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The Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is the international

gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB). Eight departments, associated research

institutions and the Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine in Oslo. Established in 1986, Noragric’s

contribution to international development lies in the interface between research, education (Bachelor,

Master and PhD programmes) and assignments.

The Noragric Master theses are the final theses submitted by students in order to fulfil the

requirements under the Noragric Master programme “International Environmental Studies”,

“Development Studies” and other Master programmes.

The findings in this thesis do not necessarily reflect the views of Noragric. Extracts from this

publication may only be reproduced after prior consultation with the author and on condition that the

source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation contact Noragric.

© Jill Tove Buseth, August 2009

jilltb@gmail.com

Noragric

Department of International Environment and Development Studies

P.O. Box 5003

N-1432 Ås

Norway

Tel.: +47 64 96 52 00

Fax: +47 64 96 52 01

Internet: http://www.umb.no/noragric

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Declaration

I, Jill Tove Buseth, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings.

Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been

appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type

of academic degree.

Signature…………………………………….…..

Date………………………………………………

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Abstract

Contemporary arguments are stating that increased resource scarcity in the Sahel will cause

many and severe conflicts in the region in the coming years. These ideas are increasingly seen

in relation to global warming today, and have had huge influences among policy makers,

within academic circles and not least among the public. This study has been carried out with

the purpose of investigating causes behind a farmer-herder conflict in the Sahel, more

specifically in the Mopti region of Mali. The study explores ideas of resource scarcity and

environmental stress as possible causes behind conflict, but more importantly it draws on

political backdrops and structural links between environmental changes and political factors

in a political ecology framework to explain the conflict. There has been a large-scale

expansion of rice fields in the case study area the last decades. This has resulted in major

losses of pastoral land, and can be seen in light of a pastoral marginalization that has prevailed

in large parts of Africa the last decades. In the case of this study, land conversion projects also

partly led to a loss of agricultural land, due to insufficient maintenance of irrigation systems,

and due to a direct confiscation of rice fields. All in all, national agricultural policies and

projects have largely resulted in a worsened access to land for mostly herders, but also

farmers, and have led to herders and farmers expanding into each other’s land. Ambiguity and

diffuseness in land management systems and political administration have contributed in

causing the conflict of this case study. This can be seen in light of a ‘political vacuum’ that

prevailed in Mali in the aftermath of the decentralization reforms of the 1990s. This ‘vacuum’

opened up for a practice of ‘belly politics’ and rent seeking in natural resource management,

and has acted as an obstacle for finding solutions to resource-related conflicts. In the case of

this study, the rehabilitation project of a pond exacerbated tensions and eventually caused the

outbreak of the conflict, as agreements on its purposes were not properly clarified in advance.

This study demonstrates that structural links between political process and environmental

change are crucial to take into account when explaining farmer-herder conflicts. Based on my

findings, I argue that political ecology is a far more suitable theoretical approach in explaining

resource-related farmer-herder conflicts today, than contemporary arguments of the

environmental security thesis. This is especially true in today’s ‘time of global warming,’ as

there is a real risk and growing problem that conflicts and problems easily are allocated

environmental issues.

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Acknowledgements

There are many persons whose contributions and support I could not have been without in the

completion of this work. First of all, my sincere thanks goes to my supervisor Tor Arve

Benjaminsen for professional guidance, inspiration and practical assistance through the entire

process of this study – from the planning of fieldwork to writing up the thesis. Great

appreciations also go to my coordinator during fieldwork in Mali, Boubacar Ba. Thanks for

logical assistance, practicalities and inspiration. Moreover, this study could not have been

completed without the help of my interpreter Hama Diall. Thanks for all assistance during

fieldwork, thanks for speaking so many languages, thanks for driving – and repairing! – the

moped, and thanks for helping me in all kinds of ways and situations.

I would like to thank the people at MELM in Mali for logistical assistance, great hospitality

and friendship. Special thanks from the bottom of my heart goes to Janne Evje Hinderaker

and Anne Lise Baltzersen for human compassion and support when I lost my father and had

to leave Mali during my first stay. Also thanks to Laila for your truly appreciated friendship

during my stay in Sévaré! Moreover, I would like to send my gratitude to the wonderful

librarians at Noragric, Liv Ellingsen and Ingeborg Brandtzæg, for probably being the most

helpful and dedicated librarians in all Universities of Norway.

This study has been financially supported by a research grant from Noragric and a Freedom of

Expression grant, something which is gratefully acknowledged.

I would also like to send the greatest appreciations to my family and friends for being so

supportive, tolerant, encouraging and helpful. Thanks to my colleagues at Tanum for stepping

in, and thanks to Jenny for excellent computer assistance. Special thanks also of course go to

my fellow students at Noragric for cooperation and common backing up through two great

years! Finally my greatest gratitude goes to my one and only favourite and beloved; Svein

Harald, whose patience, support, encouragement and love made this entire study possible.

Last, but not least, my biggest appreciation goes of course to all my informants in the field for

sharing your experiences and for taking your time. I could not have done this without your

sincere openness and cooperation, and I truly appreciate getting to know all of you. Tiaboo!

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Table of contents

Declaration………….…………………………………………………………………………..………….. p. iii

Abstract……………………………………………………………………......………………………….… p. v

Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………............................................ p. vii

Table of contents………………………………………………………………............................................ p. ix

List of abbreviations…………………………………………………………..………………………….... p. xiii

Glossary of terms……………………………………………………………...………………………….... p. xv

Table of figures………………………………………………………..….……............................................p. xvii

Chapter 1: Introduction………………………………………………………….... p. 1

1.1 Problem statement……………………………………………………………..... p. 2

1.2 Objectives and research questions…………………………………………...… p. 3

1.3 Motivations and rationale……………………………………………………… p. 4

1.4 Structure of the thesis………………………………………………………….. p. 4

Chapter 2: Conceptual and theoretical background……………………….. p. 7

2.1 Narratives and global environmental discourse………………………………. p. 7

2.2 Environmental change……………………………………………………….… p. 8

2.2.1 The concepts of land degradation and resource scarcity……………….… p. 9

2.2.2 ‘The Sahelian crisis’ narrative………………………………………….… p. 11

2.2.3 Global warming and the climate change discourse……………………..… p. 14

2.3 Farmers and herders in the Sahel……………………………………………… p. 15

2.3.1 Land, identities and farmer-herder relations……………………………… p. 15

2.3.2 Farmer-herder conflicts…………………………………………………… p. 16

2.4 ‘Belly politics’ and petty corruption in natural resource management…….. p. 17

2.4.1 Belly politics and petty corruption in Africa in a socio-historical context.. p. 18

2.4.2 ‘Rent seeking’ in natural resource management………………………….. p. 19

2.5 Political ecology…………………………………………………………………. p. 19

2.5.1 The history and principles of political ecology…………………………... p. 20

2.5.2 The relevance of political ecology as framework for this study………….. p. 23

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2.6 The environmental security thesis……………………………………………... p. 24

2.6.1 Historical roots of the environmental security thesis................................... p. 25

2.6.2 The argument…………………………………………………………...… p. 25

Chapter 3: Contextual background: setting the scene……………………... p. 29

3.1 Geography and topography……………………………………………………. p. 29

3.2 Ecology and livelihoods in the inland Niger delta…………………………..… p. 31

3.3 A history of land use system and political administration………………..….. p. 33

3.4 Description of study area and case………………………………………….….. p. 36

3.4.1 Land use and development interventions in Kounary…………….………. p. 37

3.4.2 The conflict between Guirowel and Karbaye in 2001………………….… p. 40

3.4.3 The legal proceedings…………………………………………………...... p. 42

Chapter 4: Methodology……………………………………………………..……. p. 43

4.1 Research approach and design…………………………………………….…… p. 43

4.1.1 The case study design …………………………………………………… p. 43

4.1.2 Reliability and validity…………………………………………………… p. 44

4.2 Methods of data collection and field work…………………………………….. p. 45

4.2.1 Sampling procedures…………………………………………………….... p. 45

4.2.2 Data collection………………………………………………………….… p. 47

4.2.3 Field procedures and tools………………………………………………... p. 50

4.2.4 Challenges during research……………………………………………….. p. 52

4.3 Data analysis………………………………………………………………….... p. 56

4.4 Ethical considerations………………………………………………………..… p. 57

Chapter 5: Analysis and discussion of findings……………………………… p. 59

5.1 Main findings: Causes of the conflict:

Environmental and political changes and structures in the case study area... p. 59

5.1.1 Large-scale expansion of rice fields and loss of land…………..…………... p. 60

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5.1.1.1 Lower flood levels on the river Niger…………………………….. p. 60

5.1.1.2 National agricultural policies……………………………………...p. 61

5.1.1.3 ORM and the establishment of casiers…………...………………... p. 62

5.1.2 The pond rehabilitation…….………………………………………………. p. 67

5.1.3 Political vacuum and ‘lack of governance’………………………………… p. 71

5.1.3.1 Lack of administration and power vacuum…………………….…. p. 71

5.1.3.2 Belly politics and rent seeking……………………………………. p. 72

5.1.4 Summary......................................................................................................... p. 75

5.2 Discussion: the political ecology of a farmer-herder conflict............................ p. 79

5.2.1 Environmental degradation in the case study area…..................................... p. 79

5.2.1.1 Rainfall patterns, resource scarcity and drought………………….. p. 79

5.2.1.2 Desertification….…………………………………………………. p. 82

5.2.1.3 Summary………………………………………………………..… p. 83

5.2.2 The political ecology of environmental change

and conflict in the case study area………………………………………... p. 84

5.2.2.1 Connections between political and

environmental structures and environmental process….……….… p. 84

5.2.2.2 Resource scarcity vs. resource access……………………………. p. 88

5.2.2.3 Summary……………………………………………………….…. p. 89

5.2.3 Farmer-herder conflicts in ‘the time of global warming’………...……..….. p. 90

5.2.3.1 Challenging the global environmental discourse……………….… p. 91

Chapter 6: Conclusion……..………………………………………………….…… p. 93

6.1 Summary of findings………………………………………………………... p. 93

6.2 Concluding remarks………………………………………………………… p. 95

6.3 Future research……………………………………………………………… p. 96

References…………………………………………………………………………………………………... p. 97

Appendices………………………………………………………………………………………………..… p. 112

Appendix I) Interview guide for field research………………………………...………………….. p. 112

Appendix II) Interview guide for external stakeholders…………………………………………… p. 115

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List of abbreviations

CIDA - Canadian International Development Agency

CIPEA - Centre International pour l’Élevage an Afrique

DHS - Demographic and Health Surveys

DNPIA - Direction Nationale des Productions et des Industries Animales

DRPIA - Direction Régionale des Productions et des Industries Animales

ECACP - The Environmental Change and Acute Conflict Project

(the Toronto Group)

ENCOP - The Environment and Conflict Project

(the Swiss Peace Foundation)

IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change

IRIN - Integrated Regional Information Networks

NGO - Non-governmental Organization

ODEM - Opération de Développement de l’Élevage dans la region de

Mopti

ORM - Office Riz Mopti

RESA - Environmental Rehabilitation Food Security Project

UNCCD - United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification

UNDP - United Nations Development Program

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Glossary of terms

Bessema - Traditional chief of the rimaybé and agricultural activities

Burgu - Pastoral fodder, lat.: Echinochloa stagnina.

Burtol - Livestock corridor where cattle pass

Casier pastoral - Pastoral grazing area

Casier rizicole - Irrigated rice field

Jomsaré - Village chief, head of administrative and political tasks

Jowro - Chief of the herders and manager of pastoral land and

activities

Leyde (sing. leydy) - Traditional pastoral management units

Sous-préfet - Head of communes, in this case Kounary, Fatoma and Bassirou

Transhumance - Seasonal movements of livestock between well-defined

pasture areas, in this case mostly to drylands far away

during the wet season.

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Table of figures

Figure 1: Sources and consequences of environmental scarcity………………….… p. 27

Figure 2: Map of Africa…………………………………………………………....... p. 29

Figure 3: Map of Mali…………………………………………………………..…... p. 29

Figure 4: Map of the West African Sahelian zone……….……………………….… p. 31

Figure 5: Map of regions and districts in Mali highlighting Mopti cercle…………. p. 35

Figure 6: Map of Mopti cercle highlighting Kounary commune…………...…….… p. 35

Figure 7: Resource map of study area ……………………………………………… p. 37

Figure 8: Maximum flood levels on the Niger river, Mopti 1922- 2006………….... p. 60

Figure 9: Photo of the pond…………………………………………………..…...… p. 67

Figure 10: Photo of the burtol and the gardens surrounding the pond……………….. p. 69

Figure 11: Local perceptions on whether the conflict is related to political aspects.… p. 77

Figure 12: Factors that are blamed for the conflict within each village……………… p. 78

Figure 13: Factors that are blamed for the conflict within each livelihood group….... p. 78

Figure 14: Annual rainfall Mali, 1940- 1998………………………………………… p. 80

Figure 15: Annual rainfall in Mopti, 1950- 2008…………………………………..… p. 80

Figure 16: Trends in vegetation greenness in the Sahel, 1982- 2003………………… p. 82

Figure 17: Local perceptions on whether the conflict is related to natural resources... p. 83

Figure 18: A political ecology of environmental violence…………………………… p. 86

Figure 19: Causes of the conflict between Karbaye and Guirowel in 2001………….. p. 87

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1.0 Introduction

Thomas F. Homer-Dixon wrote in 2007 a New York Times article called “Terror in the

Weather Forecast.” In this article Homer-Dixon claims that climate change presents a major

challenge to international security, in fact “just as dangerous – and more intractable – than the

arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” Moreover,

he claims that:

In the future, that battlefield is likely to be complex and hazardous. Climate change will help

produce the kind of military challenges that are difficult for today’s conventional forces to

handle: insurgencies, genocide, guerrilla attacks, gang warfare and global terrorism (Homer-

Dixon 2007).

There is a substantial – and growing – body of literature supporting these views. The

arguments are rooted in the belief that global warming, in combination with population

growth, is increasing resource scarcity (e.g. Egeland 2008, Homer-Dixon 1999, IPCC 2007),

and will dry out the soil and vegetation people depend on. It is accordingly assumed that

people eventually will engage in conflict to secure access to these natural resources (e.g.

Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994). It is, based on this, often believed that climate change will cause

many and severe conflicts in the coming years (e.g. Mjøs 2007, Kaplan 1994). Scholars have

asserted that this is our time’s greatest challenge, and that “the era of resource wars is upon

us” (Klare 2006). Already, many contemporary conflicts have been attributed to resource

scarcity and climate change (e.g. Gore 2007, Kahl 2006, Suliman 1998). Dryland areas of

Africa, such as the Sahel, are presented as the clearest examples of such conflicts (Mjøs 2007,

Sachs 2007), and many policymakers, including United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki

Moon, have stated that the crisis in Darfur stems from resource scarcity and environmental

pressure (Ban 2007).

Such thoughts have been very influential and powerful, both in academic circles and among

the public, and especially among policymakers. Indeed, in 2007, the Nobel Peace Prize was

awarded Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a statement

that places climate change as a direct threat to international security:

Unfortunately we can already establish that global warming not only has negative consequences

for "human security", but can also fuel violence and conflict within and between states. […] The

2

consequences are most obvious, however, among the poorest of the poor, in Darfur and in large

sectors of the Sahel belt, where we have already had the first "climate war". The wind that blows

the sand off the Sahara sets people and camels moving towards more fertile areas. The outcome

is that nomads and peasants, Arabs and Africans, Christians and Muslims from many different

tribes clash in a series of conflicts. There are many dimensions to this, but it is growing

increasingly obvious that desertification is a central underlying factor. […] Large parts of the

Sahel belt, from the Sudan to Senegal, are coming under threat (Mjøs 2007).

According to Benjaminsen (2009: 152), these views make up the essence in a narrative that

the last few years has gained a lot of influence. This narrative says that i) global climate

change leads to drought and desertification that again causes resource scarcity, and that ii) this

resource scarcity leads to conflict.

Although these ideas have been widely influential and popular, this ‘resource scarcity

narrative’ and the ‘environmental security thesis’ (Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994, 1999) are both

largely contested among researchers. Especially during the last few years, these views have

been questioned by in particular peace and conflict studies (e.g. Binningsbø et. al. 2007,

Gleditsch 1998, Raleigh and Urdal 2007) and political ecology (e.g. Benjaminsen 2008,

Benjaminsen 2009, Moritz 2006, Peluso and Watts 2001, Turner 2004). The most common

counter-arguments are concerned about how climate change becomes a process or a factor

easy to blame for problems caused by other mechanisms, like political and economic

structures. In spite of this critique and a large body of research questioning the links between

resource scarcity and conflict (Salehyan 2008), contemporary farmer-herder conflicts across

arid and semi-arid Africa have largely served as prominent examples of such scarcity-driven

conflicts, and still do (e.g. Baechler 1999, Kahl 2006).

1.1 Problem statement

This research project focuses on a resource-related farmer-herder conflict in the inland Niger

delta in the Mopti region of Mali. I will in the following investigate what causes that lie

behind tensions between the involved farmers and herders. I will examine resource scarcity

and land degradation caused by environmental change as a possible cause, drawing on

contemporary arguments of increased scarcity and ‘environmental violence,’ but more

importantly I draw on political structures and development interventions to show how access

to natural resources have changed for the people living in the area, and how socio-political

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factors and backdrops eventually led to the outbreak of a violent farmer-herder conflict in

2001.

Fieldwork for this thesis was carried out in October 2008, and February- March 2009.

1.2 Objectives and research questions

Based on the problem statement above, my objectives and research questions are as follows:

1) To examine a local conflict between farmers and herders, the causes of it, and who are

perceived as the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the conflict.

i) Who are or have been involved in the conflict?

ii) Who are perceived as having lost the most from the conflict situation?

iii) What is perceived as the cause of the conflict among the different

stakeholders involved?

2) To examine what kinds of changes there have been in people’s access to land in the

case study area, the causes of these changes, and whether changes in (access to) natural

resources are the cause of the conflict.

i) What kind of changes have there been in access to and amount of natural

resources in the study area, and why have these changes occurred?

ii) Have these changes led to resource degradation or scarcity?

iii) Who are perceived as ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in regards to these changes?

iv) Has competition over land changed during the last few decades, and if so,

in what ways and why?

3) To investigate the political aspects of the situation and whether there are any political

causes behind the conflict, and identify the different political stakeholders involved.

i) Have any governmental institutions or political actors been involved in the

conflict in any ways, and if so – what has been their role?

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ii) Have there been policies directly related to this conflict and the situation

leading up to it, and if so, what policies?

iii) Have there been any changes in governmental involvement in this situation,

and if so, in what ways?

1.3 Motivations and rationale

The link between global warming, resource scarcity and violent conflict is an important area

of focus in peace and conflict research and development studies as well as in public spheres

today. However, the dominating policy discourse is currently being questioned. There is an

ongoing discussion on much of the empirical ‘evidence’ made on this link, and more research

in this field is highly necessary. Since dryland areas of Africa, such as the Sahel, are viewed

as typical examples of areas with resource scarcity-driven conflicts, I find it fruitful to

investigate a farmer-herder conflict in this area.

Based on this, I find my research topic relevant for ongoing debates within the academic field.

Potentially, the research and thesis may also be of interest for policy-makers and the public at

large in light of the great contemporary interest for climate change related topics.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

I will in the following present my research and thesis through conceptual, theoretical,

contextual and methodological frameworks, before I present the analysis, discussion and

conclusions of my findings. The thesis is organized into six chapters, in which this

introduction is chapter 1. After this chapter, I present the conceptual and theoretical

background in chapter 2. Here I present some concepts that are necessary as background and

framework for the study. In this chapter I also provide the theoretical foundation and approach

of my research and analysis. I will first outline the concepts of narratives and global

environmental disourse, before I provide an overview of some topics related to environmental

change, like resource degradation and scarcity, the ‘Sahelian crisis narrative,’ and global

warming. Subsequently I will present farmer-herder relations in the Sahel, including resource-

related conflict between farmers and herders, before I introduce the concept of ‘belly politics’

and corruption in natural resource management in African countries. Finally, I present the

theoretical framework for this study, more specifically political ecology and the

5

environmental security thesis. In this part I present the two approaches in historical and

current contexts, as well as in light of socio-political and ecological aspects in relation to this

study. In chapter 3, I provide a contextual background linked directly to this case study and

analysis. Here I present the study area’s geography, ecology and topography, as well as socio-

historical and political aspects, before I introduce the circumstances related to the specific

conflict of this study. In Chapter 4, I discuss the methodology used through this research

project, from data collection to data analysis, and I also present some limitations of the

research, challenges met, and ethical considerations made during the research. In Chapter 5 I

present my findings. This chapter is the largest part of the thesis, comprising the analysis and

discussion. In this part I seek to answer the objectives of the study. The chapter is twofold;

first of all I present and analyze my findings, before I discuss these findings in light of the

theoretical approaches presented in chapter two. Here I will also allow room for the

information provided by informants during fieldwork. Finally I sum up my findings and draw

some concluding remarks in chapter 6.

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2.0 Conceptual and theoretical background

In this chapter I provide a conceptual and theoretical framework, as I find it necessary to

outline some background information before introducing the study. I will first present the

concepts of narratives and global environmental discourse, as I find these relevant for

discussing the environmental issues that this study draws on. Moreover, I will outline

environmental change that is related to the topics of this study. Here I will introduce what I

call ‘the Sahelian crisis narrative.’ I will subsequently outline farmer-herder relations and

conflict, before I introduce the concept of ‘belly politics’ and corruption in natural resource

management in Africa.

Finally, I will provide the theoretical background for this study. I have chosen to contrast the

study on two theoretical approaches, namely political ecology and the environmental security

thesis. As these approaches largely stand in contrast to each other, I will draw on both to

illuminate my findings, and as theoretical backdrop for this study.

2.1 Narratives and global environmental discourse

According to Roe (1991, 1995), narratives are stories designed to bring about action and

which are resilient to challenge. Roe says that a narrative is like a chronological story, in that

is has beginning, middle and an end, or that it can be a full argument with both premises and

conclusions (Roe 1991: 288). A narrative, like most stories or myths, has victims, villains and

heroes as actors in the scenario (Adger et. al. 2001: 685).

Flynn (2008: 308) argues that narratives dominate the environmental agenda today. He says

that environmental narratives are successful because they “conform to a certain literary

schematic of how to construct a good narrative,” and that it is “from the combined elements of

this schematic that they derive the facility to influence, shape and determine the actions of

their ‘readers’” (Flynn 2008: 308). Roe (1991: 288) argues that environmental narratives tell

scenarios more than stories, in that they tell what is going to happen more than what should

happen. This reflects, as Flynn (2008: 313) says, the idea that if narratives function the way

they are supposed to, the “target audience will be in little doubt as to ‘what needs to be

done.’” In this way, the narrative is internalised and leads the reader to inevitable conclusions

8

(Flynn 2008: 313). Discourses are more general in their contents than narratives, and can be

referred to as knowledge regimes (Adger et. al. 2001: 683). A discourse is broadly defined as

“a shared meaning of a phenomenon” (Adger et. al. 2001: 683). Discourses of global

environmental change are not new, but became more evident in the environmental debate in

the 1990s (Adger et. al. 2001: 684), and have perhaps become even more powerful later as we

now are dealing with global climate change and environmental issues – and uncertainties

related to these – as some of our time’s biggest issues of concern.

Narrative and environmental discourse analysis has a central position in environmental studies,

including political ecology (Benjaminsen and Berge 2004: 33), and is largely linked to post-

structuralism. An influential thinker in this area was the French philosopher Michel Foucault,

whose thoughts were concerned with power, truth and knowledge, and how these elements are

deeply interconnected. Foucault addressed questions about where and how meanings are

formulated, and who decides what ‘truth’ is (Foucault 1980). Moreover, he argued that many

concepts we take for granted and assume to be universally true, simply do not exist in other

times and places, and are constructed (Robbins 2004: 109). In this way, an idea or a story can

become true because someone powerful claims them to be true. This means that “ideas about

ecology and political economy actively shape human perceptions and uses of nature” (Bryant

2001: 162). Many environmental concepts are in this way constructed, and many of them

have been created for political or economic purposes. Soil erosion and desertification were for

instance both largely constructed phenomena that justified colonial control in West Africa

(Benjaminsen and Berge 2000). Many narratives have counter-narratives, but these do not get

foothold that easily. Indeed, even though environmental narratives have proven wrong, they

still persist, resistant to critique and despite empirical evidence rejecting their principles

(Benjaminsen 2009: 152, Roe 1991). Such dominant narratives form the basis of policy

agendas and public beliefs. There might be strong interests in keeping these believes,

especially among some policy makers, aid donors and organizations, and also within research

institutes.

2.2 Environmental change

The terms related to environmental change covers i) natural environmental change caused by

for instance rainfall fluctuations, ii) man-made environmental change, such as deforestation,

and iii) climate change. Environmental changes such as resource scarcity, land degradation,

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drought, desertification and global warming are believed to have severe consequences for

both the earth and its people, and are, as mentioned, increasingly regarded as main causes

behind conflicts. I will in the following present some of these processes. First I will introduce

some different views on land degradation and resource scarcity as background, before I

outline ‘the Sahelian crisis narrative.’ I will also present the basics of global warming and the

climate change discourse.

