and his colleagues point out that grounded theory can use any data, it isgeneral and ‘the process of generating theory is independent of the kind of data used’(Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 18). These arguments illustrate that without acknowledg-ing and exemplifying the epistemological beliefs underlying a method or without limit-ing the types of data and knowledge a method can produce it becomes difficult todefend any arguments that relate to the exclusion of other particular uses of a method.

Impact of erosion on qualitative researchers

We believe that the erosion of a qualitative method through its strategic or intuitiveuses has important consequences for the practice of qualitative research. The impli-cations are related to the questions we posed at the beginning of the paper. First, weasked whether methods or analytical steps of methods could be easily transferredbetween theoretical stances and epistemologies. While the transfer is possible itcomplicates the uses and the applications of a method. It might result in conceptualconfusion that influences the ways researchers understand the content of particularcore concepts associated with a method. We believe that every method, in our exam-ple grounded theory, has to be put in the historical context of its inception; in thecase of grounded theory this allows researchers to perceive it as a product of positivistdiscourse prevalent in the 1960s. This makes more understandable, for example, theargument that grounded theory can be used both quantitatively and qualitatively(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). However, if the essential works of grounded theory areformulated in intuitive ways, then the community of qualitative researchers will be ina difficult position to use grounded theory epistemologically. The reason is that itmay not only require substantial effort by researchers to locate the epistemologicaland theoretical bases of texts, but also some readers may not be aware of the impor-tance of epistemological aspects of texts that introduce new methods and proposenew ways to analyze data. Thereby, when a method is decontextualized andepistemologically detached the transfer might contribute to the misuses and to themisinterpretations of a method.

The discussion of different versions of grounded theory is particularly useful toilluminate the question of transferability of methods, because analytical steps such as


constant comparison, the coding procedures or the arguments concerning theoreticalsampling (Glaser, 1978; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) are at the core of grounded theory.The basic assumption that data and theory are closely connected by means of theapplication of the advocated analytic procedures can be found in all its versions. ForCharmaz (2002), one purpose of grounded theory is to connect the collected data andthe analysis of those data tightly together. Glaser, Strauss and Corbin propose thatcoding procedures take researchers beyond description and put them ‘into a concep-tual mode of analysis’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 66). Furthermore, constructivistgrounded theorists emphasize the value of the sophisticated analytical techniques ofgrounded theory: ‘Grounded theory techniques can sharpen the analytic edge andtheoretical sophistication of ethnographic research’ (Charmaz & Mitchell, 2001,p. 161).

The agreement on the value of analytical procedures between ‘objectivist’ and‘constructivist’ grounded theory is remarkable given that research based on these twoepistemologies should take very different perspectives on the value and the standingof analytical procedures in the research endeavor. For the ‘objectivist’ camp, data arereal and a sum of—either absolutely or probabilistically—objective facts about theobservable world. Therefore, analytical procedures such as those to identify conceptsand discover their dimensions (open coding), procedures to relate categories to theirsubcategories (axial coding), and procedures to integrate and refine those discoveredcategories (selective coding) are consistent with the embedded epistemology andtheoretical stance.

However, from the point of view of a constructionist epistemology, there is noobjective truth waiting for us to discover it (Crotty, 1998). Rather ‘all knowledge iscreated from the action taken to obtain it’ (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, p. 3). Fromthis perspective, ‘processes by which any body of “knowledge” comes to be sociallyestablished as “reality”’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 3) should be at the center ofattention. This argument places the analytical procedures again in the center of atten-tion, except that from this perspective the analytical procedures are not merely a toolto elicit objective data as in objectivism, but rather they impact the nature of the dataconstructed. An excellent example for focusing not only on the meaning that isproduced but also on the process of meaning production is provided by Holstein andGubrium (1995). These authors perceive the interview as a social situation of mean-ing and knowledge construction and suggest that interview data should be analyzedas narratives that are collaboratively constructed by interviewer and respondent.Taking a constructionist argument a step further, the same authors later conceptual-ize the interview as a very widespread means of cultural production of individualizedexperience (Gubrium & Holstein, 2002).

Charmaz’s constructivist perspective acknowledges that ‘data are narrative construc-tions…. They are reconstructions, they are not the experience itself’ (Charmaz, 2000,p. 514). However, we think that a perspective thoroughly grounded in a constructionistepistemology and social constructionist or constructivist theoretical perspective wouldgo further and take the position that data are constructed (rather than reconstructed)in the social situation of the interview as well as through the analytical techniques and


procedures (here of grounded theory) applied in the interview situation. Constructivistgrounded theorists, in our view strategically using the grounded theory method, assertthat ‘grounded theory offers a set of flexible strategies, not rigid prescriptions’(Charmaz, 2000, p. 513). Based on our definition of method and our understandingof a constructionist view of interviews we take a different position. The ‘flexibility’ ofanalytical techniques of a method is at least partially constrained by epistemology. Theinconsistency we diagnosed in the strategic use of method is that the method is nolonger informed by the epistemology in which it was embedded when it was firstdesigned. Hence, the theory of knowledge rooted in the method is now inconsistentwith the theory of knowledge the researchers supposedly produce.

