the diplomacy of restraint: the united states' efforts to repatriate greek children evacuated during...

8/11/2019 The Diplomacy of Restraint: The United States' Efforts to Repatriate Greek Children Evacuated During the Civil W

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The Diplomacy of Restraint: TheUnited States' Efforts to Repatriate

Greek Children Evacuated During theCivil War of 1946-49*

Howard Jones

In early 1948 the Department of State began receiving reports thatGreek communist guerrillas were evacuating thousands of Greekchildren from the country and relocating them in neighboring com-munist states in East Europe. Stories of atrocities during the Greekcivil war were not new, of course, but these revelations seemed par-ticularly shocking. The government in Athens charged that therebels were kidnapping youths aged three to fourteen, causing theentire episode to take on the sinister appearance of a calculated effortto destroy Greece as a nation. Indeed, the Greek government ac-cused the rebels of genocide and appealed to the United Nations forhelp. Afterward it turned to the United States, which had earlier an-nounced the Truman Doctrine of military and economic aid to pre-vent the spread of Soviet communism into Greece and Turkey. Thisseemingly new communist threat, which the Greeks called paedoma-zoma or "gathering ofthe children," aroused indignation within theTruman administration because it violated the fundamentals of

humanitarianism; more importantly, some American observers sus-pected that the evacuations were a device for undermining the Tru-man Doctrine by deepening the chaos in Greece and making thecountry a breeding ground for communism (U.S., Dept. of State,Athens Post Records, Embassy to Sec. of State, 17 April 1948). Al-though numerous writers have referred to the displacement of Greekchildren, they have been unable to determine motive for obvious rea-

*The author wishes to thank the Earhart Foundation, Truman Library, andUniversity of Alabama for support in the preparation of this article. He also ex-presses appreciation to Richard V. Burks, Robert H. Ferrell, and Hugh Ragsdalefor their advice and encouragement.

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sons: the files in the East European states and in Greece remainclosed to researchers.

The accessibility to American documents permits only a one-sided examination ofthe question, but even this approach raises im-

portant implications that extend beyond the immediate issue of thechildren. The evidence demonstrates that at least in this instance the

Truman administration was less rigid in its response to foreign policymatters during the Cold War than usually appeared to be the case.Despite pressure from many sources, the government in Washingtonrefused to engage in a propaganda campaign against the com-munists, attempting instead to make a dispassionate decision about

whether there was proof of kidnapping. There were reasons for thisrestraint. The purpose of the Truman Doctrine in Greece was towind down the war and establish internal stability not to aggravatefurther relations between the Athens government and its neighborsto the north. Furthermore, the Cold War itself would soon have aneffect on these incidents relating to the children. The Truman ad-ministration was aware of the growing troubles within the Corn-inform (Communist Information Bureau), and would try to exploitYugoslavia's break with the Soviet bloc in June 1948. Undoubtedlythis move by Yugoslavia's leader, Marshal Josip Tito, had an impacton the manner in which the United States dealt with the kidnappingallegations brought before the United Nations. State Departmentmaterials show that the Truman administration was so interested in

the overtures made by Tito shortly after the rift became public thatby 1949 it was sending economic assistance to Yugoslavia (Lees,407-22; Coufoudakis, 417, n. 47). Such a policy strongly suggeststhat Secretary of State George C. Marshall and others in Washing-ton could not have wanted to criticize the Yugoslav government (orany other potential dissident in East Europe) over the fate of theGreek children. With these realities in mind, the purpose of this es-say is to explore the delicate diplomacy exercised by the State De-

partment in dealing with this new twist in the Greek situation.The White House suspected that both sides in the child contro-

versy had exaggerated the issues, and yet it also knew that the matterwas part of the ongoing civil war in Greece and for that reason couldaffect the outcome of the Truman Doctrine. Supporters of the Ath-ens government complained that Yugoslavia was attempting to

undermine the Greek nation as part of an effort to construct a Balkanfederation. More importantly, these Greek loyalists asserted, thechild abductions were proof of the darkest kind of crime. Accordingto the government in Athens, the communists transported the youthsto foster homes inside the neighboring states of East Europe, where


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Repatriating Greek Children 67

in ideological training camps they were converted to communismand returned to Greece as guerrillas. A spokesman in Athens insisted

that the scheme "was intended to destroy Greece by destroyingGreece's futureher youth" ( Time, 15 March 1948, 35). The Greekgovernment marshalled a considerable amount of circumstantial evi-dence for kidnapping. A team of inquirythe United Nations Spe-cial Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB)interviewed witnessesofthe removals; the Greek government provided documentation forthe evacuations; Red Cross agencies and independent observers ver-ified the existence of thousands of Greek children outside the coun-

try; Time's correspondent in Greece reported that the "Reds" had

taken the youths into the "people's democracies" to receive a"Marxist education" (28 May 1949, 26); and most governments ac-cepting the youths defended their actions as humanitarian attemptsto save the children from "monarcho-fascist" Greek armies allied

with Anglo-American imperialists. In the atmosphere of civil war,perception and reality often merged. Once they did, the UnitedStates could no longer ignore the matter.

The Truman administration faced a highly sensitive situation.It realized that even if true the charge of kidnapping was impossibleto prove; indeed, many observers in Washington were probably cor-rect in believing that the evacuations had taken place primarily tosave the children from starvation and war. One of the few reliable

accounts of the practice indicates that the guerrillas initiated the re-movals as a propaganda effort to arouse worldwide sympathy, butwound up alienating villagers as well as other Greeks worried thattheir country would be sacrificed for a Balkan federation (Gage,245ff.). Yet no matter what the truth was, American policymakersknew that failure to defend their Greek protg would unsettle othernations looking to the United States for leadership in the Cold War.There were domestic considerations as well. The White House rec-

ognized that the issue could have serious political implications, fornumerous Greek-American organizations inside the United Statesdemanded that Washington take action. Under Marshall's leader-ship, the United States decided upon the only possible course: it ap-

pealed to the UN to seek the children's repatriation on humanitariangrounds.

