the declaration of martial law and church response

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The Church under the Gun A Critical-Historical Analysis of the relationship between the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) and the Marcos Regime during First three Years of Martial Law, 1972-1974. By Victor Aguilan Divinity School Silliman University Introduction Philippine Church history is a history of conflict with the political authorities from the time of Spanish colonization to EDSA II. This paper is an effort to understand the Church in the Philippines specifically the history of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) as it engaged political issues during the period when civil and political rights were curtailed by the political authorities that swore to protect and defend democracy. This study stems from the need to study the history of Protestantism in the Philippines during the Martial Law period. Many have written about the history of Martial Law. But few have devoted research on the role of the Churches especially Protestant Churches during this period. The Marcos regime had affected the lives of all Filipinos. Even today the legacy of Marcos dictatorship could still be felt. Social institutions, legislature, military, judiciary and even business were affected by the declaration of Martial Law. The church, a separate and distinct institution, was not excluded from the reach of Marcos. The United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) was one of the Protestant Churches that had been seriously affected by Marcos authoritarian rule. In fact it was the only Protestant Church to have issued an official statement calling for the lifting of Martial Law in 1978. However it should be mentioned that when Martial Law was imposed, the UCCP was willing to give Marcos a chance. They 1

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Page 1: The Declaration of Martial Law and Church Response

The Church under the Gun

A Critical-Historical Analysis of the relationship between the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) and the Marcos Regime

during First three Years of Martial Law, 1972-1974.

By Victor AguilanDivinity School

Silliman University

Introduction

Philippine Church history is a history of conflict with the political authorities from the time of Spanish colonization to EDSA II. This paper is an effort to understand the Church in the Philippines specifically the history of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) as it engaged political issues during the period when civil and political rights were curtailed by the political authorities that swore to protect and defend democracy. This study stems from the need to study the history of Protestantism in the Philippines during the Martial Law period. Many have written about the history of Martial Law. But few have devoted research on the role of the Churches especially Protestant Churches during this period.

The Marcos regime had affected the lives of all Filipinos. Even today the legacy of Marcos dictatorship could still be felt. Social institutions, legislature, military, judiciary and even business were affected by the declaration of Martial Law. The church, a separate and distinct institution, was not excluded from the reach of Marcos. The United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) was one of the Protestant Churches that had been seriously affected by Marcos authoritarian rule. In fact it was the only Protestant Church to have issued an official statement calling for the lifting of Martial Law in 1978. However it should be mentioned that when Martial Law was imposed, the UCCP was willing to give Marcos a chance. They thought that Martial Law would solve the problem of lawlessness, criminality, violence and poverty.

This paper will analyze the relationship between the UCCP and the Marcos regime during the Martial Law period. It focuses on the historical events that transpired in the Philippines within the period from 1972 to1978. It discusses the official actions, statement, and other documents of the Church produced during the period. This study attempts to understand the seeming ambivalent position of the Church on Martial Law. The main objective of the historical study is to know and understand the official position of the UCCP during this period. This study will help us appreciate how the leaders of the Church wrestled with Church-State relations under the gun of authoritarian politics.

Church Perception of the Situation Before Martial Law

Four months before President Marcos declared Martial Law, the UCCP had its 1972 Biennial General Assembly held from May 23 – June1 in Manila. A major issue that would

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preoccupy the Assembly was the approval of the revised 1958 Church's Constitution submitted by the Constitutional Convention. Originally scheduled for May 1971, the Constitutional Convention was postponed to be convened on May 22 - 27, 1972, at Ellinwood Malate Church.

After the adjournment of the Constitutional Convention, the sessions of the 1972 biennium immediately followed. The old Constitution was still the basic document that governed the conduct of the General Assembly. The Assembly received the copy of the New Constitution and endorsed the same to the Conferences for ratification within the 1972 - 1974 biennium.

Election was held simultaneously for two Jurisdictional Bishops and the post of the General Secretary. Bishop Pedro M. Raterta was re-elected and was re-assigned to the Visayas. Rev. Eligio B.A. Hernandez was elected and was assigned to the Episcopal Office of Southern Luzon Jurisdiction. Rev. Hernandez, having garnered the highest number of votes served also as the chairperson of the General Assembly for the biennium. Rev Estanislao Abainza was elected General Secretary.

Because of the imminent withdrawal of foreign subsidies, the General Assembly abolished the national divisions and placed the operation of these programs in the offices of the jurisdictions. The Executive Committee was mandated to devise a new program structure.

What was interesting to us most was the 1972 General Assembly analysis of the national situation. The United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) was strongly vocal about the existence of oppressive structures before martial law:

The setting is an oppressive, exploitative social system, which is the bedrock of imperialism, feudalism, fascism and crisis of confidence …

Against this background, the UCCP admits that the church is accused of silence, apathy, and alliance with the perpetuators of a corrupt and unjust social order. But the UCCP seeks to change this image of the Church by identifying itself with national idols and aspirations and becoming an active partner in the development of the country.1

The opening addresses of the UCCP 1972 General Assembly stressed that the Church must assess the changes taking place and provide goals and guidelines for action of the churches and the individual Christian in the process of national development. It further stated that:

…the needs of man condition the priorities of the church.... The elderly Protestants were fervent in prayers, possessed with great abilities to memorize verses but blind to the hard facts of economics, business, politics and inequalities in social structure… 1 Journal of the Thirtheenth General Assembly of the United Church of Christ in the

