the determinants of turkish foreign policy, and turkey’s european vocation

8/12/2019 The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkeys European Vocation

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Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the ColdWarAuthor(s): Mustafa AydinSource: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 103-139Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284054.

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Determinantsof lTrkish ForeignPolicy:ChangingPatternsand Conjuncturesduringthe Cold WarMUSTAFA AYDIN

I looked elsewhere at the structuraldeterminantsof Turkishforeign policy,'which included the factorsthathave traditionally nfluenced andshapedtheforeign policy of Turkeyfrom imperial times, throughthe inter-waryearswith Ataturk, to the present-day Republic. Thanks to these structuraldeterminants and their strong influence upon Turkey, it has been able todisplay a remarkabledegree of continuityin its foreign policy, in contrasttofrequentinternalchanges. It is, to a large extent, due to these factors thatTurkishforeign policy has been praised for its high degree of rationality,sense of responsibility, long term perspective, and 'realism found in fewdeveloping nations and far from universal even among the democracies ofthe West'.2Yet, thereare other factorsthat have affected Turkishforeign policy andits daily happenings. These conjunctural actors, the result of internationaland domestic changes over the years, have also helped to shape Turkey'scontemporary foreign policy. Due to their dynamic and changeablecharacter,however, they exerted a temporary influence on the country'sforeign policy, especially on its implementation. But due to these factors,Turkey's foreign policy has undergone some rapid changes in itsimplementation,even if no majordeviations have occurredin the ultimatenational goals. These factors have modified the foreign policy of Turkeythroughthe years to establish a better defined and more relevant foreignpolicy to meet the requirementsof the contemporaryworld.Though there are several of them, this article will deal with only a fewmajor conjunctural actors that have affectedTurkey'sforeign policy and itsinternationalenvironment.Bearing in mind thatalmost every happening indomestic or international politics could affect and change a country'sforeign policy in one way or another,it is imperative to be selective. Theselection of factors has been determinedby the importance of the changesthat they caused. In this respect, the most decisive reason for choosingMiddle EasternStudies,Vol.36, No.1, January2000, pp.103-139PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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104 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIEScertain onjuncturalactorswas the sudden hiftthey had caused n eitherthe implementationrmore mportantlyhe foundationf theforeignpolicyof Turkey.An overviewof Turkey's oreignrelations hows that the single mostimportant evelopment ad been the transitionrom the Cold War,whichdominated elationsbetweenthe Eastand the Westin the 1950s, to theprocessof detente.3Another mportantactor n the makingof Turkey'sforeign policy has been the Cyprus ssue, which became a permanentproblematicf Turkey'soreignrelations inceits inception. n the mid-to-late 1960s it was the continualCypruscrisis which gave impetusto aprocessof reconsiderationf thebasicorientationf Turkishoreignpolicy.And in the 1970sit was anotherCypruscrisis which led to fundamentalchanges nforeignpolicy, houghnot as dramatic s pulling hecountry utof the Western tatessystem.Other mportantactorswhich causedsomeconsiderablehanges n Turkey's ttitudeso certaingroupsof states,havebeenthe constitutionalndpoliticaldevelopment f the country, ogetherwith its economicambitions ndproblems;hedifferent iews of politicalpartiesand groupswhich came into existence after the 1960 militaryintervention;he 1961 Constitution, ogetherwith social and politicalevaluation t embodied;and the changes in attitudesof certain statestowardsTurkey.Someof theconjuncturalactors hathadaffectedTurkishoreignpolicywereephemeralncharacter. thers ontinuedoaffect tspatternsor sometime and were usually interrelated. ince it is virtually mpossible toidentifythe exact resultof each factorseparately nd any foreignpolicyaction is influencedby a combination f factors,this article, nsteadoflookingat certainactorsand heireffectsthroughheyears,will attemptodeal with Turkish oreign policy in differentperiods,distinguishableytheir distinctive patterns in foreign policy. The above-mentionedconjuncturalactors,then, will be discussedin-depth n their relevantperiods,under he overall guidance' f the traditionalnputs.Duringsome 50 years of the existenceof the Republic of Turkey(between1923and1980),one candistinguish tleastthreedifferent eriodswhichcouldbe identifiedwiththeirdistinctpatternsn the country's oreignpolicyattitudes.The inter-war eriodunder he leadership f AtatirkandInonu oundTurkeyWesternnits inclination ut ealouslyguarding gainstany intimation hat its independence, ithereconomicallyor militarily,mightbe jeopardized.The foreign policy of this period was essentiallyshapedbythefactors hat havepreviouslyabelled raditionalrstructural.ParticularlyMustafaKemal'sunderstandingndpracticeof foreignpolicywas important.As these factorswere examined arlier,here s no needtoengage in furtherdiscussion about this period.4The second period,



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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR 1051945-60, during which Turkey's foreign policy was dominated by totalWesterndependence, was followed by a period of disillusionment with theWest, late detente with Eastern bloc and rapprochement efforts with theThird World(1960-70). The 1970s, in addition, saw a patternof alienationfrom the West encouraged by the Cyprus crisis of 1974, which in turnshowed Turkey the cumulative result of the foreign policy it had beenfollowing since the end of the Second World War: loneliness in theinternationalarena. Hence, the 1970s witnessed Turkey's efforts to comeback to the internationalarena as a reliable and friendly nation, just as shewas duringthe inter-warperiod.

Modern Turkey's Western orientation and rapidly modernizing featureswere firmlyconsolidatedunderthe leadershipof Atatuirk.His foreign policywas dominated by the priority of peace, sovereignty and nationaldevelopment over expansionist-revisionism.After Atatuirk'sdeath, one ofhis close associates, Ismet Inonui, ook over the presidency of Turkey andthe Republican People's Party (RPP)in a one-partypolitical system. He wasso committed to the Kemalist ideology in general, and foreign policyprinciples of peace and sovereignty in particular,that Turkey under hisleadership 'faithfullyfollowed the Kemalistregime in every domain and theforeign policy remainedunchanged' Although 'the gatheringstorm' overEurope in 1939 forced Turkey to enter into an alliance with France andGreatBritain, it was able to stay out of the war until the last minute.6Despite surviving the Second World War virtually unscathed, Turkeyhowever, was soon to see that the situation after the war was demandingcareful diplomacy as much as it had done previously.7Throughout he war,Inonuicame to the conclusion that Turkey's biggest problemafter the warwould be the prospectof facing all alone the more powerful Soviet Union.In fact, he was convinced thatif Turkey entered the war,the Soviets wouldoccupy Turkeyeither as a memberof the Axis or as a 'liberator' He alsoforesaw the Soviet post-wardomination of Eastern Europe.9Hence, he wasdetermined not to give the Soviets an excuse to set foot on Turkish soil,thoughlearnedsoon thatall his careful manoeuvring to avoid alienating theSoviet Union had been to no avail.The Second World Warmarked a watershed in Turkey'sforeign policyas well as in its domestic developments. Although Turkey'spolitical andeconomic alignmentwith the Westerncountries after the Second WorldWarmay be treated as a natural outcome of its desire to become a fullymodernized(= westernized) country, ts dependence on the Westernpowerswent too far to representa reversal in its earlier policies. It is true that thepre-war Republic under Atattirk's leadership attempted to adopt the



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106 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESinstitutions ndthe valuesof the West n order o acceleratehe processofmodernizationndeconomicdevelopment. his inclinationo the Westdidnot, however,mply a dependency n theWestern owers,eithermilitarilyor economically.Moreover,Turkeywas reluctant o form any economicbonds which might lead to any real or imaginarydependency.On thecontrary,Turkishforeign policy before the Second World War wasindependentn nature, espitea seriesof regionalpacts,andbasedprimarilyon conciliationwithallbigandregionalpowers.During hisperiod,Turkeymaintainedriendlyrelationswith all the majorstates of the time butavoidedanyformalattachment ithanyof them until 1939.Evenduringthe SecondWorldWar,ts main oreignpolicyaimwas to find a wayto stayoutof thewarandnot to endangerhe delicatebalanceof its relationswithall theparties.10 hythendidTurkishoreignpolicyreverse tselffollowingtheSecondWorldWar?A number f domesticandsystemic actorshadpushedTurkeyowardsWesterntutelagein general,and Western-dependentoreign policy inparticular.It was no accident that significant changes occurredsimultaneouslyn both foreignand domesticpolicies,for as we shall seetherewasa linkagebetween he two.Inthe internationalrena herewerebasically wo more mportantndinterrelatedevelopmentshat were instrumentaln Turkey'sdecisiontoestablishcloser ties with the Western ountries.First of all, therewas achangenthenature f the internationalystemwhichrapidly volved roma 'balanceof power'structureo a 'bipolar' tructure.n such a structure,as Aron'sparadigmtates,a policyof neutralitywas not very realisticorpossibleat all fora country ike Turkey, middle-range owersituatednsuch a geopoliticallymportantrea.1'Othermportantevelopmentsn theinternationalarena were the emergence of the Soviet Union as asuperpower,nd,moredelicately orTurkey,ts subsequent emands ponTurkey.As mostobservers oted, he impetus orTurkey'shiftto Westernalignment id notcomefrom heWest,butrather esultedrom tsreactionto Sovietpressures.Alreadyduring he war,it becameobviousto Turkey hat the Sovietswerepursuing policydesignedogainterritorialoncessionsromTurkey.During he secretGerman-Soviet egotiationsn November1940,Turkeywas one of thebargaining ieces,and was a priceaskedby the Sovietstoenter the BerlinPact.2 Subsequently, llied with the West, the Sovietsbroughtheirdemandso YaltaandPostdamConferencesn 1945.'3Havingreceived Churchill'sacquiescenceat the Moscow Conference October1944),StalinpresentedSovietpositionat Yalta February 945)vis-al-vistheTurkish traits. Itis impossible,' emarked talin toaccepta situationin whichTurkeyhasa handon Russia's hroat.'4



