--

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1994

labor strikes rose to 25,010 in 1993,compared to 19,368 in 1992. This num­ber reflected not only the usual work­place friction, but growing sentimentsthat political peace has received moreattention than social progress in recentyears, and that the economic benefitsgenerated in part by the MatignonAccords have not been fairly distrib­uted.

On the regional level, New Caledo­nia continued to cultivate and improveits relationships with other Pacificcountries, particularly Vanuatu. InApril, Vanuatu's prime minister cameto Noumea to open a new consulate. InNovember, New Caledonia and Vanu­atu signed a cooperation agreementcomplementing the one signed in Julybetween Vanuatu and the FrenchRepublic. Vanuatu's new attitudetoward the New Caledonian indepen­dence movement was also apparent.While the former government in PortVila was vocal in its support of thestruggle for independence, currentPrime Minister Maxime Carlot Kor­man has declined to get involved inNew Caledonia's internal affairs. Atthe end of his official visit to the terri­tory, Carlot Korman stated that hisposition was purely one of support forthe Matignon Accords.

FRAN90IS SODTER

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

At the beginning of 1993, the govern­ment of Paias Wingti appeared wellplaced to implement some of the ambi­tious reforms announced after it cameto power in mid-1992. The coalitioncommanded a comfortable majority in

Parliament, and had successfully intro­duced several significant reform mea­sures during its first six months inoffice. More important, its eighteen­month grace period of immunity fromparliamentary votes of no confidencestill had twelve months to run. In Sep­tember 1993 Wingti engineered a stun­ning parliamentary coup that extendedthis immunity to early 1995. Neverthe­less, and with some notable excep­tions, the government had difficultyimplementing its policies in 1993. Byyear's end, with several major initia­tives in disarray, it appeared unlikelythat Wingti could deliver the sort ofcomprehensive and fundamentalreform he had promised.

The Wingti government did havesome remarkable successes during theyear, particularly in its dealings withthe transnational companies operatingin Papua New Guinea's rich mineraland petroleum sectors. The extremelyhigh rates of economic growth inrecent years (II.8 percent in 1992 andan expected 14.4 percent in 1993) aremainly attributable to developments inthese sectors, and Wingti came topower determined to capture a largershare of the benefits for Papua NewGuineans. In January 1993 the Interna­tional Monetary Fund was commis­sioned to review the fiscal regime formining, petroleum, and gas. By thattime, however, Wingti's high-stakesstruggle with the mining companieswas well under way.

At the beginning of the year, negoti­ations with the partners in the PorgeraJoint Venture over an increased equityshare for the state were deadlocked. In1992, the government had demanded toincrease its share in the giant gold mine

tN, ,171' " , ,

POLITICAL REVIEWS

from 10 percent to 30 percent, claimingthat the mine's operator, Placer Pacific,had deliberately downplayed the pro­ject's financial potential when the min­ing agreement was signed. Althoughthe government claimed the negotia­tions were purely commercial innature, the international financial com­munity reacted with suspicion. Oneanalyst described the impact ofWingti's aggressive actions at Porgeraand elsewhere in the mining sector as"nothing short of devastating." He esti­mated that the market value of PapuaNew Guinea-related mining and oilstocks had declined by 22 percent sincethe Wingti government came to power(Davis 1993, 24)·

Fearing that a false step could puttheir billion-dollar investment at risk,the joint venture partners were obligedto negotiate the sale of equity. As Man­aging Director Vic Botts of PlacerPacific put it, "We did not think it wasgood business to confront the Govern­ment" (pc, 18 Aug 1993,2). By early1993, their main concern was the extentof the concessions necessary to restorea more favorable political environ­ment.

The deal finalized in March repre­sented a major victory for the govern­ment. It allowed the state to purchasean additional 15 percent equity in thejoint venture (5 percent from each ofthe three corporate partners) for138,750,000 kina, significantly lowerthan the estimated market value of theshares. More important, paymentwould come from the state's new shareof the cash flow, making the invest­ment virtually risk free. No interestwas payable until the principal hadbeen fully paid off. If the mine were to

447

cease production before that time, thetransaction would be interest free. Rev­enues from taxation were unaffectedby the arrangement, and the statewould get a share of dividend income.Furthermore, the partners agreed tofinance and implement a 50-million­kina infrastructure development pro­gram in Enga, Southern Highlands,and Western Highlands provinces overthe next decade, in return for tax cred­its (Iangalio 1993).