Philippines, May 28-June 1, 1972, Manila

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Making Catholic. Protestant and vice-versa has ceased to be the valid stance of the church 2

The Assembly theme in 1972, "Meeting the Challenge of the 70’s" has metamorphosed from the theme of the previous Assembly, “The Challenges of the 70's.” This shift in tone indicates the intention to put into action the results of their study, that is, "The church is now ready to roll its sleeves, flex its muscles in the concerted thrust to meet varied and difficult challenges.”3 And the Church could do three things: first, speak with courage against all injustices and unrighteousness; second, to be agents of reconciliation between man and his fellowman and his God; third, to become servants to man in all his human needs.4

The UCCP was becoming more vocal in its public statement on social issues. The Church, because of its Reformed heritage and American democratic legacy, would value freedom of discussion and expression on important issues affecting the Church and Society. This understanding would be tested under Martial Law. The Church had to redefine its relationship under an authoritarian regime. The witnessing, preaching, prophesying and other welfare endeavors done by the Church since 60’s would be disrupted and put to the test when President Marcos declared Martial Law in September of 1974.

President Marcos declares Martial Law5

On 21 September 1972, Marcos declared martial law. He suspended the Bill of Rights, the Senate, the House of Representatives and all political parties, and began to rule by decree. His government closed down newspapers, introduced press censorship and jailed many opposition members, including student activists of various political convictions. Marcos used the deplorable situation in the country as the main justification of martial law, pointing to the crime wave and the threat of a communist take-over. In his nationwide statement broadcast on national radio and TV on the evening of September 22, 19972, he announced the imposition of Martial Law all over the country:

"I am utilizing this power... to save the Republic and reform our society... We will eliminate the threat of a violent overthrow of our Republic. But at the same time, we must now reform the social, economic and political institutions in our country.6

2 Journal of the Thirtheenth General Assembly 3 Journal of the Thirtheenth General Assembly4 Journal of the Thirtheenth General Assembly5 The following are the references used: Ferdinand Marcos. The Democratic Revolution in the

Philippines (1972: Manila), 8), Alex Bello Brillantes, Jr. Dictatorship and Martial Law: Philippine Authoritarianism in 1972 (Quezon City: Great Book Publishers, 1987); Primitivo Mijares, The Conjugal Dictatorship, (San Francisco, California: Union Square Publications, 1976), and Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines, Three Years of Martial Law (Makati 21 Septem 1975); and 9) Conrado De Quiros, Dead aim: How Marcos Ambushed Philippine Democracy (Pasig City: Foundation for Worldwide People Power, Inc., 1997

6 Ferdinand Marcos, Presidential Speeches Vol.IV (1978:139) cf. The Democratic Revolution in the Philippines. (1972: Manila)

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Opposition members regarded the declaration of martial law as maneuvers by Marcos to remain in power indefinitely. According to the 1935 Constitution, which formed the constitutional basis of the independent Philippine Republic, Marcos was allowed to serve only two four-year terms as president. At the time he declared martial law his second term was nearly over. Marcos had actively lobbied with other politicians to change this constitutional requirement in order to allow him to run for a third term. Yet it remained uncertain whether he would prevail in modifying the provision. Moreover, even if he was allowed to run for a third time, it was far from certain that he would actually be reelected, despite the fact that he had been able to strengthen his political machine substantially during his seven years as president. The social and economic conditions of the country were problematic, which of course reflected on his performance as the incumbent president.

But a major threat to Marcos was the fact that he was facing a formidable opponent: Benigno Aquino Jr. Benigno, or Ninoy Aquino was a fast rising star. He had broken a number of political records: for instance by becoming the youngest mayor — and then the youngest senator — ever elected in the Philippines. He was also a famous journalist, who had exposed many scandals in the country. Aquino was also a much wittier speaker and had a more charming personality than Marcos, which represented significant advantages in the personalized political culture of the Philippines. So Marcos declared martial law, and jailed Aquino on a charge of involvement in the murder of a local politician.

The reaction of the general public to the declaration of martial law was moderately positive, apart from criticism by outspoken Marcos opponents. Though Marcos’s popularity had been decreasing during the last years of his constitutionally allowed terms of presidency, people felt relieved by the restoration of law and order that followed the declaration of martial law. Crime declined, particularly armed robberies, as many criminals grew frightened by the government’s show of force, particularly after one major criminal was publicly executed. Student demonstrations also stopped. This reaction was reinforced by an economic recovery during the first years of martial law.

But after the imposition of martial law, foreign investments in the country significantly increased. It is interesting to note that the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines was the first to congratulate Marcos publicly on martial law with this cable

“The American Chamber of Commerce wishes you every success in your endeavors to restore peace and order, business confidence, economic growth and the well being of the Filipino people and nation. We assure you of our confidence and cooperation in achieving these objectives. We are communicating these feelings to our associates and affiliates in the United States.7

Marcos had also taken steps to legitimize his new dictatorship. The vast majority of the Supreme Court had ratified the declaration of martial law, believing that the condition of

7 International Documentation of the Contemporary Church (IDOC). 1973. The Philippines: American Corporations, Martial Law, and Underdevelopment. A report prepared by the Corporate Information Center of the National Council of Churches of Chris in the USA.No. 57. November, p.32.