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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR 107Having already received these hints about Soviet intentions on itsterritorialintegrity, and alarmed by the Soviet note of 19 March 1945,denouncingthe 1925 Treatyof FriendshipandNon-aggression, Turkey wasterrifiedby another Soviet note on 7 June 1945, demandingSoviet bases onthe Straits in addition to the territorialadjustmentsin the Soviet-Turkishborder as the price for renewing the Treaty of Friendship and Non-

aggression. President Inonti's response was sharp and emotional. tellingthe GrandNationalAssembly of Turkeythatthey were 'underno obligationto give up Turkish soil or Turkishrights to anyone ... We shall live withhonour and die with honour.' The Assembly speakerfurtherwarnedSovietsin a firm and equally emotional manner that 'if the Russians insist on theirdemand, we shall fight to the last Turk'6When Turkey refused these initial demands, from mid-1945 onwards,the Soviets started to exert heavy political pressures on Turkey. In thissituation, Turkey unsuccessfully tried 'to involve the United States indefending Turkey againstthe Soviet Union', and 'bring the United Statesposition on the Straits into harmony with the minimum Turkish view' .'However, the United StatesandGreatBritain,underthe mistakenbelief thatmeaningful co-operation with the Soviet Union after the war would bepossible, stood aside. Whatthey did not know at thetime was that the Sovietdemands on Turkeywere a partof Stalin's efforts to take advantageof thepower-gapof the wartime and immediatepost-warinternational ituationbyprovisional demandsjust beyond Soviet borders.8Furthermore,Turkey'sneutralityduringthe war hadleft its futurestatusin ambiguityin contrasttomost Europeancountries where the post-warspheres were clearly defined.'9While this ambiguity made Turkeya tempting target for Stalin's post-warexpansionism, the Western (US and UK) attitudes at the end of the war,which were slow to adopt a firm position against Soviet demands, musthave encouragedStalin about his proposalsupon Turkey.Meanwhile, at the Postdam Conference (17 July-2 August 1945), theSoviets sought to obtain an Allied consensus that the problem of the Straitswas a matterbetween Turkeyand the Soviet Union. Thoughthe Conferencebroke up without resolving the matter,it was agreed in principle to revisethe Montreux Convention.20 n the meantime, the Westernattitude towardsTurkey, and the Soviet demands in general, began to change gradually.Takenin conjunctionwith Soviet actions elsewhere, and in the light of theunsuccessful conference of foreign ministersin December 1945, the Sovietdemandsstartedto appearto PresidentTruman o demonstratean intentionto invade Turkeyand control the Straits.2With the declaration in March 1946 by Great Britain that the 1939Treaty of Alliance was still in force and obliged the UK to help it in theevent of aggression, Turkey realized that its post-war isolation had now



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108 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIESended.22Turkeywas furtherrelieved by another sign reflecting the changedAmerican stance: the battleshipMissouri anchoredat Istanbulon 15 April1946, carryingthe remains of Turkish AmbassadorM. Ertegiin, who haddied in Washingtonduring the war. This was seen as a sign of Americanreadiness to protect Turkey. Nevertheless, the dispute over the Straitscontinueduntil the end of 1946.On 7 August 1946 the Soviets presentedtheir proposalover the Straitsas authorizedat Postdam.23 he proposal called for control of the Straitstobe in the hands of Turkeyand 'otherBlack Sea Powers', with Turkeyandthe Soviet Union sharing joint defence of the waterways. They also sentstrong notes to Turkeyto complain about the administrationof the Straitsduringthe war. This time the Americans and the British backed Turkeyinits rejection of Soviet demands, and in September 1946, shortly after theproposedregulations presentedby the Soviets, the United Statesannouncedits intention to maintaina permanentnaval presencein the Mediterranean.24Althoughlater in September he Soviets repeatedtheirearlier demands,theydroppedthe issue toward the end of October 1946 afteranotherrefusal fromTurkey,backedby the United States and Great Britain.25

The answer to the question as to what actually persuadedthe Soviets toback out of their demands on Turkey is difficult to give, and has beencontroversial. Many, especially foreign observers, tend to emphasizeWestern support.26 nd the Turkishofficials, who tried to persuadethe USto continue its aid to Turkey, end to reinforcethis connection.On the otherhand, many Turkishscholars, specially since the mid-1960s, have arguedthat the years of maximumthreat were 1945 and 1946 andTurkey,withoutany formalconnection with the United States,had to standall alone againstSoviet demands. They furtherargue that when finally the United Statesagreedto give aid to Turkeythroughthe TrumanDoctrine,the Soviet Unionhad alreadybacked down in its claims.27t seems fair to state that it was thecombination of determinedTurkishresistance, opposition of the Westernpowers, and the loss of will on the Soviets' partthat caused the Soviets toback down.28Whatever the reasons for the USSR's failure to follow up its claims,Turkey, thoroughly alarmed by Soviet actions, reverted to its historicanimosity for its Russian neighbourand continuedto seek protectionfromthe West, mainly from the United States. To this end, it attempted todramatize the Soviet threat, and continued to argue that Turkey'sgeographical position made it the key to the Middle East, supposedly thefinal targetof the alleged Soviet aggression. Although by the end of 1946the Allied position had hardened in opposition to Soviet demands onTurkey, t was not until 1947, in reaction to Communist activities in Greeceand the British announcement of their intention to withdraw from its



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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR 109responsibilitiesin the area,thatthe United Statesbecame actively involved.The result was the TrumanDoctrinewhich forged the initial bondsbetweenTurkey and the United States, despitethe fact thatUnited States personnel,who began to be stationed in Turkey, quickly aroused memories of theCapitulations.29One of the main Ottomanforeign policy aims for a lengthy period wasto ally Turkey with a powerful state, against its traditional antagonistRussia. Now, in the bipolarinternational ystem, modernTurkey, aced withrenewed Russian threat,was forced to find an ally to protect its interestsagainst the Soviet Union. There were a numberof reasons why the UnitedStates was the naturalcandidate for the post. Apart from the fact that theUnited States was now assuming the leadership and protectorshipof theWesterndemocracies,and it was the only country capableof lending moneywhich Turkey's economy badly neededat the time, it was also significanttothe Turksthat the United States had no history of colonial dominationandwas geographicallylocated a considerabledistance from Turkey.Though the Soviet threat in the late 1940s stands out as the mostinstrumental factor in pushing Turkeyinto the Western camp, there wereother reasons for Turkeyto choose the Westerncourse. First, as war endedwith a victory for the Westerndemocracies,the future seemed to be on theirside and with their political system. This belief in the Western democraticsystem must have contributed o Turkey's willingness to alter its position ofnon-alignmentand seek closer links with the West. Moreover, apartfrominternationalandsystemic factors,internalpolitical and economic pressuresalso played an importantrole in Turkey'snew orientation n foreign policy.Most importantly,a dramaticchange in the Turkishpolitical system, namelythe transition to a multi-party system, was occurring concurrentlywithabove-mentioned internationaldevelopments. Turkey's post-war foreignpolicy goals, at least in part, affected this change in its domestic politicswhich in turn had an effect on Turkishforeign policy.Although there can be little doubt that the real impetus behind changewas PresidentInonui'saccurate assessment of Turkey's domestic scene,30 twould also be fair to argue that desire for Westernsupport against Sovietdemands strongly influenced his decision to promote truly democratic,multi-partyelections.3'Internally, here was mounting criticism about RPP'sone-party regime, which failed to produce viable economic policies andgenerated strong oppositionwith its capital levy duringthe war. At the sametime, similar criticisms by the United States Congress must have hadconsiderable impact upon Inonui,who was now seeking closer relations withthe United States and wishing to join the Western community.32The social changes and specific events which were instrumental n theformationof a multi-party system in Turkey are too numerous and beyond



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110 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESthe scope of this article.Whatever he reason or its introduction, owever,this political experiment hallengedRPP's almost exclusive privilege ofgovernmental olicy-making ndoffered he ruralgroupsan opportunityogain political nfluencealongsidean urban lite composedof formerhigh-rankingmilitaryofficers and bureaucrats. his in turn had inescapableeffects on the implementationf Turkish oreignpolicy.Beyond the political factors,economic needs necessitateda Westernleaningnforeignpolicy.Although ytheendof 1946Turkey adgoldandforeign exchangereservesaround$262 million,33his was mainlydue tofavourableprices that the fighting powersofferedTurkey'sagriculturalproducts ndraw materials uch as chromium.Moreover, t the end of thewarTurkish fficials,whowerenowconsideringhepossibility f warwiththe Soviet Union,didnotwant o use thesereservesand,therefore,ried outilize nternationaloans n order oenableTurkeyomaintain largearmywith its economicconsequences.Under the RPP government,Turkeyhad alreadystartedto receiveAmerican id throughhe TrumanDoctrine 1947),and aterMarshall lan(1948), although othschemeswerenotprimarily rrangedorTurkey, ndtherewererestrictions n the use of Americanaid.34 urther,Turkeyhadalso establishedadditional ormal inks withthe WesternCommunity.n1948 Turkeybecamea memberof thenewly establishedOrganizationorEuropean conomicCooperationOEEC),which n turn nabledTurkeyobe automaticallyncluded n the MarshallPlan,and in 1950 it joinedtheCouncil of Europe. Turkey's participationn these purely Europeanorganizationswas of primary mportance or its future economic andpoliticalrelations ndpolicies.

