the double helix of inequality and well-being _ social evolution forum

10/3/2014 The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being | Social Evolution Forum

http://socialevolutionforum.com/2013/02/08/the-double-helix-of-inequality-and-well-being/ 1/18

RSS Subscribe: RSS feedSocial Evolution ForumPromoting discussion and collaboration in social and cultural evolution

The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being

Posted on February 8, 2013 by Peter Turchin

28

The on-line magazine Aeon today published an article (http://www.aeonmagazine.com/living-together/peter-turchin-wealth-poverty/) of mine on why economic inequality tends to wax and wane in

very long (secular) cycles, and what consequences it has for the society.

One of the central ideas in the article was that general well-being (that is, of the overwhelming majorityof population) tends to move in the opposite direction from inequality: when inequality grows, well-

being declines, and vice versa. To illustrate this idea I put together an infographic, which was later

modified by the Aeons graphic designer. The result was visually pleasing, but I felt that the changesobscured certain features of the graph that I felt were important. I did not press the point, because

generally the editors at the Aeon made excellent suggestions, and greatly improved my text. Also, I am

a techno-geek when it comes to the analysis (graphical and statistical) of dynamics Ive been doing itfor nearly 30 years and wrote two technical books on it, so what I see is very different from what the

regular reader sees. I generally prefer austere black-and-white graphs, and use colors only when it isnecessary to make a point. A good scientific graph should be clear, not pretty.

A popular article, like the one on the Aeon, is not a place to provide the gory details of the analysisunderlying the infographic. Because the topic is quite controversial, I am sure my critics will want toknow these details so that they can rebut me. Eventually these details will be published as part of the

book that I am working on, but the graph has been published now, so I will use this blog to provide thebackground to the figure. Many of my readers may also be interested in the view from the kitchen ofwhere curves come from.So welcome to the kitchen.

First, here is the infographic in the form that I prefer.



(http://socialevolutionforum.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/infograph.jpg)The red curve shows the peaksand valleys of economic inequality, while the blue curve depicts the ups and downs of popular well-being. Heres a very important point: the curves reflect not absolute levels of these two variables, butdeviations around a trend. We all know that the United States changed dramatically between 1800 and2000 population grew by orders of magnitude, GDP and GDP per capita expanded, life expectancies



increased, and the quality of life generally improved. Generally speaking, the causes of these changesare quite well understood. But it does not mean that the change has occurred smoothly. Many variablesof interest to the structural-demographic theory (which explains the dynamics of inequality and well-being, among other things) have grown rapidly for some decades and then stagnated, or even declined

in subsequent periods. Then they resumed growing, and so on. I am interested in capturing theseoscillations around the rising trend, and the standard way of focusing on such deviations, calleddetrending, is to subtract the trend from the data.

Heres an illustration using the average age of first marriage as a proxy (indicator) of social mood.Generally speaking, when people feel optimistic about their future economic prospects they tend to getmarried early. If, on the other hand, they are unsure that they will have a well-paying job next year,they tend to delay marriage until they work up to a more secure position, or save some money.

However, age of first marriage is only imperfectly correlated with social optimism, because it is alsoaffected by other factors. For example, today people who are completely secure in their economicprospects tend to marry later than people in similar position who lived two centuries ago. For a varietyof reasons, as societies modernized, people tend to marry later.

Heres what the actual data for the average age of first marriage of American women looks like:



(http://socialevolutionforum.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/detrending.png)

The top half shows that the basic pattern is one of up, down, and again up around a rising mean. In the

bottom half I subtracted the trend, so now the numbers are fluctuating around the zero line.

There could be other reasons why the average age of marriage is an imperfect indicator of socialoptimism. For example, changes in tax laws that affect marriage penalty (or, conversely, marriage

advantage) may result in many people delaying marriage (or deciding to marry earlier). Additionally,while being able to marry when you found the love of your life (instead of waiting for years until you

can afford it) is certainly a good thing, its just one thing of many that makes us happy. Thus, if we

want to get at such a generic parameter as well-being its best to approach it with several proxies.

