the double talk of manipulative liberalism in ethiopia

Birhanu O. Dirbaba and Penny ODonnell

African Communication Research, Vol., 5, No. 3 (2012) 283 - 312

The double talk of manipulative liberalism in Ethiopia: An

example of new strategies of media repression

ACR 5 (3), 2012

By Birhanu O. Dirbaba and Penny ODonnell

Abstract

This article examines media regulation and governance in Ethiopia in the period 1991 to 2012,

during the transition from a totalitarian to a liberal media system with a free press, and critically analyses the prospects for journalistic professionalism in the country. The paper

argues that Ethiopian journalists have found it difficult to take advantage of the professional

opportunities available to them in a more open media system due to the governments manipulative use of media-related laws and a broad range of media strategies designed to

maintain its political control of the news media and the news agenda. It introduces three new

concepts to explain these difficulties - manipulative liberalism, the destabilization through

demoralization of journalists working in the independent press, and the emergence of what we

describe as remote-control journalism as an alternative to the direct censorship of state-run media. This article concludes that Ethiopian journalists increasingly face an unwelcome

dilemma: stay and obey (metazez) or run (meshafat), that is, change occupations or go into exile. The article suggests professional journalism would have better prospects with repeal of

the repressive articles of the 2009 anti-terrorism law, and of the restrictive provisions in the

2008 Proclamation on Mass Media and Information Freedom that limit access to information

and mandate the registration of journalists and licensing of independent print media. The

Ethiopian media regulator also needs statutory independence. Above all, the government needs

to genuinely commit itself to protecting press freedom, and respect the independence of justice

system of the country.

Key words: Ethiopia, professional journalism, manipulative liberalism, demoralization,

remote-control journalism

Autobiographical note:

Dr Birhanu Olana Dirbaba ([email protected]) has recently completed his PhD thesis, entitled Negotiating Identities: The

Professional Self-perception of Ethiopian Journalists, at the University of Sydney, Australia. He was a Lecturer in Journalism at the University of Addis Ababa (2006 2009), and prior to that had a successful career in Ethiopian broadcast journalism (1994 2004). His research on problems of corruption in Ethiopian journalism was published in African Communication Research in 2010.

Dr Penny ODonnell is a Senior Lecturer in International Media and Journalism in the Department of Media and Communications at the University of Sydney. Her main field of research is Journalism Studies and her most recent

publications canvass the future of Australian newspapers; the dilemmas of post-professional journalism, and the news value of justice.

The double talk of manipulative liberalism in Ethiopia

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Introduction

The Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) led by the late Prime

Minister Meles Zenawi (1955- 2012) took power in 1991 after its rebel forces deposed the

military junta, or Derg of President Mengistu Hailemariam (r. 1974 1991). This paper

examines media regulation and governance in Ethiopia in the twenty-one years since this

change of government, asking whether the EPRDF has delivered on its promise to create a

liberal media system and free press. It argues that despite significant constitutional and media

law reforms introduced in the first five years of EPRDF rule, Ethiopia is no closer to achieving

media democratization or the development of independent and critical professional journalism.

On the contrary, in the wake of disputed national election results in 2005 and 2010, repressive

state media policies, censorship, and the harassment of journalists has increased markedly, to

the point where journalists increasingly face an unwelcome dilemma: stay and obey (metazez)

or run (meshafat), that is, change occupations or go into exile.

The argument develops by first briefly outlining the media reforms undertaken by the

EPRDF government in the post-Marxist period, second, contextualizing the Ethiopian

experience in relation to debates about press freedom across Africa, and, third, introducing

three key concepts to develop the critical appraisal of media governance in the 1991-2012

period. These concepts are first, manipulative liberalism, that is, the strategic use of media law

and governance to promote the interests of the EPRDF-led government; second, destabilization

through demoralization and harassment of the independent press; and, third, remote-control

journalism. These concepts emerged from the findings of the first national study of Ethiopian

journalists professional identity (Birhanu, 2013), and from critical analysis of recent media

regulation and governance trends, based on primary and secondary sources.

The Ethiopian media system after 1991

Following 17 years of Soviet-backed communist rule, the EPRDF promised, on taking

power, that there would be a speedy transition to multi-party democracy and economic

liberalisation, with legal protection of human rights and freedom of the press. It was a curious

political platform for a party led by Meles Zenawi and other militants of the Marxist-Leninist

League of Tigray (MLLT), a regional liberation movement that followed the Albanian brand

of Marxism (Teshale, 2008). Yet, soon after taking office, the EPRDF renounced communism

and proclaimed its Abiyotawi dimokirasi (Revolutionary Democracy) doctrine, signalling that

government would play a vital role in both developing the economy and democratising society.



Critics have judged the Abiyotawi dimokirasi philosophy harshly, however, arguing it is

neither revolutionary nor democratic (Bach, 2011). Instead, it has been labelled

bureaucratic and authoritarian (Harbeson, 1998). In fact, the most favourable assessments

of the governments performance since 1991 focus on its ethno-federalist administration, rather

than its economic or political performance (Merera, 2003, 2011). Nonetheless, it is important

to acknowledge that regime change in Ethiopia in 1991 saw the creation of a constitutional and

legal framework for an open and democratic media system in Ethiopia. In its first year in

office, the EPRDF government endorsed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),

including Article 19 defending freedom of expression and information, and, in 1992, it

abolished press censorship and granted Ethiopian citizens the right to establish an independent

press (see Press Proclamation No. 34/1992, 21 October 1992). Press freedom flourished over

the next few years as deregulation of the print media was accompanied by greater access to

diverse political opinions in state-run newspapers and electronic media. Ethiopia then

enshrined press freedom into its 1995 Constitution, with Article 29 explicitly protecting

citizens democratic right to hold opinions, thoughts and free expressions.

