AD-A244 8.36T1C-

The DDirected Telescope:A Traditional Elementof Effective Command

byLieutenant Colonel Gary B. Griffin

eri hasa~ 1 ~ itsI d 3ocurn , jaQ d sole; its

"*COMBA ~ 92-01812STUDIE

-FOREWORD

"War is the realm of chance. No other human activity gives it greater scope:no other has such incessant and varied dealings with this intruder- Chancemakes everything more uncertain and interferes with the whole course of evints."So wrote Karl von Clausewitz in his classic, Onf War. This inherent uncertaintyin war, when combined with exertion, danger, and chance, produces an ever-present friction. The commander's role throughout military history has been toreduce the uncertainties of war for his own side and increase them for hisenemy. Notwithstanding great advances in the arts and sciences of commandand control, the best commanders have traditionally used trusted subordinatesas extensions of their own minds as a way of penetrating the fog of war. Thistechnique has come to be called the "directed telescope."

The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of Effectrtu' Command, byLieutenant Colonel Gary B. Griffin, was first published by the Comoat StudiesInstitute in 1985 as a CSI Report. Since its publication, The Directed 7Th'scopeh is been widely read across our Army and quite a few others, and as theI'ersiau Gulf operations began several months ago, the study tool, on a particularrelevance and timeliness- Lieutenant Colonel Griffin examines the historic roleplayed by liaison officers, aides-de-camp, and staff observers as extensions oifthe commander. The study focuses on the relationship between several greatcommanders and their liaison officers, as well as the systems, techniques, andorganizations they employed. With this study in hand, modern-and future-

commanders can draw on an expert analysis of various command and controlexpedients as they create new versions of the directed telescope.

July 1991 ROGER J. SPIILIERDi)rectorCombat Studies Institute

CSI publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressedherein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the D)epartment ofthe Army or the Deoartment of Defense.

TheDirected Telescope:A Traditional Elementof Effective Command

byLieutenant Colonel Gary B. Griffin

U.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenwcrth, Kansas 66027-6900

11INSTITUTE

Library of Congress C&taloging-in-Publication Data

Griffin, Gary B.The directed telescope : a traditional elenent of effective

command , by Gary B. Griffin.1p. clrn.

Includes bibliographical references.1. Ariiesi-Staffs-iil.tory-19th century. 2. Armies-Staffs-

flisfory-2Oth centurvy ý.- Command of troops-History-lgthcentury. 4. Command of troops--tIistory--20th century. 5. Militaryint'-lligenee--Htistory--19th century. 6. Military intelligence-

Hlistory--20th century. 7. Communications, Military-li istory--19thcentury. 8. Communications, Military--listory-20th century.I. U.a, Army Command and General Staff College. Ii. Title.UB220 c,75 '991

355.3"30.t2-4 d 20 91-25093CII'

k

CONTENTS

T a1 b le s .. . .. ..... .. .. .... ... .... .... .... ....... .... ... ... ... . . v

P re fa ce . . .... ... .. ... .... .. ........ ........... .... ... .. .... . . v ii

1. In trod uc tio n .... .... ................................ . 1

11. The IPrenineteenth-Century Era ........................ 3

II . The N apoleonic E ra ............... ................... 5

IV . T he M odern E ra ..... ................................. 9

The A m erican Civil W ar ............................... 9W orld W ar I ........................................... 13The Interwar Years ................................. 17W orld W ar II .......................................... 20Post-W orld W ar i1 ..................................... 32

V . C on clusions ............................................. 35

N o tes . .. ... .. .. . .. ..... .... ... .... ...... ..... ... . . .. ... . .. .. 3 9

1)1 1.U5... .. ...... .. ...... ........................... .. 4 1

D, T AccesiOn For

NSPCNTIS CRAL)i IC IAB L3

Iirnooced Li

By .. ... ...................

Di l

TABLES

I. Continuum of Command and Control Functions ......... 35

i ii . i V

PREFACE

This Combat Studies Institute study was ýuriginally preparedin response to a reques!_.1j the Un.ti d States Army Organi-zational Effectiveness Center and School (OECS) for historicalsupport. Specifically, the OECS asked C(SI to conduct a historicalstudy of commanders' use of aides, liaison officers, observers,and other representatives in the course of campaigns and battles.Intending to use the study to support the development of newdoctrine concerning the role of organizational effectiveness staffofficers in combat, the OECS posed a number of investigativequestions:

. What functions did such personnel perform during combat?

' In what ways did such personnel enhance the commandand control of units, generate initiative, create agility and depth,and contribute toward the synchronization of combat power?

* What special preparation and training did these personnel

receive?

-* What qualities, attributes, competencies, and capabilitiesdid these personnel possess?

* For whom did these personnel work?

H low did these personnel go about performing their duties?

H How were these personnel selected?

-W Who used these personnel? What are the similarities anddifferlinees between the battlefield effectiveness of units that usedsuch personnel versus units that did not?

* What authority did these personnel possess?

Within these guidelines, this study proceeds from a generaldescription of aide and liaison systems of the prenineteenth cen-tury to a more detailed assessment of those of the Napoleonicand modern periods of military histor.?.7The broad aardate ofthe study and the limited time available prohibited a more de-tailed analysi-e. Furthermore, throughout this report, the historicalcases selected depended on the availability of source materialat the Command and General Staff College. Nevertheless, thehistorical examples used illustrate the effectiveness of aides, liai-son officers, and other agents of the commander in the commandand control process. Historical evidence reveals, for the mostpart, that the func' n, authority, and utility of these types of

vii

officers were highly situational and, as a result, varied widelyover tine and space. Their use and organization have seldoinbeen formally defined, especially regarding their intimte relation-

ships with commanders and the means in which mutual trustand confidence were instilled.

While the 1985 OECS request established the research ob-jectives for this study, no attempt was made to link the studywith developing organizational effectiveness doctrine. Neverthe-less, it was hoped that the material presented wouid assist theOECS in the formulation of doctrine for organizational effec-tiveness staff officers on the Airl~and Battlefield and, for thatmatter, liaison officers in general. Moreover, this study shouldbe valuable and stand on its own merits by virtue of the infer-mation and analysis that it provides on the subject of techniquesof command.

"viii

I. INTRODUCTION

I1 y iiu cail till th'.I( v pt•sitimil with proper officers . . . yom might hitpu,to :1 thiv e fltu 10 t army in ilthe world.

(General Robert E. ixs21 March 1S:1

A study of command, a principal element of the art of war,reveals that its most fundamental characteristics have remainedunchanged throughout time. Although command functions appeareternal, the conm-mand sy erm, or the means through which com-i.iand is exercised, has experienced centuries of almost continu-ous development.. Consequently, organizations. techniques, andpiocedures for command have been constantly redefined in orderto me.t the demands of an increasingly sophisticated and com-plex art. Despite modification, however, common patterns existwithin the great diversity of command systems. In fact, thedegree of similarity in systems is remarkable. Many commandsvste. characteristics seem to transcend time. They appear ashistorical constants. There are several distinctive features of thetraditiu'ial "line and staff" organization that have remainedvirtually unchManged. They stand unaltered in theory as well asapplication despite centurie.• of organizational variations andtechnological advances. One of the more important fixed elementsof (ommand is what historian Martin Van Creveld has calledthe 'directed telescope." Van Creveld asserts that, from "Platoto NATO," command in combat has consisted of a search for

certainty more than anything else. The commander's unendingquest for certainty in battle has, however, never been fullysatisfied. As a result, commanders at every level have beenhistorically presented with a continuous and elusive challengeto develop the most rapid, reliable, and efficient means ofobtaining tactical information, communicating critical orders,and controlling subordinate units.

The directed telescope, or, more specifically, the use of

specially selected, highly qualified, and trusted young officersas special agents or observers for the commander has beei1 afundamental method of responding to this persistent challenge.These young officers have been popularly referred to as the",eyes" of the commander. Throughout military history, the useof officers in this capacity has been critical in obtaining battle-field command information for the commander. The utility of

2

these special agents, whether they are aides, liaison personnel,or special staff officers, has been proven in war after war forthousands of years. The directed telescope has survived despitesuccessive waves of information -gathering communications tech-nology. From the loyal aides-de-camp of the Napoleonic era tothe British command liaison officers of World War II, commandand staff liaison systems, an often overlooked technique ofcommand, have played an extremely important role in successfulcommand and control at the tactical, operational, and strategiclevels of warfare.

As stated earlier, the trusted subordinate used in his roleas a skilled observer and objective adviser is a traditional toolof command. While this tool may appear to he anl anachronism,modern commanders and military theorists can ill afford toignore the time-honored directed telescope concept in developingcommand systems capable of meeting the Army's AirLandBattle-Future command and control responsibilities. A historicalanalysis of this effective command and control expedient canassist the Army in creating a modern updated version of thedirected telescope.

The directed telescope system is as old as the military staffitself- Even the earliest commanders in history employed order-lies of some type to assist them in the execution of command.As a result, a general survey of the development of commandsystems employing staff officers offers a useful background forexamining similar techniques in the modern era, especially thosesince the start of World War II. Certain periods of militaryhistory have been more productive than others in the evolutionof the military staff and the directed telescope. Thus, it is fruitfulto trace the development of aide, adviser, and liaison systemsover three distinct periods in the history of warfare: tileprenincteenth- century, Napoleonic, and modern eras.

11. THE PRENINETEENTH-CENTURY ERA

Surprisingly. the armies of' this period displayed a remark-ably high degree of' efficiency, even by modern standards. Thesearrmies had functional staffs that included aides-de-camp. Theaides' primary duties were to assist their commanders in ad-ministering army affairs kind helping commanders execute com-mand responsibilities.

A study of Alexander the Great's staff organization (inheritedfrom his father Philip) reveals many strong similarities to moremodern systems. Alexander's staff was designed to support hiswidespread campaigns and included officer specialists for engi.neering and siege operations and younger officers called soma-tophylaxcs who served under Alexander's personal directionexcept when entrusted with the command of subordinate units.'Among other dutics, these junior officers served as aides-de-campand heralds, and their responsibilities included assisting in thecommand and control of the often widely separated columns ofAlexander's army as couriers and observers. They were, in

Alexander's aides communicated with commanders of opposingcamps and, obviouslY, held Alexander's full trust and confidencein order to be entrusted with such sensitive and critical details.