This is why I used four different indicators to approximate the generalized well-being curve. In additionto social optimism, proxied by marriage age, I also looked at an economic indicator and two biological

(health) indicators. The economic indicator is the wage of production workers divided by the GDP per



capita. Basically it tells us how the fruits of economic growth are distributed actually paid as wages toworkers, or paid out as dividends to share-holders or as compensation to CEOs.

The health aspect of well-being is captured with two proxies: life expectancy and the average stature

(height). Life expectancy is an obvious measure of the quality of life, and so is average stature as isdocumented in voluminous literature (including writings by the Nobel laureate Robert Fogel).

To combine the four variables into a single index, I did the following. First, I log-transformed each

variable to make peaks and valleys more symmetric. Then I detrended them, as with the age ofmarriage above. Finally I divided them by the standard deviation, which brings them all to the same

scale. Heres what the four curves look like when plotted together after detrending and scaling (note

that marriage age was flipped upside down, because it is earlier age that correlates with well-being):

(http://socialevolutionforum.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/wellbeing.jpg)

It is clear that there is a general tendency for these variables to move up and down together. However,

this correlation is by no means perfect. The erratic fluctuations are partly due to what is known as

measurement noise. This is particularly important for earlier periods, when collecting nationalstatistics has not yet been perfected. But, in addition, fluctuations also reflect genuinely different

dynamics of these proxies for well-being. In my tax law example, such legislation could affect marriageage, but not life expectancy, while the introduction of penicillin will affect life expectancy, but not

marriage age. By averaging the four curves (the thick line) we smooth out those erratic fluctuations,and bring out the cyclic component. This average is then my best estimate of the generalized well-

being curve, and it is the blue curve plotted in the main graph.



The red curve is easier to explain. It is based on the idea of Kevin Philips (as explained in the Aeon

article) to measure inequality by the ratio of the largest private fortune to the wealth of a typical(median) household:

year Largest

Fortune

($$mln)

Median

Wealth

($$)

Ratio

(1000)

1803 3 300 10

1830 6 350 17

1848 20 400 50

1868 40 500 80

1875 105 500 210

1890 200 540 370

1912 1000 800 1250

1921 1000 1250 800

1940 1500 1750 857

1962 1000 7200 139

1982 2000 33,300 60

1992 8000 43,200 185

1999 85,000 60,000 1417

2005 46,500 102,844 452

2010 54,000 66,740 809

Ratio is log-transformed, detrended, and scaled in the same way as other variables, after which itbecomes the red curve in the main graph.



Its pretty obvious that the red and blue curves are close to being mirror opposites of each other. Duringthe integrative phases of the secular cycles well-being is high and inequality low. During thedisintegrative phases well-being is low and inequality is high.

This does not mean that there is a direct causal connection, that inequality directly depresses quality oflife for the majority of population. Or that quality of life directly depresses inequality. Rather, these twovariables are different facets of some integrated whole. The Aeon article traces out the interconnections

between these and other structural-demographic variables (in dynamical systems there is no cause andeffect, each variable is both a cause and an effect).

In particular, if you look closer, you can see that trend reversals of the two curves are slightly out ofphase: inequality tends to turn the corner after well-being.

The main graph also lists some iconic events that illustrate the back-and-forth swings of American

history. The events on the left hand side, coded with red, are typical disintegrative phase occurrences.Mostly I am showing such instances of political instability as riots, violent labor strikes, and, of course,the American Civil War. Note how they tend to bunch up during the periods of growing inequality. Ihave also added Social Darwinism and Greed is Good on the left side of the ledger, for reasons

explained in the Aeon article.

On the right hand side and coded blue, I list some of the more important integrative occurrences.

Unlike internal wars (such as the American Civil War that divided the nation) external wars (War of1812, World War II) are listed on the right side of the ledger, because they were powerful unifying (andtherefore integrative) events.

You May Like

1.