The origins of the controversy over the Greek children lay in thecivil war itself. The removals perhaps began as early as January1948, but the first confirmed instances took place soon after a Balkan


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States Youth Conference in Belgrade the following month, where aCominform arrangement provided that all children three to fourteen

years of age should be relocated for safety in foster homes in Yugo-slavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, andRumania (Sweet-Escott, 71). In early March, the leader ofthe Greekrebels' "Democratic Army," "General" Markos Vafiades, calledfor the evacuation of eighty thousand youths from the northernSlavophone (Slavic-speaking Greeks) villages in western Macedonia(U.S., Dept. of State, General Records, Charles Bohlen, Dept. ofState counselor, to Rep. Ralph Gwinn of N.Y., 30 March 1948;

NY. Times, 4 March 1948, L3; 15 March 1948, L8; Times (Lon-

don), 4 March 1948, 4e; 6 March 1948, 3e; 16 March 1948, 4e).Despite the rhetoric that accompanied the announcement, it is likelythat the guerrilla command realized the necessity of evacuating thenorthern areas, soon to become the scene of a heavy military offen-sive by the Greek National Army.

The problem was that the Greek government denounced theevacuations as kidnappings, creating a situation which threatened toforce the United States into a broader commitment to Greece at a

particularly touchy time in Yugoslavia's relationship to the Soviet

Union. Given the panicky atmosphere of civil war, many Greeksprobably believed what they were saying. Slavic communists,spokesmen in Athens proclaimed, had abducted the youths with theintentions of indoctrinating them for a later round in the civil war.The Soviets were involved, some Greeks declared. Moscow wantedto detach Greek Macedonia and incorporate it into an independentMacedonian state, where it would become part ofthe Federal Stateof Yugoslavia. Once the Russians were assured an outlet to the Ae-gean Sea, they would install a communist regime in Athens, cut offTurkey from the West, and secure access to the eastern Medit-erranean (Burks, 99-101; Nicholson). Regardless of whether theGreek charges were valid, some Americans in Washington were cer-tain that the East European communist regimes were not free to doanything without the approval of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. Thedanger was that the ensuing chaos in Greece would promote the col-lapse of the government in Athens and undermine the Truman Doc-trine (U.S., Dept. of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Report4664, 17 April 1948, 22; U.S., Dept. of State, Foreign Relations 107,

Dwight Griswold, Chief of American Mission for Aid to Greece, toSec. of State, 16 June 1948).Countries providing refuge for the children were not hesitant in

detailing their actions and further inflaming the situation. Radio So-fia declared in early March that Hungary welcomed the youths and


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other Greek refugees "in response to the appeal of the People'sCouncils of Free Greece [rebel areas in the north]." In fifty-nine vil-lages, the bulletinvcontinued, "parents have given 4,684 childrenaged three to thirteen, who will be transferred to Hungary, Czech-oslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia." Eleftheri Ellada, thecommunist voice of Markos' rebel forces, listed over a half-dozen

Greek villages and the numbers of children taken from each. FreeGreece radio declared that over four thousand children had already

been relocated, and in April Radio Belgrade reported the arrival ofseven thousand more. Three days later it claimed that twelve thou-sand would be divided among Albania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia,

and Hungary (Voight, 188, 189, 198, 198, n. 3; Times (London), 12March 1948, 3e; UN, General Assembly, Official Records, 3 sess.,Supplement8, 1948, 19; UNSCOB Report A/574, Annex 2, 29, 31;

N. Y. Times, 11 April 1948, L28; 23 June 1948, L23; "ChildrenorSlaves?", Union Jack, 17 April 1948, enclosed in U.S., Dept. ofState, Athens Post Records, Embassy to Sec. of State, 12 May 1948).

The United States had become concerned about the Greeks'

frontier troubles even before it announced the Truman Doctrine. In

December 1946 the Athens government complained to the UN Secu-

rity Council that Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria were providingthe rebels with war matriel, places of refuge, and hospital facilities.The Security Council established an investigatory commission whichcompiled information in Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria

before submitting its report in May of 1947. The commission agreedwith the charges of border violations brought by the Greeks, and wasconvinced that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were working through acommunist controlled organization known as the National Libera-tion Front (EAM) to separate Greek Macedonia from the homeland.The hostilities in Greece therefore constituted more than a civil war;they involved external dangers as well. But the Security Councilwould go no farther. It could not agree on any action and removedthe item from the agenda (UN, Security Council, Official Records, 1stYear, 2d Series, Suppl. 10, Vol. 4, 1946, 169-92; Vol. 3, 1946, 637-701; 2d Year, Vol. 5, 1947, 2368-2405; 2d Year, Special Supple-ments 2, 1947).

