the economic origins of authoritarian values: evidence

The Economic Origins of Authoritarian Values:Evidence from Local Trade Shocks in the

United Kingdom

Cameron Ballard-Rosa Mashail MalikStephanie Rickard Kenneth Scheve

University of Texas, AustinInternational Political Economy Society 2017

Ballard-Rosa, Malik, Rickard & Scheve Economic Origins of Authoritarian Values

Motivation: Values and Political Behavior

Brexit, Trump’s election, and growing support for populistpolitical parties and leaders, have focused renewedattention on the determinants of public support forpopulists and the policies they support.

Research about these questions often focuses onidentifying the relevant economic interests and/or socialvalues that influence these behaviors and opinions.Careful accounts emphasizing the importance of valuesrecognize that the questions of where these values comefrom and whether they themselves have an economicorigin is left unanswered.Goal of this research is to provide an account ofauthoritarian values that recognizes that authoritarianismis in part shaped by economic stress and present evidencethat economic shocks cause authoritarian values.



Brexit, Trump’s election, and growing support for populistpolitical parties and leaders, have focused renewedattention on the determinants of public support forpopulists and the policies they support.Research about these questions often focuses onidentifying the relevant economic interests and/or socialvalues that influence these behaviors and opinions.

Careful accounts emphasizing the importance of valuesrecognize that the questions of where these values comefrom and whether they themselves have an economicorigin is left unanswered.Goal of this research is to provide an account ofauthoritarian values that recognizes that authoritarianismis in part shaped by economic stress and present evidencethat economic shocks cause authoritarian values.



Brexit, Trump’s election, and growing support for populistpolitical parties and leaders, have focused renewedattention on the determinants of public support forpopulists and the policies they support.Research about these questions often focuses onidentifying the relevant economic interests and/or socialvalues that influence these behaviors and opinions.Careful accounts emphasizing the importance of valuesrecognize that the questions of where these values comefrom and whether they themselves have an economicorigin is left unanswered.

Goal of this research is to provide an account ofauthoritarian values that recognizes that authoritarianismis in part shaped by economic stress and present evidencethat economic shocks cause authoritarian values.



Brexit, Trump’s election, and growing support for populistpolitical parties and leaders, have focused renewedattention on the determinants of public support forpopulists and the policies they support.Research about these questions often focuses onidentifying the relevant economic interests and/or socialvalues that influence these behaviors and opinions.Careful accounts emphasizing the importance of valuesrecognize that the questions of where these values comefrom and whether they themselves have an economicorigin is left unanswered.Goal of this research is to provide an account ofauthoritarian values that recognizes that authoritarianismis in part shaped by economic stress and present evidencethat economic shocks cause authoritarian values.


Research Question

Does economic threat cause authoritarianism?


What is Authoritarianism?

Authoritarianism is an individual preference forconventionalism and submission and belief that thesevalue outcomes should be achieved by force (Altemeyer1981).

Three key components: Conventionalism, Submission,Aggression


What is Authoritarianism?

Authoritarianism is an individual preference forconventionalism and submission and belief that thesevalue outcomes should be achieved by force (Altemeyer1981).Three key components: Conventionalism, Submission,Aggression


Motivation: Authoritarian Values and Brexit Votes

Figure: Authoritarianism and Brexit Vote.


Theoretical Framework

Early work (e.g. The Authoritarian Personality, Adorno etal. 1950) tended to view authoritarianism as a fixedpersonality trait that resulted from childhood socialization,specifically repression of hostility toward parental authority.

Most work retained view that authoritarianism is a fixedtrait, stable disposition, or persistent attitude formedthrough early socialization processes and focused on whatit explained such as hostility toward outgroups, support forpublic policies (e.g. immigration, trade, Brexit), voting forpopulist parties, etc.Some more recent work has continued to treatauthoritarianism as a fixed disposition but argued that it ismore likely to be activated and influential in behavior in thepresence of economic or social threats (e.g. Feldman2003, Stenner 2005, Hetherington and Suhay 2011).



Early work (e.g. The Authoritarian Personality, Adorno etal. 1950) tended to view authoritarianism as a fixedpersonality trait that resulted from childhood socialization,specifically repression of hostility toward parental authority.Most work retained view that authoritarianism is a fixedtrait, stable disposition, or persistent attitude formedthrough early socialization processes and focused on whatit explained such as hostility toward outgroups, support forpublic policies (e.g. immigration, trade, Brexit), voting forpopulist parties, etc.

