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The Construction of the EuropeanInstitute of Innovation and Technology:The Realisation of an Ambiguous PolicyIdeaJeroen Huismana & Dorrit de Jongb

a Department of Sociology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgiumb Berenschot, Utrecht, The NetherlandsPublished online: 20 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Jeroen Huisman & Dorrit de Jong (2014) The Construction of the EuropeanInstitute of Innovation and Technology: The Realisation of an Ambiguous Policy Idea, Journal ofEuropean Integration, 36:4, 357-374, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2013.845179

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ARTICLE

The Construction of the EuropeanInstitute of Innovation and

Technology: The Realisation of anAmbiguous Policy Idea

JEROEN HUISMAN* & DORRIT DE JONG**

*Department of Sociology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium;**Berenschot, Utrecht, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT This paper discusses the emergence of the European Institute ofInnovation and Technology (EIT), from the launch of the policy idea in 2005 to thefirst EIT board decisions on knowledge and innovation communities in 2009. Earlierattempts to set- up a European institute have either failed or have taken a very longtime and the initial idea of the EIT was risky and controversial. This raises thequestion of how and why the idea of the EIT took root so quickly. The analysis buildsupon Kingdon’s work and shows the important role of Barroso as policy entrepreneurand of contextual factors keeping the policy window open for a surprisingly longtime.

KEY WORDS: Europe, innovation, policy change, policy entrepreneur

Introduction

In March 2008, the European Institute of Innovation and Technology(EIT) was established and supported with a budget of more than 300 mil-lion for the first five years. Its mission is ‘to increase European sustainablegrowth and competitiveness; to reinforce the innovation capacity of the EUMember States; and create the entrepreneurs of tomorrow and prepare forthe next innovative breakthroughs’ (EIT 2013a). In December 2009, theGoverning Board of the EIT designated the first three Knowledge andInnovation Communities (KICs), partnerships ‘… which brings together thefields of education, technology, research, business and entrepreneurship, in

Correspondence Address: Jeroen Huisman, Department of Sociology, Ghent University,Korte Meer 3, Ghent 9000, Belgium. Email: jeroen.huisman@ugent.be

� 2014 Taylor & Francis

Journal of European Integration, 2014

Vol. 36, No. 4, 357–374, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2013.845179

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order to produce new innovations and new innovation models that inspireothers to emulate it’ (EIT 2013b). The EIT was suggested by the EuropeanCommission (EC) in 2005 as part of the (revised) Lisbon strategy, thataimed at turning Europe into the most dynamic and competitive knowl-edge-based economy in the world. In a relative short period of three years,an idea was launched and—although adjusted—turned into a policy withtangible outcomes.This appears to be a remarkable achievement, for the initial proposal—

suggesting a brick and mortar institute that would bring together excellentEuropean researchers—was rather unexpectedly introduced by EC presi-dent Barroso, just in office, in an area (at the crossroads of higher educa-tion and research and development) largely dominated by the principle ofnational sovereignty (Gornitzka 2009; Peterson 1996). Moreover, the ini-tial policy proposal had a number of characteristics that flagrantly rancounter to the interests of member states, certainly the larger states thatwere home to prestigious research universities and institutes themselves.This leads us to the key question of this paper: how can we explain the rel-atively swift acceptance and introduction of such a controversial policy?We locate that question in the specific context of the debate on policy

entrepreneurship in multi-level contexts. Originally this debate centredaround the question whether there was scope for supranational agencies insetting agendas and implementing policies (Moravcsik 1999; Pollack1997). Gradually, consensus emerged on considerable scope for politicalentrepreneurship, and the question changed into under which conditionsand in which contexts policy entrepreneurs are able to pursue and realizetheir interests (e.g. Borras and Radaelli 2011; Christopoulos 2006;Elgstrom 2000; Hodson 2013; Kaunert 2010; Kaunert and Leonard 2012;Newman 2008; Wettestad 2005; and very recently in this journal: Zaharia-dis 2007, 2008). As Mintrom and Norman (1997, 651) argued, policyentrepreneurship ‘… should be studied in a manner that [pays] attentionsimultaneously to contextual factors, individual actions, and to how con-text [shapes] such actions’. Building on Kingdon’s (1995) work on agenda-setting, policy streams and policy entrepreneurs, this paper argues that avery small set of particular conditions allowed the initial policy entrepre-neur, Barroso, to set the agenda and open a window of opportunity.Although the original policy proposal was untenable and the policy couldnot be ‘pushed through the window’, attention to the concept of the EITallowed others (in this case a skilful DG Education and Culture) to keepthe window open and to reformulate the policy into an acceptable solutionand subsequent swift implementation.