Also included within Alexander's staff was a small advisorycircle of highly quaiified trusted staff officers, among themseveral sonatophyla•-s, who acted as an informal council ofwar and who routinely performed special missions and filledhigh military and administrative positions. Thus, Alexander'sstaff council and sornatophy/axes set an early pattern for thedirected telescope system.

Alexander's example of using young officers as aides inexercising command and control (a practice probably predatingAlexander) continued with the staff developments of the RomanArmy under Scipio Africanus Major (237-183 B.C.) and JuliusCaesar (100-44 B.C.). As with Alexander, Scipio and Caesarboth employed junior officers on their staffs. Their volunteeraides, called contubernales, acted as observers and trustedcouriers for top-priority missions.2 Additionally, both Romanleaders kept a close circle of these subordinates as mess com-panions. This group primarily consisted of aides-de-camp andclose political and military advisers. The contubernalhs appeared

3

to have the sanme general duties and responsibilities asAlexander's soinatop 'hylaxes, t' at of gathering critical informa-tion and performing important missions for the commander.Essential quaities for these aides were good judgment, militaryskill, and, most of all, absolute trust and loyalty to thecommander.

Whatever their official titles, these primitive forerunners ofmodern command and stAff liaison systems demonstrated thateven the earliest military commanders had an appreciation ofthe many problems assocmiaed with exercising effective commandand control during campaigns and battles. This concerncontinued through the Middle Ages. For example, King EdwardIll used his aides with great effect as information-gatheringagents and couriers at both Crfcy and Poitiers., For the mostpart, the original observer and adviser role of these early directedtelescope systems changed little until the Napoleonic era, whenthe military staff underwent dynamic changes resulting in theemergence of formal aide de-camp and liaison systenis.

II1. THE NAPOLEONIC ERA

The advent of firearms in the sixteenth century requiredmilitary formations to become more widespread and, as a result,more disciplined. During the era of Gustav Adolphus andWallenstein, emphasis was placed on better organization andcontrol. Staffs grew in size and structure, and positions weredefined. Aides-de-camp began to function as special assistantsto the commander. For example, toward the end of the SevenYears' War (of the mideighteenth century), Frederick the Great,after the deaths of his many senior advisers, selected jinior,.fficers of tactical aptitude and expertise and trained them ascommand observers. Recognizing the increased complexity ofwarfare, Frederick called on these officers to assist in controllingthe line troops and assisting other staff officers in coordinatingmore specialized functions (administration, supply, and so forth).'Although Frederick still exercised direct command, his systemmay be considered an early forerunner of the Prussian general

gum L(itl 111ia LuI 1)ya1 d ciitut y ln ti.

The proliferation of firearms during this period also causeda revolution in tactics as well as in command. The scope ofbattle expanded with a corresponding increase in chaos. The"fog of war," now accompanied by gunsmoke, became even moredense. Combat formations could no longer be effectively con-trolled by a single man. Consequently, aides-de-camp made theirfirst formal appearance as command observers and messengers.Commanders used their aides to help them exercise control overbattles. The aides literally became the commanders' "eyes, earsand voice," a- well as thy primary means of obtaining the vitalinformation that the field commanders required to maintain ef-fective command and control over their rapidly growing, increas-ingly widespread, and decentralized forces.

Virtually every major commander of the Napoleonic periodused aides in the same manner. However, many historiansconsider the Duke of Marlborough's use of aides-de-camp in aliaison role at Blenheim in 1704 as the best example prior toNapoleon. Positioning himself at the center of hisc. ,frmy, theduke used aides extensively to communicate orders to L,:s ' lanks.Once a battle had commenced, young aides provi!red uni withupdated information as he moved about the b-•,jtt rid Theeffectiveness of this arrangement allowed the duk-e to positionhimself at the most critical point of his line. Thas, when an

5-

I6opportunity developed to deliver a decisive blow, he was invari-ably at the point of greatest importance and readily availableto influence the action.

The duke's aides were personable, ahove-awvrage junior of-ficers who were able to judge the terrain as well as the tacticalsituation. F. W. von Zanthier, a famous military theorist of theera, stated that they clearly "understood how important it is totransmit an order exactly, correctly estimate the situation, andbe sufficiently enterprising to ensure a decisive opportunity didnot pass by."' The ability of these officers to assist in accuratelyconveying the commander's intent to subordinates, coupled withtheir duties as reliable observers, is clear. They were the earliestprototype of the aide-de-camp and liaison systems of Napoleon.Wellington, and, well over a century later, Field MarshalBernard L. Montgomery.

The Napoleonic era brought about wholesale changes instrategyy and tactics and probably the greatest revolution everin the art of command. Napoleon's command structure incorpo-rated the first fully comprehensive staff organization, and his

ueof both high and l 'awmking aid, t.1o ass in ntrolling the Grande Armrne is well documented. Napoleon, perhapsmore than any other commander before him, emphasized theabsolute necessity of having critical command information avail-able to him at all times. The emperor knew full well the valueof personal observation, and he used his aides extensively togather information and to convey orders to his subordinatecommanders. However, Napoleon's aides were not. simply limitedto gathering tactical and operational information; they suppliedstrategic information as well.

As with every commander, Napoleon relied heavily on theroutine reports of his commanders and staff. Nevertheless, heoften found them lacking in detail, thus not fully useful. Also,unit reports frequently neglected to express the more intangibleaspects of a unit's status-like leadership, morale, and esprit. Ifsubordinate commands did address these vital areas in reports,they were often less than objective and sometimes totally biased.To keep him informed on the significant conditions within hisvarious commands and to verify his subordinates' reports,Napoleon used his aides as a directed telescope to augment theregular reporting system. Napoleon viewed the formal staffsystem as totally inadequate when reporting what Van Creveldrefers to as "less structured information." '[he emperor-generalalso turned his telescope toward the enemy on occasion and on

the terrain where campaigns were to be fought. It was Napoleon'suse of aides and his system of formal reporting procedures thatcontributed to his leadership techniques becoming a wholesalerevolution in military command.

Napoleon used a dual system-his formal staff and his aidesand liaison officers (a group of six to thirteen lesser-gradeofficers)-for cutting through established command channels togather time-sensitive information. The emperor's general-gradeaides-dc-camp, his lower-ranking liaison officers, and his com-missioned orderlies were young, active, and in the "full flowerof their mental and physical power." Their duties were bothbroad and diverse, ranging from carrying battlefield messagesto reconnoitering entire countries and negotiating surrenderterms. Periodically, aides were also called on to accomplish stra-tegic missions, such as bearing important diplomatic messagesto foreign heads of state. Napoleon's aides-de-camp, as a resultof their sensitive duties, had to possess savoir faire and anability to get along with and be trusted by subordinate com-manders and staff officers of higher rank. They had to be well-trained, professional soldiers; precise in their observations; ableto isolate problems; and, perhaps most of all, capable of dis-criminating between vital and nonvital tactical information. Theaides also had to master the operational philosophy of theiremperor, understand his intent fully, and be able to answer sub-ordinate commanders' questions. Napoleon's aides often spokein the name of the emperor and, as a result, were respected aspossessing his utmost confidence. Napoleop's instructions toGeneral Bertrand provide an example of the type of missionsNapoleon's aides performed:

Tornmorrow at dawn you depart and travel to Worms... make"sure all preparations for crossing thy river by my guard are beinginade. You will then go on to Kassel to make sure the place is

being put in a state of defensive and provisioned. Taking due se-curity precaution, you will visit the fortress of llanau. Can it lieoccupied by a coup de main?'

Another example of an aide's orders, in the context of veri-fying the accuracy of a subordinate's report, is a mission givento Lebrun"

You will first visit the Corps of the Duke of Regis and informme about his person. You will copy me a picture of his entire Corps.You will report on the state of his infantry, artillery, trains, maga-z:ntvs .. 0 J hospitals also the rumors circulating in and around thecorps, in brief anything that might interest Me.,

8

Although younger officers were sent on more limited mis-sions, the objectives were virtually the same-collecting specificinformation on the fighting condition of the Grande Arm6e,gathering intelligence, and assisting in tht control of forces inbattle. Napoleon's younger, lower-ranking aides-de-camp werehandpicked, often coining from noble families with a militarytradition. Two years' troop service was the only basic prerequisitefor selection. Beyond that, however, they had to be loyal, dedi-cated officers, both mentally alert and physically fit.

Napoleon's aide and liaison officer system played an instru-mental role in the command and control of the best organizedarmy that history had seen until then and was the model forseveral similar arrangements of the modern era. His directedtelescope system enabled him, as the commander of the GrandeArm6e, to circumvent the command hierarchy as needed. Theuse of aides-de-camp gave him the means to focus on any onepart of his army and obtain the specific, sometimes intangible,and often vital information required for successful operations.

Noting the effectiveness of Napoleon's use of aides, one ofhis principal adversaries, the Duke of Wellington, employed asimilar system. A common practice within the British Army ofthe ;Nalpoleonic era was that each general officer was aliowedat least one aide-de-camp, lieutenant generals were permitted two,and commanders of forces were allotted as many as they needed.During the Peninsula campaign, Wellington, because of his highcommand position, had six aides-de-camp ranging from lieutenantto lieutenant colonel." The relationship between the famousBritish commander and his aides was so close that he oncestated that even in retirement he must have his young aides athis side. Wellington's subordinates performed the same basicroles as INapoleon's but were of special use in gathering intel-ligence. Perhaps of even greater importance, however, Welling-ton's aides, like those of Napoleon, helped compile informationon the condition of his own forces."

l)uring the remainder of the nineteenth century, armiesthroughout the world followed the examples set by Napoleonand Wellington in using aides and liaison officers. The largearmies of the American Civil War proved to be no exception.During the Civil War, which has often been considered the lastgreat war of the Napoleonic era and the first one of the modernera, the use of aides in a liaison role by several famous com-manders, both Union and Confederate, provides an excellentexample of an early American version of a directed telescopesystem.

