Futures 32 (2000) 361–384www.elsevier.com/locate/futures

The end in sight?Some speculations on environmental trends in

the twenty-first century

Peter Harper*

Centre for Alternative Technology, Machynlleth, Powys, SY20 9AZ, UK

Abstract

For a generation there has been unresolved debate between anxious environmentalists andsanguine ‘contrarians’, both of which have been able to amass strong evidence in favour oftheir positions. This is an important paradox, and the paper attempts to resolve it by meansof an elementary but robust model of environmental trends between 1950 and 2100. A crucialfeature of the approach is to disaggregate the developed ‘North’ and developing ‘South’,revealing strikingly different patterns. The North’s environmental impact will decline steadily,but in the South a rapid increase in environmental impact can be expected in the first half ofthe 21st century, followed by an equally rapid decline. This dramatic environmental ‘spike’will be unique in human history and mark a fundament transition to the sustainable state. Itsqualities and duration will determine many features of the human and natural world for millen-nia to come. Many policy implications flow from this analysis. Controversially, it suggeststhat the ‘spike’ should be embraced and managed rather than avoided or delayed. 2000Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

A generation ago there was a notable polarisation of opinion about global environ-mental issues. On one side we had so-called ‘prophets of doom’ [1–10], and on theother, belligerently optimistic opponents, which we might call ‘prophets of boom’[11–15]. Their predictions were so definite and starkly opposed that by now wemight have expected some signs of resolution one way or the other. Yet this hasnot been the case. Many of the original ‘prophets’ on both sides have maintained

* Tel: +44-1654-702934; fax:+44-1654-702782.E-mail address:peter.harper@cat.org.uk (P. Harper)

0016-3287/00/$ - see front matter 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.PII: S0016 -3287(99 )00102-0

362 P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

their views [16–27] (see also Table 1), and have been joined by equally forthrightyounger theorists [28–30].

In some ways environmentalists have done well. Once the outsiders, they have —nominally at least — converted the political establishment in the industrial democ-racies, and captured the moral high ground in public opinion. They have also madesignificant theoretical advances [31–38] and can claim a far greater sophisticationthan was possible in the 60s.

On the other side a so-called ‘green backlash’ has developed [39,40]. At a popularlevel this can largely be discounted as self-interested [41], but the legion of informedtheorists sceptical of environmentalism has been growing steadily. In acknowl-edgement of the liberal establishment’s enthusiasm for environmental issues, thesetheorists have been called ‘contrarians’, a term we will adopt in the discussion whichfollows [42–47]. Significantly, some of the most persuasive contrarians are apostatesfrom the environmental cause [48–51].

For a question of such moment, it is remarkable how little effort has been madeto explain or resolve this paradox. The case built up by each side is supported bya great deal of solid data. How can such divergent views be maintained, evendeveloped, for so long, with so little effect on each other? It is reminiscent of video-game gladiators exchanging mortal blows, then getting up as if nothing had happened(e.g. [52] for precisely this effect; see also [53]).

Part of the explanation for the puzzle must lie in the familiar dynamics of rivalconceptual paradigms. In this particular case the alternative paradigms are not merelyincompatible metaphors, but an archetypal duality with unusual mythopoeic power(the historic uniformitarian/catastrophist polarity is another expression of the samearchetype [54,55]). This accounts for the emotional intensity of the debate, but notthe factual paradoxes. These, I believe, can be explained by the suggestion that, inthe manner of the old tale of the blind men and the elephant, the protagonists arelooking accurately at different parts of a larger picture. Accordingly, I propose toexplore a model of the ‘larger picture’ which could solve the puzzle and providefresh policy perspectives.

Table 1Some Persistent Prophets

Early publication Later publication Reference

‘Prophets of Doom’P. Ehrlich 1968 1997 [2,17]B. Commoner 1972 1990 [4,19]D. Meadows et al. 1972 1992 [6,22]E. Goldsmith 1972 1997 [5,20]‘Prophets of Boom’H. Kahn 1967 1984 [11,25]J. Maddox 1972 1998 [12,66]W. Beckerman 1974 1995 [13,27]J. Simon 1977 1994 [15,26]

363P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

1.1. Terminology

For clarity in the discussion that follows I need to establish appropriate termin-ology. The categories and most of the terms themselves are quite conventional, andare laid out schematically in Fig. 1. There is an important distinction between, onthe one hand, values, attitudes and conceptual models, and on the other, practicalpolicies. The major attitudinal division is between ‘environmentalists’ (anxious,pessimistic) and ‘contrarians’ (sanguine, optimistic). Inpolicy terms however, thereis common ground between moderate wings of each side, while within both sidesthere are major divisions on policy. This gives us three broad policy classes thatmap onto the two conceptual classes as shown in Fig. 1. On the contrarian side thereis a faultline between laissez-faire theorists who believe that no special environmentalpolicies should be pursued [26,27], and those who believe that targeted interventionis often necessary [45,51]. On the environmental side, in spite of a great diversityof opinion [56–58] the most important faultline is between a ‘respectable’ main-stream majority seeking solutions broadly within the present framework of consumerculture (sometimes called ‘ecological modernisation’ [59,60]) and those who believethat radical restructuring of the fabric and aspirations of modern societies is neces-sary. These three significant policy classes will be repeatedly referred to in the dis-cussion which follows so perhaps some further remarks are appropriate:

1. Business As Usual (BAU) supposes that the normal processes of economic growthand technical innovation aresufficientto circumvent or deal with environmentalproblems. This represents the old economic and political establishment, stillinfluential. In the discussion below we shall often use the abbreviation ‘BAU’ tosignify a baseline case or simple extrapolation from existing trends

2. No Fundamental Change (NFC) summarises the approach of moderate environ-mentalists and contrarians, who believe that economic growth and technical inno-vation arenecessarybut not sufficient to deal with environmental problems. Theymust be pursued in a strongly targeted policy context, but without fundamentalchallenge to the modern consumerist project or to individual civil liberties. ‘NFC’

Fig. 1. Principal ‘faultlines’ in environmental theory.

364 P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

thus represents the new Establishment, still feeling its way but increasingly confi-dent.

3. Radical Restructuring (RR) represents the views of environmental groups andtheorists prepared to challenge the modern consensus and seekdeliberate limitsto the principal factors thought to underlie the environmental impact of humanactivity. Each of these factors had its partisans, and during the sixties and seventieswhole schools of environmental thought grew up around them. They are:O population growth [2,3,61]O changing technology and economic structure [4,62,63] andO economic growth or levels of material consumption [1,64,65].

While it is widely agreed that these factors capture the fundamental influences onenvironmental impact, the relative attention given to each sharply discriminates ourthree policy classes:

O BAU theorists let all three factors do what they will. Any attempt to manipulatethem will be suboptimal.

O NFC theorists tend to ignore population and consumption — which in policyterms are regarded as off-limits — and focus their hopes and efforts on technologyin the broadest sense. They represent the mainstream, established view.

O RR theorists — a motley group — have been concerned about all three factorsbut in recent years have tended to insist on the importance of consumption as thecrucial variable. This brings them into conflict with ‘the modern project’ andmakes them a slightly embattled minority.