Yet, subsequent media proclamations, including the 1999 law which establishes the

media regulator, the Ethiopian Broadcast Agency (EBA), (proclamation no. 178/1999), the

2008 Mass Media and Information Freedom law (proclamation no. 590/2008), and the 2009

Anti-terrorism law (proclamation no. 652/2009), take media governance back to the older

trends of media control and manipulation found in the Marxist regime. Taken together, they

have created a precarious media environment in the country, jeopardizing the relationship

between the government and press, and, by extension, limiting journalists professional

freedom.

This article argues that state media policies have significantly hindered the

development of professional journalism in Ethiopia since 1991, despite initial hopes for change

associated with the creation of an independent, commercial print media sector in the post-1991

period. On paper, there are laws and policies that support greater press freedom and critical

journalism; in practice, however, Ethiopias media system is neither open nor liberal. A

liberal media system is characterised by limited state intervention; the rule of law;

constitutional protection for freedom of the press, opinion and thought, as well as individual

rights; independent commercial media outlets and professional journalism (Hallin & Mancini


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2004). We argue that the EPRDF government has demonstrated a crafty approach to media

liberalisation in order to meet two main objectives: first, out of the need to attract the attention

of international aid donors, most of whom are interested in democratization processes and,

second, out of concern to protect its hold on power (Dereje, 2011; Stremlau, 2011). Attention

to the current state of press freedom in other nation-states across Africa reveals that this kind of

political instrumentalisation is not unusual.

Press Freedom in Africa

Africa has shown considerable progress in establishing an enabling environment for

media freedom in the past two decades (White, 2011). Freedom of expression and opinion have

become a common legal and constitutional parameter in those African countries that have

become signatories to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Civil and Democratic

Rights. Yet, at the same time, many of African leaders have been reluctant to abandon the

authoritarian or patrimonialist modes of everyday media regulation and governance inherited

from their predecessors, with the result that there is often superficial respect for citizens right

to freedom of thought, opinion, and expression (Ogbondah, 2002). Indeed, Ogbondah argues

the neo-patrimonialist inclinations of African leaders represent a major ongoing threat to

African media freedom (Ogbondah, 2002, p. 55). With the exception of the West African

nations of Ghana and Cape Verde, press freedom exists only nominally in most African nations

(see, for example, www.freedomhouse.org; White, 2012).

Digital media technologies have done little to improve the situation, in part because

African governments are employing increasingly sophisticated repressive measures to

control online media and independent journalism (Freedom House, 2013). Disregard for the

proper rule of law is a major problem. Political instrumentalisation of legal systems goes hand

in hand with political instrumentalisation of media systems (Ogundimu, 2002). Ogbondah

argues the crisis of democratic governance in the nation-states of sub-Saharan Africa is directly

linked to the widespread use of arbitrary rules and proclamations that work to claw back or

strategically restrict and manipulate constitutionally guaranteed rights, including press freedom

and free speech (Ogbondah, 2002, p. 75). Thus, after two decades of constitutional and legal

reforms, media freedom is practically non-existent in many African states.

The prospects for developing critical, independent journalism in this context are less

than promising. The research literature suggests Africas neo-patrimonial leaders are more

intent on silencing dissent than listening to critical voices. Serious journalists are not only



subject to surveillance and intimidation but also have to work within the constraints of limited

access to information, the banning of critical media outlets, and punitive media controls

(Ogbondah, 2002). For instance, in Tanzania, the ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi party, in power

since 1977, has introduced all the above restrictions (Matumani, 2011). In Malawi, the

government of President Bingu wa Mutharika (2004-2012) used similar measures to control

and stifle press freedom, including the imposition of heavy taxes on newsprint paper and media

production facilities, as well as the public intimidation and harassment of journalists

(Mhagama & Kanyangwa, 2011). The Cte dIvoire (Ivory Coast) is a third African country in

which political control of and interference in the media have weakened the professional roles

of journalism (Gnonzion, 2011). Even post-apartheid South Africa, with the continents most

significant democratic media system, has been criticized for its poor treatment of journalists

(Wasserman 2011). The ruling African National Congress (ANC) proposal for Protection of

Information has attracted particular attention because it is seen as repressive and likely to

exercise a chilling effect on journalistic freedom (Wasserman, 2011). Likewise, Kenyan

journalists lack constraints on their editorial freedom when it comes to reporting and public

debate about the countrys ethnic politics (Ugangu, 2011, p. 257).

Attention to the continents recent experience of media governance contextualizes

Ethiopias failure to achieve greater media opening or stronger professional journalism over

the past two decades. Like other African governments, the ruling EPRDF party has

systematically used media rules and proclamations to effectively silence critical journalistic

voices and public dissent, particularly in response to electoral challenges to its power in the

2005 and 2010 national elections. The irony of the situation is that this big eastern African

nation promotes itself to the world, and international aid agencies, as a regional bastion of

press freedom and independent journalism. Yet, as the following sections reveal, the EPRDF

governments approach to media governance is characterized by political manipulation and

double standards.

Three major mechanisms of what we call manipulative liberalism are discussed. Firstly,

government decrees that orchestrate state control and domination of the flow of information.

Secondly, government banning and jamming of independent media outlets that destabilizes

their commercial operations and demoralizes journalists. Thirdly, government media

recruitment practices that favour the appointment of loyal EPRDF cadres to managerial and


6

journalistic positions and thus undermine media autonomy and foster cronyism. This has given

rise to the phenomenon of remote-control journalism, that is, news agendas that obey the

ruling partys information priorities without the need for direct censorship.

This study adopts a critical analytic method to examine these three mechanisms of

media regulation and governance in contemporary Ethiopia. It draws on the findings of

Birhanu Dirbabas (2013) recent doctoral research, including the results of the first national,

multilingual survey of Ethiopian journalists, and insights from 27 in-depth interviews with

Ethiopian journalists undertaken in 2010. This empirical data provides rich insights into

journalists everyday experiences of the EPRDF governments wily and heavy-handed media

governance measures, and the resulting constraints on media autonomy and journalistic

performance. The interviewees are identified in this article by pseudonyms in order to protect

the confidentiality of their contributions.

