the effects of task-specific self-schemata on attributions for success and failure

JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY 21, 375-388 (1987)

The Effects of Task-Specific Self-Schemata on Attributions for Success and Failure

JIM TAYLOR AND ANN K. BOGGIANO

University of Colorado

The purpose of the present study is to investigate whether task-specific self- schemata, i.e., cognitions that individuals hold about their ability at a particular task, determine the attributions made for success and failure. Sixty-nine subjects were categorized into three self-schema groups with a scale measuring their self- schemata about their ability in physical activities: strong-positive, aschematic, strong-negative. They engaged in a test of leg strength and were given false feedback indicating either success or failure at the task. The subjects then completed a questionnaire measuring their attributions for the task outcome. Results indicated that, as predicted, schematic subjects made attributions that were consistent with their self-schemata. In addition, sex differences emerged that coincided with previous research. The findings are discussed in terms of a self-schemata explanation for the attributional differences obtained. o 1987 Academic PKSS. I~C.

The study of self-schema and attributions as separate domains of inquiry has received increasing attention in recent years due to the growing awareness of their influences on cognition and behavior. However, little research has been directed toward the investigation of these two issues as interrelated sources of influence. The work in this area to date has focused on the effects of self-schemata on the perception of others (Crane & Markus, 1982; Fong & Markus, 1982; Markus & Smith, 1981; Miller, 1984). Markus (1977) defines self-schemata as “cognitive generalizations about the self derived from past experiences, that organize and guide the processing of self-related information contained in the individual’s social experiences” (p. 64). Yet, the findings indicating that self-schemata play a central role in the processing and evaluation of information about others imply that self-schemata may also be a significant influence on the attributions that individuals make for their own performances in meaningful activities.

Several explanations have been forwarded to delineate how and why

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376 TAYLOR AND BOGGIANO

individuals make certain attributions for their performances. Heider ( 1959) and Bradley (1978) offered motivational interpretations, suggesting that our attributions are governed by our need to maintain and enhance our self- and public esteem. Indeed, previous research examining individual differences in attributions for success and failure indicates some relationship between attributions and self-esteem (Fitch, 1970), achievement motivation (Lefebvre, 1979), and locus of control and initial self-confidence (Lefcourt, Hogg, Struthers, & Holmes, 1975). However, these effects have not always been reliable or consistent (e.g., Fitch, 1970). Recently, a cognitive explanation for the attributional differences has been proposed (Miller & Ross, 1975). Attributions, according to this cognitive view, are the result of the logical processing of available information. Thus, based on past experience, persons will make attributions that are consistent with their expectations of success (Feather & Simon, 1971a, 1971b). However, the findings relative to the relationship between expectancies and attributions have been equivocal (Riess & Taylor, 1984; Zuckerman, 1979).

One explanation for the lack of empirical consistency between expectations and attributions may relate to the sources from which expectancies derive. From a self-schemata perspective, only if an expectancy “derives from a well-articulated generalization about the self can it be expected to converge and form a consistent pattern with the individual’s other judgments, decisions, and actions” (Markus, 1977, p. 65). In other words, it may be that a relationship between expectancies and other cognitive processing such as attributions will be particularly likely under conditions in which expectancies derive from generalizations of the self based on knowledge of self across various situations and contexts. If the expectancy is not the product of a well-developed self-schema about ability level, either because of insufficient or highly variable experiences in a given domain, and, instead, a function of factors such as the social desirability of the expectancy or a particular context or the importance of the situation, then it is likely that the relationship between expectancies and attributions would not emerge (Markus, 1977). As a result, expectancies may not accurately reflect individuals’ fundamental beliefs in how well they expect to do in a meaningful activity (Dweck & Gilliard, 1975) or may depend on individual differences in types of attributions employed (Dweck & Elliot, 1983) This analysis suggests that the study of self-schemata may be a useful course to follow in examing the cognitive foundations of expectancies and the attribution process (Weiner, 1974).