The historical trajectories of these three factors and their projection into the 21stcentury hold the key to unravelling the paradox outlined at the beginning of thispaper. In the 1970s Paul Ehrlich and John Holdren [67] offered the important insightthat the three factors cannot be considered in isolation from each other. They are notalternatives, but have amultiplicativerelationship. The authors went on to suggest thesimple but heuristically powerful equation:

I5PAT

where I mnemonically represented aggregate environmentalImpact;P Population;A ‘Affluence’ or standard of living; andT ‘Technology’ in the broadest sense. Laterwe will try to apply this equation with more exact definitions and quantities, andenter some necessary reservations about its usefulness. In the meantime, as we nowhave the spectacular advantage of a whole generation of hindsight since its originalformulation, can we see any significant trends in these factors? And do these trendshelp us to resolve the theoretical and policy paradoxes?

2. Environmental trends in the last 30 years

The most striking thing about these three variables is how differently they havebehaved in the developed ‘North’ and the less developed ‘South’. Population in the

365P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

North grew hardly at all while in the South it doubled. It is intriguing that worldpopulation passed what appears to be the inflection point of an inferred logistic curvearound 1965, and the growth rate has slowed steadily since [68,69]. This patternwas not visible in the sixties and to some extent it explains both the former panicand the present lack of it. Population growth rates correlate rather well with GDPper capita and BAU theorists have argued that this provides an excellent exampleof economic growth as a beneficent environmental force [70]. NFC theorists arguethat it demonstrates the value of effective demographic policies, allowing GDP percapita to grow by reducing the ‘capita’ [71]; while RR population theorists continueto argue that the problem is not over yet and that in some countries populationgrowth frustrates any kind of development [72,73].

In the North GDP per capita (‘affluence’) grew two- to threefold, (although notice-ably slower than in the immediate postwar decades, and with increasingly unequaldistribution within most nations). Was it accompanied by an increase in environmen-tal impacts? On the whole, no. Albeit with a few exceptions, most physical indicesof environmental quality showed a steady improvement, to the delight of the contrari-ans [51]. On the other hand attempts to replace GDP with a more sophisticatedmeasure of welfare suggested something very curious: a peak in the 70s followedby a steady decline [74–76]. This has allowed RR theorists to claim that economicgrowth is self-defeating and that true welfare is increasingly negated by the needfor ‘defensive expenditures’ [34]. The singularity of the 70s crops up in many differ-ent contexts, but little attention has been drawn to this per se. I will not pursue thistopic here but it probably has some significance for the wider investigation.

On the technology side there were some spectacular disasters but generally speak-ing clear advances were made. A simple example is the replacement of open coal-fires with gas-fired central heating. This produced a simultaneous leap in comfortand a greatly reduced environmental impact in many different directions(occupational health, visual intrusion, ease of use, solid waste, air pollution, globalwarming etc). The fact that this change was not driven by environmental consider-ations is significant. It has gradually become clear that the whole tenor of advancedeconomies is changing, with progressive ‘dematerialization’ and an apparent de-coupling of material inputs from GDP growth — the so-called ‘post-industrial’ con-dition [77–79]. Again we see a watershed being reached in the 70s, since whenenergy consumption in the North has grown extremely slowly after 100 years ofrapid growth [80], and for the most advanced Northern nations material use per unitof GDP is quite clearly declining [53]. Furthermore it turned out to be far easier thanpessimists had feared to circumvent shortages of raw materials or to ‘fix’ physicalenvironmental problems. This seemed an obvious victory for laissez-faire contrari-ans, but environmentalists wanted to claim at least some of the credit. They pointedout that the improvements entailed precisely the kind of active regulations and tech-niques they had called for. More critically, it was impossible to discount the possi-bility that many of the more highly polluting industries were now re-locating in theSouth, and much of the apparent clean-up was simply a cosmetic illusion [81].Further, many citizens in the North simply did notfeel safer, cleaner or moresecure [82,83].

366 P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

In the South the story is erratic, some areas achieving the much-vaunted economic‘takeoff’ [84] while others remained firmly stuck on the ground or even sinking intoit (notably in nations with rapidly rising populations). Most environmental indicatorsshowed a marked deterioration [85], and although the more advanced Southernnations showed that they too could clean up if they wanted to, often they seemedalmost wilfully careless of environmental values.

As a broad generalisation we could say that the argument of more extreme RRtheorists that modern industrial culture is intrinsically unsustainable, is lookingweaker. Apart from this, the disagreements continue. In the North the contrarianshave had the best of it — so far. In the South it is the other way round — so far.Let us see if we can construct some scenarios with these three variables projectedinto the new millennium.

3. Refining the theoretical analysis

Ehrlich and Holdren’s equation — originally a rhetorical device to emphasise themultifactorial nature of the problem — can potentially be used in a more quantitativeway if we redefine the factors more carefully to ensure consistency and measurability.Its advantage lies in its brutal simplicity, making our assumptions transparent, easilyunderstood and readily challenged. The mathematics are trivial, so all steps can befollowed without the inevitable suspicion of legerdemain which attends more sophis-ticated computer-based models. Some readers of the draft versions have given up atthis point, terrified by the appearance of quasi-mathematical symbols. I assure suchreaders that the smallest degree of concentration at this point will permit mastery ofthe conventions I have adopted and allow my argument to be scrutinised.

In this reformulationA is effectively GDP per capita (GDP/P) in a given com-munity of populationP. T is a factor sometimes called environmental intensity, i.e.,environmental impact per unit of GDP orI/GDP. ThereforeI=P(GDP/P)(I/GDP) andsimple cancelling shows the equation to be true by definition.

Of the three factorsT is the hardest to measure and the most problematic in termsof scope and definition. It requires some exegesis. Its basis is not just technologybut the whole structure of an economy, factor endowments, cultural history etc[53,86]. Think of the gas/coal heating example just mentioned: that is part ofT.Switzerland has a similar level of affluence to the USA but historically has lowerpollution levels because it makes money and watches rather than cars and soybeans.That is also part ofT. T (and its cognateI) combine a huge number of incommensur-able environmental quantities and qualities, many of which can only be measured atthe cost of multiple arbitrary assumptions and heroic ‘guesstimates’ (how can youquantify a blot on the landscape, the loss of a rare species and the value of cleanair, and add them together?). This is indeed a philosophical minefield, and fastidioustheorists would prefer to avoid it altogether. But, foolhardy as it may appear, somekind of ‘photofit’ aggregation of the trends has some value because environmentaltheorists of nearly all persuasions constantly invoke something like it. Moreimportantly, practical policy is madeas if it means something, andas if we can

367P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

meaningfully speak of higher or lower values attached to it. And economists of verydifferent kinds work hard to reduce the diversity of its components to single measur-able units, be it dollars [87,88], energy [35], land [36] or ‘space’ [89].

It is customary in ‘global models’ such as that ofLimits to Growthand its suc-cessors [6,22] to consider the global population and its activity as a whole. Unfortu-nately this has obscured some very important patterns since the dynamics ofP, Aand T, as we have seen, are so different for the North and South. It is a crucialfeature of the approach adopted here that North and South are treated separatelythen re-integrated later. Greater accuracy could probably be gained from dividingthe North into East and West, and the South into a rapidly growing group and astagnating group, but this is not attempted here.