This patternof economicdependency ontinuedunderthe DemocratParty DP),whichwona decisivevictoryovertheRPP n 1950.Democratswere at least as anxiousas the Republicanso tie Turkeypoliticallyandeconomicallyo theWest,andparticularlyo the UnitedStates.Althoughthey encouragedree enterprisen theircampaigns, hey soon found itconvenient o continue o buildupthestateenterprisesftergainingpower,thus came to rely heavily on foreign, mainly American,economic andmilitaryassistance.As a result,Turkey'sneedfor foreignaid became anintegralpartof its foreignas well as domesticpolicy.Turkey's conomicsystemunder he DP was modelledalongWesternlines andrelied heavilyon private nitiativeand foreign nvestment, ndduringthe period 1947-61 Turkeyreceived$1,862 million in militaryassistanceand $1,394 million in economic assistancefrom the UnitedStates.35 s a resultof this extensiveassistance,Turkisheadersapparentlybecame insulatedfrom economic reality,and consequentlyestablishedTurkey'song-standing ependency nforeignassistance.



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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR 111After an impressive economic start which lasted through 1953, theeconomic situation n Turkeydeteriorated apidly.Its initial success was duemainly to the expansion of private investment, the boom in agriculturalproductionas a result of governmentsubventionin prices and the openingof new farming areas, the mechanization of farming, and favourableweather and high world prices for agriculturalproducts because of theKorean War. Despite early indications and Western warnings of seriouseconomic problems, the Menderes government, encouraged by earlysuccesses, continued to pursue ambitious but uncoordinateddevelopmentpolicies. After 1953, however, Turkey'seconomy began to deteriorateandits foreign tradedeficit grew.36Even though the Turkishgovernment refused to follow its economicadvice, the United States continued to provide essential assistance underthe, sometimes exaggerated, view of Turkey's geographical importance.Finally, when faced with bankruptcy in 1958, Menderes accepted thestabilizationprogramme mposed by an internationalconsortiumcomposedof the United States, Germany, Great Britain, the European PaymentsUnion, and the InternationalMonetary Fund. In return the consortium

rescheduledTurkey's debts and provided an aid package of $359 million.37In addition to establishing Turkey'sdependency on foreign assistanceand creating a less than favourableimage of the Turks' ability to managetheir finances, the fiscal policies of the DP government led to significantsocial changes in Turkey.The increasedcorrelationof status withpower andthe rise of the new middle class, based on economic activity, resulted in aconcomitant decline in the status of the salariedbureaucrats, ntellectualsand military officers. And the dangerwas the Democrat Partygovernmentdid not understand he new forces of instability developing in the society.Thus the stage was set for domestic conflict.Meanwhile, Turkey's main foreign policy objective was to be a fullmemberof NATO. This desire for membershipwas based on political andeconomic factorsrather hanstrategic andmilitaryconcerns, since by 1950the main Soviet threathad alreadybeen averted.AlthoughTurkey's wish toenter NATOshould be seen as a naturaloutcome of the foreign policies thatTurkey had been following since the Second World War, the economicconcerns must also have played a considerable part, and the idea that itsexclusion might lead to a decrease of US interestand subsequentreductionin American aid must have had its weight in the government's decision.Furthermore,domestic political considerations of the DP also played asignificant role in this decision. First of all the DP, which was advocatingliberaleconomy in Turkey,might have seen that it was difficult to establishsuch a system without attachingTurkey to the West. Secondly, the leadersof the DP genuinely believed that Turkey's entrance to NATO was



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112 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESnecessaryor the futureof the democraticystem n Turkeyandtheirownexistence. nfact, twas quiteclear rom heirstatementsuringhe electioncampaignof 1950 thatthe DP leaders,underthe earlierexperiencesofmulti-partyystem in Turkey,wereafraidof the possibility hat the RPPwould not deliver the government ven if they lost the election. Theythoughtthat joining NATO would preventthe RPP from playing suchgames.38inally n 1952,after he KoreanWar,andTurkish articipationnthe conflict, Turkey and Greece joined into NATO, which marked theTurkey'smilitarycommitment o the West as well as its economicdependence.

As a resultof its economic and militarydependencyon the West,Turkey'soreignpolicyalsostarted o tilt towardhe West.Turkey's ctiverole in the creationof suchalliancesas the BaghdadPact and the BalkanTreatywhich gainedit no additional ecurityandthe awkward ole sheplayedat the Afro-AsianBandungConferencen championinghe causeofWestern owersmayall be interpreteds a partof Democrat arty's ffortsto appearas an indispensable lly in order o securegreateraid from theWest.Likewise,ts support f the Western owersat the Suezcrisisof 1956;its fierceoppositiono the 1958Iraqi oup; tsthreatso Syria n 1957, ntheheatof theUS-Syrian risis, o invade hould heCommunists,rthe SovietUnion, gain controlover the Syriangovernment,were all the partsofTurkey'sfforts oexacerbatehe Communisthreatn its immediate ordersin order o get moreeconomicandmilitaryaidas well as the resultof theDemocrat arty'soreignpolicy thinkingwhichwasessentially nti-Soviet.As one couldexpect,relationswith theSovietUnionandotherEasternbloc countrieswerefarfrom riendlyduringheperiodunder onsideration.AfterSoviet territorial emandson Turkey, elations urtherdeterioratedproportionateo Turkey'salignmentwith the West through he TrumanDoctrine(1947), and its membershipn NATO (1952), the BalkanPact(1954),and heBaghdadPact 1955).Turkey's oliticalpreferencef multi-partysystembasedon freeelections,andeconomicchoicecentredon freeenterprisewere also reflections of its commitmentto Western-styledemocratic ystem. Harsh and often threateningSoviet responses onlyhelpedTurkey o movecloserto its Western llies.39 urkey's uppressionof the leftist partiesandtheirorgansduring he 1940s and 1950swas alsocaused, n part,by Soviethostility.Onthe otherhand, he Soviet fear thatTurkeymightbe used as a base for a Westernattackagainstthe SovietUnion dictated Soviet policies toward Turkeyfor a long time, whichremained penlyhostileand ntimidatingntil1953whena culminationfseveral actorsresultedn change.In May 1953, barely hreemonthsafterStalin'sdeath,the Soviet government enounced ts territorial laims toTurkey's asternprovincesand ts desire or controlof the Straits.40



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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR 113Since the Turkishgovernment regarded these peace moves as a newSoviet tactic designed to separate t from the West, there were no immediatebenefits to Turkish-Soviet relations.41Consequently, Soviet efforts toestablish intimate relations with Egypt in 1955 and the Syrian and Iraqicrises of 1957 and 1958 invoked further fears in Turkey about beingsurroundedby hostile pro-Soviet states, and the crushingof the Hungarianrevolt in 1956 by the Red Army only helped to confirm Turkishsuspicionsabout Soviet moves.42As a result, when the Cold Warentered a period oflimited detente in 1954, Turkey was left behind in the process ofnormalizationof East-West relations.Finally, when Turkishpremier Menderes agreed on exchanging visitswith Krushchev in April 1960 as a result of mainly Turkey's need foreconomic assistance, and the basic changes in Soviet policy, which was nolonger insistent on radicalchange in TurkishForeign Policy as the price forimproved relations, it was too late, because Menderes was to be ousted bythe militarycoup of 27 May 1960, which caused a Turkish-Soviet standstillfor anotherfour years.During this period, Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern Arab

countries, and Third World states in general, were literally an extension ofits Western-dependent foreign policy, as well. Even before Turkey'saccession to a Westerndefence system, there were enough factors leadingto a deterioration of Turkish-Arab relations. First of all, historicalexperiences, thatis, the relationshipbetween therulers(OttomanTurks)andthe ruled(Arabs),surelycolouredthe relations.Secondly, Atatuirk'seformscreated a difference between two Islamic peoples, and the generalsecularization of Turkey in the name of modernization (Westernization)created profound resentment and mistrust among Arabs. Moreover, thequestion of Alexandretta,which resulted from the attachmentof the regionto Turkeyin 1939, was still a matter of tension between Turkey andSyria.Furthermore,Turkey's Westernorientation,which led Turkeyto adoptpolitical, social, cultural and economic ideas from the West and eventuallyto join NATO, had significant impacts on Turco-Arab relations. In itsMiddle Easternrelations Turkeywas looked upon by the Arabs as a pawnof the West. This perception was not altogether untrue, but it would beunfair to assume that Turkeywas acting only as a Westernproxy. Indeed,Turkey had a real desire to secure its southern borders. Beyond, theemergence of Israel had an immediate and long-lasting effect onTurkish-Arab relations. Originally Turkey opposed the partition ofPalestine, but,afterestablishment of Israel,changedits stance to be the firstIslamic nation to recognize it and exchange ambassadors.43Further,Turkey'sefforts in 1951 to help establisha Middle EastDefenceOrganization (MEDO) and the Arab states' resentment against this as