Although research supports a relationship between self-schemata and attributions (e.g., Crane & Markus, 1982; Fong & Markus, 1982; Miller, 1984), these studies have focused on the attributions that individuals make about other people and do not address directly the relationship between self-attributions and performance. Because the direction and

SELF-SCHEMATA AND ATTRIBUTIONS 377

strength of the self-schemata about one’s own ability would govern what information may be encoded, how it is evaluated, and the salience associated with the information (Markus, 1977), the present study examines the relationship between self-schemata and attributions to success and failure feedback about an individual’s own performance. More specifically, it is suggested that the direction and strength of the past experiences that comprise these cognitions will be directly related to the direction and extremity of the attributions that are made. This study differs from past work (e.g., Fitch, 1970, Maracek & Mettee, 1972) examining the relationships between cognitions and persons’ reactions to success and failure in several ways. First, in contrast to global traits such as self- esteem, the cognitions measured in this study are task-specific. Second, because the cognitions are task-specific, it is expected that they will have a more significant influence on attributions than the more generalized sense of self-esteem. By examining the relationship between self-schemata and attributions, it may be possible to gain additional insight into the system by which individuals process, organize, evaluate, and attribute their successes and failures in performance-related activities.

Self-schemata composed of different proportions of positive and negative experiences may affect the direction of divergent attributions. A positive self-schema is made up of predominantly successful experiences, whereas a negative self-schema is composed of mostly negative experiences. It is expected, then, that individuals will make attributions that are consistent with their self-confidence schemata. For example, people with positive self-schemata about a specific skill will attribute success internally and failure externally to a greater extent than individuals with negative self- schemata.

In a similar manner, the strength of the self-schema may significantly influence the extremity of the attributional asymmetry that occurs. The strength of a self-schema is based on the number and importance of past experiences related to a particular activity (Markus, 1977). That is, a self-schema derived from many experiences of considerable salience will be stronger and more resistant to change than one based on few experiences of little importance. Strong self-schemata are able to provide a more reliable comparative measure of past experiences and present performance because they possess more information about the person’s capabilities.

In addition to persons who have well-defined self-schemata, Markus (1977) distinguishes another group of individuals who possess unstructured and varied self-perceptions in a particular domain. She termed this group “aschematics,” and asserted that their perceptions are qualitatively different both in terms of organization and their importance from those held by schematics. Specifically, aschematics have had either inadequate exposure in a particular domain or their experiences have been too variable for


them to develop clear, ordered self-statements about themselves relative to a certain activity. As a result, they should process, organize, and evaluate information in a different manner than schematic individuals. Markus suggests that aschematic persons process information in a more random fashion because they ,do not have self-schemata to guide the processing, but rely instead on contextually specific information upon which they drawn their conclusions. Alternatively. particularly when dealing with an affectively valenced activity, aschematics may rely on more global self-schema about themselves and may tend to behave in a manner that is socially desirable or appropriate. In other words, since they do not possess a well-developed self-schema to guide their processing in this activity, i.e., their self-perceptions are more malleable, they may use this opportunity to view of themselves in the most positive light and convince themselves that they are able and thus may be more apt to invoke more self-serving as opposed to random attributions.

In order to test these hypotheses, the subjects’ task-specific self-schemata were measured. The subjects were then identified and categorized based on the direction and strength of their self-schemata. Next, they engaged in a task in which the outcome (success versus failure) was manipulated. Finally, the subjects completed a questionnaire that measured their attributions for their performance.

METHOD

Subjects Two hundred fifty-nine University of Colorado students from four introductory psychology

classes participated in the pretest for the study. From this group, 72 subjects, equal numbers of males and females, were chosen for the actual experiment and 69 finally participated. The subjects’ involvement was in partial fulfillment of an experimental participation re- quirement for the class.

Schema Questionnaire The self-rating questionnaire, adopted from Markus (1977). was designed to measure

subjects’ self-confidence schemata for athletic activities. It involved three tasks aimed at determining the direction and strength of the self-schemata.

1. Adjective checklist. The subjects were presented with 40 adjectives associated with degree of self-confidence at an athletic task and were asked to indicate those that best described their attitude toward and ability at sports. They could check off as few or as many as they wanted. The adjectives were obtained from the Gough-Heilbrun Adjective Check list (Gough & Heilbrun, 1965) and Anderson’s (1968) list of trait adjectives.

2. Experiential recall. Six adjectives from the adjective checklist were given to the subjects on separate pages. They were asked to circle the adjectives that they believed were self-descriptive. Immediately after an adjective was circled, subjects were told to list all reasons why they felt the adjective was self-descriptive and to give specific evidence from their own past experience to support those reasons.