Theoretical Framework

Kingdon (1984, 1995) argues that policy output is the result of three ratherindependent streams coming together: problems, policies and politics. Theproblem stream consists of issues that politicians and/or citizens wantaddressed. Such problems can be signalled by publications or indicators(e.g. decreasing quality of public services). Focusing events, such as

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extensive media coverage and accidents can trigger further attention to theproblem. Feedback is important in the sense that insights on how theproblem has been perceived and tackled previously, may help to find ade-quate solutions to the problem. The policy stream is described as ideasstruggling to get attention and gain acceptance in policy networks. Thereare potentially many policy ideas floating around in the primordial policysoup, but only few receive considerable attention. Those ideas that aretechnically feasible and acceptable in terms of meeting the values of keypolicy-makers have the largest chances of survival. Important policychoices are made when the three streams come together at critical momentsin time (Kingdon 1995, 165). Policy entrepreneurs, defined as persons will-ing to ‘invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, and sometimesmoney—in the hope of a future return’ (Kingdon 1984, 129), seizingopportunities, manipulating preferences, acting as power brokers andapplying the appropriate strategies, play a critical role at such moments.What then are key elements of entrepreneurship? Kingdon (1995, 179–

181) argues that a claim to a hearing (being authorative, an expert or beingable to speak for others), connections and negotiations skills and—aboveall—being persistent is what counts. Mintrom and Norman (2009, 649)argue that four characteristics and skills of policy entrepreneurs—socialacuity, defining problems, building teams and leading by example—areimportant. Other authors particularly emphasize the ability of setting newnorms (e.g. Kaunert 2010).And what then are relevant contextual factors? Zahariadis argues that

contexts in which vague and constantly shifting problem definitions figure(2007, 67) and in which many stakeholders who come and go (Zahariadis2008, 518) seem to make coupling the streams and advancing a policysolution a very difficult challenge and risky enterprise. Moravcsik (1999)argues that domestic uncertainty and disagreement offers opportunities forsupranational agencies. Wettestad (2005) picked up Moravcsik’s argumentand concluded that lack of progress may offer scope for untried instru-ments. Also, it is argued that less-integrated networks are more competitivefor ideas, but can easily be accessed than strongly integrated networks, gen-erally being more consensus-oriented, but less open to ideas (Zahariadis2007, 72–73).Our contribution to theory is the following. First, we will highlight

which agency (entrepreneurship) and structural issues (context) were rele-vant in the EIT case and hence, contribute to our understanding of relevantand less relevant factors. In this particular case, it will be argued that anidea and a high-placed persistent advocate were sufficient conditions toreceive attention for a policy solution, even though the policy solution wasnot feasible and congruent with dominant norms and values. Second, wewill show that—contrary to general conceptions of windows of opportu-nity being only temporarily open—the shelf life of a policy idea can belonger and that advocates not necessarily have to rush to take advantage(Kingdon 1995, 175). In the case of the EIT, Barroso’s role as initial policyentrepreneur ended, but the EIT idea got stuck—extending Kingdon’s(1995) metaphor—to the wooden spoon used to stir the primordial soup

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and skilful staff within the relevant DGs was able to rework the conceptinto an acceptable and feasible policy.

Methodology

The key method used was process tracing (George and Bennett 2005, 6), inwhich ‘the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interviewtranscripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theoryhypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence andvalues of the intervening variables in that case’. We analysed Europeanlevel policy documents (EU and European Parliament documents since the2000 Lisbon strategy), academic literature on European higher educationand research developments since the 1980s, almost all specific studies onthe EIT, documents of key European stakeholders in higher education andresearch policy (e.g. the European Universities Association, the League ofEuropean Research Universities and the European Research AdvisoryBoard), and articles and opinion pieces in the media. It seemed appropriateto take the developments around the Lisbon agenda (2000) as point ofdeparture, for here we see—for the first time—the EC’s full attention tosupport for research, development and innovation. Additionally, interviewswere carried out with five key persons involved in the policy process (at thelevel of the directorates general of the European Commission). Here, wefollowed the method of elite interviewing of key informants (see Dexter2006). The main purpose was to corroborate what had been establishedfrom the other sources, to establish what the key informants thought andto reconstruct the set of events (Tansey 2007). It is important to stress thatthe researchers had completed a draft reconstruction of the events beforeinterviews took place. Although the number of interviewees was limited,data saturation (information becoming repetitive, no new ideas emerging)suggested that sufficient data were gathered. The respondents did not mindto be quoted, but preferred to stay anonymous.The data are presented in three sections, largely in chronological order.