As Mark Davis pointed out, thecosts of the deal to the three privatepartners, Placer Pacific, Renison Gold­fields Consolidated, and HighlandsGold were significant, but "not as highas they might have been." The agree­ment protects the companies' cashflows until the state's debt is paid off,and offers intrinsic tax concessionsworth an estimated 40 million kina.Most important, the joint venturersbelieved that they had "made a crucialgain in predictability and stability"(Davis 1993, 24-25).

The ownership structure of the pro­posed Lihir gold mine in New Irelandprovince was also a major source ofcontention during the year. The gov­ernment was concerned that the devel­opment of this major resource wasbeing delayed unnecessarily by Kenne­cott, a subsidiary of the London-basedmining giant Rio Tinto Zinc. Kenne­cott argued that the project was eco­nomically marginal, and indicated itsreluctance to proceed unless a thirdparty could be persuaded to join theKennecott-Niugini Mining joint ven­ture. The company suggested that theprevailing investment climate made itdifficult to find such a partner, and thatthe Wingti government must accept

M§t!!JIM41IMM#!iMGGi.Wi62MiW'MMP diM

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. FALL 1994

some responsibility for that situation(Togarewa 1993a; 1993b; 1993C).

The government used two tactics topush Kennecott toward an agreementto develop the Lihir project. The firstinvolved calling Kennecott's bluff onthe equity issue. After Kennecott hadfailed to meet a deadline to find a thirdparty, the government announced thatit would take up 20 percent of theequity itself, in addition to the 30 per­cent it had opted for previously. In aJune letter to the chairman of RioTinto Zinc, Sir Derek Birkin, PrimeMinister Wingti stated, "This lessensKennecott's exposure to a project inwhich it dearly lacks confidence, andwill, I trust, facilitate immediateprogress on the project" (Togarewa1993b). In August, Mining Ministerlangalio angrily rejected a belated pro­posal by Kennecott to sell a 20 percentshare to a Canadian mining company,Venezuelan Goldfields. He confirmedthat the government still planned totake 50 percent, and would find its ownbuyer for the extra 20 percent (PC, 13Aug 1993, I). The Malaysian govern­ment had already expressed interest ininvesting in Lihir through its companyMalaysian Mining Corporation(Togarewa 1993a).

The second tactic used by the gov­ernment to speed up the developmentof the Lihir resource was activeinvolvement in the planning and designof the project. With Bob Needham,head of the state-owned MineralResources Development Corporation,in the lead, government officials andconsultants subjected Kennecott'sdevelopment plan to intense scrutiny.By September, estimated capital costshad been cut by 20 percent, improvingthe economics of the project considera-

bly (pc, 29 Oct 1993, 9; Needham1993,53)·

By late September, with the govern­ment and its corporate partners in gen­eral agreement regarding projectfinancing, it seemed likely that a spe­cial mining license would be issued inDecember, and that constructionwould begin early in 1994. The part­ners had agreed that the state andNiugini Mining would each take 30percent of the project, with Kennecottholding 40 percent. They also agreedto float up to 40 percent of the sharesin Lihir Gold, the project vehicle.Venezuelan Gold and Malaysian Min­ing Corporation were expected to pur­chase a significant proportion of thoseshares (pc, 27 Sept 1993, I). Then, atthe mining forum in November, wherefinal details of the agreement were tobe negotiated, local representativesdemanded 20 percent of the equity forthe landowners, and a further 10 per­cent for the provincial government(TPNG, 4 Nov 1993, 4). After theirwalkout, which brought talks to a halt,the government agreed to help thelandowner company, Pangpang Devel­opment Corporation, borrow moneyto purchase shares in Lihir Gold (pc, 8Nov 1993, I). The special mining leasehad not been issued by year's end, butwas expected early in 1994.

