Olivia Hayward Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies

October 20, 2019

The Effects of Russian Propaganda on Georgia’s Diplomatic Relations: 2008 Russo-Georgian War

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INTRODUCTION Tensions between Russia and Georgia have existed since before the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in December 1991. These tensions finally erupted in 2008, when Russia invaded Georgia as part of a conflict involving the autonomous republic of South Ossetia, located within Georgia’s internationally recognized borders. The international community has had difficulty agreeing on who was the initial aggressor in the conflict, receiving different reports about the events of the war. After the war began, Russian propaganda surrounding the conflict was disseminated all across the globe, some being spread by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. The disinformation campaign headed by the Russian government created confusion, with some countries fully believing the Russian “facts” given to them about the war in the Caucasus. The effects of this disinformation on Georgia’s diplomatic relations with the international community has been minor regarding some countries but led to a significant loss of diplomatic ties with others as well as possible setbacks regarding its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. This paper will be testing the effects of propaganda on diplomatic relations between countries using the case of Russian propaganda against Georgia during the 2008 war. GEORGIA’S POST-SOVIET HISTORY

Georgia’s relationship with the autonomous republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has been complicated, even before its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Abkhazia was an independent kingdom until 985, when it became a part of Georgia, before later regaining independence. In 1801, Georgia was absorbed into the Russian Empire and Abkhazia was annexed into Russia in 18641. In 1921, both Georgia and Abkhazia were declared Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) of the Soviet Union.2 The next year, the Soviets created the autonomous region of South Ossetia within Georgia. In 1931, Abkhazia was incorporated into Georgia as an autonomous republic by Soviet authorities.3 In 1989, Soviet peacekeepers were deployed to Georgia due to violent clashes between South Ossetians and Georgians over South Ossetian autonomy. After South Ossetia claimed to be a Soviet Democratic Republic loyal to Moscow in 1990, some Georgians began to suspect that the unrest in South Ossetia was being encouraged by the Kremlin, in preparation for a Russian military suppression in Georgia. In response, the parliament in Tbilisi dissolved the autonomous region in March of 1990.4 In spring 1991, Georgia proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union and later that year, the USSR collapsed. The same year, Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected to be the Georgian president and in

1 "Abkhazia Profile," BBC News, May 28, 2018, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18175030. 2 "2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts," CNN, April 01, 2019, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict/index.html. 3 "Abkhazia Profile," BBC News, May 28, 2018, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18175030. 4 John Kohan, "Hastening The End of the Empire," Time, January 28, 1991, Accessed August 08, 2019, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,972214,00.html.

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January of 1991, Georgia’s National Guard entered Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, and the ensuing Georgian-Ossetian War continued throughout 1991 and 1992.5

A few months later in December of 1991, President Gamsakhurdia was the target of a military rebellion and was eventually overthrown in a violent coup d’état in 1992. The Georgian Military Council took over the government and appointed Tengiz Kitovani, one of the leaders of the rebellion, as acting-prime minister. Throughout 1992, government troops suppressed two pro-Gamsakhurdia demonstrations as well as an attempted coup, resulting in a combined 17 deaths. Eduard Shevardnadze was elected as chairman of parliament in October 1992.6 In June of 1992, South Ossetia and Georgia signed the Sochi ceasefire agreement mediated by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and established a peacekeeping organization called the Joint Control Commission for Georgian-Ossetian Conflict Resolution (JCC). The Joined Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) under the JCC in South Ossetia was made up of Russian, Ossetian, and Georgian troops. A de facto South Ossetian government was created and the conflict with South Ossetia was frozen.7 In September 1993, former President Gamsakhurdia led a rebellion against Shevardnadze’s Georgian government, which Russian troops supported towards the end of the conflict. The conflict ended when Gamsakhurdia committed suicide on December 31, 1993. The civil war ended with around 500 people killed and over 200,000 displaced. In the same period, Abkhazia declared their independence from Georgia in 1992, causing the Abkhazia-Georgian conflict in which Abkhazian secessionists rebelled against the Georgian government for independence. Despite the Abkhazian claims that their Soviet-made tanks, rockets, and other heavy weaponry were “war trophies” captured from the Georgians, there is evidence that these were supplied by the Russian army. In addition to Russia’s logistical support and provision of weaponry, there were also reports that fighters from Russia helped the Abkhaz troops torture and commit mass ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhaz territory.8 The conflict was suspended in 1994, when Georgia signed a ceasefire agreement with Abkhazia, leading to an influx of Russian peacekeepers in the region.9

Shevardnadze won the presidential election in 1995 despite an assassination attempt. He then survived a second assassination attempt in 1998, months before suppressing a military rebellion. Claims of corruption surfaced. In 1999, Abkhazia officially declared their

5 "Georgia 1991-present," Political Science, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/europerussiacentral-asia-region/georgia-1991-present/. 6 "Georgia 1991-present," Political Science, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/europerussiacentral-asia-region/georgia-1991-present/. 7 Republic of Georgia, Russian Federation, Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian - Ossetian Conflict,By Eduard A. Shevardnadze and Boris N. Yeltsin, Accessed August 8, 2019, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GE RU_920624_AgreemenOnPrinciplesOfSettlementGeorgianOssetianConflict.pdf. 8 “Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia's Role in the Conflict,” Human Rights Watch Arms Project 7, no. 7 (March 1995), https://doi.org/10.1163/2210-7975_hrd-1245-0312. 9 "2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts," CNN, April 01, 2019, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict/index.html.

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independence, although it was not recognized by any actors in the international community.10 President Shevardnadze was elected into office for a third time in 2000, although opposition parties claimed that the legislative elections were fraudulent.11 In 2001, the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict resumed and tensions with Russia increased, due to Russian claims that Georgia was harboring Chechen rebels on its territory.12

The dark nineties in Georgia lived up to their name. Corruption and crime plagued Georgia; police officers expected bribes and often paid to get their jobs. There was no heat, running water, or electricity in hospitals and schools. Instability, poverty, and economic stagnation caused many to be frustrated with Shevardnadze’s government.13 In November of 2001, security forces raided a privately-owned anti-government television station Rustavi-2, which incited mass protests throughout the country. President Shevardnadze dismissed his government in response to the protests.14 In November of 2003, the parliament of Georgia held elections and the results were heavily in the president’s party’s favor, despite his weaning popularity. Exit polls conducted by a non-governmental organization and the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy showed that the election results were tampered with and many Georgians believed that the president was responsible. The Georgian population protested in what was deemed the “Rose Revolution.”15 The twenty-one-day non-violent revolution outside of parliament led by Mikheil Saakashvili resulted in Shevardnadze’s resignation.16 Mikheil Saakashvili was elected to the position of president of Georgia in January 2004.17 His political objectives were pro-Western; among his goals for his presidency were joining NATO and the European Union (EU). This sharp turn away from Russia and towards the West angered the Russian President Vladimir Putin, and when the two met, Putin stated that he could not trust Saakashvili, and Saakashvili accused Putin of trying to destabilize Georgia because of its Western inclinations. Tensions between the two increased when Putin asked Saakashvili to retain a senior Georgian security official who was respected in Moscow; instead,

10 "Abkhazia Profile," BBC News, May 28, 2018, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18175030. 11 "Georgia 1991-present," Political Science, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/europerussiacentral-asia-region/georgia-1991-present/. 12 "2008 Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts," CNN, April 01, 2019, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict/index.html. 13 "Georgia's Rose Revolution," HuffPost, December 07, 2017, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/georgias-rose-revolution_b_8638118. 14 Michael Wines, “TV Station Raid in Georgia Leads to Protests and Cabinet's Ouster,” The New York Times, The New York Times, 2 Nov. 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/02/world/tv-station-raid-in-georgia-leads-to-protests-and-cabinet-s-ouster.html. 15 "The Rose Revolution," The Rose Revolution, Accessed August 08, 2019, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~yeage20v/classweb/revolution.html. 16 Ibid. 17 "Georgia's Rose Revolution," HuffPost, December 07, 2017, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/georgias-rose-revolution_b_8638118.