The United States, by March 1947 committed to Greecethrough the Truman Doctrine, brought the border problems to the

attention of the General Assembly. The result was a resolution inOctober, which established the UN Special Commission on the Bal-kans (UNSCOB) to investigate the border disputes. Headquarteredin Salonika, Greece, UNSCOB was composed of representatives ofAustralia, Brazil, China, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Paki-


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stan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with "seats beingheld open" for Poland and the Soviet Union, should they reverse

their decisions to abstain. The Polish delegate to the Security Coun-cil had opposed any commission of inquiry because, he argued, thedisturbances in Greece were internal in nature. The creation of such

a group, he complained, "was linked with a declaration ofthe guiltof Greece's northern neighbors, which had never been established."The only way to calm the situation in Greece, he and the Soviet dele-gate insisted, was to install a democratic government in Athens thatwould restore civil liberties and seek the withdrawal of all outside

military forces (UN, General Assembly, Official Records, UNSCOB

Report A/692, 4 sess., Suppl. 8, 1949, 1; Annex 1, 19; 3 sess.,Suppl. 2 (A/620), 3, 11-12).

The controversy over the children then threatened to mesh withthe border issue when in February 1948 the Greek delegation madean official protest to the Secretariat ofthe Assembly. The Greek for-eign minister later emotionally charged that "the abduction of Greekchildren was more than a mere violation of treaty pledges"; it was a"crime against humanity." The Greek Liaison Service to the UNmaintained that witnesses reported great opposition to the removals.

Markos' guerrilla bands, it declared, had instituted a census of chil-dren in northern Greece for the purpose of funneling them intonearby communist countries for "re-education." The guerrillashoped to destroy the "Greek race" by converting the children to"communist ideology." The Greek delegate to the General Assem-

bly called this the "crime of genocide" (UN, General Assembly, Of-ficial Records, UNSCOB Report A/574, 3 sess., Suppl. 8, 1948, 18;Annex 2, 29, 31).

The General Assembly quickly authorized UNSCOB to investi-gate the alleged abductions. Under the supervision of a Chief Ob-server in Salonika, a half-dozen observation groups prepared to workalong the northern frontier, although only inside Greece because Yu-goslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria barred their entry. The guidelineswere clear. Those questioned were to be chosen at random, coercionwas forbidden, and to ensure safety the witnesses were not to besworn or identified (UN, General Assembly, Official Records,UNSCOB Report A/574, 3 sess., Suppl. 8, 1948, 18; A/935, Annex3, 4 sess., Suppl. 8, 1949, 23).

Meanwhile American officials abroad confirmed that mass re-movals of Greek children were indeed taking place. The Joint UnitedStates Military Aid Program to Greece QUSMAPG) informedWashington that in mid-March communist guerrillas had attacked anumber of villages and taken both adults and children (U.S., Army,


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JUSMAPG Reports No. 6, 25 March 1948; No. 7, 1 April 1948;No. 9, 15 April 1948). American diplomatic sources reported the ar-

rival of 300 Greek youths in Rumania, another 500 in Yugoslavia,and 800 in Czechoslovakia (U.S., Dept. of State, General Records,Rudolf Schoenfeld, Legation in Bucharest, to Sec. of State, 17 April1948; Cavendish Cannon, Legation in Belgrade, to Sec. of State, 19April 1948; Laurence Steinhardt, Legation in Prague, to Sec. ofState, 28 April 1948). A story in one communist publication, MiadaFronta, was headlined "We save Greek children" and carried a pho-tograph of two visibly exhausted boys over the caption: "The firstpicture of persecuted children of democratic Greece shows two of

these courageous young comrades who had to flee their homelandbefore monarchic terror. Entirely without means, they are depen-dent on international solidarity of people's democratic and progres-sive countries" (U.S., Dept. of State, General Records, Steinhardtto Sec. of State, 28 April 1948).

II

UNSCOB encountered numerous problems gathering informa-tion. Its members had great difficulty reaching remote villages, andin several instances were fired on from outside the country. Therewas another obstacle. The rebels had accused UNSCOB of being un-der control ofthe "Anglo-Saxons and their satellites" and warnedthat "every individual or group from the above-mentioned Commis-sion" who entered areas under their control would be "arrested im-

mediately" and "treated as prisoners of war" (Voight, 190-91;Woodhouse, 248; Matthews, 177-78). UNSCOB had the formida-ble task of determining the truth without being able to gather testi-mony outside Greece (UN, General Assembly, Official Records,UNSCOB Report A/574, Annex 2, 3 sess., Suppl. 8, 1948, 29).

Though UNSCOB compiled what it termed a "considerablebody of evidence," it was circumstantial in nature and thus failed toprove kidnapping. During March and April 1948, the observationgroups learned, the guerrillas transported large numbers of Greekyouths by trains, trucks, and ox-drawn carts into the neighboringstates. The committee could not prove the complicity of Yugoslavia,Albania, and Bulgaria, although it argued that the repeated commu-nist radio broadcasts suggested that the program had the "approvaland assistance of these Governments. " There was another complica-tion. The UN observers came across more than a few cases of volun-

tary relocation of children by parents, particularly in the Slavic-speaking region of western Macedonia. Of twenty-eight removals in


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72 Howard Jones

a village near Kastoria, for example, the investigatory teams discov-ered that in five instances chosen at random, the children had will-

ingly gone to join their fathers who were members ofthe rebel army.UNSCOB concluded that a "fairly large number of parents" whosupported the removals were also sympathetic with the guerrillas.The crucial determinant in leaving Greece seems to have beenwhether a child's father was a member of the guerrilla force (UN,General Assembly, Official Records, UNSCOB Report A/644, 3 sess.,Suppl. 8, 1948, 9, 16-17; Annex 3; A/574, Annex 2, 3 sess., Suppl.8, 1948, 19, 29-31).