IV. THE MODERN ERA

The American Civil WarSeveral famous Union and Confederate commanders differed

in their approach to command procedures. For example, GeneralsUlysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman made extensive useof young aides in a directed telescope role. Like other Civil Warcommanders, they used their aides primarily to assist in thecommand and control of their forces, perform sensitive missions,and gather critical information on enemy as well as friendlyforces. On the other hand, many leading Confederate generalsfailed to use their aides to the full effect. limiting them strictlyto a commissioned courier role.* The Confederates' failure to useany truly effective command and staff liaison system oftenfrustrated their greatest military leader, General Robert E. Lee.Eventually, as a result of numerous command and staff failures,attributable mainly to Lee's ineffective means of obtainingvaluable tactical information and the undisciplined conduct ofmany of his subordinate generals, the general created a corpsof officers within the Confederate Army to perform duties strik-ingly similar to those of a general staff directed telescope system.

As a brigadier general early in the war, Grant had two cap-tains as aides-de-camp. One of them, John A. Rawlins, rose togeneral officer rank. He ultimately served as Grant's chief ofstaff and was briefly appointed Grants secretary of war whenthe general became president. As can be expected, the numberand rank of Grant's aides-de-camp increased with the general'srank. Eventually, as a lieutenant general, he had four lieutenantcolonels as aides-de-camp (out of a staff of only fourteen).Lieutenant Colonels Comstock, Porter, Babcock, and Dent wereall known for their good judgment, great personal courage, pro-fessional competence, and ability to communicate effectively withothers.'" They all had abundant field experience and were young,active, and fully prepared to perform any duty called for bytheir chief'. They acted as Grant's "eyes" on countless occasionsthroughout the war. Their role in battle, however, vas especiallycritical.

Prior to a battle, Grant would communicate his overall intentto his aides, explain how he saw the battie progressing, state

*Tl'here are at least two exceptions: Longstree's "SSorrels" and Forrest's"Gallupers."

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his plan of maneuver, and stress the importance of overcomingany delays in the communication of his orders. Grant clearlystated what he expected from his close circle of young staffofficers. For example, on the eve of the Battle of Petersburg,Grant provided the following instructions to his assembled aides:

I want you to discuss with me freely from time to time thedetails of the orders given for the conduct of a battle, and jearnmy views as fully as possible as to what course should be pursuedon all contingencies which may arise. I expect to send you to thecritical points of the line to keep me promptly advised of what istaking place, and in cases of t'reat emergency, when new dispositionshave to be made on the instant, or it becomes suddenly necessaryto reinforce one command by sending to it troops from another,and there is not time to communicate with headquarters. I wantyou to explain my views to commanders, and urgo immediate action,looking to cooperation without specific orders from me."'

The trust Grant had in his young aides-de-camp is as obviousas the heavy weight of their responsibilities.

The relationship between these officers and their army com-mander, as with Wellington and his aides, was clearly a closeone. This strong personal relationship between commander and

auouruiaLe, one based on mutuai respect, was a trend thatbecame a prime characteristic of many successful directed tele-scope systems of the future. Grant's aides dined with him nightlyin an informal, almost family-like environment. The routineevening discussions, often driven by the events of the day,provided the commanding general with key insights into thestatus of his army. As with Napoleon, Grant's aides often pro-vided information that he was unable to gather through themore conventional formal reports sent up the chain of command.His aides' observations gave him an accurate impression of themorale and esprit of his soldiers, as well as their overall readi-ness to engage the enemy.

Grant's aides also performed the more traditional aide-de-camp role of conveying orders in combat. Since the generalroutinely positioned himself centrally in the field (so he couldbe found and could issue his orders rapidly), his four aides-de-camp were important in maintaining effective command and

¶ control of the often widespread units of the army. Grant's useof his aides, like that of the Duke of Marlborough over 150years earlier, enabled him, through proxies, to be at the criticalpoi it in the line when he was most needed, and on occasion,thi ; proved decisive to the outcome of battles.

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Another famous Union general, William T. Sherman, admiredthe reduced, streamlined effectiveness of Grant's staff. He closelymodeled his own small staff after it, especially regarding howto use his aides-de-camp best. As a division commander, Shermanhad two aides, both lieutenants. He used these officers exten-sively to galher information, make observations, verify reports,and convey orders. As with Grant's aides, the two lieutenantsrose in rank along with their commander. Even as the com-mander of the Military I)ivision of the Mississippi, however,Sherman maintained a reduced staff when he was in the field.In fact, Sherman relied heavily on three captains as primaryaides during his Atlanta campaign.12 The effectiveness ofSherman's field staff information-gathering system, and per-haps a hint of the general's overall command philosophy, isreflected in his requiring only a single report-a trimonthlystrength report-from his subordinate commands during hishard-driving campaigns."

While Sherman credited technology, especially the telegraph,for improving command and control, he stated that usually thebest command and control system for every purpose was paper,ppenclis, and a goud aide. He also proposed that military head-quarters, from brigade to army, include among the staff "acouple of young aides-de-camp, habitually selected from thesubalterns of the brigade, who should be good riders, and intel-ligent enough to give and explain the orders of their gene.ral."'1Sherman's campaign successes, like those of Grant, attest tothe effectiveness of these generals' almost identical directed tele-scope aide and liaison systems. Unfortunately, many federalgenerals did not use their aides as effectively. As a result, theyoften paid the consequences, stumbling into battles without ade-quate intelligence while lacking an effective means of controllingtheir forces once they engaged the enemy.

Although Robert E. Lee used his staff and aides efficiently-especially Colonels Charles Venables, Walter Taylor, CharlesMarshall, and Randolph Falcott-many other Confederatecommanders did not.':, Consequently, their overall performanceas operational commanders often suffered accordingly. Inselecting officers for his staff, Lee conEidered individual person-alities more than professional attributes and, like tther com-manders of the period, chose junior officers, often much youngerthan himself. Furthermore, Lee insisted that his staff officers'personalities blend with the overall tone of his headquarters andhis unique style of decentralized command and control. Despite

*

12

his overemphasis on personality, Lee was an excellent judge ofprofessionalism and individual character for all of his aides.Like their Union counterparts, Lee's aides were known for theircoolness under fire, tact, and judgment.

Lee recognized that the Confederacy's severe shortage ofexperienced "Old Army" staff officers at virtually every level ofheadquarters prohibited centrajized control of tactical operationsin the Confederate Army. As a result, he was forced to assumethat his armies must function in concert with one another with-out centralized control. He did not find a staff model adequateto serve the rapidly changing needs of technology, so he reliedheavily on simple mission-oriented orders. One biographer,Clifford l)owdy, stated that nothing was required of Lee's sub-ordinate commanders beyond the most rudimentary and funda-mental techniques of command. Lee simply saw no need for adirected telescope system early in the war. He assumed thatbecause of the simplicity of his orders, the skilled lea3dership ofhis subordinates, and their renowned fighting spirit, his officerswould operate effectively within his orders and support his over-all intent when he was absent from the battlefield. Lee did notfeel it necessary to investigate what was happening in his sub-ordinate commands. let alone verify reports and closely scrutinizethe conduct of their operations. After several Confederate tacticalsetbacks, however, he painfully recognized that he needed toincrease the overall effectiveness of his rather loose commandand control system and to establish firm control over the un-disciplined actions of many of his subordinate commanders. Afterthe Seven Days' Battles, he realized that when in combat hehad no way of knowing just how his division commanders wereoperatiig in relation to the general headquarters. 16

Early in the war, Lee recognized the shortcomings of hisarmy's staff system and the failure of 1.- staffs to providecorrect and timely information. The weaknesses inherent inappointing relatives, political associates, or old friends to keystaff positions, instead of selecting officers with more profes-sional credentials, exacerbated the already dysfunctional Con-federate command and control system.* In March 1863, Leecalled for tfhe establishment of a separate corps of officers tofill critical positions within the army to correct the chronic

*This "patronage" practice was common in most armies of the period but

the rule more than the exception in the Confederawe Army and Union militiaunits.

13

"information vacuum" problem. He wrote to President JeffersonD)aX is:

The greatest difficulty I find is in calusing orders and regulationsto b)e obeyed. We therefore have need of a corps of officers to teachothers their duty, see to the obseruai:Oce of orders, and to the regu-larity and precision of all movements . ..

In reference to aides and other staff officers, Lee states in thesame correspwndence:

If you can fill these positious with proper officers-not relationsand social friends of the oi.ntmanders, who, however itgreeahle theircompany, are not the most use-ful-yout might hope to have the floest

army in the world.1:

Obviously, Lee saw the need for some type of directed tele-scope system. However, the suggestion by the famous Southerngeneral for a separate corps of trained staff officers and ob-servers is somewhat unique.

World War IThe American Civil War marked the end of one era of mili-

tary history and the beginning of another. The art of war wasclearly in a state of flux during this period. Large conscriptedarmies with expanded and more specialized staffs became popu-lar. Consequently, by the end of the nineteenth century, aide-de-camp duties had changed drastically. The aides' traditionalresponsibilities were being redefined by both staff specialization,reo-,anization, and the rapid pace of communications technology.Th, formation of general staff systems in many leading armiesaround the world resulted in the battiefield functions of aides-de-camp being passed to either operations, intelligence, or liaisonoffices.

With the advent of new weapons and larger armies, theimplemeintation of tactics became further decentralized. Strategicmovement of troops and materiel, now firmly tied to railroads,allowed the strategic and operational concentration of forces closeto the battlefield. Although the telegraph and railroad enhancedthe centralization of command and control, the growth in thesize of armies and new weaponry had the opposite effect-spreading armies farther apart. The telegraph made instan-taneous communication possible, but it was also extremelyinsecure, .nreliable, and vulnerable. In the long run, its impor-tance to field commanders proved negligible, for even thoughthe telegraph proved instrumental in exercising effective com-mand and control at army level, it was seldom utilized at corps

14

and division. It was simply an impractical frontline communi-cations system. So, during these early days of the modern era,despite advances in staff organization and technology, com-manders still relied largely on staff officers on horseback tomonitor the activities of subordinate commands. The directedtelescope system may have been modernized and redesigned intheory, but in practice, it remained the same. Prussia's centralEuropean wars against Austria and France in the late nineteenthcentury again showed the utility of the system, despite theadvances in technology and the creation of formidable generalstaff systems by the Prussians, Austrians, and French.