Ethiopian Media and Manipulative Liberalism

Given its initially strong commitment to press freedom and media opening, the Meles

governments (r. 1991- 2012) record on media freedom is arguably not all that much different,

in the end, to its predecessors (Zenebe, 2011; Ross, 2010). The mass media served as a

propaganda tool of the previous Marxist military junta of president Mengistu (r. 1974-1991),

and, before that, the feudal monarchy of Emperor Hailesillassie (r. 1930 -1974). Despite

creating a constitutional and legal framework to protect press freedom and independent

journalism in the 1990s as part of the post-junta democratisation process, the Meles

government then proved more than willing to ensure its own political survival by contravening

its own media rules and stifling media commercialization in the 2000s. Prime Minister

Hailemariam Desalegn, who took office in 2012 following Meless sudden death, seems set to

follow the same path as his predecessor. As the following discussion indicates, The EPRDFs

commitment to press liberalisation is patchy at best. One strong indicator of the EPRDFs

determination to maintain the mass media as a junior partner of government, rather than

autonomous institution, is the recent top-down introduction of development journalism as the

official editorial policy of state-run media (Skjerdal, 2011). In the context of disputed 2005 and

2010 elections, and growing political discontent, this decision shows the Meles/Hailemariam

government to be no less willing than its predecessors to use state intervention in the media to

maintain political power.



Crafty Laws

The first manifestation of manipulative liberalism is the EPRDF governments recent

self-serving media reforms. This sub-section critically evaluates the major flaws in three

relevant proclamations that unduly modify and constrain the constitutional rights of freedom of

the press by restricting or denying access to information (government secrecy), impounding

publications (as a means of purging the independent media outlets), and destabilizing

journalists (repressing journalists human and democratic rights). We argue that these problems

seriously challenge the professional autonomy of Ethiopian journalists.

Secrecy

The first most important constraint on Ethiopian journalists professional duty is their

limited access to official sources of information. This problem continues despite the 2008

Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation (Proclamation No.

590/2008, 4th December 2008) which, although designed to facilitate press freedom, works in

practice to manipulate and frustrate the liberal principles enshrined in the reformed 1995

Ethiopian Constitution. The laws heavy-handed regulations and cumbersome procedures for

accessing information mean that, effectively, it undermines rather than consolidates press

freedom (Zenebe, 2011; Ross, 2010).

The purpose of the media law is to set out the mass medias rights and responsibilities,

including the procedures journalists must follow in exercising their right to access and report

on information held by governments and other public bodies (Proclamation No. 590/2008, 4th

December 2008). Yet, the flawed and manipulative dimension of this otherwise important legal

instrument reveals itself both in the details of the bureaucratic process journalists have to

follow to obtain this information, and in the exemptions that protect the confidentiality of key

government documents.

Article 14/8, for example, gives government-employed public relation officers up to 30

working days to comply with information requests, with an additional 30 working days

allowed if the office is congested by too many requests; this means it can take up to three

months to get a response on an information request, a policy that hardly supports the publics


8

right to get information in a timely way. The government itself is mindful of this problem:

Article 14/9 stipulates that public bodies should provide information of an urgent nature within

ten working days. Yet, the article empowers government officials to decide for themselves on

the urgency or otherwise of a request, meaning that the publics right to know is always subject

to the bureaucrats prerogative. Journalists are well aware of the gaps in the proclamation.

Newspaper senior editor Sori said,

Access to information is very problematic and the information law is very restrictive in

this regard because it allows PR departments to monopolize every bit of information,

even to the extent of denying you information. You make a request and the law allows

the PR people to wait 30 days before they give it to you, so instead of the information,

they give you an appointment to come back in one month (Sori, Newspaper editor,

Personal communication, 12 October 2010).

Exemptions that shroud the workings of government in unnecessary secrecy, and

frustrate the work of political journalists, are a related problem: so, for example, Article 23

restricts access to cabinet documents, and, in addition, allows government officials to ignore a

request to confirm the existence or non-existence of information contained in a cabinet record

other than those records that are made available to the general public by the decision of the

cabinet. Newspaper editor Sori offered one measure of the extent of this problem when

talking about journalists interactions with government public relations departments:

The society is secretive. Institutions are secretive. So, people dont tell you anything.

PR people dont want to release information for fear of being attacked. So, for instance,

if you go to any government agency in this country and ask for information about the

real/practical situation that they know about, you get nothing...the PR expert wont tell

you anything (Sori, Newspaper editor, Personal communication, 12 October 2010).

While it is true that journalists have more access to government information now than

at any time in the countrys history, this provision sits awkwardly alongside Article 12/1 of the

Ethiopian Constitution, which states, The conduct of affairs of the government shall be

transparent (Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 21 August 1995).



In fact, recent media research points to the serious problem of the culture of secrecy, impeding

public access to government-held information (Getahun, 2005).

Repression

In addition, the 2008 proclamation on Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to

Information includes punitive provisions: Article 42 gives state prosecutors the right to

intervene in and suspend the publication and distribution of newspapers, and to impound news

copy, if it is seen to threaten national security; Article 43 sets out the process by which the

Attorney-General can launch criminal proceedings against persons suspected of committing an

offence through the mass media, and Article 45 sets out the financial and other penalties to be

imposed for non-compliance with government media laws. So, while this media law is meant

to facilitate media freedom within the bounds of agreed checks and balances, the EPRDF

governments readiness to use its provisions against journalists who are critical of their

administration underscores its fundamentally coercive and corrosive nature.

One recent example illustrates the depth of the problem: on 20 July 2012, the Ethiopian

Ministry of Justice ordered Birhanena Selam, the sole government printing press, to stop

distribution and impound copies of the weekly newspaper Feteh (Justice) after it attempted to

publish a front-page story on Prime Minister Meles Zenawis health condition. The Justice

Minister accused the newspaper of endangering national security.