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114 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESanotherform of Westernand Turkish imperialismin the region worsenedthe relations. Though MEDO had failed, Turkeylater joined the BaghdadPact of 1955, which was also opposed by many Arab countries,especiallyEgypt.' Though the effectiveness or utility of the Baghdad Pact hadcertainly been questionable,the role it played in the alienationof Egypt andits allies from the West in general and Turkeyin particularare obvious. Itmost assuredlycast Turkeyin the image of a tool of the Westempowers.Duringthe periodTurkey'sforeign policy objectives in the MiddleEast,as mentioned above, mirrored its pro-Western alignment and reflectedTurkey'sfearsthatthe Soviet Union was enlarging ts influenceover MiddleEasterncountries, and Turkeycould be soon contained by pro-Soviet andhostile Arab states.45Therefore, it could be said that, by contributingtoTurkey's rapprochementwith the West, and placing greatpressureupon it,the Soviet threatindirectly influenced Turkey'sfurtheralienationfrom theMiddle East.Turkeyin the 1950s certainly failed, as Karpatassesses, to understandthe trend of development, the political objectives and resentments of itsArab neighbours.46On the other hand the Arabs, too, failed to understandTurkey's security needs and fears from the Soviet Union. They weregeographically removed from the Soviet Union by the buffer that Turkeyand Iran had created between the two areas. For the Turks, the Russianswere not merely a dangerous historical enemy but also, because of theirproximity, a credible threat to the existence of themselves. As Aykanassesses, 'no matterhow the Arabs could have felt about the Soviet danger,theirfeelings could not have been so deep-seatedas Turkey'sfeeling'.4Meanwhile, Turkey'sdefence of the West at the BandungConferencein1955 further strained its relations with the Third World Countries.48OriginallyTurkeydid not even want tojoin this conference.But later,underpressurefrom the West, it changed its mind and went to the conference inorderto warn these states against the threats caused by 'middle of the roadmeasures'4 At this conference of Afro-Asian nations Turkey stronglydefended its Western alliance with harsh attacks on non-alignment,socialism and communism.50As a result, Turkey became isolated from theThirdWorld,an isolation which would later be felt in the United Nations.

Throughout he 1950s Turkish oreign policy was clearly a productof itsWestern alignment and an extension of Westernpolicies toward both theSoviet Union andthe non-alignedcountries.Duringthis period the leadersof Turkey did not agree that a 'detente' would be possible between twoblocs, and did not believe in the sincerity of 'peaceful coexistence' policywhich they regardedas another tactic by the Soviet Union to deceive thefree world.5'They did not accept non-alignmentas a viable solution andfurtherbelieved thatit would help the Soviet Union to dominatethe world



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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR 115in the long run.52However, in the 1960s, due to systemic and internalchanges as well as American policy toward Cyprus, Turkey began to re-evaluate its strictlyWesternorientation.It would have been hard to imagine in the late 1950s that the Turkswould ever be disappointedwith theWest andwouldjoin in the world-wideanti-American sentiment. Yet, the Turkish-American friendship, whichbegan with the TrumanDoctrine and flourishedin the 1950s, began to coolduring the 1960s and deterioratedin the 1970s. What happened to theTurkish-American'honeymoon' in such a short time?WhathadchangedinTurkeyand in the internationalarena that affected Turkey'srelations withthe United States in particularand generally with the Westernalignment?In fact, it was not only Turkish-American amity that was alteredthroughout the inter-coup period. The whole of Turkish foreign policythinking, actually, was experiencing a re-evaluation and reorientationprocess along with the rise of anti-American sentiments in Turkey.Althoughthe 1964 Cyprus crisis is commonly regardedas the turningpointin Turkish-American relations and Westernalignmentin general, in realitythe process of reorientation n the mind of intellectuals andsome politiciansstarted well before thatyear.Admittedly,the Cyprus question stands out asbeing the most significant factor in bringing about the reappraisalanddiversification efforts of Turkish foreign policy during the inter-coupperiod.In pointof fact, however, there were other factors bothdomestic andinternational nvolved in Turkey's policy shift.The detenteprocess andthe consequentloosening of thebipolarbalance,which had initiated important changes in world politics, also greatlyaffected Turkey's international position. The Cold War had earliernecessitated,on the one hand,Turkey'sdependency on the West,but on theother, also sustained unquestioning Western support either militarily orpolitically including economic aid. During the 1950s the Soviet threat wasfelt by Turkey so much that there was no reason on the Turkishpart toquestion its total dependence to the West, as long as the West (mainly theUS) committed itself to protect Turkey from Soviet aggression. But, the1960s saw a softening of inter-bloctensions. Furthermore, he rise of Chinaand Franceas rebellious countriesagainstbipolararrangementof the post-war years signalled a change in the power balance of the world which haseventually turned to be a multipolarone. Although, internationalrelationscontinued to be overshadowed by the two strong poles, the growinginterdependenceamong nations,andincreasing roles of the secondary statesin world politics have caused a loosening of the bipolar balance and theemergence of a more complex and multidimensionalconfiguration.This multidimensional interplay can also be observed in economicdevelopments. While seeking a fulcrumbetween East, West, and the other



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116 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESfocuses of power, the world, at the same time, had to sustain thediscriminationf theNorthowardshedevelopingountriesf theSouth.Onthe otherhand, he risingeconomic onsciousnessf theSouthhas broughtalonga set of politicalconsequencesnd has introducedew actors o theworldpoliticalstage. Of these actors, he 'Groupof 77' on the economicstage,and he 'Group f Non-aligned ountries'n thepolitical tagebecamethe representativesf risingconsciousness f the so-called ThirdWorld'countries. These events have introduced the concept of economicdevelopmento worldpoliticsandhave also resultedn considerableross-alliance relations.While the world became more inter-dependent,otheconomically ndpolitically,heperiod f detente,whichsloweddown nter-superpowerivalry,also made it possible for smallmembersof alliancesystems o havebroaderconomic ndpolitical elationswith heother tatesdisregardingilitary locs.In suchafragmented orldTurkey ad oexpandits relationso thesenewcentres f economic,political ndmilitary ower norder o take ulladvantagef itseconomicandpoliticalpotential.Moreover,an official NATOreport,the HarmelReport,issued inDecember 1967, gave way to inter-alliance elationsand must havedispelledpossibleTurkish pprehensionshat tschanging elationswiththeEasternbloc couldjeopardizets position n NATO.Thereport tated hatsince allNATOmembers re 'sovereign tates, heallies arenotobliged osubordinateheirpoliciesto collectivedecision .. each ally can decide tspolicy',andcalled heAlliesto seekimprovedelationswiththe USSRandthe countries f EasternEurope.53The expansionn Turkishoreignpolicy,however,wouldhaverequiredmoredevelopmentsothdomesticand nternationalevel other handetenteitself,though heywerenot faraway n the early 1960s.Duringthe inter-coupperiod,Turkeywent through mportantocio-politicalchanges,a combinationf whichaffected hethinking f Turkishpeoplein generaland theirapproacho the mattersof foreignpolicy inparticular.he internal volutionof Turkeyafter he 1960coup,therefore,deserves urther ttention.Since the 1960 coup was a result of various social, economicandinternal political factors rather than based on any foreign policyconsideration,54ts immediateffectonforeign elationswasminimal.55heonlyvisibleforeignpolicymodificationf the militaryuntawasanattemptto improve elationswiththe Arabcountries, nda desire o establish losercontactswiththenewlyemergingnations.56hemilitarygovernment lsoattemptedo regularizehe variousbilateralagreementswiththe US andemphasizedTurkish ational nterestsn this connection.57Althoughhe1960coupand hemilitary overnmentfterwardsidnotproduceany immediatereal foreign policy changes,the relativelyfree



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TURKISHFOREIGN OLICYDURINGTHECOLDWAR 117political atmosphereafterthe coup and the 'liberal' constitutionof 1961 hada significantimpacton Turkishdomestic politics, and subsequentlyaffectedTurkish oreign policy. Up to the early 1960s Turkish oreignpolicy-makingremained in the almost exclusive privilege of a small elitist group. Publiccriticism of government foreign policy was generally consideredunpatriotic.Under the presidenciesof AtatiirkandInonui,he very natureofthe authoritarian ingle-partypolitics precluded any real opposition in theforeign policy area as well as in domestic policies. Under the DPgovernments, too, public discussion of foreign policy, and indeed all otherissues, were tightly controlledchiefly in parallelwith Menderes' efforts tosuppressopposition in the country.Besides suppression, it is evident that the opposition RPP's views onforeign policy were very similar to those implemented by the DPgovernments.AlthoughMenderes did not consult with the oppositionpartyon mattersof foreign policy, he was usually criticized only on matters ofimplementation rather than decision itself. For example, the oppositioncriticized his decision to send Turkishtroops to Korea, one of, if not themost important, Turkish foreign policy decisions of the 1950s, morebecause of the way it was made than for its content.58Apart from this, one of the foreign policy acts of the Menderesgovernment did in fact create great unrest among Turkey's intellectualcommunityandthe RPP,shortlybefore the 1960 militarycoup. This was the1959 bilateral agreement between Turkey and the United States, whichstated that the United States would come to Turkey's aid in the event of'direct or indirect'aggression.59 oon, the term 'indirectaggression' createdgreat concern among the intelligentsia and the opposition who saw anAmerican commitment in the agreement to intervene on behalf of theMenderes government in the event of a coup or even an electoral defeat.60The criticism directed against the government was so strong that thesubmission of the agreement to the Grand National Assembly forratification was postponedfor a year.6'But still discussion of foreign policy matters was limited, and in anycase, confined to the intelligentsia. However, after the 1960 coup and thereconstructionof the constitutionalgovernment,Turkey'sforeign relationsentered inter-partydiscussions, together with relatively pluralist politicallife, and attractedpeople's attention.Moreover, the constitutional and electoral changes introduced by theNational Unity Committee (NUC, the military junta) have influencedTurkish politics, both foreign and domestic, for a long time.62The newelectoral law introduced a system of proportionalrepresentationwhichallowed small partiesto enterparliamentand thereforecreatedmultiplicityin foreign as well as domestic policies. The new constitution,moreover,put