First we set the stage by looking at the context preceding the launch of theEIT proposal. Second, we present the period in which Barroso came upwith his EIT idea. Third, we pay attention to the period in which the policyidea was reformulated and implemented.

The Policy Developments Preceding the EIT Idea

The 2000 Lisbon Strategy: An Alternative Governance Approach

The two decades before the 2000 Lisbon Strategy were characterized bydistributive policies (particularly Framework Programmes, FPs) and ‘softmethods’ (Borras 2003; Gornitzka 2007; Muldur 2006). It was not untilthe twenty-first century that a supranational research and developmentpolicy became more important. In January 2000, the Lisbon agenda waslaunched: the European Heads of State had agreed to create a ‘Europe ofKnowledge’ and set the goal that by 2010 the EU should be ‘the mostcompetitive and dynamic knowledge based economy in the world, capable

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of sustainable economic growth, with more and better jobs and greatersocial cohesion’ (European Commission 2000). The aim was to close the‘research gap’ between the EU and its international competitors (notablyJapan and the USA). The European Research Area (ERA) was to link upresearch institutes, universities and industry in the EU member states towork together to develop innovative new technologies. The stress oninnovation fits the general paradigm shift from an emphasis on research totechnology to innovation policies (Borras 2003). It was emphazised thatsome initiatives (such as FPs) did work well, but at the same time a stream-lined and better managed research strategy was needed (Muldur et al.2006). Borras and Radaelli (2011, 468) convincingly portray the Lisbonagenda and process as a governance architecture, a long-term strategy, withthree characteristics ‘… it addresses complex problems in a strategic, holis-tic long-term perspective; it sets substantive output-oriented goals; and it isimplemented through combinations of old and new organizational struc-tures within the international organization in question’.In FP6 (2002–2006), the Lisbon objectives became somewhat opera-

tional, particularly through the stress on networks of excellence, integratedprojects and integrated national programmes (following article 169 of theEC Treaty). The EC’s 2002 paper on the ERA (European Commission2002) emphazised the need for more ambition and genuine cooperation.The interviews confirmed that a strategy change was deemed necessary.One of the interviewees said that ‘… the Lisbon agenda was a kind ofshake-up, be it a positive one, based on confidence and the idea that keyplayers could enter areas they had not ventured before’.From the above, it becomes clear that in the period around the turn of

the century there was much emphasis on stressing the problem (Europe notbeing sufficiently competitive) and opportunities (Muldur et al. 2006;Natali 2009), but that at the same time there was not yet a full-blownexplicit idea about the most appropriate policies to effectively steer thecomplex set of actors involved. There was considerable support from andconsensus in the politics stream for an alternative governance architecture,although one of the interviewees referred to the ‘… lukewarm reception ofthe Lisbon agenda by the German government’. But the necessary linkbetween the three streams did not emerge yet (apart maybe from innova-tions implemented in FP6, see also Muldur et al. 2006). Firstly, as Peterson(1996) convincingly argued, despite European Union involvement, researchand development remain largely nationally organized. Even now (2013),with the boost of the Horizon 2020 programme budget of 80 billion, thetotal EU investment amounts to ‘only’ a small percentage of the totalresearch, development and innovation budgets of the member states. And,supranational involvement takes place mostly through soft methods likefinancial incentives and exceptionally through regulation. Secondly, muchof the EC communication was highly rhetoric and (too) ambitious. Thirdly,the policy stream was not made concrete—apart from the changes made tothe FPs. It was difficult to argue against the lofty objectives (moreinvestments needed in research and developments), but the lack ofexplicitness disclosed the opportunity to engage in a policy debate (either

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in the public media or in the field of higher education and research) onuseful, effective policies. In other words, whereas political and problemstreams met, the policy stream did not connect.

The Lisbon Strategy Mid-term Review: Lack of Progress and a GradualNorm Shift

On the first of November 2004, the High Level Group—asked to carry outan independent review—submits its report on the Lisbon strategy to the EC(European Commission 2004). The report (European Commission 2004, 6)critically concluded ‘a disappointing delivery, due to an overloaded agenda,poor coordination and conflicting priorities … [and] the lack of determinedpolitical action’, the latter particularly referring to weak governance at theEU level and the lack of national reform programmes. In order to realizeEurope’s knowledge society, the High Level Group recommends the EU toattract and retain world-class researchers, make R&D a top priority, reapthe full benefits of ICTs and protect intellectual property to promoteinnovation.The idea took root that Europe was seriously lagging behind, and as such