The ban came amid unconfirmed international news reports and social media rumours

suggesting Meles Zenawi had been hospitalised earlier in the month in Belgium for an

unknown medical condition (Committee to Protect Journalists, 26 July 2012). As the document

in Figure 1 (below) shows, Berhanena Selam Printing Enterprise simply complied with the

government order and notified Fetehs proprietor, the Mastewal Publishing and Advertising

Company, that the publication had been withdrawn form the market, even though it seemed to

directly contravene the countrys constitutional and legal protection of press freedom. This

action basically a breach of the fundamental democratic rights stated in the countrys

constitution article 29 sub-articles 2, 3, and 4 (Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic

of Ethiopia, 21 August 1995) as well as the international laws of which Ethiopia is a signatory.


10

In this regard, Ross (2010) commented on the shortcomings of this particular article that the

statute protects government officials more than the publics right to receive information.

Figure 1. Official Letter Impounding the Publication and Distribution of Feteh

Critical appraisal of Proclamation 590/2008 suggests it lacks a genuine commitment to

liberalising access to government information and has major shortcomings, including the

mandatory registration of publications and their proprietors, restrictions on media ownership

across different regional media markets, weak support for the information rights of the press

and the public in favour of protecting the interests of government officials, and the use of

criminal sanctions and excessive fines for non-compliance with the media laws (Ross, 2010;

Zenebe, 2011; Stremlau, 2011). Ross (2010) further suggests the fundamental challenge facing

the EPRDF government is to accept the mass medias right to scrutinize and criticize those in

power; she argues, freedom of criticism has in fact tested Ethiopias new democracy (Ross,

2010, p. 1049) and concludes, that if Ethiopias transition to democracy is to succeed, then the

pressmust have the freedom to criticize the government (Ross, 2010, p. 1066).



Silencing dissent

The 2009 anti-terrorism proclamation is even more draconian (Anti-terrorism

Proclamation No. 652/2009, 28 August 2009), making it a criminal offence to publish news

coverage that encourages or provides moral support to political organizations that the

government believes to support terrorism. Although the EPRDF is a coalition of regional

ethnic-based political parties, it has designated several high-profile regional opposition groups

and liberation movements as terrorist organizations, and, in June 2011, five of these were

banned (CPJ, 2011a, 2011b). These include Ginbot 7 for Freedom, Democracy and Justice, the

Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Journalists

now risk prosecution and a 20-year prison sentence for reporting on these groups. The

Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) (2010) has criticised the chilling effect of the ban on

reporting political dissent, indicating that journalists who write anything other than explicit

denunciations of the banned organizations are at risk of being labelled terrorist sympathizers;

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has pointed to the increased likelihood of self-censorship, citing

the experience of one high-profile private newspaper journalists who fled into exile: Their

interpretation of terrorism is so broad that it is dangerous for us. For example, if they label a

particular political party a terrorist organization then we cannot write about them (HRW,

2010).

The governments common response to criticism of the 2009 anti-terrorism

proclamation has been to insist on its responsibility to use counter-terrorism to defend the

national security of the country. Yet, CPJ and other media watch organizations have repeatedly

expressed their concern about both the 2008 Mass Media and Information Freedom and the

highly controversial and vaguely worded 2009 Anti-terrorism laws, questioning how laws

designed to protect national security and public access to information can end up proscribing

critical journalists as terrorists.

The lack of independent media regulators

The third law (Proclamation No. 178/1999) establishes the Ethiopian Broadcasting

Agency (EBA) in order to regulate and supervise frequency and media contents (Broadcasting


12

proclamation, 29 June 1999). The proclamation gives a generous right for this government

agency to assign and license frequencies. However, the independence of this agency in

providing fair services for all parties, government or non-government, is strongly disputed. The

agencys top officials, including the Director, are assigned by and directly accountable to the

Prime Minister, who is also chairman of the ruling party, EPRDF. Further, the agency has been

criticized for favouring broadcast licence and radio frequency lease applications from the

ruling EPRDF party or the government over those from commercial media. The statistics speak

for themselves: Ethiopia currently has 23 government radio stations and three government

television networks, compared to only three commercial radio stations, and no private

television network. Moreover, the agency has been blamed for jeopardising the free exercise of

independent critical journalists. Newspaper editor Tagel shared his personal experience of

arbitrary arrest and intimidation. According to Tagel, the government intervenes into

journalists activity through its regulatory institutions, such as the Ethiopian Broadcast

Authority (EBA), the Federal Police and Security personnel. He said he is watched, and his

work is systematically scrutinised by the Ethiopian Broadcast Authority, the police, and

government security personnel (Tagel, Newspaper editor, Personal communication, 4 October

2010).

Limited deregulation of the press

While media democratization was an EPRDF priority from 1991, it is important to

point out that the new governments media policy did not attempt to abolish or privatize the

state-run media. Instead, the government retained control of broadcast media (radio and

television) and only partially deregulated the print media market by legalising privately-owned

commercial publications (Hallelujah & Skjerdal, 2009). TV reporter Habtie criticised the

absence of a pluralist broadcasting environment in the country saying that limited broadcast

ownership curbs the right of citizens to freedom of information. I would have been pleased if

we had some 10 or 20 or 30 stations. You will have alternatives, and the public also would gain

better information (Habtie, TV reporter, Personal communication, 8 October, 2010).