2.2.1 The concepts of land degradation and resource scarcity:

Degradation is most commonly regarded as destruction of nature, and for most people, it

means impoverishment of the soil or vegetation. The word originates from Latin meaning

“reduction to a lower rank” (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987: 1). Degradation of natural

resources may for instance be perceived as loss of nature or natural productivity, loss of

biodiversity, loss of usefulness of a resource, loss of resilience, or loss of economic

productivity (Robbins 2004: 92- 96). Resource scarcity then, describes a lack of a natural

resource in one way or another. A traditional and more economic definition describes a

resource as scarce “when it is useful and exists in limited quantity” (Derman et. al. 2007: 4,

Montani 1987). Homer-Dixon (1995) argues that one has to take consumption into account,

and suggests that resource scarcity must be measured either as relative or absolute, depending

on how dependent we are on that exact resource. Most commonly however, ‘resource

scarcity’ describes a scarcity of the resources people are dependent on, and it is mostly used

as a description of a scenario where the soil is impoverished, where there is a lack of water, or

vegetation has disappeared, dried out or been destroyed in other ways.

One of the most common and influential approaches to land degradation and resource scarcity

is neo-Malthusianism. These ideas derive from Thomas Malthus’ theories on eco-scarcity and

population pressure in the late 1700s. Malthus’ thoughts concern the assumption that

population will grow faster than food production; accordingly poor people will ‘impoverish’

the soil and natural resources by overuse (Blaikie 2001: 134- 5, Cohen 1995, Malthus 1798).

Following this scenario, the earth’s population will face crisis through starvation and mortal

diseases, while the nature will be destroyed, as its “overused assets are driven past the point of

self-renewal” (Robbins 2004: 7). These principles found new forms in neo-Malthusianism

200 years later and were extended to a more specific environmental concern. We see a good

example in the Club of Rome’s book “Limits to Growth” from 1972, where several authors

present the dismal consequences of a rapidly growing population in combination with a

10

shrinking resource base (Meadows et. al. 1972), and also in Garret Hardin’s “Tragedy of the

Commons” (1968). Hardin’s theory is illustrated by an example from pastoralism. He argues

that if all pastoralists, for example, graze their animals in the same pasture without there being

any form of common control systems, eventually everybody will act in their own interest at

the expense of the collective good. The outcome will hence end up in ‘tragedy,’ and although

everybody acted in their own interest, they will only hurt themselves in the longer term as the

resource (the pasture) will be overused and hence destroyed (Hardin 1968). This view still has

a firm hold, and the scenario is today extended to show how dryland areas exposed to drought

and resource scarcity will suffer from conflict, as farmers and herders will not only degrade

the resources, but also eventually engage in conflict to secure access to them (Homer-Dixon

1994, 1999).

Concepts like resource scarcity are common environmental narratives often used for different

political and economic purposes. Mehta (2007: 654) argues that scarcity of resources is “not a

natural condition,” rather it is a relative notion that has been constructed as a “’meta-

narrative’ that justifies controversial schemes such as large dams, allows for simplistic

portrayals of property rights and resource conflicts and also ignores the cultural and symbolic

dimensions of resources” (Mehta 2007: 654). Often it is not an absolute scarcity that is

prevailing, but a relative scarcity that has more to do with resource distribution and

mechanisms of access and control.

Indeed, these explanations on degradation and scarcity ignore several important factors. The

most obvious flaw with Malthus and the eco-scarcity argument, is that the environment is

postulated as a finite source of natural resources, and that it will be depleted if we do not

‘control’ the extraction of resources. This assumption has indeed proved wrong through

history, as very few communities in the world actually consume the majority of its resources.

It has more to do with distribution than depletion, as the earth’s current resource base is not

depleted at any level (Gleditsch 1998). Moreover, high absolute number of people does not

automatically imply environmental crisis. A resource becoming scarcer might also lead to a

response that averts crisis, for instance better and more efficient production systems. Many

critics hold that high number of populations in fact can lead to technological innovation and

social transformation, following Ester Boserup’s (1965) principles, which include a

possibility that food production might increase as a result of agricultural intensification.

Boserup challenged the Malthusian assumption that agricultural methods determine

11

population, and stated that instead, it is the other way around; population determines

agricultural methods (Boserup 1965). A resource becoming scarcer might also lead to

increased awareness, in this way curbing the overuse of it (Robbins 2004: 8). Finally, and

most importantly, political and economic structures are largely ignored by Malthus. He and

his fellow – and contemporary – believers are blind to the fact that for instance

marginalization or bad governance also might lead to loss of natural resources (Blaikie 2001:

135). This is indeed largely the problem in common arguments about scarcity and conflict

today as well.

Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) assert that degradation is a perceptual term, meaning that it

differs depending on who defines it. This refers to the question of according to whom it is ‘a

lower rank’? On the background of this, they argue that land degradation is a social problem

with both social causes and social consequences, and that it includes multiple definitions and

interpretations. Explanations of land degradation must therefore include economic and

political aspects. Indeed, as Robbins (2004: 130) argues; “the ecological process of

degradation does not occur in a political and economic vacuum.” Both national and

international institutions affect the environment, and environmental process must therefore be

seen in political contexts. Robbins (2004: 91) points out that “in many cases, a system’s

‘degradation’ may be a loss of one capacity in exchange for another.” A forest replaced by

agricultural land will for instance not be regarded as degradation for a farmer, but it will

perhaps be perceived as such for a hunter (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987: 4). It is hence

difficult to measure the value of land. This is also because there are strong interests linked to

such measurement, and interpretations of environmental change and causes of it can have

huge political implications (Robbins 2004). There is in other words a need for a more

complex definition on degradation, and Blaikie and Brookfield (1987: 6) suggests instead that

degradation is “a reduction in the capability of land to satisfy a particular use.”

2.2.2 ‘The Sahelian crisis’ narrative:

Linked to these assumptions on resource degradation and scarcity is a prevailing ‘Sahelian

crisis narrative.’ Africa, and especially the Sahel, is considered as one of the places with most

environmental problems and an increasing resource scarcity assumed to be of staggering

proportions (Bassett and Zueli 2000: 67).1 The Sahel is seen as a typical example of an area

1 See also chapter 3.1 for extensive information about the Sahel.

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with chains of problems caused by desertification, drought, land degradation and resource

scarcity, often in combination with population growth (Baechler 1999). Sahel is a very dry

region, and resources here are scattered (Turner 2000). It is hence widely believed that this is

one of the places in the world where one can most directly experience effects of global

climate change. The Sahel has accordingly the last few years more or less become a symbol of

drought, resource scarcity, scattered settlements and natural resources, pastoralism and futile

agricultural activities on dry, infertile soils.

‘The Sahelian crisis’ concerns a belief that i) native populations are misusing the land and

worsening the degradation process, because land in the Sahel is scarce, that ii) climate change

worsens this process by drying out the resources, and finally, that iii) this growing scarcity of

natural resources will cause problems of famine, disease, crisis and eventually conflict. These

ideas are largely linked to neo-colonial views on land degradation, stating that the main cause

of degradation in the south is the ‘primitive pastoralists’ thought to be ignorant, irrational and

without knowledge of the harm they are causing the environment (Blaikie 2001). This view

goes in line with traditional, yet current, western views on ‘poor countries and their problems’

(Benjaminsen 2009: 155).2 These ideas on the Sahel are common, and have become a very

strong narrative despite the lack of empirical evidence (Robbins 2004).

The most prominent example of concerned resource degradation in the Sahel is visible

through the desertification narrative. Warren and Agnew (1988: 9) define desertification as

“an extreme form of land degradation, which occurs when the vegetation cover falls below

about 35 %.” This is, according to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification

(UNCCD), caused by “a variety of factors, including climatic variation and human activities”

(UNCCD 2008: 9). It has since colonial times been widely believed that the Sahara is

extending with inconceivable proportions, eating its way into grazing lands and cropped fields

as the soil is degraded from drought, overuse and population pressure (Benjaminsen and

Berge 2000, Benjaminsen 2008). A study carried out by E. P. Stebbing in the 1930s

concluded that i) Sahara was expanding southwards, ii) this was for the most part caused by

desiccation, which resulted from iii) the native population’s misuse of land, which in turn was

caused by iv) overpopulation (Swift 1996: 74). Stebbing specifically rejected rainfall

variability as causes (Swift 1996: 75, Forsyth 2003: 28). Again in 1975, another study on

2 See especially Said (1978) on western views on ‘the other, primitive people,’ in this case ‘the Orient.’

13

desertification was carried out. The ecologist Hugh Lamprey compared vegetation maps from

the wet 1950s with aerial photos taken in the extremely dry 1970s. His conclusions were of

course dramatic, he stated that the desert boundaries had moved south by 90- 100 kilometres

from 1958 to 1975, which is about 6 km annually (Lamprey 1988, Benjaminsen and Berge

2000: 98). The problem was assumed to be human misuse of land, and drought was only

considered to be an exacerbating factor. Both Stebbing’s and Lamprey’s findings were

repudiated, and many scientists were critical to the assumptions about Sahara’s encroachment.

They rather concluded that the Saharan shores moved back and forth in line with annual

rainfalls (Tucker and Nicholson 1999: 587, Herrmann et. al. 2005: 394, Olsson 1993), and

today it is in fact argued that the trend rather is ‘a greening of the Sahel,’ not desiccation

(Benjaminsen 2009, Herrmann et. al. 2005, Olsson et. al. 2005).

Scientists have however been largely ignored, and the belief is still a dominating

environmental narrative (Herrmann et. al. 2005: 395, Helldén 1991: 379, Benjaminsen 2008).

A recently published UNCCD report argues that the fight against desertification is even more

important now under the present conditions of climate change and growing resource scarcities

(UNCCD 2008: 5). Moreover, a UN group concluded in 2007 that “climate change is making

desertification the greatest environmental challenge of our times” (UNCCD 2008: 7). Swift

(1996: 73) argues, however, that desertification largely is a narrative construct that has more

to do with “competing claims of different political and bureaucratic constituencies” than with

science. Desertification is in fact probably the best example of environmental ideas that have

occurred in spite of remarkable scientific uncertainties (Benjaminsen 2002, Benjaminsen and

Berge 2000, Herrmann et. al. 2005, Tucker and Nicholson 1999). Indeed, Adger et. al. (2001:

691) argue that this is “an apposite example of how a single narrative has contributed

significantly to the institutionalization of a crisis discourse.”

There are several reasons why this narrative still has such has a firm hold. In the beginning,

desertification was used as a justification for colonization (Benjaminsen and Berge 2000: 96).

Some states today also see an interest in keeping the desertification narrative strong to assure

control over resources and receive aid. In many cases this has led to African governments

being able to uphold their restrictive policies on land management, and has also served to

justify calls for increased aid flows (Warren and Agnew 1988: 2, 7). Pastoralists have in many

parts of Africa been the overall losers in this trend. Mali is, as will be shown, a good example

of such governmental intervention and pastoral marginalization.

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The problem with this narrative keeping so strong, is that it often has led to an overshadowing

of other environmental problems, and it has also largely deflected attention from “more

sensitive political and social problems” and made it easy “to blame the environment, when

blame should go to human institutions or individuals” (Warren and Agnew 1988: 8, Swift

1996). Nonetheless, today the ideas of desertification and ‘the crisis in the Sahel’ are largely,

and increasingly, linked to security concerns, and tensions and conflicts in the Sahel have the

last years received increased attention due to these believes (see chapter 2.3.2 and 2.6.2).

2.2.3 Global warming and the climate change discourse:

Most commonly referred to when we talk about environmental change, is climate change.

This term describes the climatic changes that are believed to occur mostly as a result of

increased greenhouse gas emissions, which leads to global warming, environmental change,

and changes in climate patterns. According to IPCC, climate change is “a change of climate

which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the

global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over

comparable time periods” (IPCC 1995). Climate change has during the last decade become the

biggest environmental issue of global concern.

The one change that is most related to climate change, is global warming. The warming of the

earth’s climate is unequivocal, and the temperature increases we are facing can have drastic

consequences (McMichael et. al. 2006). Although it is a much debated topic and subject to

assumptions and uncertain predictions, its future impacts are largely recognized. There is,

according to IPCC (2007: 8), “high confidence” that semi-arid areas, “will suffer a decrease

in water resources due to climate change” by the mid of this century. IPCC (2007) regard it as

likely that areas affected by drought will suffer from land degradation and widespread water

stress, which inherently can have drastic consequences for both farming and herding. These

changes are believed to “have no precedent in the history of human civilization” (Barnett and

Adger 2007: 640), and the whole population is expected to be affected in some way. Indeed,

in his Nobel Peace Prize speech, Gore (2007) stated that “we, the human species, are

confronting a planetary emergency – a threat to the survival of our civilization.”

The view on global climate change has become so dominating that it can be considered a

global environmental discourse (Adger et. al. 2001). There is a considerable school of

scientists and policymakers that disagree with the views on climate change, and its causes and

15

effects are still largely debated. Nonetheless, these ideas have the last few years received

amounts of attention, and have increasingly been related to security concerns.

2.3 Farmers and herders in the Sahel

The relationships between farmers and herders in dryland Africa have been incompatibly

characterized as symbiotic, competitive and inherently conflictual (Breusers et. al. 1998,

Hussein et. al. 1999). All these descriptions can probably be true, depending on time and

place. It is however the latter that seems to be the most common today. The dominating view

on farmer-herder relations and conflict today is close to that of a ‘primitive war,’ involving

“two groups with land users that are seemingly chronically in competition over a dwindling

resource resulting in occasional flare-ups of severe violence” (Turner 2004: 866).

2.3.1 Land, identities and farmer-herder relations:

The link between livelihoods and identity is striking in many parts of the world, including the

Sahel. Social structures are often rooted in the ways people make their livelihoods (Turner

2004). Turner (2004: 872) says that these labels of ‘farmer’ and ‘herder’ traditionally and

historically are tied to identities of ethnicity and caste, but most importantly they refer to a

way of living and using land. Indeed, as Moritz (2006) argues, the traditional definitions of a

herder as a ‘keeper of cattle’ and a farmer as ‘a person involved in agriculture,’ refer to

“people associated with a particular production and socio-cultural system” and “people

involved in a specific economic activity at a particular time and place” (Moritz 2006). The

labelling of the groups is, however, problematic, because it makes it appear as if farmers and

herders are clearly defined and exclusive in their categories. It has in fact in many cases

become difficult to distinguish the two groups, as many now are involved in both activities, in

this way making the ‘herder’ and ‘farmer’ notions relative and more blurred (see e.g.

Benjaminsen and Ba 2009). It is more related to how they do it, than what they do (Turner

2004: 872). Most farmers and herders live in communities together, and interact on a daily

basis. Local networks and cooperation among farmers and herders on both community and

household level is common in the Sahel (see e.g. Moorehead 1991). More importantly,

farmers and herders often interact on a mutual economic relationship of several types; i)

patron-client relationships, ii) as landlord and tenant, iii) as sellers and buyers of milk, manure

or grain, or as iv); livestock owner, trader and herder (Turner 2004: 872). Beeler (2006: 7)

illustrates this mutual relationship in Mali by explaining how herders graze their cattle on

16

harvested fields, feeding on millet stalks left by the farmers, and how the farmers accordingly

benefit from manure left by this cattle.

2.3.2 Farmer-herder conflicts:

Farmer-herder conflicts have been part of the daily life for farmers and herders in the Sahel

for centuries (Breusers et. al. 1998), only reflecting the human need for vital resources.

Mechanisms of resource access are often very intricate in many parts of the world, and

especially in dryland areas, where people have adjusted to unstable resource bases and

uncertain resource access through centuries. Resource-related conflicts can hence be both a

struggle to gain access to resources, or resulting from the use of them (see e.g. Le Billon

2001). The term ‘farmer-herder conflict’ has come to represent many different types of

conflicts; interest conflicts, resource disputes, political action, evictions, killings and livestock

theft, to mention a few (Hussein et. al. 1999). Single-factor explanations are therefore not

sufficient in explaining most cases of such conflicts. How then, can we define farmer-herder

conflicts? Indeed, as Moritz (2006) asks;

[a]re only conflicts over natural resources ‘herder-farmer’ conflicts or are all conflicts in which the

parties identify themselves or are identified by others as such herder-farmer conflicts? Also, how

do we know if conflicts are about natural resources, if they are motivated by ‘a culture of

competition’ or articulate with other religious or political conflicts? Could we define herder-

farmer conflicts other than by saying they involve herders and farmers?

The most common way of defining farmer-herder conflicts then, is as “low-level, small-scale

conflicts between herders and farmers over access to grazing lands and campsites and crop

damage” (Moritz 2006). Such tensions are often linked to longstanding insecurity, drought

and scarcity of natural resources, and are often portrayed as ‘in-the-moment, instinctive

scrambles’ for resources, as the differences between farmers’ and herders’ livelihoods and

ways of using the land are seemingly obvious conflict causes. It is believed that tensions erupt

easily under a state of constant competition (Turner 2004: 867).

It is believed that violent farmer-herder conflicts have increased during the last decades, due

to “i) changing patterns of resource use and increasing competition for resources, and ii) the

breakdown of ‘traditional’ mechanisms governing resource management and conflict

resolution” (Hussein et. al. 1999: 397). However, important to note, the assumption that

farmer-herder relations were in terms of ‘symbiosis’ before, “in an often unspecified epoch in

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the past,” but have grown more conflictual the last decades, has been questioned by several

researchers (Breusers et. al. 1998, Hussein et. al. 1999). In fact, this idealising of the past is

often used by farmers and herders themselves “to impress upon researchers that relations are

currently worsening because of increasing resource competition, and that some intervention is

required” (Hussein et. al. 1999: 409). This argument is also commonly used by governments

to justify intervention (Hussein et. al. 1999: 402), and by scholars to collect support and to

‘modernize’ the notion of resource wars (Turner 2004: 866). Most importantly however, these

views have become even more popular in today’s climate change ‘era.’

2.4 ‘Belly politics’ and petty corruption in natural resource management

‘Belly politics’ is a Cameroonian expression implied in the proverb ‘goats eat where they are

tethered’ (Bayart 1993: 235, Mbembé 1992). The expression refers to corruption on a lower

level, and according to Bayart et. al. (1999: 8), there are different meanings attached to the

notions of belly politics compared to that of corruption. Belly politics is not a formalized

system, but it is largely institutionalized (Moritz 2006b: 107). It implies a system where

officials on different levels systematically exploit political power and authority, and

appropriate public resources for their own benefits and purposes, or more specifically;

“accumulation of wealth through tenure of political power” (Bayart 1993: 228- 59, Moritz

2006b). It is also known as ‘la politique du ventre’ (Bayart et. al. 1999: 8).

Belly politics defines the laws and customs practiced besides the formal law, or in other

words; “a complex mode of government” (Bayart 1993), in contrast to corruption, which most

often is regarded as a sign of a weak state or the opposite of ‘good governance’ (Robbins

(2000: 425- 6). According to Robbins (2000: 424) corruption is rather “a system of

normalized rules, transformed from legal authority, patterned around existing inequalities, and

cemented through cooperation and trust.” He suggests an alternative view, by “examining

corruption not as the absence of rules, but instead as the presence of alternative norms”

(Robbins 2000: 426). Cotula (2008: 2) says that local officials largely practice belly politics

through ‘customary law,’ which is based on traditional policy structures and systems of

decision making. The coexistence between this and the state system is often referred to as

‘legal pluralism.’ However, although ‘the politics of the belly’ are incorporated in systems of

negotiations and mediation, Moritz (2006b: 108) argues that it is based on a hierarchy in

which “smallholders are steadily losing out to the wealthy, powerful, and better connected

18

elite, who are much better positioned in these ‘negotiations’.” It is therefore important to note

that although the practice is rooted in social traditions, poor people still lose out.

2.4.1 Belly politics and petty corruption in Africa in a socio-historical context:

Belly politics is widely spread in African countries, and is mostly based on clientalism

(patron- client relationships) and rent seeking. Such ‘smaller’ types of corruption are termed

‘petty corruption.’ Petty corruption is, according to Olivier de Sardan (1999: 28) “extremely

familiar to ordinary mortals” on an everyday basis, either by practicing it or being its victims.

“Everyone in Africa has routine experience in dealing with corruption (and the like), this

being a part of the social landscape. It has even become part of popular know-how, […] and is

indispensable for survival in the post-colonial milieu” (Olivier de Sardan 1999: 28). Mbembe

(1992: 6, 7) says that the practices of corruption and belly politics in Africa are post-colonial,

and transformed and recombined elements inherited from the colonial period itself rather than

building on pre-colonial traditions. Olivier de Sardan (1999: 26) argues that this practice

largely stems from the building of a state-apparatus, for both establishing corruption, and for

producing the “cultural embeddedness” of it. Also Bayart (1993: 72) argues that “habits were

formed and patrimonies built up, especially since chiefs were legally entitled to retain a

percentage of the taxes they collected, and also benefited from various other payments.”

Olivier de Sardan (1999: 36- 43) identifies five behavioural traits engrained in the African

social life, that influence the complex of corruption. These are i) negotiation, ii) gift-giving, iii)

the solitary network, iv) predatory authority, and v) redistributive accumulation. He argues

that “[t]hese logics seem to have […] a certain relation of affinity with ‘corruption’-type

practices, but are not in themselves corruption” (Olivier de Sardan 1999: 26).

The first logic, negotiation, stems from corruption being a transaction, or a ‘bargaining act,’

extended to a negotiation over rules and law. Gift-giving, on the other hand, is more difficult

to deal with as a product of corruption, as it is deeply embedded in African social norms and

life. The giving of small gifts is an exchange that happens thousands of times each day,

representing a small thank you for a service rendered or some help received. This is a “moral

duty,” and it is important to separate between such legal and illegal commissions, or, in other

words; bribery and gifts (Olivier de Sardan 1999: 38). The logic of the solitary network is

related to the social capital and moral economy of peasants, in the building of a social

network that will ‘catch you’ if something unpredictable happens, like for instance in bad

harvesting periods (see also Scoones 1998). Olivier de Sardan (1999: 40) argues that “these

19

various forms of interrelations […] include an almost general obligation of mutual

assistance.” The fourth logic, predatory authority, is more linked to the state than social norms.

Many persons in power-holding positions accord to themselves a right to process extortion of

various forms. Related to this is also the last logic; redistributive accumulation. It is expected

that a person in some kind of position will appropriate resources and profit from his or her

responsibility, and thereafter spread the benefits to relatives. In fact, not “grabbing” such an

opportunity is regarded as a waste, or even stupid (Olivier de Sardan 1999: 43). According to

Moritz (2006b), such social mechanisms behind different kinds of corruption are most often

not explored thoroughly. This is especially true in natural resource management.

2.4.2 ‘Rent seeking’ in natural resource management:

‘Rent seeking’ is a phenomenon largely related to natural resource management, especially in

African countries. The term refers to the extraction of values without contributing to

productivity, and is according to Benjaminsen and Ba (2009: 72) often associated with

corruption and bribery. It is moreover “usually linked to the misuse of governmental

authority” (Benjaminsen and Ba 2009: 72, Tullock 1987). The practice of rent seeking

includes typically local officials allocating resources and values to themselves, in line with the

practice of belly politics as discussed above. This practice is wide-spread in many African

countries. Robbins (2000: 424) argues that corruption in fact more often than not is the

predominant way of organizing natural resource management.

Moritz (2006b: 107) says that the overall assumption concerning natural resource

management in West Africa is that authorities do not engage in rent seeking and that they

follow “the laws of land.” However, and more importantly, it is assumed that if rent seeking

happens, it is incidental, and not a ‘mode of government.’ The result of these assumptions,

Moritz (2006b: 107) argues, is significant failure to explain resource related conflicts. Moritz

(2006b: 107) argues therefore that it is necessary to investigate the politics of the state in

order to reveal the processes of natural resource management. This is also indeed the case for

resource-related conflicts.

2.5 Political ecology

The main theoretical approach I build this study on, is political ecology. According to Blaikie

and Brookfield (1987: 17), political ecology “combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly

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defined political economy.” The goal of political ecology is in this sense to explain “the social

and political conditions surrounding the causes, experiences, and management of

environmental problems” (Forsyth 2003: 2). Stott and Sullivan (2000: 2) also emphasize that

“the ‘science’ of environment is socially and politically situated, rather than unambiguous or

separable from the subjective location of human perception” (Stott and Sullivan 2000: 2).

Moreover, “for us, this defines contemporary ‘political ecology’” (Stott and Sullivan 2000: 2).

There are many areas of focus within the field of political ecology. These can be summarized

in the following four issues of concern, according to Robbins (2004); i) degradation and

marginalization, which seeks to explain environmental change in a “larger political and

economic context,” ii) environmental conflict, which seeks to explain environmental conflict

and access in a larger struggle including aspects of among others gender, class, race and

identity, iii) conservation and control, which seeks to explain problems within conservation

practice, and political and economic exclusion of environmental conservation, and iv)

environmental identity and social movement, which seeks to explain “[s]ocial upheaval”

linking “[p]olitical and social struggles” to environmental issues (Robbins 2004: 14). There

are furthermore many different voices and contrasting approaches to it, but in general,

according to Bryant and Bailey (1997: 28), most accounts and research within political

ecology share a common premise; “environmental change is not a neutral process amenable to

technical management. Rather, it has political sources.”

