the cuban missile

Case 334

The Cuban Missile Crisis: United States Deliberations and Negotiations at the

Edge of the Precipice

GABRIELLE S. BRUSSELColumbia University

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF DIPLOMACY

GUISD PEW CASE STUDY CENTERInstitute for the Study of Diplomacy

Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Georgetown University1316 36th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007

Tel.: (877) 703-4660 ext. 204 / (202) 965-5735 ext. 204Fax: (202) 965-5811

Web site: http://www.guisd.org

© 2011. All rights reserved. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. ISBN 1-56927-334-0

GUISD Pew Case Study Center

EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

1

© 1992, 1988. All rights reserved. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.ISBN: 1-56927-334-0. Do not duplicate or place on library shelves/reserves without express written permission. Email: [email protected]

CASE 334

The Cuban Missile Crisis: United States Deliberations and Negotiations at the Edge of the Precipice

GA B R I E L L E S. BR U S S E LCOLUMB IA UNIVER S IT Y

BACKGROUND

On Monday, October 22, 1962, after six days of secretU.S. government deliberations, President John F. Ken-nedy announced on television that the Soviet Unionhad placed offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba. The Sovi-ets had staged a sealift to Cuba, which had begun in Julyof that year and continued over the next few months,which constituted a major military deployment involv-ing more than one hundred shiploads and containingseveral thousand vehicles and more than twenty thou-sand men. U.S. policymakers interpreted these actionsas contradictions of explicit Soviet pledges and state-ments that Soviet aid to Cuba was defensive and wouldremain so.

The United States employed political pressure onbilateral and multilateral levels—through both formaland informal channels. It also applied military pressurewhile policymakers sought to resolve the crisis short ofwar. The United States succeeded in presenting a firmand resolved stance, but it stopped short of a bellicose

response. The administration, and particularly the pres-ident, was not interested in beginning a military con-frontation with the Soviet Union, but the United Stateswas strongly committed to proving to its allies andadversaries that it could meet whatever it perceived as athreat to its national security and its sphere of influence.Furthermore, since the Soviets had been warnedagainst employing such a display of force, the adminis-tration wanted to prove it would back up statements ofpolicy with actions.

Publicly the crisis lasted for six days—from Ken-nedy’s speech on October 22 until the official Sovietstatement on October 28 that the missiles in Cubawould be dismantled and removed from the island. ForU.S. policymakers, however, the crisis began on Octo-ber 16 at 11:45 A.M. during the first meeting of thegroup of advisors that became known as the ExComm.1

The group served the president almost twenty-fourhours a day as the United States managed the situation.

When they were presented with the evidence ofthe missiles, U.S. government officials were surprisedand angered by the Soviet deception. Kennedy person-ally assembled a politically diverse group of advisorscomprising representatives of the public and privatesectors that he believed would contribute to a success-ful resolution. They were men he depended on regard-

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2 Gabrielle S. Brussel Case 334

less of rank or political affiliation, men he believedserved their country and his administration above all.They were recruited regardless of seniority, the criteriafor their selection being President Kennedy’s assess-ment of their intelligence, judgment, and loyalty. Dur-ing the crisis this advisory group consisted of:

• Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson• Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy• Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon• Secretary of State Dean Rusk (who was absent

during a large part of the deliberations)• Under Secretary of State George Ball• Soviet expert and Ambassador at Large Llewellyn

“Tommy” Thompson2

• Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara• Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric• General Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff• Assistant Secretary for International Security

Affairs Paul NitzeThe Central Intelligence Agency members

included:• Deputy Director Marshall Carter for the first day

and • Director John McCone, who returned to Wash-

ington on October 16, thereafter. The special assistants/advisors to the president

included:• McGeorge Bundy, advisor on national security

affairs• Presidential Counsel Theodore “Ted” Sorenson• Kenneth O’Donnell

Other intermittent participants included:• Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs

Edwin M. Martin• Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson• Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, U.S. representative

to the United Nations • USIA Deputy Director Donald Wilson• State Department Director of Intelligence and

Research Roger Hilsman• Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who left

the deliberations after a naval quarantine was cho-sen as the U.S. policy response but served as Ken-nedy’s personal emissary to France and West

Germany• Former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett• Wall Street lawyer and former High Commis-

sioner of Germany John McCloyThe ExComm was primarily divided into two

camps—the hawks and the doves3—with the hawksadvocating a military confrontation and the dovesstressing negotiation. The hawks included Taylor,Acheson, the Joint Chiefs (without U.S. Marine CorpsCommandant David Shoup), McCloy, Nitze, and, ini-tially, Dillon and McCloy. The doves were Robert Ken-nedy, McNamara, Gilpatric, Ball, Thompson, Sorenson,Stevenson and Lovett. The others were indecisive,shifting their opinions as the days wore on.

The president mandated, and his advisors agreed,that the crisis remain secret until the United States for-mulated a plan. Consequently, to avoid leaks, the circleof people in government who knew about the crisisremained extremely tight. The group met almost con-tinuously for the two weeks of the crisis. It broke upinto smaller groups for purposes of analysis and debateswhile experts presented information, but the composi-tion of the general group remained consistent.

The Soviets placed missiles on an island that theUnited States had viewed as its backyard since the latenineteenth century. U.S.-Cuban relations, though cer-tainly strained by 1962, had been closely tied for almosta hundred years. As far back as 1808, U.S. foreign policyand government officials had viewed Cuban interests“as their own.” Repeated offers to buy Cuba culminatedin the Ostend Manifesto of 1854, which stated that theUnited States had the “right” to acquire Cuba. LaterU.S. government officials asserted that Cuba was “indis-pensable to the United States.”

On January 1, 1959, Cuban rebels took control ofthe government. The United States officially recognizedthe new regime on January 7. Not long after, U.S.-Cuban relations began to deteriorate. Tensionsincreased steadily, and the two nations went head-to-head in public forums. Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Cas-tro refused to back the United-States in its Cold Warwith the Soviet Union. In April 1959, President DwightD. Eisenhower publicly refused to meet with Castroduring his trip to the United States, instead leavingWashington to play golf. By December Castro haddeclared himself and his revolution Communist and hadreceived substantial Soviet backing. Soon the United

Case 334 The Cuban Missile Crisis 3

States reduced trade with Cuba and refused to purchasesugar from Cuba above world sugar prices. Cubaincreased its anti-American rhetoric. The Soviets beganto purchase sugar at premium prices, sent aid packages,and promised to “support the Cuban people with . . .rocket fire if aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare[d]to launch an intervention against Cuba.”

Trade between the United States and Cuba dimin-ished quickly. In 1958 exports from the United Statestotaled 69.8 percent of Cuban imports; by 1961 this fig-ure was down to 3.7 percent. In contrast, Sovietimports from Cuba rose during the same period from 0to 48.2 percent. Trade with Soviet bloc countriesaccounted for 73.4 percent of Cuba’s trade in 1961,while just three years earlier it had been a mere 2.5 per-cent. Tensions culminated in expropriation of all U.S.property in Cuba (1960–61) and the 1962 U.S. tradeembargo. Further exacerbating the relationship was the1961 Bay of Pigs episode. Supported by the CIA andpersonally approved by President Kennedy, anti-Cas-tro Cuban exiles attempted to invade Cuba. The inva-sion failed, and the U.S. government withdrew its airsupport of the exiles after they reached the island.Although Kennedy made a public apology and theadministration pursued diplomatic negotiations tosecure the release of captured exiles from Cuban jails,the crisis contributed greatly to strained relations.Moreover, the Kennedy administration employed poli-cies that had the potential to cause the ouster or deathof Fidel Castro. The United States also encouraged thepolitical and diplomatic isolation of Cuba with the dec-laration by the Organization of American States (OAS)in January 1962 that Cuba’s government was incompati-ble with the inter-American system. These incidentsand policies created an atmosphere of mistrust and mis-apprehension, with the Soviets and the Cubans expect-ing an invasion and the United States fearing increasedSoviet-Cuban ties and military build-ups.

Cuba’s importance to the United States is a result ofits geography and politics. it is ninety miles from the tipof Florida, closer than Puerto Rico to the coast ofUnited States. It lies on the Windward Passage, theStraits of Florida, the Yucatan Channel, and the ship-ping lanes from the east coast of the United States. It hasdirect access to the strategic sea lanes of South andCentral America, the Caribbean and the Western alliesof the United States. Since its early role as a colony ofSpain, Cuba’s proximity to the Caribbean sea lanes that

carry trade to Latin America has given it strategicimportance.

Cuba was the only communist country that had aU.S. naval base on its territory. It was also the onlycountry that maintained both Soviet and U.S. militaryinstallations and by which Soviet naval vessels freelypassed. Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, covering forty-five square miles, 1 percent of Cuban territory, trainsmore than 40,000 U.S. military personnel every year.Built after the Treaty of Paris that ended the Spanish-American War, Guantánamo was leased in perpetuity tothe United States. The Castro government has longmaintained that the agreement for the base is illegiti-mate because the governments were not “on equal foot-ing” and because Cuba was coerced into the contract bya foreign government. Many U.S. government officialsand analysts feared that the Soviet Union would requesta U.S. withdrawal from Guantánamo in exchange forthe withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. This prop-osition was never brought to the negotiating table, andPresident Kennedy maintained during the ExCommdeliberations that it would be rejected “out of hand.”

The Soviet placement of missiles in Cuba wentbeyond actual military and strategic importance; it wasa modern, post-nuclear affront to U.S. perceived inter-ests dating back to the early nineteenth century. OnDecember 2, 1823, President James Monroe deliveredan address to Congress in which he asserted that theUnited States viewed the Western Hemisphere as itssphere of influence and that European expansionism inthe Western Hemisphere would be regarded as “danger-ous to [United States] peace and safety.” The UnitedStates would respond in whatever manner was neces-sary to protect itself. In May 1904 President TheodoreRoosevelt’s “Roosevelt Corollary” to the Monroe Doc-trine refined the U.S. view of European expansionismby asserting that the United States had the “right” tointervene in the Western Hemisphere and Caribbean.Thus, the United States has long considered the West-ern Hemisphere a special region of influence.

Although the Monroe Doctrine was originallydirected at Western European expansion, subsequentinterpretations were directed at the Soviet Union andthe possibility of Soviet expansion in the region. The1962 decision to put missiles in Cuba made Cuba thefirst Soviet ally to receive ballistic missiles. The UnitedStates viewed this policy as a direct attack against itspublic and private perceptions of regional influence and


global balance. “Ever since the Monroe Doctrine, theUnited States has perceived a special interest in exclud-ing European military power from the Western Hemi-sphere. This was a powerful fact of [U.S.] politicalconsciousness. . . .4

President Kennedy intended to address the Sovietdecision immediately and firmly. His administrationbelieved that the missiles would affect global percep-tions of U.S. strength and resolve, causing allies andadversaries to question U.S. ability and commitment toglobal alliances. Furthermore, the missiles in Cubawould threaten the global power structure that theUnited States sought to maintain.

The missile balance also contributed to uneasyrelations between the United States and the SovietUnion. When Kennedy became president, he receivedcontradictory evidence and intelligence. By late sum-mer and certainly by fall 1961 the administration real-ized that Soviet missile superiority, which had been acampaign issue in 1960, did not exist—that the UnitedStates, in fact, was ahead. Kennedy and his advisors dis-cussed their options and decided to inform the Sovietsthat they knew the U.S. missile gap did not exist. InOctober 1961 Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gil-patric was selected to give a speech disclosing U.S.armed strength and revealing that the missile gap wasactually reversed—the Soviets were at a military disad-vantage, not the United States. The United Statesbriefed its allies, including allies who the United Statesknew had been penetrated by Soviet intelligence offi-cers, in order to reinforce its position.

U.S. POLICY RESPONSE

The ExComm began by trying to understand why themissiles were deployed in Cuba. What could Khrush-chev hope to gain by such a dangerous gamble? If theUnited States could understand the motivations of theSoviets, it could better manage an end to the crisis andcommunicate more effectively with the opposition.

U.S. Deliberations

Dean Acheson told Charles de Gaulle that the Sovietsplaced missiles in Cuba because they believed that theycould get away with it.5 The discussions about thedeployment went deeper than Acheson’s answer, how-

ever. At the first meetings of the ExComm, the advisorsdebated five hypothetical answers to the question ofSoviet motivation.

The first hypothesis was based on the SovietUnion’s strong commitment to maintaining a positionin Latin America and, specifically, to supporting thesocial and political revolution in Cuba. It was alreadysending great amounts of aid to Cuba. Although theUnited States had not continued its planned militaryand air support during the actual invasion of the Bay ofPigs, it had sponsored an invasion of Cuba less than twoyears before. The Soviet government saw an opportu-nity to defend a firm ally and decided to take it.

Constant discussions were going on in Congress, inthe White House, and in the Cuban exile communityregarding invasion. On September 4 President Kennedystated that “. . . the Castro regime will not be allowed toexport aggressive purposes by force or the threat offorce. It will be prevented by whatever means may benecessary from taking action against any part of theWestern Hemisphere. . . .” Three days later he askedCongress for standby authority to call up reserves. OnSeptember 13 Kennedy reiterated his stand againstCuba and the Castro regime “exporting aggressive pur-poses by force or threat of force” [emphasis added]. Oneweek later Congress passed a joint resolution on Cubastating that the United States would “prevent by what-ever means may be necessary, including the use of arms,the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending,by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subver-sive activities to any part of this hemisphere.”

Although Kennedy and his administration repeat-edly declared that the United States would not attemptadditional military action against Cuba, the belligerentstatements Kennedy made throughout September 1962did not persuade the Cuban and Soviet governmentsthat Cuba’s safety was ensured. Kennedy questionedwhether the U.S. mistake was “in not saying sometimebefore this summer that if they do this we’re [going] toact.”6

The second hypothesis was that missiles in Cubawould alter the geopolitical and psychological situation,showing the world unequivocally that the United Stateswas unable to control its sphere of influence, the West-ern Hemisphere. These missiles would tell U.S. alliesthat the United States could not stop Soviet influenceninety miles off the coast of Florida, in a country thathad been a U.S. territory and, for more than sixty years,


a U.S. satellite. The perception that even the WesternHemisphere was unmanageable for the United Stateswould have lead the world to ask: How could theUnited States be expected to extend protection to itsallies all over the world if it could not protect itself frommissiles in Cuba? The United States considered thateven this question in the minds of allies or adversarieswould have altered the global balance of power.