Some more recent work has continued to treatauthoritarianism as a fixed disposition but argued that it ismore likely to be activated and influential in behavior in thepresence of economic or social threats (e.g. Feldman2003, Stenner 2005, Hetherington and Suhay 2011).



Early work (e.g. The Authoritarian Personality, Adorno etal. 1950) tended to view authoritarianism as a fixedpersonality trait that resulted from childhood socialization,specifically repression of hostility toward parental authority.Most work retained view that authoritarianism is a fixedtrait, stable disposition, or persistent attitude formedthrough early socialization processes and focused on whatit explained such as hostility toward outgroups, support forpublic policies (e.g. immigration, trade, Brexit), voting forpopulist parties, etc.Some more recent work has continued to treatauthoritarianism as a fixed disposition but argued that it ismore likely to be activated and influential in behavior in thepresence of economic or social threats (e.g. Feldman2003, Stenner 2005, Hetherington and Suhay 2011).



We argue that contemporaneous economic and socialthreats increase the adoption of authoritarianvalues—authoritarianism is not a fixed disposition (Fromm1941, Rokeach 1960).

Three potential mechanisms for this effect mirroring thethree components of authoritarianism.

Conventionalism: negative shock→ return to tradition whentimes were betterSubmission: negative shock→ look to leader to fix problemAggression: negative shock→ expectations blockedgenerates aggression—frustration-aggression mechanism(Dollard et al. 1939)

Some empirical prior work but little in the way of crediblecausal evidence that real world economic threats causeincreased authoritarianism.



We argue that contemporaneous economic and socialthreats increase the adoption of authoritarianvalues—authoritarianism is not a fixed disposition (Fromm1941, Rokeach 1960).Three potential mechanisms for this effect mirroring thethree components of authoritarianism.






Conventionalism: negative shock→ return to tradition whentimes were better

Submission: negative shock→ look to leader to fix problemAggression: negative shock→ expectations blockedgenerates aggression—frustration-aggression mechanism(Dollard et al. 1939)





Conventionalism: negative shock→ return to tradition whentimes were betterSubmission: negative shock→ look to leader to fix problem

Aggression: negative shock→ expectations blockedgenerates aggression—frustration-aggression mechanism(Dollard et al. 1939)



How Do We Measure Authoritarianism?

Altemeyer (1981) developed influential account of“right-wing authoritarianism” emphasizing threecomponents of Conventionalism, Submission, andAggression

However, Altemeyer’s RWA scale was still constructed asunidimensional and critiqued for including measures ofpolicy preferences that authoritarianism was thought toexplain.Recent psychometric work on measures ofauthoritarianism suggest that approaches that captureeach of three subdimensions separately have superiorinternal consistency and discriminant validity (Duckitt et al.2010, Duckitt & Bizumic 2013, Dunwoody & Funke 2016)



Altemeyer (1981) developed influential account of“right-wing authoritarianism” emphasizing threecomponents of Conventionalism, Submission, andAggressionHowever, Altemeyer’s RWA scale was still constructed asunidimensional and critiqued for including measures ofpolicy preferences that authoritarianism was thought toexplain.

Recent psychometric work on measures ofauthoritarianism suggest that approaches that captureeach of three subdimensions separately have superiorinternal consistency and discriminant validity (Duckitt et al.2010, Duckitt & Bizumic 2013, Dunwoody & Funke 2016)



Altemeyer (1981) developed influential account of“right-wing authoritarianism” emphasizing threecomponents of Conventionalism, Submission, andAggressionHowever, Altemeyer’s RWA scale was still constructed asunidimensional and critiqued for including measures ofpolicy preferences that authoritarianism was thought toexplain.Recent psychometric work on measures ofauthoritarianism suggest that approaches that captureeach of three subdimensions separately have superiorinternal consistency and discriminant validity (Duckitt et al.2010, Duckitt & Bizumic 2013, Dunwoody & Funke 2016)



Five-point scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”averaged across six questions per dimension (Dunwoody &Funke 2016).

Authoritarian aggression: “Strong force is necessaryagainst threatening groups.”Authoritarian submission: “Our leaders know what is bestfor us.”Conventionalism: “Traditions are the foundation of ahealthy society and should be respected.”

For baseline results, we report average across threedimensions as ASC.