the problem stream became even more important. The general messagewas supported by data on key science, technology and innovationindicators (European Commission 2005a, 2008). Europe had a huge prob-lem and needed to reinforce its policies to become a knowledge society andthe Lisbon strategy needed more focus and concrete actions. In her analy-sis, Rodrigues (2009, 9) refers to the European Council concluding that‘the general approach remained valid and was, indeed, becoming moreurgent than before’. One of the interviewees stressed that ‘the mainmessage was to stick to the improvement of the competitive position ofEurope, but that those involved needed to be more selective in choosingadequate policies and instruments’. A few weeks after the High LevelGroup presented its findings, Jose Manuel Barroso became the new presi-dent of the European Commission. The subsequent EC communication(European Commission 2005b, 7) responding to the report of the HighLevel Group concluded that there is ‘… general consensus that Europe isfar from achieving the potential for change that the Lisbon strategy offers’.The new strategy combines key themes of economic prosperity, solidarityand security and—although stressing the need for community-level action—acknowledges the need for intergovernmental consensus (Cini 2005) toput the Lisbon agenda back on track. Next to making Europe a moreattractive place to invest and work and the creation of more and betterjobs, it calls to strengthen the knowledge infrastructure (European Com-mission 2005b). The problem stream regarding achieving the Europe ofKnowledge is clearly present and more focused. That said, the EC (2005b)text still uses rather vague language when it comes to concrete policies(Gornitzka 2007, 161). Thus, with respect to the political stream, the will-ingness of politicians to act in order to solve the general problem is visible.This could be interpreted as a gradual change of norms (Kaunert 2010),stakeholders starting to accept the necessity of a regime change.

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Sovereignty principles are being replaced by the acceptance ofsupranational priorities, ideationally supported by governance repertoiresand discourses revolving around ‘competitiveness’, ‘sustainability’ and‘knowledge-based society’ that aimed to make those involved aware of anew (normative) frame of reference (Borras and Radaelli 2011, 470–471).In conclusion, the political stream and the problem stream were moved

further in the context of a sense of emergency, waiting (metaphorically) forthe policy stream—not yet operationalized—to join.

Enter Policy Entrepreneur Barroso with an Ambiguous Policy Idea

Somewhere in the overall generic 2005 EC response—keeping as much aspossible open for debate and leaving much leeway for member state initia-tives—there was one bold proposal. The Commission wants to bringtogether ‘high technology small and medium sized enterprises, universitiesand the necessary business and financial support’ through an increasedfocus on innovation: ‘[i]n order to reinforce our commitment to knowledgeas a key to growth, the Commission proposes the creation of a “EuropeanInstitute of Technology” to act as a pole of attraction for the very bestminds, ideas and companies from around the World’ (European Commis-sion 2005b, 23, our italics). The launch of the idea was a surprize for tworeasons. First, Barroso only took office in November 2004, having beenelected president in July of that year and it is surprizing he came up with aconcrete and unexpected idea. One interviewee stressed that none of theEC Directorates were involved in the preparation: ‘… it was quite a sur-prize, it came out of the blue …’. Second, only a few months in the office,Barroso was willing to put forward a potentially risky and untested pro-posal (see also Jones 2008) that—in case of failure—could seriously dam-age his reputation. However, one of the interviewees contended that ‘…Barroso could have dropped the idea shortly after it had been launched,explaining it was a slip … his political European career was not dependenton the success of the EIT’.Den Bak (2008, 18) reveals the potential roots for the idea of the EIT,

reporting that the story went that one of Barroso’s sons intended to studyat the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Barroso wanted toconvince him to study in Europe, but his son rebutted that there would notbe such an institute in Europe. Den Bak (2008) also mentions that theIndian Institutes of Technology may have inspired Barroso. Interviews con-firm that the EIT was invented by Barroso: ‘it was his pet project’, but con-test the idea that Barroso wanted to copy the MIT model. That said, thediscourse in the media revolved around a brick and mortar institute. AGuardian headline in February 2006, ‘European institute “to rival MIT”’,is representative of the many comparisons made in the press with the USinstitute. The external EIT evaluation report (Ecorys 2011, 2) notes ‘Theinitial approach towards the EIT was to propose the construction of a sin-gle campus, resembling the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT),in the USA’. And in March 2005, a group of 130 Members of the Euro-pean Parliament proposed to locate the EIT in their building in Strasbourg,