According to one member of the UN observation teams, Ken-

neth Spencer, the important consideration was personal in nature(Spencer, 31-32). In villages supporting the guerrillas, the parentsdecided for themselves whether to send their children; but in ' 'hostilevillages," Spencer asserted, there was "little doubt that the ap-

proach was different and a process of virtual conscription enforced."Though some children went by force, others went voluntarilyespe-cially in the Slavic areas of western Macedonia and Thrace. The keyfactor, Spencer emphasized, was whether the father was a rebel. In avillage near Kastoria, a girl of twelve "neatly summed up the situa-tion" when asked if the children had left on their own: "Yes," shereplied, "the children whose fathers are in the mountains wanted togo. My father was not a guerrilla, therefore I didn't want to go."

Without access to countries north of Greece, UNSCOB's find-ings were necessarily inconclusive. It could not resolve the two mostimportant issues involved in the investigation: the number of chil-dren moved north against their will, and whether the purpose oftheremovals was to indoctrinate the youths with communist ideology.The Times (London) in early December 1948 reported that the

League of Red Cross Societies recently informed UNSCOB thatnearly 24,000 abducted Greek children were now living in the "sat-ellites of Russia." Six months later it raised the figure to 28,000.Although the paper had no evidence of kidnapping, its coverage sug-gested that it believed the charge (3 Dec. 1948, 3d; 30 May 1949,3e). The truth is that there was no reliable way of determining howmany children went involuntarily and whether the central objectiveof the child program was to spread communism. Doubtless therewere mixed reactions even to evacuations for safety reasons; and it is

logical to assume that communist regimes would promote their ownteachings, just as non-communist nations would seek to expand theirideas and way of life. UNSCOB's inability to collect first-hand evi-dence meant that the arguments would intensify after submission ofits report.


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Although UNSCOB observers were unable to enter communistcountries, several individuals, including Americans, received per-mission to visit homes for the Greek children. In one instance a Brit-ish news correspondent and well-known non-communist, KennethMatthews, accompanied an American newspaperman in securing vi-sas from the Bulgarian government and visiting a children's home inthe town of Plovdiv. The building, formerly the town hall, sat in awooded public park and housed 170 Thracian children. Upon thearrival ofthe two visitors, the children marched from their rooms to

present themselves. Older boys joined them from the garden nearby,carrying spades and singing in unison: "We're giving the death-

blow to Fascism; we're marching to civilization." Many ofthe chil-dren were orphans and either did not know their own names or weretoo frightened to say. Matthews believed that the Greek governmenthad converted "an act of politically motivated charity" into a diabol-ical plot. The American was dubious about this assessment (Mat-thews, 177, 180-82).

In another case, the American embassy's cultural attach in So-fia joined French, British, and Canadian newsmen in inspecting aGreek Children's Home outside the city. The home, once a hotel

bombed during the war but now rebuilt, housed 510 children inclean, comfortable surroundings. The attach claimed that theschools in Bulgaria emphasized a "pattern of thought" that wascommunist in orientation. When someone entered the room, the

youths stood, extended a clenched fist salute, and declared, "Wel-come, Dru gario [comrade]." People they talked with were "syn-agonistes," or fellow fighters, the salutation given by the communistguerrilla force. Wherever they went in groups, they did so in marchstep while singing partisan songs that substituted the word "for-

eigners" for "Germans" or "Nazis." Slogans often chanted were"Forward with Markos," "Let us struggle for liberty," and "Downwith imperialism and fascism. ' ' The school textbook opened with theGreek National Anthem and a picture of General Markos, and in-cluded poems and stories praising the guerrillas' wartime effortsagainst the Nazis and the British, while urging a campaign to driveall "foreigners and barbarians" from Greece (U.S., Dept. of State,General Records, Donald Heath, Legation in Sofia, to Sec. of State,21 July 1948).

Reports also came from American visitors to children's homesin Yugoslavia and Poland. Homer Bigart, a correspondent for the

New York Herald Tribune who was known for his non-communist feel-

ings, described the care received by Greek youths. All of the chil-dren, according to Bigart, had left Greece voluntarily (14 June


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1948). Two members ofthe American embassy in Warsaw observedGreek children in their quarters in Poland (U.S., Dept. of State,

General Records, C. H. HaIl1Jr., to Dept. of State, 23 Dec. 1949).The Americans were not granted permission to talk with the youths,but their observations convinced them that the children received sat-

isfactory care. A Greek teacher noted that the children would remainin Poland until there was "real peace" at home.

These on-site inspections of children's homes outside Greecedid not resolve the issue. The lodgings were clean, the food was am-

ple, the supervision and education were better than what most chil-dren experienced in Greek villages. And yet the uniform behavior ofthe youthsthe slogans, the ritual, the group activities, the educa-tional sessions, the attempt to blame the "fascists" (Greek govern-ment aided by the British and Americans) for all troublessuggeststhat there was an effort to convert them to communism, as the Ath-ens government declared.

UNSCOB meanwhile adopted another tactic: it proclaimed thatthe Greek government, not the guerrillas, should be responsible forthe children's safety. Removal "without their parents' free con-sent," it declared, "raises the issue ofthe inherent rights of parents"and breaks "accepted moral standards of international conduct."Furthermore, it violates Greek sovereignty and endangers relations

between Greece and its northern neighbors. The United States andBritain supported UNSCOB's recommendation that the Greek gov-ernment should bring the matter before the governments involved. Ifthere were "humanitarian grounds" for relocating the children,UNSCOB noted, the government in Athens ought to carry out the

program. Should this not work, the committee would assure that theevacuations took place "through the intermediary of an appropriateinternational organization." In June the Greek government in-formed UNSCOB that it had already contacted Yugoslavia, Al-

bania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland; by Septem-ber all governments had either ignored or refused the appeals (UN,General Assembly, OfficialRecords, UNSCOB Report A/574, 3 sess.,Suppl. 8, 1948, 19, 20; A/644, 3 sess., Suppl. 8A, 1948, 4, 5; Times(London), 3 June 1948, 3f; 25 June 1948, 3g).