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118 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESa series of checks andbalances o preventdemocraticystemto turn, neffect,intoone-partyotalitarianisms happened uringhe 1950s.Onthenegativeside, however,the new electoralsystem made it increasinglydifficult ora singleparty o obtaina majority.What ollowedwas a seriesof weak andgenerally ineffective coalition governments.63 ue to the majorideologicaldifferencesbetweenTurkey's ariouspoliticalparties, helongperiods of coalition rule createdan atmospherewithinwhich a generalconsensus npolicy,either oreignordomestic,wasrarely eached.This,ofcourse,created neffectivenessand inactivity n Turkish oreignpolicyduring he 1970s.The new system also createda pluralsociety alongsidethe pluralistparliament,yspellingout nthe 1961Constitutionhe'fundamentalights'- freedom of thoughtand belief, freedomof press, of publication,ofassociation,andmanyothers.iUnder his air of freedom, oreignpolicy,like domesticpolicies,becamea topicof open publicdiscussion.This wascontraryo the previouspracticeof the Republic,n which the public,asmentioned bove,wasgenerally ilenton matters f foreignpolicy.Anotheractorwhichwasto contributendirectlyo thereorientationfTurkey'soreignpolicy was the emergenceor the first timein Turkey'shistoryof a genuine ocialistmovement.Theemergence f thenew Turkishleft was signalledby the publication f the weekly Yon (1961) and theestablishmentf theTurkishWorker's arty TIP,alsoin 1961),whichwaslater outlawedafter the 1971 military ntervention.They advocated hedestructionf Turkey'sies withtheWestandthenormalizationf relationswith henon-alignedndcommunistountries. s anaturalxtension f theirsocialistdeology,heywereagainst hestrongAmericanresence nTurkishsoil andranananti-Americanampaignhroughouthecountry.65lthoughthesecallingsof thenewLeftdrewmany ollowersrom he ntelligentsia,tsanti-Westernampaign idnot attractwidespreadupportromthemassesuntil heCyprus risisof 1964.Itwas,however, t east npart esponsibleorabasicpolicyshiftwithin heRPP,whichadopted 'leftof centre' tanceontheeve of the 1965 general lection n anapparentttempto winbacktheintellectualsromTIPand o gainsupportrom heworking lass.66ConcomitantwiththeWorker's arty,othersplinterpartiesadvocatingnationalisticndreligiousdeasalsoemerged.Parties, nd ndeedanyotherorganization,ctingon thesegroundswerenot allowedbeforethe 1960s.With the free atmospherehe new constitution reated,however,theseparties ound a chanceto comeout andbe representedn the parliament.Thefragmentationf theTurkish oliticalsystemafter he 1960coupalsoplayeda part n thisresult.Another significant feature of the inter-coup period was theextraordinaryegreeof radicalismspousedby theTurkish outh.Though



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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR 119in the late 1960s it was undoubtedly affected by the world-wide trend,especially by student insurrection in France in 1968, the relatively freeatmosphere and extreme fragmentation n Turkishpolitical system createdafter the 1960 interventionwere, at least, partlyresponsible for the result.What began in the late 1960s as peaceful student demonstrationsagainstpoor social and educationalconditions, soon assumedpolitical significance,grew radical, and became polarized between the Right and the Left andturnedinto bloody armed clashes in the 1970s.67Anti-imperialism was a common platformfor both sides. But, while theLeftists attacked Turkey's alliance with the West, which they believedrestricted Turkey's freedom of action, the Rightists were strongly anti-Communist and opposed Soviet imperialism, which at the time was nolonger an obvious threatto Turkey.The clashes between extreme Left andRight grew in the 1970s and spread outside the political arena. Moreimportantly, n the 1970s anotherwave of violence surroundedTurkey withits roots in cultural and religious grounds as well as politics.68As far asforeign relations were concerned, increasing political and social instabilitygeneratedby political violence and terrorismseriously damaged Turkey'simage in the world at a time when Turkey was in great need of economicand political support.Moreover, it was quite certain that during the late 1970s any foreignpolicy, like any domestic policy, of the government would generatea strongchallenge from at least one of the extreme groups. Under thesecircumstances, governments had to restrain themselves to the dailyhappenings of the foreign relations instead of trying to map out generalguidelines for Turkey's foreign policy problems. This strategy in turncontributed o Turkey'sinactivity and isolation on the international ront.In terms of fostering a new direction in Turkish foreign policy, thefactors outlined above involved only a limited circle of politicians andintellectuals until the Cyprus crisis of 1963-64. The democratizationofTurkishpolitics, with the growth of a vocal and fragmentedopposition andthe emergence of foreign policy as a political issue, createdan atmospherein which a shift to a more independentforeign policy was not only likely,but also considering Turkey's need for foreign capital, very probable.However, not until the Cyprus crisis of 1963-64 did the emergingindependent policy trend at the top find wide support.Widespread anti-American sentiments emerged. But more importantly,events surroundingthe Cyprus crisis forced Turkey's leaders to recognize that their strictadherence to a pro-Western alignment in a period of a changinginternational system had left Turkey virtually isolated in the WorldCommunity. Cyprus then was the catalyst which forced Turkey to re-examine its foreign policy in the light of a rapidlychanging world system.



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120 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESWhile the historyof Cyprusanddevelopments f crises overCyprusbetweenGreeceandTurkey re not of prime mportanceo thispaper,t issufficient o know that various orcesmadethe Cyprusssue one of vitalimportance,or boththeTurkish overnmentndtheTurkish eople.Firstof all, the geographical ositionof the Islandof Cyprus n the EasternMediterraneanade t strategicallymportantor Turkishecurity hinking.The scenario hatGreek-heldCypruswould cutTurkeyoff fromtheopenseaencouraged urkey'sesistance o Greekdesignson the islandsince the1950s. Secondly,the largeTurkishcommunityon the island whichtheTurks elt compelled o defendagainst he Greekmajoritymadethe issuehighlyemotional.Furthermore,nosis(unionwithGreece), hentheGreekpositionon theisland,wasseenby manyTurksas a firststepforachievingthe Megali Idea (re-establishmentf the old ByzantineEmpire),andtherefore heCyprusssuebecamea matter oncerning ationalpride.This highlyemotional ndtherefore oliticalappealof theCyprusssuecanclearlybe seeninthe statementssuedby the Turkish oreignMinistry,in late 1963, in reply to PresidentMakarios'proposedconstitutionalchanges,whichwouldhavereduced he statusof the Turkishommunityn

the island roma communitywithequalrights o a minority.The statementended: Agovernmenthatcanabandon ome100,000dearmembers f ourraceto thearbitrarydministrationf foreignerswill nevercome to powerin Turkey.'69t is obvious hat hefragileTurkish oalitiongovernmentsfthe 1960s could not dare to negotiatea compromisewhen Turkeywasdrawnntothe crisisbythe violentclashesbetween he twocommunitiesnCyprusat the end of theyear1963.Initially,Turkeysoughtsupport or its position in NATO where theUnitedStates had the dominantvoice. AlthoughNATOseemed to be anaturalorum orTurkey ndGreece o seek asolution, twas soon evidentthatthe otherNATOstates,especially heUnitedStates,were reluctant oenter nto whatwas seen as a local discordbetween wo membersof thesame alliance.70Moreover,he UnitedStates was restrainingtself fromimposingany solutionon the Cyprusdispute or fear of alienating itherGreeceorTurkey.7Turkey, n theotherhand,was fullyexpectingAmericanupport nderwhatnow appearsas faultyappraisal f the extent of support he UnitedStatescould or wouldextend. It is evidentthat Turkey,at the time, hadfailed o take nto accounthechanged ircumstancesnwhich nternationalrelationswereoperating uring he 1960s.72twas easy forthe UnitedStatestouseleverageonTurkey ndGreece oreach ompromisen Cyprusn the1950swhen heeffectsof ColdWar till feltandbothcountrieswere n needof Americanaid. By the 1964, however,both Greece andTurkeywerefeeling less strainedby the Cold War.FurthermoreGreece, due to its