The third hypothesis raised the possibility that themissiles were placed in Cuba simply to be removed.Rusk suggested that “Mr. Khrushchev may have . . .known that [the United States does not] really liveunder fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent that . . .he has to live under fear of ours.”7 The missiles could beused as bargaining chips to secure the Soviet borderswith Turkey or traded to obtain a more positive settle-ment of the Berlin arrangement for the Soviets. If theUnited States made military concessions, it woulddiminish its prestige. Soviet statements suggested thatthey would “trade Cuba for Berlin” support thishypothesis.8

The fourth hypothesis, advanced by Nitze and Tay-lor, was that the missiles would, in fact, alter the strate-gic strength of the Soviet Union with relatively littlecost. The Soviets knew that the missile gap did notexist, but they traded on the fact that the United Statesbelieved it to be true. The newly announced U.S. mili-tary superiority made them vulnerable. Placing mis-siles in Cuba would help the Soviets change the balanceof missile power. Bases in Cuba for Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballisticmissiles (MBRMs and IRBMs) were a quick and rela-tively inexpensive means of cutting the U.S. warningtime. Although the United States would still retain a 2-to-1 military superiority over the Soviet Union, the mis-siles in Cuba would substantially change the appearanceof that superiority. Kennedy noted later that “appear-ances contribute to reality,” and the United States couldill afford the appearance of weakness or decreasingstrength.

The fifth hypothesis assumed that the Sovietswanted the United States to discover the missiles andattack the island, thereby splitting the allies and fuelinganti-American sentiment through the world. Question-ing this theory, however, President Kennedy wondered“if . . . any other time since the Berlin blockade . . . theRussians [had] given [the United States] so clear provo-cation . . . because they’ve been awfully cautious

really.”9 Discussing U.S. policy options for response tothe emplacement, Robert Kennedy effectively arguedthat such an attack would horrify the world. The UnitedStates was one of two superpowers in the world, hesaid; for it to attack Cuba would “destroy” the “essence[of ] our history and our ideals.”10

The ExComm members discussed these five possi-bilities at length. In the end they decided that theanswers to the question were the perceived balance ofmilitary power and a basic testing of Kennedy’s will.The missiles would embarrass the U.S. government anddemonstrate its inability to control its sphere of influ-ence. Furthermore, according to the U.S. advisors, theSoviets believed that the risk they were taking was notgreat. They were testing the will of a young and rela-tively inexperienced administration. Khrushchevthought “Kennedy too young, intellectual, not preparedwell for decision-making in crisis situations.”11

Soviet Motivations

The ExComm assessments were somewhat accurate,though they were also bound by U.S. perceptions ofreality, which did not coincide with Soviet and Cubanperceptions. The primary Soviet reasons for deployingthe missiles were to defend the Cuban revolution and todeter a U.S. attack. ExComm policymakers immedi-ately discounted this motivation. The United Statesknew it did not intend to invade Cuba and believed ithad communicated this intention to the Soviets and theCubans. In fact, it had not. The Soviets believed theUnited States thought it was in its interest to launch afirst strike against Cuba. “We had no doubt the UnitedStates would repeat the attack on Cuba after the Bay ofPigs.12 Furthermore, in the Soviet view, and most espe-cially in Khrushchev’s eyes, the loss of Cuba would“have been a terrible blow to Marxism-Leninism,”diminishing Soviet “stature throughout the world, butespecially in Latin America.”13

The placement of missiles in Cuba was first dis-cussed in April of 1962 between Anastas Mikoyan,Soviet first deputy premier and special envoy to Cuba atthe end of the Cuban missile crisis, and Khrushchev.14

Khrushchev continued personal discussions with advi-sors throughout the spring. By July some Presidium(now called Politburo) members were let in on the dis-cussions with Cuba, but there was no written corre-spondence.15


Khrushchev believed estimates that a Soviet inva-sion of Cuba would take “three or four days, a week,maybe,” and, therefore, “the same time would beneeded for a U.S. invasion. [Since t]hat was not longenough to defend against it, even by retaliating some-where else . . . [i]t was thought [to] deter an invasionbeforehand.”16 The Cubans did not agree with theSoviet defense assessment, asserting that they had270,000 armed and mobilized troops and could fight aninvasion much longer than several days. In fact, this wasdouble McNamara’s 1962 estimate.17

The Soviets also believed that the missiles wouldrepair the strategic imbalance in deliverable missiles.18

Deploying missiles on the U.S. periphery would estab-lish Soviet strength, countering the U.S. missiles posedon the Soviet borders.19 During his 1959 U.S. tour,Khrushchev asked, “How would [the United States] feelif there were Soviet military bases in Mexico and Can-ada.”20 The ExComm discussed this on Tuesday, Octo-ber 16. Rusk reminded the policymakers that McCone“suggested some weeks ago that one thing Mr. Khrush-chev may have in mind is that . . . we don’t really liveunder fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent, that . . .he has to live under fear of ours. Also we have nuclearweapons nearby, in Turkey and places like that.”21

Khrushchev maintained exactly that view: “Inaddition to protecting Cuba, our missiles would haveequalized what the West likes to call ‘the balance ofpower’ . . . now [the United States] would learn justwhat it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you;we’d be doing nothing more than giving them a little oftheir own medicine.”22 Soviet officials later said thatcorrecting the nuclear balance was “important” toKhrushchev “because there were only two thoughts:defend Cuba and repair the imbalance. But defendingCuba was the first thought.”23

U.S. Response

On Tuesday, October 16, members of the ExCommassembled in the White House Cabinet room for theirfirst meeting. CIA analysts and photo reconnaissanceintelligence experts made a formal presentation. Afterthe initial presentation of the U-2 photographs, theExComm discussions turned to the significance of themissiles. The men present in the room had a wide rangeof responses. President Kennedy was angered by theSoviet actions and quite aware of the implications of

such a ploy. It was, he said, “an effort to materiallychange the balance of power . . . a deliberately provoca-tive and unjustified change in the status quo.”24

Although Kennedy’s advisors were not unanimousabout the U.S. response, they agreed that the politicalimplications of the missiles were serious and that theiremplacement was a deliberate challenge to U.S. prestigeand influence. Even Adlai Stevenson, whose relationswith the president were strained after the crisis25 andwho encouraged nonmilitary solutions, said, “No politi-cian could have missed the significance of Russian mis-siles in Cuba. We just had to get them out of there.”26

The advisors, however, were not in accord on theU.S. policy response, nor were they all concerned withthe military consequences of the Soviet actions.MRBMs and IRBMs were placed in four missiles siteson the southern edge of Sierra del Rosario in west cen-tral Cuba—Guanajay and Sagua la Grande (to havethree battalions of MRBMs each), and San Cristó baland Remedios (to have two battalions of IRBMs each).In total there would be forty launch pads—San Cristóbal and Sagua la Grande would each have twelve, andGuanajay and Remedios would each have eight.

The weapons transfers were accomplished in twophases, with the defensive weapons first and the offen-sive missiles and weapons later. The plan includedMRBMs with ranges up to 1,100 nautical miles; IRBMswith ranges up to 2,200 nautical miles; IL-28s (Beaglebombers) with ranges of 600 nautical miles and the abil-ity to deliver nuclear or nonnuclear payloads of 6,000pounds; surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) with the abilityto strike at targets at altitudes of 80,000 feet and at ahorizontal distance of 30 nautical miles; Cruise missiles;KOMAR guided-missile patrol boats; and MiG-21 air-craft capable of speeds up to 1,000 knots at 40,000 feet.Soviet technicians, operators, mechanics, and soldierssent to the four installation points numbered more than20,000. The MRBMs had an estimated ability to hit one-third of the United States, including the District ofColumbia, St. Louis, and Dallas; Panama; and all ofCentral America. The IRBMs stationed in Cuba wereestimated to be able to hit southeastern Canada, all ofthe United States, Mexico, Central America, Panama,and most of South America.

The U.S. policy was not one that “came out of theblue”; it was publicly and privately reiterated by manyadvisors. From the beginning McNamara maintainedthat “a missile is a missile. It makes no great difference


whether you are killed by a missile fired from the SovietUnion or from Cuba.”27 He did not believe that theSoviets were attempting to alter the military balance.“The military balance [has not] changed.”28 McNamaraargued in favor of limited action because it could beincreased as the situation warranted it. At the 6:30 P.M.meeting on that first day, he urged the president to con-sider the consequences of an air strike against Cuba,saying, “The consequences of these actions have notbeen thought through clearly.”29 He said further, “Idon’t know quite what kind of a world we live in afterwe’ve struck Cuba, and . . . we’ve started it . . . Afterwe’ve launched . . . sorties, what kind of world do welive in. . . . I think State and [Defense] ought to work onthe consequences of any one of these courses of actions,consequences which I don’t believe are entirely clear.”30

The options that the ExComm addressed includedinaction, private diplomatic advances, an expression ofoutrage at the United Nations, limited military action inthe form of a blockade of Cuba, surgical air strikeagainst the island, and general invasion. The presidentdid not believe that the missiles changed the global mil-itary balance, but he did believe that they had seriouspolitical ramifications, and, consequently, the UnitedStates had to respond to their emplacement. Aftermonths of reassurances against such an action, theUnited States would not tolerate a Soviet action carriedout in such a deliberate and deceitful manner.31 Fur-thermore, missiles in the Western Hemisphere point-ing directly at the United States would not be judged inthe same manner as missiles similarly targeted butlocated in the Soviet Union.

Kennedy believed that not addressing the Sovietactions would have severe consequences in Soviet mili-tary and political expansionism. He said, “[W]hen wesaid we’re not going to and then they go ahead and doit, and then we do nothing, then . . . I would think thatour risks increase. . . . After all this is a political struggleas much as military.”32 Soviet expert and newlyappointed U.S. Ambassador to France Charles Bohlenattended the meetings on the first two days. In a memo-randum to the president he noted that “no one canguarantee that this can be achieved by diplomaticaction—but it seems to me essential that this channelshould be tested out before military action isemployed.”33 The Bohlen plan suggested sending a let-ter to the Kremlin before pursuing a military response.Although Sorenson worked on composing such a letter

for several days, he concluded that it was impossible towrite a letter to Khrushchev “to which his reply couldnot outmaneuver us.”34 Consequently, the Bohlen planas such was rejected.

Diplomatic advances were not discounted com-pletely, although they were not considered withoutother concurrent actions. They were rejected outrightas a preliminary to U.S. actions. Diplomatic noteswould provide the Soviets and the Cubans with warn-ing time and would not change the U.S. position. A pri-vate diplomatic approach would be time consuming,but the administration feared the possibility that noth-ing would be accomplished in a public forum. Further-more, Kennedy and his advisors believed that they hadalready on many occasions warned the Soviets againstthis type of action. Bringing the issue to the U.N. Secu-rity Council alone was discounted because, as a perma-nent member, the Soviet Union had an automatic vetoand, ironically, Soviet Ambassador Valerian I. Zorinwas serving as the chairman of the Council.

Another alternative, which seemed especiallyattractive in light of the possibility of disengaging theSoviet-Cuban alliance, was to approach Castro directly.The ExComm considered sending a message that wouldhighlight the problems for Castro. The United Statessaw it as “action [by] the Soviets . . . [which] threatened[Castro] with attack from the United States, and . . .therefore the overthrow of this regime.” The UnitedStates would point to Soviet statements suggesting thepossibility of “bargaining” Soviet “support [for Cuba]and these missiles, against concessions in Berlin, andelsewhere, and therefore . . . threatening to bargain himaway.”35

This approach was not rejected, but it was “setaside” for the time being as Kennedy believed this to bea U.S.-Soviet confrontation and crisis. Since the weap-ons were Soviet-designed, Soviet-built, Soviet con-structed, and Soviet-controlled, he did not believe thataddressing Castro on this issue would be useful.Approaching Castro would have afforded the Sovietsadvance notice. Furthermore, Castro might haveresponded defensively, thereby forcing a faster or moredifficult military confrontation if he had not perceivedthe approach to be genuine.36

The ExComm members next discussed the alterna-tive of military action. The hawks believed that theSoviet missiles had strategic as well as political value.General Taylor and Assistant Secretary Nitze argued


that the missiles exposed part of the U.S. strategicbomber force to sudden ground attack and cut the U.S.warning time from approximately fifteen minutes tothree minutes or less.37 Advocates of military actionagainst Cuba pointed out that military action was theonly option that would physically remove the missiles.The direct surgical air strike on the missiles in Cubaoption came to be known as the “fast track.” Propo-nents of this alternative maintained that the missileswere not defensive or placed for the sake of Cuba butwere, in fact, designed to enhance the Soviet positionand to intimidate the United States and its allies.

The other option that claimed ExComm’s attentionwas the “slow track.” Advocated by the doves, this plancalled for a limited military embargo of Soviet ship-ments to Cuba, enforced by a naval blockade of theisland. McNamara was one of the earliest advocates ofthe blockade. “He argued that it was limited pressure,which could be increased as the circumstances war-ranted. Further, it was dramatic and forceful pressure,which would be understood38 yet, most importantly,still leave [the United States] in control of events.”39

Both of these alternatives constituted direct con-frontations with the Soviets. The naval blockade, how-ever, would be somewhat less provocative as it did notentail the immediate risk of casualties. It could be grad-uated and tightened, and, although it would be a showof force, it would not be immediately life threatening. Inaddition, the United States had planned militarymaneuvers off the coast of Florida that could be used tocover the preparations.

Opponents of the blockade, including Acheson,Taylor, and General Curtis LeMay, criticized the policybecause the Soviets could take advantage of it. Theycorrectly concluded that it would not remove the mis-siles. It could easily drag on while the world debated itslegality and legitimacy. At the same time, the Sovietscould continue their missile construction and build-up.Furthermore, if the Soviets attempted to “run theblockade,” the United States would be forced into firingthe first shot. Above all, traditional rules in interna-tional relations protected the freedom of the seas. Ablockade was an act of war. Vice-President Johnson hadrecently characterized it as such in response to Republi-can Senator Kenneth Keating’s demand for an embargoof Cuba. By Wednesday, October 17, Secretary McNa-mara, in Robert Kennedy’s words, “became the block-ade’s strongest advocate,” arguing that limited pressure

could be increased as the circumstances warranted.“Further, it was dramatic and forceful pressure, whichwould be understood yet, most importantly, still leave[the United States] in control of events.”40

The “fast track” had advocates as well. At the firstExComm meeting, the majority of advisors encour-aged an air strike. They perceived the United States asthreatened strategically and believed it would have torespond in a quick military manner that left no room fordebate; a surprise attack on Cuba would have removedthe missiles and proved to the Soviets and to the worldthat the United States stood by its word. The UnitedStates had warned the Soviet Union repeatedly againstemplacement of missiles in Cuba, and now the UnitedStates should respond in a forceful manner, accordingto advocates of the position. The joint Chiefs of Staff,Acheson, and Taylor remained strong proponents of asurgical air strike against Cuba, while other advisorschanged their opinions sharply.