Meanwhile, the International Mon­etary Fund's report, presented in April,noted that the state's ability to capturerevenues from the exploitation of itsmineral resources had been disappoint­ing. It recommended a new fiscalregime that relied more heavily on roy­alties, and a lowering of the existingthreshold for additional profits tax, adevice used to capture a large portionof exceptionally high profits for the

POLITICAL REVIEWS

state. It also recommended an immedi­ate strengthening of the state's capacityto monitor the fiscal aspects ofresource projects and to enforce its taxregulations. Significantly, the reportargued strongly that purchasing largeamounts of equity in resource projectswas risky, a poor use of scarce govern­ment resources, weakened the state'sability to borrow overseas, and con­flicted with its regulatory duties (TPNG,

IS April 1993, I). The events of 1993demonstrate that at least some keymembers of the Wingti governmentand their advisers were not impressedby this advice, and in September thegovernment agreed to increase its stakein the Ok Tedi copper and gold minefrom 20 percent to 30 percent afterAmoco Minerals withdrew (pc, 30 Sept1993, I). For them, it seems, equity par­ticipation is a useful instrument toexercise more control over large-scaleresource developments in Papua NewGuinea (Needham 1993).

Wingti's determination to "looknorth" to the dynamic countries of Asiafor trade and investment opportunitiesalso bore some fruit in 1993. His three­day visit to Indonesia in February,accompanied by some two hundredofficials, politicians, and business exec­utives, yielded a proposal for coopera­tion on oil and gas exploration, andone to establish a coffee processing fac­tory in Papua New Guinea (TPNG, II

Feb 1993, I; 18 Feb 1993, 4, 21). Thevisit symbolized the beginning of anew, more broad-based, era in PapuaNew Guinea-Indonesia relations, long.dominated by a narrow concern withthe spillover effects of the guerrillastruggle in Irian Jaya.

Equally significant was the govern­ment's newfound enthusiasm for

449

Malaysia. Wingti visited Kuala Lum­pur in January, and Malaysia's Interna­tional Trade Minister Dato Seri Rafi­dah Aziz led a large trade andinvestment delegation to Papua NewGuinea in May. Malaysian companiesare best known in Papua New Guineafor their heavy and controversialinvolvement in the logging industry,described in a recent report as "out ofcontrol" (Nadarajah 1993). In welcom­ing the Malaysian delegation in May,Minister for Trade and Industry DavidMai warned that foreign logging com­panies "either comply with the localrules or they are out" (1993, 58). Never­theless, the government has welcomednew Malaysian investment in the coun­try, offering Kimpulani Fima an attrac­tive package of incentives to establishin Lae a mackerel-canning plant (whichrelies heavily on imported materials, atleast initially), and inviting MalaysianMining to purchase a share of the Lihirgold mine (TPNG, I4Jan 1993, 26).

In June, despite strong oppositionfrom a wide range of senior officials,cabinet approved a 50-million-kinaplan to provide housing for the disci­plined forces to be funded by theMalaysian government and a consor­tium of Malaysian banks (TPNG, 10June 1993, I). Officials noted that thedeal had been arranged without regardto normal tendering, planning, andbudgetary procedures, and was not agood one for Papua New Guinea. Theyargued that the costs were excessive,local content low, and that the Malay­sian contractor, which the fundinginstitutions had been allowed to select,would pay no taxes, fees, or importduties (TPNG, 24 June 1993, I; pc, 25

June 1993, I). Equally controversialwas the government's decision to allow

45° THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. FALL 1994

Rimbunan Hijau, a company that con­trols more than 70 percent of PapuaNew Guinea's logging leases, to estab­lish a new daily newspaper (pc, 12 July1993, I). Critics feared that the Nation,which started publishing in November,would become a vehicle to promote thecompany's commercial interests. Theassociate editor is Mr Wingti's formerpress secretary, and the publisher oneof his close political associates. Early inthe year, Rimbunan Hijau adopted theslogan We care for Papua New Guineato help counter its negative corporateimage (TPNG, 15 July 1993, 27).

The Wingti government's increasingenthusiasm for Asia has been matchedby a growing ambivalence toward Aus­tralia. Part of the motivation for the"look north" policy is clearly to lessenthe country's heavy dependence on theformer colonial power, especially fortrade and investment, but also for tech­nical assistance and advice. Papua NewGuinea leaders are very sensitive aboutquestions of sovereignty, and periodi­cally complain that Australians arepaternalistic in their dealings withPapua New Guineans. In 1993 Ministerfor Foreign Affairs John Kaputin wasthe most prominent proponent of thisView.