Tagged: cliodynamics, inequality, social change, structural-demographic

Posted in: Blogs (http://socialevolutionforum.com/category/blogs/)

28 Responses The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being 1.

tgreernmT. Greer

February 9, 2013

Two questions:

About these ads (http://en.wordpress.com/about-these-ads/)



1) What is the data base for changing height stature of Americans?2) Do you believe that the rise in average-age-married during the last 30 years to be a reflection of

uncertainty in the future, or as is the standard interpretation, a direct result of the sexual revolution?If it is the second, wouldnt that tend to skew the data somewhat?

Reply

T. Greer

February 9, 2013

Oops, sorry, scratch the second question. Posted these after reading the Aoen essay. I ought othave paid a bit closer attention to the blog post itself!

Reply

Peter Turchin

February 9, 2013

The stature data is from the Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition (Table

Bd653-687. Selected anthropometric measurements-height, weight, and body mass index: 1710-1989). There is more up-to date data in papers by anthropometricists like John Komlos, but I amstill analyzing those data. The problem is that until humans reach the age of the early 20s we

dont really know what their height will be. So this makes it difficult to find out what stature didin the last 20 years. However, Komlos made much progress looking at the body length ofinfants, so we should be able to get a handle on it.

In any case, for the period up to 2000 (which is when the curve ends) we are on solid grounds.

Reply

O.A.Wehmanen

November 20, 2013

Stature as a measure of general nutrition level is a good choice, but it has a lag built in, andwith the very low recent price of food may not be as meaningful now as it it was 100 yearsago.

Reply

2.

dantae

February 11, 2013

Very interested and nice tutorial for me on detrending. Have you published more formally on the



Very interested and nice tutorial for me on detrending. Have you published more formally on the

idea of using marriage age as an important component of optimism/well being or can you point meto other such discussions? Have you considered whether male marriage age indexes otherinformation than female marriage age? Thanks

Reply

Peter Turchin

February 11, 2013

The curve of male ages of marriage essentially parallels that for females. On average, men tend

to marry a few years later, but the ups and downs are the same. So it really has something to dowith generalized optimism. A fun book to read about social moods is John Castis MoodMatters:

Mood Matters: From Rising Skirt Lengths to the Collapse of World Powers

And I will be making a more extended argument in my forthcoming book, to which the Aeonarticle refers.

Reply

Robert Wendell

December 6, 2013

Perhaps its relevant to this question that my wife and I happened to get married at the sametime? The only way any difference in marriage age between the sexes can exist is by virtueof age differences within each marrying couple.

Reply

3. John Lilburne

February 15, 2013

The pendulum swings, but sometimes the clock breaks.

The kondratiev cycle is a subset of the demographic cycle that you present so nicely in your booksand articles. The K cycle is basically driven debt/demograpy/innovation which has been significant

since the birth of the industrial world. Peopl who follow the kcycle also believe that we are enteringa period of stress from now right through till about 2013, when hope fully the debt has its jubileeand the innovation that is accumulating in PV energy, Nanotechnology, biotechnology can beapplied.

However there are major discontinuities that are approaching. Firstly the hostile elite that rules the



However there are major discontinuities that are approaching. Firstly the hostile elite that rules the

USA whose plans appear to be to extract maximum financial wealth and displace the Wasps, are insuch a position to change the whole political game in the USA. Obama has been given the power tokill on a whima reversal of everthing that america stood for. The declining power of the west

means that they can no longer impose order on many parts of the world particularly the middleeast. This is occuring at the time when conventional crude production has already peaked and smalldisturbances can create immense volatility. Lastly the USA was always an island continent

effectively free of outside influences. Now with the rise of China and Islamic power will have to startfacing fundamental changes in its power relationships and take second place in obtaining resources.There is a significant chance that if not in the current downside, then in the K-summer (c 2040)during a time when resources become tight and whites become a minority, that there will be

fundamental and dramatic changes in the whole world system. will it be from republic to principateor from Romulus Augustus to Odoacer is an interesting question

Reply

4. cardiffkook

February 18, 2013

Nevertheless, when Communism collapsed, its significance was seriously misread. Its true that theSoviet economy could not compete with a system based on free markets plus policies and norms

that promoted equity. Yet the fall of the Soviet Union was interpreted as a vindication of freemarkets, period. The triumphalist, heady atmosphere of the 1990s was highly conducive to thespread of Ayn Randism and other individualist ideologies. The unwritten social contract that had

emerged during the New Deal and braved the challenges of the Second World War had faded frommemory.