Advisors quickly pointed to the ramifications inother U.S. military posts and situations. Deputy Secre-tary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric pointed to the “pointsof vulnerability around the world,” suggesting that “pre-cautionary measures” might have to be taken. He alsosaid that the measures adopted must be military andpolitical.41 McNamara was also concerned with the con-sequences and ramifications of a surgical air attack, sug-gesting that U.S. forces around the world must be puton alert.”42

Under Secretary of State George Ball was amongthose concerned with the costs of such a response. OnOctober 17, the second day of the meetings, he becamethe first firm opponent of an air strike.43 Ball said thatthe bombing of Cuba would be in distinct contradictionof U.S. traditions and history. Robert Kennedy agreedand became the staunchest advocate of this philosophy.Kennedy believed that the U.S. response must be con-sistent with U.S. values. He maintained that the UnitedStates was fighting for something more than just sur-vival and that all our heritage and our ideals would berepugnant to such a sneak military attack.”44 In an argu-ment with Acheson, he said that “advocating a surpriseattack by a very large nation against a very small one . . .could not be undertaken by the United States if we wereto maintain our moral position at home and around theworld.”45 Furthermore, he said, “My brother is notgoing to be the Tojo of the 1960s,” nor would he initiatea “Pearl Harbor in reverse.”46


Acheson staunchly opposed the analogy of PearlHarbor. He argued that the United States had warnedthe Soviet government for months against placingoffensive weapons in Cuba. The president had specifi-cally discussed this in his public statements of Septem-ber 4 and September 13, 1962. On October 3 Congresshad authorized the president to prevent “by whatevermeans may be necessary” Cuba from endangering U.S.security. Furthermore, Acheson stated, the WesternHemisphere had, since the Monroe Doctrine, been inthe U.S. military and political sphere of influence. Thedoctrine unequivocally stated that European interfer-ence in that sphere will not be tolerated by the UnitedStates. For Acheson, these warnings negated the “sur-prise attack” suggestion of the Pearl Harbor analogy.For the president and the attorney general, however,these statements and warnings were not enough to jus-tify a surprise attack. In fact, the attorney general latercharacterized President Kennedy’s decision against theattack as based on “his belief in what is right and what iswrong.”47

The final option the ExComm considered was ageneral invasion of Cuba. Few of the advisors believedthat the U.S. response should begin with such extremeaction, though several advisors saw it as an opportunityto “take Cuba away from Castro.” This response wasquickly discounted as risking a world war. At the veryleast it was a step that would give the world cause toindict U.S. aggression and interventionism for years tocome.

Mindful of previous crises during which the presi-dent had not received complete information, PresidentKennedy set an informal agenda for the ExComm meet-ings encouraging discussion by all present regardless ofrank. Open discussion of all alternatives was encour-aged, with advisors presenting and updating reports,analyses, and suggestions. The president believed thathis presence had a constraining effect on the discussion,arresting interaction between less senior advisors andtheir supervisors and overwhelming the possibility for“true give-and-take.” For this reason and because hewanted to maintain his schedule to convey the appear-ance of normality, Kennedy did not attend the delibera-tions during the first days.48 Robert Kennedy served asan informal chair at the meetings, although the discus-sions were rarely directed and largely unstructured.The president instructed the group to develop a con-sensus in favor of one or two specific responses, which

he would consider in making his decision. Discussionquickly centered on whether the immediate U.S.response should be a blockade or an air strike.

On the third day of the crisis, Thursday, October18, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called onthe president. During the meeting, which had beenplanned weeks before, Gromyko told Kennedy that theSoviets would do nothing about Berlin or a Germanpeace treaty until after the November 6 congressionalelections. He said that U.S. hostilities against Cubacould lead to problems between the Soviet Union andthe United States. The Soviet Union, he continued, hadgiven Cuba assistance for purely defensive purposes. Atthat point, Kennedy stopped him, saying that theUnited States had no intention of invading Cuba and theSoviet Union’s supplying of arms to Cuba was having aprofound effect on the people of the United States andwas a source of great concern.49 Kennedy then readGromyko his statement of September 4, which declaredthat Soviet placement of offensive weapons in Cubawould have serious consequences and that the UnitedStates would go to any length to stop Cuban aggressionand Soviet expansionism in Latin America. He did notask Gromyko directly whether there were offensivemissiles in Cuba. If Gromyko was puzzled by the presi-dent’s actions, he did not appear so. Upon leaving theWhite House, Gromyko described the meeting as “use-ful, very useful.”50

As the days wore on, the meetings and debates con-tinued. Certain people, from government analysts toreporters, began to be aware that a major policy issuewas under discussion, although they were not quite sureof its content. The president ordered the armed forcesto stand at DefCon 2, a stage of military preparationthat is one step away from actual confrontation. As theUnited States fortified its position, it publicly defendedthe build-up as part of long-planned naval activities inthe Caribbean—Philbriglex-62.51 Arthur Sylvester,information chief of the Defense Department, deniedthe significance of the build-up, saying that the exercisehad “nothing to do with any possible imminent actionagainst Cuba.”52 Time was running short, however.

Speculation centered on Berlin, on India, and onthe Far East as well as on Cuba. At one point during thedeliberations W. Averill Harriman, assistant secretary ofstate for Far Eastern affairs, was summoned to a privateanteroom in the west wing of the White House and leftthere as a decoy to encourage journalists to speculate


about a crisis in the Far East rather than in Latin Amer-ica. Martin Hillenbrand of the German Affairs Officeand Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern AffairsPhilips Talbot were also called to the White House in apublic manner as decoys.53 Government officials dideverything they could think of to avoid publicity. Oneevening a mid-level official told Secretary Rusk, “Iknow there is something going on that you don’t wantto talk about. But if security is all that tight, maybeyou’d better tell all those big wheels from across theriver to get their cars off the street.”54 After that the lim-ousines were left in the basement garage

On the evening of Thursday, October 18, when theState Department gave a dinner party for Gromyko, theExComm was divided into two clear camps—air strikeversus blockade. At the beginning the group wasdivided almost evenly. McCone, Dillon, Taylor, Ache-son, and Nitze favored a strategic air strike. InitiallyMcGeorge Bundy had supported a blockade, but bythat time he also favored an air strike. Robert Kennedy,McNamara, Gilpatric, Thompson, Ball, and Lovett,however, believed that the United States must pursue ablockade, at least before resorting to more drastic mili-tary action. The air strike proponents suggested anadvance warning to both the Cubans and the Sovietsthrough contacts in the Swiss government.55

Soviet expert Llewellyn Thompson, resuming anargument he had supported in earlier meetings, main-tained that the missiles were placed and controlled bythe Soviets. To consider Castro as a major policymakerin this crisis, he believed, would be futile. Since this wasa dramatic departure from previous Soviet military pol-icy (they had never before placed missiles outside theSoviet Union), Thompson argued, the plan must haveoriginated in the Kremlin. A resolution, therefore, hadto be negotiated with the Kremlin. Furthermore,attacking the Soviet missiles meant killing Soviets, andit was unlikely that Khrushchev would not respond inkind somewhere in the world. President Kennedyagreed. During a briefing with Air Force Chief of StaffGeneral Curtis LeMay, Kennedy said that although heunderstood the position of the joint Chiefs of Staff incalling for immediate military action, there would in allprobability be some Soviet military retaliation to a U.S.military action. “They, no more than we,” Kennedysaid, “can let these things go by without doing some-thing. They can’t, after all their statements, permit us to

take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians and then donothing.”56

Robert Kennedy, continuing an argument that heand others, including McNamara and Ball, supported,maintained that the president was not faced with a“zero-sum” choice. Instead, he suggested that the presi-dent should begin with responses that offered the leastrisk of war and increase pressure if necessary. Theblockade was a limited action that could be tightened orsupplemented with an air strike as time went on. Aturning point occurred when Secretary of the TreasuryDouglas Dillon shifted his opinion away from support ofan air strike to a blockade. “What changed my mind,”he suggests, “was Bobby Kennedy’s argument that weought to be true to ourselves as Americans, that sur-prise attack was not in our tradition. Frankly, these con-siderations had not occurred to me. . . .”57

Around 10:00 P.M. the advisors left the StateDepartment to meet with the president. In a meetingthat lasted past midnight, they presented two policyoptions they had been debating for days: the air strikeand the blockade. In the course of the meeting the advi-sors were not able to answer all of the president’s ques-tions, and their own opinions began to shift again. Thepresident sent them back to the State Department forfurther deliberations. The next day the advocates of thetwo plans split up to write recommendations outliningthe steps each policy would require. Presidential Assis-tant Theodore Sorenson was asked to draft a speechthat would justify the blockade. It was to include ananalysis of the Latin American countries that couldassist in the blockade and the military procedures thatwould be used to stop ships. The advocates of immedi-ate military action were required to draw up a list ofriot-control equipment that would be used to maintaindomestic security throughout Latin America; weaponsthat would be barred from Cuba; an analysis of theCuban exile groups in the United States; and a pro-posed communication to Khrushchev designed to per-suade him that it would be inadvisable to movemilitarily against us in the Caribbean, in Berlin, or else-where in the world.58 The Justice and State depart-ments were entrusted with the task of building the legaldefense for the blockade.

The deliberations were not over, however. On Fri-day, October 19, the opponents of a blockade continuedto raise criticisms of the plan and to argue the futility ofsuch action. Furthermore, they suggested that the “slow


track” of a blockade would remove any advantage thatthe United States might have with a surprise attack.

Reporters were becoming more persistent as theglobal U.S. military mobilization continued. At 1:20P.M. an alert went out to Atlantic and Caribbean basesand commands warning them against possible attacks.High-level policymakers were canceling appointmentsand speaking engagements. Government officials wereremaining in Washington when they were scheduled tobe in other places. Troop movements and mobilizationswere being questioned, even though they were coveredsomewhat by the naval exercises. The president main-tained his scheduled campaign stops in Illinois while hisadvisors continued their discussions, but questionswere being raised about what was going on. Time wasrunning out.

International and Legal Ramifications

The ExComm now began a new debate: What could bethe justification for the limited response, or “slowtrack,” which was, in fact, an act of war? Furthermore,what domestic constitutional questions were involved?Although the blockade was considered a less provoca-tive response, it was not in accord with internationallaw or with U.S. traditions. The history of foreign policyprovides numerous examples of the importance to gov-ernments of freedom of the seas. Indeed, the UnitedStates had fought the War of 1812 to protect Americanaccess to the seas.

Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach andState Department Deputy Legal Advisor LeonardMeeker were responsible for creating a legal frame-work to justify the naval blockade. Although the admin-istration already believed that it was important for itsactions to have a legal basis, Thompson emphasized theimportance of this point in dealing with the Soviet gov-ernment. He noted that although the Soviets mightmanipulate the legal justifications or ramifications of asituation, they consistently sought legal interpretationsto justify their actions in the international sphere.

Katzenbach maintained that U.S. military actions(including a blockade) could be justified on the interna-tional principle of self-defense based on Chapter VII,Article 51, of the United Nations Charter. Moreover, ablockade would not require a declaration of war.Meeker agreed that U.S. actions were valid on the basisof “self-defense,” but he maintained that a blockade or

“defensive quarantine”59 would be considered “use offorce” prohibited by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,which states:

All Members shall refrain in their international rela-tions from the threat or use of force against the ter-ritorial integrity or political independence of anystate, or in any other manner inconsistent with thePurposes of the United Nations.

There are, however, exceptions to the “use offorce” prohibition, including self-defense in an armedattack, action by the United Nations itself, and regionalarrangements. The regional arrangements exception,stated in Article 52(1) and Article 52(2), sanctions“appropriate” actions for the maintenance of regionalpeace and security. Katzenbach believed that the block-ade with a regional sanction would provide a solid legalbasis. He also felt that the United States could, withoutthe sanction, defend the blockade in view of a state’sright of self defense.

An Organization of American States (OAS) sanc-tion, under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocity,or Rio Treaty (a treaty to which Cuba is a signatory),established cooperative relations and a forum to dealwith internal and external conflicts among the Ameri-can states. Meeker argued that this treaty would legiti-mize a quarantine of Cuba. Meeker especially notedArticles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty, which condone mea-sures taken within the organization (including the rec-ommendation of force by one or more members) toresolve a situation that endangers the peace and secu-rity of the hemisphere:

Article 6: If the inviolability or the integrity of theterritory or the sovereignty or political indepen-dence of any American State should be affected byan aggression which is not an armed attack or by anextra-continental or intra-continental conflict, orby any other fact or situation that might endangerthe peace of America, the Organ of Consultationshall meet immediately in order to agree on mea-sures which must be taken in case of aggression toassist the victim of the aggression or, in any case,measures which should be taken for the commondefense and for the maintenance of the peace andsecurity of the Continent.


Article 8: For the purposes of this treaty, the mea-sure on which the Organ of Consultation may agreewill comprise one or more of the following: recallof chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplo-matic relations; breaking of consular relations; par-tial or complete interruption of economic relationsor of sea, air, postal, telephonic, and radiotele-phonic or radiotelegraphic communications; andthe use of armed force.

The advisors recognized that the language used todescribe the crisis was critical. Meeker was careful,therefore, to qualify the naval response as a “defensivequarantine” rather than a “blockade.” A defensive quar-antine would not necessarily imply a state of war, whilea blockade would be subject to considerable retaliationas an act of war. Both advisors underscored the state-ment in Article 2(4), which outlaws “use of force” thatis “inconsistent with the Purposes of the UnitedNations.” They suggested that the quarantine would be“legal” in the context of Article 2(4) as it supported theaim of maintaining international peace. Furthermore,within the sanction of the regional institution, the OAS,a “defensive quarantine” would not be illegal. Sorensonbegan a draft that announced a blockade but suggestedthat the United States would increase the pressure ofthe blockade and proceed to more offensive actions ifthe Soviet build-up continued.

The Presidential Decision

At 2:30 P.M. on Saturday, October 20, after five days ofalmost constant deliberations, the ExComm presentedtwo alternative proposals to President Kennedy:

1. Begin with a naval blockade and increase the mili-tary pressure as the crisis demands; or

2. Begin with an air strike of Cuba, probably accom-panied by an invasion of Cuba.

Assistant Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatricsummarized the general opinion of the ExComm:“Essentially, Mr. President, this is a choice betweenlimited action and unlimited action; and most of usthink that it’s better to start with limited action.”60

Adlai Stevenson said that the United States shouldbe prepared to negotiate to remove the missiles. He

suggested that the president should consider proposingthat Cuba be demilitarized, neutralized, and its territo-rial integrity guaranteed by the demobilization of U.S.forces at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base. Additionally,either as an alternative or as an accompanying proposal,the president should consider dismantling the obsoleteJupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy.