3. Descriptive stattnents. Subjects were shown 10 attitudinal and behavioral statements relating to their ability and experience at sports, e.g.. “I participate in sports three to five


times a week.” They then indicated the extent to which the statements were either highly, moderately, or not at all self-descriptive on a 37-point scale.

The items in the questionnaire were factor analyzed using the principal components method. In order to determine how many factors to retain, discontinuities in the eigenvalues of the unrotated factors across factors were examined. The Factor I eigenvalue (9.77) was substantially larger than the eigenvalue for Factor II (3.36) and the other factors. Therefore, only the unrotated Factor I was retained. The resulting factor analysis indicated that 28 of the 56 items were loaded on Factor I (loading > .40), which was labeled self-confidence. Factor I accounted for almost 18% of the variance. The items that had the highest loadings on Factor I were expects to do well (.675), skilled (.635), and confident (607). These 28 items were then standardized and summed to yield each subject’s self-confidence schema score. Finally, subjects were assigned to the following groups based on their schema score (Note: In order to control for preexisting sex differences that may become confounded with post-test differences, the means for the males and females in each schema group were tested to ensure that they were not significantly different): (1) strong-negative: the 9 males and 12 females with the lowest schema score. Only nine male subjects of those pretested possessed strong-negative self-schemata. (2) aschematics: the 12 male and 12 females whose scores reside most closely around zero; (3) strong-positive: the 12 males and 12 females with the highest schema scores.

Procedure

Once the subjects were categorized according to their self-confidence schemata, they were randomly assigned to either a success or failure condition on the experimental task. The task was a test of leg strength initially used by Martens and Landers (1%9). The test is believed to be associated with general physical fitness and athletic ability. Subjects were told that it was part of a study investigating the influence of certain factors on athletic performance. Subjects sat in a chair 16 inches high and held their leg in a horizontal position 2 in. above a cord placed below their ankle. They were instructed to hold their leg up as long as possible. A timer was started when the leg was raised and it was stopped when the leg contacted the cord. Their outcomes were measured as the time (in seconds) the leg was held in the extended position.

Following completion of the task, subjects were given feedback commensurate with the outcome to which they were assigned. This feedback was in the form of norms derived from the pretesting of male and female college students. Subjects in the success condition were told that their time placed them in the top 5% of all subjects pretested for their sex. Those in the failure condition were informed that their time placed them in the bottom 5% of all subjects pretested for their sex.

Next, subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire (Riess & Taylor, 1983) to measure their attributions for the performance. The subjects rated the influence that eight attributional factors had on their performance (on 7-point scales): good ability, lack of ability, good effort, lack of effort, task difficulty, task ease, good luck, and bad luck. In addition, approximately 50% of the subjects were questioned at random about any suspiciousness they may have had about the performance feedback that they received. Their responses indicated no suspicion of the false feedback. Finally, all subjects were debriefed. They were told about the true purpose of the research, the false feedback, and special emphasis was placed on the fact that their reported performance in no way reflected their athletic ability.

RESULTS

A 2 (sex) x 2 (outcome) x 5 (schema group) analysis of covariance was performed for each of the eight attributional items. Subjects’ per-


formances on the experimental task was used as a covariate in order to determine whether the subjects’ self-schemata could account for attributional differences independently of their actual performance level. It should be noted that in this analysis, in which performance was a covariate, performance was not a significant predictor of the attributional factors.

The effects of schema group were decomposed into linear and quadratic components. (Note: To test for the potential for capitalization on chance, the eight attributional items were collapsed along the dimensions of in- ternality and stability. Identical results emerged, indicating that the primary analysis did not capitalize on chance. The analysis employing the collapsed variables is available upon request.)

In addition, within-group comparisons of attributions were conducted in order to investigate the particular attributional patterns that were exhibited by the self-schema groups. A series of protected t tests were employed that maintained a familywise error rate of p < .05 (Kirk, 1982). The results indicated no significant within-group differences between the attributional items (p > .0.5).

A preliminary analysis examining the relationship between the self- confidence schemata and performance indicated that, as expected, the self-confidence schemata were significantly predictive of performance (F(1, 68) = 4.60, p < .05). Subjects with strong-positive self-confidence schemata performed significantly better (M = 196 s) than those with strong-negative self-confidence schemata (M = 176 s). In addition, as expected, significant sex differences were found (F(1, 68) = 5.64, P < .02), such that males extended their leg significantly longer (M = 205 s) than females (M = 156 s). However, this divergence did not significantly account for sex differences that emerged in the attributions for success and failure, as discussed below. In order to facilitate the presentation of the following results, they were collapsed across the locus of causality dimension and divided into three subsections: asymmetry, self-schema, and sex differences.