Limited deregulation has meant that the independent press that subsequently emerged

had to compete directly with an extensive and powerful network of state-run media, which

continues to this day to dominate the public sphere. The government-owned Ethiopian Press

Agency (EPA) publishes four newspapers and a magazine in local and international languages,

there are three government-owned television networks (one national and two regional) in



service, as well as 23 government-owned radio stations. In addition, two EPRDF-owned

stations (Radio Fana and Demsti Woyane Tigray), used for propaganda purposes during the

rebellion against the military junta, have recently been rebranded as commercial broadcasters

(EBA, 2009a, 2009b, 2013). The EPRDF owns its own news agency, Walta Information

Centre, and, in 2011, the Fana Broadcasting Corporation announced plans to launch the

countrys first non-government television network (see Ethionetblog 2011). There is some

evidence that the party is behind the so-called crony press: Ethio Channel newspaper,

Sendeq newspaper, the now-defunct newspaper Iftin, and Zami FM Radio, (Skjerdal, 2012;

Hakim & Kumilachew, 2012; Junedi Sado, 2012). Currently, the provision of new

broadcasting licenses to the private owners is unlikely due to the governments tacit suspension

of further media deregulation, a source of deep frustration to those who have long wished to

create independent broadcast media in Ethiopia.

Governments domination of media ownership can be likened to what Splichal calls an

information subsidy (Splichal, 1999). According to Splichal (1999), the strategy of

information subsidization presupposes absolute control over the mass media

and restricted access to information. This means that there is no adequate media space for

journalists to exercise their professional duty to criticize, scrutinize or hold the government to

account. A pioneer journalist, who worked with the Ethiopian Radio, highlighted this problem

when he said,

In this country, information on every aspect of life-economic, social, political is

insufficient. The problem is that there is no adequate infrastructure for information

supply on the one hand, and restrictive laws on the other. Many people are not satisfied

with the media situation in Ethiopia. Why? They dont have an enabling environment in

which to debate their affairs, and they dont have the chance to compare and contrast

different viewpoints. Citizens hear about their country from outside sources (Pioneer

journalist, Personal communication, 13 August 2010).

The next sub-section extends the discussion of the current Ethiopian governments

manipulative liberalism by identifying the strategy of destabilization of the independent press

and demoralization of critical journalists working in those institutions.


14

Destabilization

Media opening in the 1990s saw a proliferation of independent publications: in the

period 1992 to 1997 alone, the Ministry of Information registered 265 new newspapers and 120

new magazines (Hallelujah & Skjerdal , 2009, p. 49). Almost a decade later, in 2005, the high-

point for the free press in Ethiopia, there were 548 privately-owned journalistic publications on

the register (PMC, 2006). This suggests that partial deregulation of the print media increased

the trade in information and advertising, and provided alternatives to, and the possibility of

contesting, government information.

Nonetheless, the government adopted highly controversial strategies, in order to

reinforce its media control by employing a number of lines of attacks to destabilize the

independent press. The destabilisation of independent journalism has resulted in the rapid

decrease in the number of critical papers since 2005, and more specifically, in the aftermath of

the contested 2010 national elections results. Four controversial government

strategies are discussed: the banning of independent newspapers, denying access to

government-held information, jamming and filtering of broadcast and digital media outlets, and

intimidation of journalists.

Banning newspapers

The governments first serious crackdown on independent newspapers took place in the

aftermath of the 2005 general elections. The government violently crushed opposition protests

over electoral fraud, banned a number of private newspapers, and incarcerated their owners and

journalists (Skjerdal, 2009a). This led to the closure of a large number of private publications,

and the commercial press became weak both institutionally and professionally (IREX, 2006-

2007). A retired journalist, who participated in this study, said the governments crackdown

was fundamentally discouraging. He said, I dont understand why this regime rolls back some

of the good steps it has gone forward (Retiree journalist, Personal communication, 28

December 2010).

By the end of 2009, there were only 57 newspapers, 153 periodicals, and 66 magazines

registered with the Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority (EBA, 2009a, 2009b), and by the

subsequent general election, in mid-2010, the number of newspaper titles still in circulation

had fallen to around 35 (Birhanu, 2010). Since then, the three main newspapers critical of the

EPRDF government, Addis Neger, Awrambatimes, and Feteh, have been closed down, leaving



the independent press without any major mastheads. The latest report from the Ethiopian

Broadcast Authority suggests a further sharp decline in the number of private publications in

2012, with only 18 registered newspaper titles in the market in the month of January 2013

(EBA, 2013).

Information black-outs

The second most important constraint on journalists is limited access to official sources

of information. This problem continues despite the 2008 Freedom of the Mass Media and

Access to Information Proclamation (Proclamation No. 590/2008, 4th December 2008) which,

although designed to facilitate press freedom, works in practice to manipulate and frustrate the

liberal principles enshrined in the reformed 1995 Ethiopian Constitution. According to

informants, the government sees independent journalists as defiant rather than as stakeholders.

Newspaper editor Sara says the law supports journalists access to official information but the

government is prejudiced against the private press, and sees all private media journalists, in

stereotypical terms, as opposition supporters. Private media journalists have to work very

hard to get news stories and, according to Sara, sources are rarely identified in most of their

best stories:

I was once sent out of parliament. I was in the main hall and had switched on my tape-

recorder when an usher came to tell me that I had to leave, that he had been instructed

to send me outside. I didnt argue with him. I left the hall. I went outside. Then, I told

him that I am a journalist and shouldnt be sent out like thatFinally, I went to the

government PR person and asked him to explain to me which law allowed him to deny

parliamentary access to the private media. He didnt answer me. He just walked away.

(Sara, Newspaper reporter, Personal communication, 16 October 2010).

In fact, this denial of access is against the legal provision of the Ethiopian Constitution,

which stipulates in article 29 sub-articles 3(b) that the press shall have the right to access to

information of public interest.


16

Disrupting the trouble makers

Thirdly, another highly controversial intervention into the business of journalism by the

government has been the jamming of transmissions by critical mass media outlets, a move

which also breaches the core standards legislated in Article 29 of the Ethiopian constitution

under its sub-articles 1, 2, 3, and 4. The government started to jam broadcast services in the

wake of the 2010 election period, after Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (r.1991 2012), declared

the government would not tolerate critical broadcast media. Interestingly, among the victims of

this government action, are international broadcasters such as the Voice of America Amharic

(VOA), DuetscheWelle (DW), and the Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT). The former

Prime Minister officially disclosed, on 18 May 2010, that his government jammed VOA,

comparing it with Rwandas Radio Mille Collins.