The grounded theory method as a method in our sense—a set of techniques orprocedures designed to produce a certain kind of knowledge—is thus eroded by beingused strategically. Therefore, for researchers who are interested in avoiding the conse-quences of the erosion of a method we propose that the epistemological use of amethod allows researchers to situate any qualitative text within an epistemologicaland theoretical tradition and consequently to evaluate the knowledge that is producedin this text within these traditions and discourses. The epistemological use of methodand thus the consistent use of epistemology, theoretical stance and methods enhanceclarity and contextual validity of the research undertaken.

Second, we posed the question ‘Grounded theory—grounded in what’? Asmentioned earlier, in the tradition of Glaser and Strauss grounded theory might begrounded in data that is collected following a certain system (Glaser & Strauss, 1967;Glaser, 1978) and analytical steps that have been more and more refined (Glaser,1978; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Despite the erosion caused by the hidden scientificpractices of those authors, within their epistemological and theoretical framework,one set of data produces one set of theory grounded in these data. This is different forconstructivist grounded theory. Charmaz explains that ‘Constructivist groundedtheorists acknowledge that they define what is happening in the data. Objectivistgrounded theorists assume they discover what is happening in the data’ (Charmaz,2002, p. 684). This difference in theoretical stance and underlying epistemology isconsequential to the question posed here. If constructivist grounded theorists them-selves define what is happening in the data, then the theory developed is grounded inthe process of meaning-making on the part of the researcher. In other words, inconstructivist grounded theory the researcher controls the meaning-making andknowledge production. Thus, one set of data may produce multiple meanings, whichcan be the bases for multiple theories. In comparison, in objectivist grounded theorydata control the meaning-making process and thus knowledge is grounded in andemerging from the data; the researcher’s epistemological role is more passive. Hence,objectivist grounded theorists are revealing the meaning from the data whereasconstructivists researchers construct the meaning. These epistemological differencesin the ‘groundedness’ are illuminated in Figure 1.Figure 1. Differences in ‘groundedness’ based on different epistemologiesThe intuitive formulation of an emerging method without epistemological andtheoretical foundations makes it more feasible for others to use a method strategically.The consequential erosion of a method is not only a hindering or confusing process


but it could also enrich the practice of qualitative research by adding diversity andallowing the field to refine and restructure itself. However, if the emerging method isepistemologically situated, its strategic use becomes more challenging, as qualitativeresearchers are in a better and more knowledgeable position to evaluate the epistemo-logical and theoretical tradition, and the assumptions embedded in it, as well asultimately the method’s transferability.

Meaning

Constructionist (or in Charmaz's terms 'Constructivist')Grounded Theory: One set of data produces multiple

meanings, which produce multiple theories

Theory

Theory

Theory

Meaning

Meaning

Data

TheoryData

`Objectivist' Grounded Theory: One Set of data produces onetheory

Figure 1. Differences in ‘groundedness’ based on different epistemologies


The erosion of grounded theory: the end of religion?

For it is with literature as with law or empire—an established name is an estate in tenure,or a throne in possession. (Edgar Allen Poe [1831], ‘Preface, Letter to Mr. B….’, cited inCrotty, 1998)

Throughout history established names, labels and categories have been used to gainlegitimacy and power. Similarly, these political decisions characterize the methodchoices of many qualitative researchers who desire to gain legitimacy and acceptancein the field. The erosion of a method complicates this process by putting power andtaken-for-granted labels in circulation. We agree with Berger and Luckmann whoexplain that a ‘breakdown in the taken-for-granted acceptance of the monopoly [toimpose definitions of reality] accelerates social change’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1967,p. 123) and thus promotes diversity among qualitative researchers. Existing diversitycreates a new set of questions. Charmaz’s (2000) inquiry ‘Who’s got the realgrounded theory’ or our question ‘Where are the foundations of this “religious”movement associated with grounded theory?’ complicates the work of scholars whoare interested in the grounded theory method. Additionally, these questions challengepositions of power vested in providing generally accepted definitions.

