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Journal of Economics and Economic Education Research Volume 20, Issue 3, 2019
1 1533-3604-20-3-165
THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL INTERVENTION OF THE
GOVERNMENT ON THE COST EFFICIENCY: CASE
STUDY OF IRAN’S BANKING SYSTEM
Ali Dehghani, Shahrood University of Technology
Amir Hossein Ghaffari Nejad, University of Semnan
Jafar Abbasi, University of Semnan
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the government political intervention in the
banking system, seeking to answer the question of whether the continuation of this intervention
has been accompanied by cost-efficiency. For this purpose, the efficiency values of Iranian banks
have been obtained using the stochastic frontier analysis method in panel data and defining a
translog cost function and the trend of the efficiency has been analyzed. The data used for the
analysis included the information of 29 state-owned, private and privatized banks which were
active in Iran's economy from 2008 to 2016. After estimating the cost function and obtaining the
efficiency values, the effect of government intervention on the efficiency has been investigated
using the econometric analysis with panel data. Meanwhile, due to the critical conditions of
Iran’s economy in the 2010s and its effect on the banking system, some of the variables
representing the recession have been considered among the explanatory variables. The results of
the estimations indicate that after the currency shock in 2013, the cost efficiency of the banking
system was reduced and the government intervention had a negative effect on it. This effect was
more severe in the state-owned banks.
Keywords: Government Intervention, Cost Efficiency, Panel Data.
JEL Classification: G28, D61, C23.
INTRODUCTION
At the time of the inefficiency of the market system, government intervention in the
economy is done with the goal of balancing social costs and benefits. Meanwhile, financial
markets as the pillars of the economic life of any country are very important to the governments.
Under the condition of inefficiency in financial markets, and especially in the event of financial
crises, governments’ Intervention and support are often increased. Government intervention in
financial markets is not limited to periods of systematic crises and social turmoil such as the
Great Depression. Intervention in financial markets can be a combination of nationalization acts,
Bail-outs, voting for directors and takeover during times of crises (Pagano & Volpin, 2001). In
the face of crises such as the 2008 US crisis, capital injections are made by the government in the
financial sector. Capital injections in the banking sector, as the most important part of financing,
usually occur in state-owned or semi-state-owned banks. Capital injections significantly affect
the balance sheet and financial statements of the banks which in turn, affect the performance and
the efficiency. In order to promote privatization, measures are taken by governments to reduce
government debt, increase the efficiency of state-owned companies and promote competition in
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the monopoly sectors of the economy (Megginson & Netter, 2001). Sometimes, the privatization
plan is carried out for political purposes which have higher costs for the society. Besides,
privatization may not reduce the government intervention in the post-privatization period than
before (Perroti, 1995). Government intervention is such that politicians and bureaucrats can use
state-owned companies for their own personal and political goals; they may even encourage
private companies to receive state subsidies, thereby increasing the level of their intervention in
the economy. But private bank owners are likely to seek to reduce the costs of government
intervention in their bank. Also, in the issue of recruitment in a state-owned bank, there is the
possibility of intervention and, as a result, political corruption to the benefit of particular groups
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1994); however, mentioned corruption can also occur in privately owned
banks (Clarke et al., 2005).
1. Contrary to the prevailing belief that intervention is considered to be a factor in reducing the efficiency of the
banks, some have seen better performance among the state-owned banks, since the political intervention
under reasonable conditions (the existence of a complete market) may be better than the existence of an
oligopolistic monopoly structure in the banking sector, even If politicians seek to secure the goals of specific
groups and spread their social popularity by increasing recruitment in these banks. In terms of some
economic variables such as employment, such intervention may even be better than the market solution
(Willner, 2001).
2. This paper attempts to analyze the effect of government intervention on cost efficiency, taking into account
the state ownership and the formed crises in Iran’s banking system in the 2010s. The issue of government
intervention in Iran’s banking system is beyond the issue of ownership, since the intervention in privatized
banks still exists, as in some cases, government financing is carried out solely through the privatized banks.