A simpler explanation is that the skilled US worker gained post WWII due to the lack of worldwide

competition, this began to erode as more women and minorities and competitors from other freenations entered the system. With the fall of Communism and the expansion of technology, thecompetition among laborers became substantially more fierce. Capital has flourished bycapitalizing on a surplus of labor.

On a broader scale, this has been the best period ever for workers worldwide. The importantdynamic today is not between some imaginary zero sum battle between the wealthiest capitalists

and workers, but between advantaged first world workers finally being placed on equal footingwith third world workers, minorities and women. More people have emerged from poverty in pastdecade than ever before, and it is because the playing field for labor has become more fair, not less.

Reply5.

cal48koho

February 22, 2013

Questions on the inequality Graph



I am a newbie to Cliodynamics and I have questions on the methodology of Kevin Philips graph ofinequality using ratios of the highest net worth to the median net worth. It would seem to me thatwe should be using the median of all the highest net worth fortunes rather than choosing a single

high net worth fortune as an index point. I just finished Secular Cycles and you chose the quantityof the elites as a factor in the cycles. It seems to me your approach makes more sense than Phillips.The tacit assumption in my comment is that I think inequality is understated by Philips. I wonderhow you would redraw the graph which I find less readable on a vertical axis than the more

traditional horizontal.

Reply

Peter Turchin

February 23, 2013

The problem with estimating the median of the highest fortunes is that it is not clear how todefine this class unambiguously. What is the cut-off point? In medieval France there was acategorical legal distinction between noblemen and commoners. So it would make sense to

calculate the median or the mean of noble fortunes. But in America there is no such categoricaldistinction. The top 0.1 percent grades into the top 1 percent who grade into the top 10 percent,and so on.

Reply

hugh owens md

February 23, 2013

Thank you for your explanation. Clear enough . It seems we are dealing with a Gaussian

distribution function which would be superior to point function analysis. . Contemporarydata would be no problem, but distant data? My point is that do you think that currentincome inequality is understated by the graph? If this is such an important variable in

cliodynamics, than accurate quantification is essential, especially in view of the commonlyrepeated meme of vastly increasing income inequality in the US, especially since 1980.

Reply

6. Peter Turchin

February 23, 2013

Remember that the graph was detrended. Its purpose is to identify the turning points, not the

relative height of peaks and troughs. Also, the curve is based on wealth, not income inequality.However, both wealth and income inequality turned a corner in the late 1970s and has been rapidlyincreasing. So the increase since 1980 is real enough.

Reply



7. Chekov

February 27, 2013

Hi Peter,

Great blog post and article in Aeon. Just one question it seems to me that there are two distinct

and different factors driving the upward trends in the well-being measure in your models thethreat of revolution in this period from the US, while the supply of labor is the one that you focus onfor the older societies. I dont think that this is problematic per se it is a reasonable conjecture thatthe threat of revolution was what prevented the modern examples from requiring a hugepopulation decline in order to turn the corner. If this is indeed the case then the differentiating factorwould be the pre-existing widespread belief in a revolutionary alternative (i.e. socialism) in themodern examples, which the elites were sufficiently afraid of to usher in reforms that caused the

cycle to turn the corner without any huge population cull.

The problem is, however, that we currently no longer have such a widespread belief in analternative and there is little or no prospect of a generalised labour shortage in the West givenautomation, productivity improvements, etc. This would suggest to me that the next trough in thewell-being curve will require cataclysm for the corner to be turned.

Am I reading this right or am I missing something?