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also assuming the EIT proposal aimed to physically locate an institutesomewhere in European Community.It is clear from the above that Barroso developed the EIT idea: it was his

pet idea and brainchild. As a policy entrepreneur he invested considerableenergy, evidenced by the many phone calls he made with governmentalleaders and by advocating the idea at the informal meeting of EuropeanHeads of State at Hampton Court, October 2005 (Den Bak 2008). At thismeeting the urgency of achieving world-class excellence was reconfirmed:the European Council calls for urgent action to achieve world-class excel-lence in both research and education (European Commission 2006a, 4).Also, Barroso’s (2005a, 2005b) speeches speak of urgency, dangerous timesand ensuring survival, echoing the Kok report’s ‘must act now’ message(Robertson 2008). Helga Nowotny (chair European Research AdvisoryBoard, later vice-chair European Research Council) said ‘[Barroso] put hisentire weight behind it … Governments just couldn’t just say no’ (quotedin Enserink 2007, 1676).In summary, Barroso was seizing opportunities, operationalizing a key

element of the Lisbon strategy (constructing a focal point, in Pollack’s[1997, 124] words) and acting swiftly. He acted as a power broker (fre-quently contacting the important stakeholders) and most of all was persis-tent. The advantage of being the president of the Commission—contrary tobeing e.g. a national prime minister, chancellor or president—was thatparty politics did not stand in the way.Inasmuch as there is considerable evidence of agency, structural and con-

textual issues stood in the way. Barroso was highly likely not aware of ear-lier struggles to get a supranational higher education and research institutein place. If so, he would have taken care that the phrasing of the policywould have been less ambiguous. Corbett (2005) analysed the decades-longstruggle of setting up a European University, culminating in the launch ofthe European University Institute in Florence which was a ‘… was a palereflection of the original European University proposal for a full university’(Corbett 2003, 319). Her analysis and other reflections on Europeanresearch, development and innovation policies lead us to assess two veryrisky elements of the EIT proposal. The first element is that the idea impliesthat member states would hand over control to the supranational level.This has proven to be difficult in the case of the earlier attempt to launch aEuropean institute, particularly when it comes to its educational mission.More generally, it would go rather firmly against the largely distribute nat-ure of existing EU policies in the area of research, development and innova-tion (Gornitzka 2009; Peterson 1996). The second problematic element,related to the former, was the idea of ‘uniting the best minds’ in a particu-lar place in Europe. This would ultimately imply a form of brain drain, atthe cost of local and national centres of excellence (the existing top univer-sities). The ambiguous proposal would definitely not receive endorsementof countries that had (or thought they had) such top universities. The Euro-pean Research Advisory Board (EURAB 2005, 2) critically commented:‘…. we are weary that it cannot be created top-down. An EIT must growbottom-up from existing research communities and through the incentives

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provided by environments that push for both research and innovation’. TheLeague of European Research Universities argued that the EIT ‘… is adiversion that fails to address any of the [European] priorities’ and it ‘… isperverse to contemplate a new institution of doubtful utility when Europealready has a spectrum of powerful research-intensive institutions’ (LERU2005, 3). Despite the apparent misinterpretations of the EIT idea, Barrosohimself did not contribute much to further clarify his position. In a 2006speech, the EIT concept is still presented in an ambiguous way: ‘So far, aEuropean Institute of Technology could be a form of organization perform-ing high level education, research and innovation activities, both in somestrategic thematic areas and in the field of science and innovation manage-ment’ (our italics). One of the interviewees mentioned that ‘Barroso com-mitted himself to the idea [of the EIT], but was open to how to realize it’.That said, the media played an important role in interpreting the EIT ideaas a brick and mortar solution and Barroso himself did not much to pub-licly clarify the situation.In terms of Kingdon’s framework, there was a lack of feedback from pre-

vious policy attempts to launch a European institute. More generally, theproposal does not follow the expected pattern of gradually ‘warming up’stakeholders before proposing a policy. On the contrary, the policyfollowed the inverse patterns: a policy was announced and then muchenergy was spent on lobbying. Most importantly, the proposal sufferedfrom ambiguity, which led to a particular dominant interpretation of theidea, subsequently evoking strong opposition. Barroso could be seen as apolicy entrepreneur, but largely on the basis of persistence and being some-what authoritative and well-networked as the EC president. None of theother characteristics suggested in the literature (Kingdon 1995; Mintromand Norman 2009) applied to the EIT case. At this stage—mid-2005—itlooked like the idea would suffer a premature death, for its lack of feasibil-ity and compatibility.