2.5.1 The history and principles of political ecology:

Studies of ecology with a political content emerged in the 1960s, when cultural ecology

appeared as a field of influence in studies of human impact on the environment (Forsyth 2003:

4). This approach held that humans are part of a larger system and direct contributors to the

development of the environment (Robbins 2004: 28, Sauer 1963). Several approaches,

including cultural ecology, contributed to build political ecology as a reference in its early

days, but it was during the last twenty to thirty years it arose as an independent theoretical

approach. This period can be divided into three phases: i) the early years, 1970s- 1980s, when

a typical neo-Marxist influence played a heavy role in forming political ecology, then ii) the

mid-1980s- mid-1990s, as a more structural, power-related and agency-focused approach

emerged, with the first important publications from recognized authors in the field, and then

iii) 1995 onwards, when political ecology took a post-structural turn, placing the focus more

on post-colonialism, post-Marxism and discourse analysis (Bryant 2001).

21

‘Third world political ecology’ emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, when scholars began to

explore the relationship between social and political process and environmental change in

developing countries. It was largely a reaction to neo-Malthusianism, and was heavily

influenced by neo-Marxism and other radical theories. Third world political ecology wanted

not only to explain third world poverty, but also to do something about it (Bryant 2001: 153).

There were two important Marxist principles that influenced political ecology in this period; i)

the fact that social and cultural systems are based on historical, and changing, material

conditions and relations, and ii) that capitalist extraction of surpluses destroys the

environment. The latter was heavily influenced by dependency theory (see e.g. Peet and

Hartwick 1999: 107- 111). Being rather a theory of underdevelopment, dependency theory

held that marginalization of the poor was caused by colonial trade patterns and capitalism.

This holds, as Robbins (2004: 50) says, “implications for explaining ecological transformation

in the contemporary world,” as capital accumulation requires exploitation of both labour and

nature. Production means extraction, which again leads to degradation. Degradation of the

environment was hence seen as the other side of capitalism, in this directly linking the

environment to radical political thoughts. Robbins (2004: 45- 6) calls this green materialism,

and says it was an important influence combining political economy and the environment.

During the 1980s and 1990s, political ecology found more footholds in theory. Blaikie and

Brookfield (1987) were key contributors in this period, with their influential ideas within the

fields of degradation and marginalization (see chapter 2.2.1). Their book “Land degradation

and society” can be regarded as the first political ecology book, and has become a classic in

the field. Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) combined a structure and agency-oriented

perspective in their views on the environment. Moreover they had a strong focus on power.

This meant that power-relations, structural political and environmental relations, and different

agents were thoroughly examined in explaining environmental process. This implied among

others a way of exploring the concept of marginalization through economy, ecology and

politics, as a combination of these three showed how marginalization occurred. They sought

to show how marginalization was both a result and a cause of land degradations, and wanted

to offer new ways of explaining the process that leads to degradation and impoverishment

among the poor (Robbins 2004: 76, 77). Moreover, Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) introduced

the chain of explanation, which seeks to show why communities are marginalized in

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exploring series of events, situations and relations, and how they affect each other. In this way,

it also seeks to find root causes of (environmental) problems.

Watts (1983) was another important contributor in the 1980s. Following the Sahelian famines

in the aftermath of the heavy droughts of the 1970s, Watts (1983) linked the crisis to political

economy and economic and social transition taken place through time, rather than seeing only

ecological explanations (Robbins 2004: 77). He found that although drought was a climatic

problem, the following famine was a social problem. This was an important argument and

contributed to crystallize the field of political ecology. Finally, Bassett (1988) contributed to

this in explaining farmer-herder conflicts as contextual responses that had to be seen in

relation to other factors (see chapter 2.3). He identified different causes behind such conflicts,

showing how external structures and events were crucial in understanding the whole picture.

This early neo-Marxist influenced political ecology had a firm hold also through the 1980s,

but towards the end of this decade, it started to receive critique for not understanding complex

political, economic or cultural processes, for being too narrow in its focus on class/ economy

analysis, and for not being able to “say something meaningful about the biophysical

environment” (Bryant 2001: 154). Post-Marxist political ecology hence emerged as a critique

and alternative. 3 Post-Marxist political ecology was according to Bryant (2001) more varied

and fragmented, less economically preoccupied, and more ‘political’ in its essence. It was

heavily influenced by feminism,4 and especially post-structuralism (see chapter 2.1), including

post-colonialism. Post-colonialism seeks to rethink knowledge invented and authorized by

Western colonial powers, and refers to domination and unequal power relations (Peet and

Hartwick 1999: 132, Said 1978, Foucault 1980). The challenge is hence not only to explain

dominating theories and views, but also to rewrite history from the point of view of the

colonized rather than of the colonizer (Robbins 2004: 63, 64).

This is closely related to political ecology’s goals of challenging dominating environmental

discourses and showing how power relations are reinforced in these and manifested by 3 Political ecology has also more recently been criticized, especially from internal stands. Most importantly it has received critique for being either too political or too ecological (Walker 2005, 2006). Two prominent critics of political ecology are Vayda and Walters (1999), who assert that political ecology is too political and predetermined, and that it has become ‘politics without ecology’ in contrast to what it in its first place sought to challenge; ‘ecology without politics’ (Vayda and Walters 1999: 168). Peet and Watts (1996) argue, in contrast to this, that political ecology has not gone far enough in its critique; they call in fact for more politics. 4 Largely related is the field of eco-feminism, which combines ecology and gender issues (see Agarwal 1992, Shiva 1989, Shiva and Mies 1993).

23

powerful actors (Robbins 2004, Bryant 2001). One of the main contributors in bringing post-

colonialism into political ecology was Arturo Escobar, who, like Foucault, argues that

knowledge creates power (Peet and Hartwick 1999: 129- 145, Escobar 1995, Foucalt 1980).

Post-structural political ecology uses discourse analysis to explore the “’social construction’

of nature” (Bryant 2001: 162). With this post-structural turn, political ecologists began to look

at powerful actors and their control of politics, economics and power in relation to the

environment. Famines for instance were now more linked to export-oriented production than

population growth, and a structural, systematic subordination of the poor became a clear issue

for political ecologists (Bryant 2001: 161, 163). Bryant (2001: 166) concludes that post-

structural political ecology offers a stronger understanding of the complex human

environment interactions, and according to Peluso and Watts (2001: 25), political ecology

today, in sum, encompasses the elements and structures of culture, power, political economy,

discourse and history.

2.5.2 The relevance of political ecology as framework for this study:

Political ecology stands basically as the opposite of apolitical ecology, which holds that the

environment is natural and non-touched by political or economic processes, and not affected

by any power relations. In particular, apolitical ecologists claim to be neutral and non-political

in their views on the environment. Apolitical ecology can loosely be defined as ecology

without context, and it typically sees the environment as neutral and objective (Robbins 2004:

5). Nature is seen as distinct from society and thus ahistorical. Examples of typical apolitical

ecological approaches are eco-scarcity and the Tragedy of the Commons thesis, as discussed

in chapter 2.2.1. These views regard the environment as separate from political and economic

processes, and political ecology offers an alternative to and seeks to challenge such views.

Political ecology seeks to critically see the environment through a more contextual approach

of political, historical and societal processes, it sees the nature as power-laden, and it focuses

on multi-level connections, structures and actors in the environment and among decision-

makers and hierarchies of power (Robbins 2004, Bryant 2001: 167, Adger et. al. 2001: 682).

Political ecology hence identifies broader systems rather than local, and sees history, power

economics and politics as essential in explaining environmental processes, relations and

management. According to Robbins (2004: 12), political ecology in sum i) describes

“empirical, research-based explorations to explain linkages in the condition and change of

social/ environmental systems, with explicit consideration of relations of power,” ii) seeks to

24

find causes rather than symptoms of environmental and social problems, and iii) not only

stresses how environmental systems are political in their essence, but also how political

systems and economy influence the environment. Accordingly, political ecology attempts to

do two things at the same time, “critically explaining what is wrong with dominant accounts

of environmental change, while at the same time exploring alternatives, adaptations, and

creative human action in the face of mismanagement and exploitation” (Robbins 2004: 12).

In my view, political ecology therefore offers a suitable framework for analysing

environmental discourse and narratives, such as environmental security and the Sahelian crisis

narrative. Peet and Watts (1996) argue that such analysis is central in political ecology, and

emphasizes the importance of using a socio-historical context in environmental research. Also

Stott and Sullivan (2000: 2) emphasize this, and say that political ecology is “a concern with

tracing the genealogy of identifying power relationships supported by such narratives.” Based

on this, I find political ecology a good approach for analyzing farmer-herder conflicts. Indeed,

as Bassett (1988: 455) argues: “A weakness of human ecological analysis of peasant-herder

conflicts is their failure to address sufficiently the politics of land use.”

2.6 The environmental security thesis

It is today widely believed that climate change, global warming and environmental problems

will bring enormous challenges to the earth and its population in the coming years. Climate

change has in accordance to this increasingly been presented as a security problem. Many

countries and organizations, including the UN, have drawn direct linkages between climate

and security issues and placed climate change as a priority issue on their security agendas

(Busby 2008, Nordås and Gleditsch 2007: 628). In a report produced for the Pentagon,

Schwartz and Randall (2003: 15) concluded that “as abrupt climate change lowers the world’s

carrying capacity aggressive wars are likely to be fought over food, water, and energy.”

Moreover, they argued that there will be severe conflict scenarios, based on among others

streams of refugees, energy and natural resources (Schwartz and Randall 2003: 17). Indeed, in

the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize speech, Mjøs (2007) stated that “[a] goal in our modern world

must be to maintain “human security” in the broadest sense. Environmental problems

certainly affect human security in this broad sense” (Mjøs 2007). This has made conflict and

climate two problems presumed to require the same solutions:

25

The double-headed problem of climate change and violent conflict thus has a unified solution –

peace building and adaptation are effectively the same kind of activity, involving the same kinds

of methods of dialogue and social engagement, requiring from governments the same values of

inclusivity and transparency (Smith and Vivekananda 2007: 4).

2.6.1 Historical roots of the environmental security thesis:

The argument that resource scarcity leads to conflict has its roots in Malthusian ideas seeing a

mismatch between population and available resources, creating a resource scarcity that causes

a ‘scramble’ for resources, leading eventually to violent conflict. Moreover, the thesis builds

on popular theories developed by among others the arch-pessimist’ Paul Ehrlich’s (1968)

“Population bomb” claiming that humans already have stripped out the earth’s resources

(Homer-Dixon 1999: 28). In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a growing attention and interest

towards environmental concerns, and the environmental security literature emerged. When the

Cold War ended, there was suddenly a huge military capacity and surplus, and there was

almost a ‘need for finding’ a new threat against international security (Peluso and Watts 2001:

11). 5 The environment and security field became a well-funded academic and policy

enterprise (Hartmann 2001: 39), and as Peluso and Watts (2001: 11) argue; “[e]nvironmental

degradation was, in short, good for military business.” Environmental problems were in the

post cold war environment in many cases ‘exploited’ to increase military power, in this

linking the environment (especially conservation of nature), with security issues. The political

and economic climate was hospitable, as there no longer was a cold war to be concerned

about. Moreover, ecology, politics and climate were all ‘suitable’ issues in the global policy in

this period, and the link between them was for many scholars and policymakers short.

2.6.2 The argument:

The environmental security thesis stands in the forefront for placing links between

environmental scarcity and violent conflict, and its ideas are widely influential among policy

makers and scholars within fields of environmental issues, today increasingly in the climate

change debate. In the 1990s, two main research institutions in this field emerged, based at i)

the University of Toronto, named the Environmental Change and Acute Conflict Project

(ECACP), also known as the Toronto Group, led by Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994, 1995, 1999),

and ii) the Swiss Peace Foundation, also known as the Environment and Conflict Project

(ENCOP) led by Günther Baechler (1999). These two schools both focused on how

5 See also Huntington, Samuel (1996) on Islamic terrorism and ethnic war as the new threat.

26

environmental change and stress can (and will) lead to conflict. The latter had a more

profound focus on migration as a conflict trigger, but their answers were largely the same; i)

environmental scarcity is a key factor in generating conflict, ii) scarcity of land and water is

more likely to be a conflict trigger than climate change in itself (this view has however

changed somewhat the last few years), iii) increased resource scarcity and the conflicts it

generates, presents a much bigger threat than previously assumed, iv) this will raise serious

international security concerns, v) international wars over resources are unlikely, but it is

likely that migration will lead to group identity conflicts, vi) inequality will cause insurgency

and coups, and vii) there are many causal factors, but scarcity is a deep-rooted cause, not just

an intervening variable (Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994, Baechler 1999).

In sum, the environmental security thesis holds that resources will cause conflict in several

ways, predominantly if they are scarce.6 This link is basically founded in the negative effects

climate change is expected to have on natural resources, making competition over them

harder and eventually conflictual (Baechler 1999, Homer-Dixon 1994, 1999, 2007, Kahl 2006,

Klare 2006). Based on these changes, shifts of power balances are believed to take place,

while streams of ‘climate refugees’ will migrate into other areas in search for arable land,

water, or because they are forced to flee as natural disasters have ruined their settlements (Ban

2007, Homer-Dixon 1991: 77, 1995, Salehyan 2008: 315). Baechler (1999: xv) concludes

among others that “there is ample evidence for correlations between rural poverty,

environmental stress in rural arenas, and discriminated access to resources.” Moreover, he

argues that “environmentally caused violence” will be found in domestic arenas, not between

states (Baechler 1999: xv).

Homer-Dixon is by far one of the most influential scholars in this area. His thoughts are

concerned about resource scarcity, environmental change and violent conflict, and although to

some extent controversial, his ideas have had huge impacts on policy makers and the public

around the world. Being a former advisor for the Clinton administration in the U.S., and

having published amounts of articles and books, his main argument is that “scarcities of […]

resources – especially cropland, freshwater, and forests – contribute to violence in many parts

of the world,” and that these scarcities “can generate severe social stresses within countries,

helping to stimulate subnational insurgencies, ethnic clashes and urban unrest” (Homer-Dixon

6 A large body of research also suggests that natural resource abundance is a conflict trigger, for instance in being a motive for insurgency or in financing rebellions, see e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 1998, Ross 2004.

27

1999: 12). Homer-Dixon (1999) defines environmental scarcity as the sum of the dynamic

interactions of three sources of scarcity, namely i) supply-induced scarcity, caused by

environmental degradation, ii) demand-induced scarcity, caused by population growth, and iii)

structural-induced scarcity, caused by an unequal distribution of resources. Homer-Dixon

(1991: 106- 9, 1994: 8- 9) sees three types of conflict that can arise from the different types of

resource scarcity he presents.

Figure 1: Sources and consequences of environmental scarcity (based on Homer-Dixon 1994: 31).

The first conflict scenario Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994) presents, is simple scarcity conflicts,

caused by degradation of land, which further, according to him, results in loss of agriculture

and impoverishment. Such conflicts are caused by either i) a supply-induced scarcity,

implying that there are simply not enough resources because they are degraded or destroyed,

or ii) a demand-induced scarcity meaning that the demand is higher than the availability,

caused by population growth. When population increases, the demand for resources will rise

and conflict break out when competition extends. Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994) argues that

there will be an increased pressure on agriculture when population grows, and this will cause

both a decrease in production and economic decline. “[r]eduction in the quantity or quality of

a resource shrinks the resource pie, while population growth divides the pie into smaller slices

for each individual” (Homer-Dixon 1994: 9). This can further lead to population displacement

and disruption of legitimized institutions and social relations (Homer-Dixon 1994, 1995). In

contrast to supply-induced scarcity, which means that availability of resources is limited and

usually declining, this view holds that the demand is too high. Homer-Dixon (1991) sees land

degradation as the potentially most threatening environmental change, because this can cause

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decrease in agriculture, which he believes is likely to lead to impoverishment. Moreover, he

says that the social effects of environmental scarcity, such as lower agricultural productivity,

can lead to “objective socio-economic deprivation and, in turn, raise the level of grievance in

the affected population” (Homer-Dixon and Percival 1995).

The second scenario Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994) sees, is group identity conflicts, caused by

clashes between different (ethnic) groups who have been forced to migrate into other areas as

their home territories have been destroyed by environmental change, or because their

agricultural or pastoral land have been degraded or impoverished (see also Reuveny 2007).

Finally Homer-Dixon states that also social structures and economic decline can trigger

conflicts, based on poverty or impoverishment, or more often unequal distribution. This, he

says, can lead to relative deprivation conflicts (Homer-Dixon 1994, 1995). This is linked to a

structural-induced scarcity, meaning scarcity caused by structural problems, like resource

distribution. In 1999, Homer-Dixon added another two possible conflict triggers to these,

namely iv) disputes arising from direct local environmental degradation, like dam building,

logging or factory emissions, and v) conflicts between the North and the South over

adaptation to or compensation for global environmental problems caused by climate change,

global warming and related issues (Homer-Dixon 1999: 5).

Homer-Dixon (1995) says that poor countries will be the first to experience conflict caused by

environmental degradation. This, he says, is first of all because poverty is a hindrance for

acquiring sufficient capital for finding solutions to environmental problems, hence there will

be a destruction of the resources as management lacks, and this will accordingly lead to

poverty. He further argues that poor countries are even harder struck because they do not have

the means to curb population growth, which will lead to more resource stress. As human

populations grow and environmental damage progresses, in line with the Malthusian chorus,

policymakers will have less and less capacity to intervene. Finally, he says that poor countries

will suffer the most from environmental stress, because they are already poor, and will be

most affected by environmental impoverishment (decrease in agriculture). He do, however,

emphasize that the problems also will affect the industrialized world by threatening trade

interests and economic relations, by provoking distress migration and by destabilizing

“pivotal” countries in the developing world (Homer-Dixon 1999: 12).

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3.0 Contextual background: setting the scene

I will in the following introduce the contextual background of this study. I will first outline

the geography and ecology of Mali and the inland Niger delta, before I present a history of

land tenure system and political administration in the area. Here I will also include a brief

presentation of the decentralization processes of the 1990s. Finally, I will present the case

study area, including the villages, the land use system, development interventions in the area,

and lastly, the conflict of this case study, including the circumstances surrounding it.

3.1 Geography and topography

The area in which this study was carried out, is the inland Niger delta in Mali, in the Mopti

region.7 The Republic of Mali, as indicated in figure 2 and 3, is a large landlocked country,

covering 1 240 192 km². It is situated in West Africa, and borders Algeria, Niger, Burkina

Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal and Mauritania (CIA World Factbook 2009).

Figure 2 and 3: Map of Africa highlighting Mali’s geographical location8 and map of Mali.9

7 For extensive information on the inland Niger delta, see Gallais (1967). 8 Pickatrail, http://www.pickatrail.com/jupiter/location/africa/map/mali.gif (19.05.09). 9 CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html (01.04.09).

30

Mali is one of the poorest nations in the world, ranked number 168 out of 175 on the United

Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index (UNDP 2008). Moreover,

about half of Mali’s population are less than 15 years old, and the fertility rate is 6.6 children

born per woman. Life expectancy for male Malians is 48 years old (DHS 2008, CIA World

Factbook 2009). There are about 12, 6 million inhabitants in Mali, although the exact number

is uncertain (CIA World Factbook 2009). Approximately 90 % are Muslim, whilst the rest are

Christian or traditional animists. There are many ethnic groups and sub-groups in Mali,

whereas around 37 % of the population is Bambara – making this the largest single ethnic

group in the country. The Soninké, Malinké and Bambara all belong to the larger group of

Mandé, which constitutes around half of the country’s population. The next largest group in

Mali is the Fulani (Fulße, also called Peul), making up about 14 % of the total population, and

being the largest group in the Mopti region (see chapter 3.2). Other significant ethnic groups

in Mali are the Senufo, Dogon, Bozo, Songhai and the two desert nomadic groups Tuareg and

Moor. More than 40 languages are spoken in Mali, in addition to the official language French.

About 80 % speak Bambara, and in the Mopti region, most people speak Fulfulde, which is

the language of the Fulani. The country has a peaceful history compared to most African

countries (Library of Congress 2005). However, smaller tensions between herding groups and

farming groups exists, as well as the more known Tuareg rebellion that took place during the

1990s.10

Mali is relatively flat, but there are some hilly plateaus (200- 500 meters high) in the north,

and mountains up to 1000 meters in the northeast (Library of Congress 2005). The country

stretches from the arid vast desert of Sahara in the north, through the semi-arid Sahel belt, to

more cultivated savannah areas in the south. It is estimated that 25 % of Mali lies within the

Saharan zone, while the Sahel covers about 50 % of the country (ODEM 1987). The word

Sahel derives from the Arabic work ‘sahil’ which means ‘shore’ (Herrmann et. al. 2005: 394).

This marks the physical divide between Africa’s sub-humid southern savannah and the

northern arid desert, as well as also being a cultural divide. The Sahel is “a semi-arid belt of

barren, sandy and rock-strewn land,” stretching 3 860 km across the African continent from

Senegal to Sudan, covering more than 3 million km² (IRIN 2008). It is estimated that around

58 million people live in the Sahel, most of them being subsistence farmers (IRIN 2008).

10 On the Tuareg rebellion, see Benjamisen 2008.

31

Figure 4: Map of the West African Sahelian zone, defined according to annual average rainfall.11

Droughts and inadequate supply of water are common problems in Mali. In spite of this,

around 70 % of Mali’s population is engaged in agriculture, and agriculture makes up about

46 % of the country’s GDP. The main agricultural products in Mali are maize, cotton, millet,

ground nuts, rice, sugar cane, vegetables and sorghum, whilst cotton, gold, livestock and

ground nuts are the main export products (Library of Congress 2005, ODEM 1987).

Agriculture is possible in this dry country largely due to the river Niger, which, together with

the smaller river Bani, creates a large and fertile inland delta.

3.2 Ecology and livelihoods in the inland Niger delta

The inland Niger delta is the largest wetland area in West Africa, annually covering a 30 000

km² floodplain (Ba 2008: 26). It is essential for cultivation in Mali, covering about 70 % of

the country’s arable and irrigated land, and it is a vital source of food, mainly rice and fish, as

well as fresh water and irrigation. Due to the highly nutritious pastoral fodder plant burgu

(Echinochloa stagnina), which grows here, the delta also hosts about 50 % of the country’s

livestock during the dry season (November to May) (Cotula 2008). Thirty percent of Mali’s

export income is based on livestock production (ODEM 1987).

11 Obtained from Benjaminsen, Tor A. (16.06.09).

32

The ecology in the delta is shaped by seasonal cycles. The floodplain is mostly covered by

water from October to January (although this is a gradual process following the seasonal

climate), and amount of local and upstream rainfall during the rainy season (June to October)

is crucial for the size of land flooded (Moorehead 1998). This season-based ecology makes up

the livelihood for the delta’s inhabitants, who can be identified through three groups; i) fishers

of the Bozo, Somono and Sorko groups, ii) Fulani pastoralists, and iii) farmers of the Markas,

Bambara and Bobo groups, and also from the Fulani Rimaybé group (Ba 2008: 26).

Additionally, there is a mix of groups, like agro-pastoralists, farmer fishers etc (Cotula 2008,

Ba 2008: 28). The area, in which this study was carried out, is predominantly inhabited by

Fulani people. The Fulani are mostly pastoralists or agro-pastoralists, and have a long history

all over West Africa. The Fulani extend east as far as Sudan and south as far as Cameroon

(Wæhle 2009). The Fulani consists of Rimbé and Rimaybé. Traditionally, the Rimbé were

noble Fulani concerned with pastoralism, providing floodplain land to subordinates – the

Rimaybé – who hence became occupied with agriculture.12 Due to this sub-ordinance, the

Rimaybé are nowadays called ‘the former slaves’ on an oral basis (Moorehead 1991).

The pastoral system in the area is based on the practice of transhumance, which is an annual

movement of livestock to larger grazing areas,13 in combination with dryland pastures during

the rainy season. Fulani pastoralists go on transhumance in June- July (when the rainy season

and harvesting period begins), and return when the dry season has begun and harvesting is

over, around December. There are specific rules on this movement, concerning actual dates

for leaving and returning, and also specific routes for livestock movement. The length of the

pastoral migration among the Fulani in the inland Niger delta varies from 40 – 500 km (one

way) annually (Turner 1999: 105), and they often go northeast to Burkina Faso or northwest

to Mauritania (Cotula 2008). In addition to the transhumant herders, there are also agro-

pastoralists (or sedentary herders), who keep (part of) their cattle for milk supply also during

the rainy season, and there are specific grazing areas set apart for this purpose (Beeler 2006).

The people and livelihoods in the delta hence make up a matrix of different production

systems. Mostly paddy rice, millet, sorghum and some vegetables are grown, in addition to

the burgu, which like paddy rice grows in water, only deeper.

12 Today, this division is modified, and there seems to be a trend that Rimaybé are now growing more powerful than their former leaders from the Rimbé (see e.g. Benjaminsen and Ba 2009). 13 A useful definition of transhumance is “regular seasonal movements of livestock between well-defined pasture areas (dry to wet season, or low to highland)” (Niamir-Fuller 1999: 1).