Reply

Peter Turchin

February 28, 2013

I think of these two mechanisms as working together in an interactive way. Greatly simplifying,the threat of revolution caused a shift of social mood among the elites that caused them to adopta number of reforms. One of them was immigration reform that essentially shut downimmigration and decreased the supply of labor. Things are more complex, of course.Immigration Acts were not the only reforms that were adopted in the Progressive Era and laterNew Deal, and in fact most historians dont consider them as a major part of action duirng thisperiod.

On the effects of technlological change on labor supply one of the best articles is by RandallCollins. If you cant find it, Ill try to dig up the link later.

Reply

8.

David Hochfelder

March 9, 2013



Would it be useful to measure wealth inequality by using the Gini coefficient and income inequalityby the difference between mean and median income?

Reply

Peter Turchin

April 7, 2013

These are valid ways of measuring inequality, but I prefer not to use them, because they aredifficult to interpret. Opaque. When Gini goes from 0.6 to 0.65, what does it really mean? So I

prefer to look at such measures as the median to the lowest 10 %, the upper 10% (>90%) tomedian, and upper 1%, 0.1% and 0.001% to median. Such numbers are much more directlyunderstandable.

Reply

9.

Emulator

April 7, 2013

I was thinking about how age of first marriage indirectly measures social and economic optimism,and started wondering if marriage itself might also be a measure of asabiya. Specifically, could abreakdown of marriage be an indicator of general individualism and mistrust? Lower asabiya

might percolate down to the individual levels. Thus, I figured that a breakdown in families might bean indication of moralists (social conservatives) losing out to saints (social liberals) and knaves.

So, I looked for data, and found this: http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p70-126.pdf

Its interesting, because there is a very clear cut drop in percent of children in two-childrenhouseholds starting with the sexual revolution in the 60s, which goes along perfectly with yourdouble helix. On the other hand, the previous data is not as clear cut. There is a small rise in percent

of children living in two-parent households starting around 1900 and extending for a few decades,which coincides with the integrative phase. But I could just as easily argue that this may be due toincreases in life expectancy (i.e. it might not have been that children were born less out of wedlock,but that both parents tended to be alive). However, looking at the trends in the difference betweenthe percent of children living with father only and the percent of children living with mother onlysuggests otherwise (we wouldnt expect fathers to start dying less but mothers to start dying more,so the difference would likely be due to single motherhood).

Ill see if I can try to dig up data prior to 1880. If my hypothesis is correct, we would have seen anincrease in the difference between the percent of children living with mother only and the percent ofchildren living with father only.

Reply

Peter Turchin



April 7, 2013

I have been aware of these trends, but havent seen the data. I need to think about thesignificance of this for structural-demographic processes, though. Thanks very much forbringing these data up!

Reply

O.A.Wehmanen

November 20, 2013

Living in two parent households does not mean birth parents. Many children were sent West to

be adopted by farm families where labor was needed. I do not know if this was enough to affectthe gross statistics.

Reply

10. Georgetta

August 7, 2013

I all the time emailed this weblog post page to all my associates, since if like toread it then my links will too.

Reply11.

Robert Wendell

October 24, 2013

The best theory of history Im aware of before yours is R. Buckminster Fullers theory of the GreatPirates, although the latter is not at all rigorous in any mathematical sense. It seems that your eliteclass roughly corresponds, in principle at least, to the Great Pirates or their modern equivalent,whose real power is cyclical. These cycles would seem to correspond to an increase in power for the

elite originating in and supported by the general well-being of the society in question duringinclusive economic phases until the sense of entitlement this fosters in the elite (modern equivalent ofthe divine right of kings) rises to the point of self-destructive feedback in extractive economicphases. A virtual penny for your thoughts (grossly under-priced, Im sure).

Reply12.