Also, in recent years, the Iran economy’s exposure to stagflation condition, along with the institutional
shortcomings of the Iran financial market led to the emergence of wide disruptions in the balance sheet of the
banking system, and provided the basis for the mismatch maturities of banks' assets and liabilities. This has
led banks to resist interest rates on term deposits set by the central bank. Due to the new resource allocation
to meet previous commitments with the past depositors, resulting in the withdrawal of a significant part of the
supply resources from the lending cycle, a credit crunch was formed. Therefore, government intervention
should be examined in the context of the current crisis and its effect on the cost efficiency of the banks
should be considered.
3. This paper is organized in 6 sections. After the introduction, the literature on the research will be reviewed. In
the third section, we will examine the status of the government intervention in the banking sector of Iran. The
fourth section contains the paper methodology in which empirical models will be introduced to estimate the
cost efficiency and analyze the effects of government intervention on the efficiency with an emphasis on the
banking system crisis. In Section 5, the results of the estimations and in section 6, conclusion and suggestions
will be presented.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Historically, no industry has been subjected to intense intervention by government as much
as the financial industry (Haber & Perotti, 2008). Such an approach from the government to the
financial sector has been known as "Financial repression," and it is a controversial issue in most
countries, especially since the 1970s. Mathieson & Mckinnon (1981) define the term of financial
repression as a set of policies aiming at generating income from the financial system through
government intervention in pricing and allocating the resources of the granted funds and
determining real interest rates. Giovannini & Demelo (1990) also refer to financial repression as
a combination of imposed restrictions (price and amount) on the domestic sector and controlling
the flow of international capital to reduce the cost of domestic financing and as a source of
income for the government. So far, there have been many criticisms of the policies of financial
repression and numerous deviations that these policies create in the financial markets. However,
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many governments in developing countries insist on continuing these policies, under the pretext
of increasing investment and economic growth.
In the context of studying the effect of government intervention on banking efficiency,
there are various categories on both aspects of government intervention and the use of type of
efficiency in studies. The type of government intervention is considered as three general
categories in various studies, namely (1) ownership, (2) allocation of credits, and (3) suppressing
interest rate. Also, in terms of using the type of efficiency in the studies, regardless of how it is
estimated by parametric or nonparametric methods, two general categories can be identified: (1)
efficiency in performance and (2) efficiency in production or cost. In most of the empirical
studies, the financial ratios of the CAMELS system have been used for the performance variable
as an early warning system for assessing the health status of the banking network and each bank
in a country. For this purpose, the criteria of capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality,
profitability, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk are considered as indicators of performance
evaluation in these studies. Variables such as return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE)
are among the most important performance indicators in the field of profitability in the studies.
Efficiency in the production or cost is significant, in that the goal of an enterprise is to maximize
production or minimize costs, which both approaches will ultimately lead us to the same solution
(Henderson & Quandt, 1971).
Several studies have focused on state ownership or the role of privatization in improving
efficiency and in their modeling; they have mainly concluded the negative effect of the
intervention on efficiency. Most of these studies have introduced ownership as a dummy variable
in their model. Studies such as Xiaoqing Maggie & Heffernan (2007); Jiang, et al. (2009),
Figueira, et al. (2009); Pasiouras, et al. (2009); Jiang et al. (2013) have estimated the efficiency
of the banks positively. In the meantime, few studies such as Berger, et al. (2009); Tecles &
Tabak (2010) have found positive effects on the issue of intervention; the main reason for this
conclusion is the large size of state-owned banks and the economies of scale.
In the context of government intervention in the allocation of credits, some economists like
Mankiw (1986) considered it vital and believe that these credits are guaranteed by the state, so
that intervention can be effective in improving efficiency and performance. In this respect, he has
extracted the optimal level of effective intervention. But Gale (1989) regards this intervention as
a subsidy for the people who are unable to finance their investment and considers it probable to
lead to inefficiency. This intervention can be accompanied by an increase in asymmetric
information (more adverse selection and moral hazard). Meanwhile, the majority of empirical
studies, such as Bokpin (2013); Hryckiewicz (2014); Torres et al. (2016) have analyzed the
empirical relations in the context of government intervention in allocating credits in the form of
state ownership issue. The results of these studies indicate that banks are inefficient and
ineffective. Undesirable performance has been observed in the increasing of non-performing
loans and increased financing costs. Therefore, in the area of credit granting, the effect of
government intervention has been more severe in the state-owned banks.