Keeping the Policy Window Open: Reformulation, Negotiation andCompromise

It took those representing Barroso time and energy to convince stakehold-ers that the EIT proposal was not to undermine national sovereignty orthreaten the position of existing universities. It was never the intention—confirmed by the interviews—to launch a physical institute (see also Jones2008, 298), and very soon after the 2005 EC Communication, internallywithin the EC’s directorates (as the interviews confirmed) it was clear a net-work solution should be aimed at.Commissioners Potocnik and Figel were also quick to stress (March

2005) that a network approach was preferred (Cordis 2005). Their viewsresonated what happened a few weeks earlier at the EC departments.Within a couple of weeks after the 2005 Communication, the three rele-vant EC departments (Innovation and Industry, Research, and Educationand Culture) were called to a meeting to discuss the EIT idea. According toone of the interviewees ‘… Innovation and Industry had not prepared a

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paper. Research had prepared a paper but was rather negative regardingthe idea. It thought the EIT would upset the current diversity of higher edu-cation and research institutions and it was pretty confident that the currentresearch policies and instruments were good (enough)’. The same intervie-wee revealed that Education and Culture was positive about the EIT, butemphasized that it should not be a brick and mortar institution. The net-work perspective should be point of departure and the initiative shouldbuild on excellent universities in Europe and be sufficiently inviting forpartners from industry to join. Barroso located the EIT project in DG Edu-cation and Culture and David Coyne (director Lifelong Learning: Educa-tion and Training Policies) was charged with the further development,because this DG was most receptive to the project. But, according to twointerviewees another reason was that EIT could threaten the position ofkey (academic) constituencies of DG Research, the most logical DG to dealwith the EIT: ‘… the project would be in much safer hands in the smallerDG of EAC, which would look at the EIT idea in a neutral way’.In order not to lose momentum, it was thought most effective to launch

a consultation (September—November 2005) on how to operationalize theEIT. It would allow critics of the proposal to share their concerns and itwould produce the necessary feedback—clearly lacking given the suddenintroduction of the EIT earlier that year—to arrive at a balanced opera-tional proposal. The consultation, based on a survey across stakeholders(European Commission 2006b), revealed that there was general endorse-ment for the EIT being built on the notion of the ‘knowledge triangle’,combining education, research and innovation. There was no clear pictureemerging regarding the structure, roughly one-third of the respondents infavour of small networks and a quarter in favour of a single institution.The next EC proposal (European Commission 2006a) was based on theview that the EU needs to better concentrate its human, financial and phys-ical resources in research and higher education. The EIT ‘should be set upto receive funding from both public and private sectors’ (European Com-mission 2006a: 8). The structure would be based on two levels: a governingboard with a small administration and a set of Knowledge Communities—carrying out research activities in strategic priority areas, with teams fromacademia and business and industry—distributed over Europe. Two of theinterviewees reflected that the education element was most controversial.One stated ‘the degrees and diplomas issue … boiled down to a tricky legalissue’. Once again, it appears that the policy stream does not merge withthe other streams and has to be altered again. The February 2006 proposalhas not been able to take away the fears of a potential (partial) brick andmortar solution. But, the document was successful in embedding the EIT inthe broader EU policies and relating it to the FPs, ERASMUS, the Euro-pean Research Council and the Community Innovation Programme. Show-ing synergies with these policies, it fitted much better with the Lisbonprocess governance architecture.Barroso asked the former rector of the University of Twente, the Nether-

lands, Frans van Vught (specialist in the field of higher education) and theSpanish sociologist Manuel Castells (specialist on information technology)

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for their advice. They both suggest a network model for the EIT (Blijham2006). The EC embarks upon a second round of consultation with stake-holders in April and May 2006. The input from the consultation is usedfor the follow-up communication (European Commission 2006c). Thethree major concerns stemming from the consultation are the following.There was (still) opposition to an EIT as a physical institute. Member stateswere against a large European institute, because it would lead to a lot ofbureaucracy and overhead. Universities were most afraid of brain drain.The largest representatives of European universities, the European Univer-sity Association (EUA), the League of European Research Universities(LERU) and Coimbra Group, criticized the structure of the proposed EIT.The EUA ‘[b]elieves that the proposed legal construction for the ‘knowl-edge communities’ … is the wrong mechanism’, because they ‘will notachieve the synergetic effects intended but rather contribute to theinstitutional and intellectual fragmentation of Europe’s universities’ (EUA2006, 1). Member states and universities also used legal arguments againstthe Commission’s proposal. As has been put forward earlier, education is apolitical sensitive subject in the European policy-making scene (Corbett2005). It was argued that it would be difficult to provide the legal basis forthe awarding of degrees under the flag of the European Union. Finally, theCommission had not been clear about where the funding of EIT had tocome from, nor did it say how large the budget had to be. The ministersresponsible for the budget were not in favour of additional funding for theEIT. Furthermore, stakeholders from European business, represented byBUSINESS-Europe and the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT)were not in support of the large private contributions that the Commissionhad in mind.The European Council invites the Commission to prepare a proposal for

a regulation on the establishment of the EIT, after more consultations withthe European Research Council, Member States and stakeholders (consul-tation taking place in September 2006). After the second phase of the con-sultations, the Commission publishes its next Communication (EuropeanCommission 2006d).Throughout 2006, the EIT idea matured. The October communication