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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR 121associationwith the EEC, became much less dependenton Americaneconomicaid, and thereforeAmerican conomic everageon Greecehadgreatlydiminished.73 oreover,Cyprushadbecameanindependenttate n1960andMakarioswas nowtakinganindependenttand romGreece.Anotheraultyassumption,nwhichTurkey ased tsexpectations,wasthatthe relative mportancef Turkey o the UnitedStateswas morethanthatof Greecebecauseof its morestrategicocation.But whatTurkey ouldnot see at the time was that the thawin the ColdWarand the adventofintercontinentalallisticmissilesdiminishedheAmerican eedfor Turkishbases to maintainhenuclearbalanceof power.Ulmanalsopointsout theeffectof thelargeandwell-organizedGreek-Americanommunity ndthescopeof worldChristian rotestagainst he restrictionsTurkeyplacedonthe activitiesof the GreekOrthodox atriarchalf Istanbul.74Thoroughlyrustratedy America'sand NATO'sneutralityn Cyprus;faced withpublic outcryat home;andfuelledby the Cypriotparliamentdecision of June 1964 to establishgeneralconscription or the GreekCypriotdefence orces,Inonui'sovernmentnformedts allies thatTurkeyhaddecidedon unilateralntervention.75he American esponsewas thenowinfamous ohnsonetterof 1964,whichwas described y Inonu n hisreplyas 'disappointing'oth 'inwordingandcontent'.76The contentsof the letter,which was not made public until 1966 butneverthelessartiallyeaked othepress,wasshockingormanyTurkswhonow came to the conclusion that Turkeycould not rely on its alliesunconditionally.nthe letterJohnsonwarnedTurkeyhat ts 'NATOallieshavenot hada chance oconsiderwhetherheyhaveanobligationoprotectTurkeyagainst he Soviet Union if Turkey akes a step whichresults nSoviet ntervention ithout he fullconsentandunderstandingf its NATOAllies'.Hefurtheremindedhat theUnitedStatescannot agree o the useof anyUS suppliedmilitary quipmentor a Turkishnterventionn Cyprusunderpresent ircumstances'.Thesecondpartof the letter,which was to play a mostimportant olenearly enyears ater,passedmore or less unnoticed.77hequestioning fNATOsupport, owever,as Inonui's eplyreflected, reatedgreatconcernamongTurksand forced hemto rethink hereliability ndtrustworthinessof the alliancewiththe West.They realized,as Inonui utin his replytoJohnson,hat 'thereare... widedivergence f views' betweenTurkeyandtheUnitedStates as to the nature ndbasicprinciples f theNorthAtlanticAlliance'.In Turkishunderstanding,he NATOTreaty imposesupon allmemberstates the obligation o come forthwith o the assistanceof anymember ictimof anaggression' nconditionally,nd o debate he issue of'whether ggressionwasprovoked' nd 'whetherheyhaveanobligation oassist'would eopardizetheveryfoundation f theAlliance .. and t would



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122 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESlose its meaning'. They furtherrealized that the nationalinterestsof Turkeywere no longer identical with those of the United States or the Westernalliance. From then on, the question of re-examining and redirectingTurkey's foreign relations, a notion that the progressive intelligentsia hadbeen advancingfor a long time, spreadout to cover the hitherto silent mass;andput all Turkishgovernments,as Harrisnotes, 'on the defensive in regardto the American connection, and memories of the Johnson letter wouldcolor popularimpressionsof the United States for many years to come'."Beyond the deterioratingeffects of the Cyprus crisis and the Johnsonletter,therewere otherproblemsconcerningTurkish-USrelations.As notedabove, in the 1960s, because of domestic developments there was growinganti-Americansentimentin Turkeyeven before the 1964 Cypruscrisis. Thegeneral areas of friction, such issues as Americansovereignty over militarybases on Turkishsoil; misuse of US installationsin Turkey;79lleged covertactivities of the CIA;80what the Turksconsideredto be American abuse ofthe 'status of forces agreements';81 alleged US involvement in domesticpolicies; and the lack of sufficient American military aid, were alreadypressurizing the Turkishgovernment to re-examine its relations with theUnited States.In addition to these, two specific events which were to have an impacton Turkish-Americanrelations took place during the 1960s - the Cubanmissile 'deal' and NATO's adoption of the 'flexible response' strategy.Althoughthe two events probablydid not arouse the generalTurkishpublic,as much the Cypruscrisis did, they surely created concernamong Turkey'spolitical andmilitaryleaders.At the risk of furtheralienatingthe Soviets and makingTurkeya primetarget,the Menderesgovernment had agreed in 1958 to the deployment ofmedium-rangeatomicwarheadJupitermissiles in Turkey. npointof fact, themissiles had been renderedobsolete even before they became operational nJuly 1962. And in 1961 the UnitedStateshadbegunnegotiationswithTurkeyfor closure of missile sites. Under pressurefrom the military,however, theTurkishgovernmentopposed the idea and the United States droppedthematter.82 s a result,the missiles were still in Turkeywhenthe Cubanmissilecrisisbroke out andbecame abargainingpointwhen theSovietsproposed hattheJupitersbe withdrawn n exchangefortheirwithdrawing hemissiles fromCuba.Althoughthe US StateDepartmentdenied any kindof 'deal' over themissiles, they were in fact removedfromTurkey n 1963, apparentlywithoutconsultationwiththeTurkishgovernment,which actuallyowned themissilesbut not theirwarheads.83The removal of the Jupitersgave rise to several issues which wouldmake a deep impression on Turkish-Americanrelations. First of all, thesuddenness with which the Cubancrisis occurredand the limelight which



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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR 123Turkey haredbecauseof missileson its soil brought bouta basicchangein Turkishattitudes.The experiencehad demonstratedhat a war couldoccur almost withoutwarningand the possessionof strategicoffensiveweaponsmakesany countrya primary arget.The realizationhatTurkeymightbecamea target ora Soviet nuclearattackbecauseof theUS bases,andthathavingbasesthatwould attract uch an attackmightnotbe in thesecuritynterests f Turkey, averise to the sentimentn Turkey, s Harrisstates, infavorof removingweapons ystemswhich heSovietsconsideredespeciallydangerous,n order o decrease he likelihood hatthe countrycould be draggedntoa conflictagainst ts will'.84Equally mportant,wastheimpression iven by Kennedy's nilateral ction hatduringa crisistheUnited States could and would act in its own best interest withoutconsiderationf, or consultationwith tsallies.The Turkish ublicwas alsooffendedby theideathat he US treatedTurkey s a client whose interestswerenegotiable.85his,coupledwiththe strategy f 'flexibleresponse'andthedoubtcaston theUnitedStatescommitmento Turkeyby the Johnsonletter, reatedgreatconcernn Turkey.Soviet development of thermo-nuclearweapons in the 1960snecessitated rethinking f theconceptof 'massive etaliation', hereby nattackon anAmerican llywouldelicit an automatic uclear trikeagainsttheaggressor.The UnitedStatesoptedfor a strategy f 'flexibleresponse'which did not entail an automatic uclearresponse.86n lightof previousAmerican actions surroundingCuba and Cyprus, this new strategydoubtfully reatedgreatconcern n Turkey.The outcomeof this concernwas reappraisal y Turkey f its role in NATO.In the late 1960sall these frictionsandproblems broadand thebasicchanges n Turkey's ocio-politicalife outlinedabove were showingonlyone direction the need for a new andfreshforeignpolicy.But, as Ahmadpointedout, 'throughouthe sixties... the intelligentsiawas ableto inhibitthe activitiesof the government y constant riticismbut ... neverabletoforcethegovernmentoreformulatehepolicy' Although fter heCypruscrisesof 1963-64and 1967thesignsof re-evaluationf basicfundamentalsof Turkishoreignpolicywere evidentevenin thegovernmentalircles,88soontheoutcry hatCyprus ndotherproblems reateddiedout,or at leastshadowed,due to mounting ressure f the domesticpoliticsas a resultofgrowingviolenceandeconomicproblems.Nevertheless,herewere basicchanges n Turkey'sattitudes,f not inmaindirections,owards ertaincountriesn anapparent ttempto breakits loneliness n the internationalorumsandfind support o its positiononCyprus.One of the majorchangesin Turkish oreign policy in the late1960s was the rapprochement ith the Soviet Union. Although herehadbeen a movement owards approchementith the Sovietsasearlyas 1959