Moreover, the EPRDF government has initiated politically motivated internet

filtering (Freedom House, 2011, 2012a, 2012b) to shutdown new online information sources,

which might introduce greater competition and diversity into Ethiopias media market. The

Committee to Protect Journalists, an international media watchdog, has named Ethiopia as one

of the 10 top suppressors of internet freedom in the world because of the governments tight

control over the communication infrastructure (CPJ, 2011a, 2011b). One of the main targets of

internet censorship are alternative online information sources created by Ethiopias diaspora

community (Skjerdal, 2009b). In so doing, the government has introduced a Deep Packet

Inspection (DPI) strategy, to limit national access to these critical web and blog sites. In

addition, commercial use of internet communication platforms, such as Skype, Google Talk,

Yahoo Messenger, and Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP), has been criminalized under a

new law (proclamation no. 761/2012), an extension of the Anti-terrorism law that breaches the

freedom of electronic communication (see, for instance, www.article19.org).

Keeping the trouble makers behind bars

Destabilisation of the independent mass media also involves the strategic

demoralisation of critical journalists, through the use of intimidation, harassment, and

imprisonment. This process worsens the already hostile relationships between the government

media and private press. Newspaper closures have become an increasingly common form of

state repression against independent media, forcing journalists into hiding or exile to avoid

prosecution. In January 2012, Reeyot Alemu, one of the Addis presss most high profile and



critical columnists, was sentenced to 14 years in jail on terrorism charges. The Committee to

Protect Journalists disputes the charges, claiming instead that Reeyot Alemu has been jailed for

speaking out against the EPRDF government (CPJ, 2012).

Further support came from the US-based International Womens Media Foundation,

which awarded her a prize for journalistic courage in 2012 (see iwmf.org). There are currently

three other Ethiopian and two Eritrean journalists in prison for similar political reasons (CPJ,

2012). The Eritreans, Saleh Idris Gama and Tesfalidet Kidane Tesfazghi of Eri-TV, have been

detained without trial since 2006 following their capture during a border dispute. The three

Ethiopians are Yusuf Getachew, editor of the Ye Muslimoch Guday (detained but yet to be

prosecuted for allegedly planning acts of terrorism to advance a religious cause); Woubshet

Taye, deputy editor of the now-defunct Awramba Times (14 years for allegedly planning

terrorist acts); and high-profile blogger and Pen Americas 2012 award winner, Eskinder Nega

(18 years for allegedly attempting to overthrow the constitutional order) (CPJ, 2012). Abebe

Gelaw and Abebe Belew received 15-year jail terms each. Fasil Yenealem was sentenced to

life in prison while Mesfin Negash and Abiye Tekelemariam got eight-year jail terms each.

Two foreign journalists, Johan Persson and Martin Schibbye, were also jailed by alleged

accusations of having relations and cooperating with terrorist organizations (CPJ, 2011a,

2011b). The two Swedes had been handed down 11 years of jail terms, before they were

pardoned on diplomatic pressures.

Following the arrest of these journalists and the increasing tendency of the government

to completely mute the freedom of speech, the number of journalists fleeing the country

increased dramatically. Asegid Teferra of the Reporter newspaper, and recently, Dawit

Kebede, CPJs prize winner, and Editor in chief of the Awrambatimes newspaper shut the

newspaper and fled the country in the late 2011. Following him, Abebe Tola, prominent satirist

and journalist of Feteh newspaper, Argaw Ashinie of the Kenya-based Daily Nation newspaper

and chairman of the Ethiopian environment journalists Association and deputy of Ethiopias

Foreign Correspondents Association, Hayileyesus Worku of Ethiopian Radio and Television

Agency (ERTA) fled the country in the early 2012. More recently still, two journalists working

for Muslim media outlets fled the country following the governments crackdown on Muslim

protests.


18

The major mastheads of the independent press have all suffered as a consequence of

government destabilisations. Journalists at the Addis Neger, one of the few independent papers

in the capital, closed the paper and fled the country in 2009. Similarly, in 2011, another critical

newspaper, Awrambatimes, shut down due to increased intimidation from government

officials. Some of the interviewees who participated in the current study had similar

experiences of intimidation. Radio editor Kedam was a target of government harassment. In

one incident, he was interrogated following a critical investigatiive news report on a

government office:

He was asking me questions that had come from this big institution where many senior

officials are concentrated, and they were unhappy with my report...I was sure that I

hadnt committed any legal error in my report. I knew I would be liable for damages if

that was the case. So, I wondered whether this official who was asking me all the

questions had the mandate to interrogate me. The shock of that interrogation affected

my normal activity; it worried me for some three to four months (Kedam, Radio editor,


Newspaper editor Tagel shared his personal experience of arbitrary arrest and

intimidation. He said that he had been imprisoned several times for his journalistic reports. He

said that he is watched, and his work is systematically scrutinised, by the Ethiopian Broadcast

Authority, the police, and the government security personnel.

According to the CPJ, Ethiopia is second only to neighbouring Eritrea, among African

nations, with journalists in jail (Rhodes, 2009). The examples given above demonstrate that the

government ignores its duty to provide legal protection to ensure the operational independence

of media institutions in clear breach of the constitutional law (article 29/4). While the fear for

political intimidation has led journalists to flee the country, the government has one final

strategy of manipulation, which it uses to control the media content produced in the mass

media under its direct administration: we call it remote-control journalism.

Remote-control Journalism

One of the common claims about state-run media is that the government has been

staffing the publicly funded mass media with its loyal party cadres. Their job is to promote

and defend party and government policy agendas and, importantly to cover up scandals



and keep the secrets. In the government media, as radio reporter Tata relates, some journalists

are trusted more than others and sensitive news jobs are assigned on the basis of party

loyalty rather than merit:

Journalists who are party members are always assigned to cover the regional council

meeting. You are never told why such people are assigned to cover such serious events.

