the (dis)united kingdom and the european union

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Projet collectif de Marie Agard, Pierre-Yves Angles, Manon Bouché, Irini Hajiroussou, Charles Hart et Christiane Van Ophem, étudiants de Sciences Po dans le cadre de leurs Masters, en partenariat avec l'Atelier Europe.Plus d'infos: http://www.atelier-europe.eu/blog/2015/05/projets-2015-d…ences-po-paris.html

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  • Cover image - Lafontaine May 2014

  • The (dis)United Kingdom and the European Union

    Research project

    April 2015

  • Authors

    Sciences Po Paris graduate students

    Coordinators from Atelier Europe : Thomas Mimra and Quentin Perret

    Pierre-Yves Angles, 21 French

    Masters in French Public Affairs

    Marie Agard, 21 French

    Masters in European Affairs

    Manon Bouch, 22 French and British

    Masters in European Affairs (group coordinator)

    Irini Hajiroussou, 24 Cypriot and British

    Masters in European Affairs

    Irini Hajiroussou, 21 Cypriot and British, Master of European Affairs

    Charles Hart, 22 British

    Masters in Economics and Business

    Christiane Van Ophem, 22 Dutch

    Masters in International Public Management (PSIA)

  • Table of contents Abstract and methodology P.1

    I- The UK's Historically Ambiguous Relations with the EU P.2

    A. The UK as a Historical Outsider to the EU P.2 B. Deconstructing the Idea of the UK as a Reluctant Partner to the EU P.5 C. Other Diplomatic Relations of the UK P.7

    II- UK Internal Politics and the (dis)United Kingdom P.10

    A. National Divides and the (dis)United Kingdom P.10 B. Party Politics and the (dis)United Kingdom P.14

    III- The United Kingdom and the European Union P.19

    A. The Failing EU system and its Perception in the UK P.19 B. The Immigration Debate and the Free Movement of People P.21 C. The Economic and Financial Implications of EU Membership P.24

    IV- A Comprehensive Overview of the Different Options after May 2015 P.29

    A. The UK Stays in the EU without any Reform P.29 B. The UK stays in the EU with a Reform P.31 C. The UK exits the EU P.33

    Appendix P.35 References P.36 Acknowledgements P.39

  • Abstract This report aims at examining the role of the UK as a historical outsider to the project of European integration by analysing the factors that led the UK to join the European project in the 1970s and the factors that have affected its membership ever since. Pertinent issues relating to the UK-EU relationship have been analysed. These issues include: the UKs historical trajectory as a colonial power and a special ally to the US, its unique notion of sovereignty based on national institutions, the internal national divides between England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, party politics and the positions of the major UK parties on the European question, the influence of the media, the recent rise of the immigration question, and the economic and financial implication of EU membership. The possible scenarios of a British exit following a referendum in 2017 have also been examined. These scenarios consist of: the UK remaining in the EU without reform, the UK remaining in the EU after some reform have been achieved, the UK leaving the EU, and any alternative models of potential UK-EU cooperation.

    Methodology This report is the product of a group project by six Sciences Po Master Students. The methodology followed includes a series of personal interviews with academics, politicians and business people involved in European matters. The interviews were conducted either in person, over the phone, or by email over the course of the months of November 2014 to April 2015. The material that has informed this report has also resulted from academic research into the historical and current relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union; multiple books, academic articles, research papers, and polls were consulted. The coverage of UK-EU issues in the press was also monitored, both at the UK level and internationally.

    The (dis)United Kingdom April 2015 1

  • I- The UK's Historically Ambiguous Relations with the EU

    A. The UK as a Historical Outsider to the EU Throughout history the UK has been the European Unions awkward partner1. Its involvement in European integration has often been somewhat incomplete; indeed some have suggested that it has acted as a brake on the integration process, at least with respect to the emergence of a politically and socially unified Europe. This perception arises directly from the history of UK-EU relations, throughout which the UK has provided only distant and conditional support to the construction of a united Europe. During the first phase of the UK-EU relationship, dating from 1945 to 1973, which corresponds to the period prior to its accession to the European Community, the UK chose to remain in the background, watching the European process develop without getting formally involved. However, during this period we can already find the grounds for its participation in the European project that began in 1973. Between 1973 and 1997, the UK became a model of partial integration, leaving the door open to the multi-speed Europe that is still in effect today. Nevertheless the last twenty years have seen increasing Euroscepticism in the UK, a trend that is at the core of concerns regarding both future UK-EU collaboration and the current position of the UK in the EU. 1945-1973: the UK in the Background of the Construction of Europe In contrast to its European neighbours, the United Kingdom was a victor of the Second World War. Due to the fact that the War was fought on European soil, causing immense economic and humanitarian losses, the countries of continental Europe felt very strongly about the European project as one promoting peace and making war not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible2. The European project, in all its different manifestations, was designed to deal with unsatisfactory politics, whether that was post-war politics between the members of the European Coal and Steel Community or the corrupt and inefficient national politics commonplace in the southern countries of Europe3. The UK on the other hand never saw itself as broken, neither after the Second World War nor in more recent times, as its colonial empire was preserved and its close bond with the United States was maintained, if not reinforced. As a consequence, it did not feel an urgent need to cooperate, in economic and political terms, with its European neighbours in order to rebuild and enhance its global influence. British behaviour during this period could be described as reserved benevolence. Churchill, in his speech at the University of Zurich (1946), symbolised this position by advocating the model of the United States of Europe which he endorsed by claiming that In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living4, all the while never intending for the UK to be included in the European ensemble. Overall, the British were not opposed to the establishment of a European entity but, while this support was forthcoming in principle, the UK did not wish to be full and active participants. Their first concern, which has subsequently become a common theme running throughout British Euroscepticism, was the defence

    1 George, Stephen. An awkward partner: Britain in the European Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 2 Schuman, Robert. "The Schuman Declaration." (1950). 3 Simms, Brendan. Personal Interview. 09 January 2015. 4 Churchill, Winston. "Speech to the Academic Youth." Zrich, Switzerland (1946).

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  • of the UK`s national sovereignty. Indeed, the UK has a strong parliamentary tradition, which makes any form of supranationalism less likely to be accepted. However throughout the 1960s the picture gradually changed. The economic conditions in the UK steadily worsened, which reinforced the divergence between the growth of the British economy and those of its European neighbours. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the economies of the European Community (EC) experienced robust economic growth with their GDP per capita rising by 70 per cent in the period between the end of the Second World War and the early 1970s5. The UK on the other hand was performing relatively badly; in the third quarter of 1973 GDP had fallen by 3.3 per cent and had been falling for five quarters prior to this date6. Therefore, the UK had little choice but to join the EC7 as, in doing so, it was perceived to be harnessing itself to a much stronger economic engine8. The decision to engage in more collaboration with Europe was therefore clearly based on pragmatic grounds, the priority being to secure Britain's economic and geopolitical influence on the global scale. However, the UKs membership of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) between 1960 and 1973, seen as a viable alternative to full European participation, turned out not to be as beneficial or effective as was hoped. Alongside these developments, the ability of the UK to provide strong international leadership exhibited its bounds, partly due to the political cooperation between the European Community and the United States that threatened the previously privileged transatlantic relationship between the USA and the UK. The ratio between the political cost (in terms of sovereignty) and the economic benefit from the accession to the common market was henceforth in favour of the latter9. But the UK had to wait until 1961 for the first accession negotiations to begin, under the Conservative government of Harold Macmillan. The first two attempts, in 1963 and 1967, were both hindered by the French President Charles De Gaulle, who used his veto to deny the UK membership on both occasions. The UK, in the eyes of France, was a Trojan Horse employed by the US to extend its influence over Europe who also had specific demands regarding some core European policies. The most noteworthy of these being the UKs questioning of the terms of the Common Agricultural Policy, which was very dear to the French, and the contributions to the European Budget required from individual nations. However, following the accession of Georges Pompidou to the French Presidency in 1969, the UKs path to Europe was once again open. As a result, the 1970s saw the UK make a delayed and rather unenthusiastic entrance into the European Community. From being an external observer more preoccupied with strengthening its relationship with the USA, pragmatic considerations led the UK to European membership. The UK became an inside-outsider shaping, in its own way, the future of Europe. 1973-1997: the Construction of a Multi-Speed Europe In 1973, the outsider came in: the UK, alongside Ireland and Denmark, joined the European Community. Its outsider reputation did not however change simply with membership. Furthermore, the European Community was at that time going through a relative economic decline, having been

    5 Balcerowicz, Leszek. "Economic Growth in the European Union." Lisbon Council E-Book (n.d.): n. pag. Lisbon Council. Growth and Competitiveness Commission, 2013-14. Web. 2015. 6 "Inflation Report." Bank of England (n.d.): n. pag. Feb. 2009. Web. 7 Kassim, Hussein. Personal Interview. 11 February 2015. 8 Hazell, Robert. Personal Interview. 05 January, 2015. 9 Schnapper, Pauline. Le Royaume-Uni Doit-il Sortir De L'Union Europenne ? Paris: La Documentation Franaise, 2014. Print.