Kennedy discounted both options. He did not wantto give up Guantánamo at that time, and he refused tobe perceived as trading away an ally for the safety of theUnited States, whether the missiles in the Mediterra-nean were militarily useful or not. Primarily, the UnitedStates could not and would not negotiate under threat.The president did agree, however, that the politicalimportance of the U.S. negotiating position had to beaddressed and strengthened. With the exception of Ste-venson, the ExComm fully agreed with the president’srefusal to include the U.S. missiles in a negotiationpackage. A straw vote revealed that the ExCommremained split, with six advisors voting for a surgicalstrike and eleven advocating a naval quarantine within acontext of international negotiations.61

That morning the president ordered the U.S. mis-siles stationed in Turkey to be defused. This renderedthem incapable of firing without a direct order by anauthority.62 This was done to consolidate the responsi-bility of the crisis into the hands of the executive and toprevent, to the best of the administration’s ability, esca-lation through mistake, misperception, or miscalcula-tion of an unauthorized government official. Thisaction did not affect the U.S. strategic position ordiminish its security. By the fall of 1962, only Air ForceGeneral LeMay believed that the Jupiters were “goodmilitary weapons.”63 Turkey maintained that the mis-siles were a physical sign of the U.S. commitment toNATO, and to Turkey in particular. In May and June1962 the State Department had broached the subjectwith the Turkish government; both times the Turkishgovernment refused to discuss it. Although in August1962 Bundy had pursued the subject of how to removethe missiles, no action had as yet begun.64

President Kennedy decided in favor of a blockadeor “defensive quarantine.”65 Although he realized thatthe quarantine would not remove the missiles, he knewthat an air strike would not necessarily remove all ofthem either, thereby forcing an escalation to higher lev-els of military confrontation. This course allowed theUnited States to increase pressure as required. Once the


United States went forward with an attack, there wouldhave been little recourse. The quarantine bought sometime.

The president was scheduled to make a statementon Monday October 22, but the administration was notsure it could keep the crisis from reaching the press.James Reston of the New York Times had many of thefacts. Alfred Friendly of the Washington Post also had afair idea of what was going on. Both the New York Timesand the Washington Post, in addition to the New YorkHerald Tribune, complied with the request that theywait on the story until the president had gone publichours later.

The final hours of the weekend were spent draftingthe president’s speech to the public; contacting con-gressional leaders; coordinating the military mobiliza-tion and naval buildup; establishing support systems,including doctors and nurses, that would be needed inthe event of a military confrontation; and dispatchingambassadors to inform our allies. Kennedy also sentpersonal envoys to French President Charles de Gaulle,Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, West Ger-man Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and British PrimeMinister Harold Macmillan. Presidential letters, sentthrough U.S. embassies, went to forty-three heads ofstate.

The president gave a final, last-minute consider-ation to an air strike during a meeting with GeneralWalter C. Sweeney, Jr., commander-in-chief of the Tac-tical Air Command, on the morning of Sunday, October21. Sweeney explained that an air attack could not becertain of destroying all the missile sites in Cuba. Infact, he said, approximately ten percent of the missileswould remain, necessitating a U.S. invasion. That con-firmed the president’s decision to begin with the navalquarantine. The air strike plan as outlined by the mili-tary included bombing several populated areas as wellas military installations. Later reports suggested thatU.S. intelligence advisors had estimated that 25,000Cubans would be killed if the decision had been madeto bomb the missiles sites and destroy the bases.66

Once the president made his decision, time andenergy were channeled into reviewing the speeches tobe made and deciding on the exact presentation thepresident would make. There were many questions:How would he explain the U.S. evidence? Would hepresent the photographs on television? Should thepresident admit to illegal reconnaissance flights over

Cuban air space? Should he state that the United Stateswould continue its blockade whether it receivedregional approval from the OAS or not? Should thespeech mention Berlin and try to forestall a retaliatoryaction there?

Kennedy decided against showing the enlargedphotographs on the grounds that the viewer wouldprobably not be able to discern the missile sites in thephotographs. Robert Kennedy later admitted that thefirst time he looked at the photographs he had to takethe photo reconnaissance analysts at their word, sincewhat he saw “appeared to be no more than the clearingof a field for a farm or the basement of a house.” Thishad been the reaction of many of the experts in theroom, including President Kennedy.67 Although thepublic would have seen later stages of construction, thepresident did not want to present questionable evi-dence. At the same time the administration did notwant to heighten panic, so the president removed anyspecific references to Hiroshima and megatonnage.

The speech would admit the secret surveillance ofCuba and would announce that the United States wouldincrease this surveillance until the crisis abated. Sur-veillance was justified in an earlier OAS communiquécondemning secret military preparations. Although theUnited States would institute the blockade in any event,the ExComm chose not to review that point in thespeech in the hope that the statement about “thedefense of [U.S.] security and of the entire WesternHemisphere” would encourage regional unity andapproval. The speech discouraged Soviet advances inBerlin, stating that the United States would resist anyhostile retaliations anywhere in the world “including inparticular [against] the brave people of West Berlin.”68

At 2:30 P.M., October 21, the National SecurityCouncil formally ratified the decisions of the ExComm.Admiral George W. Anderson outlined the navy’s planfor the blockade. Orders from the Pentagon readiedGuantánamo naval base for a possible confrontation,evacuating family dependents and assigning operationalcontrol of specified army and air force units. In the eve-ning Secretary of Defense McNamara formallyapproved the procedures and authorized air force inter-ceptors flying in the United States to carry nuclearweapons.

On Monday, October 22, the political and militarypreparations continued. John McCloy flew back to theUnited States from Europe to join the Stevenson team


at the United Nations. A blockade-planning directivewas ordered to the Atlantic fleet, and the air force mis-sile crews received maximum alert orders. One hundredfifty-six Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)were readied for firing. The bomber force was dis-persed, with B-47s sent to forty civilian airports and theB-52 bomber force ordered into the air. During the fol-lowing month a significant portion of the B-52s were inthe air at all times. In addition, the force on the groundcarried a full load of fuel and bombs and was ready totake off on fifteen minutes notice. Five army divisionswere on full alert, and 180 ships were deployed in theCaribbean.69

The ExComm met to discuss the presidentialannouncement. Abram Chayes, the legal advisor of theState Department, stressed that the legal basis of thequarantine was the right of collective action found inthe Rio Treaty and in the UN Charter. He emphasizedthe OAS right to take collective actions to guard thesecurity of the region and Article 52 of the UN Charter,maintaining a state’s right to make regional arrange-ments.

The United States did not point to Article 51 of theUN Charter protecting the right of all nations to self-defense because that article allowed a broad interpreta-tion of self-defense. International justifications andpleas of self-defense had been established over manyyears. Chayes maintained that a dangerous and difficultprecedent would be set if the United States extendedthe interpretation of “self-defense” to “anticipatory self-defense” in regard to the placement of offensive missilesclose to U.S. borders when an attack, although possiblein the future, was obviously not imminent.

The legal advisors urged policymakers to supportthe U.S. position with the other available avenues ofinternational legal posture. This was agreed upon, andthe text of the president’s speech was changed. Chayesagreed with Meeker’s emphasis on terminology,strongly recommending that the U.S. action be termeda “defensive quarantine” rather than a blockade. Thepresident also accepted this idea. Action MemorandumNo. 196 was approved, formally establishing the advi-sors as the Executive Committee of the National Secu-rity Council “for the purpose of effective conduct of theoperations of the executive branch in the current crisis.”

Later that day President Kennedy met with leadingmembers of Congress, many of whom had been flownback to Washington. McCone, Rusk, and McNamara

began the briefing with a description of the intelligencereports and a report of the U.S. response. Members ofthe congressional group were fairly uniform in theircriticism of a blockade. Believing it slow and ineffec-tive, they called for stronger action. Some, includingSenator Richard Russell of Georgia and Senator J. Wil-liam Fulbright of Arkansas (both Democrats), went sofar as to call for an invasion.

President Kennedy later suggested that the con-gressional leaders were responding as the executiveadvisors had at first. He believed that “if they had gonethrough the five-day period we had gone through—inlooking at the various alternatives, advantages and dis-advantages . . .—they would have come out the sameway we did.”70 Kennedy responded to the congressionalleaders by stating that he was acting by executive order,presidential proclamation, and inherent powers, notunder a resolution or an act of Congress.”71 He wasseeking bipartisan governmental unity, he explained,but the planned U.S. response of a quarantine wouldcontinue in any event. Congressional support wasimportant to Kennedy, but he had already decided thatthe executive branch would formulate a response with-out contacting Congress.

The State Department was also preparing briefings.Secretary Rusk left the meeting with Congress for ameeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.Dobrynin was given an advance copy of the president’sspeech. Rusk recalled that Dobrynin “age[d] ten yearsright in front of [his] eyes.”72 In fact, Dobrynin’s owngovernment had not informed him of the missiledeployment. In the State Department’s internationalconference room, Under Secretary Ball briefed theambassadors of forty-six allied countries, showing themphotographs of the sites. U.S. ambassadors all over theworld, including Foy Kohler in Moscow, were givingsimilar briefings

At 7:00 P.M. (EST) President Kennedy broadcaston an international network arranged by the U.S. Infor-mation Agency:73

This government as promised, has maintained theclosest surveillance of the Soviet military build-upon the island of Cuba. Within the past week,unmistakable evidence has established the fact thata series of offensive missile sites is now in prepara-tion on that imprisoned island. The purpose ofthese bases, can be none other than to provide a


nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemi-sphere. . . .

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an impor-tant strategic base—by the presence of these large,long-range and clearly offensive weapons of suddenmass destruction—constitutes an explicit threat tothe peace and security of all the Americas. . . .

This secret, swift and extraordinary build-up ofCommunist missiles—in an area well-known tohave a special and historical relationship to theUnited States and the nations of the Western Hemi-sphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and indefiance of American and hemispheric policy—thissudden, clandestine decision to station strategicweapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil is adeliberately provocative and unjustified change inthe status quo which cannot be accepted by thiscountry, if our courage and our commitments areever to be trusted again by either friend or foe. . . .

Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be toprevent the use of these missiles against this or anyother country, and to secure their withdrawal orelimination from the Western Hemisphere. . . .

The president went on, outlining the initialresponse planned by the United States, including thenaval quarantine, continued surveillance, reinforce-ment of Guantánamo Bay, and a diplomatic approachconsisting of negotiations at the UN, through the OAS,and in bilateral discussions with Khrushchev. Hewarned that the United States would retaliate if neces-sary:

It shall be the policy of this nation to regard anynuclear missile launched from Cuba against anynation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack bythe Soviet Union on the United States, requiring afull retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

Kennedy concluded with a statement reaffirmingthe U.S. commitment to freedom and peace, “Our goalis not the victory of might, but the vindication of right;not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peaceand freedom, here in this hemisphere, and, we hope,

around the world. God willing, that goal will beachieved.”

During the president’s speech, the State Depart-ment continued addressing world opinion to gain aworld consensus favoring or at least understanding theproposed U.S. actions. Ambassador Adlai Stevensonrequested that the Security Council convene to addressthe “dangerous threat to peace and security of the worldcaused by the secret establishment in Cuba” of long-range offensive missiles. He delivered this request to thechairman of the Security Council, Soviet AmbassadorValerian Zorin.74 The United States had ready a draftresolution calling for the dismantling of the missilesunder the jurisdiction of the UN Observer Corps. If thiswere done, the blockade would be called off.

Assistant Secretary of State for Latin AmericanAffairs Edwin Martin briefed the ambassadors of theOAS, while Secretary Rusk met with members of thenonaligned and neutral nations. Characterizing theSoviet emplacement as a “gross . . . error of judgement,”Rusk appealed to the nations to “look at this situation interms of national purposes, national commitments,national interests.” Further, he suggested that “one ofthe issues . . . involved . . . the independence of states . ..” and that Cuba was the victim rather than the perpe-trator of the act.75 McNamara and Ball also held brief-ings that evening for the correspondents of the StateDepartment and the Pentagon. When asked how far thenavy would go to stop a Soviet vessel, McNamararesponded, “If there is an indication of offensive weap-ons on board” and the captain refuses another course orport, “we will use force.”76

The OAS met at 9:00 A.M. on Tuesday, October23, to discuss the U.S. resolution proposing a U.S.“quarantine” of Cuba. Martin estimated that the UnitedStates would get fourteen votes—the minimum neces-sary to approve the collective action under the RioTreaty (two-thirds of the twenty-one member nations).The U.S. delegation, including Secretary of State Rusk,urged the OAS to act in concert for the defense of theentire hemisphere. The nations discussed the blockadethroughout the day. Eighteen favored the blockade. TheBolivian ambassador, under instructions from his gov-ernment to boycott the OAS for reasons relating to anearlier border dispute, was unable to participate in theproceeding. Deciding, however, to take a stand on whatwas viewed as one of the most important decisions theOAS would ever make, he abstained on a paragraph and


voted with the majority. Uruguay alone abstained, mak-ing the vote nineteen to zero in favor of a U.S. navalquarantine of Cuba.

U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS

On Tuesday, October 23, the UN Security Council heldits first meeting on the Cuban missile crisis. U.S.Ambassador Adlai Stevenson denounced the Sovietactions in Cuba, while Soviet Ambassador ValerianZorin accused the United States of risking world warand making “false accusations.” The Soviet ambassadorintroduced a resolution calling for condemnation of theUnited States for violating the UN Charter and increas-ing the likelihood of world war. The Cuban ambassadoralso condemned the U.S. actions, announcing thatCuba would never accept UN observers on the island.

The United States estimated that it could dependon seven votes (including its own) from its allies amongthe permanent members, France, Great Britain, andChina, and Venezuela, Chile, and Ireland who, by rota-tion, were sitting on the council. The Soviet bloc on theSecurity Council consisted of Romania and the SovietUnion, which, as a permanent member, had an auto-matic veto. The other alternate members during therotation were neutral.77 Secretary General U Thant wasasked to mediate the crisis.

Edge of the Precipice

In Washington the CIA presented evidence to theExComm that “as of the day before, four MRBM siteswere ‘operational’ and many others had ‘emergencycapability.’" The Soviet technicians continued toimprove the sites. The “emergency capability” wouldbecome “fully operational” shortly. The ExCommdecided, with the president’s approval, that if a U-2reconnaissance plane flying surveillance over Cuba wasfired on, the United States would, with specific permis-sion from President Kennedy, use bomber and fighterplanes to destroy the Surface-to-Air missile site (SAM)that had shot down the U.S. plane. The United Statesdid not know if nuclear warheads were on the island, sothe administration shaped its strategy assuming theworst. In fact, two-thirds of the Soviet warheads wereeither on the island or en route to it. Thirty-six war-heads for use on medium-range missiles and twenty-

four launchers were in Cuba, as well as nine Luna short-range, nuclear-tipped missiles with six mobile launch-ers. Moreover, the local Soviet commander in Cuba hadpermission to fire a nuclear retaliation in response to aU.S.-ordered invasion of the island. The atomic war-heads on the Soviet rockets had yields of six to twelvekilotons, or 6,000 to 12,000 tons of TNT.

At 11:56 A.M. (EST) the U.S. Embassy in Moscowtransmitted the response by Chairman Nikita Khrush-chev to President Kennedy’s public statement:78

[M]easures outlined in your statement representserious threat to peace and the security of peoples.United States has openly taken path of gross viola-tion of Charter of United Nations, path of violationof international norms of freedom of navigation onhigh seas, path of aggressive actions both againstCuba and against Soviet Union.

Statement of Government of United States Amer-ica cannot be evaluated in any other way than asnaked interference in domestic affairs of CubanRepublic, Soviet Union, and other states. Charterof United Nations and international norms do notgive right to any state whatsoever to establish ininternational waters control of vessels bound forshores of the Cuban Republic.