4. Projections for the North

Consider first the North (including, somewhat arbitrarily, the OECD group plusthe former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and top tigers). We are concernedprincipally with trends rather than absolute values, and to capture these we needonly compare possible future states with a baseline at the year 2000 given an indexof 1. For even greater simplicity, we shall consider only the situation in 2050 and2100. For concision we shall represent the factors pertaining to the North with thesubscriptN, thusAN etc and the South likewise,AS etc. The state of the factors atdifferent dates will be represented by superscriptsA2000 etc.

Consider first a baseline ‘default’ or BAU scenario. North PopulationPN is staticin most countries but overall is growing slowly. By 2050 it could possibly bePN

2050=1.2 although it might actually be less. By 2100PN2100=1.2 is a neutral guess

and is unlikely to be far out, barring mass epidemics etc. ‘Affluence’ or GDP percapita has trebled in 50 years but is showing signs of slowing. Let us suppose itonly multiplies by 2.5 in the next fifty years and merely doubles in the followingfifty. This is not particularly what politicians or economists hope for or expect, butit will do as a ranging shot, soAN

2050=2.5, AN2100=5. As remarked previously, the

‘photofit’ TN is extremely hard to gauge but nearly all its measurable componentsare currently declining, some quite rapidly. A review of possible proxies suggests ahalving over 25–50 years [53,80]. Let us suppose this trend continues, sayTN

2050=0.3and TN

2100=0.1. Now we simply multiply up according to the original equationI=PAT:

2000: PN51 AN51 TN51........I2000N 51

2050: PN51.2AN52.5TN50.3........I2050N 50.9

2100: PN51.2AN55 TN50.1........I2100N 50.6

On these assumptions(and we must constantly stress this) we see the overallimpact of the North decreasing steadily, as the contrarians have foretold. Someenvironmental theorists however, argue that this is not still good enough because the

368 P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

North has occupied more than its fair share of sustainable ‘environmental space’.The general consensus in the ‘environmental space’ and ‘footprinting’ communitiesis that (roughly)IN

2050=0.2 is required by considerations of sustainability and globalequity [90] (although see below for a more nuanced view). With respect toTN ithas been persuasively argued that a technological ‘factor four’ [91], ‘factor ten’ [92]or even ‘factor 20’ [93] can be achieved more rapidly than BAU given positive eco-innovation policies. Assume for example ‘factor 7’ by 2050 and ‘factor 20’ by 2100:

Sustainability target value isIN=0.2

2000: PN51 AN51 TN51..........I2000N 51

2050: PN51.2AN52.5TN50.14...........I2050N 50.43

2100: PN51.2AN55 TN50.05..........I2100N 50.3

On these assumptionsI gets close to the target. Readers might care to enter theirown suppositions. If for example historical economic growth rates or more were tocontinue the result would be something like this:

2050: PN51.2AN53 TN50.14..........I2050N 50.50

2100: PN51.2AN59 TN50.05.............I2100N 50.54

Or, to consider a more pessimistic case, suppose the recent improvements inTN

were to falter, but strong growth ofAN were maintained:

2050: PN51.2AN53 TN50.5...........I2050N 51.8

2100: PN51.2AN59 TN50.25..........I2100N 52.7:

To assume a level of affluence nine times greater than that of today might raisesome eyebrows, but this is simply a mathematical consequence of everyday govern-ment policy and historical growth rates. A hundred years later it would be nine timesgreater still. I will return to this question later.

It is probably fair to say that under the most plausible assumptions of modestgrowth rates and historical improvements inT, IN

2100 could easily be less thanIN2000,

contrary to the Prophets of Doom and environmental street lore. Further, we couldsay that probablyIN

2050=0.2 (the notional target level) is achievable with appropriatepolicies regardingT, with some but not drastic strain onAN. This would meet theprovisional target for ‘sustainability’ in the North. Here probably the light greens,eco-realists and contrarians can all agree that it is possible, even easy,given theappropriate policies. But the North shares the planet with the South and sustainabilityonly makes sense if the whole of humanity achieves it. So now we must turn tothe South.

369P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

5. Projections for the South

The South is not homogeneous, so we must bear in mind that many of the aggre-gate figures combine extreme values. UN forecasts expect the South’s populationPS, now around 5 billion, to reach 8 billion by 2050 and 9.5 billion by 2100, so ifPS

2000=1, then PS2050=1.6, PS

2100=1.9. Economic growth in the South is a bizarremixture of very high and low or even negative growth but overall has been fasterthan the North. At present rates it is plausible to suggest (ifAS

2000=1) thatAS2050=6

and AS2100=24. This last figure will be higher thanAN

2000 but AN2100 is likely to be

considerably higher still. Of course we can postulate parity (AN=AS) at any futuretime and calculate its effect, but these values seem a reasonable starting point forthe purposes of my argument.

The estimation ofTS — the aggregated environmental intensity of the South —is much more difficult but raises issues of such importance that a digression is neces-sary. Being a composite parameter,T cannot be measured directly but through ‘bas-kets’ of specific components, with proxies employed to represent the trends [94]. Avery common proxy is energy intensity — primary energy consumed per unit ofGDP — for which good figures are available across a wide span of time and formany different societies. Plotting this variable for a range of economies over the last100 years gives Fig. 2 and reveals a very striking recurrent pattern: an inverted-U

Fig. 2. Energy Intensities for selected countries and groups of countries. (from [97]). The vertical lineshows date of original publication (1990). The developing country curves beyond 1990 were conjectural.More recent trends and former USSR have been added from [96].

370 P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

in which energy-intensity grows steadily in the early phase of industrialisation,reaches a peak, then declines [95,96].

The figure also suggests several other possible generalisations that have influencedthe debate:

O that the rising limb takes 50–100 years;O that succeeding national cycles often have lower peaks — but not always;O that the descending limbs are converging towards a common value — a kind of

global intensity attractor.

The inverted-U pattern has been recast as a more general principle under the rubricof so-called ‘Environmental Kuznets Curves’ [98,99]. The claim is that it applies toa wide range of environmental impacts associated with modern societies; each ofwhich rises to a peak at certain level ofA, then declines. In looking at the variouscurves for (say) specific pollutants there emerges a fairly regular sequence ofGNP/cap levels at which the peak and subsequent decline occurs: thus pollution ofsurface waters comes early, airborne particulates later, then sulphur dioxide, airbornelead and so on [100]. This is given a conjectural but plausible explanation in termsof direct human interest, the worst and most dangerous pollutants being tackled first,then the most visible, then the more subtle items, and finally those which are easilyexported, such as CO2. Putting them together in a kind of ‘photofit’ generatesT, theaggregated environmental intensity, which is presumed to reflect the inverted-U pat-tern of its components. We shall refer to this as the ‘EKC thesis’.