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  • caught up in the world economic crisis. Given this context, the UK predominantly experienced the drawbacks of its membership rather than the potential benefits. With Labour the winner of the 1974 elections, and having pledged in its campaign to renegotiate the terms of its membership, the referendum process was set in motion in 1975. When the possible Brexit (*British Exit of the EU) referendum of 2017 in mind, it is important to note that so far, the sole referendum on the UKs membership of the European Community occurred in that year, at the initiative of Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson. The UK joined the EC as a collaborative, confederal, but primarily economic project. It was never Britains intention to join a group intended on ever-closer political union10. At the time of the 1975 referendum the pro-European campaign did not make a case about European identity, their argument was principally a pragmatic and economic one. One could argue that there was a misunderstanding of sorts as to where the European project was headed when the UK joined, or even that the British elite misled the public. In voting yes to joining the EC, the British public were not made aware of all the potential ramifications such a decision would involve11. With a victory for continued membership in the referendum, the UK's anchoring to Europe seemed to be confirmed, but this is not to say the issue was resolved. It continued to be an ambivalent member at best, regardless of the Labour and Conservative leaders who succeeded each other. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, of course, left a permanent imprint on the British attitude towards the European Community. The differentiated integration became a leitmotiv during her mandate. The financial contribution of the UK to the European Budget was one of the main issues at the time, and contributed to this struggle for a multi-speed Europe. The Dublin summit in 1979 crystallised these tensions, with Thatchers famous I want my money back epithet, which resulted in the UK's contribution being reduced at Fontainebleau in 1984. At the same time, the UK also refused to take part in the European Monetary System, and accepted in extremis the electoral system by universal suffrage to the European Parliament. The number of opt-out provisions increased during the Thatcher era and under her successor, the Conservative Prime Minister John Major who succeeded Thatcher in 1990. Again, the UK sat on the sidelines and refused to participate in any deepening of European integration or any development towards a more politically and socially united Europe. Thatchers Bruges speech revealed the British position towards the European Community: they were not inherently against the notion, but support was conditional on the maintenance of the UKs national sovereignty and provided that European membership did not infringe upon the national identity or characteristics. This position forced the UK to be permanently on the defensive regarding the continent. The Maastricht Treaty, which left a bitter taste in the mouth of a majority of European countries, was considered a great success on the British side: references to federalism were shrugged off, moves towards a more social Europe were not enforced and the UK was able to reject its participation in the Schengen acquis. However, it did see a shift from a Community to a Union and the reinforcement of European citizenship. This time is characterised by the UKs increasing scepticism of the European Union. In the 1990s, a strong Eurosceptic movement emerged and consolidated itself. The more European integration advanced, the stronger British animosity towards it turned out to be. 1997 - Today: a wave of Euroscepticism submerging the UK The most recent period of the UK-EU relationship has seen Euroscepticism emerge as a mainstream, legitimate concern of both the British public and its political class, regardless of political affiliation, although several degrees of Euroscepticism exist. 10 Simms, Brendan. Personal Interview. 09 January 2015. 11 Kassim, Hussein. Personal Interview. 11 February 2015.

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  • Positive signals were sent to Brussels from London when, the leader of the Labour Party, Tony Blair came to power in 1997. He pledged his willingness to set the country up as a leader in the European Union, through a less obstructive and more proactive attitude. Subsequently significant progress was made, notably on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 1998, the Lisbon Council in 2000 and a generally positive assessment of the 2005 British Presidency of the Council of the EU. But Eurozone membership was a non-starter, despite Blair being in favour of it in principle. Gordon Brown, Blair's Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, was deeply convinced that the differences between the UKs economy and those of continental Europe were too fundamental to adopt a common currency. From 2007 onwards Brown, as Prime Minister, showed himself even less enthusiastic towards the adoption of the Euro, particularly as he was confronted by a Eurosceptic wave of public opinion, which called for a referendum. The 2008 global financial crisis also played a role in reinforcing the distance with the EU and the Eurozone. Some assume that the UK has entered a process of European deconstruction. Although the UK never truly accepted the European project, it seems to be prepared to break away from the European Union, which is seen as a constraint harming British interests and infringing on its sovereignty and national attributes. Throughout recent history, the UK can indeed be regarded as an outsider, whose opinion has quietly evolved from a relative detachment towards undisguised hostility.

    B. Deconstructing the Idea of the UK as a Reluctant Partner to the EU Since joining the European Community in 1973, the UK has gained the title of reluctant partner in all matters concerning the European project. But does the UK really deserve this title? Many factors are at play behind the UKs lacklustre enthusiasm, and at times even outright unwillingness, to participate in European integration. What's more, the UK has had and still has a much more important role to play in the European project than it is given credit for.

    British Perceptions of the European Project A Historical Perspective

    For many of the years between the 1970s and 2000s, despite the existence of a marginal, albeit constant, element of Euroscepticism in British politics, the general perception of the European project was one of relatively quiet contentment12. In the UK, debate historically focused on certain Treaty reforms and new legislation, such as the Working Time Directive. However, it did so within the framework of the EC or EU, and in doing so contributed to the debate regarding the direction that the European project should take. It was generally accepted that if one is part of the EU one must abide by its law-making process, and the EU is a very efficient legislative machine that has produced thousands of regulations and directives. Despite debate about their content, there were not many objections in the UK about the actual system itself simply because it was from elsewhere13.

    Furthermore, many European countries regard the UK as a strong ally, notably through numerous bilateral collaborations. France is a key example of this, with Franco-British defence and security cooperation still being very much in force today fuelled by Frances desire to develop the role of the UK as a counterweight to German predominance in the Union. Where then does the UKs reluctant partner title come from? British reluctance for European integration might currently be at an all-time high but it has historical roots and reflects internal divisions and features unique to the UK.

    12 Craig, Paul. Personal Interview. 20 January 2015. 13 Craig, Paul. Personal Interview. 20 January 2015.

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  • A British take on Sovereignty

    The current debate has focused greatly on the question of sovereignty and whether or not the UK has ceded too much of it to the EU. This preoccupation with sovereignty is revealing of the very unique notion of sovereignty that exists in Britain. There is a sense of a separate sovereign Britain based on institutions such as the Parliament, the army, and the currency, as well as control of the nations borders. The UK wants to retain control over its borders and this can be seen in the fact that it never joined the Schengen zone14. However, the sovereignty question extends far beyond border control. The notion of sovereignty in Britain is conceived in a dual manner, firstly there is parliamentary sovereignty that depends on the constitutional principle that Parliament is the highest power in the land. As such, any primacy of EU law and any European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision against the UK is a direct affront against Parliament. Secondly, there is a notion of historical sovereignty stemming from the idea of Britain undefeated in war and not invaded since 1066. Upon joining the European project in the 1970s, the issue of sovereignty was not raised. Edward Heath spoke of pooled sovereignty in his speeches, but the idea of losing sovereignty to Europe is a new one15. Keeping in mind Britains unique take on sovereignty and given developments in the EU (such as the opening of borders and the establishment of EU law as supreme over national law), one is better able to understand the reluctance towards European integration shown by a portion of the British public and British political class.

    British Perceptions of the European Project A Contemporary Perspective

    Despite the media attention the EU is receiving currently in the UK, issues including the Common Market and the Single Currency are not at the top of the British publics concerns16. According to polls conducted by Ipsos Mori, when Britons were asked to identify the most important issues facing the UK in 2014, EU-related issues scored between 6 and 12 per cent. Issues such as crime (11 to 16 per cent), defence (7 to 23 per cent), education (12 to 17 per cent) and the economy (30 to 41 per cent) consistently ranked as more important17. For some of the policy areas Britons are most worried about, namely crime and education, the EU does not have exclusive competences; and for defence it does not have any competence. Therefore the perception of the UK as an actively anti-EU force is due in a large part to the rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party (Ukip) and the noise they create rather than an actual anti-European sentiment characterising the entire country.