Authoritarian aggression: “Strong force is necessaryagainst threatening groups.”

Authoritarian submission: “Our leaders know what is bestfor us.”Conventionalism: “Traditions are the foundation of ahealthy society and should be respected.”





Authoritarian aggression: “Strong force is necessaryagainst threatening groups.”Authoritarian submission: “Our leaders know what is bestfor us.”

Conventionalism: “Traditions are the foundation of ahealthy society and should be respected.”





Authoritarian aggression: “Strong force is necessaryagainst threatening groups.”Authoritarian submission: “Our leaders know what is bestfor us.”Conventionalism: “Traditions are the foundation of ahealthy society and should be respected.”



Research Design

YouGov survey, July 2017, N=1,913

Representative of UK adult population (only study GreatBritain)Asked 18 question battery measuring AuthoritarianAggression, Submission, and Conventionalism (ASC)Asked individuals to identify their Outward Postcode.There are 2,983 live postcode districts identified by theoutward postcode. This geographical location is then usedto match each individual to the economic characteristics oftheir residence.Recorded a wide array of demographic and politicalcharacteristics of each respondent.


Research Design

YouGov survey, July 2017, N=1,913Representative of UK adult population (only study GreatBritain)

Asked 18 question battery measuring AuthoritarianAggression, Submission, and Conventionalism (ASC)Asked individuals to identify their Outward Postcode.There are 2,983 live postcode districts identified by theoutward postcode. This geographical location is then usedto match each individual to the economic characteristics oftheir residence.Recorded a wide array of demographic and politicalcharacteristics of each respondent.


Research Design

YouGov survey, July 2017, N=1,913Representative of UK adult population (only study GreatBritain)Asked 18 question battery measuring AuthoritarianAggression, Submission, and Conventionalism (ASC)

Asked individuals to identify their Outward Postcode.There are 2,983 live postcode districts identified by theoutward postcode. This geographical location is then usedto match each individual to the economic characteristics oftheir residence.Recorded a wide array of demographic and politicalcharacteristics of each respondent.


Research Design

YouGov survey, July 2017, N=1,913Representative of UK adult population (only study GreatBritain)Asked 18 question battery measuring AuthoritarianAggression, Submission, and Conventionalism (ASC)Asked individuals to identify their Outward Postcode.There are 2,983 live postcode districts identified by theoutward postcode. This geographical location is then usedto match each individual to the economic characteristics oftheir residence.

Recorded a wide array of demographic and politicalcharacteristics of each respondent.


Research Design

YouGov survey, July 2017, N=1,913Representative of UK adult population (only study GreatBritain)Asked 18 question battery measuring AuthoritarianAggression, Submission, and Conventionalism (ASC)Asked individuals to identify their Outward Postcode.There are 2,983 live postcode districts identified by theoutward postcode. This geographical location is then usedto match each individual to the economic characteristics oftheir residence.Recorded a wide array of demographic and politicalcharacteristics of each respondent.


Research Design

Trade shocks used as an empirical strategy to test for theeffect of economic shocks generally on authoritarianvalues.

Adopt Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) empirical strategyfor Great Britain.Great Britain local labor markets defined by Travel toWork Areas based on actual commuting patterns. Wematch each respondent to 1991 TTWAs (297).We then construct a measure of local labor market (TTWA)exposure to Chinese import competition.


Research Design

Trade shocks used as an empirical strategy to test for theeffect of economic shocks generally on authoritarianvalues.Adopt Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) empirical strategyfor Great Britain.

Great Britain local labor markets defined by Travel toWork Areas based on actual commuting patterns. Wematch each respondent to 1991 TTWAs (297).We then construct a measure of local labor market (TTWA)exposure to Chinese import competition.


Research Design

Trade shocks used as an empirical strategy to test for theeffect of economic shocks generally on authoritarianvalues.Adopt Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) empirical strategyfor Great Britain.Great Britain local labor markets defined by Travel toWork Areas based on actual commuting patterns. Wematch each respondent to 1991 TTWAs (297).

We then construct a measure of local labor market (TTWA)exposure to Chinese import competition.


Research Design

Trade shocks used as an empirical strategy to test for theeffect of economic shocks generally on authoritarianvalues.Adopt Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) empirical strategyfor Great Britain.Great Britain local labor markets defined by Travel toWork Areas based on actual commuting patterns. Wematch each respondent to 1991 TTWAs (297).We then construct a measure of local labor market (TTWA)exposure to Chinese import competition.


