The Deferential Evidential in Mi'kmaq

STEPHANIE INGLIS

University College of Cape Breton

In addition to the evidential suffixes - attestive -p(n) and suppositive

-s(n) - previously reported (Proulx 1978, Inglis 2002), Mi'kmaq also has

a third evidential, a deferential, which is marked by the suffix -s(i)p(n).

Non-attestive AI evidential forms m a y be either suppositive or defer­

ential, depending on the intention of the speaker. As an exception to this

pattern, non-attestive second person singular only occurs with the defer­

ential evidential, while non-attestive first person singular only takes the

suppositive. The orders of the Mi'kmaq AI verb characterized by the def­

erential suffix -s(i)p(n) m a y be summarized as follows:

Independent (main clauses): deferential suffix on all forms except 1 If-conjunct (dependent clauses): deferential suffix with 2, 23, and 13 only Future (main clauses): deferential suffix with 23 only

The endings of the AI forms which appear with the deferential evidential and the corresponding attestive and suppositive suffixes are as follows:

AI Independent (full stem):

1 2 3 12 13 23 33

neutral

V-y(an) V-n V-t V-yikw V-yek V-yoq V-jik

attestive

V-yap(n) V-p(n) V-p(n) V-yikup(n) V-yekp(n) V-yoqop(n) V-pnik

suppositive

V-yas(n) — V-s(n) V-yikus(n) V-yeks(n) V-yoqs(n) V-snik

deferential

— V-s(i)p(n) V-s(i)p(n) V-yikus(i)p(n) V-yeks(i)p(n) V-yoqs(i)p(n) V-sipnik

Papers of the 34th Algonquian Conference, ed. H.C. Wolfart (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 2003), pp. 193-200.

194 STEPHANIE INGLIS

AI If-conjunct (reduced stem):

neutral

1 V-yan 2 V-n 3 V-j 12 V-yikw 13 V-yek 23 V-yoq 33 V-tij

AI Future (reduced stem):

neutral

1 — 2 — 3 V-tew 12 13 23 — 33 V-taq

suppositive

V-yas

V-s V-yikus

V-tis

suppositive

V-tes V-teks — V-teksnu V-teksnen — —

deferential

V-sp

V-yeksip V-yoqsip

deferential

—

— — — — V-toqsip —

THE LINGUISTIC FUNCTION OF THE DEFERENTIAL EVIDENTIAL

The grammaticalized modality system of Mi'kmaq is based on direct per­

sonal experience or the lack thereof, and this experiential framework is

made explicit through the use of evidential suffixes. The deferential evi­

dential suffix, -s(i)p(n), allows a speaker to signal that she or he is invok­

ing the addressee's evidential knowledge of the topic under discussion

and seeking confirmation of his or her utterance.

In the following examples, wape 'k is an II Independent neutral verb,

and the preverb i'- marks the past:

(1) neutral: Wape 'k. '[Itislwhite.'fTMA^O.iii)1

1. T M A denotes data collected by means of the tense-mood aspect questionnaire 2002:11).

T H E DEFERENTIAL EVIDENTIAL IN MI'KMAQ 195

(2) attestive:

I'-wape 'kip na amskwes. 'It used to be white before.' (TMA-70.i)

(3) suppositive: I'-wape 'kis.

'It used to be white, so I'm told.'

(4) deferential: I'-wape'ksip. 'It used to be white, was it not?'

Eleanor Johnson's comment (Inglis 2002:65) contrasting (2) and (4)

is explicit:

... if I tell you I'-wape 'kip, I'm telling you that it used to be white and [I know for sure because I saw it.] But I'-wape'ksip, that means I might be getting m y information from somebody else to tell you that it used to be white.

Examples (5) and (6) also illustrate this contrast:

(5) Tel 'te 'tm i '-wape 'kip. 'I think that it used to be white.' (TMA-70.v)

(6) Tel 'te 'tm i '-wape 'ksip.

T think that it used to be white - do you know?' (TMA-70.iv)

In elaborating on the deferential evidential with to 'q,

(7) I'-wape 'ksip to 'q. 'It used to be white, was it not? Everyone knows that.'

Johnson also contrasts it with the attestive (2):

You have to put the to 'q in there if you're believing somebody else ... When you put the to 'q there that means I heard it from somebody that it was white ... if you put a to'qin there, that means that the neighbor­hood history tells m e that it used to be white one time ... But if I tell you, Amskwes i'-wape 'kip, that means that 'I know that it was white'.