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124 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESbecauseof economicneeds, he real haw n Turkish-Sovietelationstartedafter1964 andwasundoubtedlynfluencedbyAmerican ctionsduringheCypruscrisis. But attemptsby Turkey o improve ts relationswith theCommunistbloc were motivatedby other factors as well. The Turkishdesire for Soviet economic assistancein view of decliningAmericaneconomicand militaryaid; the developmentof a highly vocal politicalopposition; ndgrowinganti-Americanentimentn Turkey ll contributedto Turkey's approchementith the Soviet Union.Inhis memoirs, ormerTurkishoreignministerF.C.ErkinclaimsthatTurkeymoved to normalize elationswith the SovietUnion becausetheSovietthreat o Turkeyhaddecreased ue to the NATOalliance, he riseofChinaas a balancing orce, ts economicdifficultieson the domestic ront,anddemands orautonomy ythe SovietUnion'salliesinEasternEurope.89Just as importantwere the signals from Moscow that the Soviets hadabandoned heir harshpolicy towardTurkeyand that betterrelationsbetween he two countrieswouldnotbe contingent nTurkey oosening tsNATO bonds. Clearly, there were a variety of factors dictating thedesirabilityorbetter elations,but ustas clear s the fact thatCypruswasthe catalyst for rapprochement.Ulman/Dekmejiancknowledgehreefactors,relatedto Cyprus, hatforcedTurkeyo considerrapprochementith the Soviet Union.90 irstofall, the Turksprobablyelt thatsignsof a Turkish-Soviet approchementwouldpressurehe UnitedStatesand NATO ntoinducing he GreeksandGreekCypriotso accepta solution avourableoTurkey. econdly,Turkeyhoped to win positive Soviet support or its position on Cyprus, andtherefore,ecure hesupport f theCommunist locin theUnitedNations.Finally, he least they could expect was a neutralSoviet position, herebydenying support or the Greekposition. Taken into considerationwithTurkey's solation n the internationalrena, he lack of Western upport,and the Sovietwarningo Turkeyduring he 1964 Cyprus risis about heintegrity f theisland, hisattempto secureSovietsupport n Cyprus ssueseemedall the moreappropriate.Whatbeganas a tacticto secure support or its position on Cyprussoon became a firm conviction of Turkishforeign policy. Talks andvisits betweenTurkeyand the Soviet Union increasedafter 1965 and thedialoguewas extended to othermattersof mutual interestto the twocountries.Perhapsmost significantwas the increase in trade and thebeginning f a SovietaidprogrammeorTurkey.As a result,Turkish xportsto and mportsrom he Eastern loc roserapidly nd heir hare n Turkey'stotal radencreased rom7 percent n 1964to 13 per cent in 1967.9'A basictenetof Turkey's approchement iththe SovietUnionwas thebelief that the Soviets had abandoned heir harsh, militaristpolicy and



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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR 125would accept, however unwillingly, Turkey'smembership n NATO.Therefore, heSoviet'sarmed epression f the liberalizationmovementnCzechoslovakian 1968 and the Brezhnevdoctrineclaiming he rightofinterventionor the Soviets to uphold he socialistregime n anycountrymust have had more thana sobering effect in Turkey.It was, according toHarris, 'a blunt reminder that Moscow had not renounced force where itsinterests were concerned'92 The most immediatereaction to the Czech crisiswas the decision of the Demirel government, in a reversal of its previousposition, to co-operate in a multilateral force to be created in theMediterraneanunder NATOauspices.93Although Turkish-Soviet dialogue continued after a short break, twoominous developments outside the realm of diplomatic relations causedgrowing apprehension n Turkey.The first of these was the increased Sovietnaval presence in the Mediterranean and the other was the growingideological impact of socialist doctrines within Turkey. These twodevelopments were to impact on Turkey's foreign and domestic policies ofthe 1970s in that the former again highlighted Turkey's strategiclocation,and the latter created instability in both the political and social life ofTurkey.Concomitantwith its rapprochementwith the Soviet Union, Turkeyalsoattempted to improve and expand its relations with the non-alignedcountries, especially those in the Middle East. Although many factors,suchas obvious cultural,geographicandreligious affinities;the idea thatTurkey,for strategicpolitical reasons,must become a bridgebetween East andWest;and the commercialopportunities n the new marketsin the Arabcountriesundoubtedlyinfluenced this shift in Turkishforeign policy, Turkish-ThirdWorld relations in the 1960s, however, were conditioned above all by theCyprus dispute.The almost total lack of Third Worldsupport n the UN forthe Turkish position on Cyprus forced Turkey to realize that its policytoward the non-alignednations in generaland the Middle East in particularhad isolated it from the rest of the world. As could be expected Turkeymoved to breakaway from this isolation. Therefore,behind Turkey's newArab policy was the desire to marshal support in the UN for its Cyprusstand, as well as to indicate to the United States that Turkishsupportonvarious issues could no longer be taken for granted.Despite the fact that Turkey's rapprochementpolicy with the ThirdWorld initially ended with failure, as the 1965 UN vote showed,94Turkeynevertheless went ahead with its multi-faceted foreign policy initiatives.Illustrative of Turkey's new policy in the Middle East was the diplomaticposition taken by Turkey in the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the periodfollowing the 1964 Cyprus crisis up until the 1967 Arab-Israeli war,Ankara'sposition on the Middle Eastdispute was one of guardedneutrality.



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126 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESItwascharacterizedy extreme autiondesigned o avoidantagonizingheUnited States,the Soviet Union and the Arab nations.In the aftermathof thewar, henew direction f Turkey'soreignpolicybecame vident n the UN.Mindfulof the importancef the thirteen otentialArabvotesin the UN, aswell asof futureCommunist locsupportor itspositiononCyprus,Turkeyvoted for the Yugoslavresolutioncalling for Israeli withdrawal romcapturedArabterritories.Yet at the same time,in an apparent ttempt obalance its interestswith the West, Turkeyabstainedon the Sovietresolutionhat abelled sraelanaggressor.95Another ventmanifestinghe diversificationf Turkey's oreignpolicywas thecreationby Turkey,ranandPakistan, f theRegionalCooperationfor Development RCD). It was an economic and culturalagreementparallel to but separatefrom the WesterndominatedCentralTreatyOrganizationCENTO).Although Turkey'sleaders initially were notenthusiastic bout urning ack owardsheEast,oncultural ndespeciallyIslamicgrounds,Pakistan's roposal or RCD was timelyandcaught heTurks n the momentof theirpolitical solation.ThusTurkey,whose creditwiththenon-aligned loc hadbeenbankruptin 1964,beganto pursuea moreindependentoreignpolicyin the ThirdWorlddesigned o alleviate heimpression reated tBandung hatshewasrunning rrandsor the West.However,at the end, therewerefew ThirdWorldcountrieswho actuallyaccepted Turkey'seagernessto improverelationswith them.Asstated arlier,owardsheendofthe 1960sTurkey ecamepreoccupiedwithits internal conomicandpoliticalproblems, ndthereforegnored heinternationalituation.AlthoughTurkey ontinuedo followa multi-facetedforeignpolicy,and tsrestrainedositionnthe 1967Cyprusrisispaidoff assomeArab tates tartedotakea more avorabletandwithregardoTurkeyin theinternationalorums, oonTurkeywas draggedntodomestic onflictsandconsequentlynactivityntheforeignpolicyarea.Theperiod f caretakergovernmentsf 1971-73after he1971 nterventionanbe identifiedwith helackof foreignpolicy initiative.The bureaucrats hooccupiedgovernmentpostswithoutmuchauthorityndwith imitedpopular asesof supportwereinnoposition oundertakeourageousteps n foreignpolicy.BeforeanotherCyprus crisis dominated Turkey's foreign policy, there were twodevelopments,ne nternal ndoneforeign,hatwouldaffectTurkey'snd heUnitedStates'policies duringand after 1974Cyprus risis,whichin turnpositivelydeterminedurkey'soreignpolicy or therestof the 1970s.Turkey'sbiggest problemwith the United Statesbetween 1966 and1974, was thecultivation f opiumpoppies n TurkeyandtheUS reactionto it. As earlyas 1968 the UnitedStatesstarted o pressureTurkeyo adoptthe strictestcontrol o prevent he illegal trafficking f opiumin Turkey,



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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR 127which heybelievedconstituted 0percentof theheroinllegallyconsumedin theUnitedStates.'By 1970 the US Congress tarted o takeaninterestin theissue, and n 1971requiredhe President tosuspend llmilitary alesand aid [and]economicassistance' o governmentshatfailed to preventnarcoticsproducedn theircountries romreaching heUnitedStates.97n1971 criticismof Turkey rewandevenwentso farasto questionTurkey'sutility o theUnitedStates.98inally,US pressures adaneffectonTurkey'scaretaker overnment fterthe 1971 military ntervention,ndthe PrimeMinisterannouncedon 30 June 1971 thathe bannedpoppycultivationbecauseof Turkey's humanitarianbligations'9 However, hisAmericanpressure, which finally caused the TurkishAdministrationto ban poppycultivation,ontributedo anti-Americanismndto a decreasen AmericanprestigenTurkey. urther, urkswereoutragedn August1972whentheylearned hat heUnitedStateshaddecided o ask India oincreasetsopiumproductiono meet theworld-wide hortage stimatedby theInternationalNarcoticsBoard."?Althoughveryunpopular,he banremained ctive untilthe RPP-NSP(NationalSalvationParty) oalitiongovernment evoked t on 1July 1974.The UnitedStatesimmediately ignalled ts displeasureby recalling tsAmbassador to Washingtonfor consultations. And he was still inWashingtonwhen the Cypruscrisis brokeout. Congressreactedmoreharshly o thepoppycrisisthandidtheExecutive.Members f theHouseandSenateproposed number f draft esolutions sking ortheimpositionof embargoes. inallywhenResolution 07,whichprovided uthorityothePresident to terminate ll assistance o the Government f Turkey',wasapproved y theCongress n 5 August1974,theCyprus risishadalreadybeen on theway.'?'As a result,CongressdidnotpressurehePresidentoimplementheresolutionbecauseafter he secondTurkishnterventionnCyprus on 14 August 1974, congressionalopponentsof the poppycultivationhoseto supporthearms mbargo avoured ytheGreekLobbyand 'the ruleof law' opponents.'02The Turkishgovernmentand the Turkishpublic were outragedatCongress's agerness o adoptcoercivemeasures gainsta loyalally.TheEcevitgovernmenturtherudgedCongress's ctionas anindication f, attheleast, nsensitivityowardTurkish ationalnterests.Thefact thatwhenthecouptookplace n Cyprus,he UnitedStatesambassadoroTurkeyhadalreadybeenrecalled o WashingtonndCongresswasdiscussingwaystopenalizeTurkey ymbolically llustrates he lackof trustbetween he twocountries.Meanwhile, nimportantevelopmentookplace nTurkey,pecificallyinside the RPP,which would laterhave effects on subsequentTurkishforeignpolicyin general,andTurkey'sCypruspolicyin particular.uilent