Indeed, the Ministry of Social Welfare in Athens had takenmeasures to transport the children out of northern Greece and into"colonies" or "children's cities" established on the mainland and

on the islands. Whether the Greek government had begun this pro-gram to protect the children from the guerrillas or to resettle them in

preparation for military operations in the north, it had taken morethan five thousand youths from Macedonia, and had already relo-


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cated over two thousand in Salonika. Nearly half of five thousandfrom Thrace had been transported to the Greek interior. In a hous-

ing program staffed by volunteers and having the support of QueenFrederika, the Greek government eventually resettled nearly 15,000youths, from both communist and loyalist background, in forty-eight children's homes (UN, General Assembly, Official Records,UNSCOB Report A/674, 3 sess., Suppl. 8, 1948, 19, 20; Annex 2,31; N. Y. Times, 21 June 1948, Ll).

By the spring of 1948 the Chief of the American Mission for Aidto Greece (AMAG) in Athens, Dwight Griswold, reported to theState Department that General Markos' recent announcement ofchild evacuations was "unusually effective psychological warfare"and that the queen had overreacted in relocating the Greek youths(U.S., Dept. of State, General Records, 23 March 1948). BothAMAG and JUSMAPG warned Greek officials ofthe "political and

psychological danger" derived from the government's program. Up-rooting the youths would not only necessitate child care arrange-ments, but it would cause military problems by forcing the govern-ment to use army transport units in relocating the children, andwould add to the country's already enormous refugee burden. The

Americans recommended that the Greeks establish "voluntary refu-gee centers" in large towns where parents might choose to send theirchildren. Griswold was convinced that Markos' strategy was to"snatch" a few youths from time to time "to support propaganda ofmass abductions and continue [to] produce [a] demoralizing resultamong Greeks." His assessment found support in Salonika, wherethe American consul general, Raleigh Gibson, believed that therebels were waging an "effective war of nerves" designed to provethe Greek National Army incapable of guaranteeing security (U.S.,Dept. of State, General Records, Gibson to Sec. of State, 28 April1948).

American diplomats meanwhile reported growing fear inGreece that the guerrillas' abductions were part of an effort to estab-lish a free Macedonian state dominated by either Slavs or Bulgars.Gibson in Salonika noted the Greeks' belief that the communists

sought the "dismemberment" of their country (U.S., Dept. ofState,General Records, Gibson to Sec. of State, 16 April 1948). TheAmerican ambassador in Prague, Laurence Steinhardt, reportedthat the Greek charg was convinced that the guerrillas wanted tofurther the "Slav-ization" ofthe children in communist surround-

ings (U.S., Dept. of State, General Records, Steinhardt to Sec. ofState, 8 April 1948). Indeed, a later report filed by UNSCOB tooknote of frequent radio broadcasts, press releases, and statements of


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public officials in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria calling for the separationof "Greek" or "Aegean" Macedonia from Greece. The National

Liberation Front called for an ' ' independent and equal MacedonianState" within "the confederation of democratic Balkan peoples"(UN, General Assembly, Official Records, UNSCOB Report A/935, 4sess., Suppl. 8, 1949, 5).

Propaganda from both sides intensified the uproar in a countryalready torn by civil war. The American consul in Patras reported ona demonstration in that city against the abductions of children (U.S.,Dept. of State, General Records, L. Pittman Springs to Sec. of State,27 March 1948). One speaker warned: "Do not forget that Greek

children are kidnapped to be turned into Bulgarians." Another pro-claimed that the Slavs intended to "annihilate the Greek race bytheir satanic plans." The Greek press meanwhile denounced the ab-ductions. One paper lashed out at the "hateful and barbaric action

by Slav-led bands of gangsters," while another blasted the UN forbeing "indifferent" to the "extermination of a race" (U.S., Dept. ofState, General Records, quoted in Karl Rankin, Embassy in Athens,to Sec. of State, 19 April 1948).

The First Secretary of the American Embassy in Athens, Karl

Rankin, urged the State Department to publicize the child removalsalong with a recent newspaper report of a mass murder of otheryouths. His sources revealed that "senior Communist officials in[the] Slav states" had not counted on the evacuations having suchadverse effect, and that they now sought to return to their original

policy of taking "only the willing children of willing members oftherebel army and its followers." Rankin then noted press reports inGreece alleging that during the government's recent military offen-sive in Roumeli its forces had come across the bodies of forty children

along the slopes of Mount Ghiona. According to the account, theGreek National Army had trapped the retreating bandit forces,whose leaders feared that the children would reveal their places ofrefuge, and therefore ordered them strangled. The day following thediscovery, the Greek Ministries of War and Justice sent an investiga-tory team under JUSMAPG's leadership. Rankin suggested that ifthe story proved accurate, the United States should expose the atroc-ity before the world (U.S., Dept. of State, General Records, Rankinto Sec. of State, 3 April 1948, 10 May 1948; Times (London), 10 May

1948, 4b).The information soon gathered by JUSMAPG did not confirma massacre at Roumeli. Despite the testimonies of three witnessesabout multiple murders, the team found only two bodies. Nonethe-less, the officer in charge of the investigation, Captain James Hur-


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ley, Jr., asserted that the lack of evidence did not exonerate therebels. The Greek National Army had failed to safeguard the areaafter discovering^he bodies, he pointed out, and "it is my opinionthat the children originally were there and that they were since re-moved by radio instructions and dumped into snow crevices inGhiona, where no one will ever find them." (U.S., Dept. of State,General Records, Report enclosed in Embassy in Athens to Dept. ofState, 14 June 1948).