The suppression of interest rate as a result of government intervention is one of the
measures imposed by legal restrictions, such as the setting of maximum interest rate (Espinosa &
Yip, 1996). The advantage of such an action is that the government can distribute its debts at a
low interest rate, or even repay them. The suppression of nominal interest rates and the formation
of a real negative interest rate will lead to a reduction in the real value of government debt
(Reinhart & Sbrancia, 2011). The results of most empirical studies (Hermes & Nhung, 2010;
Barrell et al., 2017; Yao & Eugene, 2018) have shown the negative (positive) effect of
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suppressing interest rates (financial liberalization) on banks' efficiency or performance. They
claim that financial liberalization has reduced the effects of the financial crisis on performance.
Of course, Hermes & Meesters (2015), by their own modeling, concluded that the positive effect
of financial liberalization on the efficiency of the banks is conditional on the quality of
regulations and supervision over banks.
Government Intervention in Iran’s Banking System
During several periods, one of the most important challenges facing Iran's economic
development has been the government intervention in economic enterprises, among which the
banking sector has been no exception. After the 1979 revolution, ownership type of the banks in
Iran was changed to state ownership. At that time, if there was a problem in the banking system,
the government would overcome the problem with its support and injection of oil revenues.
Then, the government planned for the privatization of business enterprises in Iran in order to
increase the efficiency of the enterprises, empowerment of the private sector, promotion of
competition, expansion of the capital market and downsizing the state. As a result, private banks
entered into Iran’s banking system since 2001, and 80% of the shares of the state-owned banks
have been gradually transferred since 2006.
But due to the recession in the 2010s, which resulted from the intensification of sanctions
and inappropriate implementation of the distribution system of cash subsidies, the government
budget deficit in recent years has been increasing and the government began to finance its budget
deficit from the resources of the central bank and other banks. The result was a sharp rise in
government debt to the banks and the central bank and so government debt became the major
part of the banks’ assets. Since the government has not paid its debt, this part of the assets will
actually flow out of production. An investigation of central bank data shows that the government
debt to the banking system has increased from 910 billion Rials in 2012 to 2197 billion in 2016,
so that the government debt to the banking system during the years 2012-2016 was about 2.4
times higher and its average annual increase rate has been 24%. In Figure 1, the upward trend of
the government debt to the banking system is visible.
FIGURE 1
GOVERNMENT DEBT TO IRAN’S BANKING SYSTEM Source: https://www.cbi.ir.
291.5394
364.6339
553.4035
638.4761
910.4
1109.6
1466
1738.6 2197.5
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
10
00
bili
on
Ria
l
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However, in order to investigate the government intervention, given the inflationary
situation which Iran has always faced with and two-digit inflation over the past decades resulting
in the increase in the value of banking system assets, it is necessary to present the upward trend
of the government debt to the banking system in proportion to the assets of the government.
Thus, in Figure 2, the trend of the ratio of received credits of the government and state-owned
companies from the banking system to the volume of assets is presented as an indicator of
government intervention in the banking system. Government intervention in the banking system
has been increasing in the course of the review period (according to the latest available
information).
FIGURE 2
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN IRAN’S BANKING SYSTEM
Source: https://m.theglobaleconomy.com/
Memo. The linear trend has been obtained by using Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Another aspect of the government intervention in Iran’s banking system is the
determination of certain interest rates by the Central Bank of Iran, which is sometimes indicative
of political preferences rather than economic realities. This action has the effect of eventually
endangering the banks and facing them with a significant amount of non-performing loans. Also,
due to the higher interest rates on bank loans than interest rates on deposits, some individuals and
firms have been motivated in recent years to receive loans from the banks, and then deposit the
same in the banks and benefit the difference. As a result, bank loan turned into rent and in the
end, many unqualified individuals and firms received bank loans which led to overdue claims.