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the nation indeed justified its establishment. Also, prior to martial law, a Constitutional Convention had been created to devise a new Constitution. Marcos persuaded the majority of the commissioners to continue the drafting of the new Constitution following the introduction of martial law. In 1973 a Constitution was unveiled that further legitimized Marcos’s one man rule. At the same time, Marcos introduced an ideology aimed at legitimizing his dictatorship and serving as a tool in the struggle against communism. He termed this ideology The New Society, and described it as ‘real democracy’, Filipino style.

A crucial concept in the Marcos ideology was the ‘revolution from the center’. This concept was based on the idea that a clique of traditional oligarchs controlled Filipino society. This clique controlled Congress, journalism, business, and many other sectors of society, and its influence had obstructed the policies of the central government. Because of this obstruction, the good intentions of the Marcos Government in favor of the Philippines could not be materialized. Consequently the country continued to deteriorate. The solution proposed by Marcos was to break the destructive power of the oligarchs. The ‘revolution from the center’ signified that the necessary revolution to curb the influence of the oligarchs would not come from the bottom of society, the masses, nor from the top, the oligarchs themselves, but from the center: the central government run by Marcos, acting on behalf of the masses.

Marcos also subjected the judiciary to his rule. Aside from one or two exceptions, the Supreme Court consisted of Marcos supporters. In 1972, Marcos reorganized the judiciary. All judges were dismissed and selectively reappointed.

The grip that Marcos had developed over the army, police and local governments during his presidency ensured that he could effectively enforce martial law. Potential dissidents soon discovered that resistance was of little avail, and as a result many discontinued their activities. Marcos also mastered the tactic of cooptation. Various opposition members were given a position somewhere in his machinery in exchange for abandoning resistance to his rule. The old social/economic elite was divided. Those who were closely linked to Marcos had nothing to fear, but his outspoken opponents saw their economic interests severely affected. Others were granted an economic niche provided they would not act counter to the interests of Marcos and his friends.

In the meantime, the communist movement survived the initial impact of Martial Law and later would gain ground rapidly. A central element of this movement was the rural guerrilla, the New People’s Army (NPA). The guerrilla movement had received a strong impetus from student activists who had fled to the hills after the declaration of martial law. Moreover, communist student groups also went underground, operating in an elaborate cell group structure which was difficult for the intelligence services of Marcos to unravel.

Strange Silence in the Church

It was during the transition period for the Church when Pres. Marcos declared Martial Law. The leaders of the Church were caught by surprise of the declaration. The General

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Secretary, Bishop Abainza was in Mindanao attending the meeting of the Mindanao Jurisdictional Cabinet.

Church related schools and radio stations were closed down by the Military. Like what happened to Silliman University. It was closed down three days after Martial Law was declared. Dr. Proceso Udarbe was then the Acting-President. In the book Silliman University 1901-1976, the impact of Martial Law was described to be frightening.

The Silliman community was in a state of shock that day, their ears glued to their radio sets. Shock and disbelief later gave way to fear, as they heard over DZPI and VOP that hundreds of political leaders, led by Liberal Party Senators Benigno Aquino and Jose Diokno, and journalists, like Joaquin Roces, publisher of Manila Times, and Teodoro Locsin, editor and publisher of the Philippines Free Press —were being rounded up.

On the local scene, in the meantime, some faculty members and many students of the Dumaguete schools, many of them from Silliman, were rounded up by the local Philippine Constabulary (PC) for interrogation and detention. Silliman University offices, particularly the office of the student paper, the Weekly Sillimanian, were raided by the PC. Three faculty and staff members and some 40 students ended up in detention for perids ranging from one month to six months.

All schools, including Silliman, were closed effective September 23,1972, and nobody knew when they were going to reopen, if at all. The next few days were tense. No one in Silliman felt safe as the PC continued to pick up people for questioning, and to raid offices for presence of alleged subversive literature. Many students went into hiding and some faculty and staff were burning whatever books and materials they had that only faintly smelled of subversion.8

When President Marcos authorized the reopening of all school on October 14, four schools were excluded which included Silliman along with University of the Philippines, Philippine College of Commerce and Philippine Science High School. Silliman was authorized to open only on October 23, 1972.

Clergy were not exempted from arrest when Martial Law was imposed. A UCCP Pastor, Joel Tabada, who was assigned in Silliman University Church as an assistant pastor for outreach, was arrested by the military. His rights were violated. He was interrogated without a counsel. He was accused of being the adviser of the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), a subversive student organization. No charges were filed in court and he was released in December after 3 months of detention. During his 3 months detention, neither Bishop Abainza, the General Secretary, and Bishop Raterta of the Visayas Jurisdiction came to visit or inquire about the status of the detainees especially those who were members of the UCCP. Only the Church Council of Silliman Church through the leadership of Rev. Lydia Niguidula

8 Edilberto Tiempo, et al, Silliman University 1901-1976, (Dumaguete City, Silliman University Press, 1997) p. 199

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made an official inquiry in connection with Rev. Joel Tabada’s detention. It seemed the leaders of the Church chose to remain silent and uninvolved.9 There was a strange silence in the Church.

Martial Law came to many Filipinos as a surprise. When things started to normalize, people accepted Martial Law. To some it was a welcome relief; to others it was a dreadful era. But to many Filipinos they just accepted Martial Law hoping for the best and leave it to fate. The UCCP with the other religious institutions accepted Martial Law without resistance.