The thesis is by no means universally accepted [101–103], but a great deal hangson it, so we cannot avoid briefly entering the debate. Some specific environmentalindicators clearly do not conform to the pattern [95,100], yet viewed as a whole itis undeniable that historically the early stages of industrialisation have seen veryhigh levels of environmental impact. Pick almost any environmental indicator andcompare, say, Manchester in 1890 and 1990, with a much greater population andaffluence. Compare Manchester today and, say, Bangkok. In many ways this is notsurprising. Infrastructure has to be built up — roads, buildings, factories, vehicles,and these are inevitably material- and energy-intensive. Just as important is the cul-tural shift in attitudes to environmental questions. The expression ‘Where there’smuck there’s brass’ attributed to 19th century captains of industry was acceptedthroughout society. It seems that people ‘read’ environmental qualities differently inthe earlier stages of industrialisation (Fig. 3). As both individual and societal wealthincreases it becomes ‘rational’ both to shift activity towards the ‘dematerialised’service sector, and to tackle environmental problems in sequence according to thecosts and perceived benefits of doing so [100]. If this can happen faster than thenegative effects of growing population and GDP, the result is an improvement inenvironmental quality. In this light the measured decline ofTN can be seen as thepost-peak descending limb of the curve, and the broad decline ofIN a sign thatTN

is changing faster thanAN, assumingPN is roughly constant.However, if the EKC thesis is broadly correct it reasonable to expect thatTS will

rise to a peakin the next half-century, perhaps substantially, before a (rapid?) decline

371P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

Fig. 3. From a pacifist propaganda poster of the First World War.

to join the general convergence. This temporary increase will be reinforced by theNorth–South transfer of environmental damage through trade effects [104,105] andthe globalisation of markets [106]. It is a common RR assertion that (for example)Geneva is clean preciselybecauseBangkok is filthy [107,108]. Eventually Bangkokmay clean up at the expense of say, Kinshasa, but in the end there will be nowhereelse to run. In view of the mechanics of globalisation [109] this effect must surelyexist, although it is hard to quantify its contribution. Contrarians would argue thatit cannot account forall the apparent improvements inIN in recent decades, sincemost trade occurs within the North itself, and there has surely beensomegenuinetechnical progress [110]. Nevertheless we can expectTS to be somewhat inflated inthe short term.

To illustrate the possible implications of these assumptions, let us assume that anentire BAU cycle of modernisation takes about a century (as suggested by the admit-tedly schematic Fig. 2). Let us further suppose that the aggregateTS reaches a peakof 2 relative to the current level by 2050, followed by a decline to 0.2 by 2100.Combine this withPS andAS as previously projected:

372 P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

Sustainability target values:IS=2 (by 2020);IS=1 (by 2050) [90].

2000: PS51 AS51 TS51..........I2000S 51

2050: PS51.6AS56 TS52.........I2050S 519.2

2100: PS51.9AS524TS50.2.........I2100S 59.12

On these assumptions there is a much more severe mismatch than we found in theNorth between the projected and target values forI, although mathematically it ishardly surprising when all three factors have positive values. The mismatch(represented graphically in Fig. 4) is so severe, and its implications so potentiallygrave, as to suggest there must be some mistake. So let us test the robustness of themodel by looking for mistakes or implausible assumptions.

6. Questioning the assumptions

6.1. Are the population projections wrong?

The ones we used are the UN middle projections [69]. The minimum one willchangeIS

2050 to 15.6, not enough to make a serious difference. It could equally gothe other way, e.g. forPS

2050=2, IS2050=24.

Fig. 4. Projected environmental impacts from developing countries in the 21st century. Dotted lineindicates sustainability target level.

373P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

6.2. Is projected economic growth too rapid?

Probably, and in the case of many national economies, almost certainly. But if sothe drastic consequences have not been widely acknowledged. If economic growthis not as rapid as this the South will fall further and further behind the North, leadingto an impossibly unstable world. Surely global sustainability absolutely requires thatthe gap be narrowed if not closed entirely? This must be the default assumption.There are some theorists who argue that the South should avoid economic growthand the industrial pathway altogether [20,111,112] in favour of a more organic, low-tech future which would also reduceT. Mathematically this works quite well: if sayPS

2050=1.6, AS2050=1, TS

2050=0.5 thenIS2050=0.8. Unfortunately this is not at all what

most citizens of the South appear to want. For reasons discussed later it seemsunlikely such radically dematerialised models can have much influence until basicindustrialisation has run its course. This is not to deny their potential importance,and although such ideas are currently ignored in mainstream circles, they will remaina ghost at the banquet, ready to emerge when their time comes.

6.3. Is the assumption of increasing TS mistaken?

Fig. 2 (published in 1990) hints hopefully that the leading edge of the developingworld has already reached its maximum value forT, and the rest will somehowleapfrog early industrialism and jump straight to the descending limb of the curve.This is an attractive policy goal [37,113] but (again) it is simply not what is hap-pening on the ground in the South, where an irrepressible enthusiasm for what wemight call ‘vulgar modernity’ seems determined to recapitulate at least some aspectsof the West’s historic trajectory. For example, Sir Richard Rogers’ attempts to per-suade the Shanghai authorities that the true future lay in parks, trees, bicycles, lightrailways, vernacular materials and pedestrian walkways was scornfully rejected infavour of skyscrapers, underpasses, shopping malls, concrete, and cars by the million[114]. Compare also Fig. 3. This obsession with the trappings of modernity, familiarto anyone that has lived or worked in the South, is of extreme significance for thefuture of the global environment. It seems to me that the peak ofTS will occur notso much because history and BAU predict it, but because the people of the Southinsist on it. In this light a peak figure ofTS=2 might be an underestimate, althoughit could well occur before 2050, giving a lower figure forIS

2050.But of course the existence of a ‘peak’ implies an improvement thereafter, and

this is a critical feature of the broader EKC thesis: that the initial deterioration ofT is only a temporary state of affairs, which appropriate policies would be ableto mitigate.

6.4. Is the target misplaced?

Setting a broad target in this way is probably the weakest part of the argument.It is based on rather recent work originating in the Netherlands, setting levels for‘environmental space’ with respect to a wide range of resources and environmental

374 P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

impacts [89,90,115]. According to these studies the average world per capita pressureon land, fresh water, atmospheric CO2 absorption, ocean fisheries, wood and wildhabitat is at or near sustainable levelsnow. Assuming these are a representative‘basket’ the ultimate target for the world aggregate impact,IW, must be set around1 or less (in the case of CO2 emissions the IPCC recommends 0.6). Since by 2050PS=PW to a good approximation, targetIW=targetIS.

Against this, some environmental components ofI could probably expand enor-mously without long-term or global consequences. Think of (again, say) Manches-ter’s 19th century air and water pollution, food adulteration etc. Appalling as theywere, they left little lasting legacy. Or take a modern example: wind farms couldcover every hilltop and utterly blight the landscape aesthetically, but with no directimplication for sustainability. This suggests a potentially important policy strategy:to shift environmental burdens from critical areas to more robust, or at least revers-ible, ones. Temporarily, a ‘nuanced’IW could rise a great deal, but paradoxically ina ‘sustainable’ way.