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3.3 A history of land use system and political administration

The land tenure system in the delta builds on the principles introduced by the Fulani warriors

called Ardobé, in the 14th century (Ba 2008: 28). The Ardobé held a high position in the delta

society. They founded the leyde (sing. leydy), which are traditional pastoral management units.

The leyde are floodplain plots of pastoral zones, controlled by the jowros (Turner 1992: vii,

Legrosse 1999: 78). The jowros were pastoral chiefs chosen by the Ardobé among the noble

Fulani (the Rimbé) to manage these leyde. The jowro were in charge of the pastures in the

area, being ‘owners of grass’ (Benjaminsen and Ba 2009: 73). Today the jowros are basically

in charge of regulating pastoral access to the burgu pastures in the delta.

The Ardobé held power in the area until 1818, when Islamic clergymen led by Sékou

Amadou made their entrance (Turner 1992: 21- 24). Sékou Amadou founded the Dina

Empire based in Hamdallahi, which is south of Mopti town (Ba 2008: 27). The Dina Empire

formalised much of the land tenure system introduced by the Ardobé, among others Sékou

Amadou formally granted authority to the jowros to manage the leyde, he defined the rights

to burgu fields, and he also established livestock entry routes called burtols. This was done to

distinguish farmers’ and herders’ land, and to prevent them from going on each others fields

(Moorehead 1991). These burtols range from well-defined paths less than 50 metres wide, to

broad zones between pastoral encampment cites (Turner 1992: 230). The Dina administration

also introduced the bessema, who became chiefs of the Rimaybé farmers and in charge of

agricultural land. Village chiefs (jomsaré) were appointed to be in charge of administrative

tasks (Benjaminsen and Ba 2009: 74). The Dina system eventually made up a hierarchy that

made the pastoral economy predominant over farming and fishing, and the pastoral Fulani

grew powerful as the system evolved. This also provided a shift from permanently mobile

groups towards more sedentary communities (Moorehead 1991: 186). The Dina code is today

seen as part of the customary law in Mali, and “a great product of African pre-colonial state

formation” (Benjaminsen and Ba 2009: 74). The pastoral system invented by the Ardobé and

sustained by the Dina, is still practiced in the inland Niger delta.

By 1893, however, the French had conquered the area, and in 1895 the colony of French

Sudan was founded. The French adopted the land system established by the Dina to a certain

degree, and introduced the administrative unit cercle, which was headed by a commandant,

governing directly under the colonial government (Hetland 2000: 49). The cercle was sub-

34

divided into subdivisions, which again were composed of cantons in farmer districts, and

tribus among the pastoralists. The leaders of these were chosen out of a range of local leaders

(jowros or bessemas, for instance), still governing under the colonial administration. The

French colonial system did however also introduce Roman law, which became the formal

law, while the Dina code continued to define what was perceived as customary law

(Benjaminsen and Ba 2009, Benjaminsen 1997: 133). Nonetheless, the French did by no

means preserve the pre-colonial system. Indeed, according to Moorehead (1991), they

destroyed […] the centralised Dina system […] though it continued to rule through the

administrative districts set up early in the 19th century. The ‘eminent’ power in the region was

now composed, and worked in the interests of a foreign nation which […] was ignorant of

their traditions and history (Moorehead 1991: 209).

In this way the French broke the link between the Rimaybé and the Rimbé, “so altering the

relationships through which pastoral managers managed floodplain pastures both for their

grazing and cereal production” (Moorehead 1991: 209). Also, the colonial officers gave away

‘vacant land’ to individuals, to assure a productive use of this land instead of it being, in their

eyes, underutilized (Moorehead 1991: 197). When Mali gained its independence in 1960, the

first president, Modibo Keita, held a close tie with the Eastern bloc, and adopted socialist

ideas. Pastoralism was regarded backwards, “economically irrational” and a hindrance for

industrialization and modernization (Benjaminsen 1997: 123, Benjaminsen and Berge 2004).

The socialist government saw the jowros as feudal landlords, and worked to undermine their

authority (Benjaminsen and Ba 2009: 74). The Land Code of 1986 (Code dominal et foncier)

acknowledged property rights only to individual land owners, and customary land rights were

only defined as use rights. In 2000, these laws were reinterpreted by a new Land Ordinance

(Ordonnance du 22 Mars 2000 portant code domanial et foncier), which focuses on the

value of land productivity, which in practice means agriculture. Pastoral land tenure and land

tenure conflicts remain unaddressed in these laws, something which is an important shortage

(Benjaminsen and Ba 2009: 75, 80). Although the jowros’ authority was somewhat

rehabilitated during the military dictatorship in the years between 1968- 1991, the

pastoralists’ position has, just as in many other parts of Africa, in general gradually declined.

After 1991, when Moussa Traoré was overthrown, decentralization and democracy were the

two most prominent topics on the national political agenda in Mali. Decentralization was

35

very much in line with international donor politics at this time; especially the World Bank

not only encouraged, but to some degree imposed, decentralization (Hetland 2000,

Benjaminsen 1997). The development and progress of local democracy was especially

important; power and decision-making had been centred in Bamako since independence, and

development of local political, social, economic and cultural environments was now aimed.

The processes of decision-making were restructured and should now take place at local levels.

This meant that the people themselves should be responsible for their own progress (Hetland

2000). The decentralization reforms recognized the commune as the administrative units

direct under the cercle. The communes were supposed to be ‘closer’ to the people. This

meant that administration should be on the commune’s own costs, and that there should be a

co-operation between the state and the lower administrative levels (Benjaminsen 1997). As

will be discussed, this partly led to a decline in governmental presence in the rural areas.

Figure 5 and 6: Map of regions and cercles in Mali highlighting Mopti cercle,14 and map of Mopti cercle

showing the location of the communes, including Kounary located in the central area of the cercle.15

14 Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/77/Cercle_of_Mopti.png/300px-Cercle_of_Mopti.png (01.04.09). 15 Obtained from Direction Nationale de la Statistique et de l’Informatique (1998).

36

Mali is today divided into nine administrative regions, including the capital region of Bamako,

and Mopti is the fifth region, situated in central Mali (see figure 5). Each region is sub-

divided into five to nine districts, the cercles (Library of Congress 2005). Each cercle again,

is sub-divided into communes. Communes are moreover sub-divided into rural and urban

communes, whereas the rural ones consist of villages and the urban ones are made up by

quartiers. Communes are headed by mayors while the villages are headed by village chiefs.

Additionally, there are 31 leyde in the inland Niger delta (Legrosse 1999: 78).

3.4 Description of study area and case

Kounary commune is located in central Mopti cercle, about 25 kilometres northeast of Mopti

town. Kounary has about 13 500 inhabitants, and covers approximately 405 km² (CIPEA

1983 referred to in Benjaminsen and Ba 2009, Direction Nationale de la Statistique et de

l’Informatique 1998). Kounary is located in the outskirts of the delta, meaning that the

floodplain does not cover the whole commune. The villages involved in this study are

Guirowel and Karbaye, both situated in the commune and leydy of Kounary on the edge of the

floodplain on the eastern side of the river Niger (about 6 km), where Guirowel is located

southeastwards from the latter (see figure 7). The villages are located approximately one

kilometre from each other. Both villages are inhabited by both farmers and herders, and some

fishermen, but traditionally, and predominantly, Guirowel is a herding village inhabited by

Fulani people, and Karbaye is a farming village, where the majority is Malinké. The latter is

the smallest, with approximately 400 inhabitants, while Guirowel is home to about 1070

people (informant M1 and Direction Nationale de la Statistique et de l’Informatique 1998).

The head of Kounary commune is Manaco, which is inhabited by both farmers and herders.

Traditionally, both farmers and herders have had customary rights to use the land surrounding

the villages. In addition to Karbaye and Guirowel, also people from predominantly Manaco,

but also Daka-Womina, Tiroguel and Missila have used the land. Rice and millet have been

grown on separate fields as well as herders have grazed their cattle on burgu fields, all at

different times in line with seasonal cycles. A burtol runs from Guirowel past Karbaye, and is

used by the Fulani herders when they take their cattle on transhumance. This burtol is about

150 metres wide, and has been in use since Sékou Amadou created it in the 1800s. It has

traditionally been, and still is, an important part of Fulani tradition.

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Figure 7: Resource map of study area (based on sketches from informants in the field).

3.4.1 Land use and development interventions in Kounary:

Due to its proximity to the urban centres of Mopti and Sévaré, there has been high pressure on

land for many years in Kounary, and several national development interventions, especially

on agricultural production, has taken place here since the 1970s. The Office Riz Mopti (ORM,

earlier known as Opération Riz Mopti) was, with World Bank funding, established in 1972

(Benjaminsen and Ba 2009: 75). This was part of a larger national development initiative

aiming at increasing agricultural production, especially in the aftermath of the major droughts

of the 1970s and 1980s. ORM’s work included a re-organizing of land, by transforming large

areas into rice fields. This expansion of rice fields took place mostly by the building of

irrigation systems and dikes to control and distribute water out to several smaller plots

covering 1 hectare each. These plots are open for all Malians to apply for, and the price for

renting is 30 000 CFA (about 50 euro) per hectare per year.

ORM made its entrance in Kounary in 1977, when they established a casier rizicole outside

the village of Karbaye.16 This casier is 900 hectares large, and was traditionally a burgu area

16 Casiers are large zones of land set aside for specific purposes, mostly pastoral grazing (on casier pastorals) or rice cultivation (on casier rizicoles).

38

established during the Dina Empire. This area was pastoral grazing land for the dry season (as

the cattle are in transhumance during the rainy season and harvesting period). The land is

however quite far from the river Niger, and did in the 1970s not get flooded adequately,

because of the droughts. ORM thus regarded this area as now underutilized, and confiscated

the land to create a casier rizicole there. ORM built dikes and canals to irrigate remote areas

such as this casier, and hence made it possible to harvest rice there, not only once, but twice a

year. They also provided training in rice cultivation and distributed fertilizers. Moreover, the

dikes prevented the rice from being destroyed by fish.

Another national development initiative founded by the World Bank was the support of

organizations promoting livestock production. Opération de Développement de l’Élevage

dans la région de Mopti (ODEM) was established in 1975. ODEM was concerned with

livestock problems, pastoral development and to restore ecological equilibrium (Benjaminsen

and Ba 2009 : 75, de Bruijn and van Dijk 1995: 465). Due to the fact that herders’ had no

place to take their cattle after ORM established a rice field in their grazing area, ORM, in

cooperation with ODEM, once again intervened in the land tenure system in Kounary in 1984.

Acknowledging the herders’ problems, they re-transformed the casier rizicole into a casier

pastoral. Three casier pastorals were established in Mopti cercle at this time; in Kounary,

Ibetime and Souforlay (informant E12). The casier that was established in Kounary, was a

restoring of the burgu area that had been in use since Dina, still covering about 900 hectares.17

In April 2001, Karbaye got help from the Canadian International Development Agency

(CIDA) to create a pond. This project was more specifically carried out under the

Environmental Rehabilitation and Food Security Project (RESA), which was an overall

program that carried out rural development projects. Several RESA projects were carried out

in Mopti cercle up to 2006 (in the communes of Kounary, Bassirou, Sio and Fatoma). Based

on various analyses of socio-economic contexts and living conditions in the local

communities, the RESA projects had a focus on environment, food security and reinforcement

of the decentralized structures of the villages. The aims of these projects were to support a

sustainable management of natural resources in order to improve the living condition of the

population. According to CIDA, the RESA projects achieved among others an increase in

agricultural production and improved water availability in these areas.

17 ODEM’s work was however technocratic and top-down, and the results were disappointing. ODEM was hence ended in 1991 (Shanmugaratnam et. al. 1992: 22, de Bruijn and van Dijk 1995: 471).

39

The creation of the pond in Karbaye (see figure 7) was a rehabilitation of a pond that had

always been there, but had become drier after the 1970s and 1980s droughts. Traditionally,

the pond had been used for brick production (for house building) and for household

consumption purposes, and was used by all the surrounding villages, mostly Karbaye and

Guirowel, due to their proximity to it. The herders had also traditionally let their cattle drink

from it. When Karbaye wanted a rehabilitation of the pond, the surrounding villages (Karbaye,

Guirowel, Manaco, Tiroguel, Daka-Womina and Missila) agreed on carrying out the project,

on the conditions that everyone should get to use the pond. According to CIDA and my

informants, several consultations and meetings were held in advance of the project

implementation. Those who participated in these meetings were representatives from all the

villages, the sous-préfet 18 of Kounary, Fatoma and Bassirou, and the mayor of Kounary

(neither the mayor nor the sous-préfet of the time are in position today).

According to CIDA, the pond was created in land that belonged to Karbaye. However, the

pond was built on the edge of the casier pastoral, on the village border of Karbaye, and very

close to the burtol, hence it occupied some of the herders’ land. Most of my informants (both

key stakeholders in Kounary and informants from Guirowel, and even several informants

from Karbaye), said that the pond was created in “the middle of the casier pastoral.” Some

also claim that it is “in the middle of the burtol.” According to my informants, the herders

accepted these inconveniences on the conditions that they too were allowed to use it.

Moreover, the purpose of the pond should according to CIDA be agriculture (fruit and

vegetable farming) and drinking source for cattle.19 According to the leader of the communal

group Association Bomani, 20 however, it was specifically agreed on beforehand that no fruit

cultivation should take place. It is difficult to know which of these statements that are correct.

My informants also largely disagree on what the purpose of the pond should be (as outlined in

chapter 3.4.1). Nonetheless, Karbaye paid half of the costs, while the remaining villages paid

the other half (through Association Bomani). Total costs were about 200 000 CFA (about 340

18 The head of the communes of Kounary, Bassirou and Fatoma, functioning above the mayor. 19 The purposes and usage of the pond should according to CIDA be clarified in a convention and signed by all the involved parts and beneficiaries. It is however not clear whether this happened or not, none of my informants said anything about such a process, and CIDA only said that this “should” happen, without me succeeding in obtaining more information on that specific issue. 20 Association Bomani work for herders’ and fishers’ rights, and consists of three representatives from each of the villages surrounding the traditional casier pastoral; Manaco, Guirowel, Missila, Daka-Womina and Tiroguel. Association Bomani was the group who were given the responsibility of managing the dikes and casier pastoral when ORM withdrew from the projects in 1998 (see chapter 5.1.3).

40

euro). According to my informants, men from Karbaye carried out the physical construction

of the pond, technically assisted and supported by RESA.21

3.4.2 The conflict between Karbaye and Guirowel in 2001:

Early morning on August 6th 2001, four months after the pond was finished, a violent conflict

erupted between farmers from Karbaye and herders from Guirowel. Three to five people were

killed and 15- 30 were injured when a group of young men from Karbaye attacked Fulani

herders when they came from Guirowel to let their cattle to drink from the pond.22 The men

from Karbaye waited with rifles, knives and sticks, and opened fire when the herders came

close to the borders of their village. The herders had nothing but their sticks to defend

themselves with, and most of the killed and injured were herders from Guirowel. The conflict

itself lasted for approximately 30 minutes. The conflict took place just outside Karbaye, on

the burtol, only 20- 30 metres from the casier pastoral. This land was also the subject of the

conflict, as there was a discontent and smouldering anger among both farmers and herders,

who both regarded the land as solely theirs. Each year after 1984, when the casier became

pastoral, there were tensions between farmers and herders during the rainy season, and every

year they were worried a conflict would burst. These tensions never degenerated, but the

situation worsened after the creation of the pond. After the pond was finished, farmers from

Karbaye started to cultivate vegetables and fruits in large gardens on the northern shore of the

pond. The farmers hence meant that the herders should stay away from this area because the

cattle destroyed the gardens, while the herders claimed their right to use both the burtol and

pond. The gardens grew deeper into the casier pastoral and the burtol, and the herders were

dissatisfied, as larger and larger areas of their land became occupied by the farmers. The

farmers, on their side, said it would be a waste to not utilize the land, and claimed they had to

take advantage of all the possibilities they had to secure food.

In the weeks before the conflict in 2001, there were rumours that Karbaye had begun to

procure weapons, and many people were afraid something would happen. The day before the

conflict, men from Manaco, Guirowel and Karbaye, as well as local officials, gathered in a

meeting to solve the disagreements over the land use. The meeting seemingly calmed the

21 All the information where I have referred to CIDA in this section is obtained from e-mail correspondence with one employee at the Mali program at CIDA based in Canada. This correspondence took place in June- August 2009. I have not succeeded in obtaining more information on the project in Kounary, as most of the persons who were involved in the project no longer are available. 22 No one knew the exact numbers, because many of the injured died in hospital later, and because especially Karbaye have been reluctant to admit anyone from their village died.

41

tensions, but none of the involved parts accepted the negotiations. The day after the meeting,

the conflict burst. Some of my key informants emphasize that this was an incident caused by a

storm in a teacup. Those who attacked the herders were young and frustrated men, and it is

possible that the procurement of weapons was only to threaten, or not at all related to the

disagreements with the herders. Anyhow, the tragic incident was a fact.

The two involved villages largely disagree on what happened before, especially during, and

also after the conflict. It is however little doubt that it was farmers from Karbaye who

attacked the herders from Guirowel (Ba 2008). The common story from informants in

Guirowel was typically “They waited for us in the bushes when we came with our animals

that morning, and suddenly they started shooting. Many people and cattle were injured and

some also died.” One herder in Guirowel told me: “The farmers do not accept that we want to

pass with our animals. They just want all the land for themselves, and one morning they

started shooting at us when we came with the animals. They had planned this for several

months; some people said they had bought weapons. They planned a slaughter on the Fulani!

They never accept that the land is ours.” Moreover, “Karbaye planned a slaughter on us!

They waited for us and opened fire when the animals came. We did not know that Karbaye

would attack us, so we had nothing to defend ourselves with. Many herders were killed and

injured!” Many men from Karbaye who I interviewed claim that it was the other way around.

One of the key informants in Karbaye said that Guirowel had planned a “slaughter” on

Karbaye, and that it was farmers from Karbaye that were attacked by the herders. He also

claimed that “it was lucky the conflict took place so close to Karbaye, because then we could

run back to our houses and find weapons to fight back.” However, even several informants

from Karbaye said that it was Karbaye who had opened fire, but they were reluctant to talk

about it, and they also claimed that they “had no choice!”

I have based my understanding of the incident on interviews from both villages, and

importantly also external sources, that is, people who were not one of the conflicting parts,

but yet know a lot about the circumstances. Ba (2008) has also outlined the conflict incident

and the circumstances related to it. A lot of my understanding is also based on what people

from Manaco told me. I regard external informants and interviews from Guirowel and

Manaco as more credible concerning this topic, due to methodological issues and challenges

regarding fieldwork interviewing in Karbaye, as outlined in chapter four.

42

3.4.3 The legal proceedings:

In the aftermath of the conflict incidence, a number of men from both villages were arrested

for homicide or assaults. Some sat in jail for about 6 months, but most were released after a

few days. The government kept armed guards (gendarmes) in the villages for six months after

the conflict (until approximately January 2002) to maintain security. After this period, the

case was brought to court and the situation was settled through negotiations. It was once again

stated that only herders were allowed to use the casier pastoral, and that the farmers had to let

the cattle go on the burtol and the pastoral land around the pond. People from Guirowel and

Karbaye were also allowed to visit each other again. However, the relationship between the

two villages remained very tense, and most people still do not want to go to the other village

in fear of “doing something wrong,” or simply because of resentment.

In 2008, the case was again brought to court. Farmers from Karbaye claimed they needed

more land, and wanted to cultivate in the casier again. They went to ORM and asked for more

land in 2007. ORM could not help them, and the case was brought to the Primary Court in

Mopti, which is the first judicial authority in Mali. Guirowel was represented by the Direction

Régionale des Productions et des Industries Animales (DRPIA) in the trial. The first

judgement was passed in November 2008, and according to key informants, Karbaye won the

case. DRPIA and Guirowel submitted an appeal, and the case was brought to the Appeal

Court. This trial is still ongoing, and meanwhile, only herders are allowed to use the land. 23 It

is still a casier pastoral, and the agreement from 1984 is still in force. Even ORM have

supported Guirowel in the case, as the herders have no other places to take their cattle. Many

inhabitants of Guirowel and Karbaye, as well as external stakeholders, fear what will happen

if Karbaye win the second trial and get hold of the land again.

Many of my informants said they were afraid a new conflict might burst anytime. A man I

interviewed at DRPIA made this quite clear; “if the farmers win the next round, there will be

a lot of deaths! C’est trés claire!!”

23 As the case is still not closed, and it was difficult to obtain documents from it while I was doing fieldwork. The judge I talked to in the appeal court, repeatedly told me I would get some copies of documents from the case, but I never got any, although I went back several times during fieldwork, and my interpreter went back also after I had ended the fieldwork and left Mali. Others were reluctant to give me any information about the case, and it was generally difficult to get a clear picture on the process and the case. I got many different and vague answers to my questions concerning the case. This information is based on what I was told from the involved key stakeholders I interviewed.

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4.0 Methodology

I will in the following present the methodology I have chosen to follow in this study. I will

first present the overall research approach, before I outline the methods of data collection and

data analysis carried out. Finally I will outline some ethical considerations taken during the

research and study, and present some limitations of the research undertaken and limitations of

research tools.

4.1 Research approach and design

This study builds on three objectives. The overall objective is to examine a local conflict and

identify the causes of it, the second is concerned with the changes there have been in people’s

access to natural resources in the case study area, whilst the last one is to identify whether

there are any political aspects to the situation. In sum, I seek to investigate i) the local

people’s perceptions of the situation, ii) meanings, personal and opinions attached to these

aspects, and iii) examine causes of changes and process.

To follow these objectives, I have found an overall qualitative methodology by far most

useful. Indeed, Bryman (2004: 19, 20) says that qualitative research is “a research strategy

that usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of

data.” Qualitative methods are more flexible and dynamic compared to quantitative, and I

therefore find them more suitable for the objectives of this study, as I want to reveal human

aspects rather than numbers and statistics (Mikkelsen 2005: 348). Also Berg (2007: 8)

emphasizes that “qualitative research properly seeks answers to questions by examining

various social settings and the individuals who inhabit these settings.” Qualitative methods are

widely used in social research, and can contribute in acquiring information that during

quantitative research and interview can be lost (Mikkelsen 2005: 172).

4.1.1 The case study design:

A research design provides according to Bryman (2004: 27), “a framework for the collection

and analysis of data.” This means that the research design guides you in finding a suitable

method for collecting your findings. Moreover, as the research design “relates to the criteria

that are employed when evaluating social research” (Bryman 2004: 26), it is a more specific

44

framework for the possibility of a generalisation of the evidence that is collected through the

study. As I have chosen to study one conflict in one community at a specific place and time, I

regard this research as a case study. A case study “entails the detailed and intensive analysis

of a single case” (Bryman 2004: 48), and is concerned with the complexity and particular

nature of one specific case. This can be either an organization, a family, one individual person,

or a community, or it can also be events, such as a conflict (Ragin 1994: 184). According to

Ragin (1994: 184), a case is “a fundamental element of social research that is used most often

to describe the members of a set of comparable phenomena.” As Bryman (2004: 49) argues,

the purpose of a case study often tends to be an “intensive examination of the setting.” The

case study design is hence in itself not a method, but a design chosen to follow, whereas a

research method, for example qualitative methods, has to be selected in order to collect the

data. The case study design often concurs with qualitative interviews as research method.

4.1.2 Reliability and validity:

Mikkelsen (2005: 142) argues that qualitative research is concerned with values and

authenticity rather than reliability and statistics. However, reliability and validity are central

and important issues also in qualitative measures. These concepts are prominent criteria for

the evaluation of social research, and are important tools in establishing and asserting the

quality of the research undertaken (Bryman 2004: 28). Reliability means “dependability or

consistency” (Neuman 2007: 115), and refers to the extent to which a study can be replicated.

This is indeed most often related to quantitative research, and is difficult in social research,

because all cases are different and it can be very hard to find the same results other places

(Bryman 2004: 28).

Validity, on the other hand, refers to the degree to which findings can be generalized. It is

concerned with “the integrity of the conclusions that are generated” from research (Bryman

2004: 28). This is also difficult in social research, especially when using case studies, as these

are small and specific cases difficult to replicate across other social settings. Indeed, the

intentions of this study have not been to generalise any findings within cultural or societal

contexts overall, conversely I have sought to reveal some of the opinions attached to the

specific situation regarding environmental change and conflict in the community of this study.

I intend to give in-depth information regarding the issues outlined in my objectives, and these

might, but not necessarily, be valid also for a larger context.

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4.2 Methods of data collection and field work

Based on the qualitative research approach I follow, the data collection in this study is based

predominantly on semi-structured interviews. Moreover, some observation and mapping has

been carried out. Finally, a lot of the research in this study is based on secondary sources. As

these methods have both strengths and weaknesses, I have used triangulation strategies to

make sure the chances of receiving biased information are reduced. However, it has been

difficult to conduct a research completely after schedule, as some challenges during research

were met. I will in the following outline the methods of data collection I followed, as well as

some aspects related to conducting field work and research.