Kaputin dem"anded early in the yearthat Australia apologize for its disre­spectful and arrogant behavior whileattempting to return two African refu­gees who had entered Australia ille­gally from Papua New Guinea (pc, 19

Feb 1993, I; I March, I). Later, whentwo prominent naturalized citizensreclaimed their Australian citizenship,Kaputin stated that he would not toler­ate "foreigners who think they cantreat Papua New Guinea without

respect and dignity" (1993b, 64). In anoutspoken address in Canberra inNovember, he argued that "attitudes,both official and private," were a majorimpediment to improved relationsbetween Australia and Papua NewGuinea (Kaputin 1993c, 16). Aspects ofKaputin's speech were reiterated byDeputy Prime Minister Chan in Bris­bane in November (Chan 1993). YetPapua New Guinea leaders also recog­nize that the relationship with Austra­lia is, and will remain, a key one. In hisCanberra speech, for example, the for­eign minister seemed to want Australiato pay more attention to Papua NewGuinea, not less.

A major point of tension in the rela­tionship in 1993 was the ongoing shiftfrom untied to tied forms of Australianaid. Until recently, Australia has pro­vided the bulk of its substantial aid toPapua New Guinea, set at 219 millionkina for 1993-94, in the form of directbudgetary support, which leaders werefree to spend as they saw fit. Then in1989 Prime Ministers Bob Hawke andRabbie Namaliu signed the Develop­ment Cooperation Treaty, providingfor a progressive reduction in the levelof Australian aid, as well as a rapidshift from budget support to programand project funding. By 1993, tied aidrepresented 16 percent of the total. Theplan is to increase this to 52 percent by1997, and phase out budget supportcompletely by the year 2000 (Aopi1993,3). Early in 1993, a major jointstudy was initiated to investigate howthe increasing amounts of program andproject aid might best be spent (pc, 9Feb 1993, 2).

The shift to tied aid was motivatedprimarily by a feeling in Australia that

POLITICAL REVIEWS

the 3.7 billion kina of support providedto Papua New Guinea between 1975and 1993 had not been well spent. In aspeech on the aid relationship inDecember, Australia's Minister forPacific Island Affairs Gordon Bilneyargued that Australian aid should beused to meet Papua New Guinea's "realneeds," implying that it had not beenused in that way to date (1993, II).Officials in Papua New Guinea arguethat the shift to tied aid is also moti­vated by commercial considerations,and estimate that up to 85 percent ofproject aid will flow back into the Aus­tralian economy (Aopi 1993, 7).

Understandably, leaders in PapuaNew Guinea are less than enthusiasticabout the change, not least because itmeans an increase in Australia's directinvolvement in Papua New Guinea'sdomestic affairs. Officials are also con­cerned that the real value of Australianaid to Papua New Guinea will decline,because of excessive administrative andconsultancy costs as well as increasedpurchasing in Australia. Nevertheless,leaders had little option but to adjust tothe new reality. After making his reser­vations clear in a major speech inNovember, Deputy Prime Minister andMinister for Finance and Planning SirJulius Chan went on to say, "I am arealist and pragmatic enough to acceptthat a new system is desired by thedonor and so long as PNG needs thatmoney, we must now all do our best tomake it work" (1993, 8). "Making itwork" will not be easy for either side,and Australian officials may well liveto regret their decision to get moredirectly involved in some of PapuaNew Guinea's more intractable prob­lenis.

451

Shortly after coming to power,Prime Minister Wingti stated that theprovincial government system waswasteful and inefficient and had to go.In reports tabled in March and August1993, a parliamentary select committeechaired by Ben Micah recommendedreplacing the existing nineteen provin­cial governments with provincialauthorities (TPNG, II March 1993, II;19 Aug 1993, 4). Unlike provincial gov­ernments, these would have few legis­lative powers, no autonomous bureau­cracies, and no full-time, salariedprovincial politicians. The membershipwould consist of all the national mem­bers of Parliament from the province,local government council presidents,mayors, and representatives of non­governmental organizations. Eachauthority would be headed by theregional (province-wide) representativeto the national Parliament. This part ofthe "bipartisan model" would recentra­lize political power, and give nationalmembers of Parliament considerablymore control over the distribution ofresources in their electorates (Saffu1993,7)·

The Micah committee also recom­mended "the single most importantchange since independence"-the res­urrection of hundreds of local-levelgovernments. These village-level insti­tutions would be constitutionally guar­anteed sufficient financial and adminis­trative support to operate effectively(TPNG, 19 Aug 1993, 4). However,local-level government has been underthe jurisdiction of provincial govern­ments since 1976 and has been almostuniversally neglected. It is not clearthat national parliamentarians wouldbe any more prepared than their pro-

WiI!6W§lfIf",m·,ijAIft8iWMM¥9MMijij.tiQ M

452 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1994

vincial counterparts to fund potentialpolitical rivals, or to ensure that thiswas a genuine decentralization ofpower.