    Relative Support for EU Membership

    Despite appearances, support for continued membership in the EU in 2014 was at a 14 year high with 61 per cent of those surveyed in an Ipsos Mori poll stating that the UK should remain in the EU18. However, in another poll in the same year participants were given the choice between further integration, continued EU membership under current conditions, returning to an economic community without political links, and leaving the EU. While only 17 per cent opted for leaving the EU, 34 per cent expressed the desire to go back to an economic community without political links, 29 per cent were content with the current conditions of membership and only 14 per cent wanted to see further integration19. As can be seen here, the UK is not as reluctant a partner as some would 14 Simms, Brendan. Personal Interview. 09 January 2015. 15 Kassim, Hussein. Personal Interview. 11 February 2015. 16 Hazell, Robert. Personal Interview. 05 January 2015. 17 "European Union Membership - Trends." Ipsos MORI. N.p., 22 Oct. 2014. Web. 2015. 18 "Preferences for Britain's Future Role in Europe." Ipsos MORI. N.p., 22 Oct. 2014. Web. 2015. 19 "Issues Index: 2007 Onwards. The Most Important Issues Facing Britain Today." Ipsos MORI. N.p., 25 Mar. 2014.

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  • have it. Furthermore, the UK has a directive transposition deficit of only 0.3 per cent, well below the EU-wide deficit of 0.7 per cent. It also takes the UK 4.8 months on average to transpose directives, whereas the EU average is 7.5 months20. Therefore, despite both the increasing arguments against integration heard within the UK as well as an innate Euroscepticism based on notions of a unique British sovereignty, the UK is still overall in favour of the European project and not as reluctant to implement it within its own borders as might be perceived. However, these Eurosceptic tendencies should not be ignored, as appetite for further integration is low and the calls for a re-evaluation of the conditions of Britains membership to the EU seem to be getting louder.

    C. Other Diplomatic Relations of the UK

    Nostalgia and Fantasy around Churchills Three Circles On October 9th 1948, Winston Churchill made a speech at the Congress of Conservatives. While the UK had started to feel its influence decline during the aftermath of the Second World War and the growing intensity of decolonisation, he defined the international policy of the realm as organised around three circles, classified by strategic importance. First amongst these circles, in terms of significance, was the US-Anglo Saxon domain, second came the Commonwealth and the colonies of the UK, and Europe came third. Following the era of decolonisation, the rise of the EU, the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new economic powers, one is fully aware of how the three circles model is irrelevant in the present day. However, this model shaped the British consciousness as well as giving rise to a certain contempt of Europe and the EU. A Certain Perception of the UK and its National Pride opposing the EU As the 19th century French sociologist and historian Andr Siegfried ironised: The UK is an island, and I shall stop here. Since its colonial era and throughout the 20th century, the UK has developed a feeling far from shared on the continent: the one of being an independent and self-sufficient power. The UKs colonial history has played an important role in the development of its national identity. By the end of the 18th century, after the loss of its North-American colonies and the onset of the industrial revolution, the mastering of the British Empire and its development became essential to the prosperity of the UK. This nostalgia of the wealth brought by the Empire as led to favouring the Commonwealth as a trade partner and refusing the first trade agreements the EU proposed. One should also keep in mind how the UK has always regarded Europe as a potential threat to contain. The UK has always wanted to make sure no strong continental power would rise for it could threaten its own land. Therefore, UK alliances changed throughout histories (Spain, France, Russia, or Germany), depending on the rising power to oppose. It was all about ensuring a balance of powers. After the Second World War, an alliance with the US, the promotion of the Marshall plan in Europe (1947), and the creation of NATO (1949) helped ensure the USSR would not take over the continent. The negative perception of Europe as a threat or a burden is still prevalent in the UK. In her speech at the Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool (1999), Margaret Thatcher said: In my lifetime, all the problems have come from mainland Europe, and all the solutions have come from the

    Web. 2015. 20 "United Kingdom." The EU Single Market. The European Commission, Nov. 2014. Web. 2015.

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  • English-speaking nations across the world21. A certain belief in British uniqueness still exists too. In 2013, Cameron stated: We have the character of an island nation - independent, forthright, passionate in defence of our sovereignty. We can no more change this British sensibility than we can drain the English Channel.22 The EU has been regarded as a threat throughout history by the UK. During the 1970s, it was an economic partner to deal with. Nowadays, it is an administrative sovereignty-thirsty Leviathan. However, since joining the EU, the UK has had a huge influence on its economic development and legislation. Most of the external trade of the UK is carried out with the EU. The diplomatic strength of the UK might also be sustained by strengthening the EU. The UKs recent past seems to reveal a trend towards isolationist tendencies and a slight withdrawal from the international scene. Even though it is part of the UN Security Council and has one of the strongest economies and armies in the EU, the UK has refused to play an active role in the resolution of the Ukrainian crisis and has left the responsibility to France and Germany. In comparison with France, the UKs presence and role in Africa are also minor. This weakened position of the UK on the international scene is due to the recognition of the failures of the UK in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the associated costs of those interventions. The Lord Chamberlain recently ordered reports on this noticeable withdrawal from participation in international affairs. Enrico Letta echoes this view of UK isolationism and states that the British diplomatic triangle (US UK Commonwealth) is no longer relevant23. Adrian Pabst considers this phenomenon started in 1956 with the Suez crisis when France and the UK were robustly outmuscled by the US and the USSR24. Since then, one can argue the UK has stopped considering its world influence independently of the support it receives from the US. Is the UK a Satellite of the US25? The UK has always had close relations with the US. This exceptional alliance is one of reasons why the UK seems to approach involvement with the EU cautiously. The UK-US cooperation is economic, diplomatic, military and related to their intelligence agencies, as illustrated by the 2013 Edward Snowden scandal. In September 2013, a scandal also broke that claimed that the UKs intelligence service of the Government Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ) hacked the Belgian telephone operator Belgacom in 2011 in order to provide the USs National Security Agency (NSA) with access to valuable information concerning the providers infrastructure. Regarding UK-US cooperation, one may also remark that the UK has followed the US into a number of conflicts during the most recent decades (the Gulf War in 1990, Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003). After the Second World War, the UK strengthened their relationship with the US as a means to provide for stability in Europe. With the Suez crisis, the UK acquiesced to the leadership of the Americans and aligned their foreign policies with those of the US. According to Adrian Pabst the reasons behind this similar alignment are to do with a lack of imagination as much as a lack of courage26. Even though Frances reputation was as similarly harmed as the UKs following the post-Suez crisis fallout, the policies of De Gaulle and Frances active participation in the European project served to uphold the independence and strength of France during the Cold War. De Gaulle also developed an independent nuclear force in France while the development of a nuclear weapon by the UK relied on US technology. It is in this context that De Gaulle refused to let the UK join the

    21 Thatcher, Margaret. Conservative Party Conference. UK, Blackpool. 06 Oct. 1999. Thatcher Foundation. Web. 2015. 22 Cameron, David. EU Speech at Bloomberg. 23 Jan. 2013. Gov.UK. Web. 2015. 23 Letta, Enrico. Personal Interview. 17 March 2015. 24 Pabst, Adrian. Personal Interview. 2015. 25 Gunol, Thomas. Personal Interview. 2015 26 Pabst, Adrian. Personal Interview. 2015.

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  • EEC in 1963 and 1967 for they would be a Trojan Horse of the US in the organisation. Since joining the EU, the UK has made sure to remain close to the US. For example, until Tony Blair came to power, the UK strictly refused to entertain the idea of a common European defence policy. During periods of the 20th century, the influence of the cooperation between the US and the UK at an international level cannot be overstated. For instance, the unique cooperation of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher during the 1980s is a clear example of how these two nations can cooperate and set up major changes in the world. Nowadays, the US is strongly in favour of the UK staying in the EU for doing so best supports their interests. For example, the UK is very supportive of the US-EU Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) currently under discussion in Brussels. However, the idea of the UK being the Trojan Horse of the US can no longer be maintained. Despite these strong connections between the UK and the EU, Adrian Pabst feels international alliances are changing. Britain is no longer punching above its weight but is increasingly seen as a liability by the US, not least due to draconian defence cuts and an inability to carry out military interventions, such as Libya (2011). The US is switching its focus from the UK to other allies in Europe. Countries like the Netherlands, or parties and leaders such as the Spanish or French centre-right wing are strong supporters of American interests. The strategic partnership between NATO and the EU has given the US a means to influence the development of the EUs defence policy and ensure that an EU defence arm more independent from NATO does not come into existence. Additionally, the relationship is important to the EU since its common military capacity is limited. Were a Brexit to occur, the UK could not rely on the special relationship with the US alone to compensate for the economic loss and declining status on the international scene that exiting the EU would bring about. Ireland offers a much better example of how to balance close ties with the US and an open desire to be involved into the EU system. However Eurosceptic the population might be, the UK seems to perceive to a greater and greater extent how the EU might be of economic and diplomatic value to the UK in the near future. When asked with whom the UK should have the closest international ties with, 56 per cent of British people answered with the EU when only 25 per cent of the population suggested the US.