1During this period, General Helmuth von Moltke, creator ofthe first truly modern staff system, also depended on an aide-type liaison system for battlefield information.? Within the staffof each Prussian field army, Moltke assigned trusted subor-dinates-general staff officers who were to supplement the units'official reports with private correspondence. Moltke's officersroamed the battlefield and observed key events as they occurred.They carried important messages and often served as theircommander's most effective means of gathering critical infor-mation. Assigned to frontline units, his young officers were ableto gain detaiL on battles that. went beyond their cenmmander'S

"3 view. As with their aide-de-camp forerunners, they compiledinformation not included in standard telegraphic reports, freelyreporting the intangibles of combat and the bottlenecks to effi-ciency. Unlike many of their predecessors, however, thesc officershad a great deal of autlhority. Carefully selected and trained,they were military experts and analytical observers. These pro-fessional attributes made the quality of the late nineteenth-century Prussian directed telescope system extraordinary. Al-though the Prussian system was imperfect, it proved to be anextremely consistent, trustworthy, and reliable means of keepinghigh-level commanders informed as to the conditions on the front.

As the all-too-brief phase of World War I maneuver deterio-rated into static trench warfare, many headquarters were quicklyformed behind the front lines. Housed in comfortable, semi-permanent or permanent facilities and interconnected by a vastcomplex of telecommunications systems (telegraph, field tele-phone, and wireless), these headquarters soon assumed totalcontrol of the war. As a result of their relative isolation fromthe front, high-level commanders quickly lost touch with theharsh realities of battie. Major General J. F. C. Fuller describescommand conditions during this period in his postwar workGeneralship: Its Diseases and Their Cure:

15

As the general became more andI more bound to his office, and,

consequently divorced from his tnen, he relied for contact not upon

(ih personal factor, but upon the mechanical telegraph and telephone.They could establisih contact, but they could accumplish this onlyby dragging subordinate commanders out of the firing line, or more

often persuading them not to go into it, so that they might be atthe beck and call of their auperiors- In the World War nothing wasniore dreadful to witness than a chain of men starting with a bat-

talion commander and ending with an armny commander sitting intelephone boxes, improvised or actual, talking, tblking, talking in

place of leading, leading, leading IEmphasis addedJ.'"

Headquarters succumbed to the temptation of overcentralizingtheir tactical operations. It was only natural that operationalflexibility was sacrificed for disciplined control. The BritishArmy, for example, was limited to command that could be exer-cised by wire. British liaison officers simply relayed informationor sat idly by representing their headquarters "interests." Thisineffective use of liaison and the overreliability on the telephone,the telegraph, and later the wireless severely reduced Britishcommand flexibility. Consequently, the operational thinking ofmany leading staff officers and commanders became stunted.Initiative suffered, and the thinking in the rear headquartersu1amaiuete.y Jbci.•xaz ao atatiatiim asLi"h eteiicli-iiiie neelejses (of

the front. Lacking a truly effective directed telescope system, ageneral headquarters relied solely on telegraphic or telephonicdescriptions and appraisals from the front. The only tacticalinformation available originated from divisional headquarters,which were themselves too far from their units to know truecombat conditions. This overreliance on technology gave high-level commanders a poor conception of the battlefield and con-tributed directly to one disaster after another, the crucial Battleof the Somme being one of the best examples.

In that battle, one communications system after anotherfailed to provide an accurate appraisal of the battlefield. Withouta directed telescope system, General Sir Douglas Haig, Britishcommander at the Somme, stubbornly stuck to his plan, totallyignorant of actual battlefield conditions. Carrying out the ordersof a general headquarters out of touch with reality, intermediatecommands threw wave after wave of British infantry units intothe line. When it was over, almost 60,000 men had been lost ina single day's fighting. So poor were the communications thatit was days before the magnitude of the Somme defeat wasrealized.

Similar incidents occurred in other battles, including Pas-schendaele ridge, where the chief of staff of the British armies

i11 lt'urope remiirked aft ,r the battle: AM)o you mean to tell Incthat the soldiers had t.u, fight under such conditions? Why wasI never told about this lefure?''zI A young British staff officer,Major Bernard L. Montgomery, overheard the chief's remarksand vowed that, if' ever lie attained high command, le would

never be so absolutely ignorant of frontline conditions. A genera-lion later during the next world war, Montgomery developed adirected telescope liaison system second to none.

The German experience in the war with France in 1870taught them a number of staff lesson-s that the British belatedlylearned in World War I. In the Great War, the Germans resortedto their proven and effective general staff liaison syslenm. Generalstaff' officers of' higher headquarters visited the front line weekly.Each was assigned a specific section and given a questionnairefor evaluating the state of morale, supply, fortifications, andconditions in general. D)uring battles, as a backup to the moretechnical means of gathering information, these officers weresent to their assigned areas to gain a direct impression of thefighting. After awhile, these observers developed a personal rela-tionship with the unit commanders of their assigned segmentof the front. Eventually. they were accepted and not ronsidoredoutsiders. As a result, they were able to obtain even more criticaland candid information. Unlike the British, the Germans recog-nized early in the war that their type of liaison, the one origin-ally developed by Moltke some fifty years earlier, enabledcommanders to make timely decisions based on actual combatconditions, not ones driven by a conditioned response to a for-malized plan.

Seeking o more balanced approach, the French, like theirBritish allies, were determined to maintain centralized control.The commander of the French armies, Field Marshal JosephJoffre, realized that, while the telephone, the telegraph, and thewireless would enable him to receive information and transmitorders, an improved mear,s of maintaining close command super-vision had to be developed- As a result, Joffre created his famousvertical liaison system.

Joffre's liaison officers, a group of young officers, mostlycaptains and majors, were carefully selected and attached tothe operations sections of subordinate headquarters. Their dutieswere to inspect units, carry instructions, and verify the executionof missions assigned by the general headquarters. On returningfrom their tours of duty, these officers would report directly to

17

the commander. Once again, as with previous systems, the great-est. value of the system was the report-ing of intangible infor-mat ion that never reached headquarters through routine reportingchannels, like the German system, however, there were problemswith coommand relationships due to the excessive authority givensome of doffre's liaison officers (many commanders were relieveddue to adverse reports by liaison officers). In that regard, thesystem was ntot entirely successful. Nevertheless. despite occasional abuses of authority, the French vertical liaison systemserved its primary purpose by promoting an understanding oforders up and down the chain of command.-'

Observing French and German successes, as well as Britishfailures, in exercising command and control, one American officerdeveloped his own somewhat unique command and control sys-tem. Colonel George C. Marshall, then chief of operations of

the American Expeditionary Forces' First Army, assembled agroup of' young Army officers--captains and lieutenants-to act

as combat observers. Marshall told them what information hewanted from the divisions to which they were to report. EachOfficer accompanying the division assault formations was directedto carry six courier pigeons and to release the birds at 0700,090., and 1500. For the most part, the officers were to providethe location of the front line, accompanied by a brief descriptiotof the status of the fighting.2 ' Marshall stated that the infor-mation provided by these officers, a form of American WorldWar I directed telescope, proved invaluable.

Lessons in command and control from World War I werenumerous. Command liaison remained a viable staff principledespite technological advances. Nevertheless, lacking any trulyeffective liaison system, the British perhaps learned their bitterlesson better than anyone, for as Fuller concluded after the war:

Formerly there was it general s stift. This was composed ofaides-de-canmps, nout spruce, young, officers who dot flunk'y work, but

experienced mten who delivered the generad's orders and saw thatthey were carried out. Though this system of comtaot and controtl is

just as valuable today as it was in the days of Naptoleon, it hastallen into aheyance; for the present daty liaisoni officer is far removedfrom the old-fashioned aides-de-camp."

The Interwar YearsThe history of World War I abounds with stories of effective

and ineffective command and control systems. Various combatinformation systems were utilized by virtually every belligerent

and 11were usually pat~ternied after it formal commanlIdll and( staffliaison network. Fortu nately, the mlil 'Nv painful les'sonis learnedin command and control techniques during the war were notlost in postwar military education. Interwar-year field serviceregu lations, field manuals, professional journals, andl~ othecrpro fessional literature reflect the ab~solute necessity of' developingdirected telescoIpc-type liaison systems for modern war.

Answering Fuller's (call for at -system of' contact and control"and studying the irany British command failures during theGreat WVar, at postwar British field service regulation stresscsthat "during battle all commanders in their degree must keepin close andl constant touch with the fighting troops.-- Thissamie regulation cites that at commilander's greatest challenge inmodern war is to dev'elop an accurate idea of the actual battle-field situation. Once again, Van Creveld's axiomi about the questof war being at search for certainty is recognized. The Britishregulation calls for liaison officers to keep their commandersinformed of all combat conditions. As a result, liaison duties inlthe British Army were greatly expanded and were described atsfollows:

'Thw d utits oifhlaisoni offtwers~ art, to provide a cb 5cr touch bet-oveethe Ihvad~ju.'rtvrs, concerned than Is Possible bY other mnwiais, !,ocome) the highur coni n a H cr', irdvrs, and, 'A'hvi necessa rY lort,

casts oif his intent ions, to hIls subordlinate commnanders: to bringinflormation oif the sittuation in tlit' forward art-a to the highercommnandjer at frequent intervals. gene! alh. at the Vyid oI detinitteiphatses of an op. rati 00.- -

F"rench iiaison doctrine wits also refined shortly after WorldW'ar 1. A high-level military board, headed by Marshal PhilippeP~tain, studied ways to improve the command and control of'large formations. The French Army's Provisional Instructionlsfor the Tactical Employment of Large Units, published in 1924.,wats the result of the board's research. The regulation, translatedinto English for instructional use at. F'ort Leavenworth, vividl *describes the necessity of a type of directed telescope systemi.Explaining the functions and characteristics of' tihe FrenchGeneral Staff as an auxiliary of command, the manual clearlyoutlines the necessity of general staff liaison officers possessing".supe.-ior qualities of general and professional knowledge, of' tact,of devotion and of abnegationl.'"2 The absolute necessity of'commanders being in constant touch with subordinate commandsso as to fully understand the actual combat conditions, the statusof soldiers and equipment, and the progress of' battle was seenas paramount. The regulation also calls for general staff officers

19

to be sent, on a frequent basis, to subordinate commands toeither verify combat conditions or clear up situations. The boardemphasized that without effective liaison a major commandwould be unable to "animate the execution of its orders and tocoordinate the efforts of all into a single, powverful and contin-uous force."27

Somewhat surprisingly, the most in-depth descriptions of theduties and responsibilities of liaison officers in a directed tele-scope role are found in the U.S. Army's Command and StaffPrinciples, a 1937 text at the Command and General Staff' Col-lege, and the pro-World War Il FM 101-5, Staff Officers FieldManual. These American manuals, like their foreign counterparts,describe the liaison system as the commanders' principal meansof keeping in touch with the tactical situations. The small 1937textbook, however, stresses the importance of the system through-out modern military history and fully describes what is requiredto make it work to its full effect. Accordingly, two purposes forliaison officers are identified in Command and Staff Principles.First, the liaison officers' primary duties are explained. Accordingto the manual, the liaison officers' most important mission isto keep the commander up to date on the situation within sub-ordinate units by providing information not available in routinereports, information that could ultimately prove critical in thecommander's decision-making process. Second, liaison officers arerequired to dedicate themselves fully to facilitating communi-cations at all levels in order to achieve a "concerted effort."