The vast majority of Philippine society strongly supported Marcos. Most of the rest acquiesced in his reforms. Most people were convinced that Philippine democracy could not in any case long survive the perpetuation of crime, inequality and poverty, and incoherent economic policy. The Martial Law regime gave the promise of political stability, economic development and an improvement in social conditions.

David Timberman, author of A Changeless Land, summarized the apparent complacency and willingness of various segments of society to give up their civil and democratic rights:

Marcos' authoritarianism initially promised a dramatic departure from the fractious elite democracy that had preceded it. The divisions between the executive and legislative branches of the government that so often seemed to paralyse the government would be ended by the creation of a monolithic and omnipotent state. The past emphasis on "pork-barrel" and patronage would be replaced by technocratic efficiency. The political and economic dominance of the traditional elite or "oligarchy" would be broken. Economic policies and programs that enriched the few would be replaced by an economic development program that would benefit the majority of poor Filipinos. Particularistic interests would be replaced by a new sense of national unity and purposed.10

The American historian Lewis E. Gleeck, Jr., agreeing with U.S. Embassy political counselor Francis Underhill that "the Philippines needs a strong man to get the country organized and moving again," wrote in 1993:

Significant evidence of the strength of the authoritarian tradition was that the introduction of martial law was accepted with relief by most of the public, and that it proved overwhelmingly popular in the beginning. Filipinos were fed up with the chaos produced by plundering congressmen, corrupted media, venalities in the bureaucracy and crime in the streets. An approving majority applauded his abolition of Congress and even the muzzling of the press.11

9 Interview with Rev. Joel Tabada, Dumagute City, April 24,200310 David G Timberman, A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics.

(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991) pp. 75-7611 Lewis E.Gleeck Jr. The Third Philippines Republic, 1946-1972 (Quezon City: New Day

Publisher, 1993), p. 401

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The Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) has noted that:

It is clear that the vast majority of the citizens went along with the declaration of martial law. Many saw it as a respite from the situation of near anarchy prevailing before martial law. The middle class, particularly the average wage earners, appeared to welcome the relative peace and tranquility obtaining after martial law was declared. Loose firearms were collected, criminal syndicates dismantled or extirpated, traffic [became] orderly, relative cleanliness was evident -- the basics of what the urban middle class expect of government. In the provinces, the emasculation of political warlords and the neutralization and disbanding of their private armies was clearly a popular change welcomed by the vast majority.12

Eventually all sectors of society including the religious sector both Catholic and Protestant religious leaders have accepted Martial Law.13 Pres. Marcos skillfully used the people's craving for social justice, peace and order by posing as the archenemy of oligarchies and criminal syndicates to win the consent of the governed.14 Church leaders were willing to give martial law a chance precisely for this reason. Eight heads of Churches belonging to the National Council of Churches in the Philippines even issued a “Resolution of Support.” The statement said in part:

Whereas, we, the undersigned heads of our respective churches, recognize that the president of the Republic of the Philippines is God’s servant to carry out His will in the nation;

Whereas, we believe that the Philippines is in a very critical period, requiring the exercise of his emergency powers arid in the light of his judgment, based on his better knowledge of the whole situation, the president has acted accordingly.”15

Political Scientist Robert L. Youngblood cites as typical of this attitude the comments of Bishop Estanislao Abainza, General Secretary of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in an interview the late Bishop gave. He lauded the "enforced discipline of the new society" and urged the citizenry not to "minimize" the "positive effects" of Martial Law.16

It was hard to argue against the early successes of martial law. Less than three weeks into the martial law period, Con-Con Delegate Augusto Caesar Espiritu wrote in his diary:

12 Intelligene Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Reestablishmed Communist Party of the Philippines, Vol. 3 (Quezon City: ISAFP, 1989), p. 2

13 Oscar Suarez. “Protestantism and Authoritarian Politics. The Politics of Repression and the Future of Ecumenical Witness in the Philippines” (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1999) pp.50-56

14 Ferdinand Marcos, Presidential Speeches Vol.IV (1978:139) cf. The Democratic Revolution in the Philippines. (1977: Manila)

15 NCCP Newsletter, Vol 3., no. 1 (Jan 1973)16 Robert L. Youngblood, "The Protestant Church in the Philippine New Society," Bulletin of

Concerned Asian Scholars (July-September 1980). Quoted from Barbara Howell, “ Martial Law in the Philippines: Religious Reactions,” Christian Century, 22 November 1972, pp. 1200-1202.

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It would seem, at least for now, that many of the reforms that President Marcos is launching are laudable: land reform and the collection of firearms have, in particular, found popular support. A growing number of people are of the view that without martial law, land reform could not have been launched.

The issues of civil liberties -- the loss of our individual freedoms, the gross violations of our human rights, the demolition of our democratic institutions --these seem to be clearly understood and felt only by those who are politically aware. For the majority of our people, who have historically been the object of exploitation, the denial of our individual freedoms does not figure in their lives.17

But nothing last forever. In spite of Martial Law successes in initiating reforms, the New Society has remained imperfect. And those in power were always tempted to abuse it. The Church would be compelled later to speak out as a prophet called by God.