There is another point regarding the determination of certain interest rate by the central bank. In
recent years, due to the Iran’s economy facing with stagflation condition and the consequent
institutional shortcomings of the Iranian financial markets, large disturbances have emerged in
the combination of the balance sheet of the banking system which provided a background for
mismatch maturity of the banks' assets and liabilities, and continued the conduct of the Ponzi
game. In fact, running the Ponzi game by the banks is because the mortgage loans have not been
repaid on the due date and, on the other hand, banks are obliged to pay the interest to the
depositors, which in turn, has caused them to be trapped in the Ponzi game. Therefore, the
determination of the interest rate on time deposits was accompanied by non-observance of the
determined ceiling by the central bank. The continuation of this non-conformity behavior may
provide the possibility for disregarding justice in the resource allocation and creating a
5.0%
6.7%
5.7%
7.0%
9.9%
9.9%
12.5%
13.3%
15.2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Government Intervention trend
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significant gap between potential and actual growth from the channel of increasing the idle
capacity of the economy (Ghaffari nejad et al., 2018).
Therefore, the wide-ranging intervention of the government in the banking system has had
many consequences for Iran’s banking system in different aspects, as the financial stability of the
system in the future has become a serious challenge for the authorities and researchers in
banking industry.
METHODOLOGY
Empirical Methodology
The measurement of efficiency in the banking industry has an extensive literature in which
various calculation methods have been used. Major studies in this area have applied data
envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) methods. DEA is a
nonparametric method that uses data from all samples and solves problems using mathematical
programming models. The SFA method is one of the commonly used parametric methods in
numerous studies in which the stochastic production function is independently estimated with the
statistical parametric method by panel data as well as cross-sectional data. The strengths of the
SFA method, such as the consistency with statistical disturbances like the size of the error and
other factors outside the control of the enterprise, no need for price information and the
possibility of conducting the hypothesis test, have led to the relative advantage of this method in
applied studies with econometrics (Coelli, et al., 2005; Lan & Lin, 2003). So far, many studies
have been conducted on the subject of the efficiency of the banking industry using both
nonparametric and parametric methods. Most of the studies in this area, such as Rangan, et al.
(1988); Aly et al., (1990); Kaparakis, et al. (1994); Dietsch & Vivas (2000); Battese, et al.
(2000); Fries & Taci (2005); Bonin, et al. (2005); have been conducted with the main goal of
calculating efficiency, and usually, the results of two parametric and nonparametric methods
have not been the same. Some of these studies, such as Sheldon (1994) & Beccali (2004), have
investigated the adaptive comparison of the efficiency of both above-mentioned methods
considering the same clarification for inputs, input prices and outputs. The results of the studies
about these methods are very different, in that in some studies, the calculated efficiency in both
methods is the same while in some other studies, there is significant difference between the
results. Despite the extensive use of nonparametric methods, econometricians consider them
inefficient in efficiency-based studies. The most important reason for this opinion is the nature of
definiteness of these methods, in which the results are very sensitive to the outliers and
measurement errors (Cazals et al., 2002). Also, considering that consistency is usually more
important than other attributes of estimators in econometrics (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1988), most
economic studies tend to use methods based on frontier analysis.
Hence, in this paper, the main variable under review is the cost efficiency derived from the
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method in panel data, which is proposed by Greene (200
YAO,b). In this approach, Greene considered unique intercepts for each cross-section in the
stochastic frontier model with panel data, which is unlike the previous models presented in SF
approaches by Pitt & Lee (1981); Battese & Coelli (1988). In terms of formula, Greene
introduced the following relation:
'it t ït itY X
(1)
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This model, in comparison with previous models, allows the time varying inefficiency to
be separated from the unobservable heterogeneity at any cross-section which is fixed in time, but
in Pitt and Lee's model (1981), it was assumed that the inefficiency in all homogeneous cross-
sections is fixed:
2
2
'
(0, )
(0, )
it it it
it it i
it
i u
Y X
u
u
(2)
In (2), ui is the inefficiency which is fixed over time, but in the Greene’s model,
inefficiency is time varying. Greene estimates the model (1) with two methods for estimating
fixed effects and random effects in a model with panel data using the maximum-likelihood (ML)
estimator. While the model with random effects in this approach can easily be estimated by
simulation methods, estimating the maximum-likelihood of fixed effects requires considering
two important issues in relation to models with nonlinear panel data. The first problem is purely
computational due to the large dimensions of parametric space. However, Greene showed that
the approach of maximum-likelihood dummy variable (MLDV) is computationally possible,
even in the presence of a large number of nuisance parameters α_i (N>1000). The second is
incidental parameters problem which occurs when the number of crosse-sections is relatively
larger than the length of the panels. In such situations with N→∞ and fixed periods (fixed T),
Intercepts (constant components) are estimated inconsistently because Ti observations are used
to estimate the specific parameter of each cross (Neyman & Scott, 1948; Lancaster, 2002).