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Saakashvili had him fired.18 Putin did not hide his hatred for the Georgian president, at one point in 2008 stating he was going to “hang Saakashvili by the balls.”19

In June of 2004, Saakashvili decided to increase Georgia’s anti-smuggling operations in South Ossetia, a decision that was criticized by Russia and local South Ossetian authorities. The clashes between the two republics resulted in several deaths on both the South Ossetian and Georgian sides. In 2005, the Georgian prime minister was found dead from gas poisoning. Russia began to remove troops stationed in Soviet bases in Georgia due to an agreement with Saakashvili in which the evacuation was expected to be finished in late 2008. In January of 2006, the power grid and pipelines that service gas to Georgia from Russia both exploded, causing the country to be without gas and electricity during the winter. While Russia claimed it was due to terrorists, Saakashvili blamed Moscow for the gas and electricity obstructions. Georgia announced that it would try to move the pro-Tbilisi Abkhazian government-in-exile into the region, to which Abkhazia responded by ending peace talks with Saakashvili. Later that year, Russian army officers were accused of spying by Georgia and they were expelled from the country. Russia imposed sanctions on Georgia, as well as deporting hundreds of Georgians and terminating transportation between the two countries.20 EVENTS PRIOR TO THE 2008 RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR

Although the relationship between Georgia and South Ossetia has always been tumultuous, there is ample evidence that the 2008 war was premeditated by the Russian government. In as early as March 2007, attacks on Georgian-controlled villages from the Abkhazian side of the border were supported by Russian military helicopters. In August of 2007, an undetonated missile dropped from a Russian Air Force aircraft near South Ossetia.21 In April of 2008, NATO held a summit in Bucharest, where NATO leaders decided that Georgia would become a member after meeting all of the requirements at the Bucharest Summit, although they refused to formally give Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP), concerned that Russia would take it as a threat.2223 Later the same month, an unarmed Georgian unmanned aerial

18 Clifford J. Levy, "The Georgian and Putin: A Hate Story," The New York Times, April 18, 2009, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/weekinreview/19levy.html. 19 "Vladimir Putin Threatened to Hang Georgia Leader 'by the Balls'," The Telegraph, November 13, 2008, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/3454154/Vladimir-Putin-threatened-to-hang-Georgia-leader-by-the-balls.html. 20 "Georgia Profile - Timeline," BBC News, January 29, 2019, Accessed August 08, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17303471. 21 Svante E. Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, and Niklas Nilsson, Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World, August 2008, Policy Paper, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm-Nacka. 22 Francois Murphy, "France Won't Back Ukraine and Georgia NATO Bids," Reuters, April 01, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-france-ukraine/france-wont-back-ukraine-and-georgia-nato-bids-idUSL0115117020080401?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews. 23 Ralf Beste, Susanne Koelbl, and Dirk Kurbjuweit, "Berlin's Shifting Policy: Has Merkel Changed Her Tune on Georgia?" Spiegel Online, August 25, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019,

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vehicle (UAV) is shot down while in Abkhazian airspace. It recorded its destruction as well as a Russian aircraft flying from Abkhazia into Russia.24 Georgia accused Russia of shooting down the UAV and this claim was supported by the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). In May of 2008, Russia increased the size of its peacekeeping presence in Abkhazia by around 600 soldiers. Later in the month, Russia sent 400 troops to Abkhazia to fix the railway infrastructure, which Georgia claimed was only to assist the Russian military in a future invasion of Georgia.25 In June, Georgia found and captured anti-tank missiles from Russian peacekeeping soldiers on the Georgian side of the Georgian-Abkhaz border. According to the agreement on peacekeeping, Russia was required to disclose this weaponry to Georgia, which they did not.26 During the same month, during an interview with Pavel Felgenhauer, a Russian military analyst, he admitted that in April of 2008, Moscow had decided to wage a war with Georgia, which he predicted would happen in mid-August of the same year.27 A few days later, the Georgian Ministry of Defense reported that four Russian aircraft had entered Georgian airspace in South Ossetia, which Russia confirmed. However, there was already a Russian peacekeeping presence in South Ossetia and Georgia was not eager to challenge the much stronger Russia over what seemed like a minor issue.

Mid-July, Russia began a series of military exercises named “Kavkaz 2008” aimed at preparing Russian soldiers for possible future situations in the peacekeeping regions as well as counter-terrorism measures. Around 8,000 soldiers were involved in these exercises which all took place near the Georgian border. After the conclusion of these military exercises on August 2nd, none of the soldiers returned to their previous bases, and instead lingered by the border with Georgia.28 Tensions with South Ossetia continued to rise on August 1st, as six Georgian police officers were hit by explosive devices on a road connecting villages in the conflict zone with Georgian villages on the other side of the border. Violence broke out, with twenty-one people killed or injured on the South Ossetian side and seven people injured in the attacks against Georgian villages. On August 3rd, Abkhazian de facto President Bagapsh announced that Abkhazia would not participate in talks with Georgia until the conflict with South Ossetia dissipates. In response, Yuri Popov, the Russian chief negotiator in South Ossetia, reported that

https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/berlin-s-shifting-policy-has-merkel-changed-her-tune-on-georgia-a-574227.html. 24 Heidi Tagliavini, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, September 2009, Accessed August 1, 2019. https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_38263_08_Annexes_ENG.pdf. 25 Brian Whitmore, "Did Russia Plan Its War In Georgia?" RadioFreeEurope, August 15, 2008, Accessed August 1, 2019. https://www.rferl.org/a/Did_Russia_Plan_Its_War_In_Georgia__/1191460.html. 26 Svante E. Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, and Niklas Nilsson, Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World, August 2008, Policy Paper, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm-Nacka. 27 Brian Whitmore, "Did Russia Plan Its War In Georgia?" RadioFreeEurope, August 15, 2008, Accessed August 1, 2019. https://www.rferl.org/a/Did_Russia_Plan_Its_War_In_Georgia__/1191460.html. 28 Svante E. Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, and Niklas Nilsson, Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World, August 2008, Policy Paper, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm-Nacka.