The Church Critical Collaboration

“The Prophetic Role of the Church in the New Society” was the theme for the fourteenth biennial General Assembly. The chosen theme was indicative of the Church leadership understanding of its role under the Martial Law regime. But it was also a time for the UCCP to undergo structural changes brought about by the action of the 1972 General Assembly endorsing for ratification to the conferences of the new Constitution of the Church to be approved by the 1974 General Assembly.18

It was exactly 8:55 in the morning on May 20, 1974, in Cebu City that the 1974 General Assembly of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines approved the 1972 Constitution. All the 30 conferences ratified the new Constitution. On the basis of the unanimous vote by the conferences, the 1974 General Assembly proclaimed its approval and effectivity as of May 20, 1974.19

Important and new features in the new Constitution are the following:20

(1) Article II — Statement of Principles: Section 1. The Church declares as its fundamental faith and message: Jesus Christ, the Son of the living God, our living Lord and Savior; He is the Head of the Church, present and active in the world through the Holy Spirit, in accordance with the Holy Scriptures. It seeks union or close relations with “other Christian churches or denominations expressing and espousing the same faith."

17 Augusto Caesar Espiritu, , How Democracy Was Lost: A Political Diary of the 1971-1972 Constitutional Convention (Quezon City: New Day, 1993) pp. 34-35

18 Minutes of the Fourtheenth General Assembly of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, May 16-20, 1974, Cebu City.

19 Minutes of the Fourtheenth General Assembly p. 74-720 1972 UCCP Constitution and By-Laws

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(2) Article V — The Local Church: Section 1. A local church is a group of at least fifty (50) members, 12 years of age or over. (The old law provides for only "at least twenty-five (25) baptized adult members, 12 years and above.)

(3) Article VI — The Conference — Section 2: Composition. The conference shall be composed of not less than forty (40) organized churches, with not less than, ten (10) active ordained ministers, and a membership of not less than 5,000 communicant members." (The old law provides for only "at least 15 organized Churches, with not less than five (5) active ordained ministers and a membership of not less than 2,000 communicant members.)

(4) Article VII — The Jurisdictional Convention." This is a new provision.

(5) Article VIII — The National Organization. A. General Assembly: Section 7 — Secretariat. There shall be a Secretariat headed by the General Secretary: A. The General Secretary. The General Secretary shall have the title of Bishop. He shall be the executive officer of the. Church and head of the Secretariat or Administration (the old provision allowed a layman to be elected as General Secretary.) B. The Treasurer. Section 2. Election and Term. The Treasurer shall be elected by a majority vote of the General Assembly from among nominees. He shall serve until retirement unless he resigns or is removed for cause, as specified in the By-Laws.

Bishop Estanislao Q. Abainza during the 1974 Biennial General Assembly of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines was unanimously re-elected General Secretary under the new Constitution of the Church. Before his election in 1972, Bishop Abainza was bishop of the Church for the Southern Luzon Jurisdiction.

Mr. Ludovico S. Agulto was unanimously re-elected Treasurer of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines. This is Mr. Agulto's third term as Treasurer of the Church. With the approval of the new Constitution which provides for the election of other officers, the following were elected: Rev. Eliezer D. Mapanao, Chairman; Atty. George Baladjay, Vice-Chairman; Atty. David Aguila, Rev. Eduardo B. Panganiban, Rev. Alejandro L. Bingtan, Rev. Prudencio T. Plaza, Jr., Judge Odon C. Yrad, Mr. Samuel R. Capistrano, Mr. Ben Turgano (Youth), and Dr. Danilo A. Calderon (Youth), Members of the Executive Committee.21

The new UCCP Charter provided for the holding of a Quadrennial General Assembly, making Cebu as the last Biennial Assembly. The Bishops were to be elected by the jurisdictional conventions but proclaimed by the General Assembly or its Executive Committee.

One very significant accomplishment of the 1974 General Assembly, which defined the UCCP emerging perception of the situation and the relationship with the Marcos’ Martial Law Government, was the action to adopt a statement on National Issues. Three important issues were specifically mentioned, namely:

21 Minutes of the Fourtheenth General Assembly pp. 25, 40-41

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1. Announcement has been made that there might be another referendum within a month or two. Whenever it may be and whatever the issues are, we request the President that he reassures us that there is freedom of speech so that voters can discuss the issues intelligently. Our people should be encouraged to speak out their minds candidly. Furthermore, to help give maximum assurance to our people that fairness and freedom are truly respected, we suggest to the President that the conduct of the coming referendum be entrusted to an independent body composed of citizens whose integrity is beyond reproach, such as the retired justices of the Supreme Court.22

2. We are alarmed by the rapid growth of multinational corporations in the Philippines. We are particularly concerned about the adverse effect of the Philippine-Japan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. We therefore call on the appropriate authorities and knowledgeable citizens to be most vigilant and to share their thinking as widely as possible, so that the people can participate in making decisions that affect their livelihood and their future.

3. Under the regime of Martial Law, the military has a big hand in the carrying out of government programs. We pray that they will have the strength equal to the task. We are deeply concerned by the fact that many of those being detained have not been charged in court. We appeal for a more speedy dispensation of justice. Furthermore, we express disapproval of any maltreatment of citizens, believing that every individual, however lowly and humble he may be, is a child of the Heavenly Father.23

When the Statement on National Issues was presented on the floor of the Assembly there was an intense debate between those who were against and those who were in favor of the statement especially on the issues that have direct reference to Marcos’ Martial Law.