Research Design

Trade shock measure defined:

∆IPWuit =∑

j

Lijt

Lujt

∆Mucjt

Lit

u refers to United Kingdom, c refers to China, i indexesTTWA regions, t indexes year, j indexes 4-digit UK 1992SIC industries

∆IPWuit is equal to change in Chinese import exposureper worker, weighted by each region’s share of nationalemployment by sectorTake baseline time period to match Autor et al. (2013) tocalculate change in import exposure from 1991-2007


Research Design


∆IPWuit =∑

j

Lijt

Lujt

∆Mucjt

Lit

u refers to United Kingdom, c refers to China, i indexesTTWA regions, t indexes year, j indexes 4-digit UK 1992SIC industries∆IPWuit is equal to change in Chinese import exposureper worker, weighted by each region’s share of nationalemployment by sector

Take baseline time period to match Autor et al. (2013) tocalculate change in import exposure from 1991-2007


Research Design


∆IPWuit =∑

j

Lijt

Lujt

∆Mucjt

Lit

u refers to United Kingdom, c refers to China, i indexesTTWA regions, t indexes year, j indexes 4-digit UK 1992SIC industries∆IPWuit is equal to change in Chinese import exposureper worker, weighted by each region’s share of nationalemployment by sectorTake baseline time period to match Autor et al. (2013) tocalculate change in import exposure from 1991-2007


∆IPWuit

Sutherland

London

Canterbury

Birmingham

Manchester

Leeds

Newcastle

Wrexham

Cardiff

Edinburgh

Aberdeen

Glasgow

5th Quintile4th Quintile3rd Quintile2nd Quintile1st Quintile

Figure: Change in Chinese Import Penetration 1991-2007.


Research Design

Trade shock instrumental variable defined:

∆IPWait =∑

j

Lijt

Lujt

∆Macjt

Lit

a refers to United States (America), c refers to China, iindexes TTWA regions, t indexes year, j indexes 4-digit UK1992 SIC industries∆IPWait is equal to change in Chinese imports to theUnited States per worker, weighted by each region’s shareof national employment by sector


Econometric Model

ASCr = β0 + β1 ∗∆IPWi + Xrψ + Zkφ+ εi

r indexes individuals, i indexes TTWA regions, k indexesLocal Area District regions

Standard errors clustered on TTWA regionsEstimate by ordinary least squares and instrumentalvariable estimation (∆IPWait used as IV)


Econometric Model


r indexes individuals, i indexes TTWA regions, k indexesLocal Area District regionsStandard errors clustered on TTWA regions

Estimate by ordinary least squares and instrumentalvariable estimation (∆IPWait used as IV)


Econometric Model


r indexes individuals, i indexes TTWA regions, k indexesLocal Area District regionsStandard errors clustered on TTWA regionsEstimate by ordinary least squares and instrumentalvariable estimation (∆IPWait used as IV)


OLS Results (1991-2007)

(1) (2) (3)VARIABLES ASC ASC ASC

ln ∆ IPW (91-07) 0.082*** 0.068*** 0.067***(0.025) (0.021) (0.023)

Female 0.027 0.027(0.029) (0.028)

Age 0.005*** 0.005***(0.001) (0.001)

Higher Cert. -0.106*** -0.106***(0.039) (0.039)

University -0.235*** -0.233***(0.032) (0.031)

Married 0.104*** 0.103***(0.023) (0.024)

% non-UK born -0.001(0.001)

∆ % non-UK born 0.002(0.002)

Observations 1,856 1,793 1,793R-squared 0.01 0.13 0.13TTWAs 241 239 239

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


IV Results (1991-2007)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)VARIABLES ASC ASC ASC ASC ASC ASC

ln ∆ IPW (US, 91-07) 0.993*** 0.988*** 0.981***(0.027) (0.027) (0.026)

ln ∆ IPW (91-07) 0.081*** 0.069*** 0.067***(0.026) (0.023) (0.024)

Female 0.002 0.027 0.006 0.027(0.010) (0.029) (0.010) (0.028)

Age -0.000 0.005*** -0.000 0.005***(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)

Higher Cert. 0.003 -0.106*** 0.003 -0.106***(0.015) (0.039) (0.015) (0.039)