It is self-understood that we also cannot recognizeright of United States to establish control overarmaments essential to Republic of Cuba forstrengthening of its defensive capacity.

We confirm that armaments now on Cuba, regard-less of classification to which they belong, are des-tined exclusively for defensive purposes, in order tosecure Cuban Republic from attack of aggressor.

I hope that Government of United States will showprudence and renounce actions pursued by you,which could lead to catastrophic consequences forpeace throughout the world. . . .

Kennedy responded immediately, transmitting aletter through the U.S. State Department to the U.S.Embassy in Moscow. It was delivered in Moscow at 7:00A.M. October 24 (Moscow time). Briefly discussing the


cause of the crisis, Kennedy firmly announced that thequarantine would go into effect:79

I think you will recognize that the steps80 whichstated the current chain of events was the action ofyour government in secretly furnishing offensiveweapons to Cuba. We will be discussing this matterin the Security Council. In the meantime, I hopethat we both show prudence and do nothing toallow events to make the situation more difficult tocontrol than it already is.

I hope that you will issue immediately the neces-sary instruction to your ships to observe the termsof the quarantine, the basis of which was estab-lished by the vote of the Organization of AmericanStates this afternoon, and which will go into effectat 1400 hours Greenwich time October twenty-four. . . .

That evening the president signed the interdictionorders that were to go into effect the next day. Thematerials to be stopped included SAMs, bomber air-craft, bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles,warheads, support equipment for the banned weapons,and any other materials so designated by the secretaryof Defense “for the purpose of effectuating this procla-mation.” McNamara, as secretary of Defense, orderedthe quarantine: Any ships headed for Cuba would beinterdicted. The president reserved to himself the rightto order each ship to be intercepted or boarded. Again,as with the order to defuse the Turkish missiles, bycompletely centralizing the orders the President aimedto reduce the ability of government officials to takematters into their own hands and unwittingly increasethe levels of tension.

The United States asked its African allies to refuselanding rights to Soviet planes seeking to refuel on Afri-can territory. This was especially important for Senegaland Guinea, the most practical refueling stops forplanes en route to Cuba from the Soviet Union. Bothnations disavowed the Soviet buildup in Cuba andagreed to refuse landing rights to Soviet planes.

In Washington, Ambassador Dobrynin met withRobert Kennedy to discuss the events of the past sixweeks. Kennedy reminded him of the repeated Sovietpledges not to place offensive missiles in Cuba and togive Castro only defensive assistance. Dobrynin

renewed those pledges and denied the existence ofoffensive missiles in Cuba. Kennedy observed that thepresident had chosen a less belligerent attitude towardthe Soviet Union than other political figures in theUnited States would have and suggested that the Sovietactions had “devastating implications for the peace ofthe world.”81 Dobrynin questioned the U.S. silenceregarding the missiles during the Kennedy-Gromykomeeting the previous week. The attorney generalreplied that “there was nothing the President could tellGromyko that Gromyko didn’t already know—after all,why didn’t Gromyko tell the President.”82 The presi-dent had met Soviet demands for the “withdrawal ofAmerican troops from Thailand.” He believed that hewas negotiating in good faith and “sneaking missilesinto Cuba now displayed the Soviet leaders as hypocrit-ical, misleading and false.” Kennedy asked if the Sovietships were continuing on their course toward Cuba.Dobrynin replied that “that had been their instructionsand he knew of no change.”83 The meeting ended in astalemate, neither man secure in his knowledge of theother.

That evening the president met with BritishAmbassador David Ormsby-Gore. Ormsby-Gore sug-gested that Kennedy should release the aerial photo-graphs proving the U.S. position. This would help torally public opinion behind the U.S. position. It wasabsolutely imperative that the world accept that themissiles represented a real crisis rather than a politicalattempt to increase public support before the importantcongressional elections on November 6. The presidentagreed with the ambassador on this point and decidedto publish enlarged versions of the pictures the nextday.

The quarantine line was drawn at 10:00 A.M. onWednesday, October 24, by nineteen U.S. ships operat-ing as Task Force 136. If the Soviet ships bound forCuba continued at their current speed, two ships wouldbe intercepted before noon.84 More than twenty Sovietships bound for Cuba had been tracked by navy recon-naissance planes.

President Kennedy received a warning fromKhrushchev stating that the Soviet Union would notaccept the U.S. “ultimatum:”85

Having posed these conditions to us with theseconditions, you, Mr. President, have challenged us.Who asked you to do this? By what right have you


done this? Our relations with the Republic of Cuba,like our relations with other states, regardless ofwhat sort of state it may be, concern only the twocountries between which those relations exist. . . .

You, Mr. President, are not declaring quarantines,but advancing an ultimatum and threatening thatunless we subordinate ourselves to your demands,you will use force . . . You are no longer appealingto reason, but wish to intimidate us. . . .

Reference to the decision of the Organization ofAmerican States cannot in any way substantiate thedemands now advanced by the United States. Thisorganization has absolutely no authority or basis tomake decisions like that of which you speak of inyour letter.

Consequently, we do not recognize these decisions.International law exists, generally recognizednorms of conduct exist. We firmly support theprinciples of international law, strictly observe thenorms regulating navigation on the high seas and ininternational waters. We observe these norms andenjoy the rights recognized by all states.

You wish to compel us to renounce the rights thatevery sovereign state enjoys, you are attempting tolegislate in questions of international law, and youare trampling upon the generally accepted normsof this law. . . . What morality, what law can justifysuch approach by the American Government tointernational affairs? You cannot find such a moral-ity and such a law. . . .

The Soviet Government considers that violation offreedom of the use of international waters andinternational air space is an act of aggression, push-ing mankind toward the abyss of a world missile-nuclear war. . . . Of course, we shall not be simplyobservers of piratical actions of American ships onhigh seas. We will then be forced on our part totake the measure we deem necessary and adequatein order to protect our rights. For this we have allthat is necessary.

Just after 10:00 A.M. McNamara announced thatthe ships Gagarin and Komiles were going to reach the

interdiction line within one hour. A Soviet submarinehad moved into position between the two ships. TheU.S. Navy planned to meet the Soviets with an aircraftcarrier supported by anti-submarine equipped helicop-ters. The U.S.S. Essex would signal the submarine bysonar. If it failed to respond, depth charges would bereleased to force the submarine to surface.

The administration had come to the moment it hadcarefully attempted to avoid, the “first exchange with anRussian submarine.” Even at that moment the presi-dent asked if “there was some way we can avoid” it. Thismoment was characterized as “the edge of the precipicewith no way off.”86 The U.S. government began to makefinal preparations for a retaliation by the Soviets in Ber-lin. At 10:25 A.M., however, a report stating that theSoviet ships had stopped “dead in the water” wasreceived. Seven minutes later the report was confirmed.The fourteen ships closest to the quarantine line hadstopped in the water or had turned back toward theSoviet Union, although the tankers bound for Cubacontinued. The president was determined to affordboth nations the time necessary to negotiate their wayout of the crisis. “No ships will be stopped or inter-cepted. . . . If the ships have orders to turn around, wewant to give them every opportunity to do so. Get indirect touch with the Essex and tell them not to do any-thing . . . give the Russian vessels an opportunity to turnback. We must move quickly because the time is expir-ing.”87

Avoiding the Confrontation

The U.S. military community was not completely reas-sured by the Soviet actions. Some officers speculatedthat ships might have altered their course in order torendezvous with Soviet submarines, six of which hadbeen tracked in the area, and then attempt to force theirway through the line. The president ordered the Sovietships followed but not boarded. This, he believedwould keep the United States in an alert position, affordKhrushchev time to plan his next move, aware of U.S.pressure and restraint, but not cause precipitate action.

At 1:00 P.M. the administration released the photo-graphs of Soviet bases in Cuba. This was especiallyimportant in London where public opinion was run-ning against the U.S. administration. Many critics feltthat the Democratic administration was creating a pro-


paganda campaign to aid its party during the upcomingelections

U Thant, attempting to mediate between the twogovernments, proposed the simultaneous suspension ofthe quarantine and the arms shipments. This, he main-tained, would facilitate and establish the groundworkfor an immediate summit meeting between Khrushchevand Kennedy. Kennedy and Khrushchev responded tothe secretary general the next day, Thursday, October25. Khrushchev accepted the proposal: “I declare that Iagree with your proposals which accord with the inter-est of peace.” Kennedy did not: “As we made clear inthe Security Council, the existing threat was created bythe secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba,and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons.”First, remove the missiles then the United States willnegotiate. Otherwise, the quarantine will remain.

Khrushchev decided to approach the U.S. govern-ment in an unofficial manner. He settled on inviting vis-iting businessman William Knox, president ofWestinghouse International, to meet with him onWednesday in the Kremlin. During the ensuing discus-sion, Khrushchev presented the Soviet view to a manhe viewed as an informal channel to the U.S. govern-ment. Discussing semantic questions of “offense anddefense,” he admitted what his ambassadors and offi-cial statements had been denying, namely that therewere missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba.Furthermore, the Soviet Union would use them if nec-essary. He warned that they would also sink the Ameri-can vessels if the United States attempted to stop andboard the Soviet ships.

On Thursday, October 25, Walter Lippmann’s col-umn in the Washington Post suggested that there were“three ways to get rid of the missiles already in Cuba:”—invasion and occupation, total blockade and what hetermed a “face-saving agreement,” a trade of the U.S.missiles in Turkey for the Soviet missiles in Cuba.

At 8:00 A.M. (EST) on Thursday, October 25, aSoviet tanker, the Bucharest, was intercepted but wasallowed to pass through the quarantine line without aU.S. boarding. An East German passenger ship was alsoallowed through. The United States decided that sinceit was only a matter of time until a ship was boarded,contingency plans would have to be made. After longdiscussions the ExComm, the State Department, andthe Pentagon agreed that the first ship to be boarded

must not be a Soviet ship nor the ship of a Western ally,but preferably should belong to a neutral state.

That day at the United Nations, Ambassador Zorindenied the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, chal-lenging Ambassador Stevenson to present evidenceproving their existence. Stevenson obliged with a dra-matic flair:

Mr. Ambassador we do have the evidence. We haveit and it is clear and incontrovertible. . . . You, theSoviet Union, have sent these weapons to Cuba.You, the Soviet Union, have created this new dan-ger not the United States. . . .

I remind you that the other day you did not denythe existence of these weapons, but today . . . younow say that they do not exist, or that we haven’tproved they exist. . . .

All right, Sir, let me ask you one question. Do you,Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. hasplaced and is placing medium and intermediaterange missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Don’twait for the translation, yes or no?

Zorin: I am not in an American courtroom. . . . Indue course, Sir, you will have your answer.

Stevenson: You are in the courtroom of worldopinion right now and you can answer yes or no.You have denied that they exist and I want to knowwhether I have understood you correctly.

Zorin: Continue with your statement. You will haveyour answer in due course.

Stevenson: I am prepared to wait for my answeruntil hell freezes over, if that’s your decision. And Iam also prepared to present the evidence to thisroom.

With that Stevenson turned to a set of easelsbehind him and presented the enlarged photographs ofthe Soviet missile sites to the Security Council. Zorindid not respond. Stevenson said, “We know the facts,and so do you, Sir, and we are ready to talk about them.Our job here is not to score debating points. Our job,Mr. Zorin, is to save the peace. And if you are ready to


try, we are.” The Security Council adjourned later thatday and did not meet again until the crisis had ended.

At 7:00 A.M. (EST) Friday, October 26, the U.S.S.Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., stopped the American-built, Pan-amanian-owned, Lebanese-registered freighter Mar-cula. The Marcula was bound for Cuba with a Sovietcharter. It had been tracked since the previous evening.The encounter had been specifically planned by theWhite House; it was selected as a neutral ship sailingunder a Soviet charter. The U.S. Navy stopped andsearched the vessel. The Marcula cooperated with littleprotest, presumably under Soviet instructions. But con-struction of the missile sites continued at an increasingpace.

Kennedy stepped up the psychological and politi-cal pressure. Low-level photo reconnaissance flightsover Cuba were increased to one every two hours.From Florida to Washington, contingency plans weremade in the event that the United States was forced tobomb and invade Cuba. The State Department wasordered to proceed with preparations for establishing acivilian government in Cuba after the occupation ofthat country by U.S. troops.88

On Friday, October 26, statements went to thepress that there was no evidence to date indicating thatthere is any [Soviet] intention to dismantle or discon-tinue work on these missile sites. On the contrary, theSoviets are rapidly continuing their construction ofmissile support and launch facilities, and seriousattempts are under way to camouflage their efforts.”89

Early that afternoon, John Scali of ABC News wascontacted by Fomin, who urgently requested that Scalimeet him for lunch. Although Fomin was listed as aSoviet Embassy counselor, the U.S. intelligence com-munity knew that he was a KGB colonel and the direc-tor of Soviet intelligence operations in the UnitedStates. Fomin asked if the State Department would bewilling to settle the crisis under the following agree-ment: The missile sites would be dismantled under UNsupervision and sent back to the Soviet Union, Castrowould state publicly that he would not accept any fur-ther offensive weapons, and the United States wouldgive an unconditional pledge never to invade Cuba.Scali said that although he believed the United Stateswould be interested, he did not speak for the govern-ment and would have to contact the administration.Fomin urged Scali to send this proposal to the White

House, observing that Zorin would also be prepared topursue an agreement along this terms.

Scali went directly to Roger Hilsman, director ofthe Department of Intelligence and Research for theState Department. He dictated a memorandum, indi-cating what Fomin had said, and gave it to the secretaryof state. The secretary brought the proposal to the pres-ident and returned to Scali with the following messagefor Fomin:

I have reason to believe that the USG sees real pos-sibilities in this and supposes that representativesof the two governments could work this matter outwith U Thant and with each other. My impressionis, however, that time is very urgent.

Scali met with Fomin later that day. After beingassured that the message “came from the highestsources,” Fomin rushed to send the communiqué backto his own government.

That day Robert Kennedy met with Dobrynin.Dobrynin was puzzled about the U.S. reluctance toaccept the missiles in Cuba on the same level that theSoviets viewed the U.S. missiles in Turkey. “RobertKennedy said, ‘You are interested in the missiles in Tur-key?’ He thought pensively and [continued], ‘One min-ute, I will go and talk to the President.’ He went out ofthe room . . . [He] came back and said, ‘The Presidentsaid that we are ready to consider the question of Tur-key, to examine favorably the question of Turkey.’”90

Dobrynin quickly contacted Moscow.That evening the White House received a long per-

sonal message from Khrushchev. In it, he debated theoffensive character of the missiles and discussed thetotal destruction and devastation that would occur in aU.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation:91

I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid ofa sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, ofunderstanding, and of what war entails. . . . I haveparticipated in two wars and know that war endswhen it has rolled through cities and villages,everywhere sowing death and destruction.