The delegates who were connected with the government and the military chaplains in the Assembly who have registered negative votes were: Judge Odon Yrad, Jr, Chaplain Aristoteles Y. Malahay, Chaplain Samson Almarez and Chaplain Simplicio Dangawan, Jr. They argued that the statement did not state the real situation under Martial Law Philippine Style where there is freedom of speech, that civilian authority is supreme over the military, military abuses are not tolerated and there is discipline.24

Among the Bishops of the Church, Bishop Aquilino Guerrero of the Northern Luzon Jurisdiction expressed a dissenting vote while Bishop Marciano Evangelista of the Southern Tagalog Conference abstained on the ground that the statement need to have proper supporting documentations.

The statement was actually an appeal to President Marcos to ensure that abuses by soldiers and military personnel should neither be committed nor tolerated by the government

22 1974 UCCP General Assembly, May 20,1974, Appendix XVI pp. 152-15323 Ibid. 24 Minutes of the Fourtheenth General Assembly pp. 36-38

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on the basis that “…any maltreatment of citizens, believing that every individual, however lowly and humble he may be, is a child of the Heavenly Father.”25

The Assembly expressed concerned with regards to those being detained without being charged in court. This was understandable considering that detention without charges filed in court was a clear violation of one of the basic rights safeguarded by the Constitution. The Court should regulate the exercise of police power by the State. 26

Another significant issue identified in the statement adopted by the Church was the Muslim-Christian Relations.27 Acknowledging the improvement on the island undertaken by the Marcos regime the Church believed “that the uplift of the underprivileged, not only among Muslims and Christians in Mindanao but in the entire country, should be given major attention by the government much more than infra-structures and the development of physical resources.” The Church appealed to the President to:

1. Ensure that the conduct of the military be freed from actions that create fear rather than trust of the people in the Armed Forces.

2. Maximize the service of tri-sectoral conferences, especially utilizing men, women, and youth of proven integrity, and experience to decide on priorities, programs, and approaches toward the building up of self-reliance and self-development among the people.

3. Increase considerably the power of the people to work collectively to remove injustice, oppression, and enslavement, in whatever form.

4. Provide resources to support civic groups engaged in the program of pledges, especially those working in rural and remote areas not adequately served by government personnel.

5. Engaging the services of the churches in bringing about a dialogue for peace, unity, and progress among and between aggrieved groups so that resentments grievances, suspicions may be aired freely.

Despite the dissenting votes the Statement on National Issues was adopted by the 1974 General Assembly. The Statement sent a clear message to the Marcos Martial Law government that the UCCP would exercise its prophetic role in the New Society.

The statement was not against Martial Law. “By this statement, the Church expressed faith in God, love for country and deep concern.” It was in fact a statement of collaboration or “commitment in the building of a new society.” This role consisted of the following:

25 Minutes of the Fourtheenth General Assembly, Appendix XVI pp. 152-15326 1935 Philippine Constitution Article III. 27 1974 UCCP General Assembly, May 20,1974, Appendix XVI p. 153

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(1) By challenging all to a life of faith and holiness, beginning with those who are within the fellowship of the Church;

(2) By giving unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s’

(3) By praying for those who are in the authority, that they may be instruments of God in preserving peace and order, promoting righteousness and justice, securing equality and opportunity for all, and safeguarding the worth and dignity of human persons;

(4) By seeking the truth which makes men free and working for freedom that makes men whole;

(5) By witnessing to the liberating power of the Gospel which sets free both the oppressed and the oppressor.

(6) By opposing abuses and corruption in the church and in the government;

(7) By gearing and girding our educational programs to help meet the pressing needs of our people;

(8) By engaging in, various forms of Christian service to those detained but not charged in court, to prisoners in need of spiritual comfort and. pastoral care, to farm and industrial workers seeking just wages and better conditions of living, to the poor and the underprivileged who need to feel the touch of the Master's love;

(9) By upholding the due processes of democracy in church and society;

(10) By nurturing church members into a more aggressive and dynamic discipleship that will dispel the atmosphere of fear, knowing that God has given us the spirit of love and not of fear;

(11) By being prophetic in preaching, serving, and witnessing, and being true to the mandates of our Lord;

(12) By offering ourselves as a reconciling agent to heal broken relationships and foster understanding, trust, and brotherhood.

The Statement actually described the role of the Church and its members in the New Society. It pledged cooperation and support but never subservient to the government. It was a springboard to the Church’s active engagement with the Marcos government. It provided a trajectory on what issue or issues the UCCP and Marcos Government may disagree. It was a significant action of the Assembly. The Church has finally begun to speak publicly under an authoritarian regime.

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The NCCP Incident

The United Church of Christ in the Philippines was one of the few churches which was critical but supportive of the Marcos Martial Law Regime. The Catholic Church that has the biggest membership has also begun to speak critically of Martial Law. The Catholic Church called this relationship with the Marcos Government as critical collaboration which could best describe UCCP relationship with the Marcos regime.

Criticisms inevitably led to conflict. The conflict between the State and the Churches could not be avoided. To resolve conflicts, a Church-Military Liaison Committee (CMLC) was established in November 1973 and came up with CMLC Agreement. The agreement included the following provisions. 28

1. No arrest of priests, ministers, and nuns of religious sects or denominations shall be effected without clearance from the President. In cases where they are caught red- handed violating laws with penal provisions, their immediate investigation should be conducted without delay and the subjects concerned turned-over to the custody of their religious superiors. Under all circumstances they shall be accorded the courtesies commensurate to their religious calling.