University -0.016 -0.235*** -0.010 -0.233***(0.012) (0.032) (0.012) (0.031)

Married 0.005 0.104*** 0.004 0.103***(0.010) (0.023) (0.010) (0.024)

% non-UK born -0.005*** -0.001(0.001) (0.001)

∆ % non-UK born 0.001 0.002(0.001) (0.002)

Observations 1,856 1,856 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793R-squared 0.88 0.01 0.86 0.13 0.89 0.13Weak ID F stat 1328 1328 1334 1334 1423 1423

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


Robustness

Different time periods (1991-2015, 2000-2007)

Different functional form for IPW (dichotomous,untransformed)Including measure of personal incomeIncluding measure of rightwing ideologyIncluding measure of class identificationIncluding local inequality measure (80-20 earnings ratio atLocal Area District level)


Robustness

Different time periods (1991-2015, 2000-2007)Different functional form for IPW (dichotomous,untransformed)

Including measure of personal incomeIncluding measure of rightwing ideologyIncluding measure of class identificationIncluding local inequality measure (80-20 earnings ratio atLocal Area District level)


Robustness

Different time periods (1991-2015, 2000-2007)Different functional form for IPW (dichotomous,untransformed)Including measure of personal income

Including measure of rightwing ideologyIncluding measure of class identificationIncluding local inequality measure (80-20 earnings ratio atLocal Area District level)


Robustness

Different time periods (1991-2015, 2000-2007)Different functional form for IPW (dichotomous,untransformed)Including measure of personal incomeIncluding measure of rightwing ideology

Including measure of class identificationIncluding local inequality measure (80-20 earnings ratio atLocal Area District level)


Robustness

Different time periods (1991-2015, 2000-2007)Different functional form for IPW (dichotomous,untransformed)Including measure of personal incomeIncluding measure of rightwing ideologyIncluding measure of class identification

Including local inequality measure (80-20 earnings ratio atLocal Area District level)


Robustness

Different time periods (1991-2015, 2000-2007)Different functional form for IPW (dichotomous,untransformed)Including measure of personal incomeIncluding measure of rightwing ideologyIncluding measure of class identificationIncluding local inequality measure (80-20 earnings ratio atLocal Area District level)


Results by Subdimension (1991-2007)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)VARIABLES Aggr. OLS Aggr. IV Subm. OLS Subm. IV Conv. OLS Conv. IV

ln ∆ IPW (91-07) 0.104*** 0.106*** 0.036 0.041 0.060* 0.054(0.030) (0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.034) (0.035)

Female -0.013 -0.013 0.024 0.024 0.070** 0.070**(0.041) (0.041) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)

Age 0.006*** 0.006*** -0.000 -0.000 0.011*** 0.011***(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

Higher Cert. -0.207*** -0.207*** -0.023 -0.023 -0.088* -0.088*(0.055) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.052) (0.051)

University -0.356*** -0.356*** -0.113** -0.112** -0.229*** -0.230***(0.049) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.033) (0.033)

Married 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.089** 0.089**(0.035) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.039) (0.039)

% non-UK born -0.004** -0.004** -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)

∆ % non-UK born 0.005** 0.005** 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)

Observations 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793R-squared 0.111 0.111 0.016 0.016 0.129 0.129TTWAs 239 239 239 239 239 239

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


Interpretation: Downturn in local labor markets

Did import shocks actually affect local labor markets?

Estimate effect of Chinese import shock on manufacturingemployment and median wagesUnit of analysis is Local Area District (LAD)



Did import shocks actually affect local labor markets?Estimate effect of Chinese import shock on manufacturingemployment and median wages

Unit of analysis is Local Area District (LAD)



Did import shocks actually affect local labor markets?Estimate effect of Chinese import shock on manufacturingemployment and median wagesUnit of analysis is Local Area District (LAD)


Results on Employment and Wages

(1) (2) (3) (4)VARIABLES ∆ %Manuf. 91-07 ∆ %Manuf. 91-07 Med. wage ’07 Med. wage ’07

ln ∆ IPW (91-07) -3.857*** -4.078*** -28.770*** -22.957***(0.275) (0.289) (5.892) (6.174)

Estimation OLS IV OLS IVObservations 380 380 369 369R-squared 0.342 0.341 0.061 0.059

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


Threats to Interpretation: Sorting

Value change versus sorting?