As Belotti & Ilardi (2012) have shown, the variance of parameters is affected because of
this inconsistency and will lead to inefficiencies in the estimation. It seems that the MLDV
approach is only appropriate when the length of the panels is large enough (T≥10). Therefore,
model (1) is the most flexible and parsimonious choice among several specifications of time
varying models.
In order to estimate the SFA-based regression, the following trans log cost function has
been developed based on the studies of Koutsomanoli-Filippaki, et al. (2013) and Jiang, et al.
(2013). Based on the estimation results of this function, the efficiency of Iranian banks is
obtainable.
3 2
13 31 1 1
3 3 2 2
3 31 1 1 1 1 1
3 2
31 1 1
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
1 1 1ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
2 2 2
ln( ) ln( ) ln(
i k ri i k r
i k r
ji k m srij km rs
i j k m r s
i kik ir
i k r
Y w ZTC Tw TA TA w TA
YY w w ZZTA TA w w TA TA
Y w YTA w
3 2
31 1 1
2
2
) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )i kr rkr
i k r
it it
wZ ZTA TA w TA
T
(3)
In equation (3), TC is the total cost, TA stands for the total assets and Wk are the input
prices (w1: price of financial resources; w2: price of labor; w3: price of physical capital). Yi are
the outputs and Zr is the quasi-fixed input, in which equity is considered as the quasi-fixed input;
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besides, net loans and deposits are used as model outputs. T, ηit and εit indicate time trend,
inefficiency and random error, respectively and α, β, ψ, Φ, ρ, τ, ϖ, κ and σ are model parameters.
In this paper, the efficiency obtained from the estimation of equation (3) is used as the
dependent variable in examining the relationship between government intervention in the
banking system and the efficiency of the banks. The empirical model of efficiency effects
adapted from the study of Hou et al. (2018) will be considered as follows:
6 2
0 1 2
1 1
int ( int )it it it it i it j t i t it
i j
Eff P ervin GOV P ervin X A
(4)
In equation (4), the t and i indexes represent time and cross-sections (banks), respectively.
The β values are model parameters. The υi ηt and λi indexes indicate unobservable effects in
time and cross-sections, respectively. It is assumed that apart from the disturbance (ζit), the
equation has a standard normal distribution and lacks serial correlation. Effit as the dependent
variable of the model is the efficiency that will be obtained from the estimation of equation (3).
The Pintervenit variable is the government political intervention, and GOVit is the dummy
variable of the state ownership structure of a bank. Xit is the vector of control variables that
represent the bank characteristics; At is the vector of macro variables that contain time series
observations and show the environmental effects on the efficiency of the banks.
Definition of Variables and Data
The source of the data used in this study is the annual statistics published by the Iran
banking Institute in which the time period 2008-2016 is considered, according to available data.
In the meantime, the information of 29 Iranian private, state-owned and privatized banks have
been used. These banks have been selected based on the completeness of their information
during the period under review. Furthermore, data on macroeconomic variables have been
extracted from the central bank's economic indicators.
In Table 1, the explanatory variables used in estimating the regression equation (4) are
presented. The variables introduced in rows 3 to 8 are the bank-specific characteristics and in
rows 9 and 10, the macroeconomic variables are presented.
Table 1
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AFFECTING EFFICIENCY
Row Explanatory
Variable Symbol
Theoretical Expectations
Type of
Impact Description of Impact
1
Government
political
intervention
Pinterven -
According to available information, the ratio of the volume of
claims on the government to the total assets of each bank is
used as a proxy of the government political intervention.
According to the literature reviewed in the previous sections
of the paper, government intervention (getting bank credits
by the government) is expected to have a negative impact on
the cost efficiency of the banks.
2
Government
political
intervention in
state-owned
GOV
Pinterven -
The purpose of using Gov dummy variable is to determine
whether government intervention in the state-owned banks
has a higher negative impact on the efficiency compared to
the non-state-owned banks.