2. Likewise, no raids and searches of churches, mosques, seminaries, nunneries, convents and other religious establishments shall be conducted without clearance from the President

3. Extend the organization of Church-Military Liaison Committees (CMLCs) down to municipal/parish level in order that purely local problems may be expeditiously resolved and prevent as much as possible their elevation to higher levels. It is expected that by this time, you are reminded, however, that the choice of membership from the church groups should be left entirely to the discretion of the religious leaders concerned. Continuous dialogue with religious leaders, through weekly meeting with CMLCs, is encouraged to avoid misunderstanding, promote exchange of information and maintain rapport.

4. All future operations involving religious organizations should be coordinated with the CMLC concerned through your respective command Chaplains.

Nevertheless, the CMLC agreement was not to be consistently followed by the military.

The Churches’ criticism of Martial Law did not go unnoticed. The Military interpreted this as part of a communist conspiracy to undermine the authority of the government. In 1974, the government decided that some church officials and lay workers had gone too far. A Protestant ecumenical institution would be involved.

28 Cable from Maj. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, to all zone, provincial, and other commanders under his authority, 3 December 1973.

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On the evening of June 26, 1974, some NCCP staff personnel and associates were arrested by the military, and their respective residences, quarters and offices were searched. The military authorities claimed that the NCCP was communist-infiltrated and that some of its activities were considered subversive as attested to by the papers and documents confiscated during the search.29

According to the military, they were looking for Dr. Dante Simbulan, an alleged communist subversive. They were able to track him down in Quezon City attending a meeting. At about 6:45 pm while everyone was preparing for supper, a group of plain-clothes men barged into the residence of the Rev. Paul and Marilyn Wilson, missionaries working at CDSC-NCCP. They arrested all the guests –Dr. Dante Simbulan, Atty. Ibarra Malonzo, and also detained the entire Wilson’s family, Paul, Marilyn and James, their ten-year old son.30

The raiders went to Kapatiran Kaunlaran Foundation Inc. (KKFI) in Quipo upon learning that Dr. Simbulan was going to meet with a foreign visitor who was staying there. The military arrested the Rev. Harry Daniel, an Anglican minister and resident of Singapore who was the associate general secretary of the Christian Conference of Asia (CCA) and was visiting the NCCP. Later, they arrested Rev. La Verne Mercado, the General Secretary of the NCCP. Another member of the Commission on Development and Social Concern who was arrested was Fr. Roman Tiples of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) upon his arrival at the Manila International Airport, now Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA).

The constabulary also went to the home of the Rev. Henry Aguilan, executive director of the Commission on Development and Social Concerns of the NCCP, and to the residence of Carmencita Karagdag, youth secretary of the CCA and a former official of the NCCP. Failing to find and arrest Rev. Aguilan and Ms. Karagdag, the Philippine Constabulary (PC) picked up Aguilan's secretary, Jean Salamat Santiago and Erik, her 7-month old son and four members of the Karagdag family.31

Rev. Aguilan went into hiding. He contacted some of his fellow UCCP Pastors in Metro Manila and in the Southern Tagalog Conference to find refuge but not one came forward to offer sanctuary. A pastor of a well known Church in Manila even gave a justification why they could not help Rev. Aguilan because of fear that they could be included in the military drag net if they extended assistance to any suspected subversive. He found refuge only among his ecumenical friends, Roman Catholic sisters, who provided sanctuary in one of their retreat houses.32

29 NCCP Statement on the June 1974 Incident, (NCCP Executive Committee, October 12, 1974, Manila)

30 Interview with Rev. Henry Aguilan. See his account of the raid in “Memoirs of a Community Qrganizer for Genuine People’s Power” in Diwang Buhay: Living thoughts on the concept and meaning of development (Quezon City, 1988) pp. 111-134

31 Interview with Rev. Henry Aguilan, July 15, 2002, Ibaan Batangas and Jean Santiago, October 16, 2002 Quezon City.

32 Interview with Rev. Henry Aguilan in Batangas July 15,2002

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Military claimed that the raid and apprehensions were due to the presence of communist subversives and their foreign supporters. The military also claimed substantial quantities of "subversive" literature were discovered at the Wilson residence and at the NCCP headquarters and “communist subversives” have infiltrated the NCCP.

All of the NCCP member-churches denied the charges, and the military declined to press its case in court. Instead, Rev. Wilson, along with his wife and son, and Fr. Daniel were subsequently deported from the Philippines; all others arrested were eventually released from detention without trials. In the statement release by the NCCP Executive Committee, it asserted:

The NCCP Executive Committee hereby proclaims without an iota of reservation or equivocation that the National Council of Churches in the Philippines is neither ideology-oriented or motivated. Papers and documents in the NCCP, which deal with various ideological doctrines, are compiled as part of its research and documentation program, precisely, to analyze and understand existing ideological doctrines and theories to be able to enlighten others on their implications. The NCCP reaffirms its constitutional mandate that Jesus Christ is the only foundation for all churches and Christian organizations and pursuant thereto, the NCCP shall serve as a channel for united witness and common action on matters affecting the religious, moral, social, and civic life of the nation.33