In discussing the necessity of liaison as a means of obtainingcritical information and enhancing overall command and control,the Leavenworth publication emphasizes the point made byNapoleon over a century before that routine reports are oftenprepared carelessly due to either forgetfulness, stress, or simplycommunication problems. In appraising the professional andpersonal attributes of good liaison officers, Command and StaffPrinciples states that they should possess the following seventraits in order to be successful:

* Good judgment.

* Unfailing tact.

* Initiative.

* Sympathy, which implies a desire to help rather than tocriticize.

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* Acute perception, coupled with exactness and accuracy indetermining facts.

* Ability to express themselves and deliver impartial reports

in the clearest and most concise terms.

* Good tactical knowledge.2•

The World War I lessons learned and the resultant liaisondoctrine that emerged during the interwar years provided thefoundations for the many directed telescope systems that followedin a second great wai. Interwar command and staff liaison doc-trine, however, was not entirely discarded with the advent ofWorld War II. Many famous Allied and Axis field commanders,among them Montgomery, Patton, Rommel, and Manteuffel, usedliaison systems- In an attempt to hastily update and refine WorldWar I-based interwar liaison doctrine so it could support thenew dynamic nature of highly mobile blitzkrieg warfare, uniqaelydifferent systems began to emerge. In principle, however, thenew systems were remarkably similar to previous ones. The newsystems shared several key characteristics with one another aswell as with the many systems of the past. However, for anumber of reasons-new technology and tactics being the mos.prominent-redefined directed telescope systems developed eithera distinctly technical, tactical, or staff character.

World War IIThe art of war experienced yet another technological revolu-

tion at the beginning of World War II. Consequently, com-manders and military theorists sought ways to overcome thechallenges associated with mobile warfare. The new tactics andtechnology obviously demanded increased decentralization. Com-plete decentralization, however, would risk battlefield chaos. Inorder to offset the decentralization trend, effective state-of-the-art means of enhancing command and control were eagerlysought. As in previous conflicts, operational experience early inthe war emphasized the necessity of obtaining information onactual combat conditions outside of normal command channels.To meet this requirement, most major armies instituted modern-ized, yet traditional, versions of directed telescope systems duringthe conduct of the war. The Wehrmacht's staff information ser-vice, the Soviet's STAVKA "flyirjg circus" observers, the Ameri-can signal information and monitoring (SIAM) units, and theBritish Phantom service all had similar missions. Nevertheless,they differed somewhat in how the missions were accomplished.

".4

21

Regardless, early wartime Axis and Allied professional literatureemphasizes liaison as an important means of enhancing overallcommand and control in mobile warfare, and liaison was a pri-mary responsibility of all these units.

The effectiveness of liaison, however, depended entirely onthe commander's support of the system. All World War II armieshad liaison officers; some armies used them poorly, others quitewell. When used properly, these officers contributed to the highlysuccessful command and control systems employed by severalfamous field commanders. The many liaison systems describedin the interwar doctrine of the different armies were functionalin basic design and theory, but often, the systems' effectivenessin the field suffered due to the lack of command support, espe-cially when relatively incompetent, poorly trained officers wereassigned liaison duties. On the other hand, there are manyexamples of successful liaison-minded commanders who appointedhighly qualified young officers to perform the directed telescopeduties: Rormmel's lieutenants, Manteuffel's "Cowboys," Patton'sThird Army staff and liaison officers, and, perhaps most of all,Montgomery's 21st Army Group liaison officers.

it was also discovered eamly in the war that the use of cneradio as the prime means of controlling and coordinating front-line activities enhanced the overall effectiveness of liaison as ameans of command and control. Liaison patrols extensively usedlong-range radios to report tactical conditions directly to generalheadquarters. The British Army's Phantom service and the U.S.Army's SIAM companies were two such units designed tosupplement information from normal channels of communicationwith more timely and detailed data sent directly to generalheadquarters. Both units employed command liaison officers inmobile patrols, and their general responsibilities were strikinglysimilar to those of the aides-de-camp and general staff liaisonofficers of the past.

Phantom

Phantom originated in 1939 as the General lHeadquartersLiaison Regiment and was emplo5yed in Belgium and France in1939--40. Phantom patrols bypassed normal reporting channelsand sent information directly to corps and army headquarters.Information was also acquired by intercepting friendly radiotraffic on unit command nets (a separate signals componentoriginally known as the "J" service; "J" service intercept sectionswere combined with Phantom patrols in 1944).

i

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T'he primary mission of Phantom, much like the directedtelescope systems of the past, was to provide army and inter-mediate headquarters with the most accurate, confirmed, andtimely frontline information available. This was accomplishedby posting patrols at all major subordinate levels of command.Consequently, unlike systems of the past, Phantom was able toproduce identical and simultaneous information at division andcorps levels. Information was passed laterally to adjacent com-mands in the same manner. Phantom patrols carried out theirmissions by working at either the division headquarters or oneof the division's forward units. Obtaining information from themost reliable sources available, the patrol would transmit theinformation in cipher to the Phantom squadron headquarters,which was usually collocated with army headquarters. If neces-sary, the information was then sent to Phantom regimentalheadquarters at army group. Once deciphered and verified, itwas passed directly to the operations branch of the army head-quarters. Concurrent with its transmission to the squadron, thePhantom detachment at the corps headquarters of the divisionwhere the message initially originated would monitor the codedinformation, decipher it, and provide it to the corps commander.The same message, monitored by Phantom detachnienis of theremaining divisions in the corps, was provided to their com.manders accordingly. This system proved to be extremely effec-tive. One World War II after-action report on the activities ofPhantom detachments in the U.S. sector during Operation Over-lord stated that information was usually "cleared" within one-half hour of' the time of the event. Nevertheless, there were some"customary" problems with the system--Phantom liaison officerswere sometimes considered "spies" from higher headquarters.

As with similar systems in the past, especially those em-p!oying general staff officers, many subordinate commanders andstaff officers looked on Phantom liaison officers with suspicion,and their presence was often unwelcome. The reaction of onehigh-level U.S. commander to the arrival of his British Phantomliaison officer at Normandy was, "What the hell are you doinghere'?" or words to that effect.2 ' Even though Phantom officershad virtually no authority, especially when compared to thtrgcneral staff officer predecessors in the German and FrenchArmies of a generation earlier, they had to explain their presencetime and time again to their host commander. In order to dispelthe false image of Phantom command liaison officers usurpingcommand authority or "snooping," strict rules were establishedconcerning the conduct of these officers and the control of the

28

information they obtained. For example, Phantom officers wererequired to transmit facts not their own conclusions, and everymessage had to cite the source of the information (usually astaff officer or the commander of the unit being supported). Thefollowing is a typical Phantom message transmitted from anAmerican unit:

Aug 13, 1944Phantom Msg No 7 1330689 Third US ArmyXV US CorpsSOURCE MAJ G-3, 3 AIMI) l)iv, No Change in ForwardPositions up to 0630 hrs CCB Concentrated Area(14630-5630

TSO 120952

To overcome the higher headquarters inspector image, officersselected to serve on Phantom patrols were screened closely. Theliaison officers were generally junior to the officers they had towork with, so they compensated for the disparity in rank andexperience with personality, poise, tact, and energy. In addition,they had to have a good background in operations, physicaland mental stamina, and, perhaps most of all, initiative. Simplystated, they had to "sell themselves" in order to be successful.Nevertheless, as the war progressed and Phantom proved itselfthe only reliable source of information on many occasionb, mostAllied commanders became sold on the system, and problemswith the relationships between Phantom patrols and supportedunits decreased greatly. Eventually, Phantom became fully ac-cepted at lower headquarters and often was viewed as a vitalsource of information, a directed telescope for both the higher,lower, and intermediate commanders.

Toward the end of the war, the mission of Phantom unitschanged considerably: they were to obtain more specific infor-mation, emphasizing battlefield intelligence rather than commandinformation. For example, the Canadian First Army gave thefollowing orders to its Phantom detachment, outlining what itsfocus should be:

1. O1'S. General information on progress clown to battalionlevel. Inten tions--change of plans.

2. INT. Identifications and re-identifications ad 'oiocumGossip of the enemy.

;i. AIR. Line for forward troops, or estimate ditto by any andevery means.

4. R.E. Constant bridge information.5. R.A.F. INT. Information on enemy air.6. S.D). Headquarters of own troops down to battalions.7. .Q. Road surface or traffic oews.''

a-.