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bilateral talks between Georgia and South Ossetia would happen on August 7th, under Russian supervision. However, neither Popov nor the South Ossetian de facto leader, Eduard Kokoity, showed up on August 7th, with Russian peacekeeping commander Murat Kulakhmetov claiming Russia had lost control of the South Ossetian army and advising Georgia to declare a ceasefire and allow Russia to defuse tensions.2930 On August 6th, violence continued between Georgian-controlled villages and Tskhinvali. THE 2008 RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR On August 7th, after South Ossetian de facto authorities announced that 18 people have been injured during the violence the night before, Russian officer Anatoly Barakevich declared that soldiers from North Ossetia were on their way to assist the South Ossetians, which meant that Russian soldiers were entering Georgia. Violence continued from the South Ossetian side, despite Georgia announcing a ceasefire in an attempt to relieve tensions between South Ossetia and Georgia.31 Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili stated that he would be willing to have peace talks and ensured Georgia would give South Ossetia the maximum autonomy within the country, but was further ignored.32 At 11 PM on August 7th, Saakashvili was informed that over 100 Russian military vehicles were making their way through the Roki tunnel to South Ossetia, a clear act of aggression under international law.3334 Midnight on August 8th, the Georgian military entered South Ossetia and damaged the road connecting the Roki tunnel and Tskhinvali.35 According to some reports, Georgian Brigadier General Mamuka Kurashvili offered Russian peacekeepers safety guarantees as long as they did not intervene in the conflict.36 The Georgians captured several villages surrounding Tskhinvali and began to attack the South Ossetian military targets, accidentally hitting governmental buildings in the city.37 According to official Russian sources, at around 1:00 AM, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was informed

29 Ants Laaneots, "The Russian-Georgian War of 2008: Causes and Implications," Estonian National Defense College Occasional Papers, April 2016, April 2016, Accessed August 1, 2019. 30 Svante E. Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, and Niklas Nilsson, Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World, August 2008, Policy Paper, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm-Nacka. 31 "Saakashvili Appeals for Peace in Televised Address," Civil.ge, August 7, 2008, Accessed August 1, 2019, https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=18931. 32 Ants Laaneots, "The Russian-Georgian War of 2008: Causes and Implications," Estonian National Defense College Occasional Papers, April 2016, April 2016, Accessed August 1, 2019. 33 International Criminal Court, Resolution RC, June 11, 2010, Accessed August 1, 2019, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf. 34 Ants Laaneots, "The Russian-Georgian War of 2008: Causes and Implications," Estonian National Defense College Occasional Papers, April 2016, April 2016, Accessed August 1, 2019. 35 Heidi Tagliavini, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, September 2009, Accessed August 1, 2019. 36 Ruslan Pukhov, and David M. Glantz, The Tanks of August, Moscow: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010. 37 Ants Laaneots, "The Russian-Georgian War of 2008: Causes and Implications," Estonian National Defense College Occasional Papers, April 2016, April 2016, Accessed August 1, 2019.

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that Georgia had begun military activity in South Ossetia. He then officially gave the order to invade South Ossetia, under the premise of a peace enforcement operation defending Russian citizens.38 Russia claimed that Georgia was attacking Russian peacekeepers and committing genocide in South Ossetia, where many of the citizens have Russian passports.39 The Georgian forces blew up the Gupta bridge, which connected the Java region south of the Roki tunnel with Tskhinvali in an attempt to delay the Russian tanks. At around 10 AM, Georgian forces were in control of the conflict area while a Russian plane invaded Georgian airspace and shot missiles at a radar station in Shavshvebi, a Georgian village. The Georgian villages of Variani, Kareli, and Gori were also attacked. Violence continued in the conflict zone, with Russian forces overtaking the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, and Georgian forces attempting to take it back despite the heavy air and ground attacks from the Russians. Around noon, the mayor of Tbilisi stated that the Georgian government was announcing a ceasefire from 3:00 PM until 6:00 PM, to allow civilians in Tskhinvali to flee the city.40 While the Georgian forces stopped firing at 3:00 PM, three Georgian military bases, all located within fifty kilometers of Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi, were attacked by Russian aircraft. At 8:30 PM, the Georgian military was forced to retreat following the intense ground attacks by the Russian army. The Russian Defense Ministry announced that over 2,000 South Ossetian civilians were killed as a result of Georgian shelling. However, the Russian Prosecutor General stated that there were only 133 deaths.41 The attacks against Georgia were not only physical, with cyberattacks causing several Georgian websites to crash.42 On August 9th, Russian aircraft attacked military bases, railway stations, pipelines, and a port in the city of Poti, with the farthest attacks reaching only twenty kilometers from Tbilisi. Russian jets continued to attack, shooting at the town of Gori, an airport outside of Kutaisi, and Georgian-controlled villages in Abkhazia. The Russian military presence increased, reaching almost 18,000 Russian troops in Georgia. The Russian navy began to sail to Poti and Abkhazia from Sevastopol. Abkhazia began to attack Georgia as well, attacking Georgian-controlled Kodori Gorge while Russian forces bombed a village that hosted the Georgian-controlled administrative center in Abkhazia.43

38 Ibid. 39 Vicken Cheterian, "The August 2008 War in Georgia: From Ethnic Conflict to Border Wars," Central Asian Survey 28, no. 2 (June 2009): 155-70, Accessed August 1, 2019, doi:10.1080/02634930903056768. 40 Ants Laaneots, "The Russian-Georgian War of 2008: Causes and Implications," Estonian National Defense College Occasional Papers, April 2016, April 2016, Accessed August 1, 2019. 41 Svante E. Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, and Niklas Nilsson, Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World, August 2008, Policy Paper, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm-Nacka. 42 John Markoff, "Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks," The New York Times, August 12, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html. 43 Svante E. Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, and Niklas Nilsson, Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World, August 2008, Policy Paper, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm-Nacka.

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On August 10th, Russia further increased its troops in Georgia by ten thousand; six-thousand troops entered through the Roki tunnel, while four thousand were deployed in Abkhazia. Russian aircraft bombed a Georgian aircraft factory while the Georgian military retreated from South Ossetia to Gori. Russian General Sergei Chaban threatened Georgia with nine-thousand troops and three-hundred-fifty tanks if they did not disarm in Zugdidi, a city near the border with Abkhazia. Russian aircraft later attacked Zugdidi, Upper Abkhazia, Gori, and a Georgian highway, while both Russian and Abkhaz ground forces attacked the Kodori Valley in Abkhazia.44 Shavshvebi, Makhata, Batumi, Gori, the Kodori Valley, an airport in Senaki, and an airfield in Dedoplistskaro were all attacked by the Russian Air Force on August 11th. Zugdidi and Senaki were invaded by Russian ground forces, attacking their way to Gori before eventually taking control over it later in the evening and blocking the highway connecting east and west Georgia. The Russian navy also prevented Georgian cargo ships from reaching Georgian Black Sea ports. Georgian authorities also began to get reports that Russian forces were advancing towards Tbilisi.45 Mass bombing of villages near Tbilisi and the storming and destroying of the Gori broadcasting station occurred on August 12th. Upper Abkhazia and villages near Zugdidi were taken by the Russians. The first reports of ethnic cleansing in Georgian villages by Russians appeared and were later corroborated by several international human rights associations, who also noted the use of cluster bombs from the Georgians.46 French President Nicolas Sarkozy arrived in Moscow to present a ceasefire plan to Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, who accepted to withdraw Russian troops, end military actions, and free access for humanitarian aid. President Saakashvili accepted the ceasefire agreement as well.47 With Gori still under Russian control, tens of thousands of citizens escaped to safety from the Russian occupiers. It was estimated by Western media that over one-hundred-thousand people were internally displaced as a result of the conflict.48 Despite the ceasefire agreenment, Russian troops continued to wage violence against Georgian villages and civilian homes, and made their way towards Tbilisi, before changing direction in favor of going east. The Borjomi National Park was bombed as well as the cities of Gori, Kareli, and villages in the Kaspi district. Russia continued to increase the number of troops in Georgia, sending in more to Gori, Kutaisi, Poti, and Khashuri. Russian military denied Turkish and Ukrainian planes access to the Georgian

44 Svante E. Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, and Niklas Nilsson, Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World, August 2008, Policy Paper, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm-Nacka. 45 Ibid. 46 Ethnic Cleansing of Georgians Resulted from Russian Invasion and Occupation since August 8, 2008, Report, Georgian Ministry of Justice, October 6, 2008, Accessed August 1, 2019, https://www.osce.org/odihr/34091?download=true. 47 Heidi Tagliavini, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, September 2009, Accessed August 1, 2019. 48 Ibid.