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  • I I- UK Internal Politics and the (dis)United Kingdom

    A. National Divides and the (dis)United Kingdom

    Having seen how international ties influence the UKs relationship with the EU, it is now time to consider domestic influences that shape it. The general trend is to look at the United Kingdom as a single entity that presents a common hostility to the European project. Such a perception however is not only fallacious but also overly simplistic. While the UK has to take into account the growing animosity of public opinion towards the European Union, it must also reflect on its own internal divides. Made up of four nations, the UK has been home to a revival of increasingly strong claims for further devolution and even independence in the past years. In order to tackle the Brexit debate in a more comprehensive way, it is therefore essential to better understand the national divides that exist within the UK. Northern Ireland's unique relationship with Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland since the Home Rule project began in the mid 19th century, and the climate of violence that emanated thereafter, makes it a fascinating issue which is nevertheless too complex and specific to study here. Consequently, we shall be focusing on national divides at the level of Great Britain, between England, Scotland, and Wales. The Scottish Independence Referendum The cleavage in politics and identity between these nations was brought to light in a particularly striking way by the Scottish independence referendum on September 18th 2014. When British Prime Minister David Cameron and Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond signed the Edinburgh Agreement on October 15th 2012, instating the protocol for the referendum to come, only around a quarter of the Scottish electorate stated that they would vote yes to independence. Considering the actual result of the referendum, which saw 45 per cent of Scots claiming their independence, it is therefore safe to say that Westminster underestimated the risk that such a referendum would pose to the existence of the Union. This result is all the more impressive seeing as the referendum took place under circumstances that should have seen a more sweeping victory for the Pro-Union argument. Indeed, the coalition government in place since 2010 has never hidden its strong opposition to the breaking up of the British entity. Parallel to this the alleged Britishness bounce brought about by the events of the summer of 2012 not to mention the Queen's Jubilee and the London Olympic Games could have made the Scottish independence referendum a non-starter. However, it could be that the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow and the Edinburgh Festival in the summer just preceding the referendum, propitious to patriotic gatherings and the brandishing of the saltire, participated in strengthening the manifestations of Scottish identity. This relative victory at the referendum, with a much higher result than could have been anticipated even a few weeks before the actual vote, seems to have been somewhat underestimated in the press. This overwhelming vote in favour of the yes undoubtedly constitutes a real statement, and is in all probability due to the obvious gap in quality of the opposing campaigns leading up to the referendum. While the umbrella organisation Better Together, representing pro-Union supporters, based its campaign on the risks of a separation rather than on the benefits of a unity (despite its name), Yes Scotland managed a proactive and highly visible campaign. A whole ten months before the referendum, the Scottish government, led by the Scottish National Party since May 2011, published a White Paper entitled The Future of Scotland which, although shrouded in Whitehallese vocabulary, was clearly a first attempt at a political manifesto towards

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  • independence. In the months following, Yes Scotland kept on working towards increasing its visibility, notably by rallying volunteers for door-to-door yes campaigning. A strong and charismatic leadership, officially led by former Labour member Dennis Canavan but quickly overshadowed by Alex Salmond and his second-in-command Nicola Sturgeon, also achieved further visibility. The lack of charisma and persuasive power of the Better Together leader Alistair Darling participated in weakening the no camp, to the advantage of Yes Scotland. The aggressive tone in which Salmond made his pro-Independence arguments, accusing his opponent of being in bed with the Tories on a BBC Scotland debate27, weighted public opinion in favour of a yes to independence. In this seemingly unstoppable ascent of favourable Scottish public opinion towards the independence of their nation, a YouGov poll for The Sunday Times on September 7th 201428 that predicted a victory for the yes campaign for the first time (51 per cent to 49 per cent) marked an undeniable turning point. For the first time in two years, Westminster and the defenders of the Union realised that they could actually lose Scotland. In the last ten days before the vote, a massive counterattack saw the multiplication of various statements given by a number of different protagonists29: five Scottish banks including the Royal Bank of Scotland threatened to transfer their headquarters to London in case of an independence vote in the referendum, David Cameron together with other unionist parties drew up a set of commitments towards devolution max (without the requisite parliamentary approval), and even the Queen announced that voters should think very carefully about the future, subtly suggesting a pro-Union tendency of her own. It is difficult to assess the direct influence of this panicky late sprint30. On September 18th however, 55 per cent of the Scottish electorate, in a massive turnout (97 per cent of those registered, the electoral roll being open to all those older than 16), chose to maintain the 307-year-old Union. Longstanding Claims for Scottish Self-Governance This is not to say that the long-standing claims put forward during the campaign have disappeared. Following the referendum, Lord Ashcroft directed a poll looking into the various themes behind the yes or no votes. While the vote for no was dominated by the fear of having to let go of the pound sterling (57 per cent), when asked to name two or three reasons that decided their vote pro-independence Scots chose dissatisfaction with the status quo in the relationship with Westminster (74 per cent), the National Health System (54 per cent), tax and public spending (33 per cent), and oil (20 per cent)31. Concerning the latter, defenders of an independent Scotland believe that London is unjust in claiming ownership of the profits resulting from oil production in the North Sea, and so on Scottish territory. While this was a major argument in past decades, it was not put forward that much during the 2014 campaign, and for good reason. Indeed, not only can we observe the benefits of oil in Scottish cities like Aberdeen, considered as the Dallas of the North, it is also a fact that the grant of the British executive towards Scotland is the highest in the whole of the UK, including Northern Ireland. Although the question was only partly raised last year, it is also undeniable that there are major conflicts between Holyrood and Westminster concerning nuclear power. By showing their clear opposition to it, Scottish leaders proved once again their political ingenuity. The theme of nuclear power has always been a source of internal divisions in national party politics, especially for Labour. Following its disastrous campaign in 1983 that led to the re-election of 27 Salmond, Alex, and Alistair Darling. Interview. Scottish Independence: Salmond v Darling Debate as It Happened. BBC. Glasgow, 25 Aug. 2014. Television. 28 Shipman, Tim, and Jason Allardyce. "'Yes' Leads in Scots Poll Shock." The Sunday Times. YouGov, 07 Sept. 2014. Web. 2015. 29 Jacques Leruez. Personal Interview. 23 February 2015. 30 Stacey, Parker, Dickie, and Rigby. "Scottish Referendum: How Complacency Nearly Lost a United Kingdom." Politics and Policy. The Financial Times, 19 Sept. 2014. Web. 2015. 31 Lord Ashcroft. "How Scotland Voted and Why." Lord Ashcroft Polls. N.p., 19 Sept. 2014. Web. 2015.