Ex ante sortingEx post sortingOur approaches:

Ex ante: control for initial regional manufacturingdistribution.Ex post: estimate whether respondent mobility conditionsthe effect of import shock (by respondent)Ex post: estimate effect of Chinese import shock onpopulation and outward migration (by LAD)TEASER: identify “mini-panel” based on BSA data.



Value change versus sorting?Ex ante sorting

Ex post sortingOur approaches:




Value change versus sorting?Ex ante sortingEx post sorting

Our approaches:Ex ante: control for initial regional manufacturingdistribution.Ex post: estimate whether respondent mobility conditionsthe effect of import shock (by respondent)Ex post: estimate effect of Chinese import shock onpopulation and outward migration (by LAD)TEASER: identify “mini-panel” based on BSA data.



Value change versus sorting?Ex ante sortingEx post sortingOur approaches:





Ex ante: control for initial regional manufacturingdistribution.

Ex post: estimate whether respondent mobility conditionsthe effect of import shock (by respondent)Ex post: estimate effect of Chinese import shock onpopulation and outward migration (by LAD)TEASER: identify “mini-panel” based on BSA data.




Ex ante: control for initial regional manufacturingdistribution.Ex post: estimate whether respondent mobility conditionsthe effect of import shock (by respondent)

Ex post: estimate effect of Chinese import shock onpopulation and outward migration (by LAD)TEASER: identify “mini-panel” based on BSA data.




Ex ante: control for initial regional manufacturingdistribution.Ex post: estimate whether respondent mobility conditionsthe effect of import shock (by respondent)Ex post: estimate effect of Chinese import shock onpopulation and outward migration (by LAD)

TEASER: identify “mini-panel” based on BSA data.


Ex ante sorting: Initial manufacturing employment

(1) (2) (3)VARIABLES ASC ASC ASC

ln ∆ IPW (91-07) 0.056** 0.059** 0.056**(0.026) (0.025) (0.026)

Manuf. employees (log, 1991) 0.018(0.020)

Low manuf. (%, 1991) -0.007(0.034)

High manuf. (%, 1991) 0.014(0.030)

∆ % Manuf. emp. (1991-2015) -0.002(0.003)

Demographic controls Y Y YRegional controls Y Y YObservations 1,793 1,793 1,791R-squared 0.130 0.130 0.130TTWAs 239 239 239

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


Ex post sorting: Individual Mobility

(1) (2)VARIABLES ASC ASC

ln ∆ IPW (91-07) 0.061** 0.055*(0.024) (0.031)

Changed postcode 0.081(0.470)

Changed PC X IPW 0.021(0.068)

Moved last 20 yrs 0.139(0.312)

Moved X IPW 0.026(0.044)

Demographic controls Y YRegional controls Y YObservations 1,793 1,793R-squared 0.132 0.132TTWAs 239 239

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


Ex post sorting: Regional Population

(1) (2) (3) (4)VARIABLES Log pop. ∆ Log pop. Out migrants (#) Out migrants (% pop.)

ln ∆ IPW (91-07) -0.019 -0.009 -504.600** -0.002***(0.055) (0.006) (206.162) (0.001)

Observations 380 380 380 380R-squared 0.001 0.010 0.014 0.038

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


Conclusions

Economic threat can lead individuals to adopt moreauthoritarian values.

Value versus economic origins of populism, economicpolicy preferences, etc. may not be well-posed question.While values certainly part of the story, the responsivenessof values to contemporaneous economic, social, andsecurity threats needs to be taken into account inexplaining political behavior and assessing policyresponses.


Conclusions

Economic threat can lead individuals to adopt moreauthoritarian values.Value versus economic origins of populism, economicpolicy preferences, etc. may not be well-posed question.

While values certainly part of the story, the responsivenessof values to contemporaneous economic, social, andsecurity threats needs to be taken into account inexplaining political behavior and assessing policyresponses.


Conclusions

Economic threat can lead individuals to adopt moreauthoritarian values.Value versus economic origins of populism, economicpolicy preferences, etc. may not be well-posed question.While values certainly part of the story, the responsivenessof values to contemporaneous economic, social, andsecurity threats needs to be taken into account inexplaining political behavior and assessing policyresponses.


Appendix


Distribution of ASC

Figure: Authoritarian values.


Distribution of ln IPW

Figure: (Log) IPW.