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airspace, although their purpose was to aid Georgia in putting out forest fires caused by Russian firebombs.49 On August 17th, President Medvedev told President Sarkozy that he would remove the Russian troops in Georgia on August 18th, however, there were no signs of Russian withdrawal until August 21st, after pressure from the United States, OSCE, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and Germany.50 Although the Russians began to withdraw their forces, Georgian officials reported that explosions on the Georgian military base near Gori were caused by Russian forces destroying infrastructure and ammunition depots.51 Russian officials stated that they would not withdraw troops from areas they deemed “within the zones of responsibility of Russian peacekeepers” outside of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with angered both Georgia and the United States. Russia finally agreed to withdraw their troops from all areas outside Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to be replaced with OSCE observers, except for one checkpoint outside Senaki.52 On August 26, 2008, President Medvedev officially recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, making Russia the first country to do so and essentially making the two regions protectorates.53 However, this decision caused Russia to lose diplomatic relations with Georgia. Russia’s complete power over the two republics allows it to use them to help defend Russian interests in the Northern Caucasus and has control over any negotiations about conflict resolution in the region.54 The significance of this is substantial; in order to obtain NATO membership, Georgia must resolve its internal conflicts, meaning its relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, conflict resolution between these two republics is currently impossible to achieve without Russia, due to Russia’s heavy influence and presence in the region.55

49 Svante E. Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, and Niklas Nilsson, Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World, August 2008, Policy Paper, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm-Nacka. 50 Ibid. 51 Svante E. Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, and Niklas Nilsson, Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World, August 2008, Policy Paper, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm-Nacka. 52 Ibid. 53 "Russia Recognizes Abkhazia, South Ossetia," RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, August 26, 2008, Accessed August 1, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/Russia_Recognizes_Abkhazia_South_Ossetia/1193932.html. 54 Andre W. M. Gerrits and Max Bader, "Russian Patronage over Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Implications for Conflict Resolution," East European Politics32, no. 3 (July 19, 2016): 297-313, doi:10.1080/21599165.2016.1166104. 55 Ibid.

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RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA SURROUNDING THE 2008 WAR Social scientists Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews deem Russia’s propaganda model the “Firehose of Falsehood”.56 They state that two of its most distinct qualities are its lack of commitment to objective reality and lack of commitment to consistency. Paul and Matthews argue that the lack of truth in Russian propaganda makes it believable due to human psychology. They reference confirmation bias and the “sleeper effect,” the principle that information often becomes disconnected from its original source in one’s memory, leading the consumer to disassociate the credibility of the information with the content. Other studies have shown that the appearance of expertise and trustworthiness causes people to more likely accept the information being given to them. Evoking an emotional response also increases the likelihood that information will be remembered. The lack of consistency is also effective in certain circumstances. Paul and Matthews argue that when sources change their information and give a seemingly strong explanation for it, people are more willing to accept it. Differing information can also be seen as a sign that a source has considered all possible explanations, which can increase credibility in the consumer’s mind.57 Lack of consistency in Russian propaganda is also employed to confuse, rather than have them believe any one specific counter-narrative, creating a passive, confused population.58 The “Firehose of Falsehood” method put forth by Paul and Matthews was employed in the Kremlin’s propaganda surrounding the 2008 Russo-Georgian war.

There is no doubt that even before the 2008 war began, Russia’s propaganda was constantly fighting against the official international narrative. In August 2007, when the undetonated missile was dropped near South Ossetia, Russia claimed that the situation had been falsified by Georgia to increase tensions against Russia, although American and European experts concluded that the missile was dropped by a Russian plane. In April 2008, when Georgia accused Russia of shooting down a UAV, Russia denied it, although a UNOMIG investigation concluded that a Russian plane had shot it down.59 On August 7th, President Saakashvili was informed that over one-hundred Russian military vehicles were passing through the Roki tunnel to South Ossetia. Georgian authorities decided to enter South Ossetia in an attempt to push the Russian forces back. Russia denies that

56 Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html. 57 Ibid. 58 Peter Pomerantsev, "How Vladimir Putin Is Revolutionizing Information Warfare," The Atlantic, February 04, 2015, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/09/russia-putin-revolutionizing-information-warfare/379880/. 59 Svante E. Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski, and Niklas Nilsson, Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World, August 2008, Policy Paper, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm-Nacka.

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they entered Georgia until the afternoon of the following day, August 8th, however, the government has not provided an exact time, creating doubt about this claim.60

Russian propaganda about the war was pedaled by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin himself, claiming that the United States was somehow involved in the crisis. He insisted that the United States orchestrated the war in order to promote a political candidate, although he never provided evidence for his claim.61 He also declared that the US was aiding Georgia with their military training, in preparation for an attack on South Ossetia. He also claimed that the war began on August 7th, but Russian forces did not enter Tskhinvali until August 10th. When questioned as to why Russia used “an inadequate use of force” against Georgia, Putin argued that nobody knew what an adequate use of force was in this situation and listed the weapons used by the Georgian military as a defense for Russia’s own heavy artillery. He then argued that Russia’s reason for attacking villages outside of South Ossetia was that those were the areas where the Georgian command points were, and that this strategy is “a given” in war science. He then went on to affirm that Russia had no intention of infringing on the sovereignty of the post-Soviet countries. He continued to accuse the Western countries of infringing on other states’ sovereignties to further their geopolitical agendas, quoting recognition of Kosovo, war in Iraq, and invasion of Afghanistan.62 Instead of focusing on answering the questions asked, Putin strategically turned the attention to the West and their failures, a technique dubbed “whataboutism” that Putin is famous for using.63 At one point in the conference, Putin began arguing that the United States has warships ten kilometers from Russia and that this is accepted within the international community.64

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin also contradicted the Russian President in their official statements about the beginning of the war. Putin told reporters that Medvedev had called him twice on August 7th and 8th, but Medvedev had stated that they had not talked prior to late August 8th, according to independent Russian news site The Moscow Times.65 Other Russian officials alleged that Georgia’s invasion of South Ossetia could be credited to their confidence in a future membership to NATO.66

60 Ibid. 61 Clifford J. Levy, "Putin Suggests U.S. Provocation in Georgia Clash," The New York Times, August 28, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/29/world/europe/29putin.html. 62 "Putin in 2008: Russia's President Explains Georgia Situation To Western Journos At The Valdai Club," August 25, 2018, Accessed August 1, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Mg9k7VgP0o. 63 Claire Fallon, "What Is 'Whataboutism,' And Why Is It Suddenly Everywhere?" HuffPost, August 16, 2017, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/what-is-whataboutism_n_59932909e4b00914164043a4. 64 "Putin in 2008: Russia's President Explains Georgia Situation To Western Journos At The Valdai Club," August 25, 2018, Accessed August 1, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Mg9k7VgP0o. 65 Nikolaus Von Twickel, "Medvedev Defends Role in Georgia War," The Moscow Times, August 09, 2012, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2012/08/09/medvedev-defends-role-in-georgia-war-a16921. 66 Marc Champion, "Merkel Slows NATO Bids by Georgia and Ukraine," The Wall Street Journal, October 03, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122297151270999027.