Robert Wendell

October 24, 2013

By the way, Peter, are you familiar with this relatively recent Swiss study uncovering the network



By the way, Peter, are you familiar with this relatively recent Swiss study uncovering the networktopology of financial control in transnational corporations: The Network of Global CorporateControl? Heres the link:

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1107/1107.5728v2.pdf

If you can possibly find the time, you might also find these articles, with links to various pertinentstudies, interesting:

http://writerbeat.com/articles/592-Practical-Reality-Check-Ihttp://writerbeat.com/articles/709-Practical-Reality-Check-II

Reply

13. Slartibartfarst

December 29, 2013

Interesting, and probably true.This same/similar idea was put forward in the Stanford Research Institute report The Changing

Images of Man (1982).

Reply14.

Robert

January 1, 2014

It seems reasonable to assume we all know that some amount of income inequality is natural, sincewe as individuals have varying abilities to contribute productively to the economy. This begs thequestion of at what level income inequality is natural and/or (perhaps also) optimal. If we look atincome inequality as a causal factor with respect to well being, as your model as I understand itassumes, this seems to imply that well being is maximized at some optimum income inequalitylevel that we could possibly deduce from this data and use to guide policy decisions.

Judging from the very few cycles available in our history as displayed in the double helix graphic,it looks like well being peaks a few years earlier than the income inequality bottoms. If we assumesome time delay between a hypothetical optimal level of income inequality and maximum wellbeing, this appears to imply that some level well before the minimums of income inequality is ideal.In other words, too much distance in either direction from a hypothetical ideal level of incomeinequality reduces overall well being.

This looks to be rather strongly reinforced not only by the earlier peak, but by the substantialdecreases in well being preceding the minimum points of income inequality. Since this graphic isdetrended, it is not possible to deduce anything reliable about this from the graphic, since no ratiorepresenting income equality is consistent along the time axis. In fact, the fairly radical changes inratios over time for the same distance from the central axis raises the doubt that any long term



absolute value could ever be deduced from the available data (detrended or not). However, therestill might exist some way to derive a short term optimum value within a given economy. I wouldlove to know what consideration you have given this or your current thoughts about it if not.

Reply15.

Robert

January 1, 2014

Addendum: The assumption of some hypothetical ideal or natural level of income inequality

seems to explain why economic systems like Marxism or heavily socialist systems that work toeliminate inequality or reduce it too much are doomed to failure. If we assume that there is atheoretical ideal for income inequality that perfectly rewards with absolute fairness each individualstrue economic contribution to society, this could well explain why too much or too little net incomeinequality at a societal level would reduce the well being of that society.

I would think that there would be some psychological nuance that factors into this simple andperhaps overly simplistic view. It seems likely that having some safety net would remove

counterproductive anxiety that could otherwise reduce productivity by reducing individualresilience or recuperative potential. This is obviously one possible example of an exception to whatan overly literal interpretation of how a theoretical ideal for income inequality that perfectlyrewards with absolute fairness each individuals true economic contribution to society mightactually translate to optimum economic function.

My personal interest in what I regard as your very important work is inspired by how it applies to

good government. By good government I refer to how we might structure government andpositively constrain how it legislates with the aim to optimize economic function and its fairness. Isuspect optimum economic function and fairness tempered by compassion for the genuinelyincapacitated are in practice equivalent terms. I dont pretend that we could structure to fullyconform to such an ideal, but I suspect we could greatly reduce the bumps in the road with anadequate governmental and legal suspension system, if you will indulge the metaphor.

Reply16.

Robert

January 6, 2014

Peter, Im realizing I was wrong in stating that you assume a causal relationship between income

inequality and societal well being. The following are my admittedly highly speculative thoughts inreaction to your research:

Income inequality that is too low or excessively reduced politically (Marxism) fails to reward theeconomic merit of individual contributions adequately to motivate overall productivity andresulting societal well being while rewarding too much those who fail to contribute. Thats theessence of why fully Marxist economies guarantee failure.



Income inequality that is too high rewards the financial elite too much for too little genuineeconomic merit in their contributions to society while rewarding the less wealthy too little for theirvaluable work. That is the essence of what threatens to turn highly extractive economies into failedstates. Its not as if we had no examples of any of this.