However, the power struggle over the label or the content of grounded theory didnot start with Charmaz’s writings on constructivist grounded theory despite the factthat Glaser’s (2002) critique of Charmaz’s constructivist grounded theory as‘unbelievably wrong … so untrue’ (Glaser, 2002, p. 4) has promoted interestingdiscussions among qualitative researchers. These discussions have focused on ques-tions about the ownership of the method, about the context of the term groundedtheory, and on concerns about the overall justifications of different uses of the method.

The concerns emerging in these discussions are very important. Researchers mustask themselves why they prefer to use grounded theory in their work. Why are theydrawn to a particular set of beliefs? What do labels such as grounded theory, positiv-ism or constructivism mean for them? We, in turn, argue that methods, labels or beliefsystems do not operate in a vacuum but are discursively and epistemologicallyconstructed. As an example, Charmaz and Mitchell (2001) argue that ‘groundedtheory dispels the positivist notion of passive observers who merely absorb theirsurrounding scenes’ (Charmaz & Mitchell, 2001, p. 162). However, we assert thatgrounded theory as a label does not dispel anything nor does it operate independentlyfrom the researcher’s theoretical perspective. Labels and methods are dispelled byresearchers, who place labels and methods in particular epistemological and empiricalcontext. Therefore, researchers must ask themselves what grounded theory can do fortheir design and data as well as what types of analytical insights grounded theory canprovide for them.

Furthermore, do researchers epistemologically agree with Glaser and Strauss andwhat does this agreement mean? If scholars epistemologically disagree with Glaserand Strauss, our concern is with why the label of grounded theory is used. Therefore,researchers should also consider when the label is merely used to gain power, assumedcredibility and validity. And who is the one to make these decisions? How is the social


organization of theoretical experts (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) of grounded theorydefined? In this sense, the question as to who has the ‘real’ grounded theory (e.g.Charmaz, 2000) constitutes a struggle for the position of the experts who get to putforth definitions of reality in a community. According to Berger and Luckmann(1967), ‘those who occupy the decisive power positions are ready to use their powerto impose the traditional definitions of reality on the population under their authority’(p. 121). Using the label of grounded theory differently seems to be a strategy to chal-lenge this authority and thus positions of power. These challenges create the powerstruggles that the field of qualitative researchers has been witnessing during the pastdecades. At the same time, the eroded method and related power struggles open upnew positions of power. However, these new positions of power also make all of theresearchers involved in the use of a particular method more vulnerable to critique.

By raising the question of labels we illustrate the importance of language and itscontextual meanings. We believe that language use, terminology and labels are vitalfor qualitative methods and for the process of social science research (Gubrium &Holstein, 1997). ‘Language-in-use is everywhere and always “political”’ (Gee, 1999,p. 1). Different camps of grounded theorists are prime examples of the diversity ofdiscourses operating in qualitative inquiry. Furthermore, the concept of discourse(Foucault, 1972, 1980, 1995) not only influences the ontological position thatresearchers take but is also closely associated with their epistemology and knowledgeproduction. Furthermore, Foucault (1995) believes that knowledge and power areinseparable and the corpus of knowledge and techniques of scientific discourses areformed and entangled with the practices of power. ‘Power produces knowledge …power and knowledge directly imply one another; … there is no power relation withoutthe correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does notpresuppose and constitute at the same time power relations’ (Foucault, 1995, p. 27).Knowledge is defined by the discourse rather than by the researcher or by the method.‘There is no knowledge without a particular discursive practice; and any discursivepractice may be defined by the knowledge that it forms’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 183).

If a method and its uses are not situated in a discourse or in an epistemological andtheoretical context (if that is possible), knowledge and truth claims borrowing thelabel from a method appear to be more powerful, because proposed meanings cannoteasily be dismantled on epistemological and theoretical grounds by other discourses.Instead, researchers establish an illusion of a generalizable method that can be usedwith any data. Thereby a method can be detached from its context. By doing this,researchers grant immunity, which implies that a method and any of its uses areneither right nor wrong (if certain procedures are followed). However, in this case,any particular text or document can be ‘identified’ or labeled as a sacred text or a textthat should be ‘followed’. If grounded theory is used as merely a label or a conceptwithout epistemological connections, grounded theory is not grounded anywhere or,alternatively, it is grounded everywhere. In this case, it becomes an empty method ora text without contextualized meaning.

The awareness of contextualized meanings and different discourses makesresearchers more sensitive to power and to the fact that power is implicit in the ways


researchers use methods. The power of a discourse and its methods normalizes andproduces realities. For example, power (of academic discourse) normalized us whenwe wrote this manuscript. Our positions as possible contributors to an academicjournal required us to cite, label and categorize. This normalization through academicdiscourse is also constituted by the necessity to position our work, because thefrontiers of a text ‘are never clear-cut: beyond the title, the first lines, and the last fullstop, beyond its internal configuration and its autonomous form, it is caught up in asystem of references to other books, other texts, other sentences: it is a node within anetwork’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 23). However, we also exercised power by criticizing theconceptual confusion embedded in different work conducted under grounded theory.Furthermore, given that our manuscript is an attempt at knowledge production wenaturally also produce a source of power or authority (Foucault, 1995), because‘power is very much implicated in the production of knowledge’ (St Pierre, 2000,p. 496). It is not our aim to advocate a particular version or practice of groundedtheory and therefore we only partially partake in the highlighted power struggle andcontest for the label and legitimacy of grounded theory.