Predictably, the Micah reports werewell received by all but a few membersof Parliament. In August, Parliamentquickly endorsed a proposal to estab­lish an eighteen-member Constitu­tional Commission, headed by Micah,to implement the reports' recommen­dations. Armed with extremely broadterms of reference, the commission setabout reviewing the Organic Law onProvincial Government, and other rele­vant parts of the constitution (Saffu1993,6). However, the assault on theprovincial government system ran intosome major obstacles later in the year.

The provincial premiers organizedquickly to resist the Micah initiative.In September, a special meeting of theNational Premiers Council totallyrejected the committee's findings. Thepremiers of the New Guinea Islandsregion announced that they wouldsecede if the recommendations of thereport were implemented, and beganorganizing a referendum on the issue.Manus Premier Stephen Pokawin saidhe would arrange a public burning ofthe report when he got home (TPNG, 9Sept 1993, I). The provincial resistancewas not unexpected. What was a sur­prise was Prime Minister Wingti'sresponse to the premiers' demandswhen he met them in Goroka in Octo­ber. Instead of launching the expectedattack on provincial government, hetook a very conciliatory line, eveninviting the premiers to join somemembers of his government on a newreview committee (TPNG, 7 Oct 1993,I). In turn, Micah demanded that

Wingti publicly reconfirm his supportfor the constitutional commission(TPNG, 14 Oct 1993, 3). AlthoughWingti managed to persuade Micahnot to resign early in November, thefuture of the whole review exerciseremained uncertain at the end of theyear (TPNG, 4 Nov 1993, 9).

Wingti's sudden change of heart onthe provincial government issue wasundoubtedly related to the barrage ofcriticism created by his resignation andimmediate reelection as prime ministerin September. However, even withoutthat political firestorm (discussedlater), the threat of secession had to betaken seriously. Furthermore, it wasunclear how the architects of the pro­posal to abolish provincial governmentplanned to deal with the Bougainvilleissue. In April, with large parts of theisland back under government control,leaders from all parts of Bougainvillemet to discuss ways of resolving thefive-year-old crisis. The idea of seces­sion was described as "an impedimentto peace," and "rejected outright nowand in the future." However, the lead­ers demanded that the North SolomonsProvincial Government be reinstatedimmediately, and argued that failure todo so could "regerminate and legiti­mize" secessionist sentiments in theprovince (pc, 27 April 1993, II).

Although Prime Minister Wingticame to power committed to an earlyend to the Bougainville crisis, his firstmajor policy statement on the issue didnot come until March 1993. He choseto take a hard line with the rebels,describing them as "murderers" whomust surrender or face death. Thosewho have committed atrocities, hesaid, must pay for their crimes because

POLITICAL REVIEWS

"History teaches us that a bully mustbe beaten at his own game" (TPNG, 18

March 1993, 2). What was missing wasany sense of how the social and politi­cal fabric of the war-torn provincewould be restored, if and when a mili­tary victory was achieved.

Wingti's March statement appearedto confirm the conventional wisdomthat the military, rather than the gov­ernment, had the upper hand in theBougainville operation. In recent yearsnumerous aid workers and journalistshave been refused entry to Bougainvilledespite clear authorization from PortMoresby. In November, a prominentinternational medical aid group with­drew from the country altogether, cit­ing such frustrations. A spokespersonfor Medecin Sans Frontihes expressedthe opinion that Bougainville wasbeing run by a "dictatorship of thedefence force" (pc, 22 Nov 1993, I).Minister for Bougainville MichaelOgio had done little to dispel thisnotion earlier in the year. Respondingto reports that the security forces hadcrossed the border with the SolomonIslands and taken control of OemaIsland, Ogio acknowledged that thegovernment had difficulty monitoringand controlling the actions of thesecurity forces (TPNG, IS April 1993, 3).This was one of several confrontations,some involving exchanges of fire,between Papua New Guinea and Solo­mon Islands security forces during theyear (TPNG, 7 Jan 1993, 2; PC, 27 April1993, I).