You are mistaken if you think that any of our meanson Cuba are offensive. However, let us not quarrelnow. It is apparent that I will not be able to con-vince you of this. But I say to you: you, Mr. Presi-


dent, are a military man and should understand:can one attack, if one has on one’s territory even anenormous quantity of missiles of various effectiveradiuses and various power, but using only thesemeans. These missiles are a means of exterminationand destruction. But one cannot attack with thesemissiles, even nuclear missiles of 100 megatonsbecause only people, troops, can advance. Withoutpeople, any means however powerful cannot beoffensive. . . .

But, Mr. President, do you really seriously thinkthat Cuba can attack the United States and thateven we together with Cuba, can attack you fromthe territory of Cuba?. . . . Has something so newappeared in military strategy that one can thinkthat it is possible to attack thus? I say preciselyattack, and not destroy, since barbarians, peoplewho have lost their sense, destroy.

I believe that you have no basis to think this way.You can regard us with distrust, but, in any case,you can be calm in this regard, that we are of soundmind and understand perfectly well that if weattack you, you will respond the same way. . . .

This indicates that we are normal people, that wecorrectly understand and correctly evaluate the sit-uation. Consequently, how can we permit theincorrect actions which you ascribe to us? Onlylunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perishand to destroy the whole world before they die,could do this,. We, however, want to live and donot at all want to destroy your country. We wantsomething quite different: to compete with yourcountry on a peaceful basis. We quarrel with you,we have differences on ideological questions. Butour view of the world consists in this, that ideologi-cal questions, as well as economic problems,should be solved not by military means, they mustbe solved on the basis of peaceful competition. . . .

Let us normalize relations. . . . You asked what hap-pened, what evoked the delivery of weapons toCuba. . . . We were very grieved by the fact . . . thata landing took place, that an attack on Cuba wascommitted, as a result of which many Cubans per-ished. . . .

If you are really concerned about the peace andwelfare of your people, and this is your responsibil-ity as President, then I . . . am concerned for mypeople. Moreover, the preservation of world peaceshould be our joint concern, since if, under con-temporary conditions, war should break out, itwould be a war not only between reciprocal claims,but a worldwide cruel and destructive war.

Why have we proceeded to assist Cuba with mili-tary and economic aid? The answer is: we haveproceeded to do so only for reasons of humanitar-ian conditions. . . .

If assurances were given by the President and gov-ernment of United States that the USA would notparticipate in an attack on Cuba and would restrainothers from action of this sort, if you recall yourfleet, this would immediately change everything. Iam speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that heand the government of Cuba, evidently, woulddeclare demobilization and would appeal to thepeople to get down to peaceful labor. . . .

Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I pro-pose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships,bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of arma-ments. You would declare that the United Stateswill not invade Cuba with its forces and will notsupport any sort of forces which might intend tocarry out any invasion of Cuba. Then the necessityfor the presence of our military specialists in Cubawould disappear. . . .

Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pullon the ends of the rope in which you have tied theknots of war, because the more the two of us pull,the tighter this knot will be tied. And a momentmay come when this knot is tied so tight that evenhe who tied it will not have the strength to untie it,and then it will be necessary to cut the knot. Andwhat that would mean is not for me to explain toyou, because you yourself understand perfectly ofwhat terrible forces our two countries dispose. . . .

These thoughts are dictated by a sincere desire torelieve the situation, to remove the threat of war.


This letter arrived in four sections. The ExCommdebated the legitimacy of the letter and the possibilityof the Soviet government proceeding with its proposal.Acheson did not believe that the Soviets would gothrough with the deal. He viewed it as a personal pleafrom Khrushchev, dispatched without the consent ofthe Politburo. Although it did not ask for more than theUnited States was willing to give, it also did not specifyhow the missiles would be withdrawn. The ExCommdecided to regard the letter as an actual proposal. TheSoviet experts in the State Department were instructedto analyze it in conjunction with the memoranda on theFomin discussions.

The next day, Saturday, October 27, participants inthe ExComm morning meeting learned that anotherKhrushchev proposal had arrived. In a formal and pre-cisely composed response, which was broadcast overMoscow Radio, Khrushchev requested a quid pro quo. Ifthe United States wanted the Cuban missiles disman-tled, they would have to dismantle the missiles in Tur-key:92

You are worried over Cuba. You say that it worriesyou because it lies at a distance of ninety milesacross the sea from the shores of the United States.However, Turkey lies next to us. Our sentinels arepacing up and down and watching each other. Doyou believe that you have the right to demand secu-rity for your country and the removal of such weap-ons that you qualify as offensive, while notrecognizing this right for us?

You have stationed devastating rocket weapons,which you call offensive, in Turkey literally rightnext to us. How then does recognition of our equalmilitary possibilities tally with such unequal rela-tions between our great states. . . .

This is why I make the proposal: We agree toremove those weapons from Cuba which youregard as offensive weapons. We agree to do thisand to state this commitment in the UnitedNations. Your representatives will make a state-ment to the effect that the United States, on its part. . . will evacuate its analogous weapons from Tur-key. . . .

We, having assumed this commitment in order to

give satisfaction and hope to the peoples of Cubaand Turkey and to increase their confidence in thissecurity, will make a statement in the SecurityCouncil to the effect that the Soviet Governmentgives a solemn pledge to respect the integrity of thefrontiers and the sovereignty of Turkey, not tointervene in its domestic affairs, not to invade Tur-key, not to make available its territory as a placed’armes for such invasion, and also will restrainthose who would think of launching an aggressionagainst Turkey either from the Soviet territory orfrom the territory of other states bordering Turkey.

The United States will make the same statement inthe Security Council with respect to Cuba. It willdeclare that the United States will respect theintegrity of the frontiers of Cuba, its sovereignty,and undertakes not to intervene in its domesticaffairs, not to invade and not to make its territoryavailable as [a] place d’armes for the invasion ofCuba, and also will restrain those who would thinkof launching an aggression against Cuba eitherfrom U.S. territory or from the territory of otherstates bordering on Cuba. . . .

These are my proposals, Mr. President. . . .

Fomin and Scali met again that afternoon. Fominpointed to the Lippmann article of Thursday, October25, linking the missiles in Turkey with the missiles inCuba. Scali cautioned Fomin that it did not matter whatanyone wrote without the authority of the U.S. govern-ment. James Reston’s columns in the New York Timeswere specifically designed to present the White Housein a cautious light and to refute Lippmann’s proposal.Reston argued that the Soviets had placed missiles inCuba as bargaining chips to negotiate the removal of theU.S. missiles in Turkey or even the missiles defendingBerlin, and therefore, to trade them was exactly whatthe Soviets had intended.

During the October 27, ExComm meeting, theUnited States was confronted with a second problem:Rudolf Anderson, the U-2 pilot who flew one of theearly flights that discovered the missiles, was shot downover Cuba. Earlier the ExComm had decided that, inthe event of a U.S. casualty, it would respond with mili-tary force against the SAM site that had shot down itspilot. In the message the ExComm had just received,


Khrushchev specifically stated that the missiles were inSoviet control:93

The weapons on Cuba that you have mentionedand which, as you say, alarm you, are in the handsof Soviet officers. Therefore any accidental use ofthem whatsoever to the detriment of the UnitedStates of America is excluded. These means are sit-uated in Cuba at the request of the Cuban Govern-ment and only in defensive aims. Therefore, if thereis no invasion of Cuba, or attack on the SovietUnion, or any of our other allies then, of course,these means do not threaten anyone and will notthreaten. For they do not pursue offensive aims.

Here was a confirmation that the Soviet SAMs inCuba were fully operational and had attacked and killeda U.S. Air Force officer. The ExComm was shaken—thecrisis was escalating and capable of getting out of con-trol. Who had shot down Anderson? The Soviet stand-ing order, it was learned later, “to fire on any aircraftthat flies overhead in wartime,” was followed. The localSoviet commanders had twenty minutes to decide oncethe U-2 was spotted. They were unable to contact theirsuperiors and General Georgy A. Voronkov gave theorder to shoot.” The president said, “It isn’t the firstthat concerns me [now], but both sides escalating to thefourth and fifth steps—and we don’t go to the sixthbecause there is no one around to do so.”95 First, therewas a U.S. military casualty; second, the ExComm wasnot sure exactly how to respond to the Soviet proposal;and third, even more puzzling, what was the Soviet pro-posal?

The advisors debated whether Khrushchev hadbeen outvoted or overruled. Why did a second proposalcontradictory to the first arrive? Had he lost control ofthe government? Perhaps the first letter had indeedbeen written without the knowledge of the other mem-bers of the Soviet government; when they learned ofthe letter, they unanimously vetoed the overtures itcontained. Llewellyn Thompson did not believe this tobe true. Instead, he theorized that the Soviets had con-strued Lippmann’s proposal as inside information fromthe White House. Thompson also thought that theSoviets were probably divided in their assessment ofthe situation and its resolution. Therefore, when theyread the column, although Scali had denied its validity

to Fomin, they decided to take the more forcefulapproach.

Although it seemed a fair quid pro quo, the admin-istration knew immediately that it would not be pub-licly acceptable. Thompson warned Kennedy that theSoviets would interpret Kennedy’s acceptance as proofof the weakness of his government and his presidency.Secretary Rusk suggested that the United States couldaccept the proposal and have Turkey reject it. In thatway the Soviets would honor their agreement, while themissiles would remain in Turkey.

The withdrawal would not affect the actual militarybalance because the Polaris submarines in the Mediter-ranean would provide protection to NATO and Turkey.In fact, the Jupiter missiles constituted less than threepercent of the U.S. capacity to deliver a first strike. Thepresident had been pursuing a tentative course towardremoving the missiles, but no clear decision had yetbeen reached. In fact, Rusk had informally discussedthe removal of the missiles with a Turkish governmentofficial. Although Turkey did not object to the U.S. mil-itary assessment of the missiles, the domestic costs ofremoving the missiles so quickly would be high, andTurkey preferred to wait for the stationing of Polarissubmarines before removing the Jupiters. Obsolete mis-siles were now hostage to a crisis resolution. The presi-dent said, “I am not going to go to war over worthlessmissiles in Turkey. I don’t want to go to war anyhow,but I am certainly not going to go to war over worthlessmissiles in Turkey. Now I don’t know how to get out ofthis.”96

The missiles were committed to NATO. Tradingthem for the Cuban missiles would make U.S. allies andadversaries think that their doubts about the value of“extended deterrence” were well founded. Alliancesecurity would be sacrificed at the cost of U.S. security.The president later said, “appearances contribute toreality.” The United States was in a crisis confrontationwith the Soviet Union because of the importance ofperceptions. It could not allow the impression to be cre-ated that it had traded an ally or lessened its commit-ment to an ally in a crisis.

The ExComm addressed the question of the nextstep the U.S. government would have to take. Althoughthe decision was not yet firm, the advisors began to fearthat the initiation of an air strike would be a likelyresponse. The president decided that the United Stateswould agree to the trade, but he preferred that it be a


private agreement between the two governments nego-tiated by Robert Kennedy and Anatoly Dobrynin. Ken-nedy also instructed Rusk to prepare a contingencyplan. Andrew Cordier, president of Columbia Univer-sity, said that he would be willing to contact U Thantand have him appeal to both nations to pursue a missiletrade. Cordier was to speak with U Thant upon furthersignal by the U.S. government.”97 The United Statesissued a public statement that the current threat mustbe addressed—the build-up must stop, the weaponsmust be rendered inoperative, and all shipments mustbe stopped—before negotiations and arms controlefforts could continue.

Robert Kennedy then made a proposal to the presi-dent and the ExComm that at worst would delay theescalation of U.S. military responses and at best wouldresolve the crisis: respond to the first Khrushchev cor-respondence and ignore the formal letter. He arguedthat the U.S. letter should accept the Soviet proposalclearly, specifying the U.S. understanding of the pro-posal and thus avoiding a debate on the missiles in Tur-key. The president agreed that that might be a viablealternative and sent the attorney general and Sorensonto draft the letter. The success of the endeavordepended on whether Fomin was actually acting as arepresentative of his government when he met withScali. The U.S. government did not reject the Sovietoffer; it simply accepted a previous one:98

I have read your letter of October 26th with greatcare and welcomed the statement of your desire toseek a prompt solution to the problem. The firstthing that needs to be done, however, is for work tocease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for allweapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive useto be rendered inoperable, under effective UnitedNations arrangements.

Assuming this is done promptly, I have given myrepresentatives in New York instructions that willpermit them to work out . . . an arrangement for apermanent solution to the Cuban problem alongthe lines suggested in your letter of October 26th.As I read your letter, the key elements of your pro-posals—which seem generally acceptable as Iunderstand them—are as follows:

1. You would agree to remove these weapons sys-

tems from Cuba under appropriate UnitedNations observation and supervision; and under-take, with suitable safeguards, to halt the furtherintroduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

2. We, on our part, would agree—upon the estab-lishment of adequate arrangements through theUnited Nations to ensure the carrying out andcontinuation of these commitments—(a) toremove promptly the quarantine measures now ineffect and (b) to give assurances against an inva-sion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations ofthe Western Hemisphere would be prepared to dolikewise.

If you give your representative similar instructions,there is no reason why we should not be able tocomplete these arrangement and announce themto the world within a couple of days. . . . I wouldlike to say again that the United States is very muchinterested in reducing tensions and halting thearms race; and if your letter signified that you areprepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO andthe Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to considerwith our allies any useful proposals.

But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is thecessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and mea-sures to render such weapons inoperable, undereffective international guarantees. The continua-tion of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussionconcerning Cuba by linking these problems to thebroader questions of European and world security,would surely lead to an intensification of the Cubancrisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. Forthese reasons I hope we can quickly agree along thelines outlined in this letter and in your letter ofOctober 26th.

The letter was transmitted and received by theSoviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow at 10:30 A.M. onOctober 28 (Moscow time).

Robert Kennedy took a copy of the text toDobrynin. He told Dobrynin that the United Statesknew that the work in Cuba had been continuing atincreasing rates. Furthermore, the death of RudolfAnderson had put the crisis on another level. The presi-dent did not want a military confrontation, but “they


had forced our hand.” He continued, saying that theUnited States was ready to begin military action shortly.

Dobrynin said he believed that the Soviet leader-ship was committed to its course of action. He did,however, question Kennedy about the Turkey-Cubatrade. Kennedy replied

there could be no quid pro quo or any arrangementmade under this kind of threat or pressure, and thatin the last analysis this was a decision that wouldhave to be made by NATO. However . . . PresidentKennedy had been anxious to remove those mis-siles from Turkey and Italy for a long period of time. . . and it was our judgement that, within a shorttime after the crisis was over, those missiles wouldbe gone.99

Furthermore, he told Dobrynin that “if the Sovietsever discussed this, we would deny it.”100 PresidentKennedy promised, “If this leaks into the press, I willdeny it. I give my word I will do this, but this promiseshould not be made public.”101

Kennedy presented the agreement to Dobrynin as“a settled intent [of the U.S. government].”102 Further,“as long as it [was] not connected to the crisis, as long asnobody represented it as a quid pro quo, which it wasnot . . . and as long as nobody tried to make an openaffair of it” the arrangement would be consum-mated.”103 It could not be publicly acknowledged, how-ever, since the United States did not want theagreement to be “taken by many people as a sellout ofour allies.”104 To avoid further U.S. military action,Robert Kennedy stated that the Soviet agreement mustbe forthcoming quickly, and he demanded an answerthe next day.