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  • Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister, the official line of opposition to nuclear power was partly responsible for the major reorganisation of the party. However, these arguments only seem to take second place in comparison to the overwhelming dissatisfaction with Westminster. While Scotland is traditionally dominated by support towards Labour, it is indisputable that the party has not been able to adapt to the system imposed by the 1998 Scotland Act that led to the creation of a Scottish Parliament. It would seem that with the exception of Donald Dewer, who instigated this devolution process, Labour has never been able to provide Scotland with a powerful leader to stand up to London, leaving only the second eleven at Holyrood. For powerful leaders such as Gordon Brown, the target position will be found in Westminster and not in Scotland, even though Cameron's predecessor still enjoys considerable popularity in Scotland, as confirmed during his speech in Maryhill in Glasgow the day before the referendum, calling his compatriots to vote against independence. In this context of weak Labour leadership in their nation, it is therefore not surprising that an increasingly high number of Scots (including former Labour militants) would turn to the Scottish National Party (SNP), a Scottish party able to put forward its best elements in the competition for government. Although the SNP lost the September 18th referendum, the criticism of the state of devolution in the current status quo is more than ever back on the table, with a growing feeling among Scots that we can govern our own nation32. The Welsh Devolution Dissatisfaction This phenomenon is not exclusive to Scotland, however, with Wales also moving towards further recognition of their nation in the British context. It is safe to say that the Scottish referendum was one of the grounds for this new impetus in the Welsh devolution debate. Just like Scotland, Wales saw its powers increase under the Blair government with the creation of the National Assembly for Wales under the Government of Wales Act in 1998. Since then, the devolution system in place has been a major issue in Welsh politics and lack of progress in this issue has increased support for the Plaid Cymru National Party of Wales. Although it has yet to breakthrough to an extent comparable to that achieved by the SNP, the nationalist party is gaining more visibility, notably through its presence on television debates. With Wales and Scotland coming back to the fore, Westminster can no longer ignore the pressing demands from two of its nations. As a first and very marginal attempt to respond to these claims, David Cameron and Nick Clegg presented the devolution package for Wales, planning for a transfer of power on energy, port development and voting arrangements, on Saint David's Day last February. The Rise of Englishness However, as a result of this very visible opposition to the status quo both in Scotland and Wales, the British government can no longer ignore the more discreet but very real rise in Englishness. Although the political class has chosen to ignore this issue, it is most certainly not going away and there is reason to believe it will become increasingly pressing in the years to come, which will compel the different parties to adopt a clear position regarding the division of powers within the Union. While no less than twenty years ago, English citizens were claiming British national identity; the current trend is to assert one's English identity over ones British identity. This phenomenon is particularly prevalent in supporters of the Conservative party, and overwhelmingly so among Ukip voters. This change in the English population's perception of its identity finds its roots in what can be summarised by the West Lothian question, which is to say that a growing

    32 Hutchings, John. Personal Interview. 26 March 2015.

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  • fringe of the English population believes that government should introduce a system of English votes for English laws. In other words, the question asks why Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish MPs should be able to vote on English laws in Westminster, when the reverse is not true. Indeed, while the other three nations of the UK have devolved institutions governing their internal legislative issues, England has no such institution and is represented solely by British institutions shared between four nations. For both these reasons, Englishness claims are steadily increasing, despite the British manifestations of patriotism during summer 2012. Paradoxically, although Ukips strategy is based on putting forward British identity to explain the rejection of the European Union, it is not predicted to return an MP from outside England in the 2015 General Elections and has become the party most representative of general trend towards Englishness. The European Issue in National Divides The European question, although only of secondary importance in these national divides, it was only chosen by 12 per cent of the yes voters and 15 per cent of the no voters as one of the main factors deciding their vote at the Scottish referendum for example, is still worth noting. Indeed, it is apparent that the UK is facing growing Euroscepticism. Although this is true, this trend is very much concentrated in England. On the other hand, Scotland and Wales present a pro-European front, with only 16.5 per cent of the population of Scotland believing that the Britain should seek to leave the EU for example, with their nationalist parties defending the idea of an independent nation accessing full membership to the EU, despite former Commission President Barroso stating that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible33 for an independent Scotland to join the EU. It is very difficult to ascertain where this crucial dual position towards Europe comes from, but it is possible to advance the notion that it might be due to the successful regionalist policies instated by the EU34. This national divide on this issue of Europe could be crucial if a Brexit referendum were to take place in the UK, as the electoral system put in place could influence the result. During the leaders debate on April 2nd 2015, Leanne Wood, the leader of Plaid Cymru, suggested that if a referendum on the future of the UK in the EU were indeed to take place, votes should be counted up on a national basis to prevent Wales being taken out of the EU solely due to the Euroscepticism of the English population. The SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon subsequently supported this proposition during the same debate. The influential SNP leader has even called on Westminster to guarantee Scotland a veto on any future referendum on the UKs EU membership, a procedure known as a Double Lock. If this method were adopted, there is every reason to believe that both Scotland and Wales would vote against a British exit and would therefore block the process for the English, were they to vote for it. The Rise of the SNP in the lead-up to the General Elections However, a discussion of the possible manifestations that an In-Out referendum in 2017 could take is premature as the general election on May 7th will have significant ramifications for it, including whether or not it will even take place. This is particularly meaningful when looking at the incredible rise of the SNP, which has truly become a force to be reckoned with in Scotland. While the Scottish population represents only nine per cent of the British electorate, the SNP could win more than twice the number of seats won by the coalition Liberal Democrat Party, who stand prospective candidates throughout the UK and not solely in Scotland as the SNP does. With 6 seats 33 "Scottish Independence: Barroso Says Joining EU Would Be 'difficult'" Scotland Politics. BBC News, 16 Feb. 2014. Web. 2015. 34 Letta, Enrico. Personal Interview. 17 March 2015.

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  • in Westminster today, the SNP is forecast by some to win 54 out of the 59 available seats, and in doing so reduce the number of seats that Labour currently holds (the Conservative Party stands to lose less from the SNP surge as it has had few MPs in Scotland since 1997). The polls have given increasingly high numbers for the Scottish nationalists in a linear and constant way, numbers that bear witness to leader Nicola Sturgeon's astounding popularity throughout the country. Following the 7-way leaders debate held prior to the general election, she was said to have won by more than one opinion poll, and her impact and persuasive rhetoric were certainly comparable to those of Cameron, Miliband, and Farage. In the days following the debate, some English voters even asked if they could vote for the Scottish party on May 7th. If the numbers in the polls translate into reality, there is no doubt that this will be a huge statement for Scottish defenders of independence, but it will also more than ever bring back to the table the issue of the post-devolution situation for Scotland but also for Wales, Northern Ireland, and England, already at the forefront of this electoral campaign.

    B. Party Politics and the (dis)United Kingdom The Conservative and Unionist Party (The Conservative Party) the reluctant Europeans Once described by William Hague as a ticking time bomb that threatened to destroy the Conservative Party, perhaps no issue has proven more divisive amongst party members in recent history than the role that the United Kingdom should play within the European Union, if any at all. British Conservatism rests on two key principles: the maintenance of free-trade liberalism and the support of the social and political values of the national state and identity. At most points in time, the attitude of the Conservative Party with regard to the EU has been dictated by which of these tendencies holds sway.

    Prior to the 1980s, the former prevailed and so the removal of trade barriers and creation of a continental common market resulted in Conservative pro-EU policies, culminating in the UKs membership of the European Economic Community in 1973 under the leadership of Edward Heath, the Conservative Prime Minister. However, beginning with the rise of Margaret Thatcher, the party has become increasingly associated with opposition, or at least recalcitrance, to closer economic and political union. Growing Euroscepticism has been driven by both the specific and the general; while individual issues such as the British budgetary contribution, the Euro, and immigration have certainly fuelled anti-EU sentiment in some corners of the party, there has also been a wider retaliation against a perceived secession of sovereignty to the EU caused by its growing involvement in and interference with domestic affairs. This is demonstrated as early as 1988 in Margaret Thatchers speech in Bruges in which the then Prime Minister argued, working more closely together does not require power to be centralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy.35

    In recent times, the Conservative Party has consistently upheld its image as a Eurosceptic agent in British politics, seen as a legacy of Margaret Thatchers normalisation of awkwardness as a government position with regard to the EU by Dr Simon Usherwood36. In 2008, the Conservative Party opposed the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, described by the then Foreign Secretary William Hague as giving the EU unwarranted power over British life, and called for a public referendum on it. However, the Conservatives subsequently lost a vote on this proposal and the EU (Amendment) Bill, which ratified the treaty, passed through the House of Commons by a majority of 346 to 206. In order to prevent further power being transferred to the EU without public 35 Thatcher, Margaret. "The Bruges Speech." Speech to the College of Europe. Belgium, Bruges. 20 Sept. 1988. Thatcher Archive. Web. 2015. 36 Usherwood, Simon. "The Conservative Party and Euroscepticism." E-International Relations. N.p., 11 Nov. 2012. Web. 2015.

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  • approval, David Cameron, the Conservative leader, demanded in 2009 that all future treaties be subject to a referendum (known as a referendum lock), which became law with the passing of the European Union Act in 2011.

    In January 2013, the Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron promised the UK electorate an In-Out referendum on the UKs EU membership during the next Parliament, despite stating that he himself would campaign for the UK to remain in the EU. This guarantee rests on two conditions; firstly, the return of a Conservative majority in the general election to be held later in 2015 and a failure, within the first half of the subsequent government, to achieve certain (as yet undefined) reforms to existing EU treaties. Deliverable or not, this announcement represented a further escalation of anti-EU rhetoric from an increasingly Eurosceptic party and should the 2015 general election result in a Conservative majority, currently an unlikely outcome according to polling figures, there will be an In-Out referendum. Furthermore, should the Conservative Party come up just short of a majority, it may be able to reply upon the small number of MPs that Ukip and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) are predicted to return as well as a few Labour and Liberal Democrat rebels in order to get EU referendum legislation through the House of Commons, as long as David Cameron is able to form a working majority in Parliament.