Inquiries about the difference between verb forms in -s(n) and

-s(i)p(n) frequently elicit the answer that the latter is a question (even

though there is no change in intonation - either rise or fall - as might be

expected in Mi'kmaq questions). A s Theresa Mudridge of Membertou

(personal communication, 1999) puts it, "Oh yes, you're asking,

I'-wape'ksipT - meaning Tt was white, wasn't it?' The same point is

also made by Johnson (personal communication, 1999): "When you say

196 S T E P H A N I E INGLIS

panta 'teksip, that denotes that 'the window was open, was it not."

(8) Panta 'teksip tuo 'puti. The window, it was open, wasn't it? (said while looking at a closed window in a room which is cold)

The question in (6) and the statement in (8) invite agreement that some­

thing is a certain way, much like a question tag in m a n y languages.

M a n y languages have an invariant question tag that can be added to

almost any declarative statement (Hartmann & Stork 1972), e.g., French

n 'est-cepas? 'isn't it?' (9), Spanish iverdad? 'truly?' (10), German nicht

wahr? 'not true' (11), and Innu-aimun (Montagnais) tshia? 'right' (12):2

(9) a. C'est un mauvais jour, n 'est-cepas? It's a miserable day, isn't it?

b. Elle est tresjolie, n 'est-cepas? She is very pretty, isn't she?

(10) a. Es espanola, i verdad? She is Spanish, isn't she?

b. Usted va estar enfermo, ̂ verdad? You are going to be sick, aren't you?

(11) a. Wir sind uns in dieser Angelegenheit doch einig, nicht wahr? W e are in agreement on this matter, aren't we?

b. Siefahren doch am Sonntag nach Hamburg, nicht wahr? You're going to drive to Hamburg, on Sunday, aren't you?

(12) Ehe, mitshetinishapani utaudssima tshia? Yes, it seems he had a lot of children, eh?

The function of these question tags is similar to that of the Mi'kmaq

deferential evidential: to confirm with the addressee whether a statement

is true or false, and/or to elicit information. In Mi'kmaq sentences (13)

through (18) the speaker acknowledges that the addressee might be able

to add knowledge or information about a range of persons (2 3 12 13 23,33): ' ' ' '

2. I would like to thank Dr. Peter E. Thompson of Queen's University and Dr Thomas Bouman of University College of Cape Breton, respectively for the Spanish anH r?2ll examples. The Innu-aimun example is from W s , Clarke & ^ ^ , 9 9 6 : 1 4 3

THE DEFERENTIAL EVIDENTIAL IN MI'KMAQ 197

(13) Kesinukwa'sp?

You (sg.) were sick, weren't you?

(14) Kesinukwa'sp, nekm?

He/she was sick, wasn't he/she?

(15) Kesinukwayikusp?

W e (inclusive) were sick, weren't we?

(16) Kesinukwayeksip?

W e (exclusive) were sick, weren't we?

(17) Kesinukwayoqsip?

You (pi.) were sick, weren't you?

(18) Kesinukwasipnik?

They were sick, weren't they?

In using the -s(i)p(n) form, the speaker defers to the evidential knowledge

of the addressee.

The suppositive evidential -s(n), by contrast, marks statements as

second-hand information:

(19) Kesinukwas.

He was sick, so I'm told.

(20) Kesinukwayikus.

W e (inclusive) were sick, so we're told.

(21) Kesinukwayeks.

W e (exclusive) were sick, so we're told.

(22) Kesinukwayoqs. You (pi.) were sick, so I'm told.

(23) Kesinukwasnik.

They were sick, so I'm told.

The suppositive evidential marks statements as second-hand information;

consequently, second person singular verb forms never take the -s(n) evi­

dential. For the speaker to state that he or she had heard second-hand

information about the addressee's activities would be too explicit. Second

person singular forms in the Mi'kmaq AI Independent will either be

unmarked for evidentiality, i.e., neutral, or they will be marked as attes­

tive or deferential. They will never be marked as suppositive.

198 STEPHANIE INGLIS

Deference to the addressee: The Algonquian person hierarchy

The function of the deferential evidential in Mi'kmaq highlights the role

played by the Speech Act Participants (S APs). A speech act is the produc­

tion of a sentence token; speech acts are the basic, minimal units of lin­

guistic communication (Searle 1988:16). Only the first person, the

speaker, and the second person, the addressee, are active participants; the

thing or person spoken about, the third person, is not. A s noted by Hew-

son (1991:864) "There is the fact that the speaker, as an SAP, is also a lis­

tener, and that there are two listeners and only one speaker in any

discourse." The Mi'kmaq speaker, when using the deferential, explicitly

becomes a listener, ready to hear new information from the addressee

about the topic of the discourse in which they are both engaged.