These projections all depend heavily on the assumption made, but it would appearthat even if we make any other reasonable assumptions the same pattern appears: adramatic, if temporary, increase in environmental impacts attributable to the rapiddevelopment of the South. According to the logic of the argument, failure of theSouth to develop, while superficially an ‘advantage’ will make matters worse byprolonging the period of increasing environmental impact.

7. Combining North and South

For completeness we must now combine the North and South indices to giveglobal figures. Again we can take 2000 as a base index of 1 for the lower figure,so PN

2000=1, PS2000=4; AN

2000=15, AS2000=1. The ratio ofTN and TS is much more

problematic and casts some doubt on what follows. On the argument so farTN isdeclining from a historic high, whileTS is increasing from a historic low, althoughit is itself an unstable average of high and low local components. Fig. 2 hints atrough parity for energy intensity in the 1990s and if this is a reasonable proxy wecan guesstimateTN andTS as being roughly equal now, although set to diverge forthe next half-century. This assumption gives the following world scaling (Table 2):The most striking feature here is that althoughIN currently dominates the scene, onthese assumptions the situation would quickly be reversed, with the direct contri-bution of the North becoming absolutely smaller and in relative terms much smallerthan IS. Were the North to accelerate its process of dematerialisation (say to ‘factor20’ by 2050),IN would be even smaller proportion and this would not affect theIW

peak significantly (Table 3).Far more effective in reducingIW would be rapid convergence ofTS to TN.

Although on current trends it is unlikely, a crash programme of sustainable-tech-nology is technically possible, and might give results like this (Table 4):

375P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

Table 2BAU Scenario with maintained recent growth rates in North

Ratio toGroup net World present,

Population Output perDate Group IntensityTi impact Impact taken as

Pi capitaAi I i=PiAiTi IW=IN+IS targetI ti

W/IW2000

2000 North 1 15 1 1519 1

South 4 1 1 42050 North 1.2 37.5 0.25 11.3

95.3 5South 7 6 2 84

2100 North 1.2 75 0.05 4.542.9 2.3

South 8 24 0.2 38.4

Table 3Rapid Eco-innovation in North

Ratio to2050 BAU P A T ProductPAT Sum IN+IS present

North 1.2 37.5 0.05 2.2586.25 4.5

South 7 6 2 84

Table 4Rapid convergence of environmental intensity

Ratio toP A T ProductPAT Sum IN+IS present

2050 North 1.2 37.5 0.05 2.2523.25 1.2

South 7 6 0.5 212100 North 1.2 75 0.01 0.9

2.82 0.15South 8 24 0.01 1.92

8. The underlying pattern

I have now laid out the basic analysis, which suggests that, crudely speaking,things are likely to get worse before they get better in the course of the 21st century.The general pattern is summarised in Fig. 5, and here we can start to see a little ofthe ‘blind men and the elephant’ effect. The two curves differ drastically, and it isno wonder that different conclusions are drawn from concentrating exclusively onone or the other. Contrarians, noting that since the early days of environmentalawareness, the North has taken effective steps to clean up, conclude reasonablyenough that the modern project can be sustainable. Many environmentalists would

376 P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

Fig. 5. Contrasting North/South trends in environmental impact.

regard this as academic, in view of the coming tsunami of environmental impact inthe South. Moderates on both sides would probably agree that resolute policies andstrong nerves will be required, but might disagree on policy details. Some of thesedisagreements will arise from different assumptions about the influences that thethree factors haveon each other, so now we will discuss this matter.

9. The mutual dynamics ofP, A and T

Most communities strive for economic growth — to increaseA — which is seenas a good in itself, yet this process — other things being equal — contributes to thegrowth of I, which we would like to stabilise. Partisans ofP andT like to point outhow attention to one or the other could reconcile this conflict. For example, a lowerpopulation means greater GDP per capita for a given level ofI andT, while a lowerT does the same for a given level of population. This is mathematically obvious ifpolitically convoluted. What has been neglected in much environmental discussionis the likelihood that the factors are not simply independent coefficients ofI, buthave complex interactions of their own. Particularly important is the possible effectof A on the other two factors, and perhaps ultimately on itself.

Consider firstA andP. There is a remarkably strong correlation between the absol-ute level ofA and the rate of population growth [95]. Pre-industrial societies by andlarge have high birth and death rates that balance each other, giving slow or zeropopulation growth. In the early phases of industrialisation death rates go down, butbirth rates remain high. The result is a sudden increase in population which eventu-ally slows as the birth rates fall back roughly in line with death rates to produce

377P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

another fairly steady state with low growth but at a higher absolute level ofP thanbefore. This is such a reliable pattern that it has been labelled the ‘demographictransition’ [116]. The countries of the North can be considered to have more or lesscompleted the transition, while those of the South are still in the midst of it, althoughin the slowing limb of the curve. This is reflected by the assumptions regarding 21stcentury levels ofP in the analysis above.

Nevertheless, for stabilisingI it would be desirable for all societies to completethe demographic transition as soon as possible. Old fashioned Malthusians have longurged direct measures such as family planning, but contemporary demographers tendto argue that there are stronger cultural and psychological factors based on impliedcalculations of personal economic security, which in turn correlate closely with eitherindividual or — if well-distributed — societal wealth [117]. It is not that appropriate‘direct’ population policies are irrelevant or ineffective, but that they are not suf-ficient. In other words, the transition does not proceed, or cannot be completed,without a certain measure of steady economic growth, provided this is well distrib-uted. If this is true (it appears to be the orthodox view) it presents us with thedilemma thatAS must be increased several-fold to bring about a permanent stabilis-ation of PS

Turning now to the relationship betweenA andT we find almost exactly the samepattern, one we have already encountered in the EKC thesis — thatT, like P,undergoes a short period of rapid expansion followed by contraction, initiated bythe modernisation process and correlating closely with growth ofA. Once again, aswe have discussed, there is a plausible cultural-economic explanation of the link.There is one significant difference between the two cases in that in principleT cancontinue to decline indefinitely, although some limits are probably set by the sizeof human beings (certain elements such as information processing can probably beminiaturised or dematerialised to an indefinite degree, but others such as food,houses, cars and hospitals would resist the trend). But the similarity between thetwo processes is so marked that one economist has called this the ‘ecologic transition’[118]. Once again we are faced with a dilemma, thatAS needs to be increased inorder to bring about an improvement ofTS in the long term, butin the short termcontributes to a temporary deterioration ofIS.

Finally we can consider the reflexive effect ofA on itself. At low absolute levelsthere is no surplus for reinvestment beyond what is needed for immediate consump-tion, but once it does start to grow there is potential for accelerating growth, hencethe metaphor of ‘take-off’ [84]. Some theorists (the so-called ‘cornucopians’, e.g.,[25]) have a ‘space rocket’ model here, seeing no limit to the accelerating growthof A, and this is an implication of normal economic policy which sharply dividesenvironmentalists and contrarians. The alternative is an ‘aeroplane’ model in whichgrowth slows after a rapid climb, and there are weak signs that this might be hap-pening in the North. The aeroplane model does make a kind of sense; even econom-ists would probably accept that there is an intrinsic madness in everybody being abillionaire, which is what happens mathematically within a few centuries if presentgrowth rates prevail [119]. Of course some economists have argued that beyond acertain point, further economic growth is simply irrational [120–122]. The notion is

378 P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

gaining ground [123,124,137]) that the North is entering the early phases of a thirdtransition (presciently labelled the ‘economic transition’ by Parsons back in 1975[119]) in which culture itself becomes dematerialised, andA grows only in tandemwith T21 (giving a neutralI) or stops altogether, or even shrinks (giving a declineof I).