4.2.1 Sampling procedures:

Sampling is “the process of selecting a representative set of cases from a much larger set,”

most often done because of time and resource constraints (Ragin 1994: 191). The study area,

in which this research was carried out, is the two villages involved in the conflict as presented

in chapter three; Guirowel and Karbaye, and additionally the village of Manaco. To select

informants from these villages, I originally wanted to carry out a probability sampling, to

make sure my findings could be generalized, and to make sure each unit of the population had

an equal chance of being selected for sample (Bryman 2004: 95). More specifically I wanted

to carry out a stratified random sample, which means that I on beforehand made sure each

group of the population (both farmers and herders) were equally represented in the sampling

frame (Bryman 2004: 92- 3).

However, it proved difficult to carry this through, as I first of all could not carry out the

sampling procedure myself. This was based on my role as a foreign researcher (and possibly

as a woman) coming from outside. Sampling was therefore basically carried out in

collaboration with the village chiefs and other key informants, based on the contacts of my

coordinator (see chapter 4.2.3). The contact persons I met in the beginning did not understand

the importance or necessity of a probability sampling method. For the most part, they

gathered under a tree and wrote me a list of people I would want to talk to. I often

experienced that all of the interviewees they provided for me were elder and influential men,

like for instance the former mayor, or the brother of the village chief and so on. Based on this

sampling procedure, I carried out a non-probability sampling in the form of convenience

sampling (Bryman 2004: 100).

46

As my presence in the study area and the intentions of my research gradually became known

to the villagers, it was easier however to select interviewees outside the lists, as listed people

for instance were not present, or as the lists were not adequate, for instance in not including

the sufficient number of informants from either group. Based on this, I adjusted the sample,

and talked to more randomly selected informants, conducting a non-probability sampling

method. More specifically, I carried out a snowball sampling method, as many interviewees

introduced me to for instance their neighbours or some other people they knew, for the

purpose of me interviewing them. Even though snowball sampling makes generalization

difficult, it is widely used in qualitative research, as it is time efficient and also makes it easier

to get in touch with the ‘right’ people. Additionally I carried out interviews with key

informants in administrative units and organizations. The sampling method I carried out here

was convenience sampling, as I needed to pick interviewees based on their role or relevance

in my research, and not based on a probability of generalization. I carried out 21 ‘external’

key stakeholder interviews.

It was important for me to carry out half of the interviews with farmers and half of the

interviews with herders to make sure both groups were equally represented in the sample.

Guirowel is predominantly a herder village and Karbaye is a farmer village, but there are also

herders in Karbaye and farmers in Guirowel. Additionally, the distinction between the two

groups have become quite blurred, so many of my informants were both herder and farmer, or

both fisher and farmer, and so on. I ended anyhow up with having interviewed just as many

farmers as herders overall, and with an equal distribution of interviewed farmers and herders

in light of the circa percentage distribution of the groups within each village. In total, 55

village interviews were carried out.

I originally preferred to interview both women and men, but this proved to be very difficult,

as women typically told me ”I do not know anything about this,” laughed it off, or my

interpreter or guide did not understand the importance or necessity of me talking to women,

and neither explained the purpose of the study properly to the women I got in contact with.

However, and importantly, I do not feel that this has biased the research remarkably, as I

wanted to reveal overall opinions and meanings in each group (based on livelihood, village

and so on), not necessarily individual and personal opinions. As the conflict and the

circumstances around it still is an extremely sensitive issue in the study area, it was not

difficult to catch the overall feeling about it among the inhabitants. Based on this, it became

47

quite clear to me that families shared the same opinions, and for the most part also the whole

group (all farmers in one village, for instance) shared the same opinions. It was therefore not

necessary, as I perceived it, to make sure that each interview setting was completely closed or

that each individual expressed their own personal feeling.

4.2.2 Data collection:

Semi-structured interviews:

Semi-structured interviews allow people to speak freely and add more information than a

structured interview would have allowed. In a semi-structured interview, the researcher

typically has a check list of questions and topics that need to be covered, without necessarily

having a regular list of questions that are asked to all informants (Bryman 2004: 321). This

type of interviewing is more flexible and gives more room to exclude some topics and include

some others. As I were mostly interested in people’s opinions rather than facts, I see this

method as highly appropriate for this study and the research undertaken (Berg 2007: 93). In

qualitative semi-structured interviews, there is more interest in the interviewee’s point of view,

and ‘rambling’ is often encouraged as it gives insight into what the interviewee thinks is

important. Such interviews are flexible and open-ended and can follow the directions of the

interviewee. The purpose of a semi-structured interview is often to get rich, in-depth and

detailed answers instead of closed answers, which is the case in structured interviews and

questionnaires (Bryman 2004: 319- 20). Finally, an informant can be interviewed several

times in qualitative interviewing. This proved useful for me, as I went back to several

informants to fill out some gaps in my knowledge and also to ask other and different

questions. This was particularly the case with key informants.

Two types of semi-structured interviews were carried out, based on the different backgrounds

of the informants; interviews with villagers, and interviews with informants in institutions,

organizations and administrative units. I used different checklists for the two groups as the

aims of the interviews were of different character. The village interviews were meant to

provide me with information about environmental change in the study area, reasons behind

the conflict and political aspects to the situation. Generally, I sought to reveal the inhabitants’

opinions behind these aspects and the situation, and focused more on collecting data on what

they though was the reason behind environmental changes, what they perceived as the causes

of the conflict and so on.

48

However, very few of the semi-structured individual interviews were actually carried out with

only me, the interpreter and the interviewee present. Most often a number of men (and to a

smaller extent, women) gathered around us and sometimes they also contributed with

information. This was for the most part ok, but sometimes these ‘contributors’ took over the

interview, and were asked to leave or to not say anything during the interview. Moreover, I

sometimes felt that these gatherings around the interview setting contributed to a more

openness among the informants and that they became more eager to discuss the case.

Sometimes these situations turned out like focus groups, which according to Bryman (2004:

539) is a “form of group interview in which […] there is an emphasis in the questioning on a

particular fairly tightly defined topic; and the emphasis is upon interaction within the group

and the joint construction of meaning.”

Although I did not plan to carry out focus groups or group interviews due to language and

translation problems, I feel I got a lot of information from these occasions. Sometimes I also

interviewed all of the men in one group, one by one, but with all the others present the whole

time. Although I was afraid this would colour the information each and one provided me with,

they gave different and independent answers. Based on this, I do not feel that these interviews

limited my findings.

Moreover, I carried out interviews with key informants in the study area (the mayor, jowro

and so on), as well as in institutions, organizations and administrative units. These interviews

aimed more at finding some facts behind the situation and the conflict. Actual numbers and

statistics were necessary to see the whole picture behind the people’s perceptions, as the

villagers’ information often differed largely (especially the two villages involved in the

conflict disagreed about the causes of the conflict). Some ‘neutral’ and outside information

was necessary to make a fairer picture of the situation. According to Mikkelsen (2005) there

is a risk of receiving biased information from key informants that may mislead the researcher.

However, as many of these key stakeholder (external) informants had the main knowledge

about the different processes of environmental change, it was highly necessary to interview

them. I asked many of the same questions to people who had different perspectives on the

situation, to get a balanced answer in total. This was done as a triangulation technique. It is

important not to rely on only one source, and I feel that the data have not been biased on the

background of these issues. In asking both institutions and villagers some of the same

49

questions regarding these issues, I feel that the picture of the situation became clearer and

more complete, and the two often different perspectives complemented each other largely.

Mapping:

Mapping of the study area was to a certain degree carried out. In collaboration with

inhabitants of the study area, the mayor, the village chiefs and other key stakeholders, several

maps of the area were drawn in order to get a picture of where the conflict took place, and

especially in relation to location of natural resources like agricultural fields and pastoral areas.

It was useful for me to get an impression of how land was distributed in the area, as both

farmers and herders claimed they had too little land and claimed customary rights to the same

areas. All the maps were drawn independently and not in the same situation or with the same

people present. The fact that both farmers and herders, people from three different villages,

and people also from outside, drew maps of the same area, made me able to see a more

balanced picture of the area, and to draw some conclusions based on what the different groups

had said. In the end, when I had several maps (5- 6 in total), I compared them to make one

final map based on all the contributions and on my own observations (see figure 7).

Observation:

I have not conducted any participant observation, because the objectives of this study do not

require such methods, and because this has not been the character of my research. However, it

is necessary to bear in mind that I partly lived in the communities where the research was

undertaken, and to a certain extent I was able to observe daily life and people’s interactions

with each other, both during research, interview settings and in daily life in general.

Observing how interviewees acted during interview, and in interaction with others, gave me

the possibility to view and apprehend things that were not orally expressed. As Bryman (2004:

329) argues, “[q]ualitative researchers are frequently interested not just in what people say,

but also in the way they say it.” It is therefore possible that my findings have been coloured by

lessons learned from participatory methods as well, but more importantly I feel that this

method has contributed to make a more whole picture of the outcome of the research.

Use of secondary sources:

Much of the research is based on historical and socio-political background facts, so secondary

sources have been necessary. This is because my knowledge of the study area, the history, and

the situation in general was very limited before arriving there and before getting to talk to

50

informants. I have analyzed existing data and a substantial amount of documents to fill in

gaps in my own collected data, and I have drawn on a just as substantial amount of literature

to support my findings and draw conclusions on my objectives.

4.2.3 Field procedures and tools:

The fieldwork was carried out during two periods, first in October 2008, and in February-

March 2009. For the most part I was based in Sévaré, a larger town outside Kounary, and I

travelled back and forth to the villages more or less each day, with an exception of three days

spent in Manaco in the very beginning.

Practical assistance:

Doing fieldwork calls for logistical support of different kinds, and it was necessary for me to

be supported by a local coordinator. As my supervisor at UMB has worked in Mali for many

years, he had contacts that could help me. I therefore got help from a person working in the

local non-governmental organization (NGO) Eveil, which is mostly concerned with civic

education in villages in the area.24 First of all, he proposed the case to study, and he also

helped me with logistical support such as transport and housing, and provided me with an

interpreter as well as some documents.

Also, and importantly, he largely functioned as a door-opener in relation to key stakeholders,

as he has many contacts in several relevant administrative units, institutions and organizations.

It would probably not have been possible to carry out the fieldwork without his assistance.

Language, interpretation and the use of research assistance:

As I do not speak the local languages (basically Fulfulde), I had to rely on my interpreter, who

assisted me during both fieldworks.25 In addition to translating all information given during

interviews, the interpreter also functioned partly as research assistant when we were not in the

field (taking photo copies of documents, making arrangements with informants, taking care of

some logistics, and so on). He also functioned as a contact person for the inhabitants in the

24 My coordinator has done research on land tenure conflicts and farmer-herder relations in the study area himself. He is from the area and has a lot of competence on the field of relevance for this study. His assistance was however solely practical, and there has been no academic cooperation or assistance. 25 The interpreter’s name is Hama M. Diall, and he is from Diafarabé, which is a village located farther southwest in the delta, in the cercle of Tenenkou, still within the Mopti region. As I had to break off fieldwork and leave Mali during the first stay, I was lucky he had the possibility to continue working for me when I returned for my second stay some months later.

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field, and as a door-opener for me in the villages, as he knew not only the language, but also

importantly the culture. Through his role I was able to interact more personally with the

inhabitants of the study area, and got to know some of them better than others.

Also, him being Malian and born in the region, apparently made many of the informants more

relaxed and the interview situation less unfamiliar. Moreover, the interpreter functioned partly

as a ‘cultural translator’ in sometimes reading signs I was not able to see, explaining certain

concepts or things for me or for the interviewee, or stopping me from asking culturally

inappropriate questions. In the villages, we also relied on ‘guides,’ who for the most part were

younger boys, sent out by the men or the village chiefs to guide us around to the households

of informants I sought to interview. Several of these functioned partly as door-openers

through the whole stay in that specific village.

Interview notes and field notes:

During the interviews, I relied heavily on taking notes. As I used a translator, I had time to

write down everything the interviewee said appropriately, and these notes were crucial in

remembering the interview and its contents. I also to a certain extent took field notes, in

sketching notes on the interviewee’s behaviour during the different parts of the interview and

on the surrounding environment, people being present and so on. This proved helpful in

remembering why the different informants had such and such opinions on things etc, and also

in understanding why for instance someone did not want to talk about certain topic.

Use of audiorecorder:

I also relied on using an audio recorder in about half of the interviews. This was especially

done during interviews with key informants, to make sure I would not lose any valuable

information. It can be difficult to collect all oral information while at the same time leading

the interview. Bryman (2004: 330) argues that the use of a recorder can be helpful in

correcting the “natural limitations of our memories” and also allows a more “thorough

examination of what people say.” However, transcription of audiorecorded interviews is very

time-consuming, and more importantly it can also restrain information provided by the

informants during interviews, as a recorder might seem too strange, and as it can also hinder

people from giving their true opinions in fear of the possibility of their words being used

against them on another occasion (Bryman 2004: 330). As the topics related to my objectives

to a certain extent are controversial, I did not use the recorder in all cases, to make sure

52

informants did not become reserved. This was especially the case in Karbaye, where people

proved very reluctant to talk about the conflict, and where I partly was suspected of being a

‘spy’ working for the mayor or the police. I did therefore not use audiorecorder in any of the

interviews in Karbaye. Since translation was necessary, I felt I had enough time to write up

everything the informants told me, and I do not feel I lost any information because I did not

use a recorder in these interviews. Neither do I feel that any information got lost because of

the use of recorder during other interviews, but this is something I can not say for sure.

4.2.4 Challenges during research:

Time and logistics:

As the total duration of fieldwork was only two months, it is obvious that the possibility of

errors in the data exists. There are limitations on what you can carry out and how much

research you are able to do in such a short period. Possibilities of triangulation are also limited.

If I had had the possibility to stay in the study area longer, it is possible that I would have

been able to gather some more information, get to know the study area better, or simply get

better time to structure and carry out the research. However, I feel that two months were

sufficient in finding the results from my research, and I feel that all objectives have been

carried out thoroughly.

Logistically, there were a few minor challenges, as one is dependent on either a 4wd car or a

motor bike to get into the study area. Roads are bad, if at all existing. There is no such thing

as public transport in the area. Despite this fact, I did not face any major challenges in getting

in and out of the study area, as I got a moped from Eveil at my disposal. Although there was a

time pressure, I was able to go to the field almost all the days set off for this purpose. Only a

few days I had to return without anything being done, and this was predominantly because of

informants not being available at the time.

Language and translation:

The use of interpreter proved to be challenging, in several ways. First of all, it was difficult

getting an interpreter with sufficient language-skills that also had some knowledge of the

academic field of relevance and the study area, and additionally were available for two

months. As there are many spoken languages in Mali and Mopti, and as interviews were to be

conducted in many different places with different languages being spoken, the interpreter had

53

to speak French, Bambara, Fulfulde and English. Fortunately, my coordinator succeeded in

finding such a person.

Second, using an interpreter presented some problems during interviews and the interpretation

itself. As the interpreter’s English was not entirely sufficient on especially the academic field

of relevance, problems of translation were difficult to avoid. Especially in the beginning both

he and I struggled to find adequate words and concepts that were easier and could replace the

original expression. After some time I also discovered that critical concepts were mixed

together and that information were left out of his translations, because he either did not regard

them as important, or because he had problems in expressing the information in English. As I

speak some French, it was possible to clarify some of these misunderstandings, and as time

went by, I also got to understand what he meant with certain phrases and to more easily ‘crack

the code’ of his expressions. We were both eager to clarify such misunderstandings, and we

had many useful discussions in the aftermath of interviews. Based on this I do not feel that

any information was lost or biased, but this is a possibility which I have to bear in mind when

writing up the data collected.

Third, using an interpreter can be difficult in regards to the translator role. Many interpreters,

including mine, had no experience in translating interviews, and it was difficult to explain that

translation had to be direct with nothing added or excluded. This proved difficult, as my

interpreter first of all explained terms and concepts or exemplified relevant situations with the

purpose of explaining to the informant what I was looking for, without me asking for it or at

all knowing it, and second of all, he did not translate directly. This was frustrating in the

beginning, but gradually I became aware of his role in also being an interpreter for the

interviewee, and I understood that it was necessary that he explained more thoroughly, simply

because of cultural difficulties, unfamiliar and problematic concepts and terms, and

misunderstandings, and also to make it easier for me to understand their answers. It was also

in many cases highly necessary to expand on some of the questions, as the academic field of

relevance and many of the concepts and questions were unfamiliar to informants.

Fourth, the interpreter was born in a neighbouring cercle, and knew the culture and society

well. His grandfather is a jowro and thus the interpreter knew a lot about pastoral traditions.

As the conflict in the study is between herders and farmers, or more overall Fulani and

Malinké, it might have had an impact on the interviews and the information provided by the

54

informants that he was a Fulani. I was not aware of this until several weeks had passed by. It

is a factor I can not exclude as possibly having contributed to biased information, both

because of informants knowing his background, but also because he might have had an

interest in contributing in his own ways. I am quite certain this was not a problem, but it still

has to be mentioned. Finally, using an interpreter always leaves a possibility that informants

are reluctant to talk, as he easily could be regarded as ‘a mole’ from a governmental

institution, the police, or from the competing group. As it was obvious that I was foreign and

clearly had nothing to do with the conflict directly, he was more easily suspected for being

‘sent by the mayor,’ or for having his own agenda in being there. However, I feel that him

being familiar to the informants rather was positive, as he easily got in contact with people

and quickly gained their confidence.

Trust, controversy and difficult topics:

It was necessary to have contact persons and key informants who could introduce me to the

villages and the inhabitants. As I had a coordinator, whom most of the village chiefs and key

informants knew from before, I was able to meet the village chiefs and other key informants

before I met the people in the villages. The collaboration with the village chiefs was necessary

and extremely valuable, as it was no alternative for me to just show up in the village alone

without having been welcomed by the chiefs or without having any contact persons there. Me

having been introduced by first the coordinator and then the village chiefs, undoubtedly made

it easier for me to enter the villages and talk to people, also some times about controversial

and difficult topics. However, me as a researcher and a foreign woman entering the study area

and the villages involved in the conflict, did pose some challenges.

The study area is characterized by distrust between local people and governmental institutions

(so-called ‘administrators’), and also obviously between two of the villages. This seems to

have affected the way I was received as a researcher. Suspicion and distrust was common,

especially in the beginning, and many were reluctant to talk. Many wondered why I was

interested in the conflict, and if I was doing research on behalf of the conflicting village or

group. I was aware of this, and I spent several minutes before each interview thoroughly

presenting myself, my study and my intentions, as well as the role of my interpreter. This

made it easier to continue the research, although some of the informants remained sceptical.

55

As the conflict still is a difficult topic for many of the inhabitants, especially in Karbaye, I

experienced some problems in talking to some people. This was especially true during my

second stay, perhaps because some time had passed, and my intentions had possibly been

questioned and discussed in the meantime. When I arrived in Karbaye in February 2009, I was

rejected by the brother of the village chief, who claimed they did not have anything to

contribute with, or no one was there to talk to me, or everybody had “left the village.” This is

most likely because Karbaye from several stands have been presented as the ‘black sheep’ in

the conflict. People were afraid they would lose the land they had ‘gained,’ or that they would

be arrested if they “admitted something.” After having assured my intentions and all

confidentiality thoroughly, I got to talk to people in the end, but it is important to note that the

brother of the village chief was present during most of these interviews, and that he for the

most part was the one who decided who I was allowed to talk to.

The intentions of my research were probably misunderstood, as many of the people in

Karbaye believed I was there to outline the facts concerning the conflict, and not to

investigate their opinions about it. The questions I asked were therefore also somewhat

different from what they had expected, and they might have experienced that they did not

have to ‘hide anything’ after all, simply because I did not confront them with the

uncomfortable questions they feared I would. I therefore feel I got sincere and independent

answers, although this is nothing I can guarantee. It was moreover easy to understand when

informants said things that were not true, for instance some people claimed they had not even

heard about the conflict, but then later on it became clear that they had even fought

themselves. Moreover, many informants started to talk eagerly about the conflict after the

interview was over, maybe because they ‘loosened up’ a bit during the interview as they

gradually understood that I was not after judging them in any ways.

The topic of discussion being controversial and obviously difficult to talk about for some, also

posed challenges for me as a researcher. It was crucial to emphasize my intentions with the

research, make sure I was only a Norwegian student carrying out fieldwork for my master’s

thesis, and not to step on anyone’s toes. I was careful in selecting questions suitable for each

interview, and I dealt with each individual differently based on the atmosphere I perceived on

beforehand and during the interview. It became gradually easier, probably as my presence

became more known and my intentions became clearer for people in the villages.

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Local association and NGO association:

It is important to bear in mind that many people in the villages knew about Eveil and their

work before I entered the study area with their support. Although I have no indications on this

having coloured their answers, it is a possibility that can not be excluded. Moreover, many

informants associated me with Western NGOs, and talked a lot about how poor they were and

how much they needed development aid. Although I explained that I could not provide any

such assistance, this might have affected some answers, especially what concerns resource

degradation, land scarcity and access to land – or what they ‘lacked.’

Possibility of sampling-related errors:

There is always a certain risk that errors exist in own collected data. This is based especially

on the aspects discussed above. Moreover, I have had to rely on secondary sources when it

comes to statistical facts, historical data and such. Errors in secondary sources might appear,

and although I have no indications that error in own data exists, this is a risk important to bear

in mind, especially in regards to translation problems.

4.3 Data analysis

I have drawn on the theoretical framework as outlined in chapter two to analyze the data I

have collected. Moreover, I draw on selected quotes from informants to support my findings.

This is largely because my objectives seek to reveal the people’s perceptions of the issues

discussed in interviews, and I therefore find quotes to rightfully illustrate the expressions of

my informants. To make sure all views are represented, I will use both quotes that to me seem

representative for the whole sample, and also rarer quotes, to illustrate other opinions.

I have used the computer program SPSS for Windows to analyze some of the data collected.

This goes for opinions and views in relation to background of informant, e.g. how many of the

farmers think that the herders have enough land and so on. This is to get an overview of

opinions and attitudes among the different informants. This might be regarded as quantitative

analysis, but the collection of the data has not been quantitative, and I will treat all the data as

qualitative. I have not analyzed the qualitative data more thoroughly.

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4.4 Ethical considerations

My research is to a great extent based on information provided by informants, and it is of

crucial importance that their confidentiality has been assured. I spent a lot of time introducing

myself and my study, and all informants got to know what they were taking part in, what the

purposes of the research was, and what my intention with the final work has been. I asked

informants, where it was relevant, if they accepted or disfavoured the use of audio-recorder. It

is important to be sensitive regarding topics of discussion, especially since conflicts can be

painful experiences for many. As these issues can be sensitive, I did my best not to invade

people’s privacy, and I made sure they all knew that they could refuse to answer questions

they did not feel comfortable with. Also I allowed time for them to ask me any questions at

any time. I have done my best to assure people’s anonymity for those who wished so

(although many explicitly told me they did not want to be quoted anonymously).

I have as far as possible been considerate about my own role as a researcher. Although my

informants have provided me with valuable information, I was not able to offer anything in

return, and therefore I tried to not take up the informants’ time more than necessary (Bryman

2004). Individual interviews lasted on average 30 minutes, while external in-depth interviews

lasted a bit longer, mostly around an hour. Informing the interviewees about the expected

duration of the interview in advance, as well as being properly prepared myself, was

important in this aspect.

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59

5.0 Analysis and discussion of findings

The following part comprises the analysis and discussion of my findings. This chapter is made

up of two sub-chapters. In the first part I present my main findings based on the objectives

and research questions of this study. That is; an analysis of what I have found to be the causes

of the conflict. Part two of this chapter is a discussion of my findings, drawn up against the

theoretical approaches I have used as framework for this study. I will in this part illuminate

the theoretical background and arguments by drawing on my own findings and vice versa, in

this way complementing and answering the objectives of this study thoroughly. I will by

drawing on the theoretical approaches discuss how my case should be understood.

This part builds heavily on semi-structured interviews carried out during fieldwork, and I will

in this part include some of the informants’ own stories and quotations, to illustrate my

findings.

5.1 Main findings: Causes of the conflict:

Environmental and political changes and structures in the case study area:

There are many and severe causes behind the 2001 conflict between Guirowel and Karbaye.

To understand the background for this incident, it is necessary to dig deeper in the history as

well as political and environmental structures in the area, and the interactions of the people

living there. There are in my view three different causes that together fuelled the outbreak of

the conflict in Kounary in 2001. These are i) large-scale expansions of rice fields which led to

predominantly a loss of pastoral, but also partly agricultural, land, ii) the project of

rehabilitating the pond, and iii) political vacuum and ‘a lack of governance’ in the case study

area.

There are again several backdrop aspects and circumstances that together led to these factors.

I will in the following outline all these factors. In the end of this part, I will sum up the local

people’s own perceptions of the conflict.

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5.1.1 Large-scale expansion of rice fields and loss of land

“Farmer-herder tensions have been common in the recent

years, because the government made dikes.”

Farmer in Manaco, 13.10.08

The conflict in Kounary in 2001 is in my view to a great extent caused by changes in people’s

access to land in the case study area. This means first of all conversion of land, including a

large-scale expansion of rice fields and major losses of land, predominantly pastoral, but also

agricultural land. Expansion of rice fields is partly caused by a decrease in flood levels on the

river Niger, but more importantly it is a result of national agricultural policies promoting rice

cultivation on the expense of pastoralism.