The choice is not made on merit. They choose the person in terms of political

affiliationI guess, they think council secrets would be revealed if they sent a

journalist who was not a party member (Tata, Regional radio reporter, Personal

communication, 12 October 2010).

The interviewees that participated in this study unanimously agreed that the number of

EPRDF cadre journalists in the government media institutions is increasing. It is also clear to

them that these cadres pursue political and not professional goals. The main role of these

journalists is protecting and defending party programs (Skjerdal, 2009a; Skjerdal, 2008).

Newspaper senior editor Sori said that state-run media is populated by cadres, who are

labelled the Al-Shebab.

I am sorry to say that in many media outlets they are not journalists, they are cadres.

They are cadres who are inserted, who are injected. Can you believe that 200

individuals were recruited, just taken from anywhere, and put in ETV [the state-run

national TV broadcaster]? It is really devastating. These people have come with a

mission given to them by the ruling party. [] They judge issues in the eyes of whether

they favor the party in power or not; so, this is not journalism. The independent thinkers

are now removed. These people are called Al-Shebab. These Al-Shebab people are

everywhere, there are some 100 individuals in the Ethiopian News Agency, and 200 at

a time in Ethiopian Radio and Television. The nickname Al-Shebab refers to a group of

disruptive fanatics, and maybe the name is given because these people are disturbing

the environment (Sori, Newspaper senior editor, Personal communication, 6 October

2010).


20

Senior party and government officials direct and monitor the work of the cadres.

Hence, the name given to this kind of media content is remote control journalism or satellite

journalism, and it is dismissed for undermining journalisms professional goals. According to

regional radio senior editor Tabek, the cadres are not reporters, they are committed to

implementing government policy, and, hence, better labelled as report readers (Tabek,

Regional radio editor, Personal communication, 11 October 2010). Yet, some of these cadres

insist they are loyal to journalistic professionalism ahead of their party membership. For

instance, TV journalist Habtie faced strong criticism from his government media colleagues for

once suggesting that EPRDF party members are phony journalists ... who are useless to the

profession and the party as well. He says,

These people exhibit the character of a rooster that is set free to pick grains from a flat

container. They derive as much satisfaction from what they waste as from what they

consume. They are as pleased by what they destroy as what they build. Such people

hide in media institutions. The EPRDF should get rid of such people, connect the

profession with the professional and employ neutral and independent journalists in

those positions. Then, the profession would grow (Habtie, National TV reporter,


Journalists are treated differently according to whether they join the ruling party

voluntarily or reluctantly. Radio editor and EPRDF party member Lomi says newsrooms

relationships between journalists and their supervisors can get tense, especially when loyal

journalists are favoured over non-loyal journalists. According to Gedam, a TV editor, media

managers control journalistic outputs directly by reviewing and censoring editorial output, or

indirectly by assigning newsroom resources to journalists whose editorial output favours the

government. Selao is also familiar with the ways that the the hidden hands of government

affect his work:

Local government officials started to question my reporting when I investigated the

mass jailing of people without trial...After my first broadcast on the problem,

they said to me, who assigned you to be an ombudsman? Then, they labeled me as a

faultfinder...All my relatives and friends warned me about the dangers of criticising the

government. Thats when I got scared (Selao, Broadcast producer, personal

communication, 22 September 2010).



Abi, an independent newspaper journalist, points to government interference and heavy-

handed tactics as obstacles to strong professionalism:

You see journalists being prosecuted over very minor news reports. They are fined for

producing ordinary, everyday news. So, they resort to safe reporting. They just dont

dare to touch certain areas (Abi, Newspaper reporter, Personal communication, 20

October 2010).

Newspaper editor Faye, for instance, experienced intimidation and harassment from top

government officials after he tried to report on a natural disaster in the Oromia region: The

top government officials blocked us from reporting on the extent of hunger and calamity,

which was very serious. Similarly, Fewus, a regional TV producer, recalled instances where

he received harassing phone calls from government officials:

In my opinion, there is little professional independence. In government owned media in

particular, middle level managers do what they like. I dont personally support their

intervention. Sometimes they call you and make unnecessary comments. Then there are

government people, like the zonal administrator, who want you to hide the facts. So,

they call and try to tell you what to say. It is a challenge to the profession. (Fewus,

Regional TV producer, Personal communication, 7 October 2010).

Another form of remote-control journalism manifests itself in the role of party cadres in

controlling information. Various interviewees talked about information control by cadres from

the ruling EPRDF party. This is a problem across the country. In rural areas, party cadres

routinely limit journalists access to official information, select the sources they can use, and

insist on pre-recorded interviews. According to Tole, a TV journalist, political interference of

this kind is commonplace in government mass media:


22

The government agencies are our first point of contact. The tradition is to go to

government officials. They arrange the interviews for us. We interview people who

they want us to contact. That is why our news programs lack crosschecking (Tole,

Regional TV reporter, Personal communication, 15 October 2010).

Selao, a senior producer of regional media, also routinely interviews the sources

selected for him by party cadres. He tells the story of his experience of reporting on a

government resettlement program:

Certain individuals [cadres] had nominated the interviewees for me already when I got

there. You do not have the chance to talk to people freely. You are expected to

interview only the people selected by the cadres. The people you interview have been

told what to say and what not to say. They tell you they are satisfied with the

resettlement program. But when you look around, you see there are no adequate

infrastructural services, you see there is high discontent among people. So, that is how

you find out what is going wrong, you observe and informally learn about the existing

problems (Selao, Broadcast producer, Personal communication, 22 September 2010).

One has to be mindful that governments intervention into the state-run media is clearly

a breach of article 29/5 of the Ethiopian constitution. This particular sub-article clearly

legislates the operational freedom of the state media, stipulating, any media financed by or

under the control of the state shall be operated in a manner ensuring its capacity to entertain

diversity in the expression of opinion. It is explicit that governments manipulative control of

the media space has limited journalists professional autonomy, which is a challenge in

hindering the political and social roles of journalism in Ethiopia.