Through the representation made by other members of the Executive Committee of the NCCP led by Rev. George Castro of IEMELIF and Most Rev. Macario V. Ga of the IFI, they were able to request Jacobo C. Clave Presidential Executive Assistant to hand carry two resolutions of the Executive Committee namely, one, expressing confidence in the integrity and leadership of NCCP General Secretary La Verne D. Mercado and requesting the President to release the NCCP General Secretary, and, two, asking President Marcos to expedite the investigation of those arrested and order their release if no charges are filed. 34

President Marcos granted the request and ordered the release of Rev. La Verne Mercado. The other detainees, Mr. Ricardo and Mrs. Jean Santiago and their seven-month-old son, Eric, Atty. Malonzo, Rev. Paul and Mrs. Marilyn Wilson, a sister and two brothers of Carmencita Karagdag, would be release after 45 days of detention.35

The military insisted that the detainees were treated well, their rights respected and no one was tortured. However, one of the detainees after he was released would later narrate how he was tortured by the military while in detention. Among those arrested, Ricardo Santiago was the one taken by the military to the torture chamber everyday. For every wrong or not favorable answer to the question asked, his two legs were beaten with a lead pipe. He was also hit in different parts of the body. He lost his hearing due to the continued slapping at

33 NCCP Statement on the June 1974 Incident October 12, 1974, Manila34 Interview with Rev. Henry Aguilan and Jean Santiago35 Interview with Mrs. Jean Santiago, Quezon City October 16,2002 and Rev. Henry B.

Aguilan, Batangas July 15,2002

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the sides of his head. The military wanted him to confess that Rev. Aguilan is a communist who frequently met with communist leaders. They threatened him to be buried alive and his son, Erik would be place inside a freezer, if he would not cooperate with the military. Before he was released from detention, Mr. Ricardo Santiago was made to sign a paper declaring that while he was in the hands of the military, he had not been harmed or tortured.

According to Rev. Aguilan, Ric Santiago died 19 April 1986 due to complications of coronary and respiratory disorders. Aguilan remarked: “His friends and associates in the struggle for freedom consider Ric a hero who gave himself up for others. He was a man of courage, a true Christian and a martyr who died for his country's freedom.”36

Another detainee who was tortured was Josefina Karagdag. In a letter by Carmencita Karagdag, she described the effects of torture inflicted by the military on her sister. The interrogation induced a mental breakdown which led to her confinement at the National Mental Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal. According to a detainee who was with her that Josefina was sexually molested and could have been raped by the soldiers.37

Some of those arrested and whose residence were raided and searched in connection with the NCCP incidence were members of the UCCP to mention Rev. Henry Aguilan, Executive Director of CDSC-NCCP, Jean Salamat-Santiago and Ricardo Santiago. How did it affect the Church?

Impact of the NCCP Raid

The raid at the NCCP could only be interpreted as a warning to Protestant Churches and activist church workers.38 It happened when the Protestant churches were becoming more critical of the Marcos Martial Law regime. The NCCP General Assembly in November 1973 debated a resolution asking for the lifting of martial law and restoration of civil liberties. In December, the NCCP Executive Committee would pass a resolution requesting the President to lift martial law.39 The UCCP General Assembly in May 1974 a month before the NCCP raid, had earlier adopted a Statement on National Issues that included a warning to the possible abuses committed by the military under Martial Law.

However, church officials would learn that criticism of the government had limits. It appeared that the military had to remind the Churches, including the UCCP that freedom of speech has limits and it should never be used to subvert the government. The Marcos Government defined subversion as "anyone who speaks or acts against the government."40

36 Interview with Rev. Henry Aguilan37Interview with Ms. Jean Salamat-Santiago, cf. Pescador, Alex, “An Overview of Philippine

Church-State Relations since Martial Law,’ PAHAYAG, March 1975, pp. 3-6 38 Robert L. Youngblood, Marcos Against The Church: Economic Development and Political

Repression in the Philippines (Quezon City: New Day Publisher 1993) pp.117-137 39 NCCP Journal of the Sixth General Convention, 22-24 November 1974 and Minutes of the

NCCP Executive Committee Meeting, 22 December 197340 Defense Minister Enrile defined subversion as "anyone who speaks or acts against the

government." Philippine Times, 16-31 July 1977, p. 13.

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The NCCP raid traumatized the Church leadership. Thereafter Protestant pastors and Church lay leaders demonstrated caution in criticizing the government. The official minutes of the Executive Committee of the UCCP in the period between 1974 and 1976 made no mention of the NCCP incidence except in the United Church Letter (UCL) Newsletter January-February, 1975 edition, wherein the NCCP Statement on the June 1974 Incident was reproduced.

Furthermore, the Church leadership avoided any criticism against the Marcos regime as indicated in one of the actions of the Executive Committee during its Dec 5-7, 1974 meeting when they voted “that the UCBWM Statement on Human Rights in the Philippines be stricken off from the agenda."41

Conclusion

The Church was right all along when it adopted the Statement on National Issues reminding its members and the public including the President of the danger of military abuses, maltreatment of prisoners and detaining persons without charges in court. The Church had realized that under martial law, human rights could be curtailed and most often could be violated by people in government.

But when the Marcos Martial Law government reminded the Churches that it had the power to curtail the freedom of the churches, the leaders of the UCCP did not challenge it. Their open criticism became muted. Their actions became more appeasing to the Marcos regime. It would take time before the UCCP leadership would have the courage to be prophetic under an authoritarian regime.

41 UCCP Executive Committee Minutes, December 5-7, 1974, Action 74-301, p. 31

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