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The Russian Defense Ministry officials alleged that over two-thousand South Ossetians had been killed during the overnight battle at Tskhinvali on August 8th. Later, they changed that number to 133, although international organization Human Rights Watch could only find evidence of forty-four deaths.67 By stating that the number of those killed as a result of the battle in Tskhinvali was more than forty-five times higher than the actual number, Russian propaganda was able to evoke a more emotional response from those who read it, another method from the “Firehose of Falsehood”.

After Reuters published photos of a man grieving the death of his brother in Gori, another conspiracy theory regarding the war came to prominence. Russian blogs argued that the photos from Tskhinvali were fake, with their evidence being that in the two photos it seemed like the brother was in a different position and location.6869 Alexei Venediktov, a Russian journalist, claimed to record an interview with the photographer, Gleb Garanich, in which Garanich apparently admits the photos were fake. However, Venediktov later denied the interview happened.70 The propaganda reached Western news sources like Wired, who published an article titled “Possibly Staged Pics Fueled Georgian Propaganda Push.”71 In response, Reuters published several more photos of the same subject and proved that the photos were real.72

In addition to these blatant factual contradictions, Russian news sources like NTV have spun information about the war to favor Russia and place the blame completely onto Georgia by altering the details of the war. NTV alleged that Russian tanks entered Tskhinvali after the Georgian military was forced to leave the city on August 8th, however, the Georgians retreated from Tskhinvali at approximately 8:30 PM due to heavy fire from Russian ground forces. NTV also stated that Russian tanks were sent to Tskhinvali to “strengthen the peacekeepers and stop the bloodshed,” although Russian aircraft soon began firing on other Georgian villages outside of the South Ossetian conflict zone. NTV quoted Murat Kulakhmetov as saying, “The Georgian side has chosen a way for itself: to solve this conflict by purely force.” This contradicts the fact that the Georgian government had previously encouraged and tried to initiate peace talks with the South Ossetians and Russians up until August 7th, the day the war officially started, as well as announcing a ceasefire on August 8th in an attempt to end the violence. Georgian authorities only decided to move into South Ossetia after hearing reports that there were over one-hundred

67 "Russia/Georgia: Investigate Civilian Deaths," Human Rights Watch, August 12, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/08/12/russiageorgia-investigate-civilian-deaths. 68 Russia_insider, "Media War against Russia," LiveJournal, August 10, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://russia-insider.livejournal.com/25329.html. 69 Venik4, "Reuters Published Fake Propaganda Photos," LiveJournal, August 13, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://venik4.livejournal.com/14120.html. 70 Oleg Panfilov, "Fake Photos," Georgia Online, November 12, 2010, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.apsny.ge/analytics/1289592393.php. 71 David Axe, "Possibly Staged Pics Fueled Georgian Propaganda Push (Updated, Corrected and Bumped)," Wired, June 04, 2017, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.wired.com/2008/09/fake-georgia-pi/. 72 "Statement of Agency Reuters about Photo Reports from Georgia," Новости, August 18, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://ru.reuters.com/news/announcement20080818.

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Russian tanks on their way through the Roki tunnel, a clear act of aggression. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev is quoted in the NTV article as stating, “Russia was present on the territory of Georgia on absolutely legal principles, fulfilling its peacekeeping mission in accordance with the international agreements that were reached. We consider our main task to be the preservation of peace.” Yet, Russian forces continuously attacked Georgian villages and strategic targets far from South Ossetia as well as launching a second front in Abkhazia. Medvedev continued, “...Georgian troops… committed an act of aggression against Russian peacekeepers and civilians. What happened is a gross violation of international law and the mandates that were once issued to Russia by the world community as a partner in a peaceful settlement.” The Russian President further stated, “The actions of the Georgian side led to casualties...”73 blatantly ignoring the violence that the Russian side was carrying out, including the use of cluster bombs against civilians. However, only a few days into the war, there were reports of the Russians using ethnic cleansing against Georgians in villages outside of the original conflict zone, that were confirmed by unbiased international organizations. This information, combined with the obvious signs of Russian premeditation prior to the official beginning of the war, is evidence that Russia’s main purpose in Georgia was not to preserve peace, but to wage war. The article never mentions Russian violence or the casualties caused by it.

In Komsomolskaya Pravda, another Russian newspaper, Inga Safronova reported on the beginning of the 2008 war as well. She wrote, “... Georgian military actions against the peaceful population of South Ossetia…” which is contrary to the beginning of the violence that began on August 1st, when a vehicle carrying six Georgian police officers was hit with explosives while traveling between villages in Georgia and in South Ossetia. Safronova also wrote, “Recall that [on August 7th] the Georgian side, contrary to its own promises made by President Saakashvili on television, faithlessly attacked South Ossetia.” Again, the Georgian forces did not decide to move into South Ossetia until after President Saakashvili heard that Russian tanks were on their way to Georgia.

Sputnik Radio, a well-known Russian propaganda radio station and website, published an article about the events of the war. Similar to NTV, there is no mention of Russian violence or ethnic cleansing. Instead, the article opted to write “On August 10, Russian troops, South Ossetian militiamen and power structures completely drove the Georgian troops out of South Ossetia.”74 The article also fails to mention the significant bombing of Georgian villages outside of South Ossetia, the second front in Abkhazia, and the blocking of Georgian cargo ships to the Black Sea ports. An audio clip posted by Sputnik was titled “Kupalba: USA knew that Georgia was planning an attack on South Ossetia”. Major General Harry Kupalba stated that he was aware in April to May of 2008 that Georgia was planning to seize Abkhazia and that the United Nations mission knew that there was an increased Georgian military presence in Kodori Gorge in

73 "Olympic Truce Violated," NTV, August 8, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.ntv.ru/novosti/137762/. 74 Sputnik, "Хроника августовской войны 2008 года," Sputnik Абхазия, August 08, 2017, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://sputnik-abkhazia.ru/news/20170808/1021608662/xronika-avgustovskoj-vojny-2008-go-goda.html.

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Abkhazia. He said that on May 8th, Georgia was planning on sending troops to take Abkhazia.75 There was no basis to this allegation, but it served its purpose of painting Georgia as the aggressor in the conflict.