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Table 1
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AFFECTING EFFICIENCY
Row Explanatory
Variable Symbol
Theoretical Expectations
Type of
Impact Description of Impact
banks
3
concentration on
the loan
(Herfindahl-
Hirschman
Index)
HHI ?
This variable indicates the concentration on the loan granting
in the banking system and is obtained by calculating the sum
of the squares of each bank's share of the total banking
network loan. It is expected that by concentrating on the loan
granting, the cost efficiency of the banks will be higher due
to improved bank outputs. However, the impact will be
negative under the condition that loan repayments are
delayed and turn into non-performing loans.
4 non-productive
assets ratio NPR -
This variable is defined as proxy using the ratio of the fixed
assets to the total bank assets; possessing high volumes of
non-productive assets is an indication of not getting output
from these assets. This will challenge the cost efficiency of
the bank, since the bank has to use its other limited resources
when considering the expenses.
5 Cost to revenue
ratio COTRE -
As a measure of profitability, the increase of this ratio will be
an indication of reduction in profitability and is expected to
have a negative relationship with cost efficiency.
6 Liquidity ratio Liq ?
The ratio of the liquidity to the bank assets has been used in
several studies. The increase in the willingness to retain
assets in cash results in the decrease of loan granting, thus
reducing revenue and efficiency. However, low amounts of
this ratio endanger the stability of the financial system, so the
monetary authorities set obligations in this regard. Low ratios
will also challenge the bank expenses.
7 Bank size size ?
This variable is calculated based on the logarithm of the total
assets. It is usually expected that increasing the size of the
bank will lead to the economies of scale and have a positive
effect on the cost efficiency. However, the large size of the
bank will sometimes result in reduced efficiency by creating
complexities in the management of the bank. In different
studies, three positive, negative and ineffective effects have
been obtained.
8 Non-interest
income NII ?
This variable indicates the relative importance of the fee-
based services. The increase in the share of such revenues is
an appropriate source of revenue, given that there is no need
to divide them between depositors. However, relying too
much on these revenues will deviate the bank from its main
mission and lead to inefficiencies.
9 The inflation rate INF ?
Inflation will increase the bank expenses through the channel
of the inputs by increasing various types of rates. On the
other hand, it will increase revenues by increasing loan
interest rates. Therefore, it is possible to consider various
effects for it.
10
The
unemployment
rate
Unem -
The rise of unemployment, which is typically the result of a
recession in the economy, will lead to an increase in non-
performing loans and a decrease in loan demand by reducing
the total income of the society. These, in turn, will reduce the
cost efficiency of the banks by decreasing the bank outputs.
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Estimation Results
According to the methodology section, the Trans log cost function is estimated using the
SFA method in panel data. This model has been estimated using both fixed and random effects
according to the Greene's approach (2005a) and the Hausman test has been used to make the
final decision about choosing the better method. The results of the Hausman test presented in
Table 2 confirm the superiority of the fixed effect method.
Table 2
HAUSMAN TEST RESULTS
Test The statistics Result
There are fixed effects **159.93 Housman
*,
**, and
***, indicate the significant levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
After estimating the equation (3), the cost efficiency of the banks has been obtained. In
Figure 3, the trend of average annual cost efficiency of Iranian banks is visible. As shown in
Figure 3, during the review period, the efficiency has been on an upward trend from 2008 to
2013 and on a downward trend in the period 2013-2016. This can be attributed to the effects of
the intensification of banking sanctions on Iran and the onset of a recession in Iran’s economy
since late 2012. The spread of the recession in Iran’s economy, which has been accompanied by
a credit crunch in the banking system, has reduced the cost efficiency of the banks due to the
disturbances in their outputs.
FIGURE 3
THE TREND OF AVERAGE ANNUAL COST EFFICIENCY OF IRANIAN BANKS Source: Authors' calculations. *The efficiency has been obtained from the estimation of the translog cost function (Equation 3).