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In order to obtain the type of information being requestedby general, intermediate, and subordinate headquarters, Phantomliaison patrols often found themselves behind enemy lines. Atone time, a Phantom patrol was operating between the battalionsof a German regiment. Phantom patrols were also the first unitsto make contact when the Allied pincers closed around theFalaise pocket. As a result, the British XXX Corps and U.S.VII Corps commanders were aware of the juncture before thelead division commanders knew about it.32

Clearly, the intelligence and command and control value ofPhantom was obvious. Once again, however, routine channelsof communication proved inadequate. Staff officers, even thoughinstructed to keep higher headquarters informed, found them-selves so overwhelmed by their other responsibilities that theywere unable te pay full attention to sending information. Themany fluid combat situations of the war, conditions that doc-trinal communications systems such as wire could not adequatelysupport, made Phantom an absolute necessity at times. Phantomand the "J" service deeply impressed the few U.S. commanderswho were exposed to them early in the war during the closingmonths of the North African campaign. The Combined Opera-tions Headquarters August 1943 Monthly information Summaryoutlined the value of the system to all Allied commanders asfollows:

A. Phantom is a regiment solely engaged in obtaining informa-tion for the Commander it is ordered to serve. It is not a specialsignals unit.

13. The patrols "J'" Sections can be directed to any part of thebattle from which the Commander required more detailed and morespeedy information than he can obtain by normal channels.

C. Though normally serving G(t2ps), G(lnt), and Air, the regi-ment has also frequently been of assistance to Staff and Servicers.

1). The organization is flexible so that it can fit into any foice.

E. By the wide deployment of the regiment, and by the use ofthe W/T Iradiotelegraphyl sets provided in the officer patrol and inthe "J" Section to listen in to W/T nets, the regiment can givevaluable information about flanking formations to Commanders atall levels. This is especially useful where the flanking formation isan Allied one.

F. As nentioned above (para 9) the information available isoften very detailed. The Commander being served should lay down

how much detail he wants to receive.

G. It is evident that when Phantom patrol o'ticers are sent toformation IIQ they must have access to the Commander or to his

25

principal Staff Officer on whost, appreciation of the situaLWon, their

rt:ports must be made."

Signal Information and Monitoring (SIAM)

Patterned after the British Phantom, or more specificallythe radio intercept "J" service used extensively by the BritishEighth Army during the North African campaign, AmericanSIAM units were first organized on a provisional basis by theU.S. Seventh Army iii Sicily. Radio monitoring teams of attacheddivision signal company intelligence platoons were consolidatedat a' -. y level and placed under the direct operational supervisionof the army signal officer. As with its British counterpart, SIAMpruved highly successful in providing frontline information,verifying intelligence gained from other sources, and previewingreports sent through normal cornmand channels.

Impre-;sed by the results of Seventh Army's SIAM detach-ments, the U.S. Fifth Army organized its own provisional SIAMservice prior to the Italian campaign. Organized in August 19along the same lines as the Seventh Army units, the Fifth ArmySIAM service functioned directly under the signal intelligencesection of the army signal office. Attached divisions, however,reLaiiied adniinisi-i~ative uiL coto of' th untG 1'0' inr- h

general effectiveness of SIAM units, a liaison service was addedby the end of the year in order to supplement intercepted infor-mation. Similar to Phantom's liaison system, SIAM liaisonofficers served primarily as information gatherers interfacingwith division operations and intelligence sections and reportingthe information they obtained through the corps to armyheadquarters.

In July 1944, based on Fifth Army recommendations andon SIAM's successful record in combat, the War Departmentauthorized the formal activation of a signal information andmonitoring company. Consisting of approximately 350 officersand men, the SIAM company was organized into eight sections:a headquarters platoon, an army platoon, two corps platoons,and four division platoons,' Drawn from Fifth Army signalassets, the newly activated 3151st SIAM Company accompaniedthe U.S. Seventh Army in the invasion of southern France andremained with that command until the end of the war in Europe.

SIAM's mission was essentially the same as Phantom's. TheSIAM company provided the field army, corps, and division withtimely and accurate tactical information closely coordinated byliaison officers with principal staff officers of divisions on the

26

line. This information was obtained directly through monitoringthe command nets of elements in contact with the enemy. Inaddition to its information-gathering mission, SIAM also provideda means of checking the overall signal security of radio netscterating within the field army. During the peak of operationsin Jonuary 1945, the 3151st supported a field army of threecorps (totaling twelve divisions) while concurrently maintainingeffective liaison with the flank corps of adjacent armies.

Army Information Service (AIS)

Another U.S. field army to recognize the value of SIAM wasthe U.S. Third Army under General George S. Patton. After beinginformed of the nonavailability of a SIAM company until severalmonths after the Normandy landing, the army commander, asan expedient measure, converted the 6th Cavalry Group, con-sisting of the 6th and 28th Cavalry Squadrons, into aninformation-gathering unit until a SIAM company could beactivated. The group's mission was to operate a special liaisonand monitoring system for the army commander and his staff.A number of means were used to accomplish the mission, theliaison offricer nnt being the least.

Similar to SIAM and Phantom, the 6th Cavalry Groupestablished direct communications with the army command postfrom frontline locations. However, unlike the other systems, theinformation bypassed intermediate command channels. ThirdArmy also organized an intercept system similar to Phantomand SIAM that monitored battalion, regimental, divisional, andcorps reconnaissance nets, transmitting the intercepted informa-tion directly to army headquarters. Of even greater significance,however, was the 6th Cavalry Group's extensive use of commandhiaison officer patrols.

Led by highly qualified junior officers, the Third Army'sliaison patrols would routinely visit command and observationposts of units in contact with the enemy, as well as exchangeinformation with subordinate division G2s and G3s. All theseduties were accomplished by a single squadron with extra man-power and additional radio equipment. A second squadron per-formed the more traditional mission of conducting groundreconnaissance. Third Army considered the speed in whichinformation was passed through the system as a primary pre-requisite to success. Essential command and control informationobtained from frontline liaison patrols was to be passed directlyto the cavalry group headquarters collocated at the army's

27

advanced command post, eliminating the intermediate stages.The 6th Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Edward W. Fickett,was known officially as the Third Army Information Service,but it has also been popularly referred to as Patton's "HouseholdCavalry." Regardless of its title, the group provided an essentialservice and no doubt played a key role in Third Army's manysuccesses.

Like other directed telescope units, Third Army's liaisonofficer patrols also had the "snooper" image problem. The factthat the army was consistently better informed than corps didnot help the reputation of the liaison patrols, especially fromthe perspective of' the division and corps headquarters. Com-manders simply did not like higher-level headquarters' observersattached to their units who roamed throughout the area of oper-ations gathering all sorts of information. The liaison officer wassometimes looked on as the parochial general staff officer or,even worse, a "Gestapo" agent sent to spy on the commander.Suspicions were usually allayed, however, when G3s realized thatthe liaison officers had standing orders not to send messagesunless they were first checked and approved by the G3 or arcsponsiblc ,icmbcr of 0 th. cano

It was not long, however, before division staffs relied onthe Third Army headquarters patrols for up-to-date information.In several instances toward the end of the war, divisions re-quested that patrols be attached to armored formations makingdeep attacks. Some subordinate commanders accepted the patrolsas part of their own staffs, and as such, the patrol liaison officerbriefed the host commander daily along with his other staffsections. Although the patrols were designed to serve all com-mand levels, they were ultimately responsible to the army head-quarters. In that regard, they provided a steady stream of tacti-cal and operational information to the Third Army commandpost. As one Patton biographer stated, the patrols of the"Household Cavalry were behind Patton's uncanny knowledgeof the situation.":tf

Army Tactical Information Service (ATIS)

As the campaign in Europe progressed, the U.S. Army'stechnically oriented information services (SIAM and the ThirdArmy Information Service) became known collectively as theArmy Tactical Information Service (ATIS). A General Board,chaired by General Patton, was convened in Europe shortly aftrthe war to prepare a factual analysis of overall operations in

28

the European theater, and the ATIS was the focus of the board'sstudy number 18. Stressing the importance of all informationobtained by ATIS being sent directly to higher headquartersafter first being coordinated by either the local commander ora senior staff officer, the postwar report emphasized that liaisonofficers are "servants of the whole command ... not staff officersexpected to interfere with or advise any lower echelon."''2 " Eventhough the General Board concluded that the ATIS is an abso-lute necessity in modern war, it was decided that the monitoringof friendly nets should be a separate responsibility of existingsignal units instead of the ATrIS. The board recommenaed, withonly one dissenting member (Patton the leading proponent ofhis own army's information service), that the ATIS become apart of the U.S. Army's standing peacetime establishment.General Eisenhower's comments concerning the board's findingswere that the system was "a highly valuable instrument andone which commanders at all levels will soon learn to appre-ciate."•A7 Nevertheless, Eisenhower also held a caveat to hispraise; he expressed deep concern about the system's chancesfor abuse, stating that "unless it is carefully handled it can

a belcome a most objectionable thing, utilizing men and equipmentto the detriment of personal relationships between commandersof the several echelons."''.

P. antom and ATIS are excellent examples of modern, tech-nically oriented directed telescope systems designed to meet thetimeless needs for information by battlefield commanders. Aswith so many previous wars, routine reporting channels duringWorld War II proved inadequate. Consequently, the informationchallenge, the commanders' eternal quest for certainty, was metwith the marriage of a modern system-the radio-with tradi-tional doctrine and practice-liaison. An even more classic meansof attaining information in World War II, however, was the useof staff officers by General Patton and personal liaison officersby Field Marshal Montgomery.

Staff Systems

Patton did not rely solely on his Third Army InformationService to gather information on combat conditions but usedhis staff thoroughly in that capacity as well. Members of theThird Army staff were required to visit frontline units daily,frequently at night, gathering the latest information while, atthe same time, providing encouragement. These staff visits alsocreated a sense of understanding and cohesiveness throughout

29

the command that, according to many, could not bc found withinother U.S. field armies. This effective use of Patton's staff alsoreduced the number of reports needed from subordinate coin-mands. In fact, Third Army required fewer reports than anyother field army in the European theater. In addition to Patton'sown staff visits, commanders and staffs of Third Army's corpsand divisions were also encouraged to visit the front line daily.To Patton, 95 percent of command responsibility was to supervisethe execution of orders, while only 5 percent was to devise theplan or order. Patton's command and staff visits served to verifydirectly that critical orders were being carried out. In essence,every staff officer in Third Army was charged with the tradi-tional aide-de-camp role of being a command observer.