Conclusion

Despite the EPRDF governments initial commitment to press freedom, the empirical

evidence from this study, in conjunction with secondary sources, confirms the fact that the

Ethiopian media system is currently more authoritarian than liberal. Government endorsement

of international covenants on human and democratic rights is not reflected in their control of

and intervention in the media system. Instead, the government uses media law strategically, to



control rather than facilitate the free flow of information, and to restrict rather than empower

journalists. In fact, arguably, the media laws are not worth the paper they are written on. As

Ogbondah (2002) rightly states, press freedom is nothing more than a constitutional promise.

The independent or privately-owned media currently faces intense political pressure to

work in partnership with the government (the development journalism model), rather than to

scrutinize or hold it to account. This invitation to partnership is premised on the expectation

that the private media will accept the governments development philosophy and policy

agenda. In this regard, the EPRDF government demonstrates a particular form of manipulative

liberalism, speaking the rhetoric of press freedom while at the same time intimidating,

harassing and destabilizing critical journalists. Like former patrimonialist leaders from

previous Marxist and imperial governments, the EPRDF government tightly controls both the

state-run media organizations and the commercial press. These adverse conditions have

dampened the professional ambitions of many dedicated and courageous Ethiopian journalists.

It is a grim fact that those who take their work seriously, live with the constant threat of

prosecution, imprisonment or exile. International media and human rights watch organisations

have expressed concern at this situation in Ethiopia, and regularly report on the number of

independent journalists forced into exile by politically-motivated intimidation, harassment and

other coercive punishments (CPJ, 2011a, 2011b; HRW, 2010; Witchel, 2011). In a recent

survey, Ethiopia is named among the countries most likely to imprison journalists or to force

them into exile (CPJ 2011).

The EPRDF is also expert in what can be called the remote control of the media

system, via the newsroom deployment of party cadres as journalists and media managers.

This type of control is linked to problems of censorship and self-censorship. Previous research

suggests, Journalism in government mass media has been well fenced by self-censorship

(Skjerdal, 2008, 2009a). This kind of control is seen as a major source of role conflicts among

journalists; that is, conflict between what journalists think they should be doing as

professionals and what they end up doing in practice to avoid political problems. Previous

research points to divided loyalties as another level of role conflict, with journalists caught

between those who are faithful to EPRDF, and those who are loyal to the profession

(Skjerdal 2009a, p. 11; Skjerdal 2008, pp. 5-7). Skjerdal (2009a) indicates that journalists

adopt various strategies to resolve those conflicts, including professional resignation,


24

professional adjustment, professional discontinuity, and, the most extreme response,

meshafat; that is, professional rebellion, including going into exile in order to engage in

political and media activism in opposition to the EPRDF government.

The metazez or meshafat (loyalty or rebellion) syndrome is increasing widespread in

Ethiopian journalism, in particular, among veteran journalists working for independent news

media. Faced with pressures to conform to government directives, or to accept and work for

government media, journalists are opting for meshafat (the fleeing or runaway strategy) rather

than accept metazez (submissiveness and loyalty irrespective of its objective). The meshafat

option of withdrawing from the profession is the most extreme response to the dilemma of

whether to maintain loyalty to the profession (Skjerdal, 2009a, p.10) or to the government

(Skjerdal, 2012).

Currently, there are few critical voices now left in Ethiopian journalism due to this

manipulative control of the mass media. The diminishing number of private media outlets, as

well as the alarming number of journalists fleeing the country, can be taken as clear evidence

of the problem. The growth of a competitive media environment has been sabotaged in

Ethiopia. Under the EPRDFs political governance, press freedom only nominally exists. The

government manipulates the media system for self-serving propaganda purposes; it does next

to nothing to protect freedom of thought, opinion and expression. In fact, some observers

suggest that the 1990s media reforms were introduced to impress potential international aid

donors, particularly those funding projects in support of the countrys democratization process.

In this regard, the Ethiopian government is suspected of trading media and other political

reforms for substantial aid projects funded by USA, EU and UK as part of a mutually-

beneficial strategic alliance aimed at fighting terrorism in a neighbouring country, Somalia

(Dereje, 2011; Stremlau, 2011). Development, democracy, human rights and press freedom

appear to have been the less important aims of this exercise. Those veteran journalists who

took the democratization process seriously, and have tried over the years to support and

promote it, increasingly find themselves targeted by government harassment and intimidation,

even when they are working for state-run not just independent news organizations. Journalists

across the whole media system are increasingly unable to exercise their professional duty due

to governments lack of commitment to protect the press from external intervention. This

situation poses a serious hurdle to democratization and the rule of law.

The ruling party urgently needs to renew its historical promise to ensure a free press for

Ethiopia, and re-commit itself in the liberalisation of the mass media. In order to relieve the

current tensions faced by journalists, the government should repeal repressive, manipulative



and controversial laws, particularly, the controversial and repressive articles in the Anti-

terrorism and the Mass Media and Information Freedom proclamations. Moreover, the

government needs to ensure the statuary independence of the regulatory government agency,

EBA, as well as the countrys justice system. Above all, the country needs a commercially

viable independent media sector, constructive engagement between the government and the

independent press (instead of mutual suspicions and mistrust), and stronger journalistic

professionalism based on greater autonomy and shared occupational norms and conventions.

This would facilitate the healthy development of the private press, and bring about a more

competitive and pluralist journalistic professionalism, contributing to greater democracy in

Ethiopia.

Acronyms

CPJ Committee to Protect Journalists

EBA Ethiopian Broadcasting Agency

EPRDF Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front

ETV Ethiopian Television

HRW Human Rights Watch

IREX International Research & Exchanges Board

OLF Oromo Liberation Front

ONLF Ogadenia National Liberation Front

MLLT Marxist Leninist League of Tigray

PMC Population Media Center

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Ethiopian authors are referred to by their first names following the name traditions of the

country.

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