In order to estimate the model demonstrating the effect of the government political
intervention on the cost efficiency of the banks, the obtained amount of the cost efficiency is
used as the dependent variable in the estimation of the equation (4). Regarding the review period
2008-2016, which contains 9 years, there is no need to examine the stationarity of the variables,
0.69
0.82 0.80 0.77 0.78 0.85
0.80 0.76
0.58
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
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because stationarity is checked for long periods of time. In Table 3, the results of all the
estimations of the relationship between the government intervention and the government
efficiency using the fixed effects method are presented. In all the estimated models, the F
statistic is significant and indicative of the existence of relationship between the hypothetical
explanatory variables and the dependent variable (efficiency). The Significance of F-Leamer also
indicates that the cross-sections (banks) are not homogeneous. Hausman statistic is used to test
the existence of fixed or random effects in the cross-sections. The significance of Hausman
statistic confirms the use of the fixed effects method for the estimation.
Regarding the effect of control variables, the results indicate that in all the estimated
models, the concentration index has a positive effect on the cost efficiency of the banks, which
means that by increasing concentration on the market, the monopoly power is formed for the
banks and this power leads to an increase in the cost efficiency. The nonproductive assets of
Iran’s banking system, which increased during the 2010s due to the sanctions and the stagflation
condition, have reduced the cost efficiency. The negative effect of the cost-to-revenue ratio
refers to the fact that banks with higher efficiency tend to have better cost control while looking
for opportunities to increase revenue.
Table 3
MODEL ESTIMATION RESULTS
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4)
Pinterven -4.75824***
-4.77392***
-4.8418***
-4.77565***
Govpin -5.2473***
-5.27539***
-5.42397***
-6.22008***
HHI 0.167362***
0.184203***
0.184852***
0.217808***
NPR -0.961**
-1.00251**
-0.94348**
-0.98473**
COTRE -0.39415***
-0.33896 -0.34634 -0.33145
Liq 0.252787 **
0.271211**
0.279107**
0.446448***
Size -0.01643 -0.01576 -0.03351
NII -0.27875
INF -0.06566 -0.06661
Unem -0.02988**
-0.03365**
-0.03649**
-0.04019**
Constant 1.136839***
1.292528***
1.333101***
1.539978***
F_test 4.08***
3.59***
3.19***
3.75***
F (leamer) 2.3***
2.3***
2.27***
2.5***
Hausman 20***
23.35***
21.3***
36.57***
*,
**, and
***, indicate the significant levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
As shown by the results of all the estimated models presented in Table 3, the government
political intervention has a negative effect on the efficiency of the banks, and this effect increases
for the state-owned banks. These results are contrary to the results of the studies such as Berger,
Hassan & Zhou (2009); Tecles &Tabak (2010) that considered the cost efficiency higher in state-
owned banks. Therefore, all the estimation results are compatible with the results of most
studies, such as Xiaoqing Maggie & Heffernan (2007); Jiang, et al. (2009); Jiang, et al. (2013);
Hou, et al. (2018).
The positive effect of the liquidity ratio means that possessing enough liquidity by the bank
will not challenge it concerning the expenses. In all the estimated models in which the size of the
bank has been used among the explanatory variables, the effect of this variable is meaningless on
the cost efficiency. This resulted lack of significance is compatible with the results of the studies
such as Berger & Mester (1997); Pi & Timme (1993); which concluded that larger banks would
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not have any advantage in terms of efficiency. The non- interest income ratio, which is
considered as an explanatory variable only in the model (4) in Table 3, has a negative effect on
the efficiency, which means that by increasing the share of such revenues, the bank deviates
from its main area of activity, and therefore the cost efficiency is reduced.
Furthermore, in relation to the effect of macroeconomic variables, the results showed that
the inflation has not had a significant effect on the cost efficiency; indeed, the effects of the
inflation on the rate of the use of inputs and the interest rates have offset each other. Especially
in recent years in which the central bank has been determined to reduce the inflation and stabilize
it at a single digit rate, the inflation has not been an important factor in making macroeconomic
decisions. Finally, the negative effect of the unemployment rate indicates the strong influence of
the macroeconomic environment on the banks. During the critical years of the 2010s, the
widespread recession in all sectors of Iran’s economy, along with the disorders that have
emerged in the banking system have resulted in an increase in the unemployment rate (as an
indication of the state of recession in Iran) which in turn has led to the reduction of the cost
efficiency due to the lower loan demand and the inability of people to repay their loans.
Among the explanatory variables of the estimated models, the three variables of unemployment
rate, non-productive assets ratio and non-interest income ratio are all among the variables that
have influenced the recession of the 2010s and all of them have negative effects on the cost
efficiency.