The security forces continued toexpand their presence on Bougainvilleduring 1993, establishing more bases incentral and southern parts of theisland, and arming civilian "resistance

453

groups" to counter the activities of theBougainville Revolutionary Army. InFebruary, with some fanfare, troopsmoved into the devastated provincialcapital of Arawa (pc, 16 Feb 1993, I).But this part of Operation Dynamo didnot go as smoothly as planned. Tendays later, rebels ambushed and killedeight soldiers outside the town, thegreatest number of casualties sufferedby the security forces in a single inci­dent since the crisis began (pc, 26 Feb1993, I). In a series of offensives overthe next two weeks, soldiers killed anestimated thirty-five rebels in variousparts of central and southern Bougain­ville (pc, 10 March 1993, 5).

Criticism of the Wingti govern­ment's handling of the Bougainville cri­sis came from many different directionsduring 1993. The London-basedhuman rights organization AmnestyInternational issued its second majorreport on the crisis in November,claiming that at least sixty people hadbeen extrajudicially killed by govern­ment forces since 1991, and citingnumerous cases of torture, rape, beat­ings, and harassment of suspectedBougainville Revolutionary Armymembers or sympathizers. Similarabuses were attributed by Amnestyto the rebel forces. Despite numerousstatements of intent by governmentofficials, the report noted that very lit­tle had actually been done to investi­gate allegations of human rights abusesand take steps to ensure that they didnot recur (Amnesty International

1993)·Solomon Islands Prime Minister

Solomon Mamaloni was equally out­spoken in his condemnation of theWingti government's Bougainville pol-

454 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. FALL 1994

icy. In an extraordinary departure fromnormal diplomatic protocols, Mama­loni wrote a fourteen-page letter toPapua New Guinea Deputy Prime Min­ister Sir Julius Chan, in which heaccused the government of indifferenceto "the total annihilation of Bougain­villeans," among other things (pc, 24March 1993, II; 25 March, II; 26March, II). Another letter leaked tothe press during the year, this one sevenpages long, indicated some dissentwithin the government itself. Ministerfor Foreign Affairs John Kaputin wroteto the prime minister to express his dis­may at the aggressive tone of Wingti'sBougainville statement and the cabi­net's decision to delay inviting an inter­national fact-finding mission to visit(pc, 15 April 1993, I). In a subsequentstatement to Parliament, Kaputinwarned that failure to allow such visits"could have far reaching-and adverse-implications for Papua New Guinea"(I993a ,3)·

Perhaps the most hopeful develop­ment during the year was the pan­Bougainville dialogue inaugurated bythe leaders at Buka in April (pc, 27April 1993, II). There were strong indi­cations that powerful factions withinthe rebel movement were ready to par­ticipate in further talks. However, theWingti government was apparently notprepared to facilitate a second confer­ence in Cairns that would haveincluded representatives of the seces­sionist movement.

The Wingti government had prom­ised firm action on Papua New Guin­ea's perennial problems of law andorder, and several strategies were pur­sued. Late in 1992, plans were

announced to increase the strength ofthe police force by fifteen hundred overthree years (TPNG, 23 Dec 1992, 2). ByAugust 1993, boom gates were underconstruction on three roads into PortMorseby, presumably to help policecontrol the movement of criminals(TPNG, 26 Aug 1993, 9). Meanwhile,the National Law, Order and JusticeCouncil had been formed to replace aplethora of existing law and ordercommittees (pc, 15 March 1993, I).Much more significant was a series oflegislative measures introduced orannounced during 1993 that weredesigned to combat civil disorder.

In July, arguing that "The crimeproblem facing us warrants drasticaction," Wingti announced a system ofnational registration and associatedidentification cards. He alsoannounced the introduction of a con­stitutional amendment that wouldallow the burden of proof to be shiftedfrom the state to the accused in seriouscriminal cases (pc, 27 July 1993, I). Pre­dictably, this measure raised the ire ofcivil libertarians, with former AttorneyGeneral Bernard Narokobi describingpresumption of innocence as "the cor­nerstone of civilized democraticsocieties" (pc, 30 July 1993, I).

The most controversial law andorder measure introduced in 1993 wasthe Internal Security Act passed by Par­liament in May and gazetted in August.The Act allows the head of state to banorganizations that are, in his opinion,"promoting or encouraging, or . . .likely to or about to promote orencourage terrorism." Appeals againstdesignation as a terrorist organizationare to be heard, not by an independent

POLITICAL REVIEWS

body, but by cabinet and the head ofstate, who would have issued theorders in the first place. Alleged mem­bers or supporters of such organiza­tions can be identified by the policecommissioner and imprisoned (TPNG,

20 May 1993, 4, II, IS).Critics were dismayed by the way

the legislation was pushed through Par­liament without serious debate. Theywere also concerned about the enor­mous discretionary power it gives tothe executive branch of the govern­ment, and the associated erosion of theindividual freedoms protected by theconstitution. In October, the Ombuds­man Commission filed a challenge tothe Act in the Supreme Court (TPNG, 7Oct 1993, I).