Ill

The State Department was skeptical about the kidnappingcharges brought by the Athens government. In a dispatch to diplo-mats in Athens, Budapest, Bern, Salonika, and Moscow, Secretaryof State Marshall explained that British and American sources inGreece and within the "iron-curtain area" believed that guerrillapropaganda had twisted the evacuation effort for the "dual purpose"of winning praise for "humanitarianism" and for "terrorizing [the]Grk [Greek] nationalist peasantry" (U.S., Dept. of State, GeneralRecords, 29 April 1948). A "few thousand" youths had been taken

from Greece, some by force from loyalist families, but the majorityfrom the "guerrilla infested area, where they constituted [a] welfare

problem for Markos, and departed with more or less willing consent[ofthe] slavic minority or communist parents." In a statement thatsummed up the State Department's position, Marshall declared thatthe child removal program appeared to be more "convenience and

psychological warfare than planned 'genocide,' but is of course noless reprehensible for that reason."

Although it is doubtful that the Kremlin was involved in Gene-ral Markos' efforts to remove the children, American intelligence an-alysts suspected the Soviets of playing at least an indirect role (U.S.,Dept. of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Report 4340.4, 3July 1947, 41). In a secret study of April 1948, the Research andAnalysis Division of the Department of State noted several reasonsfor the communist guerrillas' "actual or threatened evacuation" ofGreek children. For one, it would "relieve [the] guerrilla economy"

by moving the youths from combat zones; it also would "supply fu-ture manpower while exerting psychological pressure on Greece. ' ' Afew paragraphs later, however, the analysis declared it "reasonableto assume that all action in support of Markos takes place with the

prior knowledge and approval of Moscow and with the participationof Soviet coordinators on the spot." The Soviets, the report contin-ued, intended to obstruct economic stability by keeping Greece in a


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"constant state of turmoil" that was designed to "undermine Greekmorale." Such a "war of attrition" aimed at eroding faith in the

Athens government, draining American resources, and facilitatingcommunist takeover (U.S., Dept. of State, Office of Intelligence Re-search, Report 4664, 27 April 1948, 20, 22, 26-27). By implication,the report seemed to say, the Soviets tacitly approved the child evac-uation program because it interfered with the Truman Doctrine.

The disclosure of UNSCOB's findings in May 1948 helped todetermine Washington's policy: it would appeal for the repatriationof only those youths taken against their will. But the Department ofState was not happy with this approach. In a dispatch released to the

press in late June and sent to the American embassies in Athens,Paris, London, Belgrade, Sofia, Budapest, Prague, Warsaw, andMoscow, Marshall explained that even in the cases of children whowent voluntarily, he agreed with UNSCOB that their "protractedretention" was "contrary to the accepted moral standards of inter-national conduct." It was "difficult to understand the 'humanitari-

anism' of harboring foreign children of uncertain family status with-out having the means to care for them, and of refusing theirrepatriation because of political considerations" (U.S., Dept. of

State, Foreign Relations 249-50, Marshall to Embassies, 23 June 1948;NY. Times, 25 June 1948, L14).

By the autumn of 1948, the United States was under publicpressure to express moral condemnation of the alleged abductionsand to seek restoration of the children to their families. Time maga-zine featured an article containing a picture of fifteen Greek childrenover the caption "Abductions for instruction" and quoting Lenin:"Give us the child for eight years, and it will be a Bolshevist forever' '(15 March 1948, 35). The New York Times carried a front-page story

by journalist C. L. Sulzberger, who asserted that Markos' purposewas to establish a Slavophone minority in Greece grounded in "newideologies" acquired in communist education camps (21 June 1948,Ll). Cries of indignation came from Boy and Girl Scout organiza-tions, state legislatures, and members of Congress, while a veritabledeluge of letters and telegrams fell upon President Truman, begin-ning in August 1948 and not abating until the summer of 1951. Cor-respondence to the White House came from fourteen countries andmore than thirty states, and included protests from university stu-

dents in the United States, private citizens, Greek-American organi-zations, and Greek church groups, including the Greek OrthodoxArchbishop of North and South America (Truman Papers, folder la-

beled "Greek Children"). Meanwhile both houses of Congresspassed resolutions urging the Truman administration to halt the ab-


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ductions and to secure repatriation of the children through the UNand other international agencies (U.S., Dept. of State, General Re-

cords, Gertrude Engstrom, Commissioner of Girl Scouts in Pitts-burgh, to Marshall, 25 May 1948; Bohlen to Gwinn, 30 March1948 ; Ernest Gross, Asst. Sec. of State, to Sen. Scott Lucas of 111., 11Oct. 1949; Jack McFaIl, Asst. Sec. of State, to Sen. Sheridan Dow-ney of Calif., 22 Dec. 1949; U.S., Congress, Senate, 81st Cong., 2dsess., 18Jan. 1950, Congressional Record, Vol. 96, part 1, 507; part 2,27 Feb. 1950, 2366-67; House, Appendix, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1March 1950, Vol. 96, part 14, A1514; 20 March 1950, A2070;House, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 22 March 1950, Vol. 96, part 3, 3812;

Senate, Appendix, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 27 March 1950, Vol. 96,part 14, A2215-16; Senate, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 17 July 1950, Vol.96, part8, 10356; 13 Sept. 1950, part 11, 14667; House, 82dCong.,1st sess., 23 April 1951, Vol. 97, part 3, 4222). The president prom-ised only to cooperate with the UN and the International Red Crossin seeking the youths' return (U.S., President, Public Papers 32, Tru-man to Greek Orthodox Archbishop Michael, 6 Jan. 1950; 259,Truman to Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House, 19 April 1950;663, Truman to Vice-President Alben Barkley, 29 Sept. 1950).