10. ‘Sustainia’

To summarise this part of the discussion, an implication seems to be thatA is acritical factor which when it grows certainly causes a lot of trouble, but then allowsthings to be cleared up and finally writes itself out of the script. This can be seenas a longer-term transition which both initiates and concludes the other transitions.The whole process is summarised in Fig. 6.

Let is call this ‘the transition complex’. If successful, it leads to a condition oflong-term sustainability which could continue for thousands, even millions, of years.This would be not so much The End of History [125,126] as a new beginning, andundoubtedly the 21st century would then be looked back on as its crucible. We needa name for this state of permanent sustainability, beyond the travails of our presentsituation, and I propose to call it ‘Sustainia’.

Our problem can now be stated succinctly. We need to get (probably) 11 billionpeople through the transition complex to ‘Sustainia’, the sustainable state, beforeirreversible damage is done. We can see that the 1.5 billion of the North couldprobably make it by 2100, even by 2050 with the right policies, if they had theplanet to themselves. But they do not. The South can only get to Sustainia throughthe transition complex, but if that is not negotiated successfully there may be noSustainia worth reaching.

What are we to do? A small minority of theorists have argued that we shouldfreeze everything in place and in effect, stop industrial development in the South[20,127]. This has a certain logic but as I have argued above, it has been overtakenby events. Modernising processes have been irreversibly initiated in virtually everysociety, leaving many in the worst possible state, whereA is stalled andP and I arerising fast and will continue to do so unless things move on.

Fig. 6. The components of the transition complex.

379P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

It seems there is little real choice. We have to move quickly. As the contrarianshave urged, there has got to be vigorous economic growth in the South:

O for reasons of simple humanityO to redress the imbalance between North and SouthO to accelerate the completion of the demographic transitionO to bring forward and/or reduce the peak of environmental intensity.

Some environmentalists might find this a bitter pill, but should probably accept it.In response, they could convincingly argue thatindiscriminategrowth will not begood enough, and probably even counterproductive. The analysis supports some pol-icy strands in almost every direction:

O NFC contrarians could urge that policy be targeted at lever points: populationissues (e.g. women’s education), basic needs, health, food [50,51]

O Industrial eco-Innovators should propose a crash programme of sustainable tech-nology development, together with vigorous technological transfer to reduceTS

[113,123,128].O Decentralist technologists can point to many failures of mass technology to

deliver, in spite of high apparent ‘efficiency’, and can demonstrate the superiorityof more complex, nuanced, local systems [129–131].

O Left-wing RR theorists could argue strongly that the programme will fail utterlyif AS is not well distributed, requiring active measures to reduce inequalities[60,132].

O ‘Lifestyle’ RR theorists have a strong case for arguing that the level ofAN,although not in itself a significant factor in the world equation, has a powerfulsymbolic demonstration role which multiplies its effect enormously in theSouth [122,133].

11. Some dilemmas in prospect

More controversially, we might be forced into some difficult environmentalchoices. Here we should perhaps take a longer historical perspective. If the analysispresented here is broadly correct, from the point of view of future humanity thetransition-complex will inevitably be seen as a defining process that set the scenefor the next few millennia or longer. There are many more of ‘them’ (i.e.,Sustainians) than of us. We have — surely? (paceBeckerman [27]; see also [134]) —some responsibility to them, and arguably to the rest of creation. The standardBrundtland definition of sustainability [135] asks us not to compromise their needs,but what would they like us to have done? If we have no choice but to leave a mess,what kind of mess would our descendants prefer? They will be wealthy, technicallysophisticated and will have plenty of time. Surely they would prefer easy problems

380 P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

to difficult ones, and difficult problems to impossible ones. This suggests a kind ofenvironmental ‘triage’ in which we divide environmental problems into three classes:

Class 1: Problems having negligible implications for sustainability, or which canbe remedied easily, or which would only become problematic in the very long term.For example local air pollution, plastic waste in landfills, ugly or ill-sited structures,temperate soil erosion, shortages of industrial minerals

Class 2: Problems posing a difficult challenge but solvable with sufficient time andtechnical sophistication: For example nuclear waste or toxic waste dumps, depletedaquifers, desertified land, minor rises in sea level, weather extremes, stratosphericozone

Class 3: Impossible problems: Major climate change, lost habitat types, extinctspecies, lost tropical soils.

Naturally we would prefer to leave posterity no environmental problems at all,but if this is not possible we should perhaps be more discriminating in our policies.This cuts across conventional environmental thinking. Consider an example fromeach class. Conscientious environmentalists sometimes fret about non-biodegradablewastes in landfills. In the long term this is unsustainable because if we carry ondumping (say) yoghurt pots or disposable diapers at the present rate, in 100,000years time there will be whole geological strata composed principally of such items.But in the present context we are talking only of hundreds of years, by which timeit is not really credible that such crude practices will obtain. Inert materials in land-fills are a solvable problem for the citizens of Sustainia, and probably we shouldnot fret about them too much. Nuclear waste is more serious, but in principle thesame argument can be applied to it: the Sustainians will certainly not thank us forleaving it, but they will be far better able to cope with it than we are, and wouldprobably prefer to do it themselves properly than inherit a botched job. There is acase then, for not spending too much time now on the question of ‘final disposal’,but leaving it on the surface as securely as possible since there are far more urgentirreversible problems concerning for example climate change and biodiversity.

Finally we must return to the paradoxical question of economic growth in theSouth. We have urged that this be accelerated, yet it is by far the most dynamic ofthe three factors, and the principal contributor to the dramatic peak ofIW which ouranalysis projects in the middle 21st century. If this growth rate ofAS continuesindefinitely without a reduction ofTS it is reasonable to expect the sort of globalinstability of whichThe Limits to Growthso famously warned in the 1970’s [6].

Long-term sustainability appears to require an eventual slow-down in the rate ofAS growth, marking the completion of the final phase of the economic transition. Inthe view of many commentators this would be profoundly rational in its own terms,and not merely a regrettable environmental necessity [120]. Yet in recent times nonation has attempted to limit the growth of affluence, and voluntary limits indeveloping societies have stood out as noteworthy exceptions [136,137]. The onlysigns of genuine popular interest in limiting personal wealth are in communities thathave already been thoroughly immersed in consumer culture [124,138].

There is a serious case then, which I would like to see argued out, for a deliberate,rapid, but well-distributed pulse of consumer activity in the South as a necessary

381P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

cultural condition for its rejection in later generations. This certainly sounds odd,but it is a possible implication of the discussion hitherto: that 9 billion people mightneed to experience a consumerist cure-by-excess before we can build Sustainia, theenvironmental New Jerusalem, albeit with the clear risk that the very process mayrender it for ever unreachable. This sums up the dilemma for environmentalists. Forcontrarians it is not quite so acute.