5.1.1.1 Lower flood levels on the river Niger:

One important factor that has contributed to an expansion of rice fields, is lower water levels

in the river Niger. This fall in water level was partly caused by a decrease in rainfall both

upstream and in Kounary itself, predominantly during the 1970s and 1980s, something which

left large areas of the floodplain dry these years. It is however important to note also the

construction of an upstream hydro-power dam in Sélingué in 1982. This damming up of the

river pulled the downstream riverbanks back and decreased the water flow in the river; hence

also the flood levels (Benjaminsen and Ba 2009).

Figure 8: Maximum flood levels on the Niger river, Mopti 1922- 2006,

(Direction Nationale de l’Hydraulique et de l’Energie, Bamako, obtained from Benjaminsen and Ba 2009).

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As indicated in figure 8, the river Niger had very low water levels in the years after 1982, and

although this obviously also was related to the previous dry years, there is little doubt that the

dam construction caused a decrease in flood levels in the delta.

When the flood levels decrease, it becomes difficult to cultivate rice as the ground land

become too dry. As outlined in chapter 3.2, burgu grows on deeper water than paddy rice. The

decrease in water level in the river has therefore led to a massive expansion of rice fields into

pastoral burgu areas on the floodplain, something which ‘squeezed out’ the pastoralists from

using this land. One problem that results from this, is that cattle go on cultivated land to graze

and drink, as they have nowhere else to go. Beeler (2006: 7) confirms this; “[the herders’]

movements appear to be determined by the requirements of their livestock and the location of

water and grazing rather than the course of the common […] routes.” A man I interviewed at

a key institution in Mopti, said that “before 1973 the water was deeper, so it was used for

burgu. But when it became drier, the farmers wanted the land to cultivate rice there, because

the water on the floodplain was shallower. When their own rice fields dried up, they took the

herders’ land.” This has been one backdrop for the agricultural expansion that eventually led

to conflict in Kounary. There has been an overall increase in farmer-herder conflicts in the

delta the last few decades (Moorehead 1991, Barrière and Barrière 2002), and these factors

might be possible explanations behind this. It is however, following Benjaminsen and Ba

(2009) “largely insufficient” to explain land tenure conflicts by scarcity.

5.1.1.2 National agricultural policies:

A more important cause of the expansion of rice fields, however, is national agricultural

policies. As discussed in chapter 3.3, Mali has after independence led an overall agricultural

policy promoting agriculture on the expense of pastoralism. It is also a widely held belief that

pastoralism causes overgrazing and desertification. Because of this, land legislation in general

largely favours farmers at the expense of herders. This is an evident trend also in other parts

of Africa, especially in the Sahel (see e.g. Bonfiglioli and Watson 1992, Azarya et. al. 1999).

As outlined in chapter 3.4.1, in Mali, this meant large-scale development interventions and

projects converting large areas into rice fields. It also implied an overall promotion of

agricultural activities, which led to first of all, a modernization of agricultural tools, which

made it easier and more attractive to become farmers, and moreover, easier to extend – and

expand – agricultural activities for those who already were farmers. A man I interviewed at

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the Direction Nationale des Productions et des Industries Animales (DNPIA) in Bamako said

that “the government has mobilised all Malians to become farmers.” This promotion policy

increased the number of farmers in Mali drastically. A man at the regional department of the

Ministry of Agriculture in Mopti, estimated in an interview with me that there are around 11-

12 million farmers in Mali now, compared to approximately 5 million in 1960. This is of

course also because of a natural population growth, but illustrates nonetheless the trend.

Access to better tools made agriculture more efficient in Kounary, and many farmers sought

more land to cultivate as they now had better opportunities to increase their production, and

since it was not as time consuming anymore. This has largely been a problem in Kounary,

where farmers have expanded millet cultivation into the burtol of the Fulani. As millet (and

vegetable) cultivation gradually increased and expanded into the burtol, the corridor was

eventually closed for cattle, causing frustration among the herders, who now did not have any

places to take their cattle. One farmer in Karbaye said, when I asked him if there is more

competition over land in the area now than before; “yes, because the government encourage

everyone to become farmers and this expands the rice production, and everybody wants more

land.” It is important to note, however, that not only farmers from Karbaye, but also agro-

pastoralists and farmers from Guirowel, cultivated millet in this burtol. This land was by

some regarded as “free,” since it is not cultivated, and hence regarded as a “waste of good

land.” It has however been an important backdrop for tensions between farmers and herders.

5.1.1.3 ORM and the establishment of casiers:

As part of this large-scale national policies promoting agriculture, the projects of ORM

converted large areas of land into rice fields. As outlined in chapter 3.4.1, ORM established a

900 hectare large rice field irrigated by dikes in Kounary in 1977. This was done on a

previous burgu area which, although dried up at this point, had been established during the

Dina, and which had been used by herders in all the surrounding villages for centuries.

Neither farmers nor herders were, according to most of my informants, consulted or

sufficiently informed before ORM started this project, and their intervention was received

with mixed feelings among the inhabitants.

The establishment of the casier rizicole in Kounary increased rice production in the beginning.

The years before and after 1977 were extremely dry in the Sahel and also in Kounary, and

there was a lack of arable land. ORM’s irrigation systems led water from the river Niger into

the casier, hence making rice production on these dry areas possible. Most farmers benefited

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from these projects in the beginning, because it doubled the rice production, and secured food

access for many people. However, it eventually became clear that there were a lot of problems

attached to the projects. Due to technical problems with the maintenance of the dikes,

irrigation water did not always reach the plots. This was worsened due to uneven grounds, and

many plots remained dry during dry years as neither the flooding nor the irrigation reached

them. This was especially true for the plots farthest away from the dikes. In fact, several of

my informants emphasized that the dikes caused a degradation of land in some of the plots,

which now not only were not flooded naturally, but also remained dry even though it rained

well, because the dikes transported all the water into the irrigation systems. The village chief

of Guirowel, who himself is a farmer, said that this in fact caused a scarcity of land; “the dikes

led to resource scarcity, it is a lack of land here because of the dikes. Even if it rains, the

dikes will take the water and control it.” Furthermore; “before, during the rainy season, you

could go all the way from Diafarabé [about 110 km away] to here by boat, but now it is too

dry, and that is because of the dikes, because they control the water.”

This further led to a degradation of land resulting also from overuse on the plots that were

adequately irrigated. A farmer said to me that they benefited from ORM’s projects in the

beginning, but that after a while, “the soil became dry and that was because of the dikes. The

dikes took land, and less land was available for cultivation, and then the cultivation became

too intensive on the small laps that remained, and then the soil became degraded. ORM

created only problems!” Another farmer told me: “there is less water now after ORM came

and started irrigation projects.” This exacerbated the process of farmers expanding into

agricultural land to cultivate, as their own fields had become dry and barren. Many of my

informants also emphasized that this caused more competition over land also amongst the

farmers. Several of the farmers I interviewed said that ORM caused a land scarcity. One

farmer in Karbaye said: “It was not a good thing that they came and made dikes, because it is

much less land now than it was before they came. The government took the land from us.”

Another common reply was: “It is more competition now because the government encourages

us to cultivate.” The village chief of Guirowel concluded by saying that “if it was up to me, I

would remove all the dikes, and then it would not be any farmer-herder conflicts.”

Those who were most dissatisfied with ORM’s projects, however, were the herders, whose

grazing areas had been confiscated. ORM said in an interview with me that today, out of

39 000 hectares of casiers in Mopti, about 33 800 hectares are casier rizicoles. Large amounts

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of herders in the delta and in Kounary lost access to pastoral grazing areas because of ORM’s

conversions of land. This largely led to herders taking their cattle to cultivated land, as they

had nowhere else to go, something which caused frustration among the herders. Moreover, the

confiscation of burgu land created ager among the herders, as it was regarded as part of an

overall pastoral marginalization. A herder in Guirowel said to me: “I don’t know if the work

of ORM benefited the farmers, but I know one thing: They destroyed the land of the herders!”

A jowro in Kounary interviewed by Benjaminsen and Ba (2009: 78) estimated that 80 % of

the leydy Kounary now is cultivated, compared to approximately only half of that at

independence. A man at DNPIA in fact said in an interview with me that both farmers and the

government are marginalizing herders by promoting rice production and by “taking all the

land for agricultural purposes.” Many of my informants even regard this as ethnic

marginalization of the Fulani: “machines came and created dikes, since then the Fulani have

suffered.” One herder said; “the local authorities just want to destroy the Fulani people. They

took all our land.” Another herder said, when I asked him if he thought the conflict was

related to resource scarcity; “no, it is related to agriculture.” This expansion of agricultural

land has been part of an overall marginalization of pastoralists, which has fuelled tensions

also in other parts of the Sahel (see e.g. Benjaminsen 2008).

When ODEM in cooperation with ORM in 1984 reorganized the casier rizicole into a casier

pastoral, they caused anger among the farmers, who just seven years earlier had been given

this area from ORM; now it was taken from them again. According to the mayor of Kounary,

all the surrounding villages agreed on establishing a casier pastoral in a meeting on

beforehand, except Karbaye. It was regarded highly necessary that also the herders got land

for grazing purposes. Herders still had overall too little pastoral land, but fortunately for the

herders from Guirowel, one of the three casier pastorals that were created in the 1980s, were

established in Kounary. The land was not given specifically to Guirowel, but to everyone who

needed pastoral land for grazing. In practice, however, this meant that Karbaye lost the right

to use the land, since they are mostly occupied with farming. According to ORM, the farmers

were allocated new areas where they could cultivate. These areas were located about 7- 8 km

from Karbaye, which is not far at all in Malian countryside standards, but however obviously

farther than the land that is surrounding their village. As the sous-préfet said in an interview

with me; “Karbaye is regarded as a farmer village caught in the middle of the big casier

pastoral.” Also the village chief of Guirowel explained to me; “it is not a conflict between

Guirowel and Karbaye, but between Karbaye and all the herders.”

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Most farmers did not accept this restructuring of the land, and continued to cultivate the

casier. Because of the national promotion of agriculture, farmers felt that they were doing

nothing wrong. Moreover, especially since the area was surrounded by dikes that had been

created to irrigate the land, they felt it was more productive to continue to cultivate rice there,

rather than herders grazing their animals on it, something which the farmers considered to be

a misusage and underutilize of good arable land. Herders complained, but nothing was done

to solve the problem. A herder in Guirowel told me: “We [the herders] got some land back

from ORM, which was very useful for us, but the farmers do not respect it. They cultivate

there now even though the land is ours.” Farmers from Karbaye continued to cultivate the

pastoral fields each year, and each year cattle from Guirowel destroyed the harvest when they

went there to graze. The herders say: “They cultivate there even though it is our land, but we

have no choice but to go there anyway, even though the cattle destroys the harvest. It is our

land.” The farmers, on the other hand, say: “the cattle come there all the time and they

destroy the harvest, this is a big problem for us, why can’t the cattle just go other places?”

One herder from Guirowel told me: “The herders did not benefit from ORM’s work, because

they took the land from us. We did not even benefit when ODEM came and gave us land,

because this caused a conflict.” Another man said: “I blame the authorities, because first they

said that farmers could grow there, and then they gave the land to the herders.”

Practically all the men I interviewed in Karbaye regard this land as theirs, since they were

allocated this land in 1977. Most of them in fact call the area “casier Karbaye.” Many farmers

see it as a struggle that has been going on since 1984, and do not regard the land as having

been ‘lost’ at any point, even though it was specifically set aside for pastoral activities 25 yeas

ago. They never accepted this decision, and so they regard it as open for their use since their

opinions were not taken into consideration in 1984. One farmer I interviewed said: “They

[ORM and ODEM] wanted to transform it into a casier pastoral, but they did not discuss this

with the farmers first,” hence implying nothing has changed with the rights to use the land.

Moreover; “we came here first and we built the dikes, this is our land and the herders just

come here to provoke.” Another farmer illustrates this; “if you give a man some of your land,

and then he begins to destroy your land, whose fault is it if a conflict burst,” in this referring

to the fact that ODEM created a casier pastoral in “their” rice fields. Moreover, many of the

farmers I interviewed said that it was forbidden to cultivate there before, but that now (after

November 2008) they can use the land again, because they won the trial. I asked a farmer

from Karbaye if there is any casier pastoral in the area now. His reply was: “No, there are

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only casier rizicoles.” Another farmer said “When we cultivated in the casier rizicole, they

said that the herders wanted the land. We protested and went to the court, and Karbaye won,

so now we can cultivate there again.” Another farmer said: “The casier was closed in 1984,

so we had to go to Sine [an area not far away, closer to the river] to cultivate, but now it is

open again. It opened this year [2008].” When I asked him if it was not an ongoing trial

about that just now, he said “yes, the herders were against the opening so they went to the

court.” I then asked him if they were allowed to cultivate there while the trial was still in

process, and he said yes.

Also many of the farmers I interviewed admit that the area, in which they are cultivating, is

pastoral land, but that they can cultivate there anyway because it is their land since the

government gave it to them in 1977, “no matter what the herders say.” Some of the farmers

also said that they have the right to cultivate there, because the herders graze the cattle on

their land too (after the harvesting): “If a village has some land that is not used, the other

villages can use it if they need it, but Guirowel said the land was only theirs.”

All in all, ORM’s restructuring of land and intervention in the land tenure system in Kounary,

created both direct and indirect tensions between farmers and herders, as i) it led to expansion

of both groups into each other’s land at different points, and ii) both groups ended up being

frustrated over having lost their land to the other part. This has, according to most of my

informants, contributed to an increased competition over land in the area. One herder told me:

“it is more competition here now because the government made dikes. Even the farmers

compete, everybody compete!”

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5.1.2 The pond rehabilitation

“They created a pond in the burtol although the authorities said it was the herders’ land,

they made the pond anyway, and so the conflict burst.”

Herder in Guirowel, 20.10.09

As outlined in chapter 3.4.1, in 2001 Karbaye, with help from RESA, rehabilitated a pond that

was located just some 30 metres outside the village border, in the casier pastoral and close to

the burtol.

Figure 9: The pond, picture taken from the village border of Karbaye.

Vegetable and fruit gardens are visible on the backside (own photo 2009).

As outlined in chapter 3.4.1, it is difficult to know what the agreed purposes of the pond were.

According to CIDA, vegetable and fruit cultivation should take place, and cattle should be

allowed to drink from the pond. The people from Karbaye and Guirowel largely disagree on

what the purposes of the pond were. Although most of my informants said that the pond

should be used for the same purposes as it had always done (brick production, household

consumption and drinking source for cattle), some of my informants said that “it was created

to irrigate the casier,” “it was created to establish vegetable gardens,” or typically; “all the

villages should use it, that’s why we paid for it,” or “only Karbaye should use the dam, it is in

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our village and therefore it is ours.” My informants from Guirowel said that the cattle should

use the pond for drinking, and that Karbaye should use it for household purposes, but not

gardens. People from Karbaye, however, say that they were supposed to cultivate vegetables

there, in addition to household consumption, and they also claim that no other villages had the

right to use the pond, including cattle. This obviously created some misunderstandings and

problems.

According to most of my informants who were not from Karbaye, just after the establishment

of the pond, Karbaye “betrayed” the other villages, and denied any use of it other than their

own. The people from Karbaye apparently said that no other villages were allowed to use the

pond, since it was practically in their village, and hence their property. A man from Manaco

said to me; “when the pond was finished, Karbaye occupied the whole area.” Another man

said: “Before the pond was created, Karbaye and all the other villages agreed on it and made

it together. When it was finished, Karbaye betrayed everyone and denied the other villages to

use it. They said it was theirs.” This was a common reply when I asked people in Guirowel

and Manaco about the pond. The leader of Association Bomani, said that “Karbaye betrayed

all the other villages, even though we paid half of it.” When I asked him if Karbaye was

penalized for doing this, he said: “this caused of the conflict.”

Farmers from Karbaye started to cultivate vegetables and fruit in gardens on the backside of

the pond soon after it was finished. They also prohibited cattle to go to the pond, as they

would destroy the gardens, and also be dangerous for small children who came with their

mothers to the gardens. One important problem was that the gardens grew deeper and deeper

into the burtol, eventually closing it for any passage. It might have been one of the purposes

of the pond to create gardens there, but it was most likely not taken into consideration that

these gardens could grow bigger, so that they would occupy herders’ land. Many of the

farmers I interviewed said that it was not a problem that the gardens grew into the burtol,

because the herders (the agro-pastoralists) cultivated millet in the burtol, and so the farmers

felt that they too could cultivate there. The herders, however, were upset because they had lost

parts of their livestock corridor. One herder even said to me that Karbaye had created the

pond with the sole purpose of closing the burtol. “They do not want the cattle to go into the

grazing land, because they want to cultivate there. Therefore they created the pond, so that

the animals could not access it anymore.”

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Figure 10: The burtol passing Karbaye indicated by the yellow posts, clearly being cut off by gardens

sprung out from the pond, which is located 30- 50 metres to the left from this picture (own photo 2009).

People from Karbaye, however, say that the pond was constructed in their land, since they

regard the casier as theirs, as discussed in chapter 5.1.1.2, and because of the proximity to

their village. Based on this, they felt they had the right to establish the pond there. A common

comprehension among people from Karbaye was that the other villages do not use the pond

anyway, because it is farther away from them. Many from Karbaye also state that the

agreement was that the pond only should be used by Karbaye, and that none of the other

villages were allowed to use it. Those who said this, also claim they do not know why the

other villages contributed with the costs, or say that they did this out of generosity. Everybody

agreed, however, on the fact that Karbaye had paid only half the costs, while the rest of the

villages had paid the rest.

One man from Karbaye said to me: “before the pond was created, all the villages were asked

if there would be any problems, and everybody said no. But when the pond was finished,

Guirowel brought their animals there anyway. They did not respect it.” Moreover, Karbaye

tried, according to several of my informants, from both Guirowel and Karbaye, to persuade

the herders to move their livestock corridor somewhat farther from the pond, as there is, in

their view, plenty of land to use for this purpose. The herders, on their side, do not want to

move the burtol because it was established during the Dina, and is regarded as Fulani property

and important to their tradition. This burtol is among many herders regarded as ‘the last thing’

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they still have, after having lost a lot of land for agricultural purposes. Also, importantly, a

moving of the livestock corridor would imply destruction of millet fields (mostly cultivated

by agro-pastoralists from Guirowel), which the area is surrounded by.

The herders from Guirowel did not accept that Karbaye denied them access to the area, and

came there anyway. All the cattle grazed on the caser pastoral in which the pond was placed,

and there were no other places to let the cattle drink. When the previous pond was in function,

Karbaye had accepted the presence of smaller animals, like goats or a few cows, but not larger

flocks of cattle. The rehabilitated pond, however, should according to CIDA also benefit

cattle. Karbaye, however, denied all animals any entrance to the area around the pond. The

herders, on their side, felt they had the right to go there, as i) they had contributed to finance

the pond, and ii) the pond was created in their pastoral area. Many people in Karbaye, on the

other hand, believe that the only reason the herders went to the pond and the burtol in the

morning the conflict took place, was to provoke, not because they needed to let their cattle

drink. Most of the farmers in Karbaye say they came there because “they [the Fulani] were

too proud,” and that they wanted “to assert themselves” over the farmers. “They refused to

accept that we are in that land, so they came anyway, and it was very dangerous for the

children who came there with their mothers who worked in the gardens.” One farmer in

Karbaye even said: “The Fulani wanted to demonstrate their power by debasing Karbaye, so

they wanted to make a burtol in the pond area.”

Many of my informants claim that this was the last straw that generated the conflict. The

herders were angry and refused to accept Karbaye’s expansion into the casier pastoral and

burtol. One thing was that they had cultivated the pastoral land ever since it had been given

back to the herders, another was that they now created a pond in the middle of this area,

claimed only they could use it, and then additionally establishing gardens that gradually grew

into both the casier pastoral and the burtol. A man from Guirowel told me that one important

cause behind the conflict was that ORM and ODEM “gave the land to the herders,” but when

I ask him why there was not a conflict earlier then, since the casier became pastoral in 1984,

he said “it was the creation of the pond that made the conflict burst.”

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5.1.3 Political vacuum and ‘lack of governance’

“Before it was a dictator, and then everything was very strict, but after we got democracy,

no one is in charge anymore. There is a lack of power here.”

Key informant in Manaco, 22.02.09

As outlined in chapter 3.3, Mali went through a series of decentralization reforms during the

1990s. This was aimed at making the cooperation between the state and the people better and

more efficient, and created a huge increase in elected local officials, from less than 20 to more

than 700 (Library of Congress 2005). However, the different roles of the officers were not

well defined, and many talk about a ‘power vacuum’ that occurred in the aftermath of these

processes (see e.g. Benjaminsen and Ba 2009). In this political vacuum, ‘no one’ knew who

were in charge of administration or governance in the outlying areas and remote villages. Also,

because of the diffuseness of these reforms and what they should imply, the government

gradually withdrew from rural areas. The result of this was less and poorer administrative

control, and this was also the case in Kounary.

5.1.3.1 Lack of administration and power vacuum:

One important consequence of this political vacuum is that ORM withdrew from Kounary.

The casier rizicole became pastoral land already in 1984, but they had, together with ODEM,

governed the dikes and the plots until now. However, in 1998 they left the management of the

casier and the dikes to Association Bomani. Bomani was, as mentioned earlier, a group

consisting of local men, and was not a formal or official unit. When Bomani took over the

management, problems began to occur. These men knew nothing about management, and

administrative tasks declined. Moreover, it became easier for the farmers to cultivate in the

casier, since there was a lack of authorities to handle such problems and smaller breaches.

The sous-préfet said to me that the conflict is a political problem, not related to resources or

land tenure. He said that “in the beginning the casier was managed by ORM, but when the

local people themselves should take over the management, problems occurred.”

Moreover, when Karbaye wanted to rehabilitate the pond, there were no outside officials to

participate in the discussions on beforehand. RESA apparently carried out several analyses

together with officials in the cercle, but according to several informants, these officials “just

stayed in their homes and did not come here to see. They know nothing about our land.”

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There were no one to consult in Manaco (head of the commune) or within the involved

villages, since governmental presence largely had declined. Hence, Karbaye and the other

villages held negotiations on their own initiative. Most likely, these negotiations ended up

with misunderstandings, as the involved parts largely disagree on who should get to use the

pond, what purposes it should have, and so on. I regard these disagreements as part of the

picture that illustrates how authorities or land managers were lacking. These problems

worsened as there were no one in charge of solving such disputes.

Many of my informants said that the conflict was caused by what they call a “lack of

authorities.” One key informant said that “the conflict is related to the fact that now,

everybody is “free” and can do what they want,” referring to uncertainty and confusion about

who were in charge after the reforms. As the state decreased its presence and responsibilities,

many feared that governmental services would become worse in rural areas (Benjaminsen

1997: 135). This was indeed the case in Kounary. A herder in Guirowel even told me that

“the authorities caused the conflict, because they were not here.” Another one said; “it is a

farmer-herder conflict that is caused by the government!”

This illustrates the fact that many of my informants blamed the authorities for the conflict also

because of their ignorance to the problem of tensions between the farmers and herders.

Tensions had been present each year ever since ODEM and ORM turned the casier into

pastoral land, and the officials, including ORM, did not do any preparing work before they

restructured the land. Most people I talked to say that the authorities were aware of the

problems, but did nothing to find a solution; instead they just closed their eyes. One man I

interviewed said “they did not even come here to see themselves, they just stayed in their

offices and did not care, and so the conflict burst.” In 2001, there were even rumours that

Karbaye had begun to procure weapons, some had threatened the herders and warned them

against going to the pond. Many also claim that the authorities had been warned there would

be a violent conflict, without doing anything to prevent this from happening, except holding a

meeting that found no solutions.

5.1.3.2 Belly politics and rent seeking:

Land property is not well-defined in pastoral areas, especially concerning management of

natural resources. After the implementation of the decentralization reforms, difficulties in

recognizing land ownership or customary rights became more problematic. In Kounary, this

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resulted in many mediating stakeholders taking advantage of the vacuum that emerged,

“taking possession of land or by making claims to land in various ways” (Benjaminsen and Ba

2009: 77, Benjaminsen 1997). This is supported by Olivier de Sardan (1999) and Bayart

(1993) who both argue that in Africa, it was largely the post-colonial building of a state

apparatus that contributed in building a system of petty corruption.

Many of my informants talked about officials exploiting their positions, allocating resources

to themselves. This is especially true when it comes to management of the dikes and irrigation

systems in the irrigated plots. The farmers have to pay a ‘water price’ to ORM (30 000 CFA,

as mentioned previously) for using irrigated plots. This fee is supposed to go to maintenance

of the irrigation system and the dikes, but many claim they do not see where the money is

going (see also Benjaminsen and Ba 2009). Many on the farmers I interviewed emphasized

that they did not benefit from ORM’s projects, because the dikes and the plots were not

sufficiently maintained. The canals easily get clogged up and the dikes disintegrate, in line

with what also Benjaminsen and Ba (2009) conclude. Many informants said that they had to

pay the ‘water price’ to ORM anyway, even though the plot they paid for were insufficiently

maintained, because if not, ORM would confiscate their land and give it to someone else. This

practice can be termed rent seeking, which as outlined in chapter 2.4.2, implies an extraction

of values without contributing to productivity. This partly contributed to cause tensions in

Kounary, because it led to land degradation and prevented access to agricultural land for the

farmers (plots becoming barren). This has also contributed to a lack of solutions in land tenure

disputes, including the conflict in 2001, as local officials tend to exploit disagreements by

allocating resources for themselves, following Benjaminsen and Ba 2009.