This should make it very clear why the financial elite who promote conditions that favor highincome inequality use the clear failure of Marxism to support their schemes. Its an easy game to

play, since history has already demonstrated the utter failure of Marxism while the evils at theopposite extreme are less obvious, making it a simple matter to misdirect attention by inflatingMarxist tendencies and blaming all the wrong things. But either excessively high or low incomeinequality excessively rewards the wrong people for their contributions. Very high incomeinequality excessively rewards the wealthy while very low income inequality excessively rewardsunproductive slackers and fails to motivate productive enterprise.

These factors motivate less productive workers to favor socialist tendencies while motivating thosewith an aristocratic sense of entitlement to favor laissez-faire (unpoliced) capitalism. I see this as theessence of political conflict in any society. The ideal situation would be willing, productive economiccontributors who sincerely desire fair compensation to everyone for the genuine economic merit intheir individual contributions.

However, selfish desire for unearned advantage is a common human flaw as abundantly illustrated

in gambling addictions, a sense of unmerited wealth as ones due by virtue of mere social status(aristocratic entitlement, divine right of kings, etc.), exploitation of others for personal gain justifiedonly by the power to do so, theft, fraud, abuse of government safety nets like welfare and foodstamps, etc. Selfish desire for unearned advantage is common to all these social ailments at bothends of the social/financial spectrum.

I see this is as the root cause of the excessive oscillations back and forth between the extremes of

high and low income inequality around whatever level at which it would naturally settle if thesehuman flaws were absent. I suspect that just as law and law enforcement ideally and fortunatelyoften successfully reduce criminal behavior in decently well-ordered societies and so increaseprotection for law abiding citizens, intelligent legal and economic structures based on thisunderstanding could also potentially reduce substantially the wild extremes of income inequalitygenerated by the flawed human tendency to selfishly seek unmerited rewards at the expense ofsociety.

The failure to recognize the dual nature, the double-edged sword of selfish interest is in my opinionthe great gaping hole in Ayn Rands thinking. She praises it in entrepreneurs, ignoring the ethics orlack of it in the means and pretending that efficient markets abound and automatically self-regulate. Meanwhile, she despises precisely the same selfishness as it manifests in free-loaders at theother end of the spectrum. Ill-gotten gains for the wealthy are just as despicable as free-loading onwelfare, food stamps, or disability by someone perfectly capable of earning an adequate living.

Worse, there is a vast difference in their proportion of the economy, making the free-loading(exploitative, predatory, crony) component of the self-entitled wealthy by far the biggest potentialthreat to societal well being as long as we avoid a Marxist ideal that pretends to eliminate thenatural inequality of income and wealth. (Precisely because income inequality is natural and so in



practice impossible to eliminate, Marxism guarantees frightfully enormous levels of politicalhypocrisy, as if politics were not already intrinsically hypocritical.) The current paranoia regarding

Marxism on the current far right is just the result of the entitled wealthy successfully enlisting grassroots political help in their fight against anything that would reduce their ability to suck upunearned money from the economy at largein other words, from all the rest of us.

Currently I see most if not virtually all conservatives as completely clueless regarding both theseissues and which end of the swing were now experiencing. They keep trying to justify with AynRand or whomever else a situation that is economically unsustainable in any practical economic

scenario.

Reply17.

Robert

January 6, 2014

Peter, I think you will find this research on the psychological effect on ordinary subjects when madeto feel even briefly rich with play money very interesting in light of your observations of elitebehaviors:

http://planetsave.com/2013/12/23/a-rigged-game-of-monopoly-reveals-how-feeling-wealthy-changes-our-behavior-ted-video/

Reply

Blog at WordPress.com.The Inuit Types Theme.

Follow

Follow Social Evolution Forum

Powered by WordPress.com

the double helix of inequality and well-being _ social evolution forum

Documents

downs of popular wellbeing

article http

popular article

important point

magazine aeon

gory details

kitchen ofwhere curves

good scientific graph