Internal-Positive

Asymmetry. A significant main effect of outcome for both good effort and ability indicated that attributions to these factors were greater in the success rather than the failure condition (F(1, 64) = 22.57, p < .OOl and F(1, 64) = 27.92, p < .OOl, respectively), thereby providing evidence consistent with previous research (see Table 1).

Self-schema. No significant schema group differences were found for either good ability or good effort.

Sex differences. A significant sex x outcome interaction for good effort was also found (F(1, 64) = 4.79, p < .05). Simple effects tests revealed a significant outcome difference for males (F(2, 67) = 23.82, p < .OOl).


TABLE 1 MEANS FOR INTERACTION OF SCHEMA GROUP BY OUTCOME AND MAIN EFFECT OF OUTCOME

ON ATTRIBUTIONAL FACTORS

Schema group

Strong- positive Aschematics

Strong- Outcome Negative overall

Good ability Failure Success

Good effort Failure Success

Lack of Ability Failure Success

Lack of Effort Failure Success

Task Ease Failure Success

Good Luck Failure Success

Task Difficulty Failure Success

Bad Luck Bad Luck

Failure Success

2.33 4.38 3.64 3.48 4.10 5.42 5.42 5.14”

4.50 5.75

3.36 5.33

4.346 5.6?

4.44 5.50

4.89’ 3.25 2.00 2.42

3.46 3.86” I .42 1.98”

3.56 3.88 5.00 4.28’ 2.60 2.42 1.50 2.26

3.67 3.75 3.21 3.86 4.20 4.25 4.42 4.61

2.11 1.38 2.18 1.84 2.30 2.00 2.2Sy 1.97

3.11h 4.00 4.18” 3.82 3.30 4.08 2.75 3.39

2.67’ 1.38 2.10 1.75

2.70’ 1.98

5 oo’.” 2:00

Note. l-no influence; 7considerable influence. Like superscripts indicate significant differences at p < .05 for the means adjacent to the superscripts.

such that successful males (M = 5.98) made more attributions to good effort than failing males (M = 4.0). No differences were found for females. This result is similar to previous findings that males tended to make more divergent attributions than females.

Internal-Negative

Asymmetry. The analysis revealed that failing subjects made more attributions to lack of ability and lack of effort than successful subjects (F(1, 64) = 41.20, p < ,001 and F(1,64) = 36.45, p < .OOl, respectively; see Table 1).

Self-schema. A significant linear interaction of schema group x outcome


was also found for lack of effort (F(1, 61) = 5.92, p < .Ol). Strong- positive failures made more attributions to lack of effort than strong- negative failures (See Table 1).

In addition, a marginally significant nonlinear interaction of schema group x outcome for lack of ability (F( 1, 61) = 3.33, p < .08) revealed that, in the failure condition, aschematics made fewer attributions to lack of ability than the strong-negative schematics. A Fisher’s paired comparison t test examining the differences between the two extreme schema groups indicated that strong-negative subjects in the failure condition attributed more to lack of ability than strong-positive subjects (t = 3.18, p < .Ol; see Table 1).

Sex differences. This analysis produced no significant effects for either lack of ability or lack of effort.

External-Positive

Asymmetry. A significant main effect of outcome emerged for task ease (F(1, 64) = 5.30, p < .05). Attributions to task ease were greater in the success condition than in the failure condition (see Table 1).

Self-schema. No significant relationships emerged for either task ease or good luck.

Sex differences. A significant sex x outcome interaction was found for task ease (F(1, 61) = 4.48, p < .05). Simple effects tests indicated that females who succeeded (M = 4.90) made more attributions to task ease than females who failed (M = 3.52, 272, 66) = 10.10, p < .Ol).

External-Negative

Asmmetry. The main effect of outcome yielded significance for bad luck (F(1, 64) = 4.41, p < .05), such that attributions to bad luck were greater in the failure rather than the success condition (see Table 1).

Self-schema. A significant nonlinear effect occurred on the schema group x outcome interaction for bad luck (F(1, 61) = 5.60, p < .Ol; see Table 1). A t test revealed that strong-positive subjects in the failure condition made significantly more attributions to bad luck than strong- negative subjects (t = 4.66, p < .Ol; see Table 1).