Brexit Vote

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)VARIABLES Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave

ASC 0.296*** 0.219***(0.023) (0.024)

Aggression 0.215*** 0.167***(0.013) (0.014)

Submission 0.040* 0.016(0.020) (0.020)

Conventional. 0.202*** 0.145***(0.012) (0.014)

Female 0.015 0.028 0.025 0.014(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)

Age 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003***(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

Higher Cert. -0.152*** -0.138*** -0.178*** -0.163***(0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)

University -0.232*** -0.223*** -0.296*** -0.255***(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034)

Married -0.019 -0.022 0.009 -0.007(0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027)

% non-UK -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.003*(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

∆ % non-UK 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.006***(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

Observations 1,579 1,526 1,579 1,526 1,579 1,526 1,579 1,526R-squared 0.131 0.200 0.147 0.217 0.003 0.138 0.113 0.188TTWAs 239 238 239 238 239 238 239 238

Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table: OLS Results, Authoritarianism and Brexit voteBallard-Rosa, Malik, Rickard & Scheve Economic Origins of Authoritarian Values

Brexit Vote & Partisanship(1) (2) (3) (4)

VARIABLES Vote Leave Vote Leave Vote Leave Vote Leave

ASC 0.080***(0.022)

Aggression 0.088***(0.014)

Submission -0.059***(0.021)

Conventionalism 0.069***(0.013)

Female 0.042* 0.046* 0.053** 0.041*(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)

Age 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002*(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

Higher Cert. -0.135*** -0.125*** -0.143*** -0.137***(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043)

University -0.191*** -0.180*** -0.211*** -0.193***(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)

Married -0.023 -0.027 -0.012 -0.021(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026)

% non-UK born -0.002* -0.002 -0.002** -0.002*(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

∆ % non-UK born 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005***(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

Right Ideology 0.047*** 0.042*** 0.059*** 0.047***(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)

Voted Conservative 0.011 0.016 0.051 0.021(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041)

Voted Labour -0.185*** -0.179*** -0.183*** -0.185***(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)

Voted Lib. Dem. -0.308*** -0.291*** -0.292*** -0.304***(0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060)

Observations 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526R-squared 0.287 0.298 0.287 0.291TTWAs 238 238 238 238

Robust standard errors clustered by TTWA in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table: Voted Leave, including ideology and partisanship controls


Additional covariates(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

VARIABLES ASC IV ASC IV ASC IV ASC IV ASC IV

ln ∆ IPW (91-07) 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.071*** 0.075*** 0.068***(0.029) (0.029) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026)

Female 0.061* 0.040 0.067** 0.031 0.086***(0.036) (0.034) (0.026) (0.033) (0.027)

Age 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.003***(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

Higher Cert. -0.135*** -0.121** -0.106** -0.146*** -0.112***(0.048) (0.049) (0.043) (0.049) (0.043)

University -0.311*** -0.275*** -0.199*** -0.302*** -0.224***(0.037) (0.038) (0.028) (0.037) (0.029)

Married 0.111*** 0.128*** 0.082*** 0.117*** 0.077**(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)

% non-UK born -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)

∆ % non-UK born 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)

Lower income -0.074 -0.053(0.054) (0.042)

Upper income 0.059 0.032(0.042) (0.036)

Inequality 0.047* 0.040(0.028) (0.026)

Right Ideology 0.130*** 0.127***(0.008) (0.008)

Middle Class 0.157** 0.081(0.067) (0.057)

Working Class 0.103 0.076(0.064) (0.054)

Observations 1,783 1,734 1,783 1,783 1,734R-squared 0.137 0.133 0.321 0.135 0.327TTWAs 242 234 242 242 234


Table: Robustness: Alternate covariate profiles


Alternate functional form for IPW

(1) (2) (3) (4)VARIABLES ASC OLS ASC IV ASC OLS ASC IV

High ∆ IPW (91-07) 0.085*** 0.115***(0.032) (0.044)

∆ IPW (91-07) 0.035** 0.032**(0.015) (0.014)

Female 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034(0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)

Age 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

Higher Cert. -0.126*** -0.125*** -0.127*** -0.127***(0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048)

University -0.285*** -0.284*** -0.283*** -0.284***(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)

Married 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.124***(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)

% non-UK born -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)

∆ % non-UK born 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)