Languages vary with respect to person hierarchies, specifically the

ranking of SAPs. The Indo-European languages, for example, often fol­

low the hierarchy (Seiler 1983:46):

first > second > third human > third animate > third inanimate;

or else treat first and second person, the two SAPs, as equal (see Comrie

1985:62; Hewson 1991). According to Hewson (1991:864), however,

The Algonkian family, in fact, almost without exception presents the following hierarchy:

second > first > third an. prox. > third an. obv. > third in[an].

where there is prominence given to second person over first. ... and indeed Speck (1935) has discussed at length the fact that among the Naskapi it is felt that one's mista:pe:w (literally 'great man' or 'spirit') may not be as powerful as that of one's interlocutor, to whom one must, as a consequence, always give deference.

The function of the Mi'kmaq deferential, which allows the speaker

to invoke the evidential knowledge of the second person, is compatible

with the Algonquian person hierarchy.

THE SOCIAL USE OF THE DEFERENTIAL EVIDENTIAL

In his study of 1 <-> 2 combinations in transitive sentences such as T saw

you' and 'you saw me' Heath (1998:84) found that such forms "... tend to

form negative or taboo targets and are often replaced by more opaque sur­

face structures." Though transitive verb forms do not appear in the

Mi'kmaq data in question, there are similarities with Heath's cross-lin-

T H E D E F E R E N T I A L EVIDENTIAL IN M I ' K M A Q 199

guistic observation. It is the second person singular form in Mi'kmaq

which carries the deferential suffix, to the exclusion of the suppositive

evidential, in the AI Independent and the AI If-conjunct. Heath (1998:84)

reports the following exchange with his Choctaw teacher:

M y first informant [Choctaw] cheerfully translated 'he hit her', 'he hit them' and 'I hit him', etc., but when it came to 'you hit me' he balked saying "we Choctaws don't talk like that; it sounds like I'm accusing you."

The same situation prevails in Mi'kmaq. There is a very obvious sense

that the addressee must not in any way be insulted. As Murdena Marshall

puts it in her discussion of contemporary M i ' k m a q relationships

(1996:27, 29):

The distinguishing mark of a true person is his or her willingness to withdraw from conflict and to think good thoughts. A n inability to balance passions and conflicts was seen as irresponsible and was not honorable behavior. ...

The essential principle of customary law was that controversies should be prevented. Harmony, not justice, was the ideal.

In Mi'kmaq discourse deferring to the personal knowledge of the

addressee contributes to interpersonal harmony. B y not using either the

reported evidential or the attestive evidential, the speaker avoids direct

statements such as " X did Y, so I'm told" or " X did Y " and leaves the

door open for the addressee to add information to the dialogue.

REFERENCES

Comrie, Bernard. 1985. Tense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hartmann, R.R.K., & F.C. Stork. 1972. Dictionary of language and linguistics. N e w

York: John Wiley. Heath, Jeffrey. 1998. Pragmatic skewing in 1 <-» 2 pronominal combinations in Native

American languages. International Journal of American Linguistics 64:83-104. Hewson, John. 1991. Verbal derivation in Micmac. Journal of the Atlantic Provinces Lin­

guistic Association 13:21-33. Inglis, Stephanie. 2002. Speaker's experience: A study of Mi'kmaq modality. Ph.D. the­

sis, Memorial University of Newfoundland. James, Deborah, Sandra Clarke & Marguerite MacKenzie. 1996. Indirect evidentials in

the Cree/Montagnais/Naskapi of Quebec/Labrador. Papers of the 27th Algonquian Conference, ed. by David H. Pentland, pp. 135-151. Winnipeg: University of Mani­toba.

Marshall, Murdena. 1996. Mi'kmawi'skwaq influence in Aboriginal government: Comple­mentary organizational or electoral equality? A report for the Social and Humanities

200 STEPHANIE INGLIS

Research Council of Canada. Sydney, Nova Scotia: Mi'kmaq Studies /Department of Culture, Heritage and Leisure Studies, University College of Cape Breton.

Proulx, Paul. (1978). Micmac inflection. Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University.

Searle, John R. 1988. Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Seiler, Hansjakob. 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Speck, Frank G. 1935. Naskapi: Savage hunters of the Labrador peninsula. Norman: Uni­versity of Oklahoma Press.