The Russian propaganda surrounding the 2008 war with Georgia has employed the “Firehose of Falsehood” approach coined by Paul and Matthews. Information regarding the exact time that Russian forces entered Tskhinvali is not consistent, one article stating that it was on August 8th and Putin himself alleging that it was on August 10th. The lack of consistency within the Russian media articles makes it that much less convincing for readers to believe the Georgian version of the beginning of the war. The articles continued to follow the formula by not incorporating objective reality, writing, “Russia was present on the territory of Georgia on absolutely legal principles…” and further obscuring the truth. The articles went so far as to omit the damage and violence perpetrated by the Russian side of the war, none mentioning the bombing of cities outside of the conflict zone and the ethnic cleansing of Georgians committed by the Russian military. Putin introduced conspiracy theories into his narrative of the war, blaming the United States for helping Georgia to prepare militarily for a possible occupation of Abkhazia and accusing United States President George W. Bush of using the war to promote a future political candidate. This conspiracy theory was furthered by a Sputnik Radio clip of Major General Kupalba confessing that he, as well as the United States, knew that Georgia was preparing for a war with Russia. STATEMENTS FROM PUBLIC OFFICIALS Statements from public officials are the best method to measure the effect of the Russian propaganda surrounding the 2008 Russo-Georgian war on Georgia’s international reputation. The effects of the propaganda were mixed; most Western countries condemned Russia and supported negotiations and diplomatic means to resolve the conflict, although some countries and individuals blamed Georgia for the war and supported Russia’s militaristic actions. Few Asian countries commented on the situation, but they all echoed the same message of agreeing to a ceasefire solving the war through political talks. The American nations who released statements on the conflict seem evenly divided, with Canada and the United States advocating for Georgia, and Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela supporting Russia. Europe Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania issued a joint statement arguing that there was no justification for the actions taken by Russia in Georgia and expressed their concern about the possible implications of this precedent for countries with Russian nationals. The presidents of these countries also demanded that Russia’s aggression against Georgia be stopped and that the

75 Sputnik, "Купалба: США знали, что Грузия планирует нападение на Южную Осетию," Sputnik Абхазия, August 08, 2017, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://sputnik-abkhazia.ru/radio/20170808/1021607182/kupalba-ssha-znali-chto-gruziya-planiruet-napadenie-na-yuzhnuyu-osetiyu.html.

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) demonstrate that Russia cannot do whatever it wants without consequences from the international community.76 Estonia even called for NATO to accept Georgia and Ukraine as members more urgently after the Russian attacks.77 Carl Bildt, the Swedish Foreign Minister, argued that Russia’s reasons for entering South Ossetia were illegitimate. He compared Russia’s justifications for invading Georgia to Nazi Europe -- stating, “Attempts to apply such a doctrine have plunged Europe into war in the past… and we have reason to remember how Hitler used this very doctrine little more than half a century ago to undermine and attack substantial parts of central Europe.”78 Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, called the Russo-Georgian war “an imperialist act unacceptable in the 21st century,” and stating that he believed Russia had started the conflict.79 Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry only stated that Georgia acted within international law.80 Ukrainian officials called upon Russia to remove its troops from Georgia and seek peace through diplomatic means.81 David Miliband, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, stated that he “deplored” the Russian attacks outside the conflict zone and pleaded Russia to accept the ceasefire that was offered by Georgia.82 Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen has refused to defend Russia’s attack and stressed the need for negotiations to solve the conflict.83 The Republika Srpska government condemned the military force by Georgia and stated that Russia’s reaction was legitimate.84 The official statement from the Slovak Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs stated that Slovakia continues to support Georgia’s territorial integrity, but

76 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Declaration of Presidents of Parliaments of the Baltic States, By Ene Ergma, Gundars Daudze, and Èeslovas Jurðënas, August 10, 2008, Accessed August 1, 2019, http://www.parliament.ge/files/294_19825_531699_3.pdf. 77 Patrick Lannin, "Let Georgia, Ukraine into NATO Now, Estonia Says," Reuters, August 14, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-ossetia-estonia/let-georgia-ukraine-into-nato-now-estonia-says-idUSLE24491620080814. 78 "Sweden Invokes Hitler in Condemning Russian Assault," The Local, August 09, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.thelocal.se/20080809/13596. 79 MTI, "Orbánnak 56 Jutott Eszébe Az Orosz Hadmûveletekrõl," Index, August 14, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://index.hu/belfold/ovgruzorsz08/. 80 "Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry: "Georgia's Actions Comply with International Law"," Today.az, August 8, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, http://today.az/news/politics/46850.html. 81 "Ukraine Calls on Russia to Pull out Its Troops from Georgia," UNIAN, August 08, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.unian.info/society/136250-ukraine-calls-on-russia-to-pull-out-its-troops-from-georgia.html. 82 "Foreign Secretary Deplores Continued Fighting in Georgia," British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, August 9, 2008, Accessed August 1, 2019, http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/press-release/2008/august/georgia-statement-080809. 83 "Fogh Støtter Georgien," DR, August 9, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/politik/fogh-stoetter-georgien. 84 "Saučešće Porodicama Stradalih U Južnoj Osetiji," Vlada Republike Srpske, August 14, 2008, Accessed August 1, 2019, http://www.vladars.net/sr-SP-Latn/Vlada/media/vijesti/Pages/Vlada_RS_uputila_saucesce_porodicama_stradalih_u_Juznoj_Osetiji.aspx.

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this view was not shared by many Slovak politicians and officials.85 The Slovak Prime Minister Róbert Fico alluded to Georgia being the country to blame for the conflict and the vice-chairperson of the Slovak National Party (SNS) Anna Belousovová went as far as to accuse Georgian troops of committing genocide.86 Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko was reported as saying that “Russia acted calmly, wisely and beautifully,” in reference to the Russo-Georgian war.87

German officials have had mixed opinions on who was to blame for the conflict. Originally, Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, stated that she thought that Saakashvili had used military means too quickly. But as the war went on, she changed her view and saw Georgia as a democratic country that was being excessively invaded by the Russians and announced her support for Georgia’s ascension to NATO.88 However, this was not the opinion of all German officials. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, when asked about who was at fault for the Caucasus war, stated, “... The conflict has had several historic precursors. But the moment that triggered the current armed hostilities was the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia.”89 When further questioned as to whether he thought Russia was at fault at all, he responded, “That is something I cannot and do not wish to judge… I assume no one in the Moscow leadership has an interest in military conflicts.”90 He also was quoted as saying, “... It would have been strange if these [American military] experts [in Georgia] had not had any information [about the Georgian attack on South Ossetia].”91 The former German Chancellor’s words seem to echo the conspiracy theory put forth by Sputnik Radio and Putin about the United States being heavily involved in the conflict. Schröder then called Georgian President Saakashvili an “obvious gambler” and stated that he saw the chances of Georgia joining NATO as less probable after the war. Der Spiegel ended the interview by quoting John McCain when he said, “Today we’re all Georgians,” to which Schröder responded, “I am not.” The Deputy Foreign Minister of Germany, Gernot Erler,

85 "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic on 10th Anniversary of the Russian - Georgian Conflict," Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, August 7, 2018, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.mzv.sk/web/en/news/detail/-/asset_publisher/oLViwP07vPxv/content/vyhlasenie-mzvaez-sr-k-10-vyrociu-gruzinsko-ruskeho-konfliktu/10182. 86 Ľuba Lesná, "Responses to Georgia and Russia Differ," The Slovak Spectator, August 18, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20030172/responses-to-georgia-and-russia-differ.html. 87 David Marples, "Belarus Responds Cautiously to Georgian Crisis," Eurasia Daily Monitor 5, no. 167 (September 2, 2008), September 2, 2008, Accessed August 1, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/belarus-responds-cautiously-to-georgian-crisis/. 88 Ralf Beste, Susanne Koelbl, and Dirk Kurbjuweit, "Berlin's Shifting Policy: Has Merkel Changed Her Tune on Georgia?" Spiegel Online, August 25, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/berlin-s-shifting-policy-has-merkel-changed-her-tune-on-georgia-a-574227.html. 89 "Interview with Gerhard Schröder: 'Serious Mistakes by the West'," Spiegel Online, August 18, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-gerhard-schroeder-serious-mistakes-by-the-west-a-572686.html. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid.