    The Labour Party the ambiguous Europeans

    Akin to the Conservative Party, the Labour Partys attitude towards the EU has evolved over time; although, in contrast to the Conservatives, the Labour Partys view of the EU has on the whole become increasingly positive as it has evolved. The only referendum on the subject of the UKs continued EU membership occurred in 1975 under a Labour Government, led by Harold Wilson, who committed to renegotiating the terms of the UKs membership in its 1974 manifesto. While Wilsons government officially supported the campaign to remain in the Common Market, the Labour Party membership rejected continuing EEC membership by a margin of almost 2:1 in 1975 and the issue was so contentious within the party that Wilson suspended the unwritten constitutional custom of Cabinet collective responsibility, thus allowing Cabinet members to campaign according to their individual consciences. In total, 148 Labour MPs opposed the governments 1975 Referendum Bill, in excess of the 138 who supported it.

    Labours opposition to the Common Market was based on a number of issues, including: an apparent loss of national sovereignty, the threat that membership would lead to unemployment, an attachment to the Commonwealth (particularly as trade partners) that the EEC was perceived to interfere with, and a perception that the EEC was not a suitable vehicle to bring about the socialist agenda sought after by many party members. Furthermore, the cost the Common Agricultural Policy and the potential rise in food prices resulting from trading blocs protectionist policies were not considered to be in the best interest of British workers. Other concerns of the time were reflected in the diaries of Tony Benn, one of the leading anti-European Labour MPs at the time, Its bureaucratic and centralised, theres no political discussion37.

    The roundabout turn in Labours views regarding the EU that began to occur in the early 1980s and reached its fruition with the election of Tony Blair as Labour leader in 1994, later to be perceived by many as one of the most pro-EU Prime Ministers in British History, was essentially a pragmatic one. During the so-called Wilderness Years between 1979 and 1997, while the Labour Party remained out of power and socialist governments were taking office across Europe, a change in the Labour Partys intellectual thinking took place. The notion of a superior British Labour movement was abandoned and replaced by a growing appreciation of the limitations that individual states

    37 Winstone, Ruth. Tony Benn: Conflicts of Interest: Diaries 1977-80. London U.a.: Hutchinson, 1990. Print.

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  • faced when trying to unilaterally improve the conditions of their working class38. A speech by Jacques Delors, the then President of the European Commission, to the British Trade Union Congress in 1988 emphasised the beneficial effects that the EC would have for workers. Additionally, there was a growing appreciation amongst members of the Labour Party that many of the basic rights set out in the European Social Charter in 1961, signed by Tony Blair in 1997, embodied similar aims to their own, in particular the various protections given to workers.

    In 2015, Ed Miliband, the current Labour Party leader, vowed not to hold a referendum on the UKs membership of the EU in the coming parliament stating that There could be nothing worse for our country or our great exporting businesses than playing political games with our membership in Europe.39 However, the Labour Party has pledged to restrain and reform the EU budget and to ensure that EU migration does not lead to the undercutting of workers wages in Britain. This is in part a response to the rise of the Blue Labour movement, launched in 2009, which argues that support for the Labour Party can be won by appealing to certain socially conservative beliefs, tougher controls on immigration and crime for instance, and that the internationalism of New Labour, embodied in the treatment of the EU by Tony Blair, has led the Labour Party to ignore the threat that low skilled immigrants pose to British workers.

    The Liberal Democrats the reliable Europeans

    The Liberal Democrats are widely perceived to be the most pro-European of the major political parties in British politics. The party was formed by the 1988 merger of the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party, initially formed by Labour dissidents (the Gang of Four) who left the party in 1981 following party policy changes that called for a withdrawal from the EEC. In Europe, the partys pro-EU credentials are echoed in their choice of parliamentary group, the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, which is one of the most vocal groups in favour of European Union (EU) integration and a firm supporter of the European single market40. Having governed during the most recent parliament term (2010-2015) in a coalition with the Conservative Party, it is yet unclear if the Liberal Democrats would be willing to enter a similar coalition during the next government due to David Camerons pledge to hold a referendum on the UKs EU membership.

    The United Kingdom Independence Party (Ukip) the dismissive Europeans

    In terms of its attitude towards Europe, Ukip can be placed at the polar opposite end of the spectrum to the Liberal Democrats. The partys primary policy is to bring about the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union, which it argues has become excessively bureaucratic and powerful in relation to nation states. Ukip rejects the idea of renegotiating or reforming the UKs relationship with the EU because the party argues that this is fundamentally not possible given the legal structures of the EU and the unwillingness of its leaders and other member states to see the UK reform the structures and treaties of the EU. As such, the party is committed to withdrawal as swiftly as possible and so has encouraged voters to vote for Ukip in order to use the upcoming general election as a referendum on the EU in itself.

    Ukip has experienced a large increase in popularity since 2012 which some have argued has taken support away from the Conservative Party and led to David Camerons increasingly aggressive

    38 George, Stephen, and Deborah Haythorne. "The British Labour Party." (1993): 12. 39 Wintour, Syal, and Perraudin. "EU Referendum Will Play Havoc with Business, Ed Miliband Warns." The Guardian. N.p., 30 Mar. 2015. Web. 40 Phinnemore, David, and Lee McGowan. A dictionary of the European Union. Routledge. 277. 2013.

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  • stance on Europe. In March 2014, Ukip received the greatest number of votes out of any British party in the European Parliament elections, having been given major party status by Ofcom, the broadcasting regulatory authority, prior to the elections. Defections to Ukip by Conservative MPs and subsequent by-election victories gave the party their first two MPs and clearly defined the threat that Ukip poses to Conservative support. In the Clacton by-election, the Conservative MP-turned-Ukip-candidate Douglas Carswell, encouraged Ukip support to rise 60 per cent from the 2010 election outcome, while Conservative support fell by 28 per cent41.

    National Divides and the rise of the Scottish National Party (SNP)

    The recent independence referendum has led to a surge in support for the SNP due in part to the collapse of the Labour vote in Scotland which has been caused by its support for the No campaign during the referendum and its perceived alliance with the Conservative Party on the same issue. Furthermore, the increased spotlight on the SNP and its policies has led to a greater appreciation of the role that they could play in Westminster, amplified by a widely held disillusion with the traditional parties of Westminster. This represents a shift in the previously common view that the SNP could only have an impact on national issues at Holyrood that led to voters tending to ignore SNP candidates in UK elections in favour of candidates from the unionist parties. Additionally, there is a concern that Westminster will not come through on its promises for the further devolution of powers to Scotland unless there is a sizeable SNP presence in Westminster.

    A recent YouGov poll has shown that the Labour Party could lose as many as 30 Scottish seats to SNP candidates in the upcoming general election42, thereby reducing the likelihood of Labour securing a parliamentary majority and leading some to suggest that the SNP may hold the balance of power after the May 2015 general election. A secondary effect of the SNPs surge in popularity in Scotland, at the expense of the Labour Party, may be to increase the likelihood of the Conservative Party being the largest single party after the 2015 election as the Conservatives stand to lose almost no MPs to the SNP given their already low polling in Scotland and the fact that the party currently only has one MP north of the Anglo-Scottish border.

    41 "Ukip Gains First Elected MP with Clacton Win." BBC News. N.p., 10 Oct. 2014. Web. 2015. 42 Kellner. "SNP Remains on Course for a Landslide." YouGov. N.p., 13 Mar. 2015. Web. 2015.