In mid-August 1948 the Greek government heightened its ef-forts to secure State Department cooperation in bringing kidnappingcharges before the General Assembly ofthe UN. Five months earlierits ambassador in Washington, Vassili Dendramis, had handed Wil-liam Baxter, specialist in Greek, Turkish, and Iranian affairs, a draftnote concerning the child removals which the Athens governmentintended to take before the UN. Dendramis wanted to send it to the

UN Secretary-General at the same time the Greek Foreign Officepublished the text and sent copies to UNSCOB and all foreign mis-sions in Athens. This approach, the Greek ambassador believed,would exert pressure on those countries holding the youths in so-called "protective custody" to permit repatriation (U.S., Dept. ofState, General Records, memorandum by Baxter, 24 March 1948).

Before Baxter forwarded the proposal to his superiors, he soughtto avert a confrontation with the Soviets by making important altera-tions in the note. The Greeks, according to the draft, condemned"Soviet Communism" ["Soviet" struck] for a "diabolical interna-tional conspiracy" designed to kidnap their children. Radios in "So-viet dominated" [both deleted] Belgrade, Sofia, Bucharest, Buda-

pest, and Tirana had announced the children's arrival. The purposesofthe abductions, the note asserted, were to scare the Greek peopleinto supporting the rebels and to drive villagers into the cities, in-creasing the government's refugee burden. "In the long run the


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80 Howard Jones

Communist objective is to warp the minds ofthe kidnapped childrenof Greece in order that they may become agents in the enslavement

of their native land" (U.S., Dept. of State, General Records, memo-randum by Baxter, 24 March 1948). Without proof for the Greeks'allegations, Baxter recognized the wisdom in eliminating referencesto the Soviet Union.

If Baxter and any others in the State Department supported theGreek approach, Secretary Marshall overruled them for at leastthree reasons. First and most importantly, he knew that the charge ofkidnapping was the "weakest link" in any case the General Assem-

bly could make against the communist states. As UNSCOB admit-

ted, there was no evidence tying these governments to the removals,even though they had admitted to providing a haven for the children.Marshall later explained to a representative of the Greek embassythat the "only group which could be definitely indicted as responsi-

ble for [the] removal [of] children from Greece is guerrillas, and nouseful purpose would be served by endeavoring [to] obtain GA [Gen-eral Assembly] condemnation of [the] guerrillas." Second, Marshallrealized that the communist governments had found an unassailabledefense in calling their reception of the children a "humanitarian

act." Denunciation of these countries, he told the American ambas-sador in Greece, would invite counter charges that terrorist practices

by the Athens government had driven these people from Greece(U.S., Dept. of State, Foreign Relations 254, Marshall to Embassy inAthens, 14 Aug. 1948). Third, Marshall undoubtedly recognizedthat his government had to be careful about criticizing the East Euro-

pean countries; as mentioned earlier, Yugoslavia had defected fromthe Cominform that same summer of 1948, and there were obviousadvantages in trying to establish ties with Tito.

Marshall emphasized to the Greeks that for "tactical reasons,"the State Department preferred that they avoid a charge of kidnap-

ping and make an appeal through the General Assembly for the re-patriation ofthe children on a humanitarian basis. The secretary un-derstood the "justice" of their complaint, but he "would not rpt[repeat] not feel able [to] support them in any attempt [to] fix blamefor [the] removal [of] children or sheltering them [by] neighboringcountries." Marshall suggested a less provocative way for bringingthe matter before the UN. He expected the Economic and Social

Council (ECOSOC) in Geneva to pass a resolution urging the returnof displaced children from all countries. If it did, such a resolutionwould become a subject for discussion by the Assembly's Economicand Social Committee. IfECOSOC in Geneva failed to adopt a reso-


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lution calling for the children's return, Marshall noted, the Greekgovernment could still take the issue before the Assembly's Political

Committee. In the meantime, he had received encouraging reportsabout repatriation efforts by Red Cross societies. Should thesegroups succeed, the Greeks might not have to take the matter beforethe General Assembly (U.S., Dept of State, Foreign Relations 254-55,Marshall to Embassy in Athens, 14 Aug. 1948).

Thus by the autumn of 1948 it was clear that the United Stateswould do no more than appeal for repatriation on the grounds ofhumanitarianism. In August ECOSOC in Geneva did pass a resolu-tion calling for reuniting "unaccompanied children" with their par-

ents, and for the repatriation of orphans and unaccompanied chil-dren whose nationality was not clearwith the stipulation that "thebest interests of the individual child shall be the determining factor. ' 'This was somewhat different from the American position that "the

best interests of the child should be a guiding principle in determin-ing final plans for the unaccompanied displaced child." There wasan irony. Depending on the definition of "best interests," theUnited States could advocate repatriation of all children. Yet by thesame argument the East European governments could refuse to re-

patriate any of them. On 27 November the UN General Assemblyresolved that the International Red Cross agencies should seek thereturn of those children whose "father or mother, or in his or her

absence, their closest relative, express a wish to that effect" (Rosen-feld Papers, "Comment Paper"Refugees and Displaced Persons,SD/A/C.3/112; UN, General Assembly, Official Records, UNSCOBReport A/935, Annex 1, 4 sess., Suppl. 8, 1949, 21).