12. Conclusion

I have tried to put the fundamental environmental debate — whether things arebasically improving or basically deteriorating — in a new context which explainsthe divergence of views, and how it is that both sides can continue to amass theoreti-cal and empirical support for their case without very much effect on each other. Theexplanation is that they are each focusing on part of a more complex pattern. I havesuggested a model which is both optimistic and pessimistic, justifying both hopeand deep anxiety, which allows each side to say with very good reason that indeed,The End is in Sight.

References

[1] Mishan EJ. The costs of economic growth. Staples Press, 1967.[2] Ehrlich P. The population bomb. Ballantine, 1968.[3] Parsons J. Population versus liberty. Pemberton, 1971.[4] Commoner B. The closing circle. Bantam, 1972.[5] Goldsmith E, Allan R, Allaby M, Davoll J, Lawrence S, editors. A blueprint for survival. Pen-

guin, 1972.[6] Meadows DH, Meadows DL, Randers J, Behrens W. The limits to growth. Universe Books, 1972.[7] Naess A. The Shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement. Inquiry 1973;16:95–100.[8] Brown LR. By bread alone. Praeger, 1974.[9] Heilbroner R. An enquiry into the human prospect. W.W. Norton, 1974.

[10] Myers N. The sinking Ark. Pergamon, 1979.[11] Kahn H. The next 200 years. London Associated Business Programmes Ltd, 1977.[12] Maddox J. The doomsday syndrome. London: Maddox Editorial Ltd, 1972.[13] Beckerman W. In defence of economic growth. Jonathan Cape, 1974.[14] Lecomber R. Economic growth versus the environment. Macmillan, 1975.[15] Simon J. The economics of population growth. Princeton University Press, 1977.[16] Mishan EJ. Economists versus the Greens: An Exposition and Critique. Political Quarterly

1993;64(2):222.[17] Ehrlich P, Daily GC, Daily SC, Myers N, Salzman J. No middle way on the environment. Atlantic

Monthly, December 1997.[18] Parsons J. Human population competition. Edwin Mellen Press, 1998.[19] Commoner B. Making peace with the planet. Pantheon, 1990.[20] Goldsmith E. The way. Green Books, 1997.[21] Naess A. Ecology, community and lifestyle: outline of an Ecosophy. CUP, 1989.[22] Meadows DL, Meadows DH, Randers J. Beyond the limits: global collapse or a sustainable future.

Earthscan, 1992.[23] Brown L, Kane H. Full house: reassessing the Earth’s population carrying capacity. Norton, 1994.

382 P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

[24] Myers N. Environmental unknowns. Science, 21st July, 1995.[25] Simon J, Kahn H, editors. The resourceful Earth. Basil Blackwell, 1984.[26] Simon. The state of humanity. Blackwell, 1994.[27] Beckerman W. Small is stupid: blowing the whistle on the greens. Duckworth, 1995.[28] McKibben W. The end of nature. Viking, 1990.[29] Trainer T. Towards a sustainable economy. Jon Carpenter, 1996.[30] Ridley M. Down to earth. Institute of Economic Affairs, 1995.[31] Pearce D et al. Blueprint 3: measuring sustainable development. Earthscan, 1993.[32] Beck U, Giddens A, Lash S. Reflexive modernization: politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern

social order. Polity Press, 1994.[33] Soper K. What is nature? culture, politics and the non-human. Blackwell, 1995.[34] van Dieren W, editor. Taking nature into account.: Springer Verlag, 1995.[35] Odum H. Environmental accounting. Wiley Odum, 1996.[36] Wackernagel M, Rees W. Our ecological footprint: reducing human impact on the Earth. New

Society Publishers, 1996.[37] Von Weizsacker E, Lovins A, Lovins L. Factor four: doubling wealth, halving resource use. Earths-

can, 1997.[38] Noorman KJ, Uiterkamp TS. Green households? domestic consumers, environment and sus-

tainability. Earthscan, 1998.[39] Rowell A. Green backlash. Routledge, 1996.[40] Beder S. Global spin: the corporate assault on environmentalism. Green Books, 1997.[41] Harper P. Will the real planet Earth please stand up? Clean Slate 1998;27:1998.[42] Budiansky S. Nature’s keepers: the new science of nature management. Weidenfeld and Nichol-

son, 1995.[43] Burton I, Kates R, White G. The environment as hazard: the coming of environmental optimism.

Viking, 1993.[44] Leach M, Mearns R. The lie of the land. Heinemann, 1997.[45] Baarschers W. Eco-facts, eco-fiction. Routledge, 1996.[46] Wildavsky A. But is it true?: a citizens’ guide to environmental health and safety issues. Harvard,

1995.[47] Economist. Environmental scares. December 20, 1997.[48] Lewis M. Green delusions: an environmentalist critique of radical environmentalism. Duke Univer-

sity Press, 1992.[49] Allaby M. Facing the future: the case for science. Bloomsbury, 1995.[50] North R. Life on a modern planet: a manifesto for progress. Manchester UP, 1995.[51] Easterbrook G. A moment on the Earth: the coming age of environmental optimism. Penguin, 1996.[52] Myers N, Simon J. Scarcity or abundance? W.W. Norton, 1994.[53] Kageson P. Growth versus the Environment — Is there a Trade-Off? University of Lund, 1997.[54] Gould S, editor. The book of life. Hutchinson, 1993.[55] Harper P. The great doom debate: a likely story. Architectural Association Quarterly 1972;4(4).[56] Young J. Post environmentalism. Belhaven, 1990.[57] Dobson A. Green political thought. Unwin, 1990.[58] Pepper D. Modern environmentalism: an introduction. Routledge, 1996.[59] Cohen M. Risk Society and Ecologicakl Modernisation: Alternative Visions for Postindustrial

Nations. OCEES Research Paper No. 7, Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics and Society, 1995.[60] Pepper D. Sustainable development and ecological modernisation: a radical homocentric perspective.

Sustainable Development 1998;6(1):1–7.[61] Paddock W, Paddock P. Famine 1975! Gollancz, 1967.[62] Carson R. Silent spring. Houghton Mifflin, 1962.[63] Farvar MT, Milton JP, editors. The careless technology. Tom Stacey, 1974.[64] Bookchin M. Our synthetic environment. Knopf, 1962.[65] Daly H. The economics of the steady state. American Economic Review 1974.[66] Maddox J. What is still to be discovered. Macmillan, 1998.[67] Holdren JP. Population and the energy problem. Population and Environment 1991;12(3).

383P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

[68] Haub C. World growth rate slows, but numbers build up. Population Today 1994;22(11):1–2.[69] UN. World population prospects, 1994.[70] Baldwin R. Does sustainability require growth? In: Goldin I, Winters LA, editors. The economics

of sustainable development. Paris: OECD 1995.[71] Harrison P. The third revolution: population, environment and a sustainable world. Penguin, 1994.[72] Ehrlich P, Ehrlich A. The population explosion. Hutchinson, 1990.[73] National Academy of Sciences. Committee on Science, Engineering and Public Policy. Policy

implications of greenhouse warming: mitigation, adaptation and the science base. National Acad-emy Press, 1992.