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  • Political Compass of Major UK Political Parties (2015)43

    43 Gunol, Thomas. Personal Interview. 2015

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  • III- The United Kingdom and the European Union

    A. The Failing EU system and its Perception in the UK

    Democratic Deficit of the EU and Disappointment with Brussels The EU seems increasingly unpopular and the idea of a transnational organisation exerting its influence in both the economic and political spheres of national life leaves citizens sceptical. This is even more so in a context of economic crisis. This facilitates the rise of extreme political parties spreading a new and ugly rhetoric of division and hatred44. The UK stands as a more sceptical country than its neighbours. Even though some are common to all EU countries, five major reasons behind Euroscepticism in the UK can be put forward. The first one is a rejection of technocracy. Beyond the discontent felt by many towards politics and politicians, at both the European and the national level, there is a feeling that those in charge of the EU have an undesirable thirst for integration that they have attempted to push through regardless of the cost to Europes people. The backlash has been growing against the impersonal forces of technocracy45, which have perhaps been exaggerated, that seem to have stripped sovereignty away from many national governments. A broad misunderstanding of European institutions, their missions, and their functioning amplifies such rejection. This lack of education is largely a fault of European leaders who refuse to put European politics forward since doing so would pose a threat to their own power. With some even going as far as making contradictory statements such as trying to sell the idea of a social Europe to others while implementing harsh austerity policies at home. National leaders can use the EU as a scapegoat in order not to take responsibility for unpopular policies themselves. Just like European citizens, UK citizens perceive a democratic deficit into the EU administration which affects its credibility and legitimacy. In the UK, leaders have promised many referendums on European issues since the 1990s but none of them has been implemented (1997 on the Euro currency, 2004 on the constitutional treaty, 2007 on the Lisbon treaty, 2010 on the sovereignty of the UK). One can imagine how citizens feel ignored when European issues are discussed. A further factor that undermines the credibility of the EU in the eyes of its citizens is that many of of its leaders seem to be unable to provide strong leadership and to be of unremarkable calibre. Both John Kiddy and Franois Duluc alluded to the low quality and lack of experience of some of the leaders sent to Brussels, principally for the purpose of removing them from national politics. John Kiddy46 reflects that European citizens would have never elected personalities like Van Rompuy or Barroso if direct election had taken place. Franois Duluc illustrates this point with the poor experience and stature of Catherine Ashton, the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who was a relative unknown in the UK prior to her nomination47. Since its inception, the UK has always been very critical and suspicious of the Euro and secured an opt-out from the section of the Maastricht Treaty that would have required it to join the common 44 Alexander, Danny. Building a Better Europe: Making the EU fit for the Challenges Ahead. lInstitut dtudes Politiques de Paris, Jan. 23 2015. 45 Pabst, Adrian. Personal Interview. 2015. 46 Kiddy, John. Personal Interview. 2015. 47 Duluc, Franois. Personal Interview. 2015.

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  • currency. This negative perception worsened with the economic crisis of 2008. It could be argued that the events of 2008 were in part due to the financial sector deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s that received strong support from certain groups in the UK. However, the UK media focused much of its criticism on the Eurozone and poor fiscal management by certain EU member states. Enrico Letta raised the possibility of the EU pursuing integration only amongst Eurozone countries48. The UK would keep most of the advantages of the system without acting as a braking force or continuing to develop Eurosceptic sentiments. The Gap between the UK and the Continent is not only geographical but also cultural - more than the Channel, a deep cultural gap stands between the UK and the Continent. In the UK, there is no sense of European identity and not a lot of cultural affinity with the continent, especially regarding political traditions. Philippe Marlire recalls that the UK joined the EU for strictly economic and strategic reasons, ultimately rejecting all attempts of federalism49. Franois Duluc summarises this entrenched attitude by saying the following about the UK: They dont have a common approach; they have a very selfish approach to Europe.50

    Euroscepticism in the UK does not have to do with a lack of information on the EU but with the perception of sovereignty, Britains position in Europe and its unique historical trajectory. In the British consciousness, there is a very clear sense of a separate and sovereign UK. Therefore, the UK is always quite reluctant to sign new treaties that go against its tradition of constitutional flexibility. The UK also gives huge importance to its parliamentary sovereignty, regarded as a key part of its national identity. In this light therefore, the direct universal elections of the European parliament places Brussels as a potential threat to British independence. EU-Bashing within the UK media As Thomas Gunol puts it: The collective perception of reality is conditioned by its depiction by the media51. The media influences political agendas by shaping public opinion. Here comes one last reason of Euroscepticism in the UK: most of the media are Eurosceptic and frequently describe EU weaknesses and its so-called uptake of national sovereignty. When they are told to associate the EU with a list of words or concepts, 60 per cent of British people associate it with bureaucracy and only 12 per cent with democracy. Since 2014, contributions to the EU budget and migration have been the most common arguments raised against the EU by Eurosceptics. Despite the EUs defence that the demand came from new rulings that had been recognised and accepted by the UK, the press became quite vocal when the UK was asked to contribute more to the EU budget (October 2014). In this precise case, was it Camerons views that drove the press towards Euroscepticism or was it the press who forced Cameron to declare quite categorically that he would not pay up? The rise of Ukip, along with the growth of Eurosceptic media, makes criticising Brussels more and more in vogue, which pushes Euroscepticism to the forefront of political discussion. The most Eurosceptic media are probably those owned by the rather Conservative, Eurosceptic and influential Rupert Murdoch (The Times, The Sun, News of the World). Even though he was born in

    48 Letta, Enrico. Personal Interview. 17 March 2015. 49 Marlire, Philippe. Personal Interview. 19 December 2015. 50 Duluc, Franois. Personal Interview. 2015. 51 Gunol, Thomas. Personal Interview. 2015

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  • Australia, Murdoch is a Thatcherist and British nationalist whose influence has led to suggestions that he led Tony Blair into not adopting the Euro. The Murdoch Empire has put all its might against the EU, taking a very pro-US stand and representing the EU as a Soviet-style system. Newspapers like the Daily Telegraph or the Daily Mail, who used to adhere to Thatchers views on Europe, have also grown increasingly Eurosceptic. Most anti-EU mainstream press is not professional in how it reports. It is biased and ideologically motivated. The tabloid press is particularly violent, almost xenophobic. The UK is one of the only countries in Europe where the main media outlets do not have a correspondent in Brussels. They get their news from lobbies in Westminster. One shall also bear in mind that even more in the UK than in the rest of Europe, most media are owned by huge corporations, capitalist moguls and tycoons52. Therefore, they tend to put forward what is overall good for business. This often implies criticising EU rules when they oppose free market policies. The only newspapers regarded as Europhile in the UK are The Guardian and The Independent, but they have a smaller and more middle/upper-class readership.

    B. The Immigration Debate and the Free Movement of People The single market principle, one of the core principles of the EU, is made possible in part by the free movement of people. Recently this principle has been put under threat by the immigration debate in the UK, which has recently come to a focal point. Public attitudes towards migrants have been thoroughly documented in the UK providing a useful platform for investigating the salience of the immigration issue in the public sphere as well as its relative presence in the press and political rhetoric. Has the immigration angle provided political parties with the ideal tool to manipulate their respective electorates to take their preferred side on the Brexit debate? What is the Debate in the Public Sphere about? The concern of the public and public attitude, or opinion, is of great importance for the UK relationship with the EU as it has the potential to foreshadow the expected outcome of the possible referendum in 2017. In terms of salience, issues such as jobs, health, education, crime, and public safety are arguably at the top of the list of issues important to most voters, surpassing the importance attached to the UK-EU relationship53. This is only natural as these issues are more tangible to the UK public. Specifically in relation to the EU, the top concerns are national sovereignty (for 28 per cent of the sample) and the free movement of people (17 per cent)54. These two factors converge in the immigration debate as changes to migration policy in the UK will inevitably involve other EU actors, something which is troubling to those pressing for immediate change. The parameters of the debate are important for analytical purposes especially to understand the public attitudes and the types of reform to which are aspired. For example, there is a difference between counter-immigration attitudes for cultural and for economic reasons; an attitude discriminating against certain nationalities or an all-encompassing one; and one which looks to change EU migration policy even if it were to restrict movement for UK citizens abroad. The

    52 Marlire, Philippe. Personal Interview. 19 December 2015. 53 Hazell, Robert. Personal Interview. 05 January 2015. 54 Raines, Thomas. "Internationalism or Isolationism? British Attitudes Towards the UKs International Priorities." Europe Programme (n.d.): n. pag. Chatham House. Chatham House and YouGov, Jan. 2015. Web. Feb. 2015.