(and subsequently proposed regulations, European Commission 2006e,2007) speaks the language of the Lisbon agenda: aiming to improve inno-vation capacity, involving and concentrating key partners in integratingresearch, innovation and education activities at the highest standards andbecoming a model for managing innovation (the latter an implicit referenceto the presumed lack of innovative capacity of the ‘traditional’ Europeanuniversities, see European Commission 2003). The proposed solution isquite different from the original 2005 idea. It proposed an ‘integrated EIT’,a mix of the centralized EIT (more or less the EIT of the communication inFebruary 2006) and the distributed EIT (completely autonomous networks[KICs], allowed to develop joint degrees). The ‘integrated’ EIT itself wouldnot award any degrees, thus meeting one of the three key concerns. Thenew proposal was again confronted with resistance among Member States.Germany, presiding the European Council during the first half of 2007,

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proposed two changes, addressing the financial concerns. First, there wouldbe an initial phase for the EIT (2008–2013) instead of a permanent regula-tion, and second, there would be a lower budget for the EIT in its initialphase. Together with Barroso, German chancellor Angela Merkel linkedthe future activities of the EIT to the key issues of climate change andrenewable energies (which emerged later as central themes of the KICs).This change of the policy stream strengthened the problem stream: moreproblems would be solved through the EIT and this led to more politicalwill. Eventually the regulations were amended and accepted by theEuropean Parliament in September 2007. One of the amendments was thechange of the name into ‘European Institute of Innovation andTechnology’. The Spring 2008 European Council adopted the regulation,an EIT Governing Board was installed in July 2008, themes for the KICswere decided upon (sustainable energy, climate change mitigation andadaptation, and future information and communication society), the callwas launched in April 2009 and the Governing Board decided on the firstthree KICs in December 2009.In this stage of the policy process, the focus was on saving the EIT. This

was done skillfully at the level of the DGs by delaying the decision (butkeeping the window open) and consulting stakeholders, adjusting the pro-posal to the views of the stakeholders and bringing the EIT proposal betterin line with the Lisbon governance (especially the stress on innovation andentrepreneurship).

Summary, Conclusions and Reflections

The analysis shows that the European Institute of Innovation and Technol-ogy was constructed in a very short period of time. Table 1 summarizes thekey stages in the process.Our analysis points out that in the 1980s and 1990s there was not yet

sufficient momentum for relatively far reaching and controversial policyideas like the EIT: soft policies of funding research (e.g. Framework pro-grammes) seemed appropriate. Around 2005 (the time of the High LevelGroup report), there was considerable awareness that part of the solutionneeded to be found at the supranational level. The problem stream and thepolitical stream were coupled because of the increasing sense of urgencyand the Lisbon strategy not yielding the expected results yet. However, theinitial solution (an ambiguous proposal for an EIT that was interpreted asa brick and mortar university to be located somewhere in Europe) metconsiderable resistance, for it clearly ran against national priorities andinterests. It was neither compatible nor feasible in the eyes of moststakeholders.By keeping the EIT on the policy agenda (consultation, negotiation),

gradually a clearer picture emerged that suggested that a solution aroundthe notion of the ‘knowledge triangle’ (knowledge dissemination in orderto innovate) was the way forward, making the EIT an acceptable part ofthe overall Lisbon strategy. The solution breathed the idea of knowledgeeconomy, innovation and entrepreneurship. The eventual realisation of the

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Table

1.

Key

stages

andactivitiesin

thepolicy

process

Period

Problem

Politics

Policies

(ideas)

Policy

entrepreneurship

Conducive(+)andinhibitive(−)

factors

1980sand1990s

Concerns

aboutEurope’s

research&

innovation

perform

ance

Slowly

growing

acceptance

thatan

additionalsupra-or

intergovernmental

governance

approach

iswarranted(signing

ofM

aastricht

Treaty)

‘Soft’mechanisms:FPs,

EUREKA,COST,

technologypartnerships,

etc

−research,developmentand

innovationunder

national

sovereignty

+growingacceptance

ofnorm

(butlukew

arm

:incentives,no

regulation)ofsupranational

involvem

ent

2000Lisbon

Strategy

Lack

of

integrationand

coordinationof

research&

innovation

policies

Support

byand

commitmentofkey

players;beliefin

revitalisation,

althoughplanswere

deemed

ambitious

Changes

inFPs

(networksofexcellence,

integrationprojects,art.