During discussions years later, McNamara said

it was important to frame [the withdrawal] as it wasframed, because . . . [the United States was] dealingnot with a military problem, but with a politicalproblem. And if [it] had not framed the withdrawalfrom Turkey as [it] did, [the United States] wouldhave created another political problem. [It] wouldhave divided the Alliance. [The United States]would have weakened it and the Soviets wouldhave faced a weakened Alliance, and this wouldhave been a danger to the Alliance.105

The president refused to approve a military escala-tion, although the preparations continued for a militaryconfrontation beginning as early as Tuesday, October31. The president did, however, order twenty-fourtroop-carrier squadrons of the U.S. Air Force Reserveto active duty. It was estimated that a 60,000–100,000person ground force would be necessary to invadeCuba. The army and marine corps units were already inFlorida or in the Panama Canal Zone. The U.S. militarywas prepared for any contingency.

The U.S. government waited impatiently andpessimistically for the Soviet response. McNamararemembers the sunset of Saturday, October 27th. “I, atleast, was so uncertain as to whether the Soviets wouldaccept replying to the first instead of the second, oraccept . . . our acceptance of the formula of the first,that I wondered if I’d ever see another Saturday sunsetlike that.”106 Many of the advisors, including RobertKennedy, George Ball, and Alexis Johnson, had similarfeelings. On Sunday afternoon at 5:00 P.M. (Moscowtime), however, Khrushchev’s response was broadcastover Moscow radio and delivered to the U.S. Embassythere:107

I have received your message of October 27,1962. 1express my satisfaction and appreciation for thesense of proportion you have displayed, and forrealization of the responsibility which nowdevolves on you for the preservation of peacethroughout the world. . . .

In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the con-flict which endangers the cause of peace, to give anassurance to all people who crave peace, and toreassure the American people, all of whom, I amsure, also want peace, as do the people of theSoviet Union, the Soviet Government, in additionto earlier instructions on the discontinuance of fur-ther work on the weapons constructions sites, hasgiven a new order to dismantle the weapons, whichyou describe as offensive, and to crate and returnthem to the Soviet Union. . . .

Cuba and the Cuban people were constantly underthe continuous threat of an invasion of Cuba. . . .Ishould like to say clearly once more that we couldnot remain indifferent to this. The Soviet Govern-ment decided to render assistance to Cuba with


means of defense against aggression—only meantfor defensive purposes. We have supplied thedefense means which you describe as offensivemeans. . . .

I regard with respect and trust the statement youmade in your message of October 27,1962, that noattack would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, andnot only on the part of the United States, but alsoon the part of other nations of the Western Hemi-sphere, as you said in your same message. Then themotives which induced us to render assistance ofsuch a kind to Cuba disappear.

It is for this reason that we instructed our officers—these means as I had already informed you earlierare in the hands of the Soviet officers—to takeappropriate measures to discontinue constructionof the aforementioned facilities, and to dismantlethem, and return them to the Soviet Union. As Ihad informed you in my letter of 27 October, weare prepared to reach agreement to enable U.N.representatives to verify the dismantling of thesemeans. . . .

The letter also discussed the dangers of the nuclearage and the possibility for better relations betweenNATO and the Warsaw Pact. Khrushchev urged cautionin future military relations, stressing the necessity toavoid provoking a fatal step.

Dobrynin called Robert Kennedy to arrange animmediate meeting. He said that the Soviet governmenthad agreed to the U.S. proposal. The missiles would bedismantled and shipped back to the Soviet Union.Dobrynin also conveyed that Khrushchev wanted tosend his best wishes to the president and the attorneygeneral.

The president ordered the overflights of Cuba dis-continued and instructed the navy not to halt any ships.He also arranged for a watch of the Cuban exile groupsto forestall any behavior that might endanger the agree-ment. Kennedy’s immediate response was released toreporters and read over Voice of America:108

I welcome Chairman Khrushchev’s statesman-likedecision to stop building bases in Cuba, disman-tling offensive weapons and returning them to theSoviet Union under United Nations verification.

This is an important and constructive contributionto peace.

We shall be in touch with the Secretary General ofthe United Nations with respect to reciprocal mea-sures to assure peace in the Caribbean area.

It is my earnest hope that the governments of theworld can, with the solution of the Cuban crisis,turn their urgent attention to the compelling neces-sity for ending the arms race and reducing worldtensions. This applies to the military confrontationbetween the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries aswell as to other situations in other parts of theworld where tensions lead to the wasteful diversionof resources to weapons of war.

President Kennedy insisted that the U.S. govern-ment resist any attempt to present the resolution as aU.S. victory. He appreciated the costs that the SovietUnion and Khrushchev would pay to dismantle the mis-siles. He did not want to raise the stakes for the Sovietsor risk a change in the resolution agreement. In a letterto Khrushchev on December 14, however, PresidentKennedy reiterated his insistence that U.S. “assurancesagainst an invasion of Cuba” were contingent on assur-ances that offensive weapons be removed from Cubaand not reintroduced, and that Cuba itself commit noaggressive acts against its neighbors. Castro and theCuban government were not pleased with what theyperceived as a Soviet betrayal. Khrushchev later admit-ted that Castro was not informed of the U.S.-Soviet dealregarding the missiles in Turkey. Castro issued a state-ment demanding that the United States end the “block-ade,” economic pressure on Cuba, harassment byCuban exiles, overflights of Cuban territory, and raidsby exile commando groups and withdraw from Guantá-namo Bay Naval Base. Furthermore, he refused to allowon-site UN supervision of the withdrawal of the weap-ons.

Upon receipt of the official text of Khrushchev’sstatement, Kennedy released a formal reply:109

I consider my letter to you of October twenty-sev-enth and your reply of today as firm undertakingson the part of both our governments which shouldbe promptly carried out. I hope that the necessarymeasures can at once be taken through the United


Nations, as your message says, so that the UnitedStates will be able to remove the quarantine mea-sure now in effect. . . .

Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have greatunfinished tasks and I know that your people aswell as those of the United Sates can ask for noth-ing better than to pursue them free from the fear ofwar. Modern science and technology have given usthe possibility of making labor fruitful beyond any-thing that could have been dreamed of a fewdecades ago

I agree with you that we must devote urgent atten-

tion to the problem of disarmament, as it relates tothe whole world and also to critical areas. Perhapsnow, as we step back from danger, we can togethermake real progress in this vital field. I think weshould give priority to the question relating to theproliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and inouter space, and to the great effort for a nuclear testban. But we should also work hard to see if widermeasures of disarmament can be agreed and putinto operation at an early date. The U.S. govern-ment will be prepared to discuss these questionsurgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva orelsewhere. . . .

NOTES

The author acknowledges the guidance of Professor RogerHilsman and would like to express special gratitude to Profes-sor Pamela S. Falk.

1. The advisory group that served Kennedy throughoutthe crisis was known later as the Executive Committee of theNational Security Council (ExComm). For the sake of clarity,the term ExComm will be used throughout.

2. Charles “Chip” Bohlen, was present at the originalmeeting instead of Thompson, but, to avoid suspicion, heassumed his duties as ambassador to France.

3. The terms were not used during the crisis but werepopularized later in an article in the Saturday Evening Post byStewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, December 8,1962.

4. McGeorge Bundy, Proceedings of the Cambridge Con-ference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, CSIA Working Paper No.89–2, ed. D. Welch (Cambridge: Center for Science and Inter-national Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, 1989), 32.[Hereinafter CC Transcript].

5. Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippin-cott, 1966), 113.

6. John F. Kennedy, Kennedy Presidential RecordingsTranscript (16 October 1962), 36. Papers of John F. Kennedy,Presidential Papers, President’s Office Files, John F. KennedyLibrary, Boston. [Hereinafter KPR Transcript].

7. Dean Rusk, KPR Transcript (Presidential Recordings,11:50 A.M.–12:57 P.M.), 14.

8. Ibid., 15.9. John F. Kennedy, KPR Transcript (Presidential

Recordings, 6:30 P.M.–7.55 P.M.), 35–36.10. Robert F. Kennedy, The Thirteen Days: A Memoir of

the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 39;see also 37–38.

11. Fyodor Burlatsky, CC Transcript, 24.12. Georgi Shaknazarov, CC Transcript, 45.13. R. Pope, ed., Soviet Views on the Cuban Missile Crisis

(Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1982), 123; seealso Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Lit-tle, Brown and Company), 1970, 493.

14. Sergo Mikoyan, CC Transcript, 26.15. Ibid., 27.16. Ibid., 29.17. B. Allyn et al., “Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana,

and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Security (14), no.3 (Winter 1989–90), 140 and n.10.

18. Sergo Mikoyan, CC Transcript, 29–30.19. Allyn, “Essence of Revision,” 138.20. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: The Political

History of the Nuclear Weapon (New York: Random House,1988), 418.

21. Rusk, KPR Transcript, 14.22. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 418.23. Mikoyan, CC Transcript, 30.24. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His

Times (New York: Random House, 1978), 545.25. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 458–59.26. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 60.27. Ibid., 51.28. Robert McNamara, Proceedings of the Hawk’s Cay Con-

ference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, CSIA Working Paper No.89–1, ed. D. Welch (Cambridge: Center for Science and Inter-national Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, January1989), 10.

29. McNamara, KPR Transcript (Presidential Recordings,6:30 P.M.–7.55.PM.), 25.

30. Ibid, 22.31. See CC Transcript, 32–35.32. John F. Kennedy, KPR Transcript (Presidential

Recordings, 6:30 P.M.–7:55 P.M.), 15.33. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, 553.34. Sorenson memorandum, October 20, 1962, RFK


Papers, in Robert Kennedy and His Times.35. Edwin M. Martin, KPR Transcript (Presidential

Recordings, 6:30 P.M.–7:55 P.M.), 5.36. Dean Rusk, KPR Transcript (Presidential Recordings,

6:30 P.M.–7:55 P.M.), 5.37. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 52.38. Although the United States was not initiating a life-

threatening situation with a naval blockade, such action wasconsidered against the freedom of the seas and could be inter-preted as a violation of international law. Furthermore, prece-dent was against the United States because it had gone to warwith England over a violation of the freedom to navigate theseas (War of 1812).

39. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 34.40. Ibid.41. Roswell Gilpatric, KPR Transcript (Presidential

Recordings, 6:30 P.M.–7:55 P.M.), 50.42. Robert S. McNamara, KPR Transcript (Presidential

Recordings, 6:30 P.M.–7:55 PM.), 50.43. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 64.44. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, 549.45. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 38.46. Ibid.; Abel, The Missile Crisis, 64; Schlesinger, Robert

Kennedy and His Times, 547.47. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 64.48. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 33.49. Ibid., 40–41.50. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 77.51. The purpose of the exercise was to liberate a mythical

Republic of Vieques from a dictator named Ortsac (Castrospelled backward). It included 7,500 Marines, four aircraftcarriers, twenty destroyers, and fifteen troop carriers. Theexercise was scheduled to take place on the island of Viequesoff the coast of Puerto Rico. Invitations to the media had goneout long before October 1962. Graham T. Allison, Essence ofDecision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little,Brown, 1971), 47; Abel, The Missile Crisis, 102.

52. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 103.53. Ibid., 102.54. Ibid., 79.55. The Swiss government seemed a likely choice for such

a task as it houses, even to this day, the U.S. Interest Section.The Interest Section functions in place of an embassy, deal-ing with U.S.-Cuban relations on a limited diplomatic basis.

56. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 36.57. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 81.58. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 45.59. Meeker borrowed the phrase (with citation) from

FDRs “quarantine-the-aggressor” speech.60. Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper

and Row, 1965), 694.61. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F.

Kennedy in the White House (New York: Fawcett Premier,1965), 739.

62. George Ball, Alfred P. Sloan Transcript (New York),56–57.

63. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 428.64. Ibid.65. Although some of the members of the ExComm,

including Secretary Dean Rusk, criticized questions of termi-nology as “semantics,” President Kennedy was impressed bythe importance of terminology during the crisis.

66. Robert Kennedy Campaign Speech, October 13, 1964,Rockville Centre, New York, 64.

67. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 24.68. John F. Kennedy, “Radio and Television Report to the

American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba,” Octo-ber 22, 1962, 7:00 P.M., cited in The Public Papers of the Presi-dents, John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1963),806–9.

69. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 132.70. Ibid.; see also Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 55.71. Sorenson, Kennedy, 702.72. J. Blight and D. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and

Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hilland Wang, 1989), 185.

73. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 47, no. 1220(November 12, 1962): 715–30; see also D. Larson, ed., TheCuban Crisis of 1962: Selected Documents, Chronology and Bib-liography, 2nd ed. (New York: University Press of America,1986), Document 17: President Kennedy’s Message of Octo-ber 22, 1962, 59–63.

74. The chairmanship of the Security Council rotates.During October 1962 the Soviet Union was serving in thechairmanship.

75. Abel, The Missile Crisis, 125.76. Ibid., 126.77. The Security Council comprises fifteen members.

Five permanent members—the five Allies of World War II,the United States, the Soviet Union (now the Commonwealthof Independent States), France, Great Britain, and China—have the special voting right of an automatic veto; and tenrotating members are elected by the permanent members fortwo-year terms based on geographic distribution. Althoughthe nonpermanent members have a vote on the SecurityCouncil, their veto does not automatically defeat a res-olution. A veto cast by a permanent member defeats the reso-lution.

78. Informal translation by the American Embassy inMoscow. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 69, no. 1795(November 19, 1973): 636–37, cited in Larson, The CubanCrisis, 67–68.

79. Ibid., 68–69.80. This was transmitted to the American Embassy as

“steps” but was corrected there to read “step.”81. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 66.82. Ibid.83. Ibid.84. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 69.85. Informal translation by the American Embassy in

Moscow. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 69, no. 1795(November 19, 1973): 636–37, cited in Larson, The Cuban


Crisis, 127–29.86. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 70.87. Ibid., 72.88. Ibid., 85.89. New York Times, October 26, 1962, and Abel, The Mis-

sile Crisis, 176.90. Allyn, “Essence of Revision,” 159.91. Informal translation by the American Embassy in

Moscow. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 69, no. 1795(November 19, 1972): 640–43, cited in Larson, The CubanCrisis, 175–80.

92. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 47, no. 1220(November 12, 1962): 741–43, cited in Larson, The CubanCrisis, 183–86 (unofficial translation).

93. Ibid., 185.94. Allyn, “Essence of Revision,” 161. 95. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 94–95.96. McNamara, Alfred P. Sloan Transcript (n.d.), 63.97. Cordier was chosen because he had been a deputy to

U Thant, and Rusk believed that he could be discreet.98. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 47 no. 1220

(November 12, 1962): 743, cited in Larson, The Cuban Crisis,187–88.

99. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 108–9.100. McNamara, Alfred P. Sloan Transcript, 59.101. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glas-

nost Tapes (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 179.102. Bundy, Alfred P. Sloan Transcript, 65.

103. Ibid.104. Bundy, Alfred P. Sloan Transcript, 66. Ambassador

Dobrynin made one attempt, two days later, October 27,1962, to make the deal public. He brought the attorney gen-eral an unsigned letter from Khrushchev to President Ken-nedy specifying the details of the agreement. After readingthe letter, it is believed that Robert Kennedy told the ambas-sador the next day that there was no quid pro quo, and the let-ter makes it appear that there was. “If you feel it is necessaryto write letters then we will also write one which you cannotenjoy.” Furthermore, evidence suggests that the attorney gen-eral warned that if the Soviets published any documentregarding the deal, it would be automatically canceled.Dobrynin replied that the “Soviet government would notpublish the correspondence. Kennedy said. ‘Speaking quitefrankly, you also told me that your government neverintended to put missiles in Cuba.”’ RFK, handwritten notes(n.d.), and RFK to Dean Rusk, reporting on the interview,October 30, 1962, RFK Papers, cited in Schlesinger, Robert F.Kennedy, 564.

105. McNamara, Alfred P. Sloan Transcript, 67.106. Ibid., 55.107. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 47, no. 1220

(November 12, 1962): 743–45, cited in Larson, The CubanCrisis, 189–93.

108. Ibid., 193–94.109. Ibid., 194–95.

CHRONOLOGY OF U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS, 1960–63

1960

Aug. 6: The Cuban government nationalizes the prop-erty of companies owned or partially owned by theUnited States. Prime Minister Fidel Castro defends thison the grounds that the U.S. reduction of the Cubansugar quota was, in effect, “economic aggression”against the Cuban government.

Aug. 10: The United States releases an analysis of thenationalization, concluding that more than $1 billionwas expropriated.

Sept. 17: The Cuban government expropriates U.S.-operated banks in Cuba. The United States protests thisaction.

Oct. 19: The United States embargoes all exports toCuba except nonsubsidized foodstuffs, medicines, andmedical supplies.

Nov. 24: The United States maintains that Soviet-blocmilitary aid to Cuba has totaled more than 28,000 tonssince the revolution.

1961Jan. 2: Cuba demands that the United States reduce itsembassy personnel to a total of eleven within two days.

Jan. 3: The United States and Cuba end diplomatic rela-tions; their affairs are turned over to the Swiss andCzechoslovakian embassies, respectively.Feb. 1: Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa characterizesthe U.S.-Cuban agreement regarding Guantánamo BayNaval Base as illegitimate because Cuba was not on an“equal footing with the United States” and “because theCuban people were coerced by a system of governmentimposed upon them from abroad.”

Mar. 31: President John F. Kennedy reduces Cubansugar imports to zero.Apr. 12: President Kennedy says that U.S. armed forceswill not intervene in Cuba to overthrow Castro.

Apr. 16: Castro mobilizes the Cuban armed forcesagainst a U.S. invasion. Castro characterizes his govern-ment as “socialist.”


Apr. 17: Miro Cardona, a Cuban exile leader, announcesa seaborne invasion of Cuba. The unsuccessful invasion,which involves Cuban exiles supported and trained bythe United States, becomes known as the Bay of PigsInvasion. The United States denies involvement in theinvasion but expresses sympathy for the rebels. TheCuban government captures 1,113 rebels. The UnitedStates admits it supported the exiles.

Sept. 7: The U.S. Congress prohibits U.S. aid to anycountry providing aid to Cuba unless the presidentdetermines that such assistance is in the national inter-est.

Dec. 2: Castro announces that he is “a Marxist-Leninistand will be a Marxist-Leninist until the last day of . . .[his] life.”

1962

Feb. 3: President Kennedy announces an embargo onshipments of all goods except medical supplies to Cuba.

Mar. 2: The United States estimates that Cuba hasreceived more than $110 million in military and techni-cal services from the Soviet Union.

May–Jun.: On orders contained in a National SecurityCouncil memorandum, representatives of the StateDepartment attempt to discuss withdrawing the U.S.Jupiter missiles deployed in Turkey. The Turkish gov-ernment rebuffs the negotiators.

Jul. 1962: Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles are sentsecretly to Cuba.

Aug. 1962: The National Security Council issues a sec-ond action memorandum ordering the withdrawal ofthe Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

Aug. 19: Castro announces that farm land in Cuba willbe taken over and “state farms” established.

Aug. 24: The United States announces that Soviet mili-tary assistance to Cuba has increased more than twentycargo ships are thought to have arrived in Havana har-bor carrying military equipment.

A Cuban exile group shells beach-front buildings inHavana. The United States disavows prior knowledge ofthe raid.

Aug. 30: President Kennedy rejects Senator Homer E.Capehart’s proposal for a U.S. invasion of Cuba.

Sept. 1: Senator Kenneth Keating asserts that more than1,000 Soviet military personnel and undisclosedamounts of Soviet military assistance are in Cuba.

Sept. 2: The Kennedy administration asserts that theSoviet military aid to Cuba is defensive. Senator Keat-ing criticizes the Kennedy policy of “do[ing] nothing.”Sept. 3: A Soviet-Cuban joint communiqué announcesSoviet military and technical assistance to Cuba.Sept. 4: Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin promisesAttorney General Robert Kennedy that the SovietUnion will not initiate a provocation in Berlin or inSoutheast Asia before the November 1962 election.Dobrynin also says that the Soviet Union will not give athird power the ability to start a nuclear war that wouldinvolve the Soviet Union. President Kennedy says at apress conference that the Soviet aid to Cuba is defen-sive, but he maintains that the United States will do any-thing to stop Cuban aggression and Soviet expansion inLatin America.Sept. 5: Secretary of State Dean Rusk tells nineteenLatin American allies that the United States will workto stop the expansion of communism in Latin America.Sept. 7: Senator Everett Dirksen and RepresentativeCharles Halleck issue statements urging a stronger U.S.policy toward Cuba. Both statements propose the presi-dential authorization of troops to stop the expansion ofCuban communism. President Kennedy calls for the“readiness” of the reserves.Sept. 11: The Soviet Union repeats the warning thatCuba will be protected by Soviet military forces.Sept. 13: President Kennedy repeats his warning againstCuban expansion and offensive weapons in Cuba butsays that the weapons in Cuba are defensive. He encour-ages US. allies to discontinue trade with Cuba.In a meeting with Under Secretary of State ChesterBowles, Dobrynin denies the possibility of offensivemissiles in Cuba.Sept. 16: Senator Barry Goldwater attacks the “do noth-ing” policy of the Kennedy administration.Sept. 17–18: Senators Goldwater, Strom Thurmond,and John Tower, and former Vice President RichardNixon call for a U.S. blockade of Cuba.Sept. 18: In a meeting with Ambassador Foy D. Kohler,Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev assures the ambassa-dor that the “last thing he wanted to do was to embar-rass the President on the eve of the elections.”Sept. 19: The U.S. Intelligence Board meets andapproves an intelligence estimate concluding that the“Soviets would not introduce offensive weapons inCuba.” CIA Director John McCone does not agree, but


he is away on his honeymoon and is only able to cablehis disapproval.

Sept. 21: The Soviet government asserts in the UnitedNations that a U.S. attack on Cuba would mean warbetween the Soviet Union and the United States; theUnited States responds by asserting that the threat topeace . . . comes not from the United States, but fromthe Soviet Union.”

Sept. 26: Congress passes a resolution authorizing theuse of force if necessary to stop Cuban expansion inLatin America.

Oct. 10: Alpha 66, a Cuban exile group, claims responsi-bility for a raid in Cuba on October 7.

Oct. 15: Reconnaissance photographs taken from U-2flights over Cuba disclose long-range missile sites inCuba. CIA Directors Lieutenant General Marshall S.Carter and Dr. Ray Cline are notified; they, in turn,notify the others in the chain of command.

Oct. 16: President Kennedy is informed of the missilesand forms an advisory board, inviting officials from hiscabinet, the Justice Department, the CIA, the Depart-ment of Defense, and the State Department and otherexperts to meet in the Cabinet Room. All participantsare instructed to work on solutions in absolute secrecy.Khrushchev and U.S. Ambassador Foy Kohler meet todiscuss a wide range of topics, including Cuba and Ber-lin.

The Castro government asserts that U.S. planes wereflying “provocatively and repeatedly” over Cuban terri-torial waters.

Oct. 17: Under Secretary of State George Ball presentsthe first sustained argument against an air strike onCuba.

Oct. 17–20: The president’s advisory group, now calledthe ExComm, debates the options for removing themissiles. Secretary McNamara, supported by lawyersfrom the justice and State departments, presents a casefor a blockade. General Maxwell Taylor presents theoption of immediate military action in the form of an airstrike.

Oct. 18: Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko meets withPresident Kennedy at the White House to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. Gromyko repeats the Soviet denialsregarding offensive missiles in Cuba. Kennedy does notconfront the Soviet minister with the missile informa-tion, but he reads Gromyko the text of his press releaseof September 4. Gromyko does not respond.

The Department of Defense announces the transfer oftwelve navy jet fighters to the southern tip of Florida,stating that the transfer occurred at the beginning ofOctober.Oct. 20: President Kennedy meets with General WalterC. Sweeney, Jr., commander in chief of the Tactical AirCommand; Sweeney says they could not be certain anattack would eliminate all missile sites. Kennedy makeshis final decision in favor of a naval quarantine.

Oct. 22: Under Secretary Ball briefs the representativesof forty-six NATO, SEATO, CENTO, and nonalignednation allies. Assistant Secretary of State for LatinAmerican Affairs Edward Martin briefs OAS allies.The United States formally requests a meeting of theUN Security Council.

The ExComm is established under National SecurityCouncil Action Memorandum No. 196 as the ExecutiveCommittee of the National Security Council.President Kennedy meets with seventeen members ofCongress and his cabinet to discuss the issues.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk meets with AmbassadorDobrynin, giving him an advance copy of PresidentKennedy’s speech.President Kennedy addresses the nation, explaining theU.S. situation, announcing a “defensive quarantine” ofCuba, and showing photographs of the Cuban missilesites. He announces that the United States will respondto any threat or to any action that endangers its citizens.

The Department of Defense puts U.S. military forces onalert throughout the world.Oct. 23: The United States submits a resolution to theOAS citing Article 6 of the Rio Treaty of 1947 authoriz-ing member states to proclaim and enforce a blockadeindividually or collectively if the “integrity or sover-eignty or political independence” of a nation is threat-ened. The OAS unanimously approves the U.S.blockade.

Ambassador Dobrynin meets with Robert Kennedy todiscuss the events. Dobrynin repeats the Soviet pledgenot to place missiles in Cuba and denies the existence ofmissiles in Cuba.The ExComm agrees that, in the event of a U-2 casu-alty, the United States will hit a surface-to-air missilesite in Cuba.

The CIA presents evidence to the ExComm that fourMRBM sites are “fully operational,” the rest have“emergency capability,” and technicians are continuingto improve the sites.


The reserves are mobilized to active duty. SecretaryMcNamara orders the naval quarantine in effect.Castro addresses the Cuban people, telling them thatthe missiles are defensive and declaring that the U.S.blockade was an “act of piracy.” He mobilizes the Cubanmilitary.The Soviet oil tanker Bucharest is intercepted butallowed to proceed with only alongside visual observa-tion.Oct. 24: Two Soviet ships, which would be interceptedbefore noon stop dead in the water.U Thant, acting secretary general of the UnitedNations, proposes that President Kennedy and PremierKhrushchev suspend all action while a summit is con-vened to discuss the issues. Khrushchev accepts; Ken-nedy does not, maintaining that the missiles must beremoved first, although he does agree to maintain com-munications channels.Oct. 25: Ambassador Adlai Stevenson challenges SovietAmbassador Valerian Zorin in the Security Council todeny the Cuban missiles. Zorin refuses to respond, andStevenson produces the reconnaissance photographs;the Security Council adjourns.President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, in lettersto Acting Secretary General U Thant, pledge coopera-tion in the crisis. Khrushchev says that he will tempo-rarily keep Soviet ships away from the quarantine line.In his Washington Post column, Walter Lippmann sug-gests a U.S.-Soviet missile trade—the Jupiter missiles inTurkey for the Soviet missiles in Cuba.Oct. 26: The American-built, Panamanian-owned, Leb-anese-registered, and Soviet-chartered freighter Mar-cula is stopped and boarded by the U.S. Navy. It isallowed to continue to Cuba.Premier Khrushchev writes a personal letter to Presi-dent Kennedy discussing the instability and insanity ofthe crisis, acknowledging the missiles, and agreeing toremove them if Kennedy pledges that the United Stateswill not invade Cuba.A U-2 reconnaissance pilot, Rudolf Anderson, is shotdown over Cuba.Oct. 26, 28: James Reston attempts to refute WalterLippmann in his column in the New York Times, main-taining that the Soviet missiles in Cuba were alwaysmeant as bargaining chips, so bargaining with them isexactly what the Soviets had planned.

Oct. 27: The United States receives a letter from theSoviet government offering to trade the missiles inCuba for the missiles in Turkey.

ExComm members, especially military representatives,begin to encourage the air strike option.

President Kennedy refuses to bargain “under fire” withthe missiles. Robert Kennedy suggests that the UnitedStates respond to the first letter from Khrushchev andignore the second. A letter pledging that neither theUnited States nor its allies will invade Cuba if the mis-siles are removed (subject to international verificationand inspection) is sent to Khrushchev.

Robert Kennedy, meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin,asserts that the United States will feel forced to go towar if the Soviets do not withdraw the missiles immedi-ately. He adds that the missiles in Turkey will be with-drawn within a few months.

Oct. 28: Premier Khrushchev announces the with-drawal of the Soviet missiles.

Oct. 29: A State Department-Defense Department taskforce is convened to address the Cuban Missile Crisisissues, including the removal of the Jupiter missiles inTurkey.

Nov. 2: Castro rejects any form of international verifica-tion or inspection of the missile withdrawal.

Nov. 5: The United States receives assurance from theSoviet Union that it supported international verificationor inspection of the missile withdrawal; the UnitedStates maintains that the “no invasion” pledge was sub-ject to international inspection of the withdrawal pro-cess.

Nov. 7: The United States and the Soviet Union agree toa withdrawal procedure whereby U.S. naval ships willinspect Soviet ships removing the missiles from Cuba.

November 20: President Kennedy announces that theU.S. naval quarantine of Cuba has been lifted.

1963

Jan. 7: Following a Cuban decision to block interna-tional verification of the missile withdrawal, the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union issue a joint communiquéending direct negotiations over the Cuban Missile Cri-sis.

Apr. 15: The United States withdraws its Jupiter mis-siles from Turkey.


SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

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