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  • figures for the latter group are quite telling: 49 per cent of the public would still support the limiting of free movement even if it restricted their own movement. This opinion is more popular amongst Ukip and Conservative voters, with 77 per cent and 66 per cent respectively55. In todays economic climate it is not surprising that research regarding public attitudes shows that the immigration debate is framed in terms of economic consequences rather than cultural: the issue regarding welfare benefits made available by the state for migrants arriving in the UK is leading the debate. Aside from this aspect, Adrian Pabst points out another stratum of the population who join the debate principally for economic reasons, namely workers and their communities that are hurt by the free movement principle due to the fact that they themselves are attached to a place, locality, and family, more than to mobility. For this reason, in his opinion, it is right to restrict the free flow of labour, just like the free flow of capital56. That the immigration debate is being driven by economic concerns is further illustrated by the fact that 47 per cent of those interviewed for the 2014 British Social Attitudes Survey are of the opinion that migrants from other countries coming to Britain are either very bad or bad for the economy57. Public perceptions have a great influence on public opinion: perceiving the number of immigrants in the UK as considerably higher than it really is or perceiving their economic contribution relative to their economic drain as smaller significantly affects public opinion. The difference in perception versus reality regarding the size of the migrant population in the UK in 2013 is striking: the publics average guess at what proportion the foreign-born population make-up of the UK is 31 per cent, compared with the official estimate of around 13 per cent58. Another important aspect influencing public attitudes is the perceived reason for migration. Figure 1 (see appendix p.35) illustrates the perceptions in the UK as to the make-up of the migrant community. Evidently, immigration for the purpose of study has been understated in the public sphere and the number of asylum seekers is grossly overestimated leading to the negative connotation associated with migration overshadows the positive interpretation of it. Public Attitudes, the Media, and the Political Agenda The perceptions versus the reality of the migrant situation in the UK differ significantly. This naturally leads one to question the sources of information feeding said perceptions. However, the relationship between the media, public opinion, and political rhetoric is complex and determining the direction of a causal relationship between these factors is even more so. Several different approaches have been developed to define the relationship between the public and the political sphere in the UK: negative public opinion about immigration induces the state to enact restrictive state immigration policies; public opinion is overshadowed by business interests and desire for economic growth; or public opinion responds to immigration policy59. The relationship between public attitudes and the media is described by the agenda-setting theory, which states the media agenda is transferred to the public agenda as a concern deserving response or action60, is most relevant to the immigration debate in the UK. The negative portrayal of immigration in the media has had a large role to play in the prominence of the immigration debate in the public sphere.

    55 Raines, Thomas. 2015. 56 Pabst, Adrian. Personal Interview. 2015. 57 "Key Findings." British Social Attitudes 31. NatCen Social Research, 2014. Web. Apr. 2015. 58 Duffy, Bobby, and Tom Frere-Smith. Perceptions and Reality. 2014. 59 Picard, Robert G. "Public Opinion, Party Politics, Policy, and Immigration News in the United Kingdom." (n.d.): n. pag. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. University of Oxford, July 2014. Web. Apr. 2015. 60 Picard, Robert G. 2015.

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  • The Framing of the Immigration debate in the UK Press One aspect fuelling the immigration debate in the UK is the fact that coverage in the UK is more Eurosceptic than compared to media outlets in continental Europe. Philippe Marlire puts this down to the influence of those running the UK media, Rupert Murdoch in particular, as opposed to the capitalist moguls and tycoons looking to promote the free market who are running the media in continental Europe61. Looking at the framing of the immigration debate in the UK press there is a divide between communitarian and cosmopolitan frames, or those for tightening immigration control and those praising mobility. Since 2014 there has been a clear switch from cosmopolitan frames to communitarian frames with the rising concern about welfare tourism. The framing by UK newspapers of issues relevant to the migration debate between 2010 and 2012 are telling of the kind of message put out into the public sphere by the media: there is a focus on the number of migrants across the board frequently using words like millions and thousands; words to do with religion and family were often used in connotation to immigration; migration was framed using the words jobs, benefits, and economic; and, finally, the most common descriptor for the word immigrants for all newspaper types was illegal62. Taking a step back and looking at the overall newspaper coverage, Figure 2 (see appendix p.35) illustrates the relationship between the newspapers read and the importance of immigration over time. The increase in overall salience of the immigration debate over time is clear, but one should not assume a causal effect; if anything the choice of newspaper reinforces already established views regarding immigration. The Immigration Debate and the UK Political Sphere For some parties the immigration debate stood as synonymous for the EU debate whilst for others it was a popular, relatable aspect of the EU debate around which to frame their campaign, the perfect tool to get voters to synchronise with their EU campaign. Marlire suggests that David Cameron is part of the latter group implying that he is putting emphasis on the immigration debate to appease public opinion, but that there is no real, significant intention for change behind it. Meanwhile, Ukip is on the rise in this respect. In fact, Nigel Farage has used this particular aspect of the EU debate which has reached the public sphere to his full advantage as he struggles to connect with the voters on issues such as economics and sovereignty: the charge that we have lost control of our borders links an issue that people care little about (Europe) with one that they care a lot about (migration)63. Ukip has made the immigration debate integral to the EU debate, which is unfortunate for other parties who would have rather moved on from this debate to avoid talking about their mistakes in tackling immigration in the recent past64. Ukip has laid out a very clear approach to immigration: reduce immigration down to 50,000 people a year; increase UK border staff by 2,500; tougher English language tests for those seeking permanent residence; opting out of the Dublin treaty; and priority for UK passport holders65. This shift in focus for Ukip has attracted voters to the party and increased the gap between their constituents and those of the Conservative party. 61 Marlire, Philippe. Personal Interview. 19 December 2015. 62 "Portrayals of Immigrants, Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees in National British Newspapers, 2010 to 2012." Migration in the News. Migration Observatory, Aug. 2013. Web. Apr. 2015. 63 Leonard, Mark. "The British Problem and What It Means for Europe." Policy Brief (2015): n. pag. The European Council on Foreign Relations. European Commission, Mar. 2015. Web. Apr. 2015. 64 Dixon, Hugo. Personal Interview. April 2015. 65 "Manifesto Watch: Where Parties Stand on Key Issues." BBC News: Election 2015. N.p., 25 Feb. 2015. Web. Apr. 2015.

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  • C. The Economic and Financial Implications of EU Membership Cost-Benefit Analysis of EU Membership Membership of the EU impacts the UK economy through many channels66. Perhaps the most important and well known of these is the EU Single Market, which maintains the four freedoms (the free movement of labour, capital, goods, and services throughout the EU) in order to bring about further economic integration amongst member states. Additionally, membership has an on-going impact on the direction and size of UK trade; the EU not only has the exclusive right to negotiate trade and investment deals with non-EU countries but also the power to impose external tariffs on goods imported into the customs union. The fiscal contributions that the UK is required to make to the EU budget have economic implications, as do the effects of EU subsidies and external tariffs on consumer prices. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows to the UK may also be dependent to certain degree on its membership of the EU.

    Any analysis of the costs and benefits of the UKs membership of the EU is immediately beset by a number of striking difficulties. Firstly, the suitable approach to such analysis is by no means agreed upon, thus making comparisons either problematic or impracticable. Those who argue that membership in the EU imposes a net cost on the UK typically take a static view and sum all its various effects within a given year. Conversely, those who maintain that the UK is better off as a result of its membership take a dynamic approach to the issue and conclude that over time the longer-run effects, such as economic integration and access to the EU Customs Union, have been of a net benefit to the UK. Secondly, the capacity to make a judgement on the positive or negative effect of EU membership is limited by the absence of a reliable counterfactual and so comparisons must be made to abstract scenarios, the underlying assumptions of which will clearly shape all subsequent conclusions. This also illustrates a substantial difficulty of assessing the likely impact of a Brexit on the UK, which is the reliance of such analysis on the particular policy settings and trade relationships one assumes to be most likely following such an event. Finally, the impact of EU membership is in no way uniform across either the regions or various economic sectors of the UK, West Wales for example is classified as a less developed region (characterised by a per capita GDP of less than 75 per cent of the EU average) by the EU and so is eligible for the highest level of regional funding offered in the EU budget.

    The EUs single market utilises three levers to increase intra-EU trade: it eliminates all tariffs on goods, it upholds the four freedoms thereby allowing all factors of production to freely move throughout the region, and it reduces the transaction costs associated with international trade by unifying domestic business legislations and product compliances. According to the Office of National Statistics, Britain exported goods and services worth 146 billion to EU countries in 2014, which represented 47 per cent of the UKs total export trade. Conversely, the value of imports from EU countries in 2014 was 218 billion, comprising 53 per cent of the UKs import trade. Analysis by the Centre of Economic and Business Research (CEBR) shows that 3.1 million jobs in the UK were directly supported by exports to the EU in 2011 and that 13.3 per cent of the UK workforce, representing 4.2 million jobs, was associated with exports to the EU. As a result, total income associated with export demand from the EU was 211 billion, which was equivalent to 3,500 per head of the population in 201167. While it is clear that the EU is a major trading partner for the UK, it is not as clear to what extent that this can be attrib