General Patton's information-gathering systems-ThirdArmy Information Service, staff visits, routine reports, andPatton's practice of seeing for himself and positioning his head-quarters well forward-made him one of the best informed com-manders of' World War II. Patton's directed telescope systemcontributed greatly toward his many successful campaigns inNorth Africa, Sicily, and Central Europe.

Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, more than any othermajor World War II Allied commander, made the best use ofliaison officers in their provincial role as a commander's directedtelescope. Montgomery's young liaison officers had personalrelationships with their colorful commander much like those ofthe traditional aides-de-camp of the Napoleonic era.:-'* Stealinga leaf from Wellington's book, Montgomery made extensive useof his close circle of personal liaison officers in ways similar tothe earlier British commander. Although technology and the artof war had changed drastically over the previous century, theprinciples and theory behind Montgomery's employment of theseyoung officers remained almost classical. They were his "eyesand ears" as much as the aides-de-camp of the past. were. Witha combination of Ultra intelligence, Phantom intercepts and trans-missions, and the insightful reports of his young liaison officers,Montgomery was able to maintain an extraordinary grip ot, thebattle and campaign situations of his 21st Army Group. Thegeneral's World War I pledge of never being ignorant of frontlineconditions was fully met as a high-level commander. His promisewas more fulfilled by his liaison officer system than by anyother separate information system because it provided him withaccurate and timely information.

4

30

Residing with the field marshal at the tactical commandpost, Montgomery's liaison officers were part of a close circle ofadvisers and confidants just as their ancient predecessors, thesomatophylaxes and contubernales, had been. The officers alsoheld a great deal of rmspect and affection for Montgomery, oftenreferring to him as "Master." Montgomery, in turn, describedthem as "the bo.s." This close, almost paternal, personal rela-tionship bctween Montgomery and his liaison officers, like thatof Grant and his ai('es, enabled these officers to express theirobservations and opinions freely to th: ir leader. Despite his highregard for his subordinates. Montgomery never let his liaisonofficers' obscrvations go unchallenged. Their observations hadto be accurate, comprehenvive, and concise in order to be ac-cepted. As one liaison officer put it, interrogation by the "Master"was at times grueling.

Often sarcastically referred to as Montgomery's "Walkers"or his "Homing Pigeons," all Montgomery's liaison officers wereyoung combat arms officers, relatively junior in rank (mostlymajors). Usually, no more than six to eight of them reported tohim at any one time, and within the group were also severalAmerican and C-anadin Army officersz iusd fnr liaison with the

U.S. and Canadian divisions attached to the British 21st ArmyGroup. All the liaison officers possessed great strength of char-acter, initiative, independence, and courage. Montgomery per-sonaily handpicked them, and his standards for selection wereextremely high. The young officers were all combat veterans,many of them had been wounded, and most had been decoratedfor bravery under fire. Their combat experience enabled themto report accurately and objectively on often critical tacticalsituations. Surprisingly, most had no military career ambitionseither before or after the war. Montgomery's "boys" were out-standing officers in every respect. Often resented, but nonethelessinvaluable, they formed a corps d'elite within the 21st ArmyGroup staff.

Montgomery's liaison officers also had unusual influence andtremendous responsibility. Montgomery authorized them to "breakthrough quicker than signals," and their battlefield reports wereoften the only basis for vital command decisions. The liaisonofficers were also often given potentially embarrassing duties,such as asking a division commander why his division wasmaking such slow progress. Obviously, with such questions, theywere quite often looked on with disfavor, especially in units notaccustomed to their presence.

31

Montgomery's young liaison officers were, nevertheless, hisspecial agents, his acknowledged "eyes and ears," reportingdirectly to him daily in a personal and candid manner. Theyhad unrestricted license to travel anywhere within the 21st ArmyGroup's area of operations and, as stated by several Montgomerybiographers, were on "nodding terms with senior commandersand the many important politicians who would periodically visitMontgomery's CP [command post]." Like so many observer sys-tems of the past, and echoini, General Eisenhower's postwarapprehensions about the ATIS, MoNtgomery's system was opento abuse. It is a credit to both the British commander and hisliaison officers that there is no evidence of the system beingmisapplied.

What prevented the system from becoming an army groupspy ring was, for the most part, the personalities of the selectedofficers. They were junior officers, modest in the presence ofsuperiors, and perhaps most importantly, they did not gossip.Utterly devoted to Montgomery and the army group as a whole,these liaison officers routinely risked death to obtain the infor-mation requested. In fact, a high percentage of them were killedin action. Their routine exposure to subordinate commanders andstaff officers, their professionalism, thcir pcrsonality and courage,and the confidence the army group commander had in themeventually resulted in their presence being fully accepted, if notdesired, in many of Montgomery's subordinate headquarters (evenin the division command posts of the U.S. First Army).

The simplicity of the system also contributed greatly to itssuccess. After the morning briefings, the liaison teams wouldtravel to the front to obtain information. The following providesthe type of information Montgomery requested from a CanadianArmy liaison officer, Major Dick Malone:

Find out the form of the unit, no highlights, exact details. Howfar forward are his patrols ... the real FLT [frontline trace]? Whatare his Battalion HQs and company CP locations? What's the realammunition status along the front line? Esprit? How many POWstaken? F •w many casualties? What did the commander do today,what's ILS plan for tomorrow? Personally see the commander andgive him your re)ort_4"1

Winston Churchill, in one of his World War II history volumes, Triumph and Tragedy, provides one of the best overalldescriptions of Montgomery's liaison system. Churchill revealsthe means in which the system evolved and its value and benefitto modern command and provides striking similarities with sys-tems of the past:

32

For nearly two hours a succession of young officers, of aboutthe rank of major, pr'sented themselves. Eachi had come back froma different sector of the front. They were the direct personial repre-sentatives of the Comniander-in-Chief, and could go anyw here andsee anything and ask any questions they liked of any commander,whether at the divisional headquarters or with the forward troops.As in turn they made their reports and were searchingly questionedby their chief the whoie story of the day's battle was unfolded. Thisgave Monty a complete account of what had happened by highlycompetent men whom he knew well and whose eyes he trusted. Itafforded an invaluable cross-check to the report:" from all the variousheadquarters and from the commanders. "I thought the system ad-inirable, and indeed the inrly way in which a modern Commnwder.in-Chief could see as well as read what was going on in every partof thle front."'1

Field Marshal Montgomery considered his liaison system)solutely invaluable. Time and again in his memoirs as well

as in his numerous biographies, his almost classic directed tele-scope system is cited as playing an instrumental role in thesuccessful command and control of the 21st Army Group.Through his own eyes and those of his trusted liaison officers,Field Marshal Montgomery is credited with never losing a firmgrip on the tactical situation or the "hearts and minds" of hissoldiers. His use of young, personable, and couragcous liaisonofficers was one of his personal leadership characteristics, ,Yeta historically proven and entirely traditional element of effectivecommand.

Post-World War H

Despite official postwar reports of every type (Army groundforce observer reports, general board documents, after-actionreports, and so forth), articles in professional journals, and evenentire books describing the value of liaison detachments, theliaison units disappeared shortly after the end of the war. Theirexistente, a wartime necessity, proved to be an unaffo,ýdablepeacetime luxury. Greatiy reduced strength and equipment tablesresulted in skilled officers and expensive radio equipment beingput to better use elsewhere. Several serious proposals, one madeas late as 1958, called for the formation of Phantom- or SIAM-type battalions in the U.S. Army Reserve or Army NationalGuard. They were summarily rejected as no longer being neededon the modern battlefield. As the U.S. Army lost its operationalfocus, the importance of liaison units in the command and con-troL of corps and field armies became less visible.

In a 1970 book, Alternative to Armageddon, a number ofdistinguished military men, including U.S. Generals Lyman L.

S;38

Lemnitzer and 1. 1). WhiLe, as well as German General vonManteuffel, propose the resurrection of a Montgomery-type liaisonsystem in the U.S. Army. Utilizing deputy or assistant com-manders at different echelons as supervisors, gro ips of highlyqualified officer observers would perform duties similar to thoseof Montgomery's "Walkers." The generals' proposal, based ontheir individual as well as collective experiences, emphasizes thatoutside observers from higher headquarters provide both a"silent" and an extremely effective means of encouraging factualreporting and saving precious time in getting critical, oftenintangible information to the force commander.

The only liaison system in recent wars comparable to theWorld War II systems has been the Israeli Defense Forces'Phantom-type command liaison patrols. Led by majors in half-tracks or armored personnel carriers, these patrols provided front-line information directly to army command from widely spread,rapidly moving combined arms columns operating in the Sinaiduring the 1967 and 1973 Middle East Wars. Other than theisraeli expeiience, it appe•dha t1he m

1 d War .co

mand liaison systems, despite their recognized effectiveness, havebeen almost totally overlooked as an effective means of enhanc-ing the command and control of modern armies.

4,.

.• ".'

V. CONCLUSIONS

This study has illustrated a number of battlefield commandand control systems that could be used in the future. In thatregard, several conclusions can be drawn from this brief analysisof both traditional and unique means of exercising commandand control in combat, especially in the context of the U.S.Army's new doctrine.

Throughout military history, regardless of the era or period,changes in force design, advances in technology, new staff con-figurations, and the several revolutions in the art of war broughton by these changes, the battlefield commanders' driving questfor certainty concerning battle conditions has remained a his-torical constant. Within the overall search for certainty, a con-tinuum of command and control functions existed (see tablc 1).In his work, On War, Clausewitz identifies uncertainty, alongwith exertion, danger, and chancc, as the key elements of war.He also emphasizes that most often "the commander finds him-self in a constant whirlpool of false and true information." Lack-ing clear, objective information, he often has to trust either the"talents at hand" or pure luck. The effective use by commandersof their liaison officers has resulted in the formation of the manyinformation systems reviewed in this study.