[74] Daly H, Cobb. For the common good. Greenprint, 1990.[75] Jackson T, Lang F, MacGillivray A, Marks N, Ralls J, Stymne S. An index of sustainable economic

welfare for the UK 1950–1990. Guildford: Centre for Environmental Strategy, University of Sur-rey, 1997.

[76] Hueting R. Correcting national income for environmental losses: towards a practical solution. In:Ahmad Y, et al, editor. Environmental accounting for sustainable development. UNEP/WorldBank 1989.

[77] Polanyi K. The great transformation. 1957.[78] Bell D. The coming of post-industrial society. Heinemann, 1974.[79] Giddens A. The consequences of modernity. Polity Press, 1990.[80] Hill R, O’Keefe P, Snape C. The future of energy use. Earthscan, 1995.[81] Low P, Yeats A. Do dirty industries migrate? In: Low P, editor. International Trade and the Environ-

ment. World Bank Discussion Papers No. 159, 1992.[82] Beck U. Risk society: towards a new modernity. Sage, 1992.[83] Lofsted R, Frewer L, editors. Risk and modern society. Earthscan, 1998.[84] Rostow WW. The stages of economic growth: a non-communist manifesto. CUP, 1960.[85] Brown L, Kane H. Full house: reassessing the Earth’s population carrying capacity. Norton, 1994.[86] Ekins P. Limits to Growth and sustainable development: grappling with ecological realities. Eco-

logical Economics 1993;8:269.[87] Pearce D, Turner R. Economics of natural resources and the environment. Harvester Wheat-

sheaf, 1990.[88] Dasgupta P, Heal GM. Economic theory and exhaustible resources. Cambridge, 1979.[89] Weterings R, Opschoor JB. Towards environmental performance indicators. Based on the notion

of environmental space. The Netherlands: RMNO, Rijswijk, 1994.[90] Carley M, Spapens P. Sharing the world: sustainable living and global equity in the 21st Century.

Earthscan, 1998.[91] Von Weizsacker E, Lovins A, Lovins L. Factor four: doubling wealth, halving resource use. Earths-

can, 1997.[92] Schmidt-Bleek F. Carnoules declaration of the factor ten club. Wuppertal Institute, 1994.[93] Manzini E. Design, environment and social quality. Design Issues 1994;10(1):37.[94] Pearce F. Trashing the planet. New Scientist, 3 October 1998.[95] World Bank. World development report. Oxford, 1992.[96] Elliott D. Energy, society and environment. Routledge, 1997.[97] Goldemberg J, Johansson T, Reddy AKN, Williams R. Energy for a sustainable world. World

Resources Institute, 1987.[98] Panayotou T. Environmental Kuznets curve: empirical tests and policy implications, 1992. Cited

in [53].[99] Grossman GM, Krueger AB. Economic growth and the environment. Princeton UP, 1993.

[100] Grossman GM. Pollution and growth: what do we know? In: Goldin I, Winters LA, editors. TheEconomics of sustainable development. Paris: OECD, 1995.

[101] Ekins P. The Kuznets curve for the environment and economic growth. London: New EconomicsFoundation, 1995.

[102] Arrow K et al. Economic growth, carrying capacity and the environment. Science 1995;268:520.[103] Stern D, Common M, Barbier E. Economic growth and environmental degradation: the environmen-

tal Kuznets curve and sustainable development. World Development Report 1996;24(7):1115.

384 P. Harper / Futures 32 (2000) 361–384

[104] Low P, Yeats A. Do dirty industries migrate? In: Low P, editor. International trade and the environ-ment. World Bank Discussion Papers No. 159, 1992.

[105] Saint-Paul G. Discussion. In: Goldin I, Winters LA, editors. The economics of sustainable develop-ment PAris: OECD, 1995.

[106] Goldsmith E, Mander J. The case against the global economy. Sierra Club, 1996.[107] The Ecologist. Whose common future? Earthscan, 1993.[108] WWF. Dangerous curves. New Economics Foundation, WWF: London 1996.[109] Lang T, Hines C. The new protectionism. Earthscan, 1993.[110] Leonard HJ. Pollution and the struggle for the world product. CUP, 1988.[111] Shiva V. Staying alive: women, ecology and survival in India. Green Books, 1989.[112] Latouche S. In the wake of the affluent society. Zed Books, 1993.[113] Wallace D. Sustainable industrialisation. Royal Institute of International Affairs/Earthscan, 1996.[114] Rogers R. Cities for a small planet. Faber, 1998.[115] McLaren D, Bullock S, Yousuf N. Tomorrow’s world: Britain’s share in a sustainable future.

Earthscan, 1998.[116] Parsons J. Population fallacies. Elek/Pemberton, 1977.[117] Becker G, Murphy K, Tamura R. Human capital, fertility and economic growth. Journal of Political

Economy 1990;98(5):S12–37.[118] Baldwin R. Does sustainability require growth? In: Goldin I, Winters LA, editors. The economics

of sustainable development. Paris: OECD, 1995.[119] Parsons J. The economic transition. Chertsey: The Conservation Trust, 1975.[120] Hirsch F. Social limits to growth. RKP, 1977.[121] Daly H, Cobb. For the common good. Greenprint, 1990.[122] Ekins P. From consumption to satisfaction. Resurgence No. 191, 1998.[123] Lovins A. Energy lessons learned and to be learned: verities that will astonish some and delight

the rest. Whole Earth, Winter 1998.[124] Schwartz W, Schwartz D. Living lightly: travels in post-consumer society. John Carpenter, 1998.[125] Fukuyama F. The end of history and the last man. Penguin, 1992.[126] Cruttwell P. History out of control. Green Books, 1995.[127] Goldsmith E, Khor M, Norberg-Hodge H, Shiva V, others. The future of progress: reflections on

environment and development. Green Books, 1995.[128] Scheer H. A solar manifesto. James and James, 1994.[129] Olson M. Metrofarm. Santa Cruz: TS Books, 1994.[130] Woodward L. Can organic farming feed the world? UK: Elm Farm Research Centre, 1996.[131] Douthwaite R. Short circuit: strengthening local economies for security in an unstable world. Green

Books, 1996.[132] O’Connor M. Is capitalism sustainable? Guilford Press, 1994.[133] Durning AS. How much is enough? the consumer society and the future of the Earth. Norton, 1992.[134] Beltratti A, Chichilnisky G, Heal G. Sustainable growth and the green golden rule. In: Goldin I,

Winters LA, editors. The economics of sustainable development. Paris: OECD.[135] Gandhi MK. The story of my experiments with truth. 1947.[136] Schumacher EF. Buddhist economics. Resurgence No. 11, 1968.[137] Krugman P. The age of diminishing expectations. MIT Press, 1990.[138] Elgin D. Voluntary simplicity: towards a way of life that is outwardly simple, inwardly rich. Wil-

liam Morrow, 1981.

Peter Harper is Head of Biology at the Centre for Alternative Technology, Wales, UK, where he has workedsince 1983.