The schema group x outcome interaction yielded a marginally significant linear effect for task difficulty (F(1, 61) = 3.13, p < .08). Simple effects tests indicate that strong-positive failures made more attributions to task difficulty than strong-negative failures (F(2, 66) = 4.00, p < .05; see Table 1).

Sex dzflerences. The interaction of sex x outcome emerged as significant for task difficulty (F(1) 61) = 4.56, p < .05). Simple effects tests indicated two relationships: a significant outcome difference for females (F(2, 66) = 5.90, p < .05) and a significant sex difference for success (F(2, 66)


= 5.11, p < .05). Females who failed (M = 4.0) attributed more to task difficulty than females who succeeded (M = 2.9), and succeeding males (M = 3.93) made more attributions to task difficulty than succeeding females (M = 2.90).

In order to determine whether the divergent attributions could be interpreted as self-serving, a series of protected t tests were conducted (Kirk, 1982) within schema group. These analyses compared the positive attributional factors for success with the negative attributional factors for failure, e.g., good ability for success with lack of ability for failure. As suggested by Riess and Taylor (1983), if the attributions are indeed self-serving, then subjects should make attributions to the internal-positive attributional items for success to a significantly greater extent than they would to internal-negative items for failure. A similar but opposite pattern would be expected for the external factors.

Results of this analysis indicate that only one pair of attributions could be interpreted as self-serving. Specifically, strong-positive subjects attributed significantly more to bad luck when they failed (M = 5.00) than to good luck when they succeeded (M = 2.25; t(21) = 3.34, p < .05). It should be noted that this finding could also be considered as supportive of the cognitive perspective because externally attributing their failure to bad luck is consistent with strong-positive subjects’ self-schemata.

DISCUSSION

The results of the present study support the assertion that self-schemata influence the direction and extremity of a number of the attributions that are made, at last under the negative outcome conditions. For example, strong-negative subjects who failed made more attributions to lack of ability than strong-positive subjects who failed. In contrast, strong-positive subjects who failed attributed more to bad luck than strong-negative subjects. In addition, parallel results emerged for task difficulty and lack of effort in the failure condition. Lack of effort, though an internal factor, is considered confirmatory of the hypotheses because it is also unstable and can be changed readily. This notion is consistent with one offered by Riess and Taylor (1984), who suggested that an attribution to lack of effort for failure indicates that subjects failed because they did not try hard enough, but if they had tried, they would have succeeded. In addition, these findings are consistent with those previously discussed by Markus (1977), who asserted that “those individuals who have schemata about themselves on a particular behavioral dimension are those most likely to display a correspondence between self-description and behavior and to exhibit cross-situational consistency on that dimension” (p. 77).

Moreover, an analysis of the pattern of attributions suggests that they were not self-serving in nature. This finding does not support the view


that the “self-serving bias is alive and well” (Zuckerman, 1979) and suggests limitations on the prevalence of self-serving biases. Furthermore, it is consistent with a cognitive perspective, in general (Miller & Ross, 197% and for a self-schema interpretation of attributions, in particular (Markus, 1977).

Not only were the attributions not self-serving, but the findings also imply that individuals need not be globally depressed or possess low self-esteem for failure to be attributed to lack of ability. Rather, the present data suggest that such a pattern can result from persons manifesting task-specific negative self- perceptions. Although the explanation that the subjects in the present study had globally negative self-concepts cannot be ruled out entirely, the finding that the negative schematic subjects made internal-positive attributions for succes and that these attributions did not differ from those of the positive schematic subjects suggests othewise.

This latter finding also raises some interesting questions relative to the effect that inconsistent outcomes and subsequent attributions can have on self-schemata. Specificaly, under what conditions does disconfirming evidence produce a significant and lasting change in the self-schemata and when and how is it explained away? It may be that these influences are moderated by the strength of the self-schema and by the importance and frequency of the counter-expectancy experiences (Jussim, 1986). Specifically, it may be that the more developed self-schemata are, the more resistant they will be to change. However, experiences that are important and of sufficient frequency and that are accompanied by the appropriate internal attributions may result in meaningful change in self- schemata. These hypotheses are offered tentatively, but future inquiries may find these issues worth investigating.