Table 1. Continuum of Command and Control Functions

Pasuive Authority Active

Couriers Info Collectors Observer/Evaluators Executors

Soinatoph ylaxes .oin aoptaplaxes 21st Army Group Prusisian Gen-Contubernutlrs Conttherrnales liaison officers eral StaffNapoleonic aidea Napo!eomic aides (Assess capabilities, (Convey in-

World War 11 recommend changes, tent, directliaison officers evaluate intangibles) changes)

PhantomSIAMAISATI S

A commander's timeless necessity for objective, accurate, andtimely battlefield information has been met by different means:aides-de-camp in the primitive and Napoleonic era and, in thewars of the modern period, liaison officers or general staff ob-servers and signals monitors. The existence of information gath-erers in one form or another bas continued to play a vital role

35I.'-I

36

in command for thousands of years. Battlefield command andcontrol realities dictated the use of aides-de-carup and liaisonofficers as information gatherers even after full staffs came intoexistence. From Alexander the Great to the Israeli Defense For-ces, these information-gathering systems, when properly used ina directed telescope role. have proven to be instrumental com-ponents of effective command and control in combat.

If the systems of the past have similarities, so have theofficers that served in them. Normally, directed telescope func-tions were performed by aides, liaison officers, or general staffofficers with similar characteristics. They were usually young,highly charismatic, energetic, brave, independent, physically 't,mentally alert, and relatively junior in rank. In the more recentperiods of military history, they became a well-trained body ofprofessionally skilled and trained observers, often belonging toa separate elite corps of officers-the general staff. Their char-acter, judgment, tact, and trust have been highly regarded byseniors and subordinates alike, and as a result, they have enjoyeda close, often intimate, relationship with commanders and higher-ranking staff officers.

Even though the duties of these officers have differed greatlyin practice, they have remained the same in principle. Primarily,these officers observed and, on occasion, personally evaluatedfrontline battlefield conditions. Routinely, they were charged withseeking out intangible information, such as that pertaining tomorale, esprit, and cohesiveness, which was usually not foundin routine reports sent up the chain of command. However, theywere not restricted to this role, for they also verified the executionof orders and the adherence to policies. Also, of perhaps greaterimportance, they ensured that the commander's intent was beingfollowed. They were least successful when strictly confined to acourier role. As representatives of their commanders, the liaisonofficers often issued orders to superiors in their commanders'names-an aspect of their role often looked on with extremedisfavor arid, on occasion, we!l-justified suspicion. Breaking thechain of command in this fashion, regardless of the outcome,was considered a negative trait by other links in the chain ofcommand.

The history of the directed telescope system has not alwaysbeen positive. Numerous historical events confirm the worst fearsof those who view the system as a breach of the proper rela-tionship between senior and subordinate commanders. There havebeen many instances of abuses by aides, observers, and liaison

37

officers who were granted excessive authority. Even worse, some-times commanders took these officers' observations at face value,which resulted in command decisions that brought about failurein battle. These negative aspects of the system, however, weremore often the exception than the rule. Generally speaking, thevalue of the system far outweighed any problems associated withits sensitive operations.

If we accept the overall worth of the directed telescope systemas it has been successfully applied in the past by many greatmilitary leaders, what implications exist for its consideration inthe development of modern command and control doctrine, orhas technology finally made the directed telescope obsolete?Certainly, today's AirLand Battle di ctrine, especially its deep-attack aspects, presents one of the greatest challenges ever inthe development of effective command and control. A fun-damental characteristic of the type of leadership inherent incurrent U.S. doctrine is that all operations, at every echelon,must proceed from a full understanding uf the commander'sintent. Helping to establish, clarily, and gain commitment tothe commander's intent has been a classic role of past aide andcommand liaison systems.

Today's functional staff officers, even more than their WorldWar II predecessors, will be consumed by their duties; they willfind it exceedingly difficult to relay important tactical andoperational information and to monitor the rapidly changingbattletield. The AirLand Battle doctrine requirement for staffofficers to concentrate the operational focus ahead in time andspace, combined with the technology enabling them to do so,will result in an even greater influx of combat information.During World War II, SIAM, Phantom, and ATIS were createdto augment heavily burdened conventional reporting systems bypicking out salient information and sending it directly to thecommand that needed it most. As a result, the World War IIsystems enabled high-level commanders and staffs to anticipateand assess situations rapidly, thus allowing them to gain, main-tain, or retain the tactical and operational initiative. Rapidlyand accurately obtaining vital battlefield information specificallyrequested by commanders enabled them to respond quickly anddecisively in countless situations, greatly increasing the overallagility of their operations. The vertical and horizontal liaisonfunctions of the systems also had remendous command andcontrol implications in the area of synchronization of overalloperations. The reconnaissance role of several modern systems

38

(Phantom and Patton's 'Household Cavalry") prcvided the com-mander with an additional means tu "see deep" in terms ofgathering precise and direct firsthand intelligence on the enemy,assessing his capabilities, and predictiaig his actions. Clearly,the accomplishments of these systems of the past have appli-cation in the development of contemporary coramand and controldoctrine.

NOTES

1. James D. Hittle, The Miliary Staff. Its History and Development, 3d ed.(Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Division, Stackpole Co., 1961), 24.

2. Martin Van Creveld, "Command" (Washington, DC: Department of Defense/Net Assessment, 1979), 31.

3. Ibid., 50.

4. Ibid., 36.

5. F. W. von Zanthier, Versuch Uber die Marsche der Armecrn, die Lager.Schlachten und die Operations.Plan (Dresden, 1778), as cited in Van Creveld,"Command," 54.

6. Correspondence, XIII, no. 10854, 2], 9, 1806 cited in Van Creveld, "Com-mand," 76.

7. Ibid., 77.

8. Samuel George Peregrine Ward, Wellington's Headquarters: A Study of theAdministrative Problems in the Peninsula, i809-1814 (London: OxfordUL.ve1tiy rreb, )i97), 36.

9. Ibid., 39.

10. Horace Porter, Campaigning With Grant (New York: The Century Co., 1907,c1897), 32.

11. Ibid., 37-38.

12. Wklliam T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman (New York:I)a Capo Press, 1984), 22.

13. Hugh Cuthbert Basset Rogers, The Confederates and Federals at War (New

York: Hippczrene Books, 1973), 135.

14. Sherman, Memoirs, 402.

15. Armistead Lindsay Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee (New York: Stoddart& Co., )886), 161

16. Clifford I)owdey, Lee (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), 272.

17. Long, Memoirs, 619.

18. Van Creveld, "Command," 142.

19. J. F. C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure-A Study of thePersonal Factor in Command (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service PublishingCo., 1936), 61.

20. Bernard Law Montgomery, Montgomery of Alamein, 1st Viscount, Memoirsof Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (Cleveland, OH:World Publishing Co., 1958), 34.

21. George P. Winton, "The Liaison Officer-Past, Present and Future," MilitaryReview 24 (July 1944):44.

39"A

40

2'I. George C. Marshall. Memnirs of My Service in the World War, 1917-IS(Boston, MA: Hioughton Mifflin Co., 1976), 183.

23. Fuller, Generalship, 64.

2.1. Great Britain, Army, Field Service Regulations, vol. 3, Operations-If ighherFortnatiotws (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1935), 30.

25. Ibid., 31.

26. United States Army General Service Schools, Provisional Instructions forthO Tactical Employment of Large Units (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The Gen-eral Service Schools Press, 19Z4), 4.

27. Ibid, 35.

28- United States Army Command and General Staff School, (ce,'mnand iindStaff Principles (Tentative, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The Command andGeneral Staff School Press, 1937), 157.

29. Howard Sargent, "Phantom Passes the Word," Artny 8 (March 195S):34.

30. "Phantom Operations in U.S. Sector, Operation Overlord" tN.p., n.d.).

31. ibid.: and Sargent, "Phantom," 34.

:!2 juh N.. n• rdh, . ,,,-, .•... .1 .. ÷ .l' ..... -;.'"- , 1':l,,-;,- 5". V ic lc u•. . .. . / 2... . .. .j*JJL ~ Q. ! tt f t lOU tfl ,ft¼L_

(Group (London: I1er Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953), 73.

33. Supreme Ileadquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, "Combined OperationsHleadquarters, Monthly Military Information Summary ;;" (August 19431),4.

34. Walter B. Potter, "SIAM: Signal Information and Monitoring," MilitaryReview 25 (May 1945):2K.

35 1,adjsls F"arago, Patton. Ordeal and Trioumnph (New York: Obolensky, 1964),49M.

;36. United States Forces, European Theater, General Board, "Army TacticalInformation Service," Study no. 1(; (20 November 1945), 3.

37. Ibid., app. 2, 2.

38. Lid.

39. Reginald William Thompson, Morntgoncry. the Field Marshal (New York:Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), 223.

4i0. I)ick Maione, Missing Froim the R'cord (T'oronto, Canada: Collins, 1946W,46.

41. Winston Churchill, The ,Second WRorla War, vol. 6, Triumph and Trugedy(Boston, MA: lHoughton Mifflin Co.. 1953,, 259.

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SU. S. Government Printing Office: VII - 554-001 (42030)

"M "'Lieutenant Colonel Gary B. Griffin is an"�5 'Army War College Advanced Operational Studies

Fellow at the School of Advanced MilitaryStudies, USACGSC, Port Leavenworth, Kansas.lie iw a 1970 graduate of tile Field ArtilleryOfficer Candidate School and holds bachelor'sand master's degrees in history from CameronUniversity and the University of Kansas respec-tively. After graduating from the USA(CGSC in1984, he became an instructor at the CombatStudies Institute, where he wrote this study.Lieutenant Colonel Griffin's command and staffassignments include serving as comimandur ofthe 3d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery. and asdeputy chief of staff" of the 1st Armored Division.

Lientenant Colonel

L- Gary B. Griffin

COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE

Miss ions

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a depart-ment-level activity within the 1.S. Army Command and General Staff College.,Fort Leavenwordh, Kansas. CSI has the following missions:

1. Prepare and present instruction in military history at UISACGSC and assistother USACGSC departments in integrating military history into their in-struction.

2. Serve as the 'U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's executive agentfor the development and coordination of an integrated, progressive programof military history instruction in the TRADOC service schcol system.

3. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns ofthe Army and publish the results in a variety of formats for the ActiveArmy and Reserve Components.

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