The court had not passed judgmenton the Internal Security Act by the endof the year. By this time Wingti himselfwas having second thoughts about itsutility. In another stunning reversal,the prime minister announced in Octo­ber that he would consider amend­ments to the Act. The immediate impe­tus for this particular change of heartseems to have come from Minister forMining Masket Iangalio, who hadalready gained the support of someother members of the government (pc,6 Oct 1993, I). Like his previous rever­salon the provincial government issue,Wingti's decision was heavily influ­enced by the political fallout from hisslick maneuvers in Parliament at theend of September.

The mechanics ofWingti's Septem­ber ploy were simple. He gave a letterof resignation dated Thursday, 23 Sep­tember to Governor General Sir WiwaKorowi. On the morning of 24 Septem-

455

ber, Speaker Bill Skate announced theresignation in Parliament, read thegovernor general's response, and calledfor nominations for the office of primeminister. With the opposition caughtcompletely off guard, CommunicationsMinister Martin Thompson, the archi­tect of the scheme, nominated Wingti,who was duly reelected unopposed(TPNG, 30 Sept 1993, 4). Wingticlaimed that the possibility of a vote ofno confidence early in 1994 was anunacceptable source of instability thatplaced his reform program in jeopardy.As it turned out, his successful bid toremove the threat served to weaken,rather than strengthen, his position.

Speculation about likely contendersfor power in a vote of no confidencehad long centered on Deputy PrimeMinister and Leader of the PeoplesProgress Party Sir Julius Chan, whowas known to disagree with Wingtiover certain key policy issues, such ashow best to deal with the mining com­panies. Furthermore, his party's parlia­mentary strength, at twenty, was sec­ond only to that of Wingti's PeoplesDemocratic Party, and could have pro­vided the core of a new coalition. Itwas no coincidence that Wingti's resig­nation gambit occurred when Chanwas out of the country. Chan claimedno prior knowledge of it (TPNG, 30

Sept 1993, 3)·Wingti underestimated the level of

opposition that his move would pro­voke. Several thousand peoplemarched on Parliament to demand theresignation ofWingti, Skate, andKorowi. Chris Havieta, who hadbecome leader of the opposition afterJack Genia died suddenly of malaria in

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1994

References

THANKS TO Bill Standish for helpful com­ments on an earlier draft ofthis review.

Amnesty International. 1993. Papua NewGuinea "Under the Barrel ofa Gun":Bougainville 1991 to 1993. Sydney: AmnestyInternational. Index number ASA

34 /05/ 93.

Aopi, Gerea. 1993. Towards 2000: TheEconomic Impact on Papua New Guinea ofthe Changing Aid Relationship-The

July, instigated a court challenge charg­ing some technical irregularities.Although the National Court ruled inWingti's favor in December, the late­night scheming revealed by the casewas politically destructive (TPNG, 2

Dec 1993,10). Perhaps most damaging,however, were the rumblings of dissentthat emanated from within the govern­ment. At least six coalition supporterscomplained publicly of Wingti's dicta­torial style, and some of them joinedthe opposition (TPNG, 30 Sept 1993, I).Ben Micah, who was leading the attackon provincial government for Wingti,was a vocal critic of the resignationmove (TPNG, 7 Oct 1993, 3)·

Although Wingti managed to sur­vive his self-inflicted political crisis,there were serious consequences for hisprogram of reforms. With his publicand parliamentary support signifi­cantly eroded, he was forced to seek abroader consensus on the provincialgovernment and law and order issues.The momentum for radical change willbe hard to regain.

TERENCE WESLEY-SMITH

Papua New Guinea Economic Perspective.Address to PNGI Australia Aid Forum,Brisbane, 29 November.

Bilney, Gordon. 1993. Changing to MakeAid More Helpful. Address to PNGI Aus­tralia Aid Forum, Brisbane, 29 November.In PC, 3 Dec 1993, II.

Chan, Julius. 1993. Keynote Address.PNGI Australia Aid Forum, Brisbane, 29November.