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128 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESEcevit, who had been advocatinga 'left-of-centre' tand for the RPP,replacedInonuas party chairmann May 1972. More importantlyorTurkishoreignpolicy,Ecevitbelieved hatTurkey ouldafford o adoptanassertive,in contrastto Inonu's cautious,foreign policy vis-a-vis thesuperpowers.His argumenthatsmalleralliesdid notneedto correlate llof theirforeignpolicy actionswith thoseof the superpowers id in factreflectthe widely sharedbelief withinthe RPP andTurkey.He suggestedthat Turkey should disassociate tself from the Cold War rhetoricofNATO.'03herewas no question f Turkey bandoningtsalliances, uchasNATOandCENTO,butwithin he alliancesTurkeywouldpursuea policydesigned to serve its national nterestsand not those of others.That,accordingoEcevit,was tobe thedifference etweenhisforeignpolicyandthatof his predecessors.""'ealso criticizedTurkey's ssumptionf therolein the Middle East on behalf of the United States, and consistentlymaintainedhatTurkey's articipationuring he 1950s n schemes ike theBaghdadPactwas harmfuloTurkey's ationalecuritynterests.'05 houghhis insistenceonmore ndependencewithinNATOdistinguished im fromhis predecessors,he majorcharacteristic f his administration as hisassertivenessn Turkish-Greekelations.As his foreignminister old theNationalAssemblyn 1974 hatTurkeywantedo live inpeacewithGreece,butthat justbecause his s so,Greecewillcertainly otbeallowed ognawawayatTurkishnterestsn anymannerwhatsoever rto upset he balancebetween hetwo countries'.""'nlikehispredecessor'sautiousness, cevitwasa risktakerwhenhe felt the stakeswerehigh enough,andstakeswerepoisedto growhigh enoughsoon.With heabove-mentionedevelopmentsnsideandoutsideTurkey,hestagewas set for anotherCypruscrisis which would be the catalyst orchange n Turkishoreignpolicy during he 1970s.The 1974 Cyprus risisserved to intensify animositybetweenGreeceand Turkey. t not onlyprecipitatedsharpdeteriorationn relations etween he two countries, utalso stretchedTurkish-Americanelationsto near breakingpoint. Thebackgroundo the crisis andspecificevents thatparticipatedhe Turkishinterventionn July1974 andsubsequent rolonged tayin Cyprusare tooinvolvedandvaried opermitadequate escriptionere.'07However, briefexamination f some of theperceptionsndmotivesof thevariousactors snecessarywithin he contextof thisstudy.The coup againstMakariosn 1974 was apparentlynspiredby theGreek unta'sneed to find a foreignpolicy success abroad o offset theirdomesticweakness,and was basedon a totalmisreading f UnitedStatespolicyandthe internationalituation,ust as Turkeyhad done in the 1964crisis.The colonelsapparentlyelt that he UnitedStates,basedon its tacitapproval f theirregime,wouldcondone,or at leasttolerate,hecoupand



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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR 129restrainTurkeyas it hadin 1964 and 1967. But the circumstancesn 1974weredifferentrom thosethathadexisted in those earlieryears;Turkish-American elationshadundergone transition, nd the UnitedStatesnolongerhad the leverageon Turkey hat it had in 1964 and 1967. Andtheimpressiongiven before the Turkish ntervention n 1974 was that theUnitedStateswouldnot use its leverageevenif it hadany.'08Furthermore, etenteand Turkey's rapprochementwith the SovietUnionhaddecreased hethreat f Soviet ntervention.n 1964the ColdWartensionwas still felt betweentwo countriesand the Soviets hadpubliclyannounced hat it would 'defend'Cyprus's freedomand independencefroma foreigninvasion',andwarnedTurkey hatthe USSR could 'notremainndifferentothethreat f anarmed onflict'near he SovietUnion'ssouthernrontier.'09n 1974,however,Turkish-Sovietelationsweremuchimproved nd heSoviets, urthermore,olongeropposedTurkey'sCyprusthesis.In addition,heychose to remain ilent aboutTurkey'snterventionpreparations,ndicatinghattheydid not opposeit."0Moreover,Turkey'sisolation n theUN had diminished ince 1965. Relationswith theEasternbloc andThirdWorld ountries ecame friendly'andtherefore hefearofanti-Turkishesolutionshad beenreduced.And the fact thatthe ColonelsJunta n Greecehad erased ts favourablemagein worldpublicopinion,hencemeanthat heyfacedworld-wide isapproval hen heyarrangedhecoupin Cyprusn 1974.WithinTurkey he situationwas also quite different rom thatof theearlierCyprus risis.Theearlier risishadboostedrisinganti-Americanismand contributedo a polarization f domesticpoliciesin Turkey. n turn,theseforcescontributedoincreased oliticalnstability.Given he fact thatit was notpossibleto argue hat heGreeksupportedoup was aninternalaffair n whichtheguarantor owers GreatBritain,Turkey nd Greecehadno legal right o intervene,Ecevit'sweakcoalitiongovernment adnoviableoptionother han ntervention."'The aftermath f Turkey'snterventions wellknown.By the end of thesummer f 1974,theTurkish rmyhadoverrun bout40 percentof Cyprus.In February1975 the UnitedStatesCongress,underpressure rom theGreek-Americanommunity, mposed an arms embargoon Turkey."2Turkish-Americanelations eached 'low', when ater n 1975theTurkishgovernmentuspendedheactivitiesat allAmerican ases n Turkey xceptthoserelated o NATO. t is importanto note thatthe armsembargowasimposedby Congressbutopposedby thePresident,he StateDepartmentandtheAmericanMilitary.Thisdifference f opinionallowed heTurks omaintainheirrelationswiththeUnitedStates,such as they were, andstillsave face. The embargo,whichwas partiallyifted in the late 1975,wasfullylifted n thesummer f 1978.



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130 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESAside from its impact on Turkish-Greekand Turkish-Americanrelations,foreign reactionto the 1974 Cyprus ntervention nce againcreated a sense of diplomatic solation in Turkey.The failure of itsdiplomatic fforts,begun in the 1960s, to gain supportamongArab andnon-aligned ountriesorits policiesin Cypruswas strikingly isplayed tthe 1976 ColomboConference f non-alignednations(as it hadbeen atLima n the previousyear),whilea UN GeneralAssemblyvoteon a draftresolution nCyprusn November1976showed94-1 againstTurkey,with27 abstentions.113onsequently,Turkeyredoubled ts effortsto expandfriendly elationswithnotonly theEastern loccountries, utalsothe Arab

andnon-alignedountries.After 1974 Cyprusbecame both a main problematic or, and adeterminantf, Turkish oreignpolicy.Moreover, ecauseof its emotionalandpoliticalcharacter,he Cyprusproblemhas affectedTurkey's omesticpolitics,which n turndeterminedoreignpolicyof Turkeywith feedback.This new directionn foreignpolicy musthoweverbe viewed against hebackgroundf Turkey'snternal olitical, ocialandeconomicproblems, sdescribed arlier.Apartrom hepoliticalandsocialevolutionof Turkey nd nternationaldevelopments, conomic considerations lso playedan importantole ininfluencing he courseof Turkish oreignpolicy in the inter-coup eriod,speciallyduring he 1970s.As mentionedn the preceding ection,as farback as the late 1950s economic necessities had led the Menderesgovernmento considerrapprochementiththe Sovietsin order o obtaineconomicaid.Among many otherconsiderations,he mismanagementftheeconomyby Mendereswas at least in partresponsible or themilitary

takeoverin 1960. Seeing the damagedone by the short-sighted nduncoordinatedconomic policies of the previousgovernment,he NUCestablishedhe StatePlanningOrganizationDPT)andinitiated he FirstFive YearDevelopment lan n 1963,whichemphasizedheimportancefspeedinguptherateof economicdevelopment.Economicplanning laceda newemphasis nTurkey's equirementsorexternal apital.And when the NATOcountries efused o sponsoran aidconsortium,Turkeyurned o the OrganizationorEconomicCooperationand Development OECD) n orderto assure a steadyflow of externalfinancing orits development lans."4Althoughhe OECDconsortiumorTurkeywas established n July 1962 after strongAmericanbehind-the-scenespressures,t nevercameupto Turkishxpectations.Alsoa sharp utin Americanaid, under he suppositionhat European llies wouldcomeforward o fill thegap,only helped o offend heTurkish uthorities."'Underthe Menderesgovernment,Turkeyhad further ried to link itseconomicpoliciesto the West hroughheEuropean conomicCommunity

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the determinants of turkish foreign policy, and turkey’s european vocation

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