Table: Robustness: Alternate codings of IPW


Alternate time periods

(1) (2) (3) (4)VARIABLES ASC OLS ASC IV ASC OLS ASC IV

ln ∆ IPW (1991-2015) 0.077*** 0.078***(0.027) (0.028)

ln ∆ IPW (2000-2007) 0.060** 0.153***(0.025) (0.051)

Female 0.033 0.033 0.037 0.041(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035)

Age 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

Higher Cert. -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.132*** -0.134***(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)

University -0.281*** -0.281*** -0.283*** -0.277***(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)

Married 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.120*** 0.120***(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)

% non-UK born -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)

∆ % non-UK born 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)



Table: Robustness: Alternate time periods for IPW


Motivation: Values and Economic PolicyPreferences–Example Research Question

What does the U.K. want for a post-brexit economic future?And why?


Motivation: Values and Economic PolicyPreferences–Research Design

Implemented conjoint survey experiment to measure policypreferences across different dimensions of globalization

Each respondent saw 6 pairs of possible “internationaleconomic integration plans”, with each plan consisting ofalternative policies about trade, immigration, foreigninvestment, and how regulatory policies are set.Respondents asked “Which of these integration planswould you rather see enacted in the United Kingdom?"YouGov survey, December 2016, N=1,000Representative of UK adult population



Implemented conjoint survey experiment to measure policypreferences across different dimensions of globalizationEach respondent saw 6 pairs of possible “internationaleconomic integration plans”, with each plan consisting ofalternative policies about trade, immigration, foreigninvestment, and how regulatory policies are set.

Respondents asked “Which of these integration planswould you rather see enacted in the United Kingdom?"YouGov survey, December 2016, N=1,000Representative of UK adult population



Implemented conjoint survey experiment to measure policypreferences across different dimensions of globalizationEach respondent saw 6 pairs of possible “internationaleconomic integration plans”, with each plan consisting ofalternative policies about trade, immigration, foreigninvestment, and how regulatory policies are set.Respondents asked “Which of these integration planswould you rather see enacted in the United Kingdom?"

YouGov survey, December 2016, N=1,000Representative of UK adult population



Implemented conjoint survey experiment to measure policypreferences across different dimensions of globalizationEach respondent saw 6 pairs of possible “internationaleconomic integration plans”, with each plan consisting ofalternative policies about trade, immigration, foreigninvestment, and how regulatory policies are set.Respondents asked “Which of these integration planswould you rather see enacted in the United Kingdom?"YouGov survey, December 2016, N=1,000

Representative of UK adult population



Implemented conjoint survey experiment to measure policypreferences across different dimensions of globalizationEach respondent saw 6 pairs of possible “internationaleconomic integration plans”, with each plan consisting ofalternative policies about trade, immigration, foreigninvestment, and how regulatory policies are set.Respondents asked “Which of these integration planswould you rather see enacted in the United Kingdom?"YouGov survey, December 2016, N=1,000Representative of UK adult population


Motivation: Values and Economic PolicyPreferences–Attribute-Levels

ISSUE AREA POSSIBLE VALUES

TradeUnilaterally remove all trade barriers,No trade barriers with European countries (but limit trade with non-EU countries),Limit trade with all countries

Immigration

Free mobility for all immigrants,Free mobility for European immigrants (but limits on non-EU immigrants),Only permit immigrants based on their education/skills,Only permit immigrants based on their region of origin with preferences forimmigrants from former British colonies,Block all new immigration

Investment

Free access to the UK economy for all international investment,Free access to the UK economy for European investment (but limits on non-EUinvestment),Disallow all foreign investment to the UK economy

Services

Free access to the service sector of the UK economy for all international providers,Free access to the service sector of the UK economy for European providers (butlimits on non-EU services),Limit access to the service sector of the UK economy for all international providers(except for financial services),Limit access to the service sector of the UK economy for all international providers,Disallow access to the service sector of the UK economy for all internationalproviders

Regulation Retain EU regulations in the UK,Establish regulations in the UK independent from those required in the EU


Motivation: Values and Economic PolicyPreferences–Baseline Results

Figure: Experimental Conjoint Estimates of Integration Preferences.


Motivation: Values and Economic PolicyPreferences–Brexit Vote

Figure: Experimental Conjoint Estimates of Integration Preferencesby Brexit Vote.


Motivation: Values and Economic PolicyPreferences–Authoritarianism

Figure: Authoritarianism and Post-Brexit Economic Policy Opinions.


the economic origins of authoritarian values: evidence

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