Theorizing the issues of power during the analysis of discourse, the questionbecomes whom discourse serves (Foucault, 1994). We propose that the label ofgrounded theory appears to be a ‘social good’ (Gee, 1999)7—something that groupsof people within the field of qualitative research compete for. For example, the labelof grounded theory provides membership in particular research communities. Byidentifying their work as grounded theory researchers gain power and legitimacy fortheir methods and research. This assumed credibility through the use of scholarlyvested labels provides theoretical and communal support for scholars and providesaccess to publication possibilities that are often controlled by particular researchcommunities. Under these circumstances it is possible for the products of research toacquire legitimacy as ‘social scientific knowledge’ and for their producers to advancein the institutions of knowledge production (Lyotard, 1984; Whitley, 2000).Assumed credibility, then, is a product of the cultural choices communities of sciencemake regarding the production of knowledge (see also Feyerabend, 1988).

For many researchers, these are legitimate reasons not to question the labels but toutilize their power without acknowledging how erosion has influenced the context andthe meaning of the label. However, researchers should be encouraged to consider theinfluence of erosion and to pay close attention to the ways particular discourses, labelsor the priorities associated with scholarly membership are used to exclude outliers (ofa method) and to define the Other (methods). Additionally, it might be beneficial totake into account that this process of exclusion maintains and feeds the discourses andbelief systems only from within.

Notes on Contributor

Thomas Greckhamer is Assistant Professor in the Rucks Department of Managementat Louisiana State University. He received his PhD from the University of Flor-ida and also holds two master’s degrees from Johannes Kepler University Linz,


Austria. In addition to his research in the areas of organization theory, strategicmanagement, and international management, he studies the epistemological andtheoretical foundations of qualitative inquiry.

Mirka Koro-Ljungberg is Assistant Professor of qualitative research methodology atthe University of Florida, in the department of Educational Psychology. Shereceived her doctorate from the University of Helsinki, Finland. Currently, herresearch interests focus on qualitative methods and the conceptual and theoret-ical foundations of qualitative inquiry, as well as on exceptional learners. Prior tojoining the faculty at the University of Florida she conducted research as a visit-ing scholar at the University of Georgia. She is a member of American Educa-tional Research Association, the World Council for Gifted and TalentedChildren, and National Association for Gifted Children, among others.

Notes

1. Webster’s new universal unabridged dictionary (1996) defines erosion as: (1) the act or stateof eroding, (2) the process by which the surface of the earth is worn away by the action of water,glaciers, winds, waves etc.

2. The term ‘scientific’ in this context acknowledges that any use of theory, as any science moregenerally, is profoundly enmeshed in social structures (Foucault, 1994) and in the differentdiscourses of science.

3. We use strategic here as defined in the American Heritage College Dictionary (2000) as: (1)Important or essential to a plan of action, (2) Highly important to an objective.

4. We acknowledge that Strauss and Corbin (1994) have labeled their work as interpretivist, inparticular following a pragmatist position. However, despite their claims for interpretiveaspects of knowledge production and the need to include the perspective of the participants inthe analysis, Strauss and Corbin emphasize the role of hypothesis that turns our perceptions oftheir work back to objectivist epistemology.

5. By positivism we refer to the spirit of Enlightenment, to the Age of reason as exemplified in theworks of Comte, Bacon and logical positivists among others. Furthermore, we define post-positivists as contemporary positivists, who have replaced the principal of verification with theprincipal of falsification and those theorists who ultimately search for the truth and reality—ifonly imperfectly and probabilistically apprehendable (Lincoln & Guba, 2000)—because theybelieve that reality can be discovered in the world of regularities through systematic inquiriesand modified experimentation (see also Crotty, 1998). Post-positivist research producesgeneralizations, descriptions, patterns and grounded theory (Hatch, 2002).

6. For us, constructionism is an epistemological position whereas constructivism is a theoreticalperspective (see also Crotty, 1998). However, in the following we will use Charmaz’s termconstructivism, as she uses it, to refer to the epistemology of constructionism.

7. Gee (1999) defines social goods as ‘anything that a group of people believes to be a source ofpower, status, or worth’ (p. 2).

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