Model Robustness Checks
In order to check the robustness of the estimated models, they need to be estimated once
again by a robust regression method. Robust regression is a form of regression method which is
robust and resistant against the outliers. Usually, the differences between these estimations and
the initial main estimations lie in the standard deviations of the estimated coefficients and the
significance of the coefficients after the change of the values of the standard deviations. The
results of the estimations by the robust regression method presented in Table 4 also indicate a
negative effect of the government intervention on the efficiency of the banks, and for the
majority of control variables, the estimation results are the same as those presented in Table 3.
TABLE 4
RESULTS OF MODEL ESTIMATION USING ROBUST REGRESSION
Variables Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4)
Pinterven -4.75824***
-4.77392***
-4.8418***
-4.77565***
Govpin -5.2473***
-5.27539***
-5.42397***
-6.22008***
HHI 0.167362***
0.184203***
0.184852***
0.217808***
NPR -0.961**
-1.00251**
-0.94348**
-0.98473**
COTRE -0.39415***
-0.33896 -0.34634 -0.33145
Liq 0.252787 **
0.271211**
0.279107**
0.446448***
Size -0.01643 -0.01576 -0.03351
NII -0.27875
INF -0.06566 -0.06661
Unem -0.02988**
-0.03365**
-0.03649**
-0.04019**
Constant 1.136839***
1.292528***
1.333101***
1.539978***
*,
**, and
***, indicate the significant levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
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CONCLUSION
In this paper, the cost efficiency of Iran’s banking system (29 selected banks) was
investigated. For this purpose, by applying the translog cost function and estimating it based on
the Greene's approach (2005), the efficiency values of the banks were obtained for the time
period 2008-2016. The average trend of the obtained efficiency values in Iran’s banking system
during the mentioned period has been downward, majorly occurred since 2013 following the
currency crisis as a result of the sanctions. The aforementioned crisis has led to long-term
recession condition, credit crunch and balance sheet disorders in Iran’s banking system. Along
with the mentioned crisis, and during this period, the government intervention in the banking
system has increased in spite of the privatization of most Iranian banks. As expected, this
intervention was much higher in the state-owned banks. Basically, the recession itself will lead to
the reduction of government tax revenues, budget deficits, and excessive borrowing from the
banking system which includes high intervention. Therefore, if the recession continues, this
faulty cycle will be also continuously accompanied by the downward trend of the cost efficiency
of the banking network and in the future, it will face the banking system with more severe crises
such as bankruptcy.
One of the serious challenges of Iran’s banking system, as determined by the estimation
results of two variables HHI (concentration on the loan ratio) and NII (non-interest income) and
their positive and negative effects on the cost efficiency, respectively, is the necessity of the
Iranian banks’ attention to their core activities, namely granting loans and receiving deposits. In
recent years, the increase in the number of enterprises owned by the banks, accompanied by the
banks’ increased focus on the non-interest revenues has led to a reduction in the cost efficiency
of the banks.
In general, the government political intervention in Iran’s banking system has led to the
reduction of the ability of bank managers to achieve efficiency in financial intermediation
operations, the reduction of the motivation of managers to minimize costs considering the market
volatility, the restrictions for the managers to exploit market information for adopting optimal
decisions and finally, rapid changes of managers’ positions which has reduced their
responsiveness. Considering the resulting reduction in the cost efficiency that can threaten the
financial stability of the banks, Iran's economic stability will also be challenged in the future,
because Iran's economic system is bank-centered and more than 80% of the financing comes
from this system.
The main suggestion of this paper is the government's serious determination to decrease its
intervention by reducing the volume of its ownership in the banking system and reduce the use of
bank credits. These should be at the top of the government's economic priorities in order to
prevent further reduction in economic stability. For this purpose, new legislation is required by
the central bank. As an alternative for government financing, it is the development of the debt
market and the use of the market-related securities, rather than borrowing from the banking
system that can be used to control the government's excess liquidity in addition to resolving the
government deficits. The other alternative is the expansion of the tax system in both efficiency
and justice. This can be achieved by optimizing tax rates and focusing on deterrent factors of tax
evasion. In Iran, these two alternatives are among the issues that can be seriously discussed and
revised in the field of implementation.
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