Moreover, there seems to have been a practice of local officials supporting the claims of both

farmers and herders parts at the same time in Kounary. These are important factors that

sustain tensions and disagreements between herders and farmers. An important aspect of the

‘lack of governance,’ is that no one prevented or punished neither farmers nor herders when

they continued to expand into each other’s areas for two decades. Both groups were told that

they could use the land, most likely at different times, although many in fact claim that they

were both allowed to use the land at the same time. As indicated in previous chapters, local

officials and institutions have been ambiguous in the management of the casiers. First the

land was set aside for agricultural purposes, and then it was reserved for pastoral purposes. An

important problem is that officials are not being clear in what they say and do. One informant

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told me: “first they gave the land to the farmers, but the authorities did not come to see what

it would mean to the herders. Then they gave the land back to the herders, but they did not see

what it would mean to the farmers. They should have been more involved in the villages, but

they just sit in their offices and they do not know what they are doing to us.” A herder in

Guirowel told me: ”The government allowed the farmers to cultivate in the casier even though

they had given the land to the herders. They supported both herders and farmers; the conflict

was caused by bad governance!” Another one said: “The government is the main cause of the

conflict! They told both herders and farmers that they could use the land.” A man in

Guirowel said to me in an interview: “The land managers just support everyone depending on

their money.” Another informant said: “There are some politicians that are involved, they

come here and tell us to vote for them and they will give us land.” One of my key informants

said, chuckling a bit, when I asked him why the farmers are still using the land that was

allocated to the herders, “you see, both farmers and herders give money to the authorities...”

This clearly illustrates the lack of power that prevailed after the government withdrew from

the rural areas. Indeed, according to Benjaminsen (1997) there was some criticism about the

implementation of the decentralization laws, as these easily could lead to more land tenure

conflicts. A man at DNPIA said to me that ”it would probably have been less conflict if the

political system was better. Now they just support all parts and no one knows who manages

the land.”

A judge I interviewed in the Appeal Court in Mopti told me that corruption is a very

important aspect of this conflict and of farmer-herder conflicts in general. He said: “I do not

have proof of corruption, but these conflicts would have been very easy to solve, so it is not

difficult to read the signs. Authorities, leaders, cultural associations, they should be able to

solve these conflict together so easily.” He emphasizes that one of the most important reasons

why these conflicts are not solved, is that one involved party often get help from political

leaders who do it for their own benefits. Also another key informant emphasized this; “if

someone give them [the officials] money, they [those who give them money] will benefit. This

makes it difficult to solve conflicts between farmers and herders.” Benjaminsen and Ba (2009:

78) argue that “the ones who pay the most to the administration, is also the one who will be

most listened to. This also goes for the legal system.” It is difficult to say anything about this

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concerning the specific case in Kounary.26 I do however want to emphasize that Karbaye won

the trial even though all the involved parties, even ORM, supported the herders in this case.

Nonetheless, both Guirowel and Karbaye accused the other part for having given money to

the administration at one point or another in this case.

5.1.4 Summary

On the background of the aspects discussed above, it is my argument that the conflict between

Kounary and Guirowel in 2001 was caused by several different factors that together

contributed to tensions and eventually caused the outbreak of violent conflict.

First of all, the interventions by ORM in the land use system, was an important cause behind

the conflict. The confiscation of pastoral areas led to cattle going onto cultivated land, as they

had nowhere else to graze or drink. This caused anger among the farmers, whose harvest was

often destroyed. This also resulted in frustration among the herders, who lost their land and

experienced an overall pastoral marginalization that had been the trend in the area for decades.

When ORM and ODEM eventually restructured the land and established the casier pastoral,

the farmers were angry and upset because they lost agricultural fields. As they had been

allocated this land only seven years earlier, and were not consulted before this decision was

taken, they felt that the new land legislation was not decisive, and they felt they had the right

to continue the cultivation on the land. As a result, the herders’ cattle destroyed their harvest

when they too continued to use the land. Both harvest and grazing land was destroyed year

after year. Another aspect of this, is that ORM contributed to cause a land degradation in the

case study area, as many of the plots they had established remained dry and neither reached

by the irrigation systems nor the natural flooding. This exacerbated the process of farmers

going into grazing land to cultivate, and it also led to an increased competition over land

within groups of farmers. In sum, ORM’s intervention in the case study area caused i)

prevented access to land for both herders and eventually also partly farmers, ii) partly a

degradation of land, and iii) eventually a conflict.

26 Due to among others the short time frame of field work and limited scope of the study.

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Second, in my opinion, the rehabilitation of the pond was decisive. The people from Karbaye

held that the pond and the area surrounding it was theirs since it was so close to their village,

and the herders meant it was theirs, since the area had been their burgu land since the Dina in

the first place, and as they had, in their own words, “finally been given back these fields” for

grazing purposes in 1984. It is easy to see why Karbaye regarded the area in which the pond

was created as theirs, as they had (unpunished) used parts of the casier for cultivation ever

since 1977, and still do. However, the area was, and still is, a casier pastoral, and the pond

partly blocked this area for the cattle. It also gradually blocked the burtol, so that herders

neither could take their cattle through the livestock corridor nor to graze in the casier pastoral.

The herders hence continued to bring their cattle there, something which Karbaye regarded as

a provocation. The conflict burst only four months after the pond was created, and it might

therefore, in my view, have been ‘the straw that broke the camel’s back.’

Third, the political vacuum and ‘lack of governance’ in Kounary during the 1990s,

contributed to cause conflict, and has been an important obstacle for peaceful solutions. The

withdrawal of the state from rural areas like Kounary caused to a certain extent i) officials

taking advantage of the situation and allocating resources and values to themselves, ii) some

kind of lawlessness, as no one were punished for expanding into others’ land, and as it was

not clear who were in charge of managing the land, and as it remained unclear who were in

charge of the overall authority. This lack of governance also contributed to misunderstandings

concerning the pond rehabilitation, as there was a lack of official discussion in advance of this

project. Iii), the political vacuum caused problems when management of the casier pastoral

was handed over to Association Bomani, and finally, iv) belly politics is part of this backdrop,

as officials largely have supported both parts in the conflict. This means both an ambiguity

among officials and governmental authorities, which caused uncertainty and confusion about

administration, and direct petty corruption, which has caused problems of solving the conflict.

Although discontent, frustration and anger prevailed among both herders and farmers as ORM

and ODEM intervened and restructured the local land use, the relationship between them was

relatively peaceful through the 1980s and 1990s. This is in my view largely related to the fact

that there was a more proper administrative presence in Kounary these years.

In sum, a total of 62 % of all my informants said that they thought the conflict was related to

the authorities, ORM, the pond or politics in some way, while 50 % directly blamed either of

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these. Only 2 % said specifically that they did not regard the authorities as part of the conflict

in any ways.

Figure 11: Local perceptions on whether the conflict is related to political aspects.

The numbers are however not equally distributed among the villages. As demonstrated in

figure 12, 75 % of my informants in Guirowel blames the pond or the authorities. The herders

typically regarded background factors like these as the cause of the conflict. This is supported

by Turner (2004) who says that farmers and herders experience their conflict differently, as

farmers are more concerned over damaged crops etc, while herders tend to look more at the

structural causes of the conflict. In Kounary, the creation of the dikes and the pond were both

regarded as structural factors that marginalized the herders, and as demonstrated in figure 13,

the herders I interviewed typically regard these aspects as important for the conflict outbreak.

Only 26 % of the informants in Karbaye blame any of these political factors. Rather, people

from Karbaye typically blamed Guirowel for the conflict. In total, 60 % from Karbaye said it

was Guirowel who had caused the conflict, while in comparison only 25 % of the informants

in Guirowel blamed Karbaye. This is possibly related to methodological issues as discussed in

chapter four, like for instance people from Karbaye were afraid of being accused of having

caused the conflict, and they were overall very reluctant to talk about the conflict. Typical

answers from Karbaye were: “I do not know anything about the conflict, I was not here” or “I

do not know anything about it because I was sick at that time, but I heard from the others it

was the herders who caused it.” However, very often people in Karbaye started to explain to

me later in the interview what happened on the conflict day, and it became clearer after a

while that although they said they directly blamed Guirowel, they recognized several factors

that led to tensions. A typical reply was “there were some misunderstandings between the

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villages, everybody went to the same area, and I blame the herders because they came there.”

One farmer in Karbaye said: “the pond caused the conflict because it was made in the burtol,”

but when I asked him who he blamed for the conflict, he said “Guirowel, because they got

land from us first [ODEM’s creation of the casier pastoral] but then they wanted to take all

the land from us [by using the burtol and the area surrounding the pond].” Another typical

reply was: “Satan caused the conflict, because a pond was created in the burtol.” It is

moreover likely that the people from Karbaye blame Guirowel for the conflict outburst,

because the conflict incident broke out when people from Guirowel came with their cattle. In

this aspect it is interesting to note that the people from Guirowel for the most part do not

blame Karbaye, although they were physically attacked by them.

Figure 12 and 13: Bar charts identifying who or what factors that are

blamed for the conflict within each village and livelihood group (note: the labels ‘farmer and herder’ and

‘herder and farmer’ are people who recognized themselves as both. Mentioned first in the labels is what

livelihood they perceived as being their dominant way of living).

As demonstrated in figure 12, inhabitants in Manaco have a far more balanced view on what

caused the conflict. It is also evident that in Guirowel and Karbaye, all informants either

blame each other, the authorities or the pond. This underlines my assertion that it was the

pond that made the situation escalate into violent conflict, although the situation leading up to

it involved several interlinked aspects.

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5.2 Discussion: the political ecology of a farmer-herder conflict

I have chosen to frame this study within a political ecological approach as well as drawing on

arguments from the environmental security thesis. I believe the way environmental problems

like resource scarcity and environmental conflict are portrayed today largely overlook the

political and economic aspects behind environmental process and conflict. I argue that it is

necessary to investigate backdrops and underlying factors behind environmental problems,

change and conflict instead of only scratching the surface, as I believe is largely done in many

such contexts today.

As outlined in chapter two, I regard the environmental security thesis largely a contrast to

political ecology. As both these theoretical frameworks can be applied to the objectives and

content of this study, I will in the following draw on my own findings to discuss the

applicability and arguments of both approaches.

5.2.1 Resource degradation in the case study area

As outlined in chapter 2.6.2, common perceptions about ‘environmental violence’ imply

environmental degradation as one of the most important conflict triggers in the Sahel. Lack of

rainfall, desertification and increased resource scarcity are important factors in this picture.

When it comes to the area where the conflict of this study took place, I have not identified any

of these factors as causes of the conflict.

5.2.1.1 Rainfall patterns, resource scarcity and drought:

The environmental security thesis argues that decreased rainfall and higher temperatures in

dryland areas like the Sahel will cause environmental degradation and resource scarcity. This

is one of the main arguments within ‘the Sahelian crisis’ narrative. Decrease in rainfall is

believed to cause resource scarcity which again is believed to cause conflict (Homer-Dixon

1999, Baechler 1999). In Kounary, like in Mali and the Sahel in general, it is difficult to know

the overall climate pattern when it comes to rainfall and temperatures, as measures older than

seventy years simply do not exist. We do however know that the 1930s were relatively dry,

and as indicated in figure 14 and 15, the 1950s were wet, while the 1970s and 1980s again

were dry (Benjaminsen 2009: 156- 157). There has been an overall increase in rainfall again

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since the 1980s. Based on predominantly secondary sources, I have not identified any climate

changes or increased resource scarcity in the case study area, although this of course is

difficult to investigate within the scope of this study. Several of my informants said that there

have been no climate changes at all, or positive climate changes (referring to more rain, longer

rainy seasons and cooler hot seasons) in the case study area, especially the last five to seven

years. One of my informants, a man at the age of 37, said: “I heard from the elder that it

rained more and that the years were better in the old days [1940s-1960s], but compared to

when I was young, it is much better now.” Figure 14 and 15 clearly indicates that there has

not been a decrease in rainfall in Mali or in the Mopti region. These factors were hence, in my

view, not part of the causes for the conflict in Kounary in 2001.

Figure 14: Annual rainfall in Mali, 1940- 1998 (obtained from Kevane and Gray 2008: 8).

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

mm

Figure 15: Annual rainfall in Mopti, 1950- 2008 (note: measures from 1997 are missing)

(based on statistics obtained from Service Météo Bamako, 2009).

However, the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s might indirectly have been contributing factors

in the backdrop that caused tensions in Kounary. First of all, the droughts led to lower flood

levels in the river Niger, something that, as we know, caused expansion of rice fields and

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tensions between farmers and herders in the delta. Today’s tensions have roots back to this

expansion of rice cultivation, because it goes straight into the history of pastoral

marginalization in the region. The flood levels have increased somewhat again since the

1980s, so the droughts were not direct causes to the 2001 conflict as such, but to an overall

more conflictual relation between herders and farmers in the delta in general.

Second, ORM’s projects on land conversion were to a great extent a response to the droughts

of the 1970s. In the aftermath of these droughts, the Malian government started several large-

scale projects and an overall policy aiming at increasing agricultural activities and food

production. Many areas had become dry, including the burgu land in which the casier rizicole

in Kounary was established on. In this way, resource scarcity can be said to have been an

indirect cause of the tensions that later emerged. However, if ORM had managed the

environmental problems and land scarcity caused by the droughts properly, tensions would

probably not have occurred. Moreover, the tensions emerged based on ORM’s land

intervention, not a land scarcity as such.

Finally, the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s contributed as a backdrop for the conflict

because the original pond outside Karbaye partly dried up as a result of them. RESA and

Karbaye re-established the pond, something which as we know largely contributed to cause

the conflict in 2001. This was an environmental change in the case study area that led to

conflict, but also this was only indirectly, because first of all, it was a political decision that

led to the establishment of the pond, second, the decision on making the pond took place in a

political vacuum where no one really were in charge of the project, and three, because the

involved parts (RESA, the villages, officials and stakeholders) did not carry out sufficient

stakeholder analyses before the project was started, leading to misunderstandings that largely

led to tensions in the aftermath of the project. Other villages were denied any use of the pond,

and the purposes of the pond were not clear and thoroughly discussed by all parts, something

which led to farmers starting to cultivate on the borders of it and expanding into the casier

pastoral. Most importantly, however, the pond might not have caused problems or tensions if

it had been properly managed or if the involved parts had agreed on its purposes. It was not

the pond itself that caused conflict, it was rather the uses of the land surrounding it. This

might also again have been affected by the political vacuum, since no one penalized Karbaye

for cultivating vegetables in the casier or for denying the other villages to use it.

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Hence, the droughts might indirectly have led to tensions. However, it was not the

environmental problems that led to conflict, but insufficient management of them. This is also

emphasized by Watts (1983), in explaining how the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s were

climatic problems, but the following famines were social problems.

5.2.1.2 Desertification:

The environmental security school, and to a great extent today’s policymakers and scholars,

claim desert encroachment will contribute to severe environmental stress in the Sahel.

Drought, soil erosion and degradation of land are believed to have huge implications for the

desiccation and encroachment of the Sahara. As outlined in chapter 2.2.1 and 2.2.2,

desertification is among the factors believed to have the most impact on conflict in the region.

However, none of my informants recognized any desert encroachment in the case study area.

This is in line with what Benjaminsen (2008b, 2009) argues, that the trend that has been

observed all over the Sahel the last 20 years has been a “greening of the Sahel,” not

desertification, which is the dominating belief. This is also indicated in figure 16, based on the

conclusions of Herrmann et. al. (2005):

This research […] refute[s] claims of widespread human-induced land degradation [...].Rather, a

greening of the Sahel expressed in positive trends in NDVI [Normalized Difference Vegetation

Index] indicates a net increase in biomass production during the period 1982- 2003, which

challenges the notion of irreversible desertification in the Sahel (Herrmann et. al. 2005: 402).

Based on this, and the fact that I could not identify any desertification in the case study area, I

do not regard desertification as a contributing factor to the conflict in Kounary.

Figure 16: Trends in vegetation greenness in the Sahel, 1982- 2003.

Percentages indicate changes in average vegetation27 (Herrmann et. al. 2005).

27 Based on measures of monthly Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHHR) and Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) (Herrmann et. al. 2005).

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5.2.1.3 Summary:

Based on the aspects discussed above, I conclude that neither environmental degradation nor

resource scarcity can be regarded as causes behind the conflict in Kounary in 2001. In the

Sahel, farmer-herder conflicts have been prevalent also in times of drought and in wet periods

(Dafinger and Pelican 2006). Additionally, there are areas here with a scarce resource base

but no conflict, and there are conflicts in “relatively land abundant areas” (Bassett 1988: 453).

A ‘sudden resource scarcity’ based on climate change can therefore not explain farmer-herder

conflicts alone, nor can it explain over-lapping land uses (like grazing of cropped land and

cultivation of grazing land). This is indeed demonstrated in this case study, considering the

structural causes behind pastoral and agricultural expansion. Indeed, only 2 % of all the

people I talked to in the case study area blamed resource scarcity as a cause of the conflict. A

farmer in Guirowel in fact said, when I asked him if he believed the conflict was related to

resource scarcity; “No, no! There has always been resource scarcity; the conflict has nothing

to do with that!” This is also the conclusion of Moorehead (1991), who demonstrates that

none of the theories or arguments related to ‘the Sahelian crisis’ narrative have been sufficient

in explaining farmer-herder tensions in the inland Niger delta.

Figure 17: Local perceptions on whether the conflict is related to natural resources.

My findings demonstrate that the farmer-herder tensions in this case study are caused by

governmental interference in the land tenure system. This also largely corresponds with the

conclusions of Benjaminsen and Ba (2009). Based on the aspects discussed above, I therefore

argue that it is crucial to look at more underlying causes in explaining environmental

problems in the case study area and the conflict of 2001.

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Most of the principles of the environmental security school are therefore insufficient in

explaining the conflict of this study. Blaming the climate and resource scarcity would in this

case imply an ignorance of far more important underlying aspects. Indeed, as Hendrix and

Glaser (2007: 711) argue; “the neo-Malthusian expectation of a decreasing resource base may

miss more theoretically interesting mechanisms leading to conflict in resource-scarce

environments.” This correlates with research from the Peace Research Institue of Oslo (PRIO),

that among others have concluded that environmental stress plays a less causal role than

economic and social factors (although it can be present) (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998).

5.2.2 The political ecology of environmental change and conflict in the case study area

Moritz (2006) argues that farmer-herders conflicts have to be analyzed within institutional

contexts of both formal and informal rules. This means investigating balances of power,

decision-making and focus of development programs, as well as pastoral rights, since these

often are undermined at the expense of agricultural rights. As shown in chapter 5.1, the main

cause behind the conflict in Kounary in 2001, was large-scale conversions of rice fields and

loss of pastoral land, and the creation of the pond. These factors are environmental changes,

but they are environmental changes caused by political factors. This illustrates the necessity

of looking at political, economic and social causes behind environmental processes to

understand environmental problems and conflict. Political ecology offers a radical critique

against neo-Malthusian assumptions regarding the environment, especially concerning

environmental conflict and struggle (Peluso and Watts 2001). As outlined in chapter 2.5, this

approach seeks rather to critically see the environment through a contextual approach of

political, historical and societal processes. It sees the nature as power-laden and focuses on

structures and actors in the environment and among decision-makers (Robbins 2004, Bryant

2001: 167, Adger et. al. 2001: 682). This makes political ecology a useful framework for

understanding the environmental changes, problems and conflict of this study.

5.2.2.1 Connections between political structures and environmental process:

The environmental security thesis has received a lot of critique from several stands, and most

importantly, it has been criticized for being indifferent to social, economic, historical and

political factors in explaining environmental problems and conflict (Gleditsch 1998, Peluso

and Watts 2001). It is necessary to see the connections between political structures and the

environment to understand environmental process and conflict.

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First of all, direct political interventions in environmental processes are common. Such direct

interventions include development projects, like for instance hydro-power dams, deforestation,

like in agrofuel business, or direct land reforms. Such interventions are common in large parts

of the world, illustrating how political processes and the environment are closely related. In

Kounary, historical and socio-political processes have largely shaped environmental

structures, through land tenure systems and processes rooted in the Dina Empire. Moreover,

and more importantly, national policies and direct restructuring of land have shaped people’s

access to natural resources. Direct national agricultural policy had a huge impact on land use

in Kounary, as illustrated by ORM’s restructuring of land, something which to a large extent

caused problems. Also the creation of the pond illustrates how political interventions cause

environmental change leading to problems. This clearly illustrates the necessity of taking

politics into account when explaining environmental changes and hence conflict.

Second, political processes can directly cause environmental degradation. This is supported in

the arguments rooted in green materialism from the 1970s and 1980s (see chapter 2.5.1), and

is today also an important part of political ecology. Political structures and environmental

changes are largely related. In Kounary, this is illustrated by the fact that the dikes and

irrigation systems created by ORM, in addition to prevent access to land, also partly caused a

direct degradation of land. This underlines the argument that resource degradation not

necessarily is a natural, environmental phenomenon. Many of my informants emphasized that

ORM had created a degradation of agricultural land in the case study area. This was also a

factor which exacerbated problems, discontent and tensions. Moreover, as discussed the

previous part, in Kounary, political vacuum and ‘lack of governance’ were important

backdrops environmental conflict. This also concerns corruption in natural resource

management, and clearly strengthens the argument that it is necessary to investigate political

structures related to environmental process, change and conflict.

Third, and most importantly, the concept of resource scarcity does not provide a useful

understanding of the relations between resources and conflict. According to Peluso and Watts

(2001: 20), Homer-Dixon (1999) assumes what the outcomes of environmental problems can

be, instead of actually showing them. This illustrates a basic methodological problem for the

environmental security thesis, which indeed has been criticized for being under-theorized and

for basing its theories on postulated future events without having empirical evidence or

sufficient methodological foundation (Gleditsch 1998: 393, Raleigh and Urdal 2007: 678,

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Peluso and Watts 2001: 6, 18- 20). Political ecologists emphasize that conflict analysis should

begin with exploring the political economy of resources, instead of the amount of them.

Indeed, Peluso and Watts (2001) argue that analysis of violence should begin with the precise

and changing relations between political economy and mechanisms of access, control and

struggle over environmental resources. Scarcity (and abundance) of resources are historically,

socially and environmentally produced expressions, and such should not be the starting point

for analysis as they are “connected to larger processes of material transformation and power

relations” (Peluso and Watts 2001: 4). Peluso and Watts (2001) argue that there are

underlying factors behind environmental problems that should be analyzed first of all.

Resource degradation and unequal access to resources do not emerge from nowhere, and

should be explored thoroughly before claiming they lead to conflict.

Figure 18: A political ecology of environmental violence (Source: Peluso and Watts 2001: 28).

Also Turner (2004: 865) argues that the “seemingly straightforward ‘conflicts over resources’

are produced from a set of broader processes of change within specific historical contexts.”

Moreover, he argues that such conflicts represent a type of social conflict, and that it is

important to address the underlying reasons for such tensions (Turner 2004: 863, 868). He

points out that farmer-herder conflicts most often have been fuelled by external factors, and

are mostly also linked to other conflicts (see also Bassett 1988). The underlying causes behind

these scenarios are often more interesting to take into account when explaining the causal

relationships behind conflict, but this is ignored by the environmental security school. Indeed,

Moorehead (1991: 32) argues;

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For hundreds of years Delta inhabitants have lived in […] an hierarchical structure overseen by

a resource manager who allocated access to resources clearly bounded within a territory that is

accepted as being their property. Yet […] increasingly in recent years, the conditions for

‘Tragedy of the commons’ and ‘Prisoners Dilemma’ outcomes are becoming apparent. This

situation cannot be accounted for solely as a result of increasing scarcity […], but rather must be

looked for in the ways in which local inhabitants are being prevented from managing resources

that customarily belonged to them.

This proves true for the conflict in Kounary, where political structures prevented inhabitants

from using resources that previously had belonged to them. As illustrated in figure 19, the

causes of environmental change, problems and eventually conflict in Kounary were not

environmental degradation or resource scarcity, but a complex matrix of interlinked factors

rooted predominantly in political structures. This figure can be seen in comparison to Homer-

Dixon’s figure on sources and consequences of environmental scarcity (see figure 1).

Figure 19: Causes of the conflict between Karbaye and Guirowel in 2001

(note: red factors indicate political structures).