Davis, Mark. 1993. Stunning Deal RenewsConfidence. Mining Quarterly Review.Supplement to PC, 20 May, 24-27.

Iangalio, Masket. 1993. Porgera Is the BestDeal PNG's Ever Negotiated. PC, 19

March, II.

Kaputin, John. 1993a. Statement to Parlia­ment on Overseas Assignments. 27 April. InKundu Newsletter I (2): 1-6.

---. 1993b. Foreign Minister QuestionsResumption of Australian Citizenship byFormer MP. Statement issued 28 June. InKundu Newsletter 1(2): 64-65.

---. 1993c. Papua New Guinea andAustralia: Drifting or Pulling Apart? Princi­ples, Practice and Problems in the BilateralRelationship. Address to the National PressClub, Canberra, 4 November.

Kundu Newsletter. Quarterly. Papua NewGuinea High Commission. Canberra.

Mai, David. 1993. Malaysian Trade Minis­ter Visits Papua New Guinea. KunduNewsletter 1(2): 56-59.

Nadarajah, Tahereh. 1993. Overexploitedor Overcommitted: PNG's Forests in Crisis.Port Moresby: National Research Institute.

Needham, Bob. 1993. Insight into MRDC

Operations. Address to Mining and Petro­leum Conference, Port Moresby, 17November. In Mining Review. Supplementto PC, 18 November, 51-54.

pc, Post-Courier. Daily. Port Moresby.

**

POLITICAL REVIEWS

SaHu, Yaw. 1993. A Current Example ofPolicy-Making on the Trot in Papua NewGuinea. Paper presented at Pacific IslandsPolitical Studies Association conference,Rarotonga, 5 December.

Togarewa, Neville. 1993a. Lihir a "Goer."PC, 24 May, II.

--. 1993b. Government Sets SaturdayDeadline for Talks on Lihir. PC, 29 July, 3.

--. 1993c. 50 pct Equity Decision IsFinal. pc, 13 August, 5I.

TPNG, Times ofPapua New Guinea.Weekly. Port Moresby.

SOLOMON ISLANDS

New Year's Eve 1992 brought havoc tothe southeastern parts of SolomonIslands as Cyclone Nina passedthrough. Parts of Malaita, SouthGuadalcanal, Makira, Temotu, andRennell and Bellona were devastated.For the people in these islands, a sea­son of celebration and reflectionbecame overnight a time of disasterand lost hopes. Homes and schools hadto be rebuilt, new gardens had to becleared, and short-term assistance wasnecessary. The much-needed assistancewas given promptly when the wholenation pitched in and, with some helpfrom other governments and organiza­tions, pledged SI$L5 million toward thegovernment's rehabilitation program(ss, March 1993). As in the aftermathof other natural disasters, SolomonIslanders looked to the future withoptimism as they rebuilt their homes,churches, and schools, and hoped forbetter fortune in the year to come.

Another kind of storm-a politicalone-was awaited with equal uncer-

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tainty. The national general electiontook place on 26 May 1993. Seats ineach of the 47 constituencies through­out the country were contested bysome 280 candidates. The state ofuncertainty lasted for some time afterthe results were announced over na­tional radio. Solomon Mamaloni'sparty of National Unity won the mostseats, but with only 21 of the total of 47it did not have a clear majority. Of theother parties, the People's AllianceParty led by Nathaniel Waena won 7seats; the new National Action Party ofSolomon Islands (Francis Saemala) andthe United Party (Ezekiel Alebua) won5 each; the Labour Party (loses Tuha­nuku) won 4; the National Front forProgress (Andrew Nori) and the newSolomon Islands Leaders Fellowship(Reverend Michael Maeliau) won 2

each; and 1 was won by an indepen­dent (Francis Billy Hilly). A coalitiongovernment had to be formed.

Uncertainty and political specula­tion were fueled by strong indicationsthat veteran politician and incumbentPrime Minister Solomon Mamaloniand his party might lose their parlia­mentary majority. The first sign ofimpending doom for Mamaloni camewith the election for Speaker of theHouse, which was held a few weeksafter the general election and beforethat for the new prime minister. In theelection for the Speaker, the two con­tending groups, the Government forNational Unity led by Mamaloni andthe National Coalition Partnershipgroup whose leader was yet to benamed, fielded their respective candi­dates. Waita Ben, who was thenSpeaker, was the nominee of the Gov­ernment for National Unity, and Paul