Interestingly, significant relationships occurred primarily on negatively valenced attributional items in the failure condition (i.e., lack of ability and effort, task difficulty, and bad luck), and less so on the positive dimension. This intriguing finding may be explained in the following manner. Regardless of individuals’ direction of their self-schemata, it is possible that subjects initiate a task with hopes and expectations of success. Indeed, this notion is supported by considerable research in the area of positivity biases (for a review, see Sears & Whitney, 1972) As a result, success would have a confirming effect on these previously- held cog&ions and information-processing would remain at that superficial level. In contrast, failure would be inconsistent with those cognitions, i.e., the hopes and expectations, thereby instigating more information processing at a deeper level in an attempt to explain the negative outcome. Coinciding with this view, Kanouse and Hanson (1971) suggest that the


added processing occurs because failure typically contradicts expectations, thereby carries more informational value and, consequently, more salience.

As a result, at the inception of the additional cognitive activity, the failure may be compared with the individual’s self-schemata at the task. It is at this point that a relationship between self-schemata and attributions emerges. This interpretation may explain why attributions have not always been found to be related to measures of expectation of success (Riess & Taylor, 1984). Thus, a two-level explanation for the attributional divergence is suggested. First, a superficial level of processing occurs if the outcome is consistent with individuals’ hopes and expectations. Second, if the outcome does not coincide at that level, more extensive processing is invoked to explain the inconsistency (see Pittman & Pittman, 1980).

The findings for the aschematic subjects were supportive of one of the hypotheses offered earlier explaining the pattern of attributions that they would demonstrate. It was predicted that aschematics would either make attributions that appeared random, in accord with Markus (1977), or would exhibit a pattern of self-serving attributions. In fact, the results suggest that the attributions of the aschematic subjects were random and showed no discernible pattern as compared to the schematic groups (see Table 1).

It might be argued that the aschematic subjects are not, in fact, as- thematic, but rather perceive themselves as being of average ability and simply lie on a continuum between the extreme schematic subjects. In other words, they may believe strongly that they are average and have considerable information to support these self-perceptions. As such, the varied experiences of these subjects, instead of interfering with the de- velopment of a structured self-schema, produced an averaging effect that resulted in the judgment that they were average. The evidence suggests, however, that this interpretation may not be appropriate in this particular case. There is no apparent rationale as to why subjects possessing average self-schemata would make random attributions. It would be predicted that these subjects would manifest a consistent pattern of attributions that lie somewhere between the strong-positive and strong-negative self- schema subjects. This finding, however, was not found. For example, aschematics made greater attributions to lack of ability, but made fewer attributions to bad luck than either schematic group. Additionally, sup- plemental analyses indicated that aschematic subjects made significantly fewer and more varied responses to the experimental questionnaire as compared to the two schematic groups.

Although not predicted, sex differences emerged that may be interpreted in light of contextual factors and previous findings. While attributions for males were generally consistent with predictions, females appeared to make attributional statements comparable to subjects possessing negative


self-schemata, at least on the task difficulty and task ease measures. Consistent with the augmentation principle (Kelley, 1972), males made attributions to task difficulty for success that may be interpreted as confirmation of their ability and effort because it takes more of each to succeed at a difficult rather than an easy task (Riess & Taylor, 1984). In contrast, females made attributions more to task ease than task difficulty, thus disconfirming their ability and effort. Following this line of reasoning, though a broad spectrum of self-schemata measuring overall athletic ability for females was employed, some more specific self-schemata relating to females’ abilitity at athletic activities involving raw strength (such as the experimental task) may have influenced their overall athletic self- schemata. That is, they may have believed that they had less ability at tasks requiring physical strength. Consequently, these perceptions may have caused the female subjects to attribute their success partially to the ease of the task. This explanation coincides with previous research examining the influence of sex appropriateness of the task on attributions (Rosenfield & Stephan, 1978) and sex differences in attributions (Feather, 1969: Stephan, Rosenfield, & Stephan, 1976; Deaux & Farris, 1977).

In conclusion, the present study offers support for the self-schema interpretation of the attributional process. This explanation may account for many of the ambiguous findings reported in past research. The self- schema interpretation appears to provide one account for the plethora of inconsistent findings from past research as well as those of the present study. It is recommended that future research focuses on the manipulation of the self-schemata in order to determine a causal link between self- schemata and attributions, and to examine further the hypothesized two- level information-processing interpretation of the attributional process.

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the effects of task-specific self-schemata on attributions for success and failure

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