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said that Georgia had violated the 1992 ceasefire agreement over South Ossetia and therefore had broken international law, while Eckart von Klaeden, a member of the Christian Democratic Union in Germany, declared Russia was “equally guilty” for the escalation of the conflict.92

In Czechia, reactions were also divided. The Czech Foreign Ministry declared that they supported Georgia’s territorial sovereignty, however, Miloslav Vlček, the Czech Speaker of the Lower House, blamed Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Czech President Václav Klaus refused to explicitly choose a side, saying, “... I refuse to accept this widespread, simplified interpretation which paints the Georgians as the victims and the Russians as the villains.” He argued that after Kosovo’s separation, Russia was justified in their actions.93

The European Union released a final report on the 2008 war, acknowledging the provocation by Russia but also blaming Saakashvili for triggering the conflict and condemning his decision to use force to solve the conflict instead of negotiation. It declared that Russia’s initial attack was a legal response to its peacekeepers in the region being attacked. However, the report rejected Russia’s claim that they entered Georgia as “humanitarian intervention” and stated that by invoking the need to protect its citizens abroad as a reason to invade past South Ossetia violated international law. It also argued that the violence committed by South Ossetians and the decision of the Russians to continue into Georgian territory after the ceasefire agreement on August 12 was against international law. But the EU’s report also condemned Georgia’s military reaction to Russia’s invasion as against international law, as it stated that it could not find evidence of a large-scale Russian military presence in South Ossetia prior to August 7/8. It also argued that Georgia’s shelling of Tskhinvali violated international law, since it deemed it to be neither proportional nor necessary. The report was reluctant to give credit to Russia’s claim that it was a peace enforcement operation or Georgia’s claim that Russia was the aggressor. It also concluded that the propaganda claiming there was genocide committed by the Georgians was objectively inaccurate. But the EU’s report also partly blamed Europe, stating that the reaction and actions taken by the international community were not sufficient to stop the crisis. The report assigned responsibility of the conflict to both sides, writing that “they have all failed.”94 The Atlantic Council’s James Joyner published a statement following the release of the EU’s report, arguing that it had severely underplayed the importance of Georgia’s territorial sovereignty and that no matter what, Russia’s invasion of South Ossetia was illegal. He stated he was “astounded” by the European Union’s “moral equivalency and blatant disregard for the basic

92 "German Leaders Split on Placing Blame in Caucasian War," DW, August 10, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/german-leaders-split-on-placing-blame-in-caucasian-war/a-3551206. 93 Daniela Lazarová, "Czech Political Scene Split over Georgia," Radio Praha, August 15, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/czech-political-scene-split-over-georgia. 94 Heidi Tagliavini, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, September 2009, Accessed August 1, 2019.

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notions of international relations.”95 The Atlantic Council was not the only entity to be outraged with the EU’s report. The Atlantic also commented on the findings of the report, with some analysts arguing that the war began on August 6, when South Ossetians fired on Georgian peacekeepers and villages.96 Asia

The Japanese foreign affairs spokesman did not take much of a stance on the issue, but did state that he supported solving the South Ossetia issue peacefully on the basis of Georgia’s national integrity.97 China refused to take a side but urged all relevant parties to pursue a ceasefire agreement.98 The Americas United States President George Bush was quoted as stating, “Bullying and intimidation are not acceptable ways to conduct foreign policy in the 21st century.” He reinforced the United States’ support for Georgia and stated that “Russia has invaded a sovereign neighboring state and threatens a democratic government elected by its people.”99100 However, the United States Ambassador to Russia John Beyrle argued that Russia’s initial military response was legitimate.101

The Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his dismay that Russia had “escalated the hostilities through its attacks on Georgian towns and cities outside the conflict zone,” instead of acting as the peacekeeper role they were there to play and told Russia to “desist from any further encroachment on Georgia’s territorial integrity.”102

95 James Joyner, "EU: Georgia 'Triggered' Russia's Illegal Invasion," Atlantic Council, September 30, 2009, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/eu-georgia-triggered-russias-illegal-invasion. 96 John Hudson, "Who Caused the Russian-Georgian War?" The Atlantic, October 1, 2009, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2009/10/who-caused-the-russian-georgian-war/347974/. 97 Foreign Affairs Spokesman, "About the Intensification of the South Ossetia Situation," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, August 8, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/danwa/20/dga_0808.html. 98 "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang's Remarks on the Conflicts in South Ossetia," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, August 10, 2008, Accessed August 1, 2019, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t464558.htm. 99 "Bush to Russia: 'Bullying and Intimidation Are Not Acceptable'," Los Angeles Times, August 15, 2008, Accessed August 1, 2019, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/presidentbush/2008/08/georgia-russi-1.html. 100 Kevin Connolly, "US Has Only Tough Talk for Russia," BBC News, August 12, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7555806.stm. 101 Conor Sweeney, "Russia's First Georgia Move Legitimate: U.S. Envoy," Reuters, August 22, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-ossetia-russia-ambassador/russias-first-georgia-move-legitimate-u-s-envoy-idUSLM47889020080822. 102 "Minister Emerson Issues Statement on Continuing Hostilities in Georgia," Canada News Center, August 10, 2008, Accessed August 1, 2019, http://news.gc.ca/web/view/en/index.jsp?articleid=413889.

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The Cuban government strongly supported Russia in the war. The official statement given by Raul Castro Ruz declared, “It is a false claim that Georgia is defending its national sovereignty. The Russian troops were in South Ossetia legally as a force for guaranteeing the peace… they have not committed any illegality. The request for the invaders to withdraw is just, and our government supports it.”103 He also argued that a part of Cuban territory has been occupied for over one-hundred years and the government of Cuba has not even considered using force to regain it, therefore condemning Georgia for using force to take South Ossetia back. Nicaragua responded by formally recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.104 Venezuela’s reaction to the Russo-Georgian war differed from the usual statements. The government stated that it thought that Georgia’s acts of violence against the South Ossetian population were “unacceptable” and that “Venezuela reiterates its rejection of any act that violates human rights.”105 The Venezuelan government further said that Georgia’s military offensive was “without any valid reason.” The statement accused the United States government of planning and ordering the conflict, as well as “stimulating the aggressions of the Georgian government,” finally ending the paragraph with, “the international community was, once again, a witness to the recurring destabilization and incitement to violence policy that the American empire usually puts into practice.”106 The statements released by the Venezuelan government are similar to Putin’s theory about the United States orchestrating the conflict, as well as the Sputnik Radio articles. ANALYSIS Individual States While many states considered Russia to be the aggressor or at least be equally blamed in the war’s beginnings, there were a few that were heavily influenced by Russian propaganda, most notably Venezuela, Cuba, Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, as well as a few officials from Germany, Czechia, the United States, and Slovakia. Venezuela’s and Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s statements that the United States was somehow involved in the conflict eerily echo the comments made by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Republika Srpska in Bosnia, Cuba, and officials from Czechia, Slovakia and Germany blame Georgia for the conflict despite most of the international community blaming Russia for provoking the war. In some cases, the influence of the propaganda caused diplomatic relations

103 Raul Castro Ruz, "Official Statement from the Government of Cuba," CubaMinRex, August 10, 2008, Accessed August 1, 2019, http://www.cubaminrex.cu/English/Statements/2008/Official.htm. 104 "Nicaragua Recognizes Independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia," The New York Times, September 04, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/04/world/americas/04iht-georgia.4.15904253.html. 105 "Government Celebrates Steps for Peace in Conflict in Georgia," UnionRadio, August 14, 2008, Accessed August 1, 2019, http://www.unionradio.com.ve/Noticias/Noticia.aspx?noticiaid=250964. 106 Ibid.