169)

+em

ergingsense

ofcrisis

−em

bryonic

governance

architecture,butnoconcrete

policies

Response

toM

id-

term

review

(2004)

Poor

coordination,

weak

governance,

ineffective

national

programmes,

lack

of

progress

in‘catchingup’

Key

players

(Council,headsof

state)acceptthe

analysis

More

focusin

existing

policy

instruments.EIT

presentedas‘stand-

alone’

solution,

insufficientlylinked

toproblemsandcontexts,

withriskyelem

ents,

harm

ingnational

sovereignty

Barroso

launches

hispet

ide.

aBarroso

vehem

ently

andpersistentlysupports

andcommunicatesthe

idea

oftheEIT.Barroso

gainssupport

andbuilds

coalitionsonthebasisof

hisauthority

(as

president)

+increasingsense

ofcrisis

+persistentandauthorative

entrepreneur

−governance

architecture

(knowledge-basedsociety,

competitiveness)

accepted

−proposalnotfeasible,not

congruentwithcommunity

values,actuallyagainst

national

andinstitutionalpriorities

(Continued)

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Table

1.

(Continued

)

Period

Problem

Politics

Policies

(ideas)

Policy

entrepreneurship

Conducive(+)andinhibitive(−)

factors

Developingthe

idea

(2005–

2007)

Further

empirical

evidence

of

lack

of

progress

(EC

2005,2007)

Directlyinvolved

stakeholders:lack

of

support

forsome

operationalelem

ents

EIT

presentedas

network,butstillmany

tracesofbrick

and

mortarsolutions

Developmentofidea

left

toDG

Education,

support

from

Barroso

inthebackground

+policy

idea

stuck

intheminds

ofthose

involved,scopefor

negotiations,betterfitwith

governance

architecture−not

fullycompatible

andfeasible

(yet)

Consultation

(2005–2007)

Key

stakeholders

involved

inconsensus-building

EIT

offered

asintegrated

network,autonomous

KIC

sandstrongEIT

board;fundingdecision

DGsbringEIT

inline

withrevised

Lisbon

agendaandnegotiation

andbargaining

+consensusonpolicy

idea,

scopefornegotiationsonfinal

details,further

dovetailingwith

governance

architecture

Legislationand

implementation

(2007–2008)

Acceptance:most

stakeholders’

concernstaken

on

board

KIC

s,EIT

board,no

degree-awardingpowers,

butEIT

label

for(joint)

degrees

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EIT was a watered-down compromise in which the most controversialelements were taken out and replaced by acceptable alternatives. Althoughwatered-down, one of the interviewees remarked that ‘one could also saythat it has been a real achievement to set up an institute with a veryindependent and powerful Governing Board’.Barroso can be seen as the founding father of the EIT policy idea and

key policy entrepreneur in the initial stages. His personal efforts and posi-tional authority are noteworthy and clearly resonate the idea of entrepre-neurs being persistent and trying to build coalitions and support (Mintromand Norman 2009).Overall, Kingdon’s model proved to be very helpful in explaining the

process and outcomes. Key factors are presented in the last column ofTable 1. Regarding our first contribution to knowledge, the analysisshows that Barroso was able to set and initially drive the agenda withlimited entrepreneurial means (persistence and authority, as in access—aspresident—to networks) in an opportunistic vein (Christopoulos 2006) ina context rather hostile to supranational initiatives. That contextprevented the meeting of the three streams, even though the policyentrepreneur was fast and persuasive (Kaunert 2010, 177). The policyidea lent itself, however, to be further explored and fitted in with the Lis-bon governance architecture. Stakeholders closed ranks and accepted—ordid not object to—the reworked idea, suggesting the gradual acceptanceof a new norm (Kaunert 2010) regarding supranational steering in thearea of higher education and research.Our second contribution pertains to the question why the policy window

was not permanently shut after Barroso failed to push through the initialproposal. Our answer is that, the lack of progress regarding the Lisbonagenda offered scope for untried and potentially risky instruments (Wettes-tad 2005) against a background of a loosely integrated network—a softgovernance architecture (Borras and Radaelli 2011)—that allowed for easyaccess of new ideas (Zahariadis 2007). That Lisbon governance architec-ture has offered the proliferation of a new norm that may have been ‘…difficult to stop once it has gained an organizational platform’ (Elgstrom2000, 472).For sure, our research focused on a single case. Further studies (an

analysis of the policy on the European Research Council or the emergenceof ERASMUS Mundus would be interesting) are to be carried out toconfirm or contradict the notion that there is considerable scope for policyentrepreneurs in multi-level governance contexts (even if their initial ideasare controversial and potentially incompatible with existing norms),provided the contextual factors are conducive for keeping the idea on theagenda.

Acknowledgements

We thank the interviewees for their willingness to free time and toparticipate in this research project.

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