There would be another outburst of the controversy in thespring of 1949, when the UN received reports that the Greek youthswere among the communist guerrillas fighting the Greek NationalArmy (UN, General Assembly, Official Records, UNSCOB ReportA/935, 4 sess., Suppl. 8, 1949, 13-15). The British delegate to theGeneral Assembly, Hector McNeil, denounced the "satanic use" ofchildren in war. International organizations protected youths from"harmful drugs, from indecent traffic, from pornography, fromhunger and from disease," he asserted; surely the General Assemblycould not be "uncritical of men who twisted a child's mind to throw

his body into a struggle of which he knew little, perhaps against kith

and kin" (UN, General Assembly, Official Records, 1st Committee, 4sess., 1949, 304th Meeting, 31 Oct. 1949, 153). Despite the Polishrepresentative's denials, the Greek General Staff insisted that chil-dren were among the 14,000 "fit" guerrillas in Yugoslavia, Albania,


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82 Howard Jones

and Bulgaria (UN, General Assembly, Official Records, 1st Commit-tee, 4 sess., 1949, 301st Meeting, 28 Oct. 1949, 131; Greek General

Staff cited in U.S., Army, History of JUSMAGG 52).The end ofthe Greek civil war in August 1949 did not terminatethe issue involving the children. Few ofthe 28,000 evacuated Greekyouths returned to their homes soon after the war, although more didso later on. In December 1949 the co-ordinator ofthe American aid

program in Greece, George McGhee, reported that most ofthe chil-dren were now receiving "intensive communist indoctrination"(U.S., Dept. of State, General Records, McGhee to Sec. of State, 29Dec. 1949). The UN later received a report from the International

Red Cross that as of April 1951 requests had arrived for the repatria-tion of only 10,344 Greek youths. Less than 300 of over nine thou-sand Greek children in Yugoslavia had returned home by May; overseven thousand lived in Yugoslavia with their parents, who weremostly Greek Macedonians, the government in Belgrade empha-sized (UN, General Assembly, Official Records, UNSCOB Report A/935, 4 sess., Suppl. 8, 1949, 13; A/1857, 6 sess., Suppl. 11, 1951,24;Times (London), 16 Aug. 1948, 3d; 27 Nov. 1948, 5e; 29 Nov. 1948,3b; 29 Jan. 1951, 3d). In November 1952 a high ranking British for-

eign affairs official told the House of Commons that the InternationalRed Cross had received no help from the governments "within theSoviet orbit" and had temporarily halted efforts to secure the chil-dren's return (Sweet-Escott, 71, 72, n. 1). For practical purposes,the matter had been effectively closed.

The guerrillas' removal of the Greek children had posed a di-lemma for the United States. Not only did the Truman administra-tion have a public commitment to Greece, but it believed that stabil-ity in that country was vital to the success of the Truman Doctrine in

preserving the Mediterranean from Soviet expansion. At the sametime, however, the administration in Washington sought to avoidalienating Yugoslavia, which was, according to the Greek govern-ment, a major perpetrator of the kidnappings. The State Depart-ment was probably correct in believing that the child removals hadoriginated as evacuations of those Greeks in danger of war and star-vation; it also seems likely that the rebels had expanded their initial

purpose in an attempt to undermine the Greek people's faith in theirgovernment. But from there the matter became enormously compli-

cated. The Greek government charged that the removals were kid-nappings designed to destroy Greece by genocide, leaving the Medi-terranean and the Balkan Peninsula open to Slavic-communistinfiltration. Each side in the civil war, it appears, had exploited is-


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sues in an effort to put the other in the worst possible light. Whateverthe truth, in the emotional atmosphere ofthe late 1940s, reason had

given way to hysteria, making almost any charge credible.Marshall believed, and probably correctly, that the overwhelm-ing majority ofthe children were simply refugees. The chief supportsfor his view were the low number of requests for repatriation and thefact that seven thousand of the nine thousand Greek children in Yu-

goslavia were living with their parents. By the spring of 1951, asshown, parents ofthe closest relatives ofthe children had filed for thereturn of less than forty percent of those removed from Greece. Thisfigure suggests two probabilities: one, that at least a few children

were taken by force; and two, that a large number of the parentsthemselves had fled from Greece. Furthermore, there is no proof thateven the remaining children had been kidnapped. It is likely thatmany of these youths were children of either captured rebels or ofrebel sympathizers who chose to stay in Greece and believed theiroffspring safer outside the country. Marshall was doubtless aware ofthese considerations and therefore sought the return of only thoseyouths taken by force.

The Secretary of State had skillfully averted a touchy situationpartly brought on by the Greek government itself. He could not ig-nore the matter because the evacuations endangered the credibilityof the Truman Doctrine by prolonging internal disorder, exposingthe inability of the Athens government to guarantee security for its

people, and making the country vulnerable to communist takeover.But he also realized that the Greek government had not proved itscase for kidnapping, that its own relocation program was seriouslymagnifying an already great refugee problem, that America's policytoward the civil war was to restrict involvement to Greek domestic

affairs, and that there were advantages in establishing a relationshipwith Yugoslavia. With UNSCOB itself unable to substantiate theGreek government's accusations, Marshall had no choice but to callfor the return of only those children forcibly removed, and on themorally impregnable grounds of humanitarianism. Such an ap-proach was the only response that permitted the United States tomaintain prestige by meeting its commitments to Greece. Marshall'srestraint was unusual in an activist era marked by the Truman Doc-trine, Marshall Plan, Berlin Airlift, and North Atlantic Treaty Or-

ganization; but he recognized that it was the only feasible escapefrom a dilemma forced onto the United States by its Greek ally. Hisadept diplomacy accomplished a stalemate in a no-win situation, leftAmerica's options open with Yugoslavia, and permitted the admin-


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84 Howard Jones

istration in Washington to concentrate on matters in West Europethat were important to American security.

UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA

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