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with Georgia to change. Russia’s 2008 disinformation campaign caused Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent nations in 2009 as well as support Russia’s actions during the war.107 Venezuela and Georgia had no diplomatic relations prior to the war and this remained the same at the end of the conflict after Venezuela became the third country to recognize the republics.108 Nicaragua also officially recognized the republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, further undercutting the significance of the Russian invasion across Georgia’s international borders. As a result of formally recognizing the republics, Nicaragua and Georgia cut diplomatic ties in November of 2008 after fourteen years of official relations.109 A few other countries also lost diplomatic relations with Georgia after recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, most notably Russia in 2008 and Syria in 2018.110111 Despite the disinformation spread by the Russian government, it seems as though most countries view Georgia as a small democratic country that was invaded by the much larger and stronger Russia. While nations like Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Belarus may not be fond of Georgia or its actions as a result of the propaganda spread by Russia, the majority of states did not see Georgia’s behavior during the war as overly aggressive or inappropriate. North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Although most countries’ perceptions of the small Caucasian country remained the same, the events of the 2008 war raised concerns about Georgia’s eventual ascent to NATO membership. Georgia has been trying to become a member of NATO since 1994, when it joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative and officially declared its desire to join NATO in 2002 under Shevardnadze. Since then, Georgia has supplied military towards NATO objectives including sending the most troops per capita per country to the coalition mission in Afghanistan, despite not being a NATO member.112 According to an International Republican Institute survey in September of 2008, 81% of Georgians responded positively to the government’s plan to join NATO. However, after the events of the 2008 war, Georgia’s possible NATO membership became less likely. Some officials argued that after Georgia’s actions in the war, it should not be

107 AFP/Reuters, "Venezuela Recognises Rebel Georgian Regions: Chavez," ABC News, September 10, 2009, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-09-11/venezuela-recognises-rebel-georgian-regions-chavez/1424872. 108 "Will the Georgian Foreign Ministry Use the Current Political Processes in Venezuela?" Metronome.ge, December 08, 2015, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://metronome.ge/story/33763. 109 "Georgia Cuts Ties with Nicaragua over S.Ossetia, Abkhazia Recognition," Civil.ge, November 29, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://civil.ge/archives/117989. 110 "Information about the Break-off of the Diplomatic Relations between Georgia and Syrian Arab Republic," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, June 5, 2018, Accessed August 1, 2019, http://www.mfa.gov.ge/News/informacia-saqartvelosa-da-siriis-arabta-respublik.aspx. 111 Andrew E. Kramer, "Georgia and Russia Sever Diplomatic Ties," The New York Times, August 29, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/29/world/europe/29iht-georgia.4.15749925.html. 112 Neil Hauer, "The West Takes NATO for Granted. One Country Still Wants In," The Atlantic, April 03, 2019, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/04/west-georgia-nato/586225/.

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invited to join, while others have urged NATO to accept Georgia more urgently due to the nature of the war.113114 Estonia’s President Toomas Ilves emphasized the importance of quickly awarding Georgia member status in NATO, arguing that Europe needed to be more involved in the region to preserve peace between the countries. He complained that Europe has created their security model around the idea that Russia would not invade another country; but since it has already happened, Europe needs to redesign its security model, and that model needs to include Georgia as a NATO member.115 However, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany’s parliamentary deputy chairman Andreas Schockenhoff vehemently opposed Georgia receiving a candidate position for NATO. He argued that granting Georgia NATO candidate status would award its “dubious behavior” during the war. He also stressed the importance of not angering Russia by giving Georgia an official MAP and finally asked whether NATO was willing to fight if Russia attacked Georgia.116 German Chancellor Angela Merkel also voiced her initial opposition to a quick path to membership for Georgia after the war with Russia.117 CONCLUSION The events of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War are disputed by both sides. Russian propaganda about the war has been propagated by Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Russian media sources, and Russian military generals. Its influence reached public figures in Germany, the United States, Czechia, Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovakia, Belarus, Venezuela, and Cuba, who have spoken out about their opinions on the war and the roles of both Russia and Georgia in starting it. Some analysts argue that the European Union-backed report unfairly put the blame on Georgia for the war and ignored the blatant violations of international law by Russia.118 Regardless of the states who believed the Russian disinformation campaign, the effects of this propaganda have permanently changed Georgia’s diplomatic

113 Patrick Lannin, "Let Georgia, Ukraine into NATO Now, Estonia Says," Reuters, August 14, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-ossetia-estonia/let-georgia-ukraine-into-nato-now-estonia-says-idUSLE24491620080814. 114 "Interview with Gerhard Schröder: 'Serious Mistakes by the West'," Spiegel Online, August 18, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-gerhard-schroeder-serious-mistakes-by-the-west-a-572686.html. 115 Patrick Lannin, "Let Georgia, Ukraine into NATO Now, Estonia Says," Reuters, August 14, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-ossetia-estonia/let-georgia-ukraine-into-nato-now-estonia-says-idUSLE24491620080814. 116 Ralf Beste, Susanne Koelbl, and Dirk Kurbjuweit, "Berlin's Shifting Policy: Has Merkel Changed Her Tune on Georgia?" Spiegel Online, August 25, 2008, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/berlin-s-shifting-policy-has-merkel-changed-her-tune-on-georgia-a-574227.html. 117 AFP, "No Fast-track NATO Membership for Georgia: Merkel," France 24, August 24, 2018, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20180824-no-fast-track-nato-membership-georgia-merkel. 118 John Hudson, "Who Caused the Russian-Georgian War?" The Atlantic, October 1, 2009, Accessed August 01, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2009/10/who-caused-the-russian-georgian-war/347974/.

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relations with Nicaragua, Russia, Syria, and even with NATO, a detrimental effect for the majority of Georgian citizens who support joining NATO. The diplomatic consequences of propaganda similar to the type used in the 2008 war create a foreboding atmosphere for post-Soviet countries who may want to “westernize” in the future. The message that Russia has sent through Georgia is clear: it is still very much in control of the fate of the countries in its near abroad and is not afraid to wield its power, both militarily and diplomatically, to ensure that control.

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Appendix A

Figure 1: Timeline of events up to A

ugust 2008

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Figure 2: Timeline of events from August 1, 2008 to August 26, 2008

Figure 3: Timeline of events on August 7, 2008

Figure 4: Timeline of events on August 8, 2008

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Appendix B

Figure 5: Map of R

usso - Georgian w

ar from A

ugust 7- 12, 2008