This is also emphasized by Turner (2004), who argues that people’s access to resources are

shaped by social as well as environmental change, and that farmer-herder conflicts hence

should be investigated through an interlinked complexity, seeking to understand “the relative

importance of moral concerns in the underlying motivations of the disputants themselves”

(Turner 2004: 865, 866). Turner argues that political ecology, “through its active engagement

with the materiality of resource use, is well-placed to contribute to a fuller understanding of

the interplay of material and nonmaterial antecedents to resource-related conflicts” (Turner

2004: 884). Indeed, Peluso and Watts (2001) argue that the environmental security thesis

focuses on scarcities produced instead of taking into account the mechanisms of appropriation

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and exclusion from access at the heart of this process, or explaining the causes behind the

scarcities. This illustrates the importance of distinguishing resource scarcity and access.

5.2.2.2 Resource scarcity vs. resource access:

My findings illustrate the most important problem with, and critique against, the

environmental security thesis; that political and economic factors largely are ignored in

dealing with environmental degradation, resource scarcity and other environmental issues.

These structures are crucial for understanding both resource use and environmental problems

also in the case study area of this study.

Political ecology sees people’s access to resources as “multi-faceted and contested,” and as

shaped by both “social and environmental change” (Turner 2004: 865). An important aspect

of this is how can we measure ‘environmental scarcity’? Homer-Dixon (1995) has a model for

this; consumption divided by stocks equals scarcity. There are however some problems with

this model. It is criticized for being insufficient, too simplistic, and for ignoring factors like

time fluctuations and commodity prices (Gleditsch 1998: 383). Moreover, a possibility that

consumption might be low while the resource stock is large, is not taken into account. Indeed,

political ecologists argue that the environmental security literature is based on poor

environmental knowledge and that it is unclear concerning the use of concepts and methods

(e.g. Peluso and Watts 2001: 20, Nordås and Gleditsch 2007: 630).

This is one example of such an environmental concept that can not be applied to the case of

this study, since in Kounary, resource scarcity was i) partly caused by political intervention,

and ii) more related to resource access, than absolute scarcity. Homer-Dixon (1994) does

recognize this possibility, in his theories on relative-deprivation conflicts, implying that also

resource access can lead to conflict based on resource distribution. In this way, one of the

arguments of this thesis can be illustrated by this case. Most of my informants said that the

reason they had less access to land now, was not increased scarcity of resources, but a

prevented access to resources, caused by governmental intervention. Irrigation systems caused

a lack of land and prevented both farmers and herders from using available land. This clearly

shows that it is not possible to measure scarcity of resources in Kounary by consumption

divided by stocks, and illustrates an important flaw in Homer-Dixon’s model; the fact that

political, economic and social factors are not taken into account in analysing scarcity of

natural resources. It is more a relational scarcity, following Turner (2004: 877), who argues

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that resource-related conflict is more often driven by “relational rather than absolute

scarcities,” and are hence “less likely to be “in-the-moment” struggles over a particular

resource patch and more likely to resemble strategic contests to maintain resource access over

the longer-term.” Related to this is also, as discussed in chapter 2.2.1, the fact that land

degradation is a perceptual term, meaning it depends on who defines what degradation of that

specific resource implies. This is true for the concept of scarcity as well, especially if we talk

about an overall environmental scarcity. Who decides when an environment is ‘scarce’? This

is also further related to the value of land, as also previously discussed. In Kounary, the

perceptions about a prevailing land scarcity led to among others the establishment of the

casier rizicoles. Neither was value of land taken into consideration in this case. The land

conversion was done on land that had dried out, and which the authorities hence regarded as

scarce. The area was however burgu land that had belonged to the Fulani for centuries, and

although it did not grow burgu there at the time ORM intervened, it had different meanings of

value for the herders than it had to the authorities and officials who started the land

conversion projects there. This illustrates the importance of investigating underlying

structures before intervening in environmental structures.

5.2.2.3 Summary:

As I have now shown, the conflict of this study can easily look like a typical example of a

resource induced conflict between farmers and herders. When one however takes into

consideration political, economic, historical and social factors and relations between the

involved parts, it is clear that one has to take background factors into account in order to

understand the picture. There are in sum three different political influences on the conflict in

Kounary, illustrating that the environmental security thesis is insufficient in explaining the

conflict. First of all, degradation and scarcity of resources in Kounary have largely been

caused by political factors, and has more to do with a prevented access to resource than a

simple scarcity. Second, it was governmental interference, politics and marginalization that

created tensions between the farmers and herders involved, and finally, a political vacuum and

a ‘lack of government’ contributed to cause tensions. Not investigating important underlying

factors and causes of farmer-herder conflicts, or ignoring cultural and historical aspects

behind the situation, can have serious consequences. This can again lead to for instance false

conclusions about solutions to conflict resolutions. Seen in a larger perspective then, this can

have drastic consequences if conflicts simply are attributed to resource scarcity without

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underlying aspects behind environmental problems and the social mechanisms of conflict

having been taken into account.

5.2.3 Farmer-herder conflicts in ‘the time of global warming’

Contemporary farmer-herder conflicts in the Sahel largely serve as examples of resource

scarcity-induced conflicts (Baechler 1999), in line with ‘the Sahelian crisis narrative’ and the

environmental security concerns. This is exacerbated by the growing belief in global warming

and the severe consequences this process is believed to have, especially in dryland areas like

the Sahel. This has become a very strong narrative the last few years, although there are still

scientific doubts about what is happening and what the outcomes will be (IPCC 2007,

Salehyan 2008). Salehyan (2008) says that “claims of environmental determinism leading

seamlessly from climate change to open warfare are suspect” (Salehyan 2008: 317). The study

of environmental change and farmer-herder conflicts are challenged in such an environment.

Political ecologists argue that farmer-herder conflicts are more than simple resource conflicts,

(Bassett 1988, Turner 2004). Moreover, such conflicts need to be explored through the

concepts of access to and control over resources, and emphasizes power relations as essential

in understanding these relationships, instead of just blaming simple scarcity and

environmental stress. Political ecology is therefore “well suited for analyzing the etiology” of

farmer-herder conflicts like the one investigated in this study, because it can address “the

physical and political economic natures of the resources in question” (Turner 2004: 866).

Turner (2004: 865) further argues that political ecological analyses have revealed that

resource-related farmer-herder conflicts have been caused by broader processes and historical

change more than resource-scrambles. This is clearly illustrated through my own case.

As production systems most often can be associated with specific socio-cultural groups, as in

the case of this study, it is difficult to determine whether farmer-herder conflicts are solely

resource-related conflicts, or if they articulate with other types of tensions. This is especially

true in areas with environmental scarcity. Turner (2004) therefore presents several questions

we, through political ecology, must ask in studying resource-related conflicts: i) What is the

social benefit and harm associated with such conflicts?, ii) how are rural networks implicated

in conflicts like these?, iii) are the conflicts actually over natural resources, or is this a factor

that have only come more into play at a later stage in the conflict?, iv) is the conflict driven by

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resource scarcity or resource abundance?, v) if the conflicts are over resources, are they

unreflective scrambles or are they strategic concerns?, and vi) how might different portrayals

of the conflict serve different interests? (Turner 2004: 869- 870). By analysing these questions

and investigating these circumstances thoroughly, we can more easily determine causes of

such conflicts, as illustrated in the case of the conflict in Kounary. This conflict can easily

look like a typical resource scarcity-induced farmer-herder conflict, but as I have shown, it

articulates more with political interventions, structures and policies.

There are several problems related to misunderstandings about resource-related farmer-herder

conflicts. Although there is probably no doubt that global warming is happening and that it

will have severe consequences, it is important to not become too reliant on climate change as

the root cause of all problems. The belief in climate change has in many cases created

ignorance of social, economic and political problems, which in turn has led to problems of

solving them. Indeed, as Adger et. al. (2001: 697) argue; “the development of this global

environmental issue leads to climate change and its implications being illegible at other scales

and hence ignoring the social mechanisms and processes.” Salehyan (2008) argues that the

linking of climate change and conflict also ignores important aspects like human agency,

ingenuity, the potential for technological innovation, the role of political institutions and

distribution of resources (Salehyan 2008: 317). Moreover, an important aspect related to this,

is that environmental degradation and problems often is what people in power want to hear

about as it can easily overshadow other problems and conflict triggers. The best example is

probably to be found in Darfur, where climate and drought partly are being blamed – by a

variety of actors – for a conflict many regard as genocide (see e.g. Flint and de Waal 2005).

Climate change has become easy to “blame” by leaders and authoritarian regimes for

overshadowing other national political problems, or in the demand for more aid. Turner (2004:

867) says that farmer-herder conflicts also in some cases have acted as “a major stimulus for

community rules governing land use […] and in others as the stimulus for the enclosure of

agricultural lands.” This illustrates how important it is to not become blinded by dominating

environmental narratives and discourses, but to instead see the whole picture behind.

5.2.3.1 Challenging the global environmental discourse:

The environmental security thesis is in sum largely a result of neo-Malthusian and neo-

colonial ideas of eco-scarcity, and although Homer-Dixon (1999: 28) claims he is not a neo-

Malthusian in its right sense, because he does not accept that “finite natural resources place

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strict limits on the growth of human population and consumption,” his and all these different

ideas about environmental scarcity have been challenged ever since they were born at their

different times and contexts. Interestingly, therefore, the environmental security thesis does

much of the same as the Malthusian thesis did some centuries ago; justifying controversial

interventions. Some centuries ago, it justified colonialism, and ever since, it has justified land

interventions and conflicts and blaming it on something we can not control. Before it was

population growth, today it is the climate.

These beliefs are based on narratives and global environmental discourses that political

ecology seeks to challenge. In doing this, there are several trends within today’s political

ecology that must be reversed. First of all, a clearer vision must be stated. Walker (2005, 2006,

2007) has argued political ecology is a field of too marginal influence, with much bigger

potentials. To gain more influence, it would probably be necessary to gather in a common

cause, so to say. Walker (2006: 383) argues that political ecologists often see each other of

disinterest, although their work all in all is much the same. This is a serious problem implying

lack of both theoretical and public influence, especially as political ecology in its essence

seeks to challenge public assumptions about the environment. Second, political ecology must

try to unify in passing on its research. The field has been criticized for lacking openness to the

public and for being too closed in its research (Walker 2006). This is an obvious problem in

seeking to challenge global environmental discourses. Walker (2006) presents several barriers

for political ecology to engage the ‘outside world.’ First of all, public debate outside academia

has been very limited. This has partly led to also the fact that political ecology has not come

up with the necessary counter-narratives to global environmental discourses and narratives.

Finally, political ecologists have not been capable of telling their ‘good stories’ to the outside

world. Indeed, Walker (2006: 385) argues that “[a]s a whole, political ecology has not been

notably successful in creating effective counter-narratives.” What is the point of doing

research if no one outside academia gets to read it (Walker 2007)? Counter-narratives must be

established to challenge the global climate change discourse. It is necessary to move the focus

away from this, and over to more important issues. Indeed, as Walker (2006: 392) concludes:

Political ecology has an enormous amount to offer to help create a more just and sustainable

world, but this potential is underutilized […]. Virtually all political ecology research has policy

relevance, but policy relevance alone does not mean the research is used effectively, or

appropriately.

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6.0 Conclusion

This study has been carried out with the aim of investigating causes behind a resource-related

farmer-herder conflict in the inland Niger delta in Mopti, Mali. In line with the objectives of

this study, I wanted to explore political structures and actors involved in the conflict and the

situation leading up to it, as well as identify environmental changes and changes in people’s

access to natural resources in the case study area, and see whether these could be identified as

causes of the conflict. More specifically, I wanted to i) draw on common contemporary

arguments saying that resource scarcity in the Sahel leads to more conflict, done especially in

light of arguments from the environmental security thesis, and ii) illuminate my findings

through a theoretically framing of political ecology. I chose to draw on these theoretical

approaches to investigate both environmental and political structures and causes behind the

conflict of this study.

The study demonstrates how political, social and historical factors must be taken into account

when explaining environmental change and conflict. In the case study area, structural links

between politics and the environment have both directly and indirectly i) largely determined

changes in people’s access to land, ii) partly caused a degradation of land, and iii) led to

tensions and violent conflict between farmers and herders.

6.1 Summary of findings

There has been a large-scale expansion of rice fields in the inland Niger delta the last decades.

This has several reasons, including lower flood levels on the river Niger because of the

droughts of the 1970s and 1980s and upstream dam building, resulting in farmers moving

their rice cultivation into burgu areas. More importantly, however, there has been a national

agricultural policy promoting rice production in the case study area, including direct

governmental interventions in the land use system, through large-scale projects of turning

areas into irrigated rice fields. This has caused major losses of pastoral land, and can be seen

in light of an overall pastoral marginalization that has been taking place in parts of Africa,

regarding pastoralism as ‘backward’ and a hindrance for modernization and development. In

Kounary, these land conversions led to first, a confiscation of pastoral land, and then later,

herders being given back this land again, so that eventually also the farmers lost their land.

94

This led to frustration and anger among both pastoralists and farmers, and resulted in both

groups continuing to use the same land, hence farmers cultivating pastoral land, and cattle

destroying harvested land. This was an important cause of the conflict in Kounary in 2001.

Another consequence of the establishment of irrigated rice fields, was to a certain extent

degradation of land. As the dikes and irrigation systems were poorly managed, several plots

remained dry; hence also farmers lost out, as their plots became barren. This exacerbated the

process of farmers cultivating herders’ grazing land, and also resulted in an overall discontent,

especially against the local authorities. This can furthermore be linked to rent seeking in the

area, as local officials have tended to allocate resources for themselves; hence the insufficient

maintenance of the dikes. It can also be seen in light of the political vacuum that prevailed, as

it was not clear who were in charge of such administration.

Moreover, the rehabilitation of a pond in the case study area caused problems for the herders,

as it blocked their access to the casier pastoral and the burtol, while the cattle’s presence in

the pond area caused problems for the farmers, in the form of destroying vegetable and fruit

gardens and by coming too close to people working in the area and their children. This

resulted in discontent and anger among both parts, and was, in my view, the ‘straw that broke

the camel’s back’ in this case. In addition, the political aspects of the pond project were not

clarified. There were several misunderstandings and uncertainties, all which led to

disagreements and problems as soon as the pond was finished.

This can furthermore be seen in light of the political power vacuum and lack of administration

that generally prevailed in the case study area in the last half of the 1990s. This vacuum

resulted from a governmental withdrawal from the area after the decentralization and

democratization processes in the 1990s. This withdrawal was much a result of the diffuseness

of the reforms, which remained vague and unclear, and largely resulted in more uncertainty

regarding who were in administrative charge and who had authority in the area. The political

vacuum that emerged out of this, resulted in an overall conflictual environment, as farmers

and herders were not punished for going into each other’s land, and since the locals

themselves were set to administrate the land and natural resource management. Moreover, a

practice of rent seeking got foothold, and caused a mismanagement of the dikes and irrigation

systems ORM had created. Finally, the political vacuum exacerbated the practice of belly

politics, meaning in this case that both conflicting parts have been supported. This has been a

95

major obstacle to find solutions to the problems between herders and farmers in the case study

area.

6.2 Concluding remarks

Based on my findings, it is my conclusion that political factors and a general underlying

political backdrop largely caused the conflict between the farmer-village Karbaye and the

herder-village Guirowel in 2001. I argue that changes in people’s access to land has been the

main cause behind the conflict of this study. These changes have predominantly resulted from

political factors, and I do therefore not regard this conflict as scarcity-driven or caused by

environmental factors. Climate change, resource scarcity, and ‘the Sahelian crisis’ can be

rejected as causes behind this conflict.

Political ecology seeks to reveal underlying political structures and background factors to

understand environmental change, process and conflict, and has hence been highly relevant in

this study. The environmental security thesis and political ecology largely contrast each other.

In drawing on arguments from both, I have through this study demonstrated that political

ecology is a more suitable framework for analysing farmer-herder conflicts, than the

environmental security thesis. Furthermore, I argue that political ecology is the most relevant

approach for this study because it allows room for understanding underlying causes and

political aspects of environmental issues. In my view, the environmental security thesis is

insufficient in explaining resource scarcity and environmental conflict when it comes to the

case of this study. My case shows that it is necessary to look at background factors and related

aspects behind resource-related conflicts before simply allocating them to climate change,

resource scarcity or environmental problems.

The findings of this study might also be applicable for similar cases. It is my opinion that

political ecology is the most useful framework for studying environmental problems and

environmental conflict in general. The arguments of the environmental security thesis might

be applicable for other cases with environmental problems and conflict, but it is my belief that

concepts within political ecology should not be excluded is such analyses.

I argue that this is especially important to take into consideration when explaining

environmental problems and resource-related conflicts in today’s ‘time of global warming.’

96

Barnett and Adger (2007: 644) say that “climate change will not undermine human security or

increase the risk of violent conflict in isolation from other important social factors.” The

claimed evidence that such assertions are built on, are unreliable, and as Nordås and Gleditsch

(2007: 627) puts it; “the gaps in our knowledge about the consequences of climate change for

conflict and security appear daunting.” Although global warming should not be dismissed as a

phenomenon with possibly serious consequences at any point, it is my argument that it is

highly necessary to take other factors into account in today’s complex mesh of global and

national politics. There is a real risk that the belief in global warming and its consequences

will overshadow other and far more important problems because of the dominance of this

global environmental discourse. It is important to recognize also other problems and chains of

relations in the world. It is also of crucial importance to remember that many stakeholders

might have interest in keeping up dominating belief. These might for instance be development

aid organizations or policy makers, but more importantly corrupt leaders or dictators seeking

to get the attention off other problems, or seeking to blame climate change or resource

scarcity for conflicts that originally are rooted in totally different factors.

6.3 Future research

Contemporary farmer-herder conflicts in the Sahel largely serve as examples of scarcity-

induced conflicts today, and are often related to arguments of global warming and increased

resource scarcity. This is in spite of a lack of sufficient research on the area, and great

uncertainties in regards to climate patterns in the Sahel. There are also huge disagreements on

global warming itself; whether or not it is happening, what the causes of it are, and especially

on what consequences of it will be. There are moreover huge disagreements on whether this

poses a risk for the world’s security.

This study might have contributed in the research of causes behind resource-related farmer-

herder conflicts in the Sahel, but the way ahead is still long in understanding the complex

relationships between these issues. I believe that it is highly necessary with more research on

this field. As climate change and global warming are one of today’s most important fields of

political, academic and public interest, and especially within peace and conflict studies and

development studies, there is a need for investigating these relations more. This is especially

important since there is an ongoing debate on this field.

97

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Appendix I)

Interview guide for field research in villages:

semi-structured interviews, and key stakeholder in-depth interviews

For village chiefs and key stakeholders in case study area:

- Number of inhabitants in village/ commune/ leydy

- Ethnicity, majority, minorities

- Livelihood of majority in this village

- How do the people of this village use the land, and where is this land?

- Distance to casier and pond

- Role in 2001 conflict

- How big part of Kounary is agricultural land and how mush is pastoral land? Has this

changed? What changes? Why?

- Has the conflict from 2001 been in the court? If so, what was the outcome? Can you

tell me about this process?

I) Natural resources (role in conflict and environmental changes):

For farmers only:

- What do you grow, and where do you grow it? Have you always grown this?

- Do you own land yourself? If yes, how did you get access to it? If not, who owns the

land? Do you pay for it? How much and how often?

- Have you always cultivated in the area you cultivate in today?

- Are there any other places you can cultivate?

- Where do other farmers cultivate?

For herders only:

- What animals do you have?

- Where do they graze?

- Whose land do they graze on? Is it common property? Who manages it?

- Have you always kept your cattle in this land?

- Are there any other places you can keep your cattle?

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In general:

- What or who determines access to land here?

- Is it enough land for everybody? If no, why?

- Do you think farmers have enough land?

- Do you think herders have enough land?

- Do you want more land? How can you get more land?

- Are there any common property areas here? Who use these? What are the purposes of

the common property areas? How are they managed?

- Have there been any changes in your access to land, and if so, what are these changes,

and what are the causes of these changes? Better or worse?

- Have you seen any degradation of land? Changes in vegetation, sand, water? If so,

why has there been a degradation of resources?

- Have you seen any climate changes, and if so, what changes?

- Have there been any environmental changes, and if so, what are the causes of these

changes?

- Have anyone benefited from environmental changes?

- Do you think there is a scarcity of resources here? Scarcity of what? Why is it a

scarcity of resources? Do you think it is more or less scarcity now than before?

- Do you think there is a competition over land her? If so, who compete, and why?

- Is such competition common? Is it more or less common now? Why?

- Has competition over land led to tensions or conflict? If so, between who?

II) Political aspect (of conflict and the situation in general):

- Do you know about ORM/ ODEM? What do you know about them?

- Do you know about the dikes that were created?

- What have ORM done in this area? When? Why? Good or bad?

- Have you benefited from ORM’s work? Have anyone else benefited or lost anything?

- How was it in this area before ORM came? Compared to now, is it better or worse?

- Do you feel that the work ORM has done has been efficient or good for the

community and inhabitants in general?

- Did ORM talk to people here before they created the dikes?

- Whose land did they create the dikes on? Who had traditionally used this land?

- Has your access to land changed since ORM came, and if so, better or worse?

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- Did ORM’s (and ODEM’s) work change relations between farmers and herders?

- Has the government or authorities changed your access to resources? Better or worse?

- Which of the two parts (ORM and ODEM) do you think has done a good or bad job?

- Do you feel that ORM and ODEM cooperated with the people in the villages here?

- Do you know about the pond?

- Who created the pond, when and why?

- Whose land was the pond created in?

- What were the purposes of the pond and who should get to use the pond?

- Were there any meetings before the pond was created?

III) The conflict:

- Why was there a conflict in 2001?

- What happened? Who were involved in the conflict?

- Where did the conflict take place?

- What are the causes behind the conflict?

- Who do you blame for the conflict?

- What is the common perception as the cause of the conflict among the inhabitants of

this village, and do you agree with this perception?

- Do you think the conflict is accurately portrayed?

- Who do you think are the ‘losers’ of the conflict? Why? Did anyone benefit from it?

- Have there been any changes in this community after the conflict?

- Has the relation between villages, farmers, herders and ethnic groups changed, and if

so, better or worse?

- Do you think the importance of identity has changed since conflict?

- Do you think the conflict has anything to do with resource scarcity?

- Do you think the conflict is related to politics/ ORM/ government/ the dikes/ the pond?

- What do you perceive as the main cause of the conflict?

- What do you today see as the most important hindrance for peaceful coexistence in

this community?

- Do you think the conflict could have been avoided, and if so, how?

- What do you think should be done to solve the conflict?

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Appendix II)

Interview guide for in-depth interviews with officials and key stakeholders

Concerning creation of casiers and dikes:

1) Tell me about this institution/ organization? What do you do, when established etc?

2) What are the focus areas of your work?

3) What have you done in the commune of Kounary?

4) Can you tell me about the creation of the casiers?

a. Who made them?

b. When were they made?

c. What was the purpose of the dikes?

d. How many casiers have been created in Mopti? In Kounary? In Mali?

5) How are the casiers managed, and has it always been like this? Who manages them?

How often? What kind of maintenance? How is this work financed?

6) What are the most common problem with the dikes, if any?

7) Have any areas become dry? How do you solve this problem?

8) Have the creation of the dikes and casier rizicoles reached their aims? Been beneficial?

9) On whose/ what land was the casier rizicole in Kounary created?

10) Were the owners of this land compensated?

11) Do the users of the casier rizicoles pay anything? How much, often etc?

12) When you made the dikes in Karbaye, who were they meant to benefit?

13) What about the herders?

14) Has it also been established casier pastorals there? (when, where, why)

15) Why did you establish casier pastorals in Kounary?

16) What is the relationship between ORM and ODEM?

17) Did ORM and ODEM make decisions about the casiers together?

18) Who manage/ managed the casiers?

19) Did the casier or the dikes create any problems, what problems, and for whom?

20) Have these problems been solved?

Concerning national agricultural policies:

1) What is the goal of this organisation/ institution?

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2) How much rice is produced annually in Kounary/ Mopti/ Mali? Changes?

3) What policies do you have for promoting rice production?

4) Is it enough land for everybody?

5) Do you expand rice fields? If yes, on what land, whose, why, compensation?

6) How have you supported the farmers in practice? Have they benefited? Have your

reached your goals?

7) Are you experiencing that more people want to become farmers? If so, why do think

this is a trend?

8) Do you feel the herders are facing any problems? If so, how do you solve them?

9) Do you also support the herders?

Concerning the pond:

1) When was the pond in Karbaye created, and by whom?

2) Why was the pond created? Who should use the pond? What were its purposes? Who

should benefit from the pond?

3) Were there any collaborative partners? Who? What were the agreements?

4) On whose land was the pond created? What was the land used for before?

5) Who initiated the creation of the pond?

6) Was a stakeholder analysis carried out?

7) Did the pond create any problems? What problems? For whom? Solved?

Concerning the conflict:

1) What were the causes of the conflict in 2001?

2) Do you think the conflict is caused by environmental factors?

3) Do you think there are any political aspects of the conflict?

4) Has the conflict been in court, and if so, what have been the outcomes of these

processes?

5) Are such farmer-herder conflicts common?

6) What are the causes of farmer-herder conflicts in the delta?

7) Are such conflicts more common now than before, and if so, why?

8) How are such conflicts solved?

9) Who are the involved parts in such conflicts?

10) Is there a competition